Update on the Highly-Pathogenic Avian Influenza Outbreak of 2014-2015

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Update on the Highly-Pathogenic Avian

Influenza Outbreak of 2014-2015

-name redactedAnalyst in Agricultural Policy

July 20, 2015

Congressional Research Service

7-....

www.crs.gov

R44114

Update on the Highly-Pathogenic Avian Influenza Outbreak of 2014-2015

Summary

The U.S. poultry industry is experiencing a severe outbreak of highly-pathogenic avian influenza

(HPAI). The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA’s) Animal and Plant Health Inspection

Service (APHIS) has reported 223 cases of HPAI in domestic flocks in 15 states. With the start of

summer, the finding of new cases slowed. The last reported new case was in Iowa on June 17,

2015. More than 48 million chickens, turkeys, and other poultry have been euthanized to stem the

spread of the disease. Cases have been caused by several highly pathogenic H5 avian influenza

(AI) strains that result in substantial mortality in domestic poultry. Turkey and egg-laying hen

farms in Minnesota and Iowa have been hardest hit. Commercial broiler farms have not been

affected to date. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), no

infections in humans have been associated with the HPAI outbreak, and the public health risk is

low.

Under the Animal Health Protection Act (AHPA; 7 U.S.C. §8301 et seq.), APHIS, in cooperation

with state and local animal health officials, has the authority to take extraordinary measures, such

as seizing, restricting movement, or euthanizing animals to protect the health of animals. During

the current outbreak, APHIS has paid to euthanize poultry, clean and disinfect poultry premises

and equipment, and then test for the AI virus to ensure poultry farms can be safely repopulated.

USDA has indemnified poultry owners for euthanized poultry.

USDA has received approval to use nearly $700 million in additional funds from the Commodity

Credit Corporation (CCC) to address HPAI. As of July 7, 2015, APHIS has committed over $500

million of the $700 million to help producers control the spread of HPAI, including $190 million

for indemnity payments. The agency is committed to covering cleaning and disinfecting costs on

affected farms.

The cost of the HPAI outbreak to the poultry industry is high. The value of turkey and laying hen

losses is estimated at nearly $1.6 billion. Economy-wide losses are estimated at $3.3 billion.

Since the HPAI outbreak in December 2014, 18 U.S. trading partners have imposed bans on all

shipments of U.S. poultry and products, and 38 trading partners have imposed partial, or regional,

bans on shipments from states or parts of states with HPAI cases. China, Russia, and South

Korea, 3 of the top 10 destinations for U.S. poultry meat in 2014, have banned all imports of U.S.

poultry.

It is believed that an HPAI outbreak is likely to occur again in the fall when wild birds begin their

migrations through the four flyways. This may result in more spread of AI, possibly in the

poultry-producing eastern and southeastern regions untouched by the current outbreak. APHIS

and the poultry industry are taking lessons from the current outbreak to prepare for the fall.

USDA is developing a vaccine to be available for manufacture if the agency decides to adopt a

vaccination policy to manage any future outbreak. APHIS and the poultry industry are reassessing

biosecurity, indemnity payment formulas, and other measures that aim to improve the

containment and elimination process.

Congressional Research Service

Update on the Highly-Pathogenic Avian Influenza Outbreak of 2014-2015

Contents

Onset of the HPAI Outbreak ............................................................................................................ 1

HPAI Cases to Date ......................................................................................................................... 3

Containing and Eliminating HPAI ................................................................................................... 4

Compensation ............................................................................................................................ 5

Disposition and Restocking ....................................................................................................... 5

HPAI and Public Health ................................................................................................................... 6

Funding for the HPAI Response ...................................................................................................... 6

Economic Impacts of the HPAI Outbreak........................................................................................ 7

Turkeys ...................................................................................................................................... 8

Eggs ........................................................................................................................................... 8

Broilers ...................................................................................................................................... 9

Trade Implications ......................................................................................................................... 10

Selected Issues ............................................................................................................................... 11

Vaccine Use Policy .................................................................................................................. 12

Biosecurity Practices ............................................................................................................... 13

Timely Depopulation and Disposal ......................................................................................... 14

Indemnity Payments ................................................................................................................ 14

Communication with Producers .............................................................................................. 15

Figures

Figure 1. North American Flyways for Waterfowl .......................................................................... 2

Figure 2. Location of HPAI Detections, Including Wild Birds ........................................................ 3

Figure 3. U.S. Wholesale Egg Prices ............................................................................................... 9

Figure 4. Bans on U.S. Poultry ...................................................................................................... 11

Tables

Table 1. HPAI Cases in Domestic Flocks in the United States in 2014-2015 .................................. 3

Table 2. Top 10 Poultry Meat Export Markets in 2014.................................................................. 10

