Russia: Background and U.S. Policy

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Russia: Background and U.S. Policy

Summary

Over the last five years, Congress and the executive branch have closely monitored and

responded to new developments in Russian policy. These developments include the following:



increasingly authoritarian governance since Vladimir Putin’s return to the

presidential post in 2012;

Russia’s 2014 annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea region and support of separatists

in eastern Ukraine;

violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty;

Moscow’s intervention in Syria in support of Bashar al Asad’s government;

increased military activity in Europe; and

cyber-related influence operations that, according to the U.S. intelligence

community, have targeted the 2016 U.S. presidential election and countries in

Europe.

In response, the United States has imposed economic and diplomatic sanctions related to Russia’s

actions in Ukraine and Syria, malicious cyber activity, and human rights violations. The United

States also has led NATO in developing a new military posture in Central and Eastern Europe

designed to reassure allies and deter aggression.

U.S. policymakers over the years have identified areas in which U.S. and Russian interests are or

could be compatible. The United States and Russia have cooperated successfully on issues such

as nuclear arms control and nonproliferation, support for military operations in Afghanistan, the

Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs, the International Space Station, and the removal of

chemical weapons from Syria. In addition, the United States and Russia have identified other

areas of cooperation, such as countering terrorism, illicit narcotics, and piracy.

Like previous U.S. Administrations, President Donald J. Trump has sought to improve U.S.Russian relations at the start of his tenure. In its first six months, the Trump Administration

expressed an intention to pursue cooperation or dialogue with Russia on a range of pursuits (e.g.,

Syria, North Korea, cybersecurity). At initial meetings with President Putin in April and July

2017, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and President Trump said they agreed to find ways to

improve channels of communication and begin addressing issues dividing the two countries.

At the same time, the Administration has indicated that it intends to adhere to core international

commitments and principles, as well as to retain sanctions on Russia. Secretary Tillerson has

stated that Ukraine-related sanctions will remain in place “until Moscow reverses the actions that

triggered” them. Secretary Tillerson and other officials also have noted the severity of Russian

interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election and the need for an appropriate response.

Since the start of the 115th Congress, many Members of Congress have actively engaged with the

Administration on questions concerning U.S.-Russian relations. As of August 2017, Congress has

held more than 20 hearings on matters directly relating to Russia, codified and strengthened

sanctions through the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (P.L. 11544, Title II), and considered other measures to assess and respond to Russian interference in the

2016 elections, influence operations in Europe, INF Treaty violations, and illicit financial

activities abroad.

This report provides background information on Russian politics, economics, and military issues.

It discusses a number of key issues for Congress concerning Russia’s foreign relations and the

U.S.-Russian relationship.

Congressional Research Service

Russia: Background and U.S. Policy

Contents

Political Structure and Developments ............................................................................................. 1

Democracy and Human Rights ................................................................................................. 2

Government Reshuffles ............................................................................................................. 6

September 2016 State Duma Elections ..................................................................................... 9

The Opposition ......................................................................................................................... 11

The Economy ................................................................................................................................ 13

Economic Impact of Sanctions................................................................................................ 15

U.S.-Russian Trade and Investment ........................................................................................ 16

Energy Sector .......................................................................................................................... 18

Foreign Relations .......................................................................................................................... 21

Russia and Other Post-Soviet States ....................................................................................... 21

Ukraine Conflict ...................................................................................................................... 24

NATO-Russia Relations .......................................................................................................... 26

EU-Russia Relations ............................................................................................................... 29

Russia-China Relations ........................................................................................................... 30

Russia’s Intervention in Syria ................................................................................................. 31

Russia’s Global Engagement................................................................................................... 34

The Military................................................................................................................................... 35

Russia’s Military Footprint in Europe ..................................................................................... 36

U.S. Policy Toward Russia ............................................................................................................ 40

U.S. Policy Under the Obama Administration ........................................................................ 40

U.S. Policy Under the Trump Administration ......................................................................... 42

Congressional Action in the 115th Congress............................................................................ 46

Selected Issues in U.S.-Russian Relations .................................................................................... 47

U.S. Sanctions on Russia ........................................................................................................ 47

Ukraine-Related Sanctions................................................................................................ 47

Sanctions for Malicious Cyber Activity ............................................................................ 48

Sanctions for Human Rights Violations and Corruption................................................... 49

Other Sanctions ................................................................................................................. 49

Malicious Cyber Activity ........................................................................................................ 50

Interference in U.S. Elections ........................................................................................... 50

Other Activities ................................................................................................................. 52

Nuclear Arms Control and Nonproliferation ........................................................................... 53

Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 55

Figures

Figure 1. Map of Russia .................................................................................................................. 2

Figure 2. U.S. Merchandise Trade with Russia ............................................................................. 17

Figure 3. Separatist Regions in Eastern Ukraine ........................................................................... 25

Figure 4. Russia’s Military Footprint in Europe ............................................................................ 39

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Russia: Background and U.S. Policy

Tables

Table 1. Election Results to the State Duma, September 18, 2016.................................................. 9

Table 2. European Imports of Russian Natural Gas (2015) ........................................................... 20

Contacts

Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 56

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Russia: Background and U.S. Policy

Political Structure and Developments

Russia, formally known as the Russian Federation, is the principal successor to the United States’

former superpower rival, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR, or Soviet Union). In its

modern form, Russia came into being in December 1991, after its leaders joined those of

neighboring Ukraine and Belarus to dissolve the USSR. From 1922 to 1991, Soviet Russia was

the core of the USSR, established in the wake

of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and the

Russia: Basic Facts

civil war that followed. The USSR spanned

Land Area: 6.3 million square miles, about 1.8 times the

much the same territory as the Russian Empire size of the United States.

before it. Prior to the empire’s establishment

Population: 142.4 million (mid-2016 est.).

in 1721, Russian states had existed in various

Administrative Divisions: 83 administrative

subdivisions, including 21 ethnic-based republics and the

forms for centuries.

Today, Russia’s multiethnic federal structure

is inherited from the Soviet period and

includes regions, republics, territories, and

other subunits. The country’s constitution

provides for a strong presidency and central

authority. The government is accountable to

the president, not the legislature, and

observers consider the presidential

Administration rather than the Cabinet

(headed by a prime minister) to be “the true

locus of power.”1

cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg. Russian law

considers Ukraine’s occupied region of Crimea and the

Crimean city of Sevastopol to be additional

administrative subdivisions.

Ethnicity: Russian 77.7%; Tatar 3.7%; Ukrainian 1.4%;

Bashkir 1.1%; Chuvash 1.0%; Chechen 1.0%; Other

10.2%; Unspecified 3.9% (2010 census).

Gross Domestic Product: $1.268 trillion (2016 est.);

$26,100 per capita (purchasing power parity) (2016 est.).

Political Leaders: President: Vladimir Putin; Prime

Minister: Dmitry Medvedev; Speaker of the State Duma:

Vyacheslav Volodin; Speaker of the Federation Council:

Valentina Matviyenko; Foreign Minister: Sergei Lavrov;

Defense Minister: Sergei Shoigu.

Source: CIA World Factbook.

Russia’s president is Vladimir Putin, who has

led the country as president (2000-2008,

2012-present) or prime minister (2008-2012)

for more than 17 years (see “Vladimir Putin” text box, below). In recent years, opinion polls have

reported increased levels of support for President Putin. Since the annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea

region in March 2014, he has consistently received approval from more than 80% of respondents

in opinion polls.2 This reported approval level is considerably higher than what Putin received in

polls over the previous two years, when his approval rating was in the low 60s.

Russia’s bicameral legislature is the Federal Assembly. The upper chamber, the Federation

Council, has 170 deputies, two each from Russia’s 83 regions and republics (including two major

cities, Moscow and St. Petersburg) and four from Ukraine’s occupied region of Crimea. These

deputies are not directly elected but are chosen by regional executives and legislatures. The lower

house, the State Duma, has 450 deputies, half of which are elected by proportional representation

and half of which are in single-member districts. The State Duma also includes members from

occupied Crimea: four from majoritarian districts and another four from party lists.3

The judiciary is the least developed of Russia’s three branches. Courts are widely perceived to be

subject to manipulation and control by government officials. The Supreme Court is the highest

Karen Dawisha, Putin’s Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia? (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 2014), p. 2.

Ratings over time are available from the Levada Center at http://www.levada.ru/en/.

See U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Individuals for Activities Related to Russia’s Occupation

of Crimea,” November 14, 2016, at https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0609.aspx.

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Russia: Background and U.S. Policy

appellate body. The Constitutional Court rules on the legality and constitutionality of

governmental acts and on disputes between branches of government or federative entities. A 2015

law gives the Constitutional Court the legal authority to disregard verdicts by interstate bodies

that defend human rights and freedoms, if the court concludes that such verdicts contradict

Russia’s constitution (although the latter requires compliance of rules established by international

treaties over domestic law).4 A Supreme Commercial Court, which handled commercial disputes

and was viewed by experts as relatively impartial, was dissolved in September 2014, with its

areas of jurisdiction transferred to the Supreme Court; lower-level commercial courts continue to

function.

Figure 1. Map of Russia

Sources: Graphic produced by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). Map information generated by

(name redacted) using data from the Department of State (2015) and Esri, ageographic data company (2014).

Democracy and Human Rights

Under Putin’s rule, Russia has experienced a steady decline in its democratic credentials. At the

start of the 2000s, the U.S. government-funded nongovernmental organization (NGO) Freedom

House classified Russia as a “hybrid” regime, with democratic and authoritarian elements. By the

Many observers believe that the intent of this law was to enable Russia to ignore rulings by the European Court of

Human Rights (ECHR), which Russia joined in 1996. Carl Schreck, “Russian Law On Rejecting Human Rights Courts

Violates Constitution, Experts Say,” RFE/RL, December 16, 2015, at https://www.rferl.org/a/russian-law-on-rejectinghuman-rights-courts-violates-constitution-experts-say/27432125.html; Library of Congress Law Library, “Russian

Federation: Constitutional Court Allows Country to Ignore ECHR Rulings,” May 18, 2016, at http://www.loc.gov/law/

foreign-news/article/russian-federation-constitutional-court-allows-country-to-ignore-echr-rulings/.

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end of Putin’s second term in 2008, Freedom House considered Russia to be a consolidated

authoritarian regime. This status continued during the tenure of Putin’s handpicked successor for

one term, Dmitry Medvedev, despite some signs of liberalization. Since Putin’s return to the

presidency in 2012, Freedom House has noted a new rise in authoritarian governance in Russia.

In its 2016 annual report, Freedom House assigned Russia the same “freedom rating” it gave to

China, Yemen, Cuba, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.5

Vladimir Putin

After more than 15 years in the Soviet Union’s Committee for State Security (the KGB), Vladimir Putin held a variety

of governmental positions from 1990 to 1998, first in the local government of St. Petersburg (his native city) and then

in Moscow. In 1998, Russian President Boris Yeltsin appointed Putin head of the Federal Security Service (FSB), a

successor agency to the KGB, and prime minister a year later, in August 1999.

Yeltsin unexpectedly resigned on New Year’s Eve, 1999, and Putin became acting president. He was elected president

in March 2000, with 53% of the vote. Putin served eight years as president before stepping down in 2008, in

compliance with constitutional limits on successive terms. His successor was Dmitry Medvedev, a trusted former

presidential chief of staff, deputy prime minister, and board chairperson of the state-controlled energy company

Gazprom. As prime minister from 2008 to 2012, Putin continued to govern Russia in tandem with Medvedev, who

remained informally subordinate to Putin.

In September 2011, Medvedev announced that he would not run for reelection, paving the way for Putin to return to

the presidency. In exchange, Medvedev was to become prime minister. Putin’s return to the presidency had always

been plausible, but the announcement was met with some public discontent, particularly in Moscow. A series of

protests followed the December 2011 parliamentary elections, which domestic and international observers

considered to be marred by fraud and other violations. In March 2012, Putin won the presidency. His current term

extends to 2018 (as president, Medvedev extended the next presidential term to six years). Putin has not confirmed if

he is planning to run for reelection, although many observers believe he plans to do so.

Russia’s authoritarian consolidation has involved a wide array of nondemocratic practices and

human rights violations. The U.S. Department of State’s most recent human rights report notes

that the Russian government has “increasingly instituted a range of measures ... to harass,

discredit, prosecute, imprison, detain, fine, and suppress individuals and organizations critical of

the government.” The report also notes the “lack of due process in politically motivated cases.”6

According to the human rights report, Russian NGOs have been “stymied” and “stigmatize[d],”

including through a 2012 law that requires foreign-funded organizations that engage in activity

seeking to affect policymaking (loosely defined) to register and identify as “foreign agents.” In

addition, a 2015 law enables the government to identify as “undesirable” foreign organizations

engaged in activities that allegedly threaten Russia’s constitutional order, defense capability, or

state security, and to close their local offices and bar Russians from working with them.7

Freedom House scores post-Communist states on an index of “democratic progress,” which includes seven different

categories of governance and ranges between 1 (most democratic) and 7 (least democratic). States that receive a

“Democracy Score” between 4 and 5 are considered “transitional governments or hybrid regimes”; between 5 and 6,

“semi-consolidated authoritarian regimes”; and between 6 and 7, “consolidated authoritarian regimes.” Russia’s

Democracy Score has gone from a 4.88 in 2001 to a 6.57 in 2017. In addition, Freedom House ranks all countries in the

world on a “freedom” scale, which includes measures of political rights and civil liberties; Russia’s 2017 “freedom

rating” is 6.5 out of 7 (not free). Annual scores reflect the state of affairs at the start of the year. See the annual reports

for Russia in Freedom House, Nations in Transit, at https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/nations-transit2017, and Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2017, at https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedomworld-2017.

U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016: Russia, at http://www.state.gov/j/

drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2016&dlid=265466.

For background, see International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, “Civic Freedom Monitor: Russia,” at

http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/russia.html.

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Russia: Background and U.S. Policy

As of the start of August 2017, 88 NGOs are classified as foreign agents (of these, 7 have been

added since the start of the year).8 In 2014, Russia’s main domestic election-monitoring

organization, Golos, was the first organization to be so classified. Just before the September 2016

Duma election, a well-known polling organization, the Levada Center, also was branded a foreign

agent; in October 2016, a prominent human rights group, Memorial, was so labeled, as well.

Eleven organizations or their subsidiaries have been barred from Russia for “undesirable”

activity. In 2015-2016, barred organizations included the National Endowment for Democracy,

Open Society Foundations (including the Open Society Institute Assistance Foundations), U.S.Russia Foundation for Economic Advancement and the Rule of Law, National Democratic

Institute, International Republican Institute, and Media Development Investment Fund. In April

2017, three allegedly foreign-registered affiliates of the NGO and civic movement Open Russia

were added to the list; Open Russia was founded by former oil magnate Mikhail Khodorkovsky,

who served 10 years in prison on charges deemed by the opposition and most observers to be

politically motivated. In June 2017, the German Marshall Fund’s Black Sea Trust for Regional

Cooperation also was barred.9

Russian law also limits freedom of assembly and expression. Public demonstrations require

official approval, and police have broken up protests by force. The fine for participation in

unsanctioned protests can be thousands of dollars; repeat offenders risk imprisonment. In 2016,

new “antiterrorism” legislation (known as the Yarovaya Laws) hardened punishments for

“extremism” (a crime that has been broadly interpreted to encompass antistate criticism on social

media), required telecommunications providers to store data for six months, and imposed

restrictions on locations of religious worship and proselytization.

A 2013 law restricts lesbian/gay/bisexual/transgender (LGBT) rights by prohibiting “propaganda”

among minors (including in the media or on the Internet) that would encourage individuals to

consider “non-traditional sexual relationships” as attractive or socially equivalent to “traditional”

sexual relationships. In June 2017, the European Court on Human Rights ruled that the law is

discriminatory and violates freedom of expression.10

These laws and related discriminatory actions have impacted religious and sexual minorities. In

April 2017, for example, Russia’s Supreme Court upheld a March order of the Justice Ministry

banning the operations of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Russia for what it ruled to be “extremist”

activity. Since then, Jehovah’s Witnesses have reported increased harassment and violence. The

Supreme Court rejected an appeal by the organization in July 2017.11

Also in April 2017, Russian media reported that local authorities in Chechnya, a majority-Muslim

republic in Russia’s North Caucasus, had rounded up more than 100 men on the basis of their

The list of organizations currently classified as “foreign agents” is available on the website of the Russian Ministry of

Justice (at http://unro.minjust.ru/NKOForeignAgent.aspx). Some organizations classified as foreign agents have been

declassified after the government determined that these organizations no longer receive foreign funding, and others

have shut down. In February 2017, Human Rights Watch noted that 158 organizations had been classified at some point

as foreign agents. Human Rights Watch, “Russia: Government vs. Rights Groups,” February 6, 2017, at

https://www.hrw.org/russia-government-against-rights-groups-battle-chronicle.

