What Is “Building Partner Capacity?” Issues for Congress
Congressional research reportDec 18, 2015
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What Is “Building Partner Capacity?”
Issues for Congress
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Analyst in International Security
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Section Research Manager
December 18, 2015
Congressional Research Service
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What Is “Building Partner Capacity?” Issues for Congress
Summary
Since 2001, successive U.S. administrations have increasingly prioritized efforts to build foreign
security forces—particularly in weak and failing states—arguing that doing so advances U.S.
national security objectives. In turn, the Department of Defense (DOD) has invested billions of
dollars in “Building Partner Capacity,” a term that refers to a broad set of missions, programs,
activities, and authorities intended to improve the ability of other nations to achieve those
security-oriented goals they share with the United States. As a consequence, these efforts and
programs have been a growing focus of Congressional attention. Many partner capacity building
programs and activities have their roots in the post-World War II period, if not well before, yet
today they are implemented more widely, and often with greater resourcing, than efforts prior to
September 11, 2001. Indeed, building partner capacity was a central feature of the 2003-2010 Iraq
campaign, and is a core component of the ongoing current campaigns both in Afghanistan to
counter Al Qaeda and the Taliban, and in Iraq/Syria to counter the Islamic State.
Recent events, particularly the battle between the Afghan government and the Taliban over
Konduz, the inability of DOD-led efforts to produce more than a “handful” of anti-Assad, antiIslamic State (IS) forces in Syria, and the collapse of U.S.-trained forces in Iraq in the face of the
Islamic State, have called into question—including in Congress—whether these BPC programs
can ever achieve their desired effects. CRS surveyed the publicly available literature on the
subject, and found the debate on the strategic effectiveness of BPC and related programs nascent,
at best. While a variety of studies explore programmatic effectiveness, very few explore what the
United States sought to achieve when engaging in a BPC effort, and whether or not doing so led
to desirable outcomes.
The increasing emphasis that the U.S. government is placing on BPC as a means to achieve
strategic goals, combined with the paucity of the literature on this subject, prompted CRS to
explore the historical track record of BPC efforts to help determine whether they produced
outcomes consistent with U.S. strategic objectives. Twenty case studies since World War II were
explored; each was grouped according to one of seven strategic goals that U.S. sought to
accomplish. These goals included
victory in war/war termination,
managing regional security challenges,
indirectly supporting a party to a conflict,
conflict mitigation,
enhancing coalition participation,
building institutional and interpersonal linkages, and
alliance building.
Given that U.S. leaders often argue that a BPC effort could help accomplish more than one of the
above goals, determining what constitutes the “primary” strategic objective for a given BPC
effort required analytic judgment. CRS organized the cases according to public statements at the
time, with particular attention paid to how leaders described the purpose of the BPC effort.
Effectiveness was judged based on two criteria: whether the strategic goal was achieved, and
whether the effort produced unintended consequences that were obviously and meaningfully
damaging to U.S. national interests. Within the case studies explored, BPC was least effective as
a tool for allowing the United States to extract itself from conflict (victory in war/war
termination). However, it was most effective as a tool for building interpersonal and institutional
linkages, and for alliance building.
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What Is “Building Partner Capacity?” Issues for Congress
Contents
Introduction: Why Is Building Partner Capacity of Interest to Congress? ...................................... 1
Potential Key Issues for Congress ................................................................................................... 2
Explaining Effectiveness? ......................................................................................................... 3
What Is “Building Partner Capacity”? ............................................................................................ 5
DOD Activities That Build Partner Capacity ............................................................................ 5
BPC in National Strategy .......................................................................................................... 6
How DOD Executes BPC Strategies......................................................................................... 8
DOD and Congressional Interpretations of BPC .................................................................... 12
Is Building Partner Capacity Effective? ........................................................................................ 15
Rationale: BPC as an Exit Strategy from Wars ............................................................................. 17
Case Study: Vietnam (1954-1973) .......................................................................................... 18
Case Study: Afghanistan (2001-2015) .................................................................................... 20
Case Study: Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003-2010) ................................................................ 23
Analysis ................................................................................................................................... 25
Rationale: BPC for Managing Regional Security Challenges ....................................................... 26
Case Study: U.S. Support to the African Union and the African Union Mission in
Somalia (2005-Present) ........................................................................................................ 26
Case Study: U.S. Assistance to Mali (2002-2015) .................................................................. 29
Case Study: U.S. Support to the Former Warsaw Pact (1994-Present) ................................... 30
Case Study: U.S. Security Assistance to Pakistan: 2002-Present............................................ 31
Analysis ................................................................................................................................... 33
Rationale: BPC to Indirectly Strengthen a Party to an Internal Conflict ....................................... 34
Case Study: The United States and the Philippines (1947-1953)............................................ 34
Case Study: U.S. Intervention in the Soviet-Afghan War (1980-1988) .................................. 35
Case Study: U.S. Assistance to Colombia (2000-2015) .......................................................... 36
Analysis ................................................................................................................................... 38
Rationale: BPC for Conflict Mitigation ........................................................................................ 38
Case Study: BPC to Mitigate Conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995-2002) ................... 38
Case Study: BPC to Prevent the Re-emergence of Conflict between Egypt and Israel .......... 39
Analysis ................................................................................................................................... 41
Rationale: BPC for Military Coalition Participation ..................................................................... 42
Case Study: Vietnam and the “Many Flags” Initiative ............................................................ 42
Case Study: Coalition Participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom............................................ 43
Case Study: Coalition Participation in Operation Enduring Freedom/International
Security Assistance Force .................................................................................................... 44
Analysis ................................................................................................................................... 44
Rationale: BPC to Build Institutional and Interpersonal Linkages ............................................... 44
Case Study: The Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (1995-Present) ............................. 45
Case Study: International Military Education and Training .................................................... 47
Analysis ................................................................................................................................... 49
Rationale: BPC for Alliance Building ........................................................................................... 49
Case Study: BPC in Greece to Support NATO (1947-1952) .................................................. 49
Case Study: BPC in Korea to Support the United Nations (1948-1950) ................................ 52
Case Study: BPC to Build Alliances in the Former Warsaw Pact (1992-2010) ...................... 53
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What Is “Building Partner Capacity?” Issues for Congress
Analysis ................................................................................................................................... 54
Study Results ................................................................................................................................. 54
Effectiveness of BPC by Strategic Rationale .......................................................................... 55
Explaining BPC Success and Failures .................................................................................... 56
Potential Questions and Issues for Congress ................................................................................. 58
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 59
Figures
Figure 1. BPC Effectiveness by Strategic Rationale in Cases Explored ......................................... 3
Figure 2. Differing Congressional and DOD Definitions of Building Partner Capacity ............... 13
Tables
Table 1. Criteria for Judging Likely BPC Effectiveness ................................................................. 4
Table 2. Key Security Assistance Programs .................................................................................... 9
Contacts
Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 60
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What Is “Building Partner Capacity?” Issues for Congress
Introduction: Why Is Building Partner Capacity of
Interest to Congress?
A number of reasons underlie a growing Congressional interest in the complex national security
policy area that has come to be labeled “Building Partnership Capacity,” or “BPC.” First, since
2006 BPC has increased in prominence within U.S. strategy, arguably becoming a central pillar of
U.S. national security and foreign policy in recent years. Following the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001, successive U.S. and Department of Defense leaders concluded that the
traditional set of security assistance and security cooperation tools did not meet the needs of the
changed strategic landscape. The term “Building Partnership Capacity” was coined in the 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review. Since then, BPC has become a catchall phrase for a wide array of
1
programs, all underpinned by the assumption that strengthening foreign security institutions in
weak and fragile states will have tangible positive benefits for U.S. national security. Activities in
which DOD engages toward those ends include (but are not limited to): training, mentoring,
advising, equipping, exercising, educating and planning with foreign security forces, primarily in
fragile and weak states. BPC is also used to describe a core element of recent U.S. military
campaigns—namely, training and equipping foreign security forces—in Iraq (2003-2011),
Afghanistan (2001-present) and Iraq/Syria (2014-present).
Despite the increasing emphasis on, and centrality of, BPC in national security strategy and
military operations, the assumption that building foreign security forces will have tangible U.S.
national security benefits remains a relatively untested proposition. This leads to the second
reason for growing Congressional interest: neither the policy nor academic communities have
explored in great detail whether or not Building Partner Capacity works to achieve U.S. strategic
objectives. Recent events, particularly the battle between the Afghan government and the Taliban
over Konduz, as well as the collapse of U.S.-trained and equipped forces in Iraq and Syria in the
face of the Islamic State, have called into question whether these BPC programs can achieve their
desired effects.2 Do BPC programs and activities actually advance U.S. national security
interests? If so, when? If not, why not?
This leads to the third reason for increased Congressional interest in BPC and related programs:
fiscal oversight. The relative intellectual and programmatic ambiguity of these efforts make it
difficult to understand what, specifically, the DOD is doing to build partner capacity in fragile
states. Answering the question, “what is BPC?” is surprisingly difficult, as definitions of BPC
vary across the U.S. government. This uncertainty, in turn, makes it difficult to understand what,
specifically, DOD is spending on BPC and related programs. While Congress has authorized over
$100 billion toward higher profile BPC missions in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria since 2001, DOD
continues to execute BPC missions in countries around the globe. In some instances, components
of DOD have begun augmenting its force structure in order to better conduct current and future
BPC missions. As DOD budgets generally reflect inputs rather than outputs or outcomes, these
BPC expenditures are difficult to identify and account for; this, in turn, creates challenges in
determining whether it constitutes a cost-effective policy option.
1
Dafna H. Rand and Stephen Tankel, Security Cooperation & Assistance: Rethinking the Return on Investment, Center
for a New American Security, Washington, DC, August 5, 2015, p. 2, http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/
publications-pdf/CNAS%20Report_Security%20Cooperation_FINAL.pdf.
2
See, for example, Rosa Brooks, “The Hard Lessons of Kunduz and Syria,” Foreign Policy, October 2, 2015, and
Lawrence Korb, “Why the U.S. Military Can’t Succeed in Training Foreign Armies,” Reuters, October 5, 2015.
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In short, despite the centrality of BPC in U.S. national security strategy and military operations, it
remains unclear whether building the capacity of foreign security forces is an effective way to
accomplish U.S. strategic objectives. It also remains unclear exactly how much DOD allocates
toward BPC and related programs. These issues both individually and collectively present
considerable oversight challenges for Congress, especially as it weighs the relative strengths and
weaknesses of training and equipping programs in Iraq and Syria today as well as the need for
future programs.
The complexity of BPC and related programs makes analyzing these programs’ effectiveness a
challenging endeavor. This report is therefore intended to accomplish two interrelated purposes. It
first seeks to build a common understanding of what, exactly, constitutes BPC by illuminating the
various ways in which different USG components define it. In so doing, it charts the evolution of
BPC in national strategy documents since the term was first coined in 2006. With that intellectual
baseline established, it then explores whether BPC has proven an effective means by which the
United States has accomplished its strategic objectives to which such programs have directed
since World War II. It concludes with questions and issues for Congress to consider. It is
important to note that this is not an exhaustive study of all U.S.-led BPC efforts, which is beyond
the scope of this research.
This report differs from many other CRS products, as it is intended to assist Congress with its
oversight responsibilities by helping it think critically about BPC and related programs.
Accordingly, it raises more questions than it answers. Among the most important: are BPC
shortcomings due to execution issues? Or are they due to BPC being an inappropriate way to
accomplish U.S. strategic objectives? While RAND and CRS scholarship illuminates some
criteria for judging whether a BPC effort is likely to be effective (found on page four), ultimately,
there are no clear-cut answers at present; further analysis is needed.
Potential Key Issues for Congress
CRS research offers the following potential key takeaways for Congress:
“Building Partner Capacity” (BPC) is difficult to define. Since the term’s
introduction in 2006, it has been used to describe DOD programs, a strategic
rationale for building the security forces of weak and failing states, and broader
DOD cooperative activities with a variety of actors, including the State
Department, U.S. state and local governments, security institutions in foreign
countries, private companies, and nongovernmental organizations. This report
focuses on BPC’s use as a strategic rationale for building security forces of weak
or failing states.
Determining exactly how much DOD currently spends on BPC-related activities
across its enterprise is difficult. This oversight challenge appears to have
increased in recent years due to DOD’s increased emphasis on, and prioritization
of, cooperation on security matters with other countries. Cooperative security
activities, including those that build capacity in weak and failing states, are
diffuse across the DOD enterprise, and therefore difficult to trace to a particular
budget activity or line item.
The conceptual and programmatic complexity of BPC activities has compounded
the analytic challenge of determining whether BPC programs are effective.
Therefore, this report takes a “back to basics” analytic approach to understanding
BPC effectiveness by identifying what kinds of strategic goals the United States
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What Is “Building Partner Capacity?” Issues for Congress
sought to accomplish since World War II when deciding to build a partner’s
capacity. These goals included
victory in war or war termination;
managing regional security challenges;
indirectly supporting a party to a conflict;
conflict mitigation;
building institutional and interpersonal linkages;
enhancing coalition participation; and
alliance building.
This report examines between two and four case studies for each strategic-level rationale, for a
total of 20 cases.3 The overall results are depicted in Figure 1 below:
Figure 1. BPC Effectiveness by Strategic Rationale in Cases Explored
Source: Congressional Research Service.
Figure 1 suggests that in the case studies CRS researched, BPC efforts have been the least
effective—relative to the strategic goal the United States sought to achieve—when used as a war
exit strategy. BPC efforts have been most effective when used to build interpersonal and
institutional linkages with other states and to build alliances. With respect to alliance building,
several nations have, in a sense, “graduated” from being considered relatively weak and fragile
states (particularly after the cessation of major wars) to strong U.S. allies; South Korea, Poland,
and Japan are such examples.
Explaining Effectiveness?
The case studies CRS explored provide vignettes to illuminate questions associated with
evaluating BPC activities rather than in-depth explorations. Perhaps the most critical of those
questions is: why does, or does not, BPC work? Considerable debate exists in the policy and
scholarly communities about why BPC efforts have a mixed track record. Two primary schools of
3
To determine whether a BPC effort was “effective,” CRS asked two questions. First, did the BPC effort contribute to
achieving the stated U.S. goals? Second, did the BPC effort materially and obviously undermine U.S. interests in the
long term? While it would be an analytic stretch to presume that failures or successes were a direct result of BPC
efforts rather than other external or internal factors, one can make judgments based on the overall trends as to whether
BPC meaningfully contributed (or did not contribute) toward accomplishing stated U.S. strategic objectives.
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What Is “Building Partner Capacity?” Issues for Congress
thought bear on this question: (1) those who blame BPC failures on execution issues, and (2)
those who argue that, from a strategic perspective, BPC can never work.
Although CRS research for this report was focused on whether BPC worked rather than why, our
findings suggest that according to the case studies selected, neither explanation may be fully
accurate. For BPC to be effective a host of factors need to be taken into account and many of
these factors are beyond the United States’ ability to control. As a starting point, Congress may
wish to consider the criteria below (see Table 1) when judging whether BPC is likely to be an
appropriate tool toward accomplishing strategic objectives.
Table 1. Criteria for Judging Likely BPC Effectiveness
Factors Within U.S.