Contacts

Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 15

Congressional Research Service

Update on the Highly-Pathogenic Avian Influenza Outbreak of 2014-2015

he U.S. poultry industry is experiencing a severe outbreak of highly-pathogenic avian

influenza (HPAI).1 As of June 17, 2015, the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA’s)

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) reported 223 cases of HPAI in

domestic flocks in 15 states. (In this context, a “case” is an affected premise.) More than 48

million chickens, turkeys, and other poultry have been euthanized to stem the spread of the

disease. Cases have been caused by several highly pathogenic H5 avian influenza (AI) strains that

result in substantial mortality in domestic poultry.2 Turkey and egg-laying hen farms in Minnesota

and Iowa have been hardest hit. Commercial broiler farms have not been affected to date.

According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), no infections in humans

have been associated with the current HPAI outbreak, and CDC considers the public health risk to

be low.

Prior HPAI outbreaks in the United States occurred in 1924, 1983, and 2004. The 1924 and 2004

outbreaks were quickly contained. To control the 1983 outbreak, 17 million birds were euthanized

in the U.S. northeast. Outbreaks of low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) are more frequent, but

result in minor illness in poultry. Nonetheless, efforts are made to also eliminate LPAI outbreaks,

because LPAI strains could potentially mutate to become more pathogenic.

Established U.S. animal health policy is to eliminate the AI virus (both HPAI and LPAI strains),

when it is found, through depopulation (i.e., euthanasia and disposal) of affected poultry. APHIS,

state, and local animal health officials euthanize poultry, clean and disinfect premises and

equipment, and then test for elimination of the virus to ensure that farms can be safely restocked.

USDA indemnifies poultry owners and pays for cleaning, disinfecting, and testing. This process is

time consuming, and poultry producers lose significant income as barns and laying houses are out

of production for several months. The poultry export sector is also faced with numerous bans on

shipments of U.S products. With loss of production, consumers see higher retail prices.

Onset of the HPAI Outbreak

The current HPAI outbreak was discovered in December 2014 in backyard flocks in the Pacific

Northwest, and in two commercial turkey and chicken flocks in California. It is thought to have

been introduced from Eurasia by wild birds migrating along the Pacific flyway and has continued

to move eastward to and along the Central and Mississippi flyways (see Figure 1). It is primarily

infecting flocks of egg-laying hens in Iowa and turkeys in Minnesota, with cases in several other

states (see Figure 2). In addition to cases in domestic flocks, outbreak strains of HPAI have been

found in free-ranging and captive wild birds in Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana, California,

Nevada, Utah, New Mexico, Wyoming, Kansas, Missouri, Kentucky, Michigan, and Wisconsin.3

USDA provides updates on the HPAI outbreak on its website at http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?

contentidonly=true&contentid=avian_influenza.html.

Most of the cases in the Midwest are from the H5N2 strain. The Asian H5N1 strain that reemerged in China in 2003

has public health implications and has not been found in humans or poultry in the current outbreak. Centers for Disease

Control and Prevention (CDC), “Information on Avian Influenza,” http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avianflu/index.htm.

HPAI findings in wild birds are reported at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/wildlife_damage/downloads/

WILD%20BIRD%20POSITIVE%20HIGHLY%20PATHOGENIC%20AVIAN%20INFLUENZA%20CASES%20IN

%20THE%20UNITED%20STATES.pdf.

Congressional Research Service

Update on the Highly-Pathogenic Avian Influenza Outbreak of 2014-2015

In June 2015, APHIS issued a report on the epidemiology of the outbreak. Although its studies

showed that wild birds probably introduced the virus into U.S. poultry flocks, APHIS said that

lapses in biosecurity practices—such as movement of vehicles, equipment, and persons from

infected to uninfected farms—contributed to the continued spread of the virus. APHIS also raised

concern about possible airborne spread of the AI virus.4

In general, colder temperatures favor transmission of influenza viruses, and cooler temperatures

in the spring of 2015 could have extended the spread of HPAI. With the start of summer, the rate

of new cases slowed. The last reported new case was in Iowa on June 17, 2015. Despite this,

USDA said it is preparing for the possibility that HPAI could resurge in the fall as migratory birds

fly south for the winter.5 With all flyways likely involved, HPAI could be introduced into large

poultry production areas in the southeastern United States that have not been affected so far. In

June 2015, APHIS updated interagency surveillance plans for migratory birds—a collaboration of

APHIS, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the U.S. Geological Survey, state and local

governments, and the private sector—with the goal of early detection and monitoring of HPAI

before it again threatens domestic poultry flocks.6

Figure 1. North American Flyways for Waterfowl

Pathways for Avian Influenza

Source: U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.