The list of organizations classified as “undesirable” is available on the website of the Russian Ministry of Justice at

http://minjust.ru/ru/activity/nko/unwanted.

Sewell Chan, “Russia’s ‘Gay Propaganda’ Laws Are Illegal, European Court Rules,” New York Times, June 20,

2017, at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/20/world/europe/russia-gay-propaganda.html.

Jason Le Miere, “Jehovah’s Witnesses Ban Appeal Rejected by Russia’s Supreme Court, Allowing Government to

Seize Worship Halls,” Newsweek, July 17, 2017, at http://www.newsweek.com/jehovahs-witnesses-russia-ban-appeal637816.

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Russia: Background and U.S. Policy

suspected homosexuality.12 Reports indicate that detained individuals were beaten and tortured

and that at least three died as a result of the roundup (including two reportedly killed by relatives

after their release from detention).13 Putin’s presidential spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that the

government had no information concerning the allegations, and the local administration’s press

secretary denied the reports.14 In May 2017, Putin said that he would speak to Russia’s

prosecutor-general and minister of internal affairs “concerning the rumors” about the detentions,

but it is unclear what, if any, subsequent measures the government took.15

Over the years, a number of opposition-minded or critical Russian journalists, human rights

activists, politicians, whistleblowers, and others, including opposition politician Boris Nemtsov in

2015, have been reported murdered or have died under mysterious circumstances.16 Although

those who commit crimes are often prosecuted, suspicions frequently exist that such crimes are

ordered by individuals who remain free.17

Corruption

Observers contend that Russia suffers from high levels of corruption. The U.S. State Department’s 2016 Human

Rights Report notes that corruption in Russia is “widespread throughout the executive branch ... as well as in the

legislative and judicial branches at all levels of government. Its manifestations [include] bribery of officials, misuse of

budgetary resources, theft of government property, kickbacks in the procurement process, extortion, and improper

use of [one’s] official position to secure personal profits.” Transparency International (TI), a nongovernmental

organization (NGO), ranks Russia 131 out of 176 countries on its 2016 Corruption Perception Index, similar to

Kazakhstan, Iran, Nepal, and Ukraine (though Russia’s TI ranking has improved over time; in 2010, the country ranked

154 out of 178).

Many Russians share these perceptions of corruption. In a February 2016 poll by the Russia-based Levada Center,

76% of respondents said that Russian state organs were either significantly or wholly affected by corruption. Of

respondents who engaged in activities such as vehicle registration and licensing, hospital stays, university admissions,

and funerals, 15%-30% reported having paid a bribe (as did nearly half of those who reported being detained by traffic

police). Estimates of bribe amounts vary. In December 2015, Russia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs reported that the

average amount of a bribe in criminal cases was around $2,500. In September 2016, a domestic NGO, Clean Hands,

Human Rights Watch, They Have Long Arms and They Can Find Me: Anti-Gay Purge by Local Authorities in

Russia’s Chechen Republic, May 2017, at https://www.hrw.org/node/304090/; Masha Gessen, “The Gay Men Who

Fled Chechnya’s Purge,” New Yorker, July 3, 2017. The original reports (in Russian) are Elena Milashina, “Honor

Killing,” Novaya Gazeta, April 1, 2017, at https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2017/04/01/71983-ubiystvo-chesti,

and Elena Milashina and Irina Gordienko, “Violence Against Chechen Gays,” Novaya Gazeta, April 4, 2017, at

https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2017/04/04/72027-raspravy-nad-chechenskimi-geyami-publikuem-svidetelstva.

Human Rights Watch, They Have Long Arms and They Can Find Me, p. 15.

The press secretary also reportedly told a Russian journalist that there were no homosexuals in Chechnya and, even if

there were, these individuals probably would be killed by their own relatives. Tanya Lokshina, “Anti-LGBT Violence

in Chechnya,” April 4, 2017.

TASS Russian News Agency, “Putin Vows to Discuss Gay Rights Issue in North Caucasus with Prosecutor

General,” May 5, 2017, at http://tass.com/politics/944803.

For example, the Committee to Protect Journalists cites cases of 38 murdered journalists from 1993 to 2017

(including 24 since Putin was elected president), at https://cpj.org/killed/europe/russia/murder.php. In January 2017,

Representative Marcy Kaptur included for the Congressional Record (January 12, 2017, H399-H400) a list of 33

journalists killed in Russia since Putin came to power.

Some critics and opponents of the Russian government also are said to have become victims of other measures, such

as poisoning. In February 2017, opposition figure Vladimir Kara-Murza, who lives part-time in the United States, fell

seriously ill for the second time in two years while visiting Moscow and had to be placed in an induced coma. KaraMurza is a frequent visitor to Congress and campaigned in favor of U.S. sanctions on Russian officials. Several

Members of Congress issued statements of support for Kara-Murza after learning of his illness. Carl Schreck,

“‘Poisoned’ Kremlin Critic Vladimir Kara-Murza: What You Need to Know,” RFE/RL, February 8, 2017, at

http://www.rferl.org/a/explainer-russia-kara-murza-kremlin-critic-poisoned/28298062.html.

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Russia: Background and U.S. Policy

calculated the average reported bribe to be around five times that amount.

Government officials are occasionally arrested for bribery or compelled to resign from their posts. In 2016, cases

included a regional governor who was once an opposition figure, the mayor of Russia’s Pacific port city Vladivostok,

an Interior Ministry anticorruption official, and the head of the Federal Customs Service. Although observers often

presume there may be grounds for arrest or dismissal, these cases tend not to be interpreted as elements of a

serious anticorruption campaign but rather as manifestations of political and economic infighting or as a way to

remove ineffective or troublesome politicians.

Few of Russia’s most senior officials are arrested or dismissed for corruption. On the contrary, many observers,

including within the U.S. government, believe that Putin and several of his closest colleagues have amassed

considerable wealth while in power. In a January 2016 interview, then-Acting Under Secretary of the Treasury for

Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Adam Szubin said that “We’ve seen [President Putin] enriching his friends, his

close allies and marginalizing those who he doesn’t view as friends using state assets.” Szubin also noted that Putin

“supposedly draws a state salary of something like $110,000 a year. That is not an accurate statement of the man’s

wealth, and he has longtime training and practices in terms of how to mask his actual wealth.” Russian government

officials reject all such claims.

Sources: U.S. Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2016: Russia; Transparency

International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2016”; Levada Center, “Impressions about the Scale of Corruption and

Personal Experience,” April 6, 2016 (in Russian); Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Today—the

International Anti-Corruption Day,” December 9, 2015; Association of Russian Lawyers for Human Rights, Corruption

in Russia: An Independent Annual Report of the All-Russian Anticorruption Social Organization Clean Hands, September 21,

2016; BBC News, “Russia BBC Panorama: Kremlin Demands ‘Putin Corruption’ Proof,” January 26, 2016.

Government Reshuffles

Many observers agree that Vladimir Putin is the most powerful person in Russia. However, Putin

does not rule alone. For most of his tenure, he has presided over a complex network of officials

and business leaders, many of whom are individuals Putin knew from his time in the Soviet KGB

or when he worked in the St. Petersburg local government in the early 1990s.18 An influential

leadership circle below Putin includes government officials, heads of strategic state-owned

enterprises, and businesspersons. Since 2012, the Russian-based Minchenko Consulting group

has produced a series of well-regarded studies that assess who, besides Putin, are the most

influential figures in the Russian policymaking process.19 This list specifies 8 to 10 individuals

who wield the greatest influence (see “Key Russian Officials Under Putin” text box), including

some who do not hold official positions, as well as around 50 other key individuals in the

security, political, economic, and administrative spheres.

For a thorough review, see Dawisha, Putin’s Kleptocracy.

The most recent report is Minchenko Consulting, Politburo 2.0: Dismantling or Reset?, November 7, 2016 (in

Russian), at http://www.minchenko.ru/analitika/analitika_61.html. Another prominent list of influential Russian elites

counts Putin’s chief of staff, Anton Vaino, and his deputy, Sergei Kiriyenko, among the top 10 leading officials.

Dmitry Orlov, “Russia’s 100 Top Politicians in January 2017,” Nezavisimaia Gazeta, February 3, 2017 (in Russian), at

http://www.ng.ru/ideas/2017-02-01/5_6917_politics.html. Also see Nikolay Petrov, “Down the Funnel: Russia’s

Trajectory After 2014,” Russian Politics & Law vol. 53, no. 4 (2015), pp. 18-22, and Brian Taylor, “Clans and

Networks,” The Code of Putinism (forthcoming publication).

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Russia: Background and U.S. Policy

Observers have noted some recent changes to

this system of governance.20 The first change

is a reduction in influence of several of Putin’s

longtime senior associates, including Putin’s

former chief of staff (and former minister of

defense), Sergei Ivanov, who was once pegged

as a possible successor to Putin. Since 2014,

four senior officials close to Putin have

retired, and Ivanov and at least one other

appear to have been demoted (see

“Resignations or Demotions of Longtime

Putin Colleagues” text box).

Key Russian Officials Under Putin

Alexander Bortnikov: Director of the Federal

Security Service (FSB)

Sergei Chemezov: Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of

Rostec (hi-tech and defense state corporation)

Sergei Lavrov: Foreign Minister

Dmitry Medvedev: Prime Minister

Nikolay Patrushev: Secretary of the Security Council

Igor Sechin: CEO of Rosneft (state oil company)

Sergei Shoigu: Minister of Defense

Sergei Sobyanin: Mayor of Moscow

Vyacheslav Volodin: Chair of Parliament

Viktor Zolotov: Director of the National Guard

Notes: Chemezov, Medvedev, Patrushev, Sechin, Shoigu,

and Sobyanin are listed by Minchenko Consulting (see

footnote 19) as among Russia’s eight most influential

policymakers under Putin, together with businessmen

Yuri Kovalchuk and Arkady Rotenberg.

A related change is a steady rise in the number

of senior officials who are at least a decade

younger than Putin (aged 64) and have risen as

Putin’s subordinates more than as his

colleagues. Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev

(aged 51) straddles this divide; he has worked

with Putin since St. Petersburg and was

Putin’s handpicked successor to the presidency (2008-2012) after Putin’s first two terms. Others

have served Putin or Medvedev for several years and have gained relatively powerful positions.

Several other younger officials have emerged

recently. They are generally seen as having no

real power bases of their own and as entirely

loyal to Putin. Some are bureaucrats who have

replaced Putin’s retiring colleagues. Observers

also have noted the rapid rise of at least three

younger officials who started their careers as

members of the presidential security service

(i.e., Putin’s bodyguards) and have gone on to

serve as regional governors; one is currently a

deputy head of the Federal Security Service

(FSB).21

In assessing the impact of these changes, a

few considerations may be useful to keep in

mind. First, there does not appear to be a

single explanation for the declining influence

of Putin’s longtime colleagues. The most

common factors that observers suggest are

Resignations or Demotions of Longtime

Putin Colleagues

Vladimir Kozhin: Head of the Presidential

Administrative Directorate (demoted May 2014)

Vladimir Yakunin: Head of the Russian Railways

(resigned August 2015)

Viktor Ivanov: Head of the Federal Drug Control

Service (retired May 2016; service dissolved)

General Yevgeny Murov: Head of the Federal Guard

Service (a more powerful version of the U.S. Federal

Protective Service and Secret Service) (retired May

2016)

Andrei Belyaninov: Head of the Federal Customs

Service (resigned July 2016)

Sergei Ivanov: Presidential Chief of Staff (and former

minister of defense) (demoted August 2016)

Note: Kozhin, Yakunin, V. Ivanov, Murov, and S. Ivanov

are subject to U.S. Ukraine-related sanctions.

For example, Anders Åslund, “Putin’s Great Purge,” American Interest, August 24, 2016, at http://www.theamerican-interest.com/2016/08/24/putins-great-purge.

The three are deputy FSB head Yevgeny Zinichev, Governor of Tula region Aleksey Dyumin, and acting Governor

of Yaroslavl region Dmitry Mironov. See, for example, Oleg Kashin, “How Do You Get to Be a Governor in Vladimir

Putin’s Russia?,” New York Times, September 8, 2016, at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/09/opinion/how-do-youget-to-be-a-governor-in-vladimir-putins-russia.html.

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Russia: Background and U.S. Policy

declining efficiency or increasing mismanagement.22 However, these factors are not evident in

every case. Moreover, when they are relevant, the reasons behind them have varied, including

corruption, age, and even bereavement (Sergei Ivanov recently lost his son to a drowning

accident).

Second, the changes do not yet amount to a total turnover. Several of Putin’s other longtime

colleagues remain in positions of considerable power or influence (see “Longtime Putin

Colleagues Still in Power” text box).

Third, this gradual “changing of the guard” is occurring against the backdrop of what observers

characterize as frequently vicious struggles for wealth and influence among different power

centers, but most often between the FSB (in particular, its Interior Security Department) and

others: the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Investigative Committee (a kind of Federal Bureau of

Investigation), Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov, and a more liberal (i.e., economically

oriented) wing of the Russian government.23 Considerable speculation has occurred that such

rivalries on occasion lead to developments that Putin does not control. Potential examples include

the February 2015 murder of opposition politician Boris Nemtsov, which was blamed on people

close to Kadyrov, and the November 2016 arrest of Minister of Economic Development Alexey

Ulyukaev, which observers suspect is linked to a rivalry with Rosneft CEO Igor Sechin,

considered one of Russia’s most influential policymakers.24

Longtime Putin Colleagues Still in Power

Sergei Chemezov: CEO of Rostec, Russia’s large state-owned military-industrial complex, who oversees scores of

hi-tech and defense companies across the country.

Nikolay Patrushev: Chair of the National Security Council. Colleagues reportedly have referred to Patrushev as

“Russia’s most underestimated public figure.” He is thought to have had considerable influence in shaping Russia’s

recent anti-Western foreign policy trajectory, including the annexation of Crimea.

Igor Sechin: CEO of Rosneft. Sechin has long been considered one of the most powerful officials in Russia, with not

only influence over the state-owned oil sector but also unofficial ties to elements of the FSB. Last year, Sechin was

subject to some speculation that he risked overstepping his bounds and losing power, but he ultimately appeared to

strengthen his position at the expense of various rivals.

Viktor Zolotov: Head of the National Guard. Zolotov is considered to be singularly loyal to Putin. He now heads a

new security apparatus that officially serves as a special police force to combat terrorism and organized crime but is

widely considered to be Putin’s “personal army” and, potentially, a repressive tool for fighting civil unrest.

Other Longtime Putin Colleagues Still in Power: Andrei Fursenko (Presidential Aide), German Gref

(Sberbank), Dmitry Kozak (Deputy Prime Minister), Alexei Kudrin (Vice Chair, Presidential Economic Council), Alexei

Miller (Gazprom), Sergei Naryshkin (Foreign Intelligence Service), Yevgeny Shkolov (Presidential Aide), and Nikolai

Tokarev (Transneft). Some influential businessmen also are longtime colleagues of Putin: Arkady and Boris Rotenberg,

Nikolai Shamalov, and Gennady Timchenko.

Notes: Chemezov is subject to U.S. and European Union (EU) Ukraine-related sanctions (as are Kozak, Naryshkin,

and A. Rotenberg). Sechin is subject to U.S. Ukraine-related sanctions (as are Fursenko, B. Rotenberg, and

For example, Andrew Monaghan, “Putin’s Removal of Ivanov as Chief of Staff Is More About Rejuvenation,”

Chatham House, August 15, 2016, at https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/putins-removal-ivanov-chiefstaff-more-about-rejuvenation.

For example, Karina Orlova, “The Siloviki Coup in Russia,” American Interest, September 21, 2016, at

http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/09/21/the-siloviki-coup-in-russia.

For example, Joshua Yaffa, “The Unaccountable Death of Boris Nemtsov,” New Yorker, February 26, 2016, at

http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-unaccountable-death-of-boris-nemtsov, and Ilya Matveev, “The Big

Game: Ulyukaev, Sechin and Russia’s Neopatrimonial Privatisation,” OpenDemocracy Russia, November 21, 2016, at

https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/ilya-matveev/big-game-ulyukaev-sechin-and-russias-neopatrimonialprivatisation.

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Russia: Background and U.S. Policy

Timchenko). Patrushev (and Shamalov) are subject to EU sanctions. In addition, Rostec is subject to U.S. (and,

partially, EU) Ukraine-related sanctions and Rosneft is subject to U.S. and EU Ukraine-related sanctions.