Control
What does the United States want to achieve? Is there a demonstrable record of U.S.
strategic-level success in accomplishing those objectives?
Are U.S. objectives clear and consistent across U.S. government (USG) agencies (e.g., State,
USAID, DOD)?
Are U.S. programs across USG agencies organized, designed, managed and executed in a
coherent and consistent manner?
Are U.S. programs designed in a manner that will actually benefit the partner in the short,
medium and long term?
Are U.S. programs executed consistently over time (measured in years rather than months)?
Is the United States prepared to conduct the BPC effort over longer durations (measured in
years rather than months)?
Are U.S. programs designed and implemented in a manner that is coherent with international
community efforts?
Factors Outside
U.S. Control
Are U.S. and partner interests aligned in the short, medium, and long term? If not, can the
United States mitigate risks associated with diverging interests? If so, how?
Does the partner have legitimate institutions of governance and effective political structures?
Has the partner invested its own funds or other resources to build its security capacity? In
other words, has it demonstrated it has “skin in the game?”
Does the partner have sufficient systems and processes in place to translate U.S. assistance
into durable capabilities?
Do key actors in the international community support U.S. strategy? Are their efforts
reinforcing those of the United States?
Source: The RAND Corporation and CRS.
CRS research points to the following additional observations:
A common denominator in most of the successful cases is that the recipient of
assistance was a legitimate, relatively effective institution of governance. Many
of the least effective BPC efforts were conducted either during conflicts and wars
(situations in which governance is contested by opposing parties) or in countries
where legitimate governance was relatively nascent. Further, corruption and graft
in a partner can significantly inhibit BPC effectiveness. Little evidence exists to
suggest that BPC will be effective without a willing and capable partner on the
ground.
An alignment of interests between the United States and recipients of security
assistance in the short, medium, and long term appears to be important for overall
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BPC success. This implies, of course, that recipients of BPC assistance are
politically legitimate enough to formulate and articulate their interests, and
execute their strategies accordingly.
BPC programs may lead to unintended consequences that create new, often
equally significant strategic challenges. For example, U.S. partnership activities
in Central and Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War have been used by
Moscow as a political pretext for interventions along its periphery.
Partnership comes with long-term U.S. responsibilities that are not immediately
obvious. Although the United States may build partner capacity to help partners
help themselves, those partners are likely making a different, longer-term
calculation. On the ground, accepting U.S. assistance is essentially making a de
facto political and strategic choice that in some instances is tantamount to
strategic alignment with the United States. This alignment can lead states to make
assumptions about U.S. support in the event of a crisis that might not be in line
with broader U.S. interests.
What Is “Building Partner Capacity”?
The breadth and scope of the different activities and programs that fall under DOD’s catchall term
“Building Partner Capacity” (BPC) has made analyzing these programs—and their overall
efficacy—difficult. This difficulty arises in part because the term “building partner capacity,”
based on recent DOD usage, has been used to capture DOD’s wide variety of engagements with
an extensive range of non-DOD actors. As a recent report from the Center for a New American
Security (CNAS) notes, “the term building partner capacity (BPC) has become a catchall for a
wide array of programs, only some of which actually pertain to enhancing the capabilities and
capacity of a partner’s military and civilian institutions.”4 Indeed, as a RAND study noted, BPC is
more a “term of art” than a specific program or capability. Moreover, like many other terms of art,
BPC means different things to different people.5 Regardless of how the term BPC is used, it is
primarily associated with a fundamental assumption: that enhancing the security capabilities of
partners in less capable, weak, and/or failing states will ultimately advance U.S. national security
interests.
DOD Activities That Build Partner Capacity
Illustratively, in no particular order, BPC includes the following activities:
Establishing senior-level personal relationships between the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff or Combatant Commanders and the Chiefs of Defense of
other states.
Holding bilateral military exercises like the annual African Lion exercise
conducted by the United States Marine Corps and the Moroccan Royal Armed
Forces.
4
Rand & Tankel, p. 4.
Christopher Paul, Colin Clarke, Beth Grill, Stephanie Young, Jennifer Moroney, Joe Hogler, Christine Leah, What
Works Best When Building Partner Capacity, and Under What Circumstances? (Arlington, VA: The RAND
Corporation, 2013) p. 8.
5
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Conducting multilateral exercises such as NATO’s annual Combined Endeavor
communications interoperability exercises involving NATO Allies and
Partnership for Peace countries.
Engaging in multilateral military planning and discussion of capabilities
development, for example as practiced by NATO allies and “Partnership for
Peace” countries.
Including foreign military officers as students at U.S. military schools, as well as
the participation of U.S. military officers as students at foreign military schools
such as the National Defense University of Pakistan.
Training and equipping of foreign military and security forces.
Fostering specific capabilities in a country or given region of the world, such as
the maritime capability-focused Africa Partnership station.
Preparing foreign security forces to participate in multilateral military operations,
such as training Burundian battalions to support their deployment to Somalia as
part of the African Union Mission in Somalia.
Embedding advisors into foreign military and security ministries, such as in
Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan (plans exist to send advisors to Yemen,
Indonesia, Botswana, and Ukraine).
BPC in National Strategy6
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks (9/11 attacks) and the subsequent global war on terror
provided the impetus for expanding DOD’s security cooperation and assistance tools under the
rubric of BPC.7 The term “Building Partner Capacity” first came into use in the 2006 Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR), which argued,
Long-duration, complex operations involving the U.S. military, other government
agencies and international partners will be waged simultaneously in multiple countries
around the world.... Maintaining a long-term, low-visibility presence in many areas of the
world where U.S. forces do not traditionally operate will be required. Building and
leveraging partner capacity will also be an absolutely essential part of this approach, and
the employment of surrogates will be a necessary method for achieving many goals. 8
According to the 2006 QDR, BPC was, in essence, a maximalist interpretation and employment
of a concept normally executed by Special Operations Forces when working with partner forces
on the ground—“by, with and through.”9 Over time, BPC became a preferred, if not primary,
6
In 2013, the Obama Administration announced a U.S. Security Sector Assistance policy, designed to coordinate USG
activities to build the capacity of those institutions within partner nations that promote security and the rule of law.
BPC, to include security cooperation and security assistance activities, constitutes the DOD contribution to interagency
security sector assistance. http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/ssa.pdf.
7
DOD initially used “BPC” to describe efforts the Department would undertake to strengthen its relationships with a
wide variety of actors, to include state and local governments; other agencies and departments within the U.S.
executive branch; nongovernmental organizations; private businesses; and the security institutions of foreign countries.
See Department of Defense, Building Partnership Capacity: QDR Execution Roadmap (May 2006), p. 4.
8
Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2006 Report, February 6, 2006, p. 23
9
After the QDR’s publication, DOD issued an Execution Roadmap for Building Partner Capacity. In it, it argued that,
“The nation’s strategic objectives are unattainable without a unified approach among capable partners at home and with
key friends and allies abroad.... The Department of Defense requires a long-term, focused approach to build the
capacity and capability of its mission-critical partnerships.” The roadmap defined BPC as “targeted efforts to improve
(continued...)
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means by which the United States could secure its interests—as well as a national security
objective in its own right. As the argument goes, much like Afghanistan before 9/11, the collapse
of fragile states into conflict zones could ultimately create areas in which terrorist groups could
plan and execute attacks against the United States and its allies. As then Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates argued,
Building the governance and security capacity of other countries was a critical element of
our strategy in the Cold War. But it is even more urgent in a global security environment
where, unlike the Cold War, the most likely and lethal threats – an American city
poisoned or reduced to rubble – will likely emanate from fractured or failing states, rather
than aggressor states.10
Gates went on to note that, “in these situations, the effectiveness and credibility of the United
States will only be as good as the effectiveness, credibility, and sustainability of our local
partners… [BPC] is in many ways the ideological and security challenge of our time.”
Over time, BPC became primarily associated with DOD’s activities to enhance the capabilities of,
and cooperation with, international partners characterized by weakness, instability, or fragility. In
the QDR reports between 2006 and the current 2014 version, DOD seemed to emphasize BPC as
a concept distinct from traditional security assistance and security cooperation, with the latter
more geared toward building linkages with U.S. allies. Together, the QDR reports could be
interpreted to make the following distinctions regarding BPC:
BPC should help the United States maintain a long-term, low-visibility presence
in parts of the world where U.S. forces do not traditionally operate (2006 QDR);
BPC should focus on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations (2006
QDR);
BPC should deal with threats that emanate from state weakness rather than state
strength (2010 QDR);
BPC authorities apply in situations without a neat divide between defense,
diplomacy, and development (2010 QDR);
Security Force Assistance (SFA) operations are an increasingly critical element
of BPC (2010 QDR); and
BPC includes improving partners’ peacekeeping and counterterrorism capabilities
and applies especially in fragile states (2014 QDR).
The 2010 QDR draws out the idea that the U.S. government widened its aperture when discussing
when, whether, and how to build partner capacity. Rather than using “traditional” security
cooperation programs exclusively to help its allies, the United States would help weaker states,
thereby preventing conflicts stemming from non-state actors from becoming serious or even
beginning in the first place. This approach could be seen as using BPC as a state-building tool for
partner countries. In the context of U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, though, perhaps the
key phrase is using BPC to “reduce risk to U.S. forces and extend security to areas we cannot
(...continued)
the collective capabilities and performance of the Department of Defense and its partners,” and took a very wide
approach to defining what, specifically constituted DoD partners. These included other departments and agencies of the
U.S. Government, state and local governments, allies, coalition members, host nations, and other nations, multinational
organizations, nongovernmental organizations and the private sector.
10
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Remarks as Delivered to the Nixon Center, February 24, 2010,
http://archive.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1425.
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reach alone.” Using this approach, this broadly conceptualized notion of BPC may be seen as a
means of achieving U.S. strategic objectives at a lower cost without necessarily using U.S.
military forces to achieve the same ends.
Perhaps in response to events in Central and Eastern Europe and elsewhere, recent DOD strategy
documents appear to be re-expanding BPC’s aperture. The 2015 National Military Strategy
appears to link building partner capacity efforts both to counterterrorism (generally conducted in
fragile states) and alliance/coalition building (a task normally applied to more durable states and
U.S. allies):
As we look to the future, the U.S. military and its allies and partners will continue to
protect and promote shared interests. We will preserve our alliances, expand partnerships,
maintain a global stabilizing presence, and conduct training, exercises, security
cooperation activities, and military to military engagement. Such activities increase the
capabilities and capacity of partners, thereby enhancing our collective ability to deter
aggression and defeat extremists. 11
Altogether, BPC appears to have moved from a post-9/11 counterterrorism strategy applied to
fragile states to a key means through which the United States seeks to accomplish “traditional”
and “non-traditional” national security objectives. Recently, some scholars have argued that this
emphasis on BPC constitutes a grand strategy in its own right—one of “sponsorship”—that
counsels strategic patience and working with partners to achieve mutual objectives. As their logic
goes, “proponents of sponsorship strategies recognized that they are likely to achieve acceptable
results at a lower cost and with greater long-term legitimacy to the policy being implemented.”12
How DOD Executes BPC Strategies
Programmatically speaking, within the DOD context, BPC is most frequently associated with
security cooperation and security assistance programs administered by the Defense Security
Cooperation Agency (DCSA).13 According to DOD Directive 5105.65, DSCA:
Under the authority, direction and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
(USD(P)) directs, administers and provides DOD-wide guidance to the DOD components
and DOD representatives to U.S. missions abroad for the execution of DOD security
assistance and security cooperation programs over which DSCA has responsibility. 14
According to DSCA, security cooperation refers to those activities undertaken by the Department
of Defense to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to
achieve strategic objectives. It includes all DOD interactions with foreign defense and security
establishments, including all DOD-administered security assistance programs that (1) build
defense and security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, including all
international armaments cooperation activities and security assistance activities; (2) develop
allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and (3)
11
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015: The
United States Military’s Contribution to National Security, June 2015, p. 9, http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/
Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdf.
12
Peter Dombrowsky and Simon Reich, “The Strategy of Sponsorship,” Survival (57:5, October-November 2015)
p. 123.
13
Other related programs are managed by the State Department, as directed in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended.
14
Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency Directive 5105.65, October 26, 2012, p. 1.
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provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.15 Security cooperation
is a core aspect of DOD’s key planning processes, to include the Guidance for the Employment of
the Force and Guidance for the Development of the Force.16
Security assistance, by contrast, is defined as a group of programs authorized by Title 22 of the
U.S. Code, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense
articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, cash sales, or
lease, in furtherance of national policies and objectives.17
Security assistance is a subset of security cooperation,18 and BPC, in its current formulation,
appears to be associated with those security cooperation and assistance activities designed to
enable weakened or fragile states to manage their own security challenges. Although all DOD
aspects of security assistance programs are administered by DSCA, the agency is not responsible
for the department’s broader strategy and non-programmatic elements of security cooperation or
building partner capacity.19
As with all federal agencies, DSCA allocates its resources according only to the authorities
Congress has provided. The authorities associated with security cooperation and security
assistance are often described as a “patchwork” of authorities and programs, only some of which
are exclusively within DOD’s purview. Others are either (1) managed by the State Department,
(2) managed by the State Department and executed by DOD (such as Foreign Military Sales
programs), or (3) jointly managed by the State Department and DOD, requiring both departments’
concurrence to authorize specific activities. Table 2 depicts some of the key programs and
authorities in the security assistance toolkit, including from where each program derives its legal
authority.
Table 2. Key Security Assistance Programs
Program
Major Security Assistance and
Cooperation Programs Before 9/11
(“Traditional Assistance”)
Legal Authority
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
Title 22
Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
Title 22
International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement (INCLE)
Title 22
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)
Title 22
Excess Defense Articles
Title 22
International Criminal Investigative
Training Assistance (ICITAP)
DOJ program funded and authorized
by interagency agreements with
State, USAID and DOD
15
Department of Defense, DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation Directive 5132.03,
October 24, 2008, p. 11
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid., p. 11.
18
Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Security Assistance Management Manual, Chapter 15.
http://www.samm.dsca.mil/chapter/chapter-15.
19
Within DSCA, a BPC directorate is tasked with managing and integrating a variety of security assistance and
cooperation programs in a manner that advances partner nation capacity and capabilities through the provision of
training and equipment, and includes a series of Title 10 humanitarian-based programs that provide DOD with the
ability to accomplish national security objectives through military-civilian engagement.