APHIS, Epidemiologic and Other Analyses of HPAI-Affected Poultry Flocks: June 15, 2015 Report, June 15, 2015,

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/animal_dis_spec/poultry/downloads/Epidemiologic-Analysis-June-152015.pdf.

Thorton, Gary, “Analysis: Avian Flu Will Be in All Flyways This Fall,” WATTAgNet, June 18, 2015.

APHIS, Surveillance Plan for Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in Waterfowl in the United States, June 2015,

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/downloads/animal_diseases/ai/2015-hpai-surveillance-plan.pdf; and Early

Detection and Monitoring for Avian Influenzas of Significance in Wild Birds, June 2015, http://www.aphis.usda.gov/

animal_health/downloads/animal_diseases/ai/wild-bird-strategic-plan.pdf.

Congressional Research Service

Update on the Highly-Pathogenic Avian Influenza Outbreak of 2014-2015

Note: The four U.S. migratory flyways show the predominant routes of north-south seasonal migration. The

routes overlap somewhat over the United States, and converge in both the summer and winter ranges in Canada

and Latin America, respectively. As a result, infectious diseases are often transmitted across flyways.

Figure 2. Location of HPAI Detections, Including Wild Birds

By county as of June 18, 2015

Source: USDA, APHIS.

HPAI Cases to Date

From December 2014 through June 17, 2015, there were 223 cases of HPAI in domestic flocks in

15 states (see Table 1). Of the 48 million birds euthanized to control this outbreak, the vast

majority were chickens, specifically egg-laying hens (38.4 million). In Iowa, more than 25

million egg-laying hens and 5 million pullets (young chickens that have not entered the egglaying flock) were euthanized. Nearly 7.8 million turkeys were euthanized, with the majority (4.8

million) on Minnesota farms. Iowa turkey farms have had 1.5 million euthanized birds. In

addition to the cases in commercial operations, 20 cases in 11 states involved backyard flocks,

affecting about 10,000 birds. Most of these cases were classified as mixed poultry, which may

include quail, guinea fowl, ducks, geese, and pheasants.

Table 1. HPAI Cases in Domestic Flocks in the United States in 2014-2015

Last finding was on June 17, 2015

State

Cases

Species Infected

# of Affected Birds

Arkansas

turkey

40,020

California

chicken, turkey

247,300

Idaho

mixed poultry

Indiana

mixed poultry

N/A

Iowa

chicken, turkey, mixed poultry,

duck

Congressional Research Service

31,723,300

Update on the Highly-Pathogenic Avian Influenza Outbreak of 2014-2015

State

Cases

Species Infected

mixed poultry

Minnesota

105

turkey, chicken, mixed poultry

8,996,050

Missouri

turkey, mixed poultry

53,100

Montana

mixed poultry

Nebraska

chicken

3,794,100

North Dakota

turkey, mixed poultry

111,500

Oregon

mixed poultry

200

South Dakota

chicken, turkey

1,168,200

Washington

mixed poultry

6,710

Wisconsin

turkey, chicken, mixed poultry

Total

223

Kansas

# of Affected Birds

1,950,733

48,091,293

Source: USDA, APHIS. Data from December 2014 through June 17, 2015.

Notes: N/A is not available. Mixed poultry cases are usually from backyard flocks. Chicken (egg-laying hens,

pullets) and turkey cases are on commercial operations.

In addition, HPAI findings in wild birds have been reported in 14 states.

Containing and Eliminating HPAI

Established U.S. animal health policy is to eliminate the AI virus through depopulation of poultry

where the virus is found. In order to achieve this, the Animal Health Protection Act (AHPA; 7

U.S.C. §8301 et seq.) authorizes USDA to take extraordinary measures, such as seizing,

restricting movement, or euthanizing animals to protect the health of animals.7 USDA has

established a five-step process that federal and state responders use to address HPAI:8

1. Quarantine—restrict movement of poultry and poultry-moving equipment into

and out of the control area;

2. Eradicate—humanely euthanize affected flocks;9

3. Monitor region—test wild and domestic birds in a broad area around the

outbreak;

4. Disinfect—kill the virus in the affected flock locations and operations; and

5. Test—confirm the poultry farm is AI virus-free.

APHIS, in cooperation with state and local animal health officials, euthanize poultry, disinfect

and clean poultry premises and equipment, and then test for the virus to ensure poultry farms can

be safely repopulated. Poultry owners are indemnified for euthanized poultry, and APHIS pays

for cleaning and disinfecting, and testing.

Regulations governing HPAI are in 9 C.F.R. Part 53.

APHIS, Questions and Answers: Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza, May 2015, http://www.aphis.usda.gov/

animal_health/downloads/animal_diseases/ai/QA-producerquestionsHPAI.pdf.