September 2016 State Duma Elections

On September 18, 2016, Russians elected the State Duma, the lower house of parliament.

Russia’s last parliamentary elections, in December 2011, triggered a wave of protests against

electoral fraud and heralded the rise of a revitalized opposition against Putin’s government. Five

years later, expectations of democratic change at the ballot box had subsided. With a voter turnout

of 48%, the ruling United Russia (UR) party won a resounding victory, with more than 75% of

the seats (as opposed to 53% in 2011). All other seats went to those considered loyal opposition

parties and deputies. No parties genuinely in opposition (sometimes termed the liberal

opposition) won any seats (see Table 1).25

Table 1. Election Results to the State Duma, September 18, 2016

Party List

Seats

Single-Member

Seats

Total Seats

% of Seats

United Russia (UR)

54.2%

140

203

343

76.2%

Communist Party

(KPRF)a

13.3%

9.3%

Liberal Democratic

Party of Russia (LDPR)a

13.1%

8.7%

A Just Russiaa

6.2%

5.1%

Other

11.2%

0.7%

Yablokob

2.0%

0.0%

PARNASb

0.7%

0.0%

98%

225

450

Total

100%

Source: Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation, at http://www.vybory.izbirkom.ru.

Notes: Total party list percentage is calculated out of the total number of valid and invalid ballots.

a. The KPRF, LDPR, and A Just Russia parties are considered the loyal opposition parties. These parties

criticize the government, if not Putin, but typically support its legislative initiatives.

b. Yabloko and PARNAS are liberal opposition parties considered to be genuinely in opposition to the

government. They fall under the “Other” category, which includes several small parties that did not meet

the 5% threshold for party list representation.

The ruling UR party traditionally polls lower than Putin, who does not formally lead the party, but

it appeared to benefit from a surge in patriotic sentiment unleashed by Russia’s annexation of

Crimea, Russia’s so-called defense of pro-Russian populations in eastern Ukraine, and appeals for

national solidarity in the face of Western sanctions and criticism.26 UR also experienced a certain

renewal in advance of elections; party primaries promoted the rise of many candidates new to

national politics and eliminated a number of sitting deputies.27

For additional background, see CRS Insight IN10573, Russia’s Parliamentary Elections, by (name redacted)

Denis Volkov, “How Long Will It Be Before 2011-2012 Style Mass Protests Reemerge?,” Intersection, September 8,

2016, at http://intersectionproject.eu/article/society/how-long-will-it-be-2011-2012-style-mass-protests-reemerge.

Darrell Slider and Nikolai Petrov, “United Russia’s ‘Primaries’: A Preview of the Duma Elections?,” Russian

(continued...)

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Russia: Background and U.S. Policy

At the same time, the Russian government took measures after the last election to bolster the

victory of UR and minimize opposition gains across the country.28 Fourteen parties that received

at least 3% of the vote in the last election or held at least one seat in a regional council competed

in the 2016 election. Other parties technically could register after collecting 200,000 signatures,

but no such registrations were approved. In addition, state-controlled media and government

officials subjected opposition leaders to a barrage of negative publicity, branding them as agents

of the West.29 Restrictions on mass demonstrations tightened. A centrally controlled redistricting

process led to the carving up of urban centers that leaned toward the opposition. Finally, the

election date was moved up from December 2016, considerably shortening the campaign

period.30

UR also benefited from a change in electoral rules restoring a mixed electoral system that had

been in place through 2003 parliamentary elections. UR’s financial and administrative resources

across the countryside were expected to help the party win more seats via single-member races

than it would in a purely proportional contest; indeed, UR candidates won more than 90% of

these races.31 By comparison, in the contested 2011 election, when seats were allocated entirely

by party-list vote, UR officially won 49% of the vote (as opposed to 54% in 2016) but only 53%

of seats (as opposed to 76% in 2016).

Election observers also raised concerns about fraud. The election observation mission of the

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) noted that the counting process was

bad or very bad in 23% of the polling stations it observed. One widely cited statistical analysis by

a Russian scholar also suggested the election was marred in certain areas of the country by high

levels of fraud, including ballot-box stuffing.32

Besides UR, the three parties that gained seats have served in parliament already and are known

as the loyal opposition. These parties criticize the government, if not Putin, but typically support

its legislative initiatives. Two are longtime fixtures of Russian politics: the Communist Party

(KPRF, led by Gennadiy Zyuganov) and the right-nationalist Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR,

led by Vladimir Zhirinovsky). The third, A Just Russia (led by Sergei Mironov), is a center-left

party that flirted with the opposition in 2011-2012 before returning to the fold (and expelling

some of its members, who remained in opposition).33

(...continued)

Analytical Digest no. 186 (July 15, 2016).

Vladimir Gelman, “Correction of Errors: How the Kremlin Re-equilibrated Authoritarian Elections in 2016,”

PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 437, August 2016, at http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/correction-errors-howkremlin-re-equilibrated-authoritarian-elections-2016.

For example, Yelena Plotnikova and Robert Coalson, “Samara Governor Offers a Stark Choice: United Russia or the

CIA,” RFE/RL, September 10, 2016, at http://www.rferl.org/a/russia-samara-governor-merkushkin-united-russia-cia/

27978955.html.

Nikolay Petrov, “Putin’s Gamble on Russia’s Duma Elections,” European Council on Foreign Relations, September

8, 2016, at http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_putins_gamble_on_russias_duma_elections_7109.

Felix Riefer, “Russian Parliamentary Elections to Take Place Under New Rules,” Deutsche Welle, August 16, 2016,

at http://www.dw.com/en/russian-parliamentary-elections-to-take-place-under-new-rules/a-19478968.

OSCE/ODIHR International Election Observation Mission, Russian Federation—State Duma Elections, “Statement

of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions,” September 18, 2016, at http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/russia/265186;

Leonid Bershidsky, “Russia Proves Vote Fraud Can Happen Anywhere,” Bloomberg View, September 26, 2016, at

https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-09-22/russia-proves-vote-fraud-can-happen-anywhere; Olga Sichkar,

Jack Stubbs, and Gleb Stolyarov, “Phantom Voters, Smuggled Ballots Hint at Foul Play in Russian Vote,” Reuters,

September 20, 2016, at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-election-fraud-idUSKCN11Q1RI.

Vladimir Kara-Murza, “Back on the Leash: The End for A Just Russia,” Institute of Modern Russia, January 29,

(continued...)

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Russia: Background and U.S. Policy

The Opposition

As noted above, no liberal opposition party won Duma seats in the 2016 elections. However, two

liberal opposition parties, neither of which was in the previous parliament, were eligible to

compete: Yabloko (identified with its former longtime chairman Grigory Yavlinsky) and

PARNAS (led by a former prime minister, Mikhail Kasyanov, as well as, previously, Boris

Nemtsov, slain in 2015). Both parties consider themselves European-style liberal democratic

parties, though other parties criticized PARNAS in 2016 for including at least one populist

firebrand near the top of its list.34

In addition, 18 single-member races were contested by candidates representing the Open Russia

movement, founded by former oil magnate Mikhail Khodorkovsky.35

The party of another prominent opposition leader, anticorruption activist and 2013 Moscow

mayoral candidate Alexei Navalny, had its registration revoked in 2015, ostensibly for technical

reasons, and thus was unable to participate in the election. Navalny himself is barred from

running for political office due to a 2013 criminal conviction that resulted in a suspended

sentence. Navalny supporters and most outside observers deemed the case (and a second one) to

be politically motivated, and in February 2016, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)

concluded that the trial had violated Navalny’s rights.36

Opposition fragmentation was an issue prior to the election. Opposition leaders protected their

individual brands and appeared to fear that these brands could be damaged by formal unification

with other parties (electoral blocs have been banned since 2005). In 2015, Navalny’s Party of

Progress had joined with PARNAS and others in a “Democratic Coalition,” which was to run

candidates under the PARNAS banner. The coalition soon encountered difficulties, however. It

was barred from registering candidates in September 2015 regional elections, and in spring 2016

the coalition collapsed after PARNAS leader Kasyanov was targeted in a scandal involving

alleged hidden video footage of an affair with a party colleague.37

For now, observers tend to see Vladimir Putin’s rule as relatively stable, although new signs of

discontent have arisen. Ongoing economic difficulties (see “The Economy,” below) have led to

small-scale protests across Russia, as prices have risen, salaries have fallen, unemployment has

(...continued)

2013, at http://imrussia.org/en/politics/377-back-on-the-leash-the-end-for-a-just-russia; Gabrielle Tétrault-Farber,

“Dmitry Gudkov, L'Enfаnt Terrible of the State Duma,” Moscow Times, October 6, 2014, at

https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/dmitry-gudkov-lenfnt-terrible-of-the-state-duma-40113.

Nataliya Vasilyeva, “Russian Opposition Faces Infighting, Apathy at Upcoming Vote,” Associated Press, September

12, 2016, at http://bigstory.ap.org/article/a178ad99cd8f49e59e7f84a50f775b16/russian-opposition-faces-infightingapathy-upcoming-vote.

Ola Cichowlas, “Russian Election Watch 2016: Noteworthy Candidates,” Moscow Times, September 12, 2016, at

https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/russian-election-watch-2016-noteworthy-candidates-55249.

Meduza, “Navalny Wants Supreme Court to Review His First Criminal Conviction, Saying He’s Being Kept from

Elections Intentionally,” August 22, 2016, at https://meduza.io/en/news/2016/08/22/navalny-wants-supreme-court-toreview-his-first-criminal-conviction-saying-he-s-being-kept-from-elections-intentially; Neil MacFarquhar and Ivan

Nechepurenko, “Aleksei Navalny, Viable Putin Rival, Is Barred from a Presidential Run,” New York Times, February 8,

2017, at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/08/world/europe/russia-aleksei-navalny-putin.html.

Meduza, “Russia’s Democratic Coalition: The Opposition Is Being Barred from Elections Again. Here’s What You

Need to Know,” July 29, 2015, at https://meduza.io/en/feature/2015/07/29/russia-s-democratic-coalition; Meduza, “The

Strange Death of Russia’s ‘Democratic Coalition,’” May 31, 2016, at https://meduza.io/en/feature/2016/06/01/thestrange-death-of-russia-s-democratic-coalition.

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Russia: Background and U.S. Policy

grown, and social spending has been reduced.38 In March and June 2017, nationwide protests

spearheaded by Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation reportedly attracted thousands, many of

whom were university-aged or younger, to demonstrate against corruption. Hundreds of

protestors were temporarily detained, including Navalny, who was fined and sentenced to,

respectively, 15 days and 30 days in prison for what the courts cited as illegal activity.39

Whether such protests are sufficient to catalyze a more substantial political movement remains to

be seen. Some observers believe that the government is seeking to minimize popular discontent

by continuing to increase social benefits in the lead-up to the next presidential election, scheduled

for March 2018, even as expenditures in education, health care, and defense stay flat or decline.40

Potential future scenarios tend to center on succession politics, whether engineered by Putin or

prompted by his incapacitation or untimely passing. As late as June 2017, Putin still would not

say if he was planning to run for reelection, although many observers believe he plans to do so.41

In the event of a controlled succession (in 2018 or after), observers speculate about a number of

well-known potential successors. However, the eventual choice also could be a relatively

unknown figure; Putin himself was a highly unexpected choice to succeed his predecessor, Boris

Yeltsin.

Many observers put little stock in the possibility of a democratic transition of power. In such a

scenario, candidates are thought more likely to emerge from right-wing nationalist forces or a

new post-Communist left, not from a liberal, pro-Western opposition or civil society, whose

influence has been seriously undermined by the Russian government.

Other scenarios involve a loss of control by Putin or members of his inner circle, as a result of a

collapsing economy, weakened state apparatus, or an external war gone wrong. Some observers

have speculated that rival political centers could compete for power in Putin’s absence and that

this competition could turn violent. In addition, some have voiced concerns that an uncontrolled

transition could lead to the rise of more nationalist forces.

Local Elections

Formally, Russia has a robust system of subnational elections; in practice, the country’s top-down system provides

centralized control over key issues. Regional and municipal councils are elected, as are governors of most of Russia’s

83 regions and republics (though candidates must secure the signatures of 5%-10% of all their region’s municipal

deputies, which is seen as a major constraint).

Kremlin-backed leaders dominate local government structures. All but one of Russia’s 83 governors are United Russia

(UR) members or other government-backed figures. In the Siberian region of Irkutsk in September 2015, Communist

Party member Sergei Levchenko became the only gubernatorial candidate since elections were reintroduced in 2012

to defeat a government-backed opponent. UR also has majorities, typically substantial ones, in all regional councils;

only a handful of regional deputies across the country are affiliated with the liberal opposition.

Certain regions and cities contain more opposition-minded voters, most notably the two major urban centers of

Sean Guillory, “Kremlinology: An Intervention,” OpenDemocracy Russia, September 13, 2016, at

https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/sean-guillory/kremlinology-intervention.

See, for example, Joshua Yaffa, “What the Russian Protests Mean for Putin,” New Yorker, March 27, 2017, at

http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/what-the-russian-protests-mean-for-putin, and Maxim Trudolyubov,

“Alexei Navalny and the Cycle of Russian Protest,” Atlantic, June 15, 2017, at https://www.theatlantic.com/

international/archive/2017/06/navalny-russia-protests/530463/.

Andrey Movchan, “Pensions and Security: Russian Budget Reveals Government Priorities,” Carnegie Moscow

Center, December 15, 2016, at http://carnegie.ru/commentary/?fa=66454.

TASS Russian News Agency, “Putin Says Too Early to Discuss 2018 Presidential Election,” June 1, 2017, at

http://tass.com/politics/949110.

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Russia: Background and U.S. Policy

Moscow and St. Petersburg. In the September 2013 Moscow mayoral election, opposition candidate Alexei Navalny

won 27% of the vote (incumbent Sergei Sobyanin, Putin’s former chief of staff and deputy prime minister, won 51%).

Some regions in Siberia and the Far East, as well as in the Northwest, also elect greater numbers of opposition

candidates (including the Communists and other loyal opposition parties).

Although Russian law allows for the direct election of mayors in cities other than Moscow and St. Petersburg, most

municipalities have an indirectly elected mayor or council head who shares authority with a more powerful appointed

or indirectly elected city manager. A few opposition candidates have won competitive mayoral elections, although

some of the more prominent were subsequently removed from office and even imprisoned.

Sources: J. Paul Goode, “The Revival of Russia’s Gubernatorial Elections: Liberalization or Potemkin Reform?,”

Russian Analytical Digest no. 139 (November 18, 2013), pp. 9-11; Joel C. Moses, “Putin and Russian Subnational Politics

in 2014,” Demokratizatsiya vol. 23, no. 2 (Spring 2015), pp. 181-203; Maria Tsvetkova, “When Kremlin Candidate

Loses Election, Even Voters Are Surprised,” Reuters, September 29, 2015; Ola Cichowlas, “Endangered Species: Why

Is Russia Locking Up Its Mayors?,” Moscow Times, August 2, 2016.

The Economy42

The Russian economy has gone through periods of decline, growth, and stagnation since 1991. In

the first seven years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union (1992-1998), Russia experienced an

average annual decline in gross domestic product (GDP) of 6.8%. A decade of strong economic

growth followed, in which Russia’s GDP increased on average 6.9% per year. The surge in

economic growth—largely the result of increases in world oil prices—helped to raise the Russian

standard of living and brought a significant degree of economic stability.

The Russian economy was hit hard by the global financial crisis and resulting economic downturn

that began in 2008. The crisis exposed weaknesses in the economy, including its significant

dependence on the production and export of oil and other natural resources and its weak financial

system. The Russian government’s reassertion of control over major industries, especially in the

energy sector, also contributed to an underachieving economy. As a result, Russia’s period of

economic growth came to an abrupt end by 2009. Although Russian real GDP increased 5.2% in

2008, it declined by 7.8% in 2009. Russia began to emerge from its recession in 2010, with 4.5%

GDP growth that year, but by 2013 growth had again slowed to 1.3%.43

Since 2014, two external shocks—low oil prices and international sanctions—have contributed to

considerable economic challenges. In particular, Russia has grappled with the following:



economic contraction, with growth slowing to 0.7% in 2014 before contracting

by 2.8% in 2015;

capital flight, with net private capital outflows from Russia totaling $152 billion

in 2014, compared to $60 billion in 2013;

rapid depreciation of the ruble, more than 50% against the dollar over the course

of 2014;

increasing inflation, from 6.8% in 2013 to 15.5% in 2015;

declining trade, with the dollar value of exports and imports down by 31% and

36%, respectively, from 2014 to 2015;

This section was prepared primarily by Rebecca Nelson, Specialist in International Trade and Finance. For more, see

CRS Report R43895, U.S. Sanctions and Russia’s Economy, by (name redacted) .