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Program
Major Global Security Assistance and
Cooperation Programs after 9/11
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Legal Authority
Cooperative Threat Reduction
Title 10
Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism,
Demining, and Related Programs
(NADR)
Title 22
International Military Education and
Training (IMET)
Title 22
Counter-Drug Assistance (Two
authorities: Section 1004, Section
1033)
Title 10
Joint Combined Exchange Trainings
(JCET)
Title 10
Combatant Commanders Initiative
Fund (CCIF)
Title 10
Training and Education Programs
Title 10 and 22, depending upon
program
Warsaw (now Wales) Initiative Fund
Title 10
Train & Equip (Section 1206)
Reauthorized as Building Capacity of
Foreign Security Forces (Section
2282)
Title 10
Global Lift & Sustain
Title 10
Support to Foreign Forces (Section
1208)
Title 10
Logistics Support to Foreign Forces
(Section 1210)
Title 10
Counterterrorism Partnership Fund
(CTPF)
Title 10
Combating Terrorism Fellowship
Program (CTFP)
Title 10
Exercise-related programs (e.g.,
developing country combined
exercise program [DCCEP]),
Exercise-Related construction
[ERC])
Title 10
Ministry of Defense Advisors
(MODA) Program
Title 10
Coalition Support Funds (CSF),
including Coalition Readiness
Support Program (CRSP)—
technically reimbursement, not
assistance
Title 10
Global Security Contingency Fund
(GSCF)
Pooled State/DOD Fund
Global Peace Operations Initiative
(GPOI)
Title 22
Complex Crises Fund (CCF)
Title 22
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What Is “Building Partner Capacity?” Issues for Congress
Program
Major Country & Region-Specific
Security Assistance and Cooperation
Programs after 9/11
Legal Authority
Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)
Title 10
Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF)
Title 10
Authority to Provide Assistance to
the Vetted Syrian Opposition
(Section 1209)
Title 10
European Reassurance Initiative
Title 10
Asia Pacific Regional Initiative
Title 10
Source: Dafna H. Rand and Stephen Tankel, “Security Cooperation & Assistance: Rethinking the Return on
Investment,” Center for a New American Security, August 2015, p. 5.
Examining Table 2, one could make two observations. First, after the 9/11 attacks, the number of
security assistance programs proliferated. Of the 31 programs listed above 17 were created after
9/11, suggesting that the United States government believed that its traditional, pre-9/11 security
assistance portfolio was necessary but insufficient to meet the challenges of an increasingly
interdependent and complex world. Second, the majority of these programs established after 9/11
were additional authorities given to the Department of Defense, suggesting that DOD plays a
greater role in security cooperation today than the one it historically played.
The latter observation is borne out by the current manifestations of BPC across the DOD’s
activities. Although the programs and authorities listed above are the focus of most analysis and
discussion with respect to BPC, they do not capture the full extent of DOD’s activities and
expenditures in this area. This is because DOD has integrated BPC—in its various guises and
manifestations (security cooperation, assistance, foreign internal defense, security force
assistance, and so on)—across a wide range of its operations and activities (see “DOD Activities
That Build Partner Capacity”). In order to do so, different DOD components utilize a variety of
funding sources. For example, according to a 2013 RAND study, rather than using DSCAearmarked funds for specific activities with partners,
Most [BPC] programs are funded by other, less narrow [funding] sources, such as
operations and maintenance funds. Examples include exercises overseen by the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and military-to-military contacts, which are often (but not
always) funded by Traditional COCOM Activity Authority. In each of these cases, DoD
uses a specific authority to use its operations and maintenance funds for a given security
cooperation activity. In some cases, these funds are then reimbursed, but more often than
not, the security cooperation activity comes at the expense of another defense priority. 20
DSCA, with its relatively narrow mandate, oversees only a smaller subset of DOD’s overall BPC
activities. This has financial oversight implications, as it is difficult to determine what,
specifically, DOD spends on non-DSCA BPC programs.
BPC is also beginning to manifest in force structure. One example is the U.S. Army’s initiative to
build “Regionally Aligned” forces (i.e., augment its force structure to ensure that divisions and
brigades both plan and prepare for operations to support a designated geographic combatant
commander). To prepare U.S. forces to support a Combatant Commander’s area of responsibility,
units are required to train and exercise with counterparts in the region and help build a partner’s
20
Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill, Stephanie Young, Jennifer D.P. Morony, Joe Hogler, Christine Leah,
“What Works Best when Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstances?” (Santa Monica: The RAND
Corporation) 2013, p. 13.
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capacity in the process.21 The Regionally Aligned Force concept is to be paid for by using a
variety of different “pots” of money, to include Title 22 funds, Combatant Commander Funds,
joint exercise funds, and special authorities such as the Global Security Contingency Fund.22
Looking forward, the Department of the Army is planning for a 25% increase in its security
cooperation budget, which, according to Army planners, will have to be offset from elsewhere
within the Army budget.23 The U.S. Army is also contemplating building new “Train, Advise and
Assist” units within its force structure, ostensibly to better prepare itself to accomplish BPC
tasks.24
DOD and Congressional Interpretations of BPC
Comparing DOD and legislative perspectives on partnership strategy, important conceptual
distinctions seem to exist between how the two approach BPC. In DOD, especially in the QDRs,
BPC appears to be a strategic concept allowing the Department and the military services to
rationalize and make sense of a wide range of potential missions and tactics, including fixing the
security institutions of failed states, creating like-minded security partners, facilitating
interagency cooperation, and, recently, shoring up deficiencies in allies’ defense capabilities for
deterrence and defense purposes. DOD’s 2006 BPC execution roadmap, for example, places the
“Strengthen Interagency Planning and Operations” task above the “Enhance the Capabilities of,
and Cooperation with, International Partners” task, stating that
the QDR recognized that the Department of Defense cannot meet many of today’s
complex challenges alone. Success requires unified statecraft: the ability of the US
government to bring to bear all elements of national power at home and to work in close
cooperation with allies and partners abroad.25
In contrast, Congress, in legislation, has presented BPC as a narrower concept. The FY2006
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), P.L. 109-163, §1206, gave the President limited
authority to direct DOD to “conduct or support a program to build the capacity of a foreign
country’s national military forces in order for that country to (1) conduct counterterrorist
operations; or (2) participate in or support military and stability operations in which the United
States Armed Forces are a participant.”26
21
“Pacific Pathways” is how the U.S. Army is preparing its soldiers to operate in the Pacific theater.
Kimberly Field, James Learmont and Jason Charland, “Regionally Aligned Forces: Business Not as Usual,”
Parameters (vol. 43, no. 3) Autumn 2013, pp. 55-63.
23
Field et al., p. 62. http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/Parameters/issues/Autumn_2013/5_Field.pdf.
24
Sydney J. Freeberg, “Army Mulls Train, Advise & Assist Brigades: Gen. Milley,” Breaking Defense, December 14,
2015, http://breakingdefense.com/2015/12/army-mulls-train-advise-brigades-gen-milley/.
25
Department of Defense, Building Partnership Capacity: QDR Execution Roadmap, May 22, 2006, p. 5.
22
See CRS Report RS22855, Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress, by
(name redacted) .
26
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Figure 2. Differing Congressional and DOD Definitions of Building Partner Capacity
Source: Congressional Research Service
Notes: This figure depicts the different definitions of BPC, as used by different components of the U.S.
government. DOD tends to use BPC to describe both strategies and programs, some—but not all—of which are
managed by DSCA. Congress, by contrast, in legislation tends to focus on DSCA-managed programs (in the
white circle) when considering BPC activities.
Figure 2 illustrates the difference of definitions between Congress and DOD when it comes to
BPC. Congress tends to view BPC as a narrow set of programs (global train and equip and so on,
as outlined in Table 2), managed by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. This definition is
depicted by the orange circle in the middle. The white circle depicts DOD’s overall security
cooperation activities that are led by DSCA - which include DSCA’s security, security sector, and
BPC activities; the white circle depicts how Congress tends to view DOD’s role in security
cooperation and assistance.
However, as the Regionally Aligned Forces example demonstrates, in DOD’s view security
cooperation, and by extension BPC, is much broader than those programs DSCA manages. The
green circle depicts the wide array of programs, activities, and even force structure decisions
designed to support the overarching rationale of building partner capacity. Essentially, DOD has
infused BPC across its activities and operations, not just in DSCA-managed programs and
activities. DOD does not presently capture the level of granularity necessary to identify the full
scope of expenditure on BPC programs, particularly those represented in the green circle. Thus,
identifying how much money DOD actually spends on BPC activities is nearly impossible at
present.
The final component of the diagram is the grey shaded circle in the background. This represents
the use of building partner capacity as a strategic rationale in its own right, and is used as a
justification for many of the activities captured in the other circles of the diagram. As the diagram
suggests, the term BPC is used to represent a variety of different programs activities, as well as
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the intellectual rationale for undertaking those activities. These varying definitions—alternately
using “BPC” to describe ends, ways and means—add to the ambiguity surrounding BPC and
therefore compounding the oversight challenge associated with these programs.
Views are mixed regarding the efficacy of the “patchwork” system of security cooperation
authorities. Some analysts argue that the ad-hoc manner in which these programs were formulated
and executed created overlaps in some areas and gaps in others, leading program managers to find
multiple sources of funding for a single activity.27 Others, by contrast, maintain that these
overlaps create flexibility, allowing program managers to organize activities that are more tailored
to their individual requirements.28 Regardless, successive administrations have sought to bring
greater coherence to security cooperation and BPC efforts. Most recently, in 2013, the Obama
Administration tried to make these programs and activities more coherent through Presidential
Policy Directive 23 (PPD 23), which instructs national security agencies to improve, streamline,
and better organize all U.S. security assistance and cooperation efforts.29
What Does “Building Partnership Capacity” or “Train and Equip” Mean on the Ground?
Given that BPC is a term of art, a number of programs, capabilities, and activities fit under its umbrella. On the
ground, this heterogeneity manifests itself in several different ways. The U.S Army, in its Field Manual 3-22: Army
Support to Security Cooperation, outlines the main tasks that U.S. ground forces would use to conduct what it terms
“security force assistance.” This is an operationalization of both DOD BPC efforts and congressionally authorized
“1206 Train and Equip” programs. It also applies to more traditional forms of security cooperation, especially
“Foreign Internal Defense” missions performed by Special Operations Forces. The mission to equip is often tailored
to different situations in specific countries.
Individual Training. In this task, U.S. forces train foreign security forces on “military occupational skills appropriate
to their organization and equipment.” That is, U.S trainers provide individual members of partner nation security
forces with basic instruction in how to shoot their weapons, move in a tactical environment, and communicate with
members of their unit. This training may also involve instructing officers and leaders in principles of military
leadership, as well as tactical mission planning and execution.
Collective Training. In this task, U.S. forces train foreign security forces on “collective tasks at the battalion level
and below.” That is, units (from a squad of approximately 10 individuals to a battalion of up to approximately 500
individuals) that perform the same type of missions (infantry, reconnaissance, logistics) learn to fight and conduct
operations as a unit, increasing in complexity from squad patrolling to battalion-sized maneuvers.
Staff Training. In this task, U.S. forces train the staffs of foreign security forces in their functions, encompassing
“staff training from company level troop leading procedures through military decision-making at the task force level.”
That is, staff officers and noncommissioned officers learn how to plan tactical operations and obtain decisions and
guidance from commanding officers and noncommissioned officers in leadership positions. Such training could range
from planning and synchronizing fires and movements in a platoon defense to coordinating company maneuver and
artillery fire in a battalion-sized attack.
Institutional Training. In this task, U.S. forces train the staff of a foreign nation’s “force generation structure and
ministerial or departmental staff.” It may focus on force generation, budgeting, and oversight.30
While largely limited to Army and Marine Corps units (along with Special Operations Forces), the method of
conducting basic military training and weapons training, moving along in complexity to unit training, is applicable to all
military and security force “train and equip” programs.
27
Rand & Tankel, p. 3.
Jennifer D.P. Moroney, David E. Thaler and Joe Hogler, Review of Secuity Cooperation Mechanisms Combatant
Commands Utilize to Build Partner Capacity, Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 2013.
29
The White House, Fact Sheet: U.S. Security Sector Assistance Policy, April 5, 2013, September 15, 2015,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/04/05/fact-sheet-us-security-sector-assistance-policy.
30
Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-22, Army Support to Security Cooperation, p. 4-6,
http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_22.pdf. See also CRS Report R41817, Building the
Capacity of Partner States Through Security Force Assistance, by (name redacted)
.
28
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Is Building Partner Capacity Effective?
Despite the increasing importance and priority placed upon BPC by senior figures in the U.S.
government, the assumptions that BPC is actually effective—and that the unintended
consequences of BPC efforts are manageable—appear to have remained relatively untested. To
the extent that BPC has been evaluated by government and nongovernment analysts, studies have
tended to focus either on whether programs have been successfully executed (was equipment
package X delivered to country Y), or on the difficulties of executing BPC programs due to the
hodgepodge architecture of the security cooperation/security assistance enterprise. Arguments for
or against the application of BPC strategies and programs tend to be anecdotal (it worked/did not
work in country A; therefore, it could work/could not work in country B). Almost none of them
systematically explore whether BPC programs achieved their intended strategic-level effects.31
Understanding whether, and when, BPC programs actually deliver intended strategic effects (as
listed above) is an inherently tricky analytic endeavor. This is due to a variety of reasons. In the
first instance, as a 2013 RAND study argued, data limitations, lack of assessments, and the long
time horizons for partnership efforts make assessments of effectiveness difficult. In some
instances, these dynamics are exacerbated by the fact that those institutions tasked with
monitoring a given BPC program’s effectiveness are often those charged with executing the
program. Furthermore, RAND observes that in some instances, program managers lack sufficient
longevity—or institutional memory—to understand the efficacy (or lack thereof) of programs.
The study also observes that the relationship between improving the effectiveness of security
forces and reducing the necessity for U.S. combat forces to intervene is, “is not a straightforward
endeavor.”146
Another analytic challenge pertains to what, exactly, constitutes a BPC effort. While Congress
and the State Department tend to think of BPC as a relatively narrow foreign assistance tool, the
DOD is de facto conceptualizing BPC as a strategy to address a broad range of challenges.
Indeed, DOD is including engagement with foreign forces across the full spectrum of its
activities—doctrine, organization, training, materiel, logistics, personnel & facilities
(“DOTMLPF”)—which go beyond the more tightly scoped foreign assistance programs and
authorities.
A further complication to understanding BPC effectiveness is determining what, precisely, the
strategic objectives are for a given program. Determining effectiveness requires understanding
what the BPC effort was intended to do in the first place. BPC programs are, almost by definition,
longer-term activities spanning multiple years, if not decades. During these times, events on the
ground, as well as changes of leadership in Washington, often lead to strategic-level shifts of
emphasis or priorities. While at the strategic level these are often shifts of degrees, on the ground
this can have real resource implications—and therefore real impact on the overall effectiveness of
the mission.
Complicating matters further, rationales are often conflated with each other when justifying a
particular BPC program or mission. For example, in Iraq, the argument for building Iraqi security
31
A noteworthy exception: Mara E. Karlin, “Training and Equipping is Not Transforming: An Assessment of U.S.
Programs to Build Partner Militaries,” Johns Hopkins University Doctoral Dissertation, Baltimore, MD, September
2012. Surveying U.S. efforts in Greece following World War II, South Vietnam throughout the 1950s and Lebanon in
the 1930s and mid-2000s, Karlin maintains that if the United States “gets deeply involved in the partner state’s
sensitive military affairs, and if unhelpful actors play a diminishing role, then the partner state is more likely to
establish internal defense” (p.2). Still, the United States seeks to build partner capacity to fulfill a variety of different
requirements including, but not limited to, internal defense, which this study seeks to explore.
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institutions was about alliance building (creating a stable Iraq that is friendly to the United States)
as well as war termination (allowing U.S. and coalition forces to withdraw). Which goal mattered
more? What were the resource implications of prioritizing one over the other? Without a solid
strategic-level understanding of why these BPC programs were initiated, it becomes extremely
difficult—if not impossible—to truly judge whether they were effective.