International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook, April 2017, at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/

weo/2017/01/weodata/index.aspx.

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Russia: Background and U.S. Policy



budgetary pressures, with the budget deficit widening from 1.2% in 2013 to 3.4%

in 2015;

drawing on international reserves to offset fiscal challenges, with reserves falling

from almost $500 billion in January 2014 to $356 billion in April 2015; and

more widespread poverty, which increased from 16.1 million living in poverty in

2014 to 19.2 million in 2015 (13.4% of the population).44

During 2016, Russia’s economy largely stabilized, even as sanctions remained in place. Russia’s

economy only slightly contracted (0.2%); net private sector capital outflows slowed, from more

than $150 billion in 2014 to $19.8 billion in 2016; inflation fell by more than half since 2015, to

7.0%; the value of the ruble stabilized; reserves began to rise; and the government successfully

sold new bonds in international capital markets in May 2016. Around 19.8 million (13.5% of the

population) were estimated to be living in poverty.45 Net inflows of foreign direct investment

(FDI) into Russia, which essentially came to a halt in late 2014 and early 2015, started to resume

in 2016. Most notably, a consortium of the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA, Qatar’s national

sovereign wealth fund) and Glencore, a Swiss-based mining and commodity trading firm,

purchased 19.5% of the state-controlled Rosneft, Russia’s largest oil company, for €10.2 billion

(about $10.6 billion at the time).46

According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Russia’s economy is projected to grow by

1.4% in 2017.47 The IMF argues that after two years of recession, the economy is recovering due

to a rise in oil prices and improved investor sentiment but that the medium-term prospects are

subdued given oil prices still well below their peak and structural weaknesses in Russia’s

economy.48 Low oil prices also have strained the government budget, which ran a deficit of 3.7%

of GDP in 2016, but the fiscal outlook has improved as oil prices have stabilized, with a budget

deficit of 1.9% of GDP projected for 2017.49 The government has tapped one of Russia’s

sovereign wealth funds, the Reserve Fund, to address the budget shortfall, and its resources have

fallen to about $16 billion from $143 billion in 2008.50 The government is considering

IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 2017; Central Bank of Russia, External Sector Statistics, “Net

Inflows/Outflows of Capital by Private Sector,” at https://www.cbr.ru/eng/statistics/?Prtid=svs&ch=

itm_49171#CheckedItem; IMF Exchange Rates Database, at https://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/ert/GUI/Pages/

CountryDataBase.aspx ; The Customs Committee of Russia, as accessed from Global Trade Atlas; Central Bank of

Russia, External Sector Statistics, “International Reserves of the Russian Federation,” http://www.cbr.ru/eng/statistics/?

Prtid=svs; and World Bank, Russia Economic Report 35, April 6, 2016, at http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/pressrelease/2016/04/06/russia-economic-report-35.

World Bank, Russia Economic Report 37, May 2017, at http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/russia/publication/rer.

The consortium borrowed most of the funds from Intesa Sanpaolo, an Italian bank, and others, including Russian

banks. BP, the UK-based international energy company, owns 19.75% of Rosneft. The purpose and method of the sale

has raised some questions among observers. See Katya Golubkova, Dmitry Zhdannikov, and Stephen Jewkes, “How

Russia Sold Its Oil Jewel: Without Saying Who Bought It,” Reuters, January 25, 2017, at http://www.reuters.com/

article/us-russia-rosneft-privatisation-insight-idUSKBN1582OH; Sarah McFarlane and Summer Said, “Russia Could

Buy Back Stake It Sold in Rosneft,” Wall Street Journal, June 7, 2017, at https://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-to-buyback-stake-it-sold-in-rosneft-1496827804.

IMF, World Economic Outlook Update, July 2017, at http://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2017/07/07/

world-economic-outlook-update-july-2017.

IMF, Russian Federation: 2017 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report, July 2017, at

http://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2017/07/10/Russian-Federation-2017-Article-IV-Consultation-PressRelease-Staff-Report-45054.

Ibid.

Vladimir Kuznetsov, “Russian Wealth Fund Has This Year’s Biggest Drop as Buffers Wilt,” Bloomberg, September

6, 2016, at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-06/russian-wealth-fund-has-this-year-s-biggest-drop-as(continued...)

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Russia: Background and U.S. Policy

consolidating its two sovereign wealth funds as the government continues to face budget

shortfalls. Russia’s other sovereign wealth fund, the National Wealth Fund, was designed to help

balance the pension system and has about $75 billion.51

In the longer term, Russia’s economy faces long-standing structural challenges, including slow

economic diversification, weak protection of property rights, burdensome administrative

procedures, state involvement in the economy, and adverse demographic dynamics.52 The IMF

argues that sanctions dampen the potential for accelerating investment growth.53 Some analysts

also have noted that the low value of the ruble may hamper Russia’s attempts to innovate and

modernize its economy and that the economy’s continued reliance on oil makes it vulnerable to

another drop in oil prices.54

Despite Western sanctions and Russia’s own retaliatory ban against agricultural imports, the EU

as a whole remains Russia’s largest trading partner. In 2016, 47% of Russia’s merchandise

exports went to EU member states and 38% of its merchandise imports came from EU member

states. By country, Russia’s top three merchandise export destinations were the Netherlands

(10%), China (10%), and Germany (7%), and its top three sources of merchandise imports were

China (21%), Germany (11%), and the United States (6%).55

Economic Impact of Sanctions

It is difficult to assess whether, and to what extent, sanctions on Russia and Russia’s retaliatory

measures have impacted the country’s economy over the past few years (for details on U.S.

sanctions against Russia, see “Ukraine-Related Sanctions,” below). Sanctions were imposed at

the same time the price of oil, a major export and source of revenue for the Russian government,

dropped significantly, by more than 60% between the start of 2014 and the end of 2015.56

That said, many economists, including at the IMF, have argued that the twin shocks of sanctions

and low oil prices have adversely affected Russia’s economy.57 In 2015, the IMF estimated that

sanctions and Russia’s retaliatory ban on agricultural imports reduced output in Russia over the

short term between 1.0% and 1.5%.58 The IMF’s models suggest that the effects on Russia over

(...continued)

buffers-wilt; Andrey Ostroukh, “Russia’s Reserve Fund Grows to $16.71 Billion as of July 1,” Reuters, at

https://www.reuters.com/article/russia-funds-idUSR4N1IY00Q.

Olga Tanas and Anna Andrianova, “Russia Eyes a $90 Billion Sovereign Wealth Fund,” Reuters, June 19, 2017, at

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-19/russia-to-discuss-merging-wealth-funds-into-90-7-billioncoffer; Ostroukh, “Russia’s Reserve Fund Grows to $16.71 Billion as of July 1,” July 4, 2017.

IMF, Russian Federation: Staff Report for the 2016 Article IV Consultation, July 2016, at https://www.imf.org/

external/pubs/ft/scr/2016/cr16229.pdf.

IMF, Russian Federation: 2017 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report, July 2017.

Pavel Koshkin and Ksenia Zubacheva, “The Worst of the Economic Crisis in Russia Lies Ahead,” Russia Direct,

January 22, 2016, at http://www.russia-direct.org/analysis/worst-economic-crisis-russia-lies-ahead.

European Commission Directorate-General for Trade, “European Union, Trade In Goods With Russia,” May 3,

2017, at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113440.pdf, and Customs Committee of Russia,

as accessed from Global Trade Atlas.

Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, “Global Price of Brent Crude,” at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/

POILBREUSDM, accessed February 2, 2017.

For example, see IMF, “IMF Staff Concludes Visit to Russian Federation,” November 29, 2016, at

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2016/11/29/PR16529-Russian-Federation-IMF-Staff-Concludes-Visit.

IMF, Russian Federation: Staff Report for the 2015 Article IV Consultation, August 2015, p. 5, at

http://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF002/22733-9781513502441/22733-9781513502441/22733(continued...)

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Russia: Background and U.S. Policy

the medium term could be more substantial, reducing output by up to 9.0%, as lower capital

accumulation and technological transfers weaken already declining productivity growth. At the

start of 2016, a State Department official argued that sanctions were not designed to push Russia

“over the economic cliff” in the short run but rather were designed to exert long-term pressure on

Russia.59

In November 2014, Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov estimated the annual cost of

sanctions to the Russian economy at $40 billion (2% of GDP), compared to $90 billion-$100

billion (4%-5% of GDP) lost due to lower oil prices.60 Similarly, Russian economists estimated

that the economic sanctions would decrease Russia’s GDP by 2.4% by 2017, but the effect would

be 3.3 times less than the effect from the oil-price shock.61 In November 2016, Putin stated that

the sanctions are “severely harming Russia” in terms of access to international financial markets,

although the impact was not as severe as the harm from the decline in energy prices.62

In December 2016, the Office of the Chief Economist at the U.S. State Department published

estimates of the impact of the U.S. and European Union (EU) sanctions in 2014 on a firm-level

basis.63 The main finding was that the average company or associated company in Russia subject

to sanctions lost about one-third of its operating revenue, more than one-half of its asset value,

and about one-third of its employees relative to nonsanctioned peers.

The longer-term effect of sanctions, if they are kept in place, is unclear. The economic bite of

restrictions on U.S. long-term financing for certain sectors or technology for specific Russian oil

exploration projects may manifest more prominently in coming years. At the same time, the longterm impact may depend on whether Russia can develop viable and reliable alternative economic

partners, particularly among countries that have refrained from sanctions (such as China, India,

and Brazil), to fulfill economic activities restricted by U.S. and EU sanctions.

U.S.-Russian Trade and Investment

Even before sanctions were imposed, the United States had relatively little direct trade and

investment with Russia. Over the past decade, Russia has accounted for less than 2% of total U.S.

merchandise imports, less than 1% of total U.S. merchandise exports, less than 1% of U.S. FDI,

and less than 1% of FDI in the United States.64 At the same time, in 2016, the United States was

Russia’s third-largest source of merchandise imports (and 10th-largest destination for exports).

(...continued)

9781513502441_A001.xml.

Robin Emmott, “Sanctions Impact on Russia to Be Longer Term, U.S. Says,” Reuters, January 12, 2016, at

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-sanctions-idUSKCN0UQ1ML20160112.

European Parliamentary Research Service, Sanctions over Ukraine: Impact on Russia, March 2016, at

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/EPRS-Briefing-579084-Sanctions-over-Ukraine-impact-Russia-FINAL.pdf.

Evsey Gurvich and Ilya Prilepskiy, “The Impact of Financial Sanctions on the Russian Economy,” Russian Journal

of Economics (2015), pp. 359-385.

Nikolaus Blome, Kai Diekmann, and Daniel Biskup, “Putin—The Interview: ‘For Me, It Is Not Borders That

Matter,’” Bild, November 1, 2016, at http://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/wladimir-putin/russian-president-vladimirputin-the-interview-44092656.bild.html.

Daniel Ahn and Rodney Ludema, Measuring Smartness: Understanding the Economic Impact of Targeted Sanctions,

Office of the Chief Economist, U.S. Department of State, December 2016, Working Paper 2017-01, at

https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/267590.pdf.

Trade data are from the U.S. Census Bureau, the Customs Committee of Russia, and Eurostat, as accessed from

Global Trade Atlas, unless otherwise noted. U.S. investment data are from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (on a

(continued...)

Congressional Research Service

Russia: Background and U.S. Policy

Over the past three years, U.S. merchandise trade with Russia has fallen by almost half (see

Figure 2). U.S. merchandise exports to Russia fell from $11.1 billion in 2013 to $5.8 billion in

2016. U.S. merchandise imports from Russia fell from $27.1 billion in 2013 to $14.5 billion in

2016. U.S. investment ties with Russia also continued to weaken. U.S. investment in Russia was

$9.2 billion in 2015, down from a peak of $20.8 billion in 2009.65 Russian investment in the

United States was $4.5 billion, down from a peak of $8.4 billion in 2009.

U.S. merchandise imports from Russia tend to be dominated by oil and unfinished metals. Of the

$14.5 billion in merchandise that the United States imported from Russia in 2016, about half was

mineral fuels and oils ($7.2 billion), particularly noncrude oil ($6.6 billion). Other top U.S.

merchandise imports from Russia in 2016 included aluminum ($1.33 billion); iron and steel ($1.3

billion); inorganic chemicals, precious and rare-earth metals and radioactive compounds ($1.2

billion), particularly enriched uranium ($1.03 billion); precious metals, stones, and related

products ($696 million), particularly unfinished platinum ($607 million); fertilizers ($502

million); and fish, crustaceans, and aquatic invertebrates ($410 million). These products

accounted for more than 85% of U.S. imports from Russia in 2016.

U.S. merchandise exports to Russia tend to focus on machinery and manufactured products. Of

the $5.8 billion in commodities exported by the United States to Russia in 2016, the top export

was nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery, and parts ($1.4 billion). Other top U.S. merchandise

exports to Russia in 2016 included aircraft, spacecraft, and related parts ($1.3 billion); vehicles

and parts ($617 million); optic, photo, medic, and surgical instruments ($438 million); electric

machinery and sound equipment ($421 million); and pharmaceutical products ($190 million).

These products accounted for more than 75% of U.S. exports to Russia in 2016.

Figure 2. U.S. Merchandise Trade with Russia

Source: Created by CRS using U.S. Census Bureau data, as accessed from Global Trade Atlas.

Even though overall trade and investment flows between the United States and Russia are limited,

economic ties at the firm and sector levels are in some cases substantial. Several large U.S.

companies, such as PepsiCo, Ford Motor Company, General Electric, and Boeing, have been

actively engaged with Russia: exporting to Russia, entering joint ventures with Russian partners,

and relying on Russian suppliers for inputs. The U.S.-Russia Business Council, a Washington-

(...continued)

historical-cost basis).

U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Data are U.S. direct investment position abroad on a historical-cost basis.

Congressional Research Service

Russia: Background and U.S. Policy

based trade association that provides services to U.S. and Russian member companies, has a

membership of around 170 U.S. companies conducting business in Russia.66

In 2012, Russia joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), and Congress passed and the

President signed legislation that allowed the President to extend permanent normal trade relations

to Russia (P.L. 112-208). Part of this legislation requires the U.S. Trade Representative to report

annually on the implementation and enforcement of Russia’s WTO commitments. The 2016

report stresses that although Russia acted as a responsible member of the WTO community in

some areas, such as reducing bound tariffs (maximum rates allowed by the WTO between trading

states) by the required deadline, other areas were more problematic: Russia’s actions continued to

depart from the WTO’s core tenets of liberal trade, transparency, and predictability in favor of

inward-looking, import-substitution economic policies.67 Separately, some analysts have raised

questions about whether Russia’s retaliatory ban on agriculture imports from the United States

and other countries is compliant with its obligations under the WTO, whereas others argue that

the ban may be permitted under the national security exemption. To date, no state has formally

challenged the ban at the WTO.

Energy Sector68

Russia is a significant producer of energy in various forms, including crude oil, natural gas, coal,

and nuclear power. In 2016, Russia was the third-largest oil producer, behind the United States

and Saudi Arabia; the second-largest natural gas producer, behind the United States; and the

sixth-largest coal producer. It is also a significant exporter of oil and the largest natural gas

exporter, the latter providing Russia with market power, which it has exploited for geopolitical

purposes. Natural gas is more of a regional commodity than oil because natural gas requires

expensive infrastructure for transport. (Oil, by contrast, is a global market in which Russia does

not have the same type of leverage over countries as it does with its natural gas exports.)

Table 2, below, provides data for all countries in Europe that received Russian natural gas (EU

members are in bold) in 2015, the latest year for which data are available.69 Seven EU countries

(Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Romania, and Slovenia) relied on Russia for 100%

of their natural gas imports in 2015, as did five non-EU countries (Belarus, Bosnia and

Herzegovina, Macedonia, Moldova, and Serbia). Russian gas imports made up more than half the

total gas consumption in 20 countries. However, only three EU countries (Hungary, Latvia, and

Lithuania) and three non-EU countries (Armenia, Belarus, and Moldova) depended on Russian

gas for more than 20% of their total primary energy consumption.

To maintain its leverage and position as Europe’s dominant gas supplier, Russia has sought to

develop multiple pipeline routes to reduce its dependence on transit states such as Ukraine and to

satisfy regional markets. To the north, the Nord Stream pipeline runs under the Baltic Sea from

Russia to Germany; Russia’s state-controlled natural gas company, Gazprom, is seeking to build a

second, parallel pipeline, Nord Stream 2, with the financial support of five European energy

companies. However, the project still must receive approval from the governments of Denmark,

U.S.-Russia Business Council, at http://www.usrbc.org/site/membership/services.

U.S. Trade Representative, 2016 Report on the Implementation and Enforcement of Russia’s WTO Commitments,

December 2016, at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2016-WTO-Report-Russia.pdf.

This section was coauthored with (name redacted), Specialist in Energy Policy. For more on Russian-European

energy relations, see CRS Report R42405, Europe’s Energy Security: Options and Challenges to Natural Gas Supply

Diversification, coordinated by (name redacted).

In 2015, Russia also exported natural gas to China, Japan, Kazakhstan, South Korea, and Taiwan.

Congressional Research Service

Russia: Background and U.S. Policy

Finland, and Sweden, whose waters it would cross. The European Union (specifically, the EU’s

executive branch, the European Commission) also is considering whether and to what extent the

proposed pipeline would be subject to existing EU regulations.

Opponents of the pipeline—including, among others, the governments of Estonia, Latvia,

Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine, and many Members of the U.S. Congress—argue that the pipeline

runs counter to the stated EU goal of diversifying European energy supply sources by increasing

reliance on Russian gas. In addition, they contend that by bypassing existing pipelines to Eastern

Europe through Ukraine, Nord Stream 2 could leave Ukraine and other countries in Central and

Eastern Europe more vulnerable to supply cutoffs or price manipulation by Russia.

To the south, Russia had long planned the South Stream pipeline that would have run under the

Black Sea to Bulgaria. That project was canceled at the end of 2014. Despite initial skepticism

and a temporary decline in Turkish-Russian relations, however, the planned South Stream

pipeline has been replaced to an extent by the Turk Stream project, which follows a similar route

across the Black Sea but stops at the Turkish-Greek border. Gazprom has signed some contracts

for the project, including one for the laying of pipe.

Congressional Research Service

Russia: Background and U.S. Policy

Table 2. European Imports of Russian Natural Gas (2015)

Russian Imports as

% of Total Imports

Russian Imports as % of

Total Gas Consumption

Russian Imports as % of

Primary Energy

Consumption

Armenia

83%

40%

Austria

68%

57%

11%

Belarus

100%

66%

Belgium

30%

58%

17%

Bosnia and Herzegovina

100%

Bulgaria

100%

97%

14%

Czech Republic

48%

47%

Denmark

53%

21%

Estonia

100%

19%

Finland

100%

France

20%

22%

Georgia

15%

Germany

41%

50%

12%

Greece

61%

Hungary

100%

81%

23%

Italy

38%

34%

14%

Latvia

100%

30%

Lithuania

84%

37%

Macedonia

100%

Moldova

100%

68%

Netherlands

Poland

77%

56%

Romania

100%

Serbia

100%

72%

Slovakia

90%

88%

20%

Slovenia

100%

Switzerland

Turkey

54%

17%

Ukraine

44%

21%

Country

Sources: CRS, on the basis of data from Cedigaz (http://www.cedigaz.org), industry data provider, 2015; British

Petroleum (BP), Statistical Review of World Energy 2016, at http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energyeconomics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html; and U.S. Energy Information Administration, International

Energy Outlook 2016, at http://www.eia.gov/outlooks/ieo.

Notes: European Union member states are in bold.

Congressional Research Service

Russia: Background and U.S. Policy

Foreign Relations

In recent years, many Members of Congress and other U.S. policymakers have paid growing

attention to Russia’s active and increasingly forceful foreign policy, both toward neighboring

states, such as Georgia and Ukraine, and in regard to operations further afield, such as the

intervention in Syria and interference in political processes in Europe and the United States.

These actions have even resurrected talk of a new Cold War.70

Although Russian foreign policy has been increasingly active, observers note that the principles

guiding it have been largely consistent since the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991. One principle is

to reestablish Russia as the center of political gravity for the post-Soviet region and to minimize

the military and political influence of rival powers, particularly NATO and more recently the EU.

A second principle is to establish Russia as one of a handful of dominant poles in global politics,

capable in particular of competing (and, where necessary, cooperating) with the United States.

Beyond these fundamentals, debates exist on a number of related issues. Such issues include

whether strong responses by outside powers can deter Russian aggression or whether these

responses run a risk of escalating conflict; how much states that disagree with Russia on key

issues can cooperate with Moscow; whether the Russian government is primarily implementing a

strategic vision or reacting to circumstances and the actions of others; and the extent to which the

Russian leadership takes actions abroad to strengthen its domestic position.

Russia and Other Post-Soviet States

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, one fundamental goal of Russian foreign policy has been

to retain and, where necessary, rebuild close ties with neighboring states that were once part of

the USSR. Many observers inside and outside Russia interpret this policy as laying claim to a

traditional sphere of influence. Although Russian policymakers avoid reference to a sphere of

influence, they have used comparable terms at various times. In the early 1990s, Russia’s foreign

minister and other officials employed the term near abroad to describe Russia’s post-Soviet

neighbors, and in 2008 President (and current Prime Minister) Dmitry Medvedev referred to

Russia’s neighbors as constituting a “region” where Russia has “privileged interests.”71

The original mechanism for reintegrating the post-Soviet states was the Commonwealth of

Independent States (CIS), which was established by the Presidents of Russia, Belarus, and

Ukraine in December 1991. The CIS includes as members or participants all post-Soviet states

except the Baltics (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, all now NATO and EU members) and

Georgia.72 The organization has had limited success in promoting regional integration, however.

See, for example, Dmitri Trenin, “Welcome to Cold War II,” Foreign Policy, March 4, 2014, at

http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/03/04/welcome-to-cold-war-ii, and James Stavridis, “Are We Entering a New Cold

War?,” Foreign Policy, February 17, 2016, at http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/17/are-we-entering-a-new-cold-warrussia-europe.

William Safire, “On Language: The Near Abroad,” New York Times, May 22, 1994, at http://www.nytimes.com/

1994/05/22/magazine/on-language-the-near-abroad.html; Economist, “Medvedev on Russia’s Interests,” September 1,

2008, at http://www.economist.com/blogs/certainideasofeurope/2008/09/medvedev_on_russias_interests.

The full members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan,

Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Neither Turkmenistan nor Ukraine signed the CIS charter in

1993, although both countries participate in the organization (Turkmenistan considers itself an “associate member”).

Georgia withdrew from the CIS after its 2008 war with Russia.

Congressional Research Service

Russia: Background and U.S. Policy

Russia has had relatively more success developing multilateral relations with a narrower circle of

states. In recent years, Russia has mainly accomplished this aim via two institutions: the

Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a security alliance that includes Russia,

Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, and the Eurasian Economic Union

(EEU), an evolving single market that includes all CSTO members except Tajikistan (a

prospective candidate).73

Current members of these organizations mostly have joined voluntarily, if not always

enthusiastically.74 Their goals in joining have been diverse. Although these aims could include the

facilitation of trade and investment, as well as protection against a variety of external threats

(including terrorism and drug trafficking), they also may include a desire to accommodate Russia,

ensure opportunities for labor migration, promote intergovernmental subsidies, and bolster regime

security.

Russia dominates both the CSTO and the EEU. It has around 75% of the EEU’s total population,

approximately 85% of EEU members’ total GDP, and more than 95% of CSTO members’ military

expenditures.75 Russia maintains active bilateral economic, security, and political relations with

CSTO and EEU member states, and observers often consider these bilateral ties to be of greater

significance than Russia’s multilateral relations within these two institutions. Russia’s main

military facilities in CSTO member states consist of bases in Tajikistan, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan

and radar stations in Belarus and Kazakhstan.

Russia’s relations with its CSTO and EEU partners are not always smooth. In addition to

expressing differences over the principles and rules of the two institutions, Russia’s closest

partners have been reluctant to bind themselves entirely to Russia on matters of foreign policy

and economic development. None of them followed Russia’s lead in recognizing Georgia’s

breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states in 2008. Russia secured

relatively greater support from partners in its annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea region. In March

2014, Armenia and Belarus voted with Russia (and eight other states) to reject United Nations

General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 68/262, which affirmed Ukraine’s territorial integrity. In

December 2016, Armenia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan voted with Russia (and 19 other states) to

reject UNGA Resolution 71/205, which “condemn[ed] the temporary occupation” of Crimea and

reaffirmed nonrecognition of its annexation.76

For more on the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), see CRS In Focus IF10309, Eurasian Economic Union, by

(name redacted) .

The most visible reluctance concerned Armenia’s membership in the EEU. The Armenian government, which was

planning to conclude an association agreement with the EU, abruptly reversed course and declared its intent to join the

EEU after a meeting of the Russian and Armenian presidents in September 2013. Kyrgyz President Almazbek

Atambayev referred to EEU membership as “the lesser of two evils.” TASS, “No Option for Kyrgyzstan But to Join

Customs Union—Kyrgyzstan President,” October 27, 2014, at http://tass.com/economy/756666.

Stratfor, “Why the Eurasian Union Will Never Be the EU,” September 17, 2016, at https://www.stratfor.com/

analysis/why-eurasian-union-will-never-be-eu; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Military Expenditure

Database (2015), at https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex.

U.N. General Assembly Resolution 68/262 passed 100-11, with 58 abstentions. Kazakhstan abstained, whereas

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were absent. Resolution 71/205 passed 73-23, with 76 abstentions, including by Kyrgyzstan

and Tajikistan. U.N. General Assembly Resolution A/RES/68/262, “Territorial Integrity of Ukraine,” March 27, 2014,

at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/68/262; U.N. General Assembly Resolution

A/RES/71/205, “Situation of Human Rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol

(Ukraine),” December 19, 2016, at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/71/205. The voting

records are available at, respectively, https://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/html/world/middleeast/voting.pdf, and

http://www.un.org/en/ga/third/71/docs/voting_sheets/L.26.pdf.

Congressional Research Service

Russia: Background and U.S. Policy

Russia’s partners also have cultivated strong ties with other countries. Kazakhstan, in particular,

has developed strong relations with China and the West, particularly in the energy sector. China is

the largest trading partner of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Although Armenia and Belarus have

close bilateral relations with Russia in the security and economic spheres, they also have

established economic ties to Europe, and Belarus’s authoritarian leader Alexander Lukashenko

periodically criticizes Russia for what he considers unfair bilateral trading practices and strongarm diplomacy. Both Armenia and Kazakhstan have established institutional partnerships with

NATO; Armenia is a troop contributor to the NATO-led Kosovo Force and Resolute Support

Mission in Afghanistan. For more than 13 years, Kyrgyzstan hosted a major military base and

transit center for coalition troops fighting in Afghanistan.

Russia also has partnerships with three post-Soviet states that are not members of the CSTO or

the EEU: Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. These three states have opted to pursue

independent foreign policies and do not seek membership in Russian-led or other security and

economic blocs.77 Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are significant energy producers; they partner

with Russia but also have developed major alternative transit routes for oil (in Azerbaijan’s case)

and natural gas. In addition, Russia has cultivated a partnership with Uzbekistan, although the

latter competes with Kazakhstan for regional leadership in Central Asia and has long-standing

disputes with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

Russia’s relations with Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine have been the most difficult. These three

states have sought to cultivate close ties with the West. Georgia has consistently pursued NATO

membership and served as one of NATO’s closest nonallied partners in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Moldova and Ukraine are also close NATO partners.78 All three states have concluded association

agreements with the EU that include the establishment of free-trade areas and encourage

harmonization with EU laws and regulations.

Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine also have territorial conflicts with Russia, which stations military

forces within these states’ territories without their consent (see Figure 4, below). Since the first

years of independence, Georgia and Moldova have confronted separatist regions supported by

Moscow (in Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia; in Moldova, Transnistria). Following a steady

worsening of relations with Georgia, together with increasing clashes between Georgian and

separatist forces, Russia went to war with Georgia in August 2008 to prevent Georgia from

reestablishing control over South Ossetia. The war resulted in the expulsion of Georgian residents

and the destruction of their villages, as well as Russian recognition of the independence of South

Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russia has periodically imposed embargoes on key imports from Georgia

and Moldova, although both states have managed to partially normalize relations with Russia.

Moldova’s current president, Igor Dodon, seeks to reorient Moldova closer to Russia, although

his formal powers to do so are relatively limited in Moldova’s political system.

Turkmenistan is constitutionally neutral. Uzbekistan was a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization

from 2006 to 2012. Azerbaijan contributes troops to the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan.

At the April 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, NATO members agreed that Georgia and Ukraine would “become

members of NATO.” In 2010, Ukraine adopted a “non-bloc” (i.e., nonaligned) status, but its parliament rejected that

status in December 2014, after Russia’s annexation of Crimea and support of separatists in eastern Ukraine. NATO,

“Bucharest Summit Declaration,” April 3, 2008, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm; Steven

Pifer, “Ukraine Overturns Its Non-bloc Status: What Next with NATO?,” Kyiv Post, December 26, 2014, at

https://www.kyivpost.com/article/opinion/op-ed/steven-pifer-ukraine-overturns-its-non-bloc-status-what-next-withnato-376208.html.

Congressional Research Service

Russia: Background and U.S. Policy

Ukraine Conflict79

Many observers consider that of all the postSoviet states, Ukraine has been the most

difficult for Russia to accept as fully

independent.80 Even before 2014, the RussianUkrainian relationship suffered turbulence,

with disputes over Ukraine’s ties to NATO and

the EU, the status of Russia’s Crimea-based

Black Sea Fleet, and the transit of Russian

natural gas via Ukraine to Europe. Under

Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych

(2010-2014), such disputes were largely

papered over. By the end of 2013, Yanukovych

appeared to make a decisive move toward

Russia, postponing the conclusion of an

association agreement with the EU and

agreeing to substantial financial assistance

from Moscow.

The decision to postpone Ukraine’s agreement

with the EU was a catalyst for the so-called

Euromaidan protests, which led to a

government crackdown on demonstrators,

violent clashes between protestors and

government forces, and eventually the demise

of the Yanukovych regime. Ukraine’s armed

conflict with Russia emerged soon after

Yanukovych fled to Russia in February 2014.

Moscow annexed Crimea the next month and

facilitated the rise of new separatist

movements in eastern Ukraine (the Donetsk

and Luhansk regions, together known as the

Donbas, see Figure 3). In late August 2014,

Russia stepped up support to separatists in

reaction to a new Ukrainian offensive.

Summary of Minsk-2 Provisions

1. Immediate and full bilateral cease-fire.

2. Withdrawal of all heavy weapons by both sides.

3. Effective international monitoring regime.

4. Dialogue on (a) modalities of local elections in

accordance with Ukrainian legislation and (b) the future

status of certain districts in Donetsk and Luhansk.

5. Pardon and amnesty via a law forbidding persecution

and punishment of persons involved in the conflict.

6. Release of all hostages and other illegally detained

people based on a principle of “all for all.”

7. Safe delivery of humanitarian aid to those in need,

based on an international mechanism.

8. Restoration of full social and economic links with

affected areas.

9. Restoration of full Ukrainian control over its border

with Russia alongside the conflict zone, beginning from

the first day after local elections and ending after the

introduction of a new constitution and permanent

legislation on the special status of districts in Donetsk

and Luhansk.

10. Withdrawal of all foreign armed groups, weapons,

and mercenaries from Ukrainian territory and

disarmament of all illegal groups.

11. Constitutional reform in Ukraine, including

decentralization and permanent legislation on the special

status of districts in Donetsk and Luhansk.

12. Local elections in districts of Donetsk and Luhansk,

to be agreed upon with representatives of those districts

and held according to OSCE standards.

13. Intensification of the work of the Trilateral Contact

Group (Ukraine, Russia, OSCE), including through

working groups on implementation of the Minsk

agreements.

In September 2014, the leaders of France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine, together with separatist

representatives, negotiated a cease-fire agreement, the Minsk Protocol (named after the city

where it was reached). However, the protocol failed to end fighting or prompt a political

resolution to the crisis.

The parties met again in February 2015 and reached a more detailed cease-fire agreement known

as Minsk-2. This agreement mandates a total cease-fire, the withdrawal of heavy weapons and

This section draws on CRS Report RL33460, Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy, by (name redacted) .

In 2008, a Russian newspaper alleged that Putin told President George W. Bush “that Ukraine is not even a state.

What is Ukraine? Part of its territories is Eastern Europe, but the greater part is a gift from us.” James Marson, “Putin

to the West: Hands off Ukraine,” Time, May 25, 2009, at http://content.time.com/time/world/article/

0,8599,1900838,00.html. The original article was published in Kommersant, April 7, 2008 (in Russian), at

http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/877224.