Still, all this does not necessarily argue that an analysis of BPC’s effectiveness—relative to
strategic-level aims for a given program—should not (or cannot) be undertaken. Given how many
billions of dollars have been spent on these programs, a study of BPC’s overall efficacy is
necessary, even if it only serves as a starting point for other, more in-depth analytic work in this
area.
CRS therefore sought to understand whether, at a strategic (versus programmatic) level, BPC has
been an effective way to achieve strategic goals? If so, when? CRS reviewed the historical record
and developed a list of objectives that the United States sought to accomplish through building
partner capacity activities.32 This list included
victory in war or war termination,
managing regional security challenges,
indirectly supporting a party to a conflict,
conflict mitigation,
building institutional and interpersonal linkages,
enhancing coalition participation, and
alliance building.
CRS then selected 20 case studies since World War II, organized by strategic rationale, to
determine whether a given BPC effort had its intended strategic effect (an explanation of the
methodology can be found in the text box below).33 While it would be an analytic stretch to
presume that failures or successes were a direct result of BPC efforts rather than other external or
internal factors, one can make judgments based on the overall trends whether BPC meaningfully
contributed (or did not contribute) to the accomplishment of stated U.S. strategic objectives.
Methodology: Determining BPC Effectiveness
This report uses stated rationales for building partner capacity activities as its analytic starting point. This is for two
reasons. The first is definitional. As described earlier in this report, the Department of Defense is increasingly using
“BPC” as a term describing (as well as justification for) a broad range of military-to-military activities across the
spectrum of its planning and operations (“DOTMLPF”). By contrast, Congress—as well as the State Department—
understands BPC in narrower, programmatic terms that pertain to specific authorities in support of broader foreign
assistance objectives. Because of these definitional differences, using traditionally defined security cooperation
authorities and programs as a starting point for analysis excludes the broader range of activities in which DOD is
engaging. This broader range of activities, which spans across authorities, budget categories, and time, is not neatly
captured by programmatic or budgetary assessments; a more fundamental conceptual starting point is needed. The
32
Although “Building Partner Capacity” is a relatively new umbrella term, the “toolkit” comprises a number of
programs and activities that the United States has conducted with relative frequency over its history.
33
Between two and four cases were explored per strategic-level rationale. Given that each individual case could fill
multiple volumes, each case is a cursory “wave tops” survey. In other words, neither the case selection, nor the cases
themselves, are intended to be exhaustive; rather, they are designed to help identify broader trends in the historical
record. See the Appendix for an explanation of the research methodology. Note that NATO’s Partnership for
Peace/Warsaw Initiative Fund is explored in two case studies because the participation in these programs was so wide
that the strategic-level objectives varied significantly.
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second reason this report uses rationales as the starting point for analysis is that determining “did it work?” requires
understanding what “it”—in this case, a given BPC effort—was supposed to accomplish in the first place.
BPC efforts exploring how effective these programs were, relative to the primary strategic aim they were intended to
accomplish. Cases were therefore selected based on the major goals that the BPC effort intended to accomplish. All
were selected from the post-World War II period and beyond, due to the fact that relatively reliable data do not
exist prior to this time frame. Additional criteria for case selection included (1) significant U.S. participation in, or
leadership of, the BPC effort, and (2) sufficient literature and primary source material discussing the effort, by which
to develop a reasonably clear sense of how the effort progressed. To develop more generalizable analytic conclusions,
between two and three cases were selected for each stated rationale (war termination, conflict prevention, and so
on). Given that this is not an exhaustive history of BPC efforts, this report by necessity omits some BPC cases that
scholars and practitioners might consider key. Those cases should be considered in future research.
Determining the “primary” strategic aim is, of course, a somewhat subjective exercise, as rationales for engaging in a
particular program are often conflated with each other. In those instances, the CRS team collaboratively determined
which primary strategic rationale a given BPC effort was intended to advance based on the available historical record.
Changes to those rationales over time, if any, are explored in case studies, as is the outcome of the BPC effort.
“Effectiveness” was judged according to two criteria: (1) that the BPC effort accomplished its strategic objectives in
the long term, and (2) that effects of the given BPC effort did not materially and obviously undermine U.S. national
security interests in the long term.
Case studies themselves are not intended to be detailed chronologies of a diplomatic relationship, military campaign,
or program. Rather, their purpose is to situate BPC efforts within their respective strategic contexts, to understand
how that context may have changed over time, and to understand whether or not BPC programs enabled the United
States to achieve its objectives. The case studies therefore, by necessity, omit details in diplomatic—or military—
relationships that may be important, but less salient for the purposes of this report. Furthermore, case studies are not
intended to be audits of a given BPC program. While many BPC programs undoubtedly meet their programmaticlevel criteria for success, this report is more interested in whether BPC programs helped the United States achieve
its intended strategic-level objectives – a heretofore relatively unexplored question in the academic and policy
literatures.
The following sections of this report delve into the case studies used to support the analysis in
Figure 1. The sections are organized according to BPC rationale. After outlining the logic behind
a given rationale (war termination, proxy warfare, etc.), each section explores whether those
strategic objectives were met and concludes with an overall assessment of the efficacy of BPC
toward accomplishing that rationale.
Rationale: BPC as an Exit Strategy from Wars
In many instances, the United States has built or expanded partner militaries with the goal of
curtailing its involvement in wars. Particularly in those instances in which U.S. forces were
engaged in a conflict, but with limited interests, the United States has dedicated significant
resources to training and equipping host nation forces. As the logic goes, enabling a host nation
and transitioning security responsibility from the United States to the partner creates conditions
whereby American forces are able to withdraw. Put differently, at times the United States has
sought to create an environment in which the level of conflict, even if it continued, could be
handled by local forces, thereby creating a path to extricate U.S. forces. Further, as many senior
officials argued during the counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, local forces and
governments must ultimately be responsible for maintaining security after military coalition
members depart. Thus, constructing durable security institutions has been a key component of
post-9/11 military campaign strategies. In the post-World War II period, large-scale capacity
building missions designed to enable U.S. withdrawal from a particular theater of operations
occurred in three countries: Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan.
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Case Study: Vietnam (1954-1973)
After World War II, the Pacific theater of operations became progressively challenging.
Communists took over China and aligned with the Soviet Union, the situation in Korea was
escalating, an insurgency was brewing in the Philippines, and anti-colonial movements were
emerging in French Indochina. Fearing a communist takeover of the entire region, the United
States began a modest military support effort in 1950, called the Military Assistance Advisory
Group-Indochina (eventually renamed the MAAG-Vietnam). The MAAG was initially composed
of some 128 personnel and had the narrow mission focus of sending military equipment to French
and Vietnamese forces. After France withdrew from the theater of operations in 1954, the United
States took on the responsibility of training and equipping the Army of the Republic of Vietnam
(ARVN). Eventually, the MAAG became so significant in size and scope that it was the only U.S.
military advisory effort commanded by a three-star general. Further, of the more than $2 billion in
aid distributed to South Vietnam up to 1960, 80% of that aid was directed to military capacity
building efforts.34
The efforts initially appeared successful; South Vietnam was relatively politically stable until
around 1957. Eventually, however, the Viet Cong returned to the guerilla tactics it had employed
against the French.35 The ARVN, with its conventional focus and insufficient manpower, was
unsuited to waging a counterinsurgency campaign. By 1960, the United States began
reconsidering the nature of its support to the Vietnamese government, in favor of a strategy that
reflected its somewhat rudimentary understanding of counterinsurgency principles. In 1961, a
“limited partnership” strategy was implemented, which expanded the scope of the MAAG to
include advising ARVN counterparts down to the battalion level and in each provincial capital.
Furthermore, beginning in 1962, the United States and the ARVN engaged in a “Strategic
Hamlet” program intended to pacify the local population by providing security as well as
improving Vietnamese lives economically, politically, socially, and culturally. Unfortunately,
according to the Pentagon Papers, the Strategic Hamlet program failed in its objectives:
The Strategic Hamlet Program soon became the unifying vehicle to express the
pacification process. The theory was that of physical security first, then government
programs to develop popular allegiance. The fact was over-expansion, counter-productive
coercion in some areas, widespread mismanagement, and dishonesty.36
Ultimately, the American expectation at the time was that the government of Vietnam would
reform itself to eradicate local concerns about injustice that were breathing life into the
insurgency in the first place. The latter did not take place.
Challenges of Executing BPC Programs During the Vietnam War
The Pentagon Papers—the name of a secret study of U.S. involvement in Vietnam from 1945-1967 commissioned by
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara—identifies several execution issues associated with U.S. BPC efforts:
U.S. “mirror imaging.” The United States focused on training a conventionally oriented ARVN force capable of
repelling an overt invasion by North Vietnam, despite the fact that intelligence assessments suggested that an
overwhelming conventional attack from the north was unlikely.37
34
National Archives, Report of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Vietnam Task Force (The Pentagon Papers), Part
IV, B-3, p. ii.
35
http://www.history.army.mil/books/Vietnam/comm-control/ch01.htm.
36
National Archives, Report of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Vietnam Task Force (The Pentagon Papers), Part
IV, B-3, p. v.
37
Ibid, part IV, A-4, p. 1.1
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Insufficient attention to “means” in strategy development. The decision to undertake and enhance the
training mission was largely political, without due consideration of resource and capability limitations.
Insufficient mission focus. The ARVN was in “extremely poor condition in 1954; its prospects were worse.”
ARVN was tasked with internal and external security responsibilities that it was not capable of addressing due to
resource and manpower limitations.
Questionable host nation “ownership” of the mission. According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time,
“Unless the Vietnamese themselves show an inclination to make individual and collective sacrifices required to resist
Communism, which they have not done to date, no amount of external pressure and assistance can long delay
complete communist victory in South Vietnam.”38
Lack of Alignment between U.S. and Vietnamese Interests. Other parts of the Pentagon Papers question the
degree to which there was sufficient alignment of interests between the United States and Vietnamese governments.
While “Diem [the Vietnamese leader] needed the U.S. and the U.S. needed a reformed Diem,” the papers note “It is
a matter of record that he did not reform his government.... What remains in issue is whether he could have done so.
If he could not, the U.S. plan to end the insurgency was foredoomed from its inception, for it depended on
Vietnamese initiatives to solve a Vietnamese problem.”39
Source: National Archives, Report of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Vietnam Task Force (The Pentagon Papers),
Part IV, A-4, pp. 1.1-5.1, https://www.archives.gov/research/pentagon-papers/.
After the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident, U.S. attention on its BPC efforts were diverted; instead,
the United States deployed additional forces of its own to escalate its campaign against the North
Vietnamese. Eventually, a division of labor between the United States and its Vietnamese
counterparts emerged, whereby the former took responsibility for offensive operations against
North Vietnamese forces, and the latter focused on internal pacification.40 Exacerbating matters,
the conventional buildup occurred without the commensurate fundamental reforms to the South
Vietnamese government that had been, at least in theory, agreed. The United States found itself
waging a counterinsurgency campaign on behalf of a partner that was increasingly at odds with
its own population.
Despite calls within the military to escalate the campaign even further,41 after the Tet Offensive—
in which communist Vietnamese forces demonstrated their ability to mount surprise military
operations in South Vietnam—and the election of President Nixon, the political tide turned
against the war. Seeking to extricate the United States from the conflict, in 1969 U.S. strategy
shifted to one of “Vietnamization,” that is, the progressive transfer of security responsibility from
American to South Vietnam forces as a vehicle to allow U.S. military forces to withdraw by
1973.42 The training mission was therefore reprioritized to build the AVRN capability to a level
sufficient to allow it to shoulder more of the military burden. In tandem, U.S. forces began
withdrawing from Vietnam, backfilled by their ARVN counterparts. According to President
Nixon in his November 3, 1969, speech:
Under the new orders, the primary mission of our troops is to enable the South
Vietnamese forces to assume the full responsibility for the security of South Vietnam.…
We have adopted a plan which we have worked out in cooperation with the South
38
Memorandum for SecDef from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Indochina,” 17 November 1954, as cited in The Pentagon
Papers, Part IV, A-4, p. 3.1
39
The Pentagon Papers, Part IV, B-3, p. iii.
40
Pentagon Papers, Part IV, B-3, p. vii.
41
According to Melvin Laird, General Westmoreland proposed raising the number of U.S. forces in Vietnam from
500,000 to 700,000.
42
Laird also describes “Vietnamization” as “de-Americanization.”
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Vietnamese for the complete withdrawal of all U.S. combat ground forces, and their
replacement by South Vietnamese forces on an orderly scheduled timetable. 43
However, two years after the withdrawal of American troops, Saigon, the capital of South
Vietnam, fell to North Vietnam in 1975. According to former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird:
Vietnamization represented a formula for withdrawing our forces with honor from
Vietnam while supplying the South Vietnamese themselves with indigenous combat
capabilities, provided they had the will and resolve to fight for their freedom. Time,
however, was not on our side. The years of neglect of South Vietnam’s own combat
effectiveness, and the limited time available for our withdrawal, made the tasks of
Vietnamization formidable. In the end we bought some time for both Saigon and
Washington to adjust to the painful realities of our not so much having fought the wrong
war in the wrong place at the wrong time, as having fought this war wrongly in the first
place.44
In part due to the systemic problems in South Vietnam, as well as the rapid timetable of
transitioning to a force unprepared to take on security responsibility, the strategy of
“Vietnamization” failed to create a government capable of repelling the North Vietnamese after
U.S. forces withdrew.
Case Study: Afghanistan (2001-2015)
In response to the September 11, 2001, attacks, the United States launched an offensive in
Afghanistan designed to eradicate the Al Qaeda terrorist group and depose the Taliban-run
government, which hosted Al Qaeda on its soil. Subsequent to the initial military campaign, the
international community met in Bonn under the auspices of the United Nations to establish an
interim government for Afghanistan. The resulting Bonn Agreement outlined how the
international community would support the newly created Government of the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan, to include providing security for the capital city, Kabul.45
According to RAND, the international community’s interest in immediately establishing an
Afghan-led security presence was no accident:
Coalition commanders … did not want a Bosnia-like long-term occupation of
Afghanistan. Soon after the invasion, the blanket term “security sector reform” began to
be bandied about in Kabul as the tool for extracting coalition forces.
The initial U.S. plan for the Afghan Security Force was to co-opt existing ethnically and
geographically based militias by providing uniforms and equipment while integrating them into
legitimate government institutions. Under power-sharing arrangements, faction leaders became
Generals and militia leaders became officers in the Afghan National Army (ANA), which initially
numbered 50,000 troops. Yet this approach quickly proved difficult to implement, as “local
43
President Richard M. Nixon, November 3, 1969 speech. http://www.nixonlibrary.gov/forkids/speechesforkids/
silentmajority/silentmajority_transcript.pdf.
44
Melvin Laird, “Nixon-Ford Defense Policy,” International Security, Vol 10, No. 2 (Fall, 1985) p. 11.
45
United Nations, Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Reestablishment of Permanent
Government Institutions, Bonn, 2001.