Congressional Research Service

Russia: Background and U.S. Policy

foreign troops and fighters, and full Ukrainian control over its border with Russia, among other

provisions (see “Summary of Minsk-2 Provisions” box).

Figure 3. Separatist Regions in Eastern Ukraine

Sources: Graphic produced by CRS. Map information generated by (name redacted) using data from the

National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (2016), the Department of State (2015), and geographic data companies

Esri (2014) and DeLorme (2014).

To date, most observers perceive that little has been achieved in implementing the provisions of

Minsk-2, despite commitments made by all sides. Although the conflict’s intensity has subsided at

various times, a new round of serious fighting arose at the end of January 2017 and lasted for

several days. As of mid-May 2017, the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights

estimated that the conflict had led to at least 10,090 combat and civilian fatalities.81

Moscow officially denies Russia’s involvement in the conflict outside of Crimea, where there are

an estimated 28,000-29,000 Russian troops; most observers agree, however, that Russia has

unofficially deployed troops to fight, helped recruit Russian “volunteers,” and supplied Donbas

The Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights estimated that this figure includes at least 2,777

civilian deaths (including the 298 individuals who died in the July 17, 2014, shootdown of Malaysian Airlines Flight

17). Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine: 16

February 2017 to 15 May 2017, pp. 2, 7, at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/UAReport18th_EN.pdf.

Congressional Research Service

Russia: Background and U.S. Policy

separatists with weapons and armed vehicles.82 Estimates of the number of Russian troops in

eastern Ukraine have declined since their height in 2015.83 In March 2017 testimony to a Senate

Appropriations Subcommittee, Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs Pavlo Klimkin said that

there were now about 4,200 Russian troops in the region (together with around 40,000 militants,

presumably a combination of local and Russian fighters).84

NATO-Russia Relations85

The Ukraine conflict has heightened long-standing tensions between NATO and Russia. Three

days after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, then-NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh

Rasmussen declared that NATO could “no longer do business as usual with Russia.”86

Accordingly, Russian actions in Ukraine resulted in a series of actions by NATO and its members

intended to counter Moscow and to reassure Central and Eastern European allies that NATO will

protect them against potential future acts of Russian aggression.

Even before the Ukraine conflict, post-Cold War efforts to build a cooperative NATO-Russia

partnership had at best mixed results. Allies sought to assure a suspicious and skeptical Russia

that NATO did not pose a security threat or seek to exclude Russia from Europe. The principal

institutional mechanism for NATO-Russia relations is the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), which

was established in May 2002, five years after the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act provided the

formal basis for bilateral cooperation. Recognizing that NATO and Russia face many of the same

global challenges and share similar strategic priorities, Russian and NATO leaders structured the

NRC as a forum of equal member states, with goals that included political dialogue on security

issues, the determination of common approaches, and the conduct of joint operations.87 Formal

meetings of the NRC were suspended in April 2014 and resumed in 2016.

Prior to the suspension over events in Ukraine, NATO and Russia had identified a number of

areas for cooperation. In 2010, they endorsed a Joint Review of 21st Century Security Challenges,

intended to serve as a platform for cooperation.88 The review identified several common security

For a recent official Ukrainian estimate of the size and composition of the Russian military force in Crimea, see

Testimony of Pavlo Klimkin, in U.S. Congress, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and

Related Programs, Russian Policies & Intentions Toward Specific European Countries, hearings, 115th Cong., 1st sess.,

March 7, 2017. Transcript available at http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-5056818. For additional

background on Russia’s militarization of Crimea, see Reuters, “In Crimea, Russia Signals Military Resolve with New

and Revamped Bases,” November 1, 2016, and Dave Gilbert and Fred Pleitgen, “Russia Puts on Show of Military

Strength in Crimea,” CNN, September 9, 2016.

In March 2015, a few weeks after the Minsk-2 peace agreement was signed, the U.S. Army Europe Commander,

Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, estimated that there were around 12,000 Russian troops in eastern Ukraine. Reuters,

“Some 12,000 Russian Soldiers in Ukraine Supporting Rebels: U.S. Commander,” March 3, 2015. One detailed study

of the Russian military presence in Ukraine and combat deaths is James Miller et al., An Invasion by Any Other Name:

The Kremlin’s Dirty War in Ukraine, The Interpreter (Institute of Modern Russia), September 2016, at

http://www.interpretermag.com/an-invasion-by-any-other-name-the-kremlins-dirty-war-in-ukraine/.

Testimony of Pavlo Klimkin, in U.S. Congress, Russian Policies & Intentions Toward Specific European Countries,

March 7, 2017.

This section draws on CRS Report R43478, NATO: Response to the Crisis in Ukraine and Security Concerns in

Central and Eastern Europe, coordinated by (name redacted)

, and CRS Report R44550, NATO’s Warsaw Summit: In Brief,

by (name redacted)

NATO, “A Strong NATO in a Changed World,” speech by NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the

Brussels Forum, March 21, 2014, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_108215.htm.

NATO, “NATO-Russia Council,” April 15, 2016, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50091.htm.

NATO, “NATO-Russia Council Joint Statement,” November 20, 2010, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/

news_68871.htm.

Congressional Research Service

Russia: Background and U.S. Policy

challenges, including instability in Afghanistan, terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of

mass destruction. In the past, observers highlighted operations related to Afghanistan as a key

example of enhanced NATO-Russia cooperation. From 2009, Russia allowed the transit over its

territory (via air and land) of cargo for NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in

Afghanistan. In partnership with the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Russia and

NATO member states also jointly trained Afghan, Pakistani, and Central Asian counternarcotics

officers, with a view toward reducing narcotics transit to and through Russia. In 2011, NATO and

Russia established a Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund to provide maintenance training and

spare parts for Afghanistan’s Russian-produced helicopters.89

Nonetheless, disagreements within the alliance and between NATO and Russia persisted on some

core issues. In particular, although a 2010 agreement to pursue cooperation on missile defense

was seen as a significant breakthrough, ensuing negotiations were marked by disagreement and

increasingly vocal Russian opposition to NATO plans.

After Russia’s actions in Ukraine, NATO moved to implement what its leadership characterized

as the greatest reinforcement of NATO’s collective defense since the end of the Cold War.90

Measures taken to reassure allies in Central and Eastern Europe and to deter further Russian

aggression include the following:



New Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) of four multinational combat battalions

of about 1,000-1,200 troops each in Poland and the three Baltic states. The four

battalions, in operation since early 2017, are led by the United Kingdom (in

Estonia), Canada (Latvia), Germany (Lithuania), and the United States (Poland).

Significant increase in NATO military exercises in Central and Eastern Europe

and a bolstered naval and air presence, including through NATO’s Baltic Air

Policing mission.

Expansion of the NATO Response Force (NRF)—a multinational defense

force—from 13,000 to 40,000 troops and creation of a new rapid-reaction Very

High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) within the NRF of approximately 5,000

ground forces capable of deploying at short notice.

New command-and-control capacities in Central and Eastern Europe, including

multinational headquarters in Poland and Romania.

The United States has been a key architect of and contributor to NATO’s reassurance and

deterrence initiatives, and it has sought to bolster U.S. force posture in Europe in response to

Russian actions. The enhanced U.S. military presence in Eastern Europe—dubbed Operation

Atlantic Resolve—has primarily consisted of increased rotational deployments of air, ground, and

naval assets and a significant increase in military exercises.91 To fund these increased U.S.

military activities, Congress appropriated around $5.2 billion from FY2015 to FY2017 for a new

European Reassurance Initiative (ERI, also referred to as the European Deterrence Initiative). In

NATO, “NATO-Russia Counter-Narcotics Training Reaches Milestone,” April 19, 2012, at http://www.nato.int/cps/

en/natohq/news_86310.htm; NATO, “NATO-Russia Council Expands Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund Project for

Afghanistan,” April 23, 2013, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_100106.htm.

For details, see NATO, “Boosting NATO’s Presence in the East and Southeast,” updated August 11, 2017, at

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm; NATO, “NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence,” fact sheet,

May 2017, at http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_05/1705-factsheet-efp.pdf; NATO, “NATO

Response Force,” updated January 16, 2017, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49755.htm.

For details on Operation Atlantic Resolve, see the Department of Defense’s OAR website at http://www.defense.gov/

home/features/2014/0514_atlanticresolve/.

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Russia: Background and U.S. Policy

its proposed FY2018 budget, the Trump Administration requested $4.8 billion for ERI, a 40%

increase over the Obama Administration’s FY2017 request.

Recent Air and Sea Incidents

Since 2014, Russia has adopted an increasingly aggressive posture with its air and sea patrols and military exercises.

According to the Lithuanian Defense Ministry, for example, NATO fighter jets scrambled to intercept Russian aircraft

nearing or, in some cases, entering Baltic countries’ airspace 140 times in 2014, 160 times in 2015, and 110 times in

2016. A 2014 report by the European Leadership Network provided a list of selected “high risk” or “serious”

incidents during that year, including the following:



In March 2014, a Russian military reconnaissance aircraft flying with its transponder switched off to avoid

commercial radar came within 100 meters of colliding with an SAS 737 passenger plane taking off from

Copenhagen. Another similar episode occurred in December 2014.



On four separate instances during 2014, Russian fighter aircraft intercepted U.S. and Swedish reconnaissance

aircraft.



In April 2014, an unarmed Russian fighter aircraft made 12 low-altitude passes of the destroyer USS Donald Cook

in the Black Sea, coming within 1,000 meters at an altitude of 150 meters. In September 2014, Russian fighters

flew within 300 meters of the Canadian frigate HCMS Toronto in the Black Sea.



In June 2014, Russian aircraft approached the Danish island of Bornholm in what appeared to be a simulated

attack. In September 2014, Russian aircraft over the Labrador Sea practiced cruise-missile attacks against the U.S.

mainland and Russian aircraft violated Swedish airspace while conducting a mock bombing run.



In September 2014, Russian officials detained a Lithuanian shipping vessel operating in international waters in the

Barents Sea and towed it to Murmansk.



A “massive outburst” of Russian air activity occurred along NATO’s borders in October 2014 in conjunction

with a large Russian military aviation exercise.

Selected reported incidents from 2015 to 2017 include the following:



In June 2015, six unarmed SU-24s flew 500 meters from the destroyer USS Ross in international waters in the

Black Sea.



In October 2015, U.S. fighter aircraft intercepted two TU-142 reconnaissance/antisubmarine aircraft that

reportedly came within one nautical mile of the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan east of the Korean peninsula.



In January 2016, an SU-27 reportedly came within 5 meters of a U.S. RC-135 over the Black Sea.



On two occasions in April 2016, SU-27s came within 15-25 meters of a U.S. RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft in

international airspace over the Baltic Sea and reportedly performed a barrel roll over the top of the U.S. aircraft.



On two other occasions in April 2016, Russian SU-24 bombers made several low-altitude passes of the USS

Donald Cook in the Baltic Sea, reportedly coming within 10 meters of colliding with the ship.



In September 2016, an SU-27 fighter aircraft intercepted a U.S. Navy P-8 conducting routine operations in

international airspace over the Black Sea, reportedly coming within 3 meters of a collision at one point.



In September 2016, fighter jets from Norway, the United Kingdom (UK), France, and Spain consecutively

intercepted two TU-160 bombers that flew near Norway and onward near the UK, Ireland, France, and Spain.



In February 2017, an SU-24 fighter aircraft flew within 200 meters of the USS Porter guided missile destroyer in

the Black Sea. Another two SU-24 aircraft and an IL-38 maritime patrol aircraft also flew near the destroyer.



In April and May 2017, U.S. fighter aircraft intercepted Russian Tu-95 bombers, IL-38 maritime patrol aircraft,

and Su-35 fighter aircraft near Alaska in five separate incidents, including on four consecutive days in April. These

were reportedly the first such flights since 2015.



In May 2017, an SU-27 fighter aircraft flew within approximately 6 meters of a U.S. Navy P-8 surveillance plane

over the Black Sea. Despite the close distance (around 20 feet), a U.S. Navy spokesperson characterized the

encounter as “safe and professional.”



In June 2017, an SU-27 fighter aircraft flew within 1.5 meters (5 feet) of a U.S. RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft

over the Baltic Sea in an encounter a U.S. official referred to as “unsafe.”

Sources: Damien Sharkov, “NATO: Russian Aircraft Intercepted 110 Times Above Baltic in 2016,” Newsweek,

January 4, 2017; European Leadership Network, “Dangerous Brinkmanship: Close Military Encounters Between Russia

and the West in 2014,” November 2014; and European Leadership Network, “Russia-West Dangerous Brinkmanship

Continues,” March 12, 2015; additional media reports (full citation information available from the author).

Note: Prepared with (name redacted), Analyst in European Affairs

Congressional Research Service

Russia: Background and U.S. Policy

EU-Russia Relations92

Like NATO, the EU has had to reconsider its relationship with a more assertive Russia and the

implications for European security and stability. Especially after the July 2014 shootdown of

Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 over Ukraine, the EU closely coordinated with the United States in

imposing sanctions on Russia (see “U.S. Sanctions on Russia,” below). Even after the imposition

of sanctions, Russia is the EU’s fourth-largest trade partner (behind the United States, China, and,

since 2015, Switzerland) and main supplier of natural gas (see Table 2, above).

Crafting common EU policies has been challenging, given various EU member states’ different

national histories and economic relations with Russia. Many in the EU have long advocated for a

pragmatic “strategic partnership” with Russia based largely on commercial and energy ties, as

well as practical cooperation on certain foreign policy issues. Others, such as Poland and the

Baltic states, by contrast, have tended to view Russia more as a potential threat to themselves and

their neighbors.

The sharpness of such divisions within the EU appeared to diminish before 2014, but Russia’s

annexation of Crimea caused a distinct shift in perceptions across the board. Pragmatists moved

more into alignment with those who have tended to view Russia with greater wariness.

Furthermore, many in Europe have expressed concern about Russia’s efforts to expand its

influence on the continent by other than military means. Media reports and outside experts

contend that the Russian government is seeking to influence European political discourse,

policymaking, and electoral processes with an array of tools. Such measures reportedly have

included the use of disinformation, the spread of fake news, cyberattacks on government or

political party computer systems, and the cultivation of relations with European political parties

and allies broadly sympathetic to Russian views. Efforts by the Russian government to influence

Europe’s political landscape appear aimed at sowing disunity and destabilizing the EU and

NATO.

In recent years, a new and increasingly evident ideological link has appeared between European

far-right parties and the Russian leadership.93 Most of these far-right parties tend to be

antiestablishment and anti-EU, and they often share some combination of extreme nationalism; a

commitment to “law and order” and traditional family values; and anti-immigrant, anti-Semitic,

or anti-Islamic sentiments. A few parties on the left or far left also appear to harbor more friendly

views toward Russia.

Concrete evidence of direct financial support from the Russian government to European political

parties is difficult to identify. Widespread speculation exists, however, that the Russian

government has funneled money through Russian banks or other organizations and individuals to

far-right parties in Europe. Many suggest that Russia also has been proactive in offering

organizational expertise, political know-how, and media assistance to parties on Europe’s far

right. Russian support reportedly has included establishing and coordinating pro-Russian parties,

nongovernmental civil organizations, and think tanks, and supporting friendly media outlets.94

This section was coauthored with (name redacted), Specialist in European Affairs. Also see

CRS Report R44249, The

European Union: Current Challenges and Future Prospects, by (name redacted).

See, for example, Dalibor Rohac, Edit Zgut, and Lorant Gyori, Populism in Europe and Its Russian Love Affair,

American Enterprise Institute, January 2017, at http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Populism-in-Europeand-Its-Russian-Love-Affair.pdf; and Alina Polyakova et al., The Kremlin’s Trojan Horses, Atlantic Council,

November 2016, at http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/kremlin-trojan-horses.

Political Capital Institute, The Russian Connection: The Spread of Pro-Russian Policies on the European Far Right,

(continued...)

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Russia: Background and U.S. Policy

Many experts note that the Russian government under Putin has become very sophisticated in its

efforts to exert influence in Europe. At the same time, analysts point out that many European

countries have been dealing with Russian disinformation and political meddling for decades,

although they acknowledge that Russia’s digital and cyber capabilities have greatly increased in

recent years.

Russia-China Relations95

Russia and China have many reasons to cooperate. Both countries have a desire to counter what

they see as U.S. hegemony, regionally and worldwide. Both are wary of the U.S. military

presence in Asia and often criticize U.S. efforts to upgrade the United States’ defense capabilities

with its treaty allies, Japan and South Korea. Both hold vetoes on the U.N. Security Council and

often work together to adjust or oppose U.N. Security Council resolutions that are supported by

Western states.