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politics often trumped national interests during operations.” 46 The decision was subsequently
taken in 2003 to build an ANA from scratch, with a target end-strength of 70,000.47
In 2003, NATO assumed responsibility for commanding the International Security Assistance
Force. By 2006, it became clear that the Taliban—once thought to be on the retreat—had instead
regrouped, orchestrating a series of “spring offensives” each year designed to challenge the reach
and legitimacy of the Afghan government in Kabul. By 2008, the Afghan National Army endstrength was increased to 122,000. While problems existed with respect to attrition and
overstretch, generally speaking the ANA was considered by Afghans to be a legitimate, respected
Afghan institution. Still, forces opposed to the Kabul government grew in strength, necessitating
the continued presence of U.S. and coalition forces. The Afghan National Police, by contrast, had
considerably more difficulty becoming an effective security provider. At the time, DOD and
Government Accountability Office (GAO) officials determined that the police had significant
shortcomings; in 2008, no ANP units were capable of performing their security responsibilities.48
Several months after the inauguration of President Obama, the White House conducted a
strategic-level review of the mission in Afghanistan. Ultimately, the United States departed
slightly from the Bonn strategy by recalibrating its strategic objectives for Afghanistan and
Pakistan to focus on the “core” goal to “disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and
Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future.”49 In his address to the
nation, President Obama noted:
At the same time, we will shift the emphasis of our mission to training and increasing the
size of Afghan security forces, so that they can eventually take the lead in securing their
own country. That’s how we will prepare Afghans to take responsibility for their security,
and how we will ultimately be able to bring our troops home (CRS emphasis added).50
In 2010, at the Lisbon Summit, NATO Allies, ISAF partners, and the Afghan government agreed
to a plan to transition security responsibility to Afghan security forces and ensure they were in the
lead by 2014:
The process of transition to full Afghan security responsibility and leadership in some
provinces and districts is on track to begin in early 2011, following a joint Afghan and
NATO/ISAF assessment and decision. Transition will be conditions-based, not calendardriven, and will not equate to withdrawal of ISAF-troops. Looking to the end of 2014,
Afghan forces will be assuming full responsibility for security across the whole of
Afghanistan (CRS emphasis added).51
According to the plan, on December 31, 2014, the ISAF mission ended; on January 1, 2015, the
NATO-led Resolute Support Mission (RSM) began. This mission change signaled NATO’s
transition from a combat role to that of training, advising, and assisting Afghan forces.
Simultaneously, Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan (which to that point had been largely
focused on conducting counterterrorism operations) was redesignated Operation Freedom’s
46
Obaid Younossi, Peter Dahl Thruelsen, Jonathan Vaccaro, Jerry M. Sollinger and Brian Grady, The Long March:
Building an Afghan National Army, The RAND Corporation: 2009, p. 14
47
Ibid, p. 15.
48
Robert M. Perito, “Afghanistan’s Police: The Weak Link in Security Sector Reform,” USIP Special Report, United
States Institute of Peace: August 2009, p. 6.
49
The White House, “Remarks by the President on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan,” March 27, 2009.
50
Ibid.
51
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Lisbon Summit Declaration, November 2010. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/
natolive/official_texts_68828.htm#afghanistan.
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Sentinel (OFS), with two tasks: contributing to NATO’s Resolute Support Mission and continuing
U.S counterterrorism efforts against al Qaeda.
Presently, the overall U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan is approximately 9,800;52 some 6,834 of
those troops are assigned to Resolute Support (the total multinational force’s troop strength is
13,223), while the remainder are assigned to Operation Freedom’s Sentinel.53 According to public
estimates, approximately 500 of those are conducting day-to-day training with Afghan forces
outside of Kabul.54 The end-strength goal for the Afghan National Police is now 157,000. As of
April 2015, 154,263 of those positions had been filled.55 The goal for the Afghan National Army
is 195,000, and the Air Force goal is 7,800. As of April 2015, 169,984 of the ANA positions and
6,533 of the Air Force positions had been filled. As of June 30, 2015, the United States
appropriated more than $686 billion to combat operations in Afghanistan and $65 billion to
programs supporting the training and equipping of Afghan Security Forces since 2001.56
On August 26, 2015, Musa Qala, a key district in Helmand Province and a focal point for ISAF
and Afghan security efforts, fell to the Taliban.57 In October 2015, the northern Afghan city of
Konduz was temporarily seized by the Taliban. These incidents occurred against a broader
backdrop of increasing instability. As the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction
(SIGAR) noted in his July 30, 2015, report, “conflict-related violence increased in Afghanistan as
the ANDSF sought to contain insurgent activity whose intensification resulted in record-high
levels of civilian casualties, according to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan.”
Further, “incidents per-day average was higher in this [reporting] period than in the same periods
in 2014 and 2013.”58 SIGAR also reports that, “DoD and RS officials acknowledge that the
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has spread into Afghanistan, although they added that
the group was ‘nascent and relatively small.’”59 The DOD itself notes that significant challenges
to ANP effectiveness remain:
The ANP continues to perform traditional policing as well as counterinsurgency
operations in the face of significant casualties. Challenges remain in force protection,
command and control, training, maintenance, medical, force management and personnel
attrition, and corruption. 60
Although increased instability was, to some extent, expected to occur in the wake of the
withdrawal of most U.S. and coalition forces, events in Konduz arguably necessitated a
reconsideration of President Obama’s strategy to withdraw all but 1,000 troops by the end of
2016. On October 15, 2015, President Obama announced that he would retain 9,800 troops in
Afghanistan until late 2016 and then 5,500 troops thereafter. A presence of 5,500 troops is
52
U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2015, p. 11.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Resolute Support Placemat,” June 2015, http://www.nato.int/
nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2015_02/20150227_1502-RSM-Placemat.pdf.
54
General John Campbell, Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, October 8,
2015.
55
U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2015, p. 86.
56
Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report, July 30, 2015, p. 93.
57
Mohammad Stanekzai, “U.S. Soldiers Killed in Afghanistan, Taliban Grab District,” Reuters, August 26, 2015,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/08/26/us-afghanistan-attack-idUSKCN0QV13E20150826.
58
Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report, July 30, 2015, p. 94.
59
Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report, July 30, 2015, p. 96.
60
U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2015, p. 5.
53
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anticipated to cost approximately $15 billion per year, approximately $5 billion more than the
smaller Kabul-based force was projected to cost.61
While it is difficult to assess whether efforts to train and equip the Afghan Security Forces have
been successful, it is worth recalling the history of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Three
years after the Soviet campaign concluded, the Moscow-sponsored government in Kabul abruptly
fell in 1992.
Case Study: Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003-2010)
Shortly after the campaign in Afghanistan commenced, the United States turned its focus to Iraq.
At the time, U.S. Administration officials assumed that the entire campaign would take between
two and four years—a time frame predicated on the assumption that the regime of Saddam
Hussein could be “decapitated,” leaving the rest of the government capable of assuming authority
after an appropriate transition period. During the transition, an interim U.S.-led Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA), in consultation with anti-Hussein Iraqis (both expatriate and
local),62 would set the conditions to create a stable, democratic, and free Iraq.63 These
assumptions were further amplified in military campaign planning at the time; U.S. Central
Command believed that coalition forces would be able to draw upon existing Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF) and structures to help provide security before responsibility was transitioned to a
new Iraqi government.
By late 2003, training and equipping of the new Iraqi Security Forces was being implemented as
part of a strategy to transition security and governance responsibility to the Iraqis. As President
Bush noted at the time:
Our strategy in Iraq has three objectives: Destroying the terrorists; enlisting the support
of other nations for a free Iraq; and helping Iraqis assume responsibility for their own
defense and their own future.... We are helping to train civil defense forces to keep order
and an Iraqi police service to enforce the law, a facilities protection service, Iraqi border
guards to help secure the borders and a new Iraqi army. In all these roles, there are now
some 60,000 Iraqi citizens under arms, defending the security of their own country. And
we are accelerating the training of more.64 (CRS emphasis added.)
Efforts to execute this training program were somewhat fragmented in 2003 and 2004. While the
Coalition Provisional Authority was responsible for reconstituting the Iraqi Security Forces, its
ability to do so was stymied, at least in part, by a combination of a lack of resources and
ambitious training objectives. In August 2003, the CPA directed the creation of the New Iraqi
Army, with the goal of training and fielding 27 Iraqi battalions in two years—a goal subsequently
revised to one year, likely in accordance with emerging plans to transition governing
responsibility to the Iraqis in 2004. Meanwhile, efforts to create an Iraqi police force were called
into question by the CPA’s limited resources. Military commanders at the time began establishing
their own police training programs for their respective areas of responsibility, because CPA’s
“throughput” of police personnel was not sufficient to meet immediate requirements.
61
Greg Jaffe and Missy Ryan, “Obama expected to announce new plan to keep 5,500 troops in Afghanistan,” The
Washington Post, October 15, 2015.
62
OSD Policy, “Iraqi Interim Authority Implementation Concept—Summary,” March 30, 2003; OSD Policy, “Iraqi
Interim Authority Action Plan,” March 30, 2003.
63
Donald Rumsfeld, “Principles for Iraq – Policy Guidelines,” The Rumsfeld Papers, May 13, 2003.
64
President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation, September 7, 2003, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/
white_house-july-dec03-bush_iraq_speech/.
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On May 11, 2004, President Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive 36, which
streamlined the training of Iraqi security forces by giving responsibility for the effort to United
States Central Command. Despite this improvement in the coherence of the ISF training effort—
and despite the transition of governing authority from the CPA to Iraqi control in June 2004—
violence across the country continued escalating. Recognizing the deteriorating situation, in
November 2005 the White House issued a “National Strategy for Victory in Iraq,” which stated:
A “Security Track,” carrying out a campaign to defeat the terrorists and neutralize the
insurgency, developing Iraqi security forces, and helping the Iraqi government:
Clear areas of enemy control by remaining on the offensive, killing and capturing enemy
fighters and denying them safe-haven;
Hold areas freed from enemy influence by ensuring that they remain under the control of
the Iraqi government with an adequate Iraqi security force presence; and
Build Iraqi Security Forces and the capacity of local institutions to deliver services,
advance the rule of law, and nurture civil society (CRS emphasis added).
While the need to build Iraqi security institutions was never in doubt—it was always a key
component of the United States’ exit strategy65—differences of opinion existed as to the priority
the effort ought to have relative to other missions, such as counterterrorism and stability
operations. As violence continued to escalate, voices inside and outside the Administration began
arguing that the United States needed to prioritize the ISF capacity building effort more
meaningfully.
In early 2007, Congress mandated the creation of the Independent Commission on the Security
Forces of Iraq (P.L. 110-28, $1314 (e) (2)), which published its findings during September of that
year. It concluded that:
The Iraqi Armed Forces – Army, Special Forces, Navy and Air Force – are increasingly
effective and are capable of assuming greater responsibility for the internal security of
Iraq; and the Iraqi police are improving, but not at a rate sufficient to meet their essential
security responsibilities. The Iraqi Security Forces will continue to rely on the Coalition
to provide key enablers such as combat support (aviation support, intelligence, and
communications), combat service support, (logistics, supply chain management, and
maintenance), and training. The Commission assesses that in the next 12 to 18 months
there will be continued improvement in their readiness and capability, but not the ability
to operate independently. Evidence indicates that the ISF will not be able to progress
enough in the near term to secure Iraqi borders against convention military and external
threats.”66
By 2009, violence across Iraq had decreased significantly, and the ISF demonstrated some
capability and capacity to take the lead for Iraq’s security.67 In the judgment of the Obama
Administration, therefore, the United States could begin its withdrawal from Iraq, redeploying all
its combat brigades by August 31, 2010. The United States completed its withdrawal from Iraq in
December of 2011, at the conclusion of its Status of Forces Agreement authorizing U.S. troops on
Iraqi soil. According to DOD and Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction reporting,
over the course of their involvement in Iraq, U.S. and coalition forces trained and equipped
65
Ibid.
Center for Strategic & International Studies, Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, September 6,
2007, p. 12, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/isf.pdf.
67
Starting in 2005, Congress required DOD to submit “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq” reports on a quarterly
basis (P.L. 109-13). Reports included assessments of the capability and capacity of Iraqi security forces.
66
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roughly 950,000 Iraqi Security Forces.68 The United States spent upwards of $815 billion on its
combat operations, of which approximately $25 billion was allocated to the Iraqi Security Forces
Fund.69
Although Iraq remained unstable after the withdrawal of U.S. forces, many leaders believed that
the levels of violence were manageable. Yet rather than decrease—or plateau—in the years after
the U.S. departure, violent incidents increased. Aggravating matters, remnants of Al Qaeda in Iraq
(a formidable adversary prior to the surge) reemerged after the U.S. departure. Furthermore, Syria
descended into unrest, which then turned into a brutal civil war. These and other factors,
including the exacerbation of sectarian divisions by the Maliki government, combined to create a
uniquely challenging security environment. In in early 2014, the Iraqi Security Forces proved
unable to repel the Islamic State. As the New York Times noted in June 2014:
The stunning collapse of Iraq’s army in a string of cities across the north reflects poor
leadership, declining troop morale, broken equipment and a sharp decline in training
since the last American advisers left the country in 2011, American military and
intelligence officials said Thursday. Four of Iraq’s 14 army divisions virtually abandoned
their posts, stripped off their uniforms and fled when confronted in cities such as Mosul
and Tikrit by militant groups, principally fighters aligned with the radical Islamic State in
Iraq and Syria, or ISIS, the officials said. 70
In August 2014, the United States began Operation Inherent Resolve, a coalition effort to build
the capacity of Iraqi and Syrian forces while degrading its military effectiveness. The effort is
currently ongoing; however, assessments regarding the campaign’s progress are mixed. Given
that another BPC effort was initiated in 2014, the 2003-2011 training and capacity building effort
in Iraq does not appear to have produced security institutions capable of managing local security
challenges.
Analysis
Despite significant investments of money, time, and personnel, U.S. efforts to build partners’
capacity as a means to enable withdrawal from wars in which it was directly engaged did not
prove successful in two—possibly three—out of three cases. In all three examples, the host nation
forces that were to assume responsibility for waging a military campaign, in order to allow a U.S.
departure from the theater, initially demonstrated some proficiency. Yet in both Vietnam and Iraq,
those forces proved unable to secure their respective countries in the long term; in Afghanistan,
the Obama Administration has chosen to retain almost 10,000 U.S. troops due to concerns about
the ANDSF’s ability to fend off Taliban incursions. Execution challenges throughout significant
portions of these campaigns were manifest in all three cases. Yet a number of scholars and
practitioners have questioned whether strategic issues—namely, whether host nation and U.S.
goals can ever be sufficiently aligned to enable a durable security transition71—were the root
cause of these BPC challenges. These questions deserve greater analytic scrutiny.
68
Figure compiled by CRS using Department of Defense, United States Central Command, and U.S. State Department
sources.
69
CRS Report RL33110, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, by
(name redacted)
70
Eric Schmitt and Michael R. Gordon, “The Iraqi Army Was Crumbling Long Before its Collapse, U.S. Officials
Say,” The New York Times, June 12, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/13/world/middleeast/americanintelligence-officials-said-iraqi-military-had-been-in-decline.html.
71
Rosa Brooks, “The Hard Lessons of Kunduz and Syria,” Foreign Policy, October 2, 2015
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Rationale: BPC for Managing Regional
Security Challenges
The logic for this strategic rationale is that building the security capability of states might prevent,
or roll back, the ability of terrorist groups and other hostile forces to launch attacks against U.S.
interests or those of its allies. Doing so might also prevent the outbreak of hostilities among
warring factions that might otherwise lead to a humanitarian catastrophe and/or U.S. military
intervention, as well as empower nations to participate in regional military operations that might
benefit U.S. national security interests. As President Bush argued in 2004, the world “must create
permanent capabilities to respond to future crises,” in particular, “a more effective means to
stabilize regions in turmoil, and to halt religious violence and ethnic cleansing.”72 The 2015
National Security Strategy builds on this logic, arguing that mitigating state fragility and
preventing, containing, and resolving armed conflict are all in the national security interests of the
United States.73 Thus, military-to-military engagements in this context are envisioned to be part
of risk-mitigation strategies; a mechanism through which the local, “friendly” governments can
be empowered to manage internal or regional security challenges with minimal U.S. involvement,
if any.
BPC in this context has therefore evolved into a set of programs and authorities designed to better
allocate the security burden among concerned countries, particularly in regions in which the
United States has less direct interests. These BPC programs to manage regional security
challenges tend to be more preventive in nature; they are designed and implemented as a bulwark
against instability rather than with a specific crisis or conflict in mind. As such, these programs
are designed to strengthen partners’ ability to manage their own security responsibilities,
whatever they may be.74
Case Study: U.S. Support to the African Union and the African
Union Mission in Somalia (2005-Present)75
The African Union (AU), a regional grouping of all countries in Africa except Morocco, was
established in 2002 as the successor to the now-defunct Organization of African Unity (OAU).
Despite funding and capacity shortfalls, the AU routinely becomes involved in internal and interstate armed conflicts and political crises. Support to the African Union, and African peacekeeping
capabilities more generally, has been a key component of both the Bush and Obama
Administrations’ Africa policies. At the U.S.-Africa Leaders’ Summit in 2014, President Obama
announced the African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP) to strengthen the
crisis response capabilities of African forces. Since 2009, the United States has committed to
provide over $1 billion to develop African peacekeeping capacity and strengthen African
72
U.S. Department of State, Address to the United Nations General Assembly by President George W. Bush, September
21, 2004.
73
The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States, February 2015.
74
Recently, Peter Dombrowski and Simon Reich have described these kinds of activities as a “Strategy of
Sponsorship.” See, Peter Dombrowsk & Simon Reich, “The Strategy of Sponsorship,” Survival (vol 57, no. 5) OctoberNovember 2015, pp. 121-148. However, while Dombrowski and Reich describe a concept of employment for U.S. and
partner forces, this paper is more concerned with whether those partner forces are effective.
75
Much of the material contained within this section is derived from work by CRS analysts Nicholas Cook and (name r
edacted).
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institutions. Further, the United States has trained and equipped more than a quarter-million
African troops and police for service in UN and AU peacekeeping operations, many of which
have ultimately been trained through the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI).76
Global Peace Operations Initiative
According to the U.S. State Department website, the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) is a U.S. governmentfunded security assistance program “intended to enhance international capacity to effectively conduct both United
Nations and Regional peace support operations by: building partner country capabilities to train and sustain
peacekeeping proficiencies; increasing the number of capable military troops and formed police units available for
deployment to stability operations contingencies; and facilitating the preparation, logistical support, and deployment of
military units and FPUs to peace support operations.”77 GPOI was launched at the 2004 G8 Sea Island Summit as the
U.S. contribution to the broader G8 Action Plan for Expanding Global Capability for Peace Support Operations.
GPOI is funded through the Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account, which is managed by the U.S. State
Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, although the U.S. military plays a role in implementing GPOI
programs, particularly outside of Africa. During the first five-year phase of GPOI’s existence (2005-2010), the
program focused on directly training peacekeepers; it met its goal to train upwards of 75,000 troops. While GPOI’s
scope is global, the bulk of these troops have come from African countries. GPOI has since expanded its programs
from the direct training of peacekeepers in many countries to helping partner countries efforts to build their own
sustainable, indigenous peacekeeping training capacity. GPOI has also sought to expand its efforts to Asia, Europe, and
Latin America. In addition, GPOI is the primary foreign sponsor of the Italian-run Center of Excellence for Stability
Police Units, which uses Italian Carabinieri to teach constabulary policing skills to participants. According to the State
Department, GPOI has facilitated the deployment of more than 197,000 peacekeepers from 38 countries to 29 peace
operations around the world.78
Source: CRS Report RL32773, The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress, by (name re
dacted) .
Although much of the U.S. assistance to African countries is bilateral, the United States has
allocated significant resources toward building the capacity of the African Union to manage
multilateral peacekeeping operations. To this end, since 2005, the United States has stationed a
peace and security advisor at the AU headquarters, provided assistance to the AU’s Peace Support
Operations division, given training on defense resource management and control, and supported
training exercises to enhance partners’ interoperability. In 2014, the United States committed to
delivering $70 million worth of equipment to African peacekeepers, including for AU forces in
Somalia and the Central African Republic.
With respect to East Africa, instability and conflict have plagued Somalia for over 30 years. After
Somali dictator Mohamed Said Barre was ousted in 1991, power struggles among clans and
warlords overtook the country. In an attempt to ameliorate the situation, the United States, under
the auspices of the United Nations, deployed troops to Somalia in 1992. However, after forces
allied with warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed shot down a U.S. Black Hawk helicopter and killed
several U.S. Army Rangers, the United States withdrew from Somalia six months later.
Despite attempts to form a federal government in early 2000s, Somalia remained unstable. A
Transitional Federal Government, backed by the international community, was established, but it
was rejected by many of the warlords and militias in Somalia. In 2006, the Union of Islamic
Courts—with its militant wing, al-Shabaab (with linkages to al Qaeda)79—established control in
76
The White House, Fact Sheet; U.S. Support for Peacekeeping in Africa, August 6, 2014.
U.S. Department of State, Global Peace Operations Initiative Overview, November 10, 2015, http://www.state.gov/t/
pm/ppa/gpoi/.
78
U.S. Department of State, Global Peace Operations Initiative Factsheet, November 10, 2015. http://www.state.gov/r/
pa/prs/ps/2015/06/243940.htm.
79
The U.S. National Strategy for Counterterrorism highlights East Africa as a region of concern because of al Shabaab
(continued...)
77
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Mogadishu. By mid-2006, al-Shabaab had taken much of central Somalia, prompting Ethiopian
military intervention with U.S. support in December 2006.
In January of 2007, the African Union launched the African Union Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM), which quickly found itself embroiled in a brutal civil war. AMISOM supported the
Transitional Federal Government on one side and al-Shabaab and the UIC waged an insurgency
campaign on the other. Al-Shabaab and the UIC gained momentum among many Somalis, fed by
historic anti-Ethiopian sentiment among Somalis and a lack of TFG capacity to secure its
territory. As one scholar notes:
The ongoing conflict produced an escalating spiral of violence, not least because
Ethiopian, TFG, and later AMISOM forces were often heavy handed in responding to
these attacks. The resulting collateral damage among the civilian population produced a
huge wave of displacement (in 2007, 400,000 of Mogadishu’s population of
approximately 1.3 million fled the city) and generated intense levels of anti-Ethiopian
and also anti-American feeling.80
Through 2009-2010, AMISOM and al-Shabaab fought bloody battles on the streets of
Mogadishu, with neither side achieving a decisive advantage. During that time, Al Shabaab
conducted its first terrorist attacks outside Somalia, with simultaneous bombings in the capital of
one of AMISOM’s main troop contributors, Uganda, in 2010.
By 2015, al-Shabaab appeared to be in retreat—although still potent. U.S. strikes were
responsible for the deaths of several key figures responsible for coordinating terrorist operations
outside Somalia, and a number of other notable figures have defected.81 As of September 2015,
the strength of AMISOM uniformed personnel stood at 22,126, comprising both troops and
police. Along with the current Force Headquarters staff of 81, the military component has 5,432
troops from Burundi, 1,000 from Djibouti, 3,664 from Kenya, 850 from Sierra Leone, 4,395 from
Ethiopia, and 6,223 from Uganda.82
With respect to AMISOM specifically, in 2014 the White House publically reiterated its
commitment to “build capacity to counter al-Shabaab in Somalia and provide space for political
progress. This includes predeployment training, provision of military equipment, and advisors on
the ground.” Based on State Department and DOD notifications, CRS estimates that the United
States has allocated more than $800 million in bilateral logistics, equipment, and training for
AMISOM troop contributors since 2007, and almost $300 million for Somali Forces. The United
States has also provided more than $500 million to the UN Support Offices for AMISOM.83 The
United States also maintained a small contingent of military personnel, including Special
Operations Forces. These forces were augmented by a small team of military advisors in 2013,
known as the Mogadishu Coordination Cell.
Given that Somalia is now diplomatically recognized by the United States, and that al-Shabaab’s
territory has been decreased and its capabilities have reportedly been degraded, the White House
(...continued)
and its connections with al Qaeda. See http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/al_shabaab.html.
80
Paul D. Williams, AMISOM’s Five Challenges, November 10, 2015, http://csis.org/story/amisom%E2%80%99sfive-challenges.
81
Congressional Research Service.
82
The African Union Mission in Somalia Website, “Frequently Asked Questions,” October 15, 2015, http://amisomau.org/frequently-asked-questions/.
83
Statement of (name redacted) Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on Africa and
Global Health, Hearing: U.S. Security Assistance in Africa, June 4, 2015.
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views U.S. efforts to build the capacity of the African Union, and AMISOM, as a success. Others
argue for caution, pointing out that AMISOM’s track record is more fraught than a cursory glance
might suggest. First, after over 30 years of war, challenges to rebuilding the Somali state remain
substantial. Islamist militants continue to control territory in some rural areas, making it difficult
for Somali and AMISOM forces to secure main supply routes. Second, although al-Shabaab is
degraded, it remains potent. It has continued striking targets in Kenya, and in late February 2015,
it released a video on social media—in English—calling for jihadists to attack Western targets.
Some analysts are concerned that al-Shabaab may sever its links with al Qaeda in favor of the
Islamic State.84 Third, U.S. support for earlier Ethiopian interventions in Somalia arguably
exacerbated local tensions, thereby fueling the conflict, and some analysts warn that civilian
casualties during AMISOM operations could again alienate the local population.
AMISOM itself experienced significant challenges during the course of the campaign.
Coordination among troop-contributing countries varies by sector, and some of AMISOM’s
military operations, by some accounts, are not directed by the central headquarters. Despite U.S.
financial and training support, personnel shortfalls have plagued the operation, and participating
countries are reimbursed for some but not all contingent-owned equipment.85 Some AMISOM
troop contributors, notably Ethiopia and Kenya, reportedly conduct operations outside the
auspices of AMISOM for which they are not reimbursed. Other observers note that despite U.S.
assistance thus far, the African Union’s capabilities fall well short of expectations:
[The AU] has glaring shortcomings when it comes to analyzing and predicting violent
conflict, formulating military doctrine, planning peace operations, mobilizing and
deploying troops, providing logistical support, ensuring effective command and control,
and distilling lessons learned and best practices from ongoing and completed operations.
Professional standards vary widely across troop contributors, interoperability remains
uneven, and many member states are reluctant to participate in AU missions.
Case Study: U.S. Assistance to Mali (2002-2015)86
The Malian government has received U.S. support for its counterterrorism efforts since 2002, in
response to perceived terrorist threats from radical Islamists (e.g., the Salafist Group for
Preaching and Combat, which eventually renamed itself al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
[AQIM] in 2007). These terrorist activities led the United States to launch the Pan-Sahel Initiative
(PSI)—a counterterrorism, military, and border training program for the Malian army, among
others, in the Sahel. The PSI eventually became the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership
(TSCTP), which integrated counterterrorism and train and equip support with development
assistance and public diplomacy efforts.
A separatist rebellion launched in late 2011 by members of the minority ethnic Tuareg community
aggravated intra-military and political tensions in the country, leading to a military coup by junior
officers in March 2012. The coup was led by Captain Amadou Sanogo, who had previously been
a recipient of U.S. professional military education and training.87 Sanogo argued that deposing the
democratically elected government was necessary due to its inability to handle the Tuareg
84
In October, 2015, a faction of al-Shabaab pledged its allegiance to ISIS. See Robyn Kriel and Briana Duggan, “Al
Shabaab Faction Pledges Allegiance to ISIS,” CNN.com, October 23, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/22/africa/alshabaab-faction-isis/.
85
Williams, “Fighting for Peace,” p. 225.
86
Much of the material contained within this case study has been derived from reports by CRS analyst (name redacted).
87
Martin Vogl, “Mali Coup leaders partially reopen airport,” The Associated Press, March 26, 2012.
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situation in northern Mali. Islamist extremist groups including Al Qaeda in the Islamic Magrheb
(AQIM), who initially reportedly fought alongside the separatists, took advantage of the ensuing
chaos to expand their presence and eventually ousted the separatists to assert control over major
towns in northern Mali. Malian forces, in turn, largely disintegrated and proved unable to reverse
the territorial gains of these Islamic extremist groups.88 In January of 2013, France launched
military operations in northern Mali to dislodge AQIM in coordination with other regional forces.
U.S. security assistance for Mali was suspended between 2012 and 2013 due to the military coup,
although the Obama Administration has slowly restarted some programs, focusing largely on
security sector reform (rather than focusing on specialized training and equipping of Malian
forces for counterterrorism purposes).89
On June 20, 2015, after nearly a year of peace talks mediated by Algeria, a coalition of northern
separatist rebel groups agreed to a peace accord with the government and a rival set of loyalist
northern factions. However, the underlying causes of Mali’s crisis have not been resolved, and
security conditions have deteriorated since 2014. Islamic extremist groups launched attacks in
targets across Mali in 2015; 90 on November 20, 2015, gunmen attacked the Radisson Blu hotel in
Bamako, killing 22 people including one American. Al Murabitoun, a Sahel-based terrorist group
affiliated with Al Qaeda, and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) jointly claimed
responsibility for the assault, possibly in coordination with other Mali-based groups.91 Despite
post-9/11 efforts by the United States and France to train and equip Malian forces to counter
terrorism, some have questioned whether these were sufficient in the wake of these attacks. As
one Malian Member of Parliament noted, “we are not up for the fight against terrorism - we are
not prepared enough.”92
Case Study: U.S. Support to the Former Warsaw Pact (1994-Present)
At the end of the Cold War, the United States and its European allies sought to rebuild ties with
Central and Eastern European countries formerly associated with the Warsaw Pact. In January of
1994, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) established the Partnership for Peace (PfP)
program to encourage closer collaboration between non-NATO states and NATO, and to help
partners become full NATO allies when appropriate. Later that year, President Clinton announced
the Warsaw Initiative, a program to provide U.S. bilateral assistance to PfP partners through
supporting their participation in exercises, conferences, seminars, and other non-exercise events,
as well as a program of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to purchase equipment, training, and
services to improve a partner’s interoperability with NATO. The two programs, while
programmatically distinct, are intertwined due to their overlapping participants and strategic
goals.