China and Russia are far from embracing a full alliance with one another, however. To a large

extent, the partnership depends on external events in a web of relationships around the world.

U.S. behavior may be the largest variable: to the extent that China and Russia feel the United

States is challenging their strategic space, they may feel driven to develop stronger relations. In

recent years, Beijing has not wanted to enter into an explicitly anti-Western alliance; its trade

volume with the United States dwarfs that with Russia, and it has been loath to confront the West

directly.

Russia’s intervention in Ukraine also has affected its relations with China. On the one hand, the

intervention drove closer cooperation and a strong show of solidarity as Western countries

imposed sanctions and attempted to isolate Putin diplomatically. On the other hand, it also created

an imbalance in the relationship, as Moscow’s need for Beijing’s support increased. Beijing also

appeared to be uneasy with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which was at odds with China’s official

statements concerning respect for the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of other

countries.

Tensions also have periodically risen because of a perception in Russia that large numbers of

Chinese migrants are crossing the border for possible economic opportunity in the sparsely

populated Russian Far East. Many observers assert that the numbers of Chinese in Russia are

much lower than suspected, and some suggest that the flow of Chinese migrants from Russia may

now be going in the other direction, given the comparative economic vibrancy of the Chinese

side.96

China is Russia’s largest trading partner, but Russia does not rank in China’s top 10 partners.

Trade between the two countries declined substantially in 2015, with Chinese exports to Russia

falling by more than 30% and Chinese imports from Russia falling by more than 20% (mostly due

to the steep drop in energy prices). In 2016, bilateral trade increased modestly, primarily on the

(...continued)

March 14, 2014, at http://politicalcapital.hu/library.php?article_read=1&article_id=100.

This section draws on CRS Report R44613, Northeast Asia and Russia’s “Turn to the East”: Implications for U.S.

Interests, by (name redacte d)

For example, Alexander Gabuev, Friends with Benefits? Russian-Chinese Relations After the Ukraine Crisis,

Carnegie Moscow Center, June 29, 2016, p. 23, at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/

CEIP_CP278_Gabuev_revised_FINAL.pdf.

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Russia: Background and U.S. Policy

basis of growing Chinese exports to Russia (whereas Russian imports to China declined by a

small amount).

Energy deals have played an important role in Russia and China’s partnership, particularly after

Moscow’s relations with the West soured after its actions in Ukraine. China has been willing to

sign large oil-for-loan deals with Russia, which has supplied around 14% of China’s crude oil

imports since 2012.97 In 2014, China and Russia signed an agreement to construct a major gas

pipeline, the “Power of Siberia,” which the two countries say will start transporting gas by the

end of 2019. Russia and China have discussed additional gas pipeline routes, although

construction plans have been repeatedly postponed.98

Russia-China security relations have advanced significantly in recent years. Under the auspices of

the multilateral Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Russia and China have held

increasingly large and sophisticated bilateral and multilateral military exercises, dubbed “Peace

Mission,” since 2005.99 They also have held joint naval drills since 2012, most recently in the

Mediterranean Sea and the Sea of Japan in 2015, the South China Sea in 2016, and the Baltic Sea

in 2017. Some analysts say that by holding these high-profile exercises, Beijing and Moscow

intend to send strong signals to the West, particularly the United States.100

Russia’s Intervention in Syria101

Russian military involvement in Syria dates back to the 1950s, when the former Soviet Union

courted Syrian nationalist rulers as a counterbalance to U.S. regional partners. Soviet and Russian

naval forces have accessed a facility at the Syrian port of Tartus since the early 1970s, using it as

a logistical hub to enable longer Mediterranean operations. Former Syrian President Hafez al

Asad (1971-2000) regularly hosted Soviet military and economic advisers but resisted Moscow’s

attempts to leverage Russian military assistance to gain greater or permanent access to shore

facilities. Before the start of Russia’s current intervention in Syria, Russian personnel continued

to be based in Syria to maintain Russian military equipment and train Syrians, although their

numbers fluctuated over time.

After the NATO-led 2011 military intervention in Libya, the Russian government came out more

strongly in support of President Bashar al Asad’s regime. Moscow supplied Damascus with

military and financial assistance. It also provided Asad with diplomatic support, insisting that

U.N. efforts to promote the establishment of a transitional government focus on brokering an

agreement between the Syrian government and rebel movements, rather than what the United

States and its allies typically characterized as the negotiated departure of Asad.102 Despite their

U.S. Energy Information Administration, “More Chinese Crude Oil Imports Coming from Non-OPEC Countries,”

April 14, 2017, at https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=30792.

Olesya Astakhova and Oksana Kobzeva, “Russia-China Talks Over New Gas Routes Stalled: Sources,” Reuters,

June 7, 2017, at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-china-energy-idUSKBN18Y1TX; Gazprom, “Russian Gas

Supplies to China via Power of Siberia to Start in December 2019,” July 4, 2017, at http://www.gazprom.com/press/

news/2017/july/article340477/.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization also includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and (since

June 2017) India and Pakistan. Afghanistan, Belarus, Iran, and Mongolia have observer status.

100

For details, see Richard Weitz, Parsing Chinese-Russian Military Exercises, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

War College, April 2015, at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1266.pdf.

101

This section was coauthored with Carla Humud, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, and Christopher Blanchard,

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs. For an overview of the Syria conflict, see CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict

in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, coordinated by (name redacted).

102

For background on Russia’s Syria policy, see Dmitri Trenin, The Mythical Alliance: Russia’s Syria Policy, Carnegie

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Russia: Background and U.S. Policy

differences, Russia and the United States cooperated in the United Nations and with the League

of Arab States in a fitful and unsuccessful string of peacemaking endeavors. In September 2013,

the Russian government made a surprise proposal to work with the United States in establishing

an international mission to remove chemical weapons from Syria as a way to avoid U.S. military

intervention.

Over the summer of 2015, Moscow began a gradual buildup of Russian personnel, combat

aircraft, and military equipment in Syria. Russia then began airstrikes in September,103 initially

focusing on Syrian opposition targets, including some groups reportedly backed by the United

States. In 2016, Russia expanded its targeting to include Islamic State forces, although it

continued to occasionally target U.S.-backed rebel groups. In addition, Russia continues to

resupply Syrian military forces, although Russian officials have stated they are merely fulfilling

existing contracts.

To date, airstrikes have constituted Russia’s primary offensive military effort in Syria. These

strikes have enabled forces loyal to Asad to reverse some opposition gains, particularly in and

around Aleppo. Russia’s introduction of advanced air defense systems in Syria also reportedly

constrains the ability of other aircraft to operate freely in the area and complicates proposals

calling for the establishment of a no-fly zone. At the same time, Russia has pushed for

cooperation between U.S. and Russian military forces in Syria against terrorist groups, which in

Russia’s view include a number of groups fighting the Asad government. Russian ground forces

in Syria appear to have played a limited combat role and seem to be focused primarily on

defending Russian bases and installations, although some may be embedded as advisers with

Syrian military forces.104

Russia’s transfer of modernized weapons systems to the Syrian military, which prior to the unrest

had relied on older Russian (or even Soviet-era) equipment, has bolstered the capabilities of Asad

government forces. It also has provided the Russian military with an opportunity to test new

weapons systems and a platform to market Russian equipment to potential regional buyers. In

early 2017, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu stated that Russia had tested 162 types of

weapons in Syria.105 Russian media have highlighted the performance of the T-90 battle tank in

Syria, claiming that it is able to withstand strikes from U.S.-made TOW missiles.106

Going forward, Russia may continue operations against Syrian rebel groups, with the aim of

weakening any credible or capable opposition to the Asad government. This course of action

(...continued)

Moscow Center, February 2013, at http://carnegie.ru/2013/02/12/mythical-alliance-russia-s-syria-policy-pub-50909;

and Samuel Charap, “Russia, Syria and the Doctrine of Intervention,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, vol. 55,

no. 1 (2013), pp. 35-41.

103

In October 2015, the United States and Russia signed a memorandum of understanding to establish a safety-of-flight

protocol for aircraft operating in the same airspace.

104

See Mark Galeotti and Jonathan Spyer, “Russia to Defend Core Syrian Government Areas,” IHS Jane’s Intelligence

Review, September 22, 2015; Jeffrey White, “Russia’s Military Strategy in Syria Becoming Clearer as Its Forces

Engage in Combat,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Watch 2503, October 9, 2015, at

http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/russias-military-strategy-in-syria-becoming-clearer-as-itsforces-engage-in; and Dmitry Gorenburg and Michael Kofman, “There Is No Russian Withdrawal from Syria,” War on

the Rocks, March 18, 2016, at https://warontherocks.com/2016/03/there-is-no-russian-withdrawal-from-syria/.

105

Lucian Kim, “Russian Defense Minister Says His Military Has Tested 162 Weapons In Syria,” NPR, February 23,

2017, at http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/02/23/516895124/russian-defense-minister-says-his-military-hastested-162-weapons-in-syria.

106

Mansur Mirovalev, “How Russia’s Military Campaign in Syria is Helping Moscow Market Its Weapons,” Los

Angeles Times, November 25, 2017, at http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-russia-weapons-20161118-story.html.

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Russia: Background and U.S. Policy

could place the Syrian regime in a stronger negotiating position vis-à-vis rebels, while also

accomplishing Russia’s goal of avoiding Western-led regime change in Syria. In the short term,

Russia potentially could extend its operations in Islamic State-held areas of central and eastern

Syria. Over the long term, Russia may seek to retain influence with the Syrian government by

continuing to advise and assist the Syrian military. Russia has agreements to maintain a long-term

presence at both the Tartus naval facility and the Hmeimim airbase in Latakia.

Russia has adopted an increasingly active role in political negotiations between the Syrian

government and opposition groups. Since January 2017, Russia, Turkey, and Iran have hosted

peace talks in Astana, Kazakhstan. During a fourth round of talks in early May, representatives of

Russia, Iran, and Turkey signed a memorandum calling for the creation of four “de-escalation

areas” in Syria.107 The memorandum stipulated that the de-escalation areas be administered by

forces from the three signatory countries, or “guarantors,” raising the possibility that these areas

might become de facto spheres of influence for Russia, Iran, or Turkey, and generate an additional

influx of personnel from those countries into Syria.108 Laying the groundwork for two of the four

de-escalation areas, Russia has deployed military police and set up monitoring stations in the

eastern suburbs of Damascus and in southwestern Syria, along the Jordanian border.109 The

planned de-escalation area in southwestern Syria emerged from a cease-fire deal brokered in July

by the United States, Russia, and Jordan.110

Analysts have offered a variety of motivations for Russia’s intervention in Syria.111 In general, the

series of losses suffered by forces of the Russian-backed Syrian government in 2015, U.S. and

other third-party security assistance to Syrian opposition groups, the growth of the Islamic State

organization in Syria, and the potential for broader U.S.-led coalition military operations all may

have contributed to Russia’s decision to enter the conflict directly.

In 2015, the prospect of Asad’s defeat had several negative implications for Russia. It would have

meant the loss of a key partner in the Middle East, a region in which Russia had begun to expand

its influence to help establish itself as a global power and peer competitor to the United States. It

also would have set another major precedent for a U.S. military-backed transition in the Middle

East after Iraq and Libya, something Moscow firmly opposed. Finally, Russian authorities

insisted that the final beneficiary of the Asad regime’s collapse would be the Islamic State and

other extremists who would be the likely victors in the ensuing contest for national power.

Such an outcome, in turn, could promote the spread of Islamist extremism to other countries,

including within Central Asia and Russia itself. Russian authorities have said that up to a few

thousand Russian citizens, predominantly from Muslim-populated republics in the North

Caucasus, have fought with the Islamic State and other extremist movements in Syria and Iraq.

107

The areas are to be located in four noncontiguous parts of Syria: Idlib Province and its surroundings, some parts of

northern Homs Province, eastern Ghouta in the Damascus suburbs, and parts of the southern provinces of Dar’a and

Quneitra.

108

A fifth round of talks in early July 2017 proved inconclusive, and the issue of where to draw the borders of the deescalation areas was postponed to a sixth round of talks scheduled for the end of August 2017.

109

Al-Araby al-Jadeed, “Russian Troops ‘Man Checkpoints’ in Syria’s Flash-Point Eastern Ghouta,” July 26, 2017, at

https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2017/7/26/russian-troops-man-checkpoints-in-syrias-flash-point-ghouta.

110

Jeff Mason and Denis Dyomkin, “Partial Ceasefire Deal Reached in Syria, in Trump’s First Peace Effort,” Reuters,

July 07, 2017, at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-ceasefire-idUSKBN19S2DG.

111

See, for example, Paul Stronski, “Russia’s Fight in Syria Reflects the Kremlin’s Fears at Home,” Reuters,

September 29. 2015, at http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/09/28/russias-fight-in-syria-follows-a-dangerouspattern, and Ekaterina Stepanova, Russia’s Policy on Syria After the Start of Military Engagement, Policy Memo No.

421, PONARS Eurasia, at http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/russias-policy-syria-after-start-military-engagement.

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Since Russia’s intervention, commanders once affiliated with the Al Qaeda-aligned Islamic

Emirate of the Caucasus, established in 2007, reportedly have pledged allegiance to the Islamic

State and formed a local affiliate, the Wilayah Kawkaz.

Russia’s leadership may have believed that intervention, although potentially risky, could help to

avoid these negative outcomes by shoring up the Asad regime, bolstering Russian influence, and

staving off the collapse of the state and a takeover by Islamist extremists. In addition, analysts

have suggested that international criticism and sanctions related to Russia’s actions in Ukraine

encouraged the Russian government to seek ways to reassert its global influence.112 By

intervening in Syria, Moscow could demonstrate its ability to project military power past its

immediate neighborhood, test existing and new capabilities, and make Russia an unavoidable

diplomatic player on an issue of significance to the United States and other countries.

Russia’s Global Engagement

With the exception of Russia’s relations with China and its Syria intervention, Russia’s foreign

policy priorities traditionally have focused primarily on the post-Soviet region and the West.

However, Russia (like the Soviet Union before it) actively pursues foreign relations on a global

scale. Russia plays a significant global role as one of five permanent members of the U.N.

Security Council. Until its annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia was a member of the Group of

Eight (G8), together with the West’s seven leading economies (including Japan).113 It is also a

member of BRICS, an alternative group of states with large economies that also includes Brazil,

India, China, and South Africa. In these and other international fora, Russia has engaged on

global issues such as nonproliferation (including combatting the nuclear weapons programs of

Iran and North Korea), counterterrorism, counterpiracy, and global health challenges. Russia is a

leading oil and gas exporter (see “Energy Sector,” above) and, over the last several years, the

second-largest major weapons exporter in the world (its top clients include India, China, Vietnam,

and Algeria).114 Russia has constructed nuclear power plants in Europe, Iran, India, and China,

with more under construction or planned.

In addition, Russia has cultivated a variety of bilateral partnerships around the globe. In Asia,

Russia also has cultivated good relations with Japan, with which it still has a territorial dispute

over islands Russia annexed at the end of World War II, as well as with India, Pakistan (more

recently), Afghanistan, Vietnam, and across Southeast Asia.115 In the Middle East, Russia’s Syria

intervention is exceptional in scope but reflects a long-standing policy of fruitful relations with

regional governments including Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, and Libya. In Latin America, Russia

has sought to reengage with Soviet-era partners Cuba and Nicaragua, as well as Venezuela,

Brazil, and others. In sub-Saharan Africa, Russia has not developed similarly strong relations;

however, it has begun to expand its focus on this region, where the Soviet Union used to have

several close partners.

112

For example, Stepanova, Russia’s Policy on Syria after the Start of Military Engagement; Joshua Yaffa, “Putin,

Syria, and Why Moscow Has Gone War-Crazy,” New Yorker, October 14, 2016, at http://www.newyorker.com/news/

news-desk/putin-syria-and-why-moscow-has-gone-war-crazy.

113

This group has since returned to the status of the Group of Seven (G7).

114

CRS Report R44716, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2008-2015, by (name redacted)

;

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), “Increase in Arms Transfers Driven by Demand in the

Middle East and Asia, says SIPRI,” February 20, 2017, at https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2017/increasearms-transfers-driven-demand-middle-east-and-asia-says-sipri.