Over time, NATO’s PfP program expanded somewhat in scope, adding strategic-level dialogue
with key non-NATO members (such as Sweden and Austria) on defense matters to its defense
88
Simon J. Powelson, Enduring Engagement Yes, Episodic Engagement No: Lessons for SOF from Mali, Naval
Postgraduate School Thesis, December 2013.
89
The White House, Fact Sheet: Security Governance Initiative, August 6, 2014, https://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2014/08/06/fact-sheet-security-governance-initiative.
90
(name redacted), “Mali: Transition from Conflict?”
CRS In Focus (IF 101166), July 23, 2015.
91
CRS Insight IN10401, The November 2015 Terrorist Siege in Mali, by (name redacted), (name redacted), and
(name redacted)
92
Thomas Fessy, “Mali Not Geared Up To Combat Terrorist Threat,” BBC News, November 27, 2015,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34920659.
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institution-building mission. There are now 22 countries in the PfP program; some 35 countries
have participated in NATO’s PfP overall, 12 of which became NATO members.93
The Warsaw Initiative, by contrast, contracted in scope, as its members grew in defense capability
and capacity, thereby “graduating” from the program. Presently, the Warsaw Initiative comprises
16 developing countries in the Euro-Atlantic region, including the Ukraine and Georgia. It has the
following core goals:
Enhancing partner capacity and advance democratic reform of defense
establishments and military forces.
Focusing on identified defense institution-building efforts in partner countries.
Increasing U.S./NATO-Partner interoperability to enhance partner contributions
to coalition operations.
Supporting further partner integration with NATO.
Continuing to support aspirant accession to NATO of select countries.
The Partnership for Peace and Warsaw Initiative resulted in the accession of 12 former Warsaw
Pact nations into NATO, accomplishing, in theory, the program’s overall strategic rationale of
sharing the security burden in the Euro-Atlantic region. This burden-sharing, in turn, enabled U.S.
forces to withdraw from the European theater and focus on other challenges, including a “pivot”
to Asia. However, experts on both sides of the Atlantic argue that European allies and partners
have not yet “backfilled” departing U.S. forces with the defense capabilities needed to meet
emerging security challenges.94 Allied defense spending declined, and most NATO states
consistently failed to meet an agreed defense spending target of 2% of gross domestic product.
This reduction in defense spending, compounded by the expense of expeditionary operations in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and other places, has led to a reduction of NATO’s actual military capabilities.
Experts now debate whether Europe has the collective capabilities to manage myriad security
challenges along its southern and eastern peripheries.95
Case Study: U.S. Security Assistance to Pakistan: 2002-Present96
After more than a decade under broad U.S. sanctions for its nuclear proliferation activities, and
later for a military coup, Pakistan became a key ally in U.S-led efforts to combat Islamist
militancy and extremism following the September 11, 2001, attacks. As the logic went, Pakistan
was a base for numerous U.S.-designated terrorist groups. By building the capability of Pakistani
security forces, the government of Pakistan would be able to address the threat posed by these
terrorist groups without the direct involvement of the United States. The United States, in turn,
would be better able to focus its efforts on operations in Afghanistan. As President Bush stated
during a press conference with President Musharraf of Pakistan in December 2004:
The President and I are absolutely committed to fighting off the terrorists who would
destroy life in Pakistan, or the United States, or anywhere else. 97
93
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Signatures of Partnership for Peace Framework Document, January 10, 2012,
August 5, 2015, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_82584.htm.
94
See, for example, Naftali Bendavid, “Just Five of 28 NATO Members Meet Defense Spending Goal, Report Says”
The Wall Street Journal, June 22, 2015. For further information on NATO matters, see CRS Report R43698, NATO’s
Wales Summit: Outcomes and Key Challenges, by (name redacted), September 8, 2014.
95
(name redacted), “Four Questions for NATO’s Leaders,”
Defense One, September 2, 2014.
96
CRS Report R44034, Pakistan-U.S. Relations: Issues for the 114th Congress, by (name redacted).
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In 2006, the United States and Pakistan affirmed their bilateral strategic partnership and
articulated a number of steps that both countries would take together to strengthen their
relationship and advance core goals. 98 With respect to peace and security, the countries
announced they would take the following actions:
Build a robust defense relationship that advances shared security goals, promotes
regional stability, and contributes to international security;
Continue robust U.S. security assistance to meet Pakistan’s legitimate defense
needs and bolster its capabilities in the war on terror;
Deepen bilateral collaboration in the fields of defense training, joint exercises,
defense procurement, technology transfers, and international peacekeeping;
Decide to increase the frequency of defense policy discussions to strengthen
collaboration in the identified sectors;
Work together to ensure the maintenance of peace, security, and stability in the
South Asia region and beyond; and
Cooperate closely in international institutions, including bodies of the United
Nations, on matters of mutual concern.99
In 2009, President Obama announced a recalibration of U.S. strategy toward Pakistan:
[W]e must focus our military assistance on the tools, training and support that Pakistan
needs to root out the terrorists. And after years of mixed results, we will not, and cannot,
provide a blank check.100
U.S. goals for Pakistan took several years to formally develop and articulate, and they evolved
over time. Yet as early as 2002, Pakistan became a leading recipient of U.S. foreign assistance
and other aid, with Congress appropriating more than $18 billion in such assistance for FY2002FY2015, including $7.6 billion in security-related aid.
In FY2002, Congress began appropriating billions of dollars to reimburse Pakistan and other
nations for their operational and logistical support of U.S.-led counterterrorism operations
through Coalition Support Funds.101 These “coalition support funds” (CSF) have accounted for
roughly half of overt U.S. financial transfers to Pakistan since 2001, or about $13 billion to date.
The amount equals a significant portion—as much as one-fifth—of Pakistan’s total military
expenditures during this period.102 According to the Department of Defense, CSF payments have
been used to support scores of Pakistani army operations and to help keep more than 100,000
Pakistani troops in the field in northwest Pakistan. Such payments also compensate Islamabad for
coalition use of Pakistani airfields and seaports.
(...continued)
97
The White House, “President Bush and President Musharraf Discuss International Relations, Commerce,” December
4, 2004, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/12/20041204-2.html.
98
The White House, “Joint Statement on United States-Pakistan Strategic Partnership,” March 4, 2006,
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060304-1.html.
99
Ibid.
100
The White House, “Remarks by the President on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan,” March 27, 2009,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-a-new-strategy-afghanistan-and-pakistan.
101
Coalition Support Funds are not technically considered Foreign Assistance.
102
Tom Countryman, “Pakistan: U.S. Security Assistance Programs Help Address Shared Challenges,” Dipnote, June
7, 2010, September 15, 2015, http://blogs.state.gov/stories/2010/06/07/pakistan-us-security-assistance-programs-helpaddress-shared-challenges#sthash.NI198Zdn.dpuf.
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The U.S. government has engaged in further efforts to build the capability and capacity of
Pakistani Security Forces. In 2009, Congress authorized the creation of the Pakistan
Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund (PCCF), a State Department-administered fund, as well as
the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund, administered by the DOD. These funds were ultimately
intended to support the government of Pakistan in building and maintaining the capability of its
security forces to conduct counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations, and to clear and
hold terrain in contested areas throughout the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and
elsewhere along Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan. These programs were zeroed out of the
Assistance budget to Pakistan in FY2013. According to the Defense Security Cooperation
Agency:
The Department intends to continue to reimburse the Government of Pakistan in FY 2015
for military operations it undertakes on its border with Afghanistan, which supports U.S.
operations. Pakistan has served as an ally in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) since
2001 and will continue to play a key role in follow on operations. Pakistan’s security
forces regularly engage violent extremists who threaten the security of Afghanistan and
Pakistan. Pakistan incurs expenses to engage in counterinsurgency operations, man
observation posts along the Afghanistan border, and conduct maritime interdiction
operations and combat air patrols.103
While the post-2001 U.S. assistance program has seen notable accomplishments—notably in the
area of humanitarian relief—according to many analysts, U.S. assistance to Pakistan since 2001
has not achieved its central goal as articulated in 2006. Mullah Omar, the spiritual leader of the
Afghan Taliban movement lived in Quetta (a town in Pakistan) until his death; many military
leaders attributed the organization, command, and control of the Taliban to the “Quetta Shura,” a
group of Taliban leaders living with Omar in Pakistan. Efforts to encourage the Pakistani
government to take on terrorist groups also languished, as the Pakistani government consistently
prioritized its preparations for a conventional conflict with India. Yet it was the May 2011
revelation that Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden had apparently enjoyed years-long and
undisturbed refuge inside Pakistan—near Pakistan’s military academy—that caused many to
question the wisdom of the continued provision of aid.
After the post-Osama bin Laden raid nadir in U.S.-Pakistan relations, the two countries resumed a
strategic-level dialogue in January 2015. The assistance the United States provides to Pakistan
has evolved into a mechanism to advance bilateral cooperation on other national security
priorities, to include securing “lines of communication” to multinational operations in
Afghanistan and nuclear security.104 Yet on balance, despite the priority placed on building
Pakistan as a stable ally capable of tackling terrorist groups on its own soil, and despite
considerable U.S. expenditure on building Pakistan’s security capabilities in order to do so, the
central goals of this BPC effort arguably have not been met.
Analysis
Based on the four case studies selected, applying BPC to manage regional security challenges
appears problematic. In the most successful case—U.S. support to the former Warsaw Pact—
many argue that NATO allies failed to invest in the defense capabilities needed to effectively
manage security challenges on the European periphery after the United States withdrew
103
Defense Security Cooperation Agency, FY 2016 Budget Estimate, p. 95.
“House Foreign Affairs Committee Holds Hearing on President Obama’s Fiscal 2014 Budget Proposal for the State
Department and Foreign Affairs,” CQ Transcripts, April 17, 2013. .
104
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significant components of its European-based force structure after the end of the Cold War. In the
other cases—support to the African Union and AMISOM, Pakistan, and Mali - U.S. investments
to build local security forces have not necessarily translated into partners’ increased capability—
or willingness—to manage regional security challenges in a manner that advances U.S. national
security interests.
Rationale: BPC to Indirectly Strengthen a Party to an
Internal Conflict
Over the course of its history, the United States has, with relative frequency, supported its allies
and partners as they wage their own internal conflicts. These are contingencies wherein the
United States has some sort of larger, geopolitical stake in the outcome of an ongoing conflict, but
cannot—or politically will not—become a direct party to the conflict. During the Cold War, this
indirect support was often an extension of great power competition. In the absence of the Soviet
Union, however, the United States continued supporting local actors to advance other national
objectives, such as stemming the flow of narcotics into the United States. In these instances,
military support and aid are channeled to one belligerent over another, in the hopes that doing so
will enable the U.S.-favored party to ultimately win and create an advantageous post-war
situation for the United States. This assistance can be as simple as providing weapons and money,
or as complex as providing combat advisors.
Case Study: The United States and the Philippines (1947-1953)105
The Japanese invasion of the Philippines during World War II threw Philippine society into
turmoil and fomented the formation of the Hukbalahap (or, Huk) Rebellion.106 The Huks initially
targeted Japanese forces and their Philippine clients; upon conclusion of World War II, the Huks
turned their focus toward the Philippine ruling class, which had excluded them from post-war
political life as well as U.S. economic assistance. Fueled by these grievances, the Huks—already
somewhat communist in leaning during World War II—took an even stronger communist
disposition. The Huks began an insurgency to overthrow what they viewed as a corrupt post-war
Philippine government.
The post-war, post-colonial Philippine government siphoned off aid and supplies from the United
States, preventing much needed assistance from reaching the general population. Further, the
government’s constabulary forces conducted a brutal anti-Huk campaign, preying upon the local
population by “seizing foodstuffs without paying for them, becom[ing] drunk and disorderly,
extract[ing] information by inhumane methods, abus[ing] women, shoot[ing] up country towns
and generally mistreat[ing] the populace.”107As the rebellion grew in strength, the United States
became increasingly concerned. Not only was the Philippines a former U.S. territory (until 1946),
the situation was becoming ominously similar to Chiang Kai-shek’s China—with endemic
corruption and alienation of moderates within the country—just before the Communist takeover.
Geopolitically, the United States wanted to address the situation, but given that the Truman
105
For more information, see Walter Ladwig, The Trouble With Allies: U.S. Indirect Intervention in the Philippines,
Vietnam and El Salvador, Oxford University Press, (Forthcoming in 2016), pp. 108-157.
106
The Philippines became a U.S. commonwealth in 1935, which gave it greater self-autonomy.
107
Ladwig, p. 117.
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Administration was using the Philippines as an example to the Europeans of successful
decolonization, direct intervention was not politically feasible.
After Philippine President Quirino—seen by the United States as an incompetent leader—
requested military aid for his anti-Huk campaign, the United States began a policy of
conditioning its support, tying aid and advice to initiatives that would erode the Quirino
government’s ability to prey upon ordinary Filipinos. For example, the Joint U.S. Military
Assistance Group (JUSMAG) argued for the incorporation of the Philippine constabulary into the
Philippine Armed Forces in order to curtail the Constabulary’s predatory behavior. After initially
resisting, the Quirino government acquiesced and, under American pressure, replaced the Chief of
Defense with Ramon Magsaysay, who subsequently reformed the Philippine security forces to
make them more accountable to the local population. Altogether, the United States spent
approximately $243 million on assistance to the Philippine security forces between 1947 and
1952.108
Reforms in the security sector were echoed by reforms in the political sphere. The reforms
Magsaysay instituted essentially devitalized the Huk rebellion. Magsaysay himself died in an
airplane crash in 1957 before his reforms could fully take root. In 1960, Ferdinand Marcos
became president; in Marcos’s second term, he instituted a series of crackdowns that turned the
presidency into a dictatorship, although U.S.-Philippine relations remained relatively close due to
longstanding ties between the two countries, as well as the positioning of U.S. bases in the
Philippine archipelago.
Case Study: U.S. Intervention in the Soviet-Afghan War (1980-1988)
Responding to escalating chaos that challenged the Soviet-installed Afghan government, in
December 1979, the Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan. The Soviets deployed thousands of
troops to Afghanistan and took charge of fighting what had by that time become a full-scale war
against Soviet occupation.109 This was the first time the Soviet Union attempted to extend its
authority outside Central and Eastern Europe; the United States therefore sought to contain, if not
check, Soviet expansionism.
According to press reports at the time, a low-level aid program involving the United States,
China, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan began in early 1980. In these early years, the U.S.organized program was limited to one that would provide deniability to Pakistan. This meant
obtaining Soviet-made weapons, or copies thereof, from the international black market and
funneling them into Pakistan, who would then pass on the weaponry to anti-Communist Islamic
forces in Afghanistan. The program was limited to approximately $80 million.
In 1984, largely as a result of congressional intervention, the U.S. program to assist anticommunist forces in Afghanistan increased significantly. Subsequently, the Afghans were
provided with U.S. and European equipment, including Swiss anti-aircraft guns and “Stinger”
anti-aircraft missiles. Funding levels grew to approximately $600 million per year, with a total of
$2 billion from 1980 through 1988. The anti-communist insurgency grew, both in strength and
momentum.
108
U.S. Department of State, “Philippines,” Foreign Assistance Green Book.