115

For more on U.S.-Japan relations, see CRS Report R44613, Northeast Asia and Russia’s “Turn to the East”:

Implications for U.S. Interests, by (name redacte d)

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The Military116

Russia’s armed forces surprised most U.S. and European observers with their actions in Ukraine

starting in March 2014 and in Syria from September 2015. Since the end of the Cold War,

conventional wisdom about the Russian military has tended to indicate a force in relative decline,

with aging Soviet-era equipment and with technology and a philosophy of warfare lagging well

behind that of the United States and other NATO members. Analysts have noted that the

shortcomings of Russia’s military appeared to be confirmed by its relatively lackluster

performance in the 2008 conflict with Georgia (see “Russia and Other Post-Soviet States,”

above).

Over the past three years, however, many analysts have been struck by the improved capabilities

exhibited by the Russian military, as well as the unexpected ways in which Russia has used its

military:



Russian special forces, elite airborne troops, and naval infantry effected a swift

and bloodless seizure of Ukraine’s Crimea region in March 2014.

The subsequent Russian involvement in the conflict in eastern Ukraine

highlighted the practice of “hybrid warfare,” centered on the use of irregular

“separatist” forces covertly backed by regular military troops, along with an

information and propaganda campaign orchestrated to create misdirection and

spread an alternate international narrative.

The campaign in Syria, in addition to serving a number of broader Russian

interests and diplomatic objectives, has allowed Russia to test and display how

various components of its military work together in an expeditionary setting.

The Syria operation has demonstrated noteworthy capabilities, such as the launch

of long-range cruise missiles from naval vessels in the Caspian Sea and the

deployment of Russia’s most modern combat aircraft. It also has highlighted the

Russian military’s ability to effect “area denial” with an air defense “bubble” of

overlapping advanced missile systems.117

At the same time, Russia has been upgrading or constructing new facilities in the

Arctic and reactivating Soviet bases in the Arctic that fell into disuse with the end

of the Cold War. In December 2014, Russia launched a new Arctic Joint Strategic

Command. In addition, Russia has been forming two new brigades specializing

in Arctic warfare.

Over the past several years, Russia also has adopted an increasingly aggressive

posture with its air and sea patrols and military exercises (see “Recent Air and

Sea Incidents” text box, above).

116

This section was coauthored with (name redacted), Analyst in European Affairs.

Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Top NATO General: Russians Starting to Build Air Defense Bubble over Syria,”

Washington Post, September 29, 2015, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/09/29/top-natogeneral-russians-starting-to-build-air-defense-bubble-over-syria.

117

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Russia: Background and U.S. Policy

Russian Military Modernization

Since 2008, Russia’s military has undergone substantial reforms. The reform program has focused largely on

streamlining command structures and increasing professionalization, increasing unit combat readiness and personnel

training, and reequipping forces through an ambitious acquisition program. Although many of Russia’s reform efforts

have faced myriad challenges, partial reversals, and other setbacks, some of the efforts appear to have been at least

partly successful in achieving their objectives and yielding improved capabilities.

Russia also has pursued an ambitious modernization program as it steadily increased defense spending, at least until

2016, when the defense budget declined for the first time in years. In 2010, Russia announced a new 10-year State

Armaments Program (SAP) for 2011-2020, calling for approximately 20 trillion rubles in new weapons procurement

over that period. (This figure amounted to approximately $664 billion at the time but is approximately $333 billion as

of August 2017 due to depreciation of the ruble.) Prior to returning to the presidency in 2012, Prime Minister Putin

outlined the procurement goals of the SAP:

In the coming decade, Russian armed forces will be provided with over 400 modern land and seabased inter-continental ballistic missiles, 8 strategic ballistic missile submarines, about 20 multipurpose submarines, over 50 surface warships, around 100 military spacecraft, over 600 modern

aircraft including fifth generation fighter jets, more than 1,000 helicopters, 28 regimental kits of S400 air defense systems, 38 battalion kits of Vityaz missile systems, 10 brigade kits of Iskander-M

missile systems, over 2,300 modern tanks, about 2,000 self-propelled artillery systems and

vehicles, and more than 17,000 military vehicles.

The plan calls for upgrading 11% of military equipment each year, with a final goal of increasing the share of modern

weaponry to 70% of total inventory by 2020. For 2015, Putin related the expected share of “modern weapons” was

32% in the Army, 33% in the Air Force, 40% in airborne units, and “over 50%” in the Navy and aerospace defense

forces. Some analysts have questioned the definition of modern in this context, noting that in some cases the term

appears to include newer versions of older designs.

Although the SAP has achieved some significant results, the process also has faced considerable challenges and

encountered delays. Since 2014, the Russian economy has been negatively affected by falling oil prices and

international sanctions, with a prolonged recession accompanied by severe currency depreciation, high inflation, and

increased capital flight. The downturn has strained public finances and complicated long-term budgetary and planning

efforts. Accompanying an overall decline in defense spending from 2016, the approval of a new 30-trillion ruble

(currently over $500 billion) SAP for the period 2016-2025 was postponed until 2018 due to the instability of

economic conditions. Additionally, some analysts doubt that the Russian defense industry can produce and deliver the

full complement of equipment at the pace and scale envisioned by the SAP.

Sources: Dmitry Gorenburg, Russia’s State Armaments Program 2020: Is the Third Time the Charm for Military

Modernization?, Policy Memo No. 125, PONARS Eurasia, October 2010; Vladimir Putin, “Being Strong: National

Security Guarantees For Russia,” Rossiiskaya Gazeta, February 20, 2012; TASS, “Putin Prioritizes Task to Keep Pace of

Armed Forces Modernization,” May 12, 2015.

Russia’s Military Footprint in Europe

Russia’s Western Military District stretches from its border with Finland in the north to its border

with northeastern Ukraine and includes Kaliningrad, a Russian territorial exclave wedged

between Poland and Lithuania (see Figure 4). Officially, the Western Military District hosts

around 400,000 troops (or 40% of Russia’s total military forces). Unofficial estimates put the

number closer to 300,000 (total active military forces are estimated at around 830,000 in 2016).

The Western Military District includes the 6th Army, 20th Guards Army, and 1st Guards Tank

Army; the 6th Air Force and Air Defense Army, as well as Airborne Troops; the Baltic Fleet

(based in Kaliningrad), naval infantry, and coastal defense forces; and intelligence, support, and

special forces units.118 In May 2016, Russia announced plans to put two new divisions in the

118

The official number is from Russia’s Ministry of Defense, at http://structure.mil.ru/structure/okruga/west/

history.htm. For unofficial estimates, see International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2017,

February 13, 2017, pp. 211, 218-219; Anna Maria Dyner, “Russia Beefs Up Military Potential in the Country’s

Western Areas,” Polish Institute for International Affairs, June 13, 2016, at https://www.pism.pl/publications/bulletin/

(continued...)

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Russia: Background and U.S. Policy

Western Military District and another in the Southern Military District (Caucasus, Black Sea, and

Caspian region), totaling approximately 30,000 new troops.

Defense experts say that Russian forces stationed in the region, including surface ships,

submarines, and advanced S-400 air defense systems, could “allow [Russia] to effectively close

off the Baltic Sea and skies to NATO reinforcements.”119 According to a RAND report based on a

series of war games staged in 2014 and 2015, a quick Russian strike would be able to reach the

capitals of Estonia and Latvia in 36-60 hours.120

Kaliningrad is a key strategic territory for Russia, allowing the country to project military power

into NATO’s northern flank. The territory has a heavy Russian military presence, including the

Baltic Fleet and two airbases. In October 2016, the Russian Minister of Defense reported that

Russia had temporarily deployed Iskander short-range nuclear-capable missiles in the region,

something they have done in the past.121 Many consider the deployment to be a response to new

NATO deployments, and some observers suspect that Russia is planning to deploy the missiles to

Kaliningrad on a permanent basis.122 Sources close to the Russian military have said that it is

“part of a long-standing plan to modernize Russia’s non-nuclear ballistic missile system.”123

According to NATO officials, Russia is using Kaliningrad “to pursue what is known as an antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) strategy for surrounding areas. That involves a strategic layering of

surface-to-air missiles to block off NATO’s air access, if needed, to the three Baltic states and

about a third of Poland.” According to one Russian analyst, “Moscow’s plan for Kaliningrad is

not to flood it with troops and firepower, but to modernize its military infrastructure.”124 Analysts

also have observed that Kaliningrad’s geographic isolation creates the potential for a scenario

whereby Russia tries “to seize the 100-kilometer wide strip on the Polish-Lithuanian border

known as the Suwalki Gap that separates the exclave from Belarus, a Russian ally.”125

In addition to the increased militarization of its western flank, Russia has increased its military

presence in neighboring states. It has extensively militarized Ukraine’s occupied region of

Crimea, home of the Black Sea Fleet and an estimated 28,000-29,000 troops, around double the

number stationed there prior to Russia’s occupation (Russia used to lease naval facilities from

Ukraine).126 Russia also continues to sponsor and support separatist movements in eastern

(...continued)

no-35-885; and Andrey Frolov, “Russian Army in 2014 and Western Military District” (presentation), at

http://www.defmin.fi/files/2840/Andrey_Frolov_Russian_army_SPb_25_04_2014.pdf.

119

Henry Meyer, “Putin’s Military Buildup in the Baltic Stokes Invasion Fears,” Bloomberg, July 6, 2016, at

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-06/putin-s-military-buildup-in-the-baltic-stokes-invasion-fears.

120

David A. Shlapak and Michael W. Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank: Wargaming the

Defense of the Baltics, RAND Corporation, September 30, 2016, at http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/

RR1253.html.

121

Reuters, “Russia Moves Nuclear-Capable Missiles Into Kaliningrad,” October 8, 2016, at http://www.reuters.com/

article/us-russia-usa-missiles-confirm-idUSKCN1280IV.

122

Geoff Brumfiel, “Russia Seen Moving New Missiles To Eastern Europe,” NPR, December 8, 2016, at

http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/12/08/504737811/russia-seen-moving-new-missiles-to-eastern-europe.

123

Lidia Kelly, “Russia’s Baltic Outpost Digs in for Standoff with NATO,” Reuters, July 5, 2016, at

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-russia-kaliningrad-idUSKCN0ZL0J7.

124

Ibid.

125

Meyer, “Putin’s Military Buildup in the Baltic Stokes Invasion Fears.”

126

For a recent official Ukrainian estimate of the size and strength of the Russian military force in Crimea, see

Testimony of Pavlo Klimkin, in U.S. Congress, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and

Related Programs, Russian Policies & Intentions Toward Specific European Countries, hearings, 114th Cong., 1st sess.,

(continued...)

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Ukraine, including unofficially deploying as many as 12,000 troops to the region in 2015 and,

more recently, 4,200-7,500 troops, according to Ukrainian government sources.127

Russia also has stationed military forces in Georgia and Moldova without these states’ consent.

Since Russia’s 2008 war with Georgia, its military bases in the breakaway regions of Abkhazia

and South Ossetia have housed some 3,500-4,000 personnel each. In 2016, Russia finalized an

agreement with the de facto authorities of Abkhazia, establishing a combined group of military

forces in the occupied region. Earlier this year, Russia concluded an agreement with South

Ossetia to integrate the breakaway region’s military forces with its own. In Moldova, Russia

continues to deploy 1,500-2,000 troops in Transnistria (of which Moldova accepts a few hundred

as peacekeepers).128

Finally, Russia deploys military troops by consent on the territory of its longtime military ally

Armenia, which hosts some 3,300-5,000 Russian troops. In recent years, Armenia also has

concluded agreements with Russia to establish a joint air defense system and a combined group

of forces, both on the basis of previous arrangements.129

(...continued)

March 7, 2017. For additional background on Russia’s militarization of Crimea, see Reuters, “In Crimea, Russia

Signals Military Resolve with New and Revamped Bases,” November 1, 2016, at http://www.reuters.com/investigates/

special-report/russia-crimea, and Dave Gilbert and Fred Pleitgen, “Russia Puts on Show of Military Strength in

Crimea,” CNN, September 9, 2016, at http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/09/europe/crimea-war-games-pleitgen.

127

On estimates of Russian troops in Ukraine, see Reuters, “Some 12,000 Russian Soldiers in Ukraine Supporting

Rebels: U.S. Commander,” March 3, 2015, at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-russia-soldiersidUSKBN0LZ2FV20150303; Bellingcat, Russia’s War in Ukraine: The Medals and Treacherous Numbers: A

Bellingcat Investigation, August 31, 2016, at https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2016/08/31/russias-warukraine-medals-treacherous-numbers; RFE/RL, “Kyiv Says Russia Has at Least 5,000 Troops in Eastern Ukraine,”

November 29, 2016, at http://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-russia-troops-crimea/28146059.html; Testimony of Pavlo

Klimkin, in U.S. Congress, Russian Policies & Intentions Toward Specific European Countries, March 7, 2017 (see

transcript available at http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-5056818); and International Institute of

Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2017, p. 224.

128

International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2017, February 13, 2017, p. 224; Ekaterina

Zgirovskaya, “Global Presence,” Gazeta.ru, December 16, 2015 (in Russian), at https://www.gazeta.ru/army/2015/12/

16/7972523.shtml.

129

Emil Danielyan, “Russia, Armenia Agree to Boost Joint Military Force,” Azatutyun.am (RFE/RL), November 30,

2016; Eduard Abrahamyan, “Russia and Armenia Establish Joint Ground Forces,” CACI Analyst, December 16, 2016;

International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2017; Nikolai Litovkin, “Russia and Armenia To

Create Joint Defense Force in Caucasus,” Russia Beyond the Headlines, November 16, 2016.

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Russia: Background and U.S. Policy

Figure 4. Russia’s Military Footprint in Europe

Sources: Graphic produced by CRS. Map information generated by (name redacted) using data from the

Department of State (2015 and 2016); geographic data companies ArcWorld (2014) and DeLorme (2014); and

the U.S. interagency Humanitarian Information Unit (2016); and IISS Military Balance (2017).

Strategic and Snap Military Exercises

In recent years, Russia has significantly increased the frequency of large-scale strategic exercises and short-notice snap

drills, serving to bolster the readiness of its forces, rehearse for a variety of contingencies in its neighborhood, and

gain experience in the rapid redeployment of large numbers of personnel and equipment. In 2009, Russia alarmed

many U.S. and European observers with exercises rehearsing an attack on Poland and the Baltic states and culminating

in a simulated nuclear strike on Warsaw. In March 2013, according to NATO officials, the Russian Air Force

conducted a mock nuclear strike against Sweden. An exercise in western Russia involving 150,000 troops in FebruaryMarch 2014 unfolded in conjunction with the seizure of Crimea. At the tactical level, smaller-scale unit exercises and

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Russia: Background and U.S. Policy

live-fire exercises reportedly also have increased in frequency.

NATO officials assert that Russia staged about a dozen unannounced, large-scale, snap military drills in 2015-2016,

including in the run-up to the July 2016 NATO summit in Warsaw. Besides testing units’ readiness for battle,

mobilization procedures, equipment, and command systems, the exercises were presumed to be a signal to NATO

through the display of forces and weaponry. NATO countries such as Poland, Romania, and the Baltics have been

concerned about a repeat of tactics used during the takeover of Crimea, with putative exercises morphing into an

actual assault operation.

Russia’s next major strategic exercise, Zapad-2017 (West-2017), is scheduled for September 2017, raising concerns

among Russia’s western neighbors. Regularly scheduled every four years, the exercise will take place in western

Russia, including Kaliningrad, as well as in Belarus. It is estimated that some 70,000-100,000 troops will participate.

This is a far greater number than were involved in the last Zapad exercise in 2013 but similar to the number of

participants in last year’s major strategic exercise in southern Russia, Kavkaz-2016.

Sources: Matthew Day, “Russia ‘Simulates’ Nuclear Attack on Poland,” The Daily Telegraph, November 1, 2009;

Testimony of Ian J. Brzezinski, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, United States Policy on Europe,

hearings, 114th Cong., 1st sess., April 28, 2015; Gustav Gressel, Russia’s Quiet Military Revolution, and What It Means For

Europe, European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2015; Edward Lucas, The Coming Storm: Baltic Sea Security

Report, Center for European Policy Analysis, June 2015; additional media reports (full citation information available

from the author).

U.S. Policy Toward Russia

For more than 25 years, the U.S.-Russian relationship has gone through positive and negative

periods. The spirit of the U.S.-Russian “strategic partnership” forged by Presidents Bill Clinton

and Boris Yeltsin in the early 1990s was gradually overtaken by increasing tension and mutual

recrimination, in large part as a consequence of disagreements over Russia’s efforts to reestablish

a sphere of influence in the post-Soviet region, U.S. promotion of NATO enlargement to Central

and Eastern Europe, and NATO’s military intervention in the former Yugoslavia in the mid-1990s.

Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin believed they could restore U.S.-Russian

relations, particularly in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The two

countries reshaped their relationship on t

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