U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian, Milestones: 1977-1980 The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and the
U.S. Response, 1978-1980, September 1, 2015, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/soviet-invasionafghanistan.
109
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During this time, the Soviet Union also continued to increase military pressure and pour money
into Afghanistan. Yet these efforts failed to quell the growing U.S.-backed insurgency, and by
1986, Premier Gorbechev began referring to Afghanistan as a “bleeding wound.” On April 14,
1988, a United Nations-brokered accord between Afghanistan and Pakistan was signed, with the
United States and the Soviet Union as guarantors to the agreement. The U.S.-backed Afghan
insurgents were not invited to the negotiations, which may have contributed to the conflict’s
endurance post-settlement. Although the United States and the USSR agreed as part of the
agreement to cease their military activities—indirect or otherwise—in Afghanistan, Congress
maintained that assistance should be extended if the Soviet Union continued interfering in
Afghanistan. Moscow executed its withdrawal by February 15, 1989. U.S. assistance to
Afghanistan dwindled after the cessation of hostilities, and within several years the region once
again descended into chaos. The subsequent civil war, which led to the rise of the Taliban in the
1990s, eventually created a space wherein al-Qaeda could train and direct the 9/11 attacks against
the United States.
Case Study: U.S. Assistance to Colombia (2000-2015)110
Colombia, a key U.S. ally in Latin America, has been caught in a protracted and complex internal
armed conflict for upwards of half a century. Both right and left wing armed groups that opposed
the Colombian government (two of the most prominent being the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia [FARC] and the National Liberation Army [ELN]) funded themselves through
narcotics trafficking. Through their activities, Colombia dominated the global cocaine trade by
the late 1990s, and heroin produced from Colombian-grown poppies became the dominant source
of the drug in the eastern United States. Observers in Congress and in the Clinton Administration
began to fear that Colombia would become a failed state.
In particular, Members of Congress grew alarmed over the increasing financial reliance of illegal
actors in Colombia on the highly lucrative drug trade and feared that poorly equipped Colombian
security forces were losing ground to these illegal actors. Some officials in the Clinton
Administration thought that Colombia could become a failed state or a “narco-state.” Colombia
did not possess the resources to salvage its deteriorating security, compromised public safety, and
struggling economy, which in the late 1990s had plunged into recession.
Plan Colombia was announced by Colombian President Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002) at the U.S.
General Assembly on September 21, 1999. It was originally a six-year strategy to end Colombia’s
then-40-year-long internal conflict, eliminate drug trafficking, and promote democracy and
development. The original plan had a goal to reduce the cultivation, processing, and distribution
of narcotics by 50% over the plan’s six-year time frame. It would do so by eradicating narcotics,
implementing alternative development programs, strengthening, equipping, and professionalizing
the Colombian Armed Forces and Colombian National Police, strengthening the judiciary, and
fighting corruption. As initially conceived, the plan would cost $7.5 billion, of which the
Colombians would pay $4 billion. Colombia sought international donations, including from the
United States, for the balance.
At the outset, Congress appropriated $1.27 billion over two years to the program. The U.S.
contribution included training and equipping two new counternarcotics army battalions and
providing Black Hawk and Huey helicopters for their transport. U.S. support also included
assistance for: (1) drug trafficking interdiction; (2) Colombian National Police eradication
110
Much of the information contained in this section is derived from work written by CRS analyst June Beittel.
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capabilities; (3) economic development; (4) “boosting government capacity,” such as funding for
human rights monitors and improving the justice system and the rule of law; and (5) other
economic assistance and support for the peace process. Congress also prohibited U.S. personnel
from directly participating in combat missions, which served to underscore and reinforce
Colombian “ownership,” according to some observers.
Key U.S. Lessons Learned from Plan Colombia
According to participants in the formulation and execution of Plan Colombia and follow-on assistance programs, both
purpose and process were essential. The countries were united in purpose due to a general agreement between the
U.S. and Colombian governments regarding what each intended to do, and the U.S. government organized itself to
achieve its goals through a successful process.
Purpose. Both the United States and Colombian governments had a strong interest in ensuring that Colombia did
not become a failed state. It was initially unclear, however, what Colombia was prepared to do to prevent its own
collapse. Before developing a joint U.S.-Colombian plan, U.S. officials sought to understand the activities that the
Colombian government was doing, or sought to do. U.S. assistance was then designed to improve and strengthen
those Colombian-initiated efforts. This helped ensure that there was Colombian ownership of the plan, as well as
sufficient alignment of interests between the United States and Colombia to enable a productive partnership. As
Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering, Undersecretary of State at the time, poignantly noted, “We knew from experience
that without a willing and competent local ally, all bets were off.”
Process. Architects of Plan Colombia worked to ensure that different U.S. government agencies (both civilian and
military) involved in Plan Colombia synchronized their efforts better than they had previously. While support to
Colombia was established as an interagency, Assistant Secretary-level Executive Committee project (initially chaired
by Undersecretary Pickering), it was housed within the Department of State rather than at the National Security
Council. This helped “institutionalize” U.S. assistance to Colombia over multiple Administrations. To help ensure that
the U.S. agencies involved would support increased U.S. assistance to Colombia, the Clinton Administration sought
supplemental funding rather than have agencies reprogram funds they had already planned to allocate toward other
foreign policy objectives.
Source: Thomas R. Pickering, “Anatomy of Plan Colombia,” The National Interest, November/December 2009, pp. 7179.
After the September 11, 2001, attacks, there was a growing recognition that the counternarcotics
and counterterrorism problems in Colombia were tightly linked. Congress therefore agreed to
grant the U.S. executive branch greater flexibility to build a unified campaign to combat both
terrorist organizations and drug trafficking. Between FY2000 and FY2015, Congress
appropriated nearly $10 billion in assistance from State Department and DOD accounts to carry
out Plan Colombia and its follow-on strategies.
By many accounts, the partnership between the United States and Colombia succeeded. As early
as 2009, then-U.S. Ambassador to Colombia William Brownfield described U.S. assistance
efforts as “the most successful nation-building exercise that the United States has associated itself
with perhaps in the last 25-30 years.”111 Colombian Armed Forces are now working with other
nations in the Central and South America to tackle their own counternarcotics and narcotrafficking challenges.112 On September 23, 2015, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, in a
highly symbolic gesture, shook hands with the leader of the FARC, Ricardo Londoño (alias
Timochenko) and announced a timetable to complete peace talks, a framework for a transitional
justice system for assisting victims, and a date for disarmament of the FARC. Some believe that
this disarmament could lead to the disarmament of the ELN as well. Still, work remains ahead.
The FARC and the Colombian government have not yet signed the final peace accord. Further,
111
112
“Colombia to Aid U.S. in Taliban Fight,” CBS Evening News, July 27, 2009.
CRS Report R43813, Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations, by (name redacted).
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Colombia remains a dominant producer of cocaine; 90% of the cocaine seized in the United
States originates from Colombia.
Analysis
Based on the cases selected, it appears that BPC can be used effectively to support partners as
they wage their own internal conflicts. In all three cases, U.S. military and security sector
assistance helped U.S. partners win a given conflict. Further, in the cases of the Philippines and
Colombia, this assistance helped promote longer-term stability and strengthened their respective
bilateral relations with the United States. In the example of Afghanistan, however, when the BPC
effort concluded, the U.S.-supported Afghans were unable to translate U.S. assistance into longerterm political security gains. Ultimately, Afghanistan descended into violent conflict and
instability, which Al Qaeda eventually exploited. Thus, although BPC seems to validate the aim
of indirectly supporting a party to a conflict, the Afghanistan case suggests that if such BPC
efforts are not carefully managed in the short, medium and long term—both politically and
militarily—they can have longer-term effects that may prove counterproductive to U.S. interests.
Rationale: BPC for Conflict Mitigation113
BPC has been used to help prevent the outbreak of further hostilities among warring countries or
factions. As the logic goes, strengthening a relatively weak party to a conflict can help create—or
reestablish—a balance of power among different factions, especially upon cessation of hostilities.
This, in turn, makes it more difficult for the parties in question to return to violent conflict.
Case Study: BPC to Mitigate Conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina
(1995-2002)114
After the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords were signed, the United States aimed to mitigate conflict
through establishing a Federation Army from the Bosniak (Muslim) dominated Army of Bosnia
and the Croatian Defense Council, which distrusted each other even after significant Bosnian
Serb military attacks. In December 1995, James Pardew was appointed as U.S. Special
Representative for Military Stabilization in the Balkans, and he took charge of a joint DOD-State
Department task force, based in the State Department, to coordinate a train and equip effort for
the Federation Army.
In this case, BPC efforts had the rationale of strengthening the military capacity of the Bosnian
Federation to help promote legitimate state governance, which, in turn, would prevent other
actors from destabilizing the country’s security. The Bosnia Train and Equip Program sought to
establish a balance of power between Federation forces and the Bosnian Serb forces, which the
Clinton Administration believed would help prevent a resumption of fighting when the NATO-led
peacekeeping force in Bosnia was withdrawn. The program was carried out by a private firm,
Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI), with many retired U.S. military officers on its staff.
The direct U.S. contribution was about $100 million in used, refurbished U.S. military equipment.
113
In the initial research design for this rationale, conflict prevention was included. However, identifying whether, or
when BPC contributed to the prevention of conflict (rather than preventing the re-emergence of a pre-existing armed
conflict) proved problematic. It is difficult to prove a negative.
114
This section is based on archived CRS Report 96-735F, Bosnia: U.S.-Led Train-and-Equip Program, by (name r
edacted) (available from the author).
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The distribution of equipment, as well as the training component of the program, was carried out
by MPRI under contract to the Bosnian Federation, not the U.S. government.
Approximately 200 retired U.S. military personnel ran the program. This was due to the desire to
downplay direct U.S. military involvement, in part due to concerns that direct U.S. military
participation in the program would undermine the neutrality of U.S. peacekeepers in Bosnia in the
eyes of the Bosnian Serbs, and might even present a threat to U.S. soldiers. The program also
included a training component, which focused on leader development; the leaders, in turn, were
to train their soldiers. Training involved establishing leadership seminars, professional
development schools, and a combat training center where senior commanders and staffs were to
train.
In 2002, the State Department announced the end of the Bosnia Train and Equip Program. ThenDepartment Spokesman Richard Boucher said in a briefing to reporters:
The U.S.-led international program to train and equip the armed forces of the Federation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina successfully has completed its work. Through the generosity
of the donors,115 the Train and Equip Program over the last seven years has provided
world-class training, equipment, and facilities to the Federation designed to make its
forces compatible with NATO standards. In present year (2002) dollars, the total
combined value of U.S. and international goods and services provided under the program
amount to approximately half a billion dollars. By redressing military imbalances, the
program has achieved its goal of enhancing stability in Bosnia and the region. Other
donor countries included: Brunei, Egypt, Germany, Jordan, Malaysia, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, Turkey, and the U.A.E.
The security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina today has greatly improved since the
end of the Bosnian war in 1995. The voluntary reductions of the Federation and
Republika Srpska armed forces are evidence of that. There is general agreement in
Bosnia on the need to reform and restructure the armed forces in order to meet conditions
to enter NATO’s Partnership for Peace. There is growing understanding that the armed
forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina must be able to defend the territorial integrity and
sovereignty of the state as a whole and represent it in collective defense missions. 116
Case Study: BPC to Prevent the Re-emergence of Conflict between
Egypt and Israel117
Egypt and Israel in the context of the late 1970s and afterwards provide a more complicated case
than Bosnia. At first blush, U.S. efforts to build up military capabilities in both Egypt and Israel
in the decades following the 1978 Camp David Accords and the subsequent 1979 peace treaty
between Israel and Egypt would be a textbook example of using what came to be termed BPC to
achieve the strategic aim of preventing the re-emergence of conflict between the two nations.
However, the complexities of conflict in the region, as well as significant changes in perceived
threats to the United States in the Middle East since 1978 make conclusions regarding strategic
effects of U.S. military aid murky. The conceptual distinction between BPC as an overarching
strategic concept in DOD and the limited view of BPC as specific security cooperation authorities
115
The United States coordinated and led the Bosnia Train and Equip Program. Donor nations included Brunei, Egypt,
Germany, Jordan, Malaysia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the U.A.E.
116
U.S. Department of State, Daily Briefing, October 30, 2002, http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/14799.htm.
117
This section is based upon CRS Report RL33003, Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations, by (name redacted), and
CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by (name redacted).
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in the State Department may also add to potential confusion given the relative size of State
Department-administered security assistance and security cooperation programs to both Egypt
and Israel. This case study uses BPC in the sense stated in the 2014 QDR: “Building security
globally not only assures allies and partners and builds partnership capacity, but also helps protect
the homeland by deterring conflict and increasing stability in regions like the Middle East and
North Africa.”118
For decades, the United States has used military aid and security cooperation to secure peaceful
relations between Israel and Egypt. Since the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty, the United
States has provided Egypt and Israel with large amounts of military assistance and has
inaugurated a number of joint programs and exercises designed to increase U.S. bilateral
institutional closeness with both countries. In the case of Egypt, U.S. policymakers have routinely
justified aid as an investment in regional stability, built primarily on long-running military
cooperation and on sustaining the treaty—principles that are supposed to be mutually reinforcing.
For Israel, U.S. military aid has helped transform the Israeli armed forces into one of the most
technologically sophisticated militaries in the world. U.S. military aid has been designed to
maintain Israel’s “qualitative military edge” (QME) over neighboring militaries. The rationale for
QME is that Israel must rely on better equipment and training to compensate for being much
smaller geographically and in terms of population than its potential adversaries.119
For Egypt, the United States has provided Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants of
approximately $1.3 billion per year and International Military Education and Training grants of
between $1 and 2 million per year since the mid-1980s. However, the military-to-military
relationship has, in the past two decades, received less U.S. emphasis than one might expect to
achieve the strategic aim of conflict prevention. The last significant U.S.-Egyptian joint military
operation was in 1991, when Egypt contributed 20,000 troops to Operation Desert Storm.120 As
the United States continually engages in military operations against terrorist groups across the
broader Middle East, the U.S. military, in particular, seeks partners that can provide “irregular”
warfare capabilities including intelligence, training, and counterinsurgency support. Yet analysts
consider the Egyptian armed forces to be more oriented to fight interstate than asymmetric
warfare.
For Israel, the United States has provided FMF grants of between $1.8 billion and $3.1 billion per
year since the mid-1980s. The United States and Israel also have jointly developed missile
defense programs, for which the United States has allowed Israel to use FMF funds to purchase
weapons systems. While the 1979 Memoranda of Agreement (out of the Camp David Accords)
between Israel and the United States says “the United States will endeavor to take into account
and will endeavor to be responsive to military and economic assistance requirements of Israel,” 121
U.S. military aid to Israel has more closely followed the model of military sales and financing to
developed countries (for example, NATO Allies) than the BPC concept, found in the 2006 QDR,
of “maintaining a long-term, low-visibility presence in many areas of the world where U.S. forces
do not traditionally operate.” It is also unclear as to the extent to which U.S. military aid to Israel,
given Israel’s own defense spending and capabilities development (as well as a significantly
118
U.S. Department of Defense, 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, p. 13.
CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by (name redacted), p. 1.
120
In Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, Egypt contributed a field
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