APHIS has primarily used a water-based foaming method for turkeys and CO2 for laying hens.

Congressional Research Service

Update on the Highly-Pathogenic Avian Influenza Outbreak of 2014-2015

Once laboratory tests indicate a presumptive positive for HPAI, the poultry producer must

develop a flock plan. The flock plan establishes the steps that will be taken to eliminate the virus,

and to clean and disinfect the premises in order to be able to resume business. The flock plan

must be signed by the producer, a state animal health official, and APHIS. After the flock plan is

in place, APHIS prepares an appraisal document for indemnity.

Compensation

Under the authority of the AHPA (7 U.S.C. §8306(d)), USDA compensates producers for birds

that must be euthanized. Payment is based on the “fair market” value as determined by USDA

appraisers.10 Based on the inventory, age, and intended use of birds, APHIS prepares an appraisal

calculated on available prices, costs, and bird productivity. The indemnity is usually for 100% of

the appraised value. APHIS also pays for the disposition of birds and for destruction of infected

materials. Producers are neither compensated for birds that die prior to the confirmation of HPAI,

nor for lost income from barns and hen houses being idle. If the producers elect to perform some

of the tasks involved in eliminating HPAI, they must sign a compliance agreement with APHIS

that identifies who is responsible for what tasks, and what it is expected to cost. Some producers

may choose this option in order to keep their workers employed through the outbreak crisis.

Disposition and Restocking

Each state develops HPAI response plans that account for specific environmental and resource

requirements in each state. APHIS works with the states and poultry producers to identify which

of the options works best given the conditions at the premises—flock size, space, depopulation

method—and meet state and local requirements. Usually euthanized birds may be disposed of

through composting, landfills, burial, and incineration. It takes around 30 days for bird carcasses

that are composted to be cleared as virus free.

In general, repopulation of barns or hen houses may not begin for at least 21 days (the incubation

period for the AI virus) after barns and hen houses are cleaned and disinfected, and environmental

testing of the premises is completed. The actual number of days may vary for each case. Also, the

area around the premises to be restocked must be assessed for risk of the premises becoming

infected again. Producers must have written approval from APHIS and state officials to restock a

facility. As a condition for restocking, producers are required to follow surveillance, movement,

and biosecurity requirements. If a farm restocks without the approval of APHIS and state

officials, APHIS will not indemnify the producer should the restocked flock become infected

again.

Restocking will vary by the type of operation affected by the outbreak. Egg-laying hen operations

will phase restocking to reestablish variable hen ages in the flock. The age variability allows for

even, year-round egg production. This phased restocking could take 18 months or more to

accomplish before the producer will reestablish a normal income flow. A turkey operation, on the

other hand, will restock the barn with birds of similar age that will be market-ready at about the

same time. An HPAI outbreak results in a significant income disruption for the producers, which

existing indemnities address only in part.

APHIS, HPAI Outbreak 2014-2015, Indemnity Procedures, April 22, 2015, http://www.aphis.usda.gov/

animal_health/emergency_management/downloads/hpai/indemnity_procedures.pdf.

Congressional Research Service

Update on the Highly-Pathogenic Avian Influenza Outbreak of 2014-2015

HPAI and Public Health

As deadly as they are in poultry, most HPAI strains are not easily transmissible to humans.

However, influenza viruses mutate and transfer genes with notable frequency, and public health

officials track H5 avian influenza strains for signs of increased risk of human infection.11

According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), no infections in humans

have been associated with the ongoing HPAI outbreak, and CDC considers the public health risk

to be low. However, human infections with other AI strains have occurred, most often in persons,

such as poultry workers, who have had close contact with infected birds. With the possibility of

bird-to-person infection, CDC’s National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)

and the Department of Labor’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) advise all

farm workers and responders to the outbreak to wear proper protective clothing, practice good

hand washing and showering practices, and participate in health monitoring programs for a period

of time after exposure to infected poultry.12

In addition to guidance for poultry workers, CDC has developed guidance for health officials and

providers for monitoring, diagnosis, and treatment of infections in humans.13 According to CDC

testimony before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, the

agency has also issued guidance to state preparedness officials to allow the use of federally

subsidized antiviral medications stockpiled at the state level, and instructions for requesting

supplies from the Strategic National Stockpile if needed. In addition, CDC has developed an

HPAI virus strain that could be used to produce a vaccine for use in humans, if needed.14

Funding for the HPAI Response

In the event of an animal health emergency, USDA has the authority15 to request additional funds

from the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC)16 as necessary, and the Office of Management

and Budget (OMB) may make an apportionment to provide money to contain and eliminate an

animal disease. APHIS noted in its FY2016 budget document that an AI outbreak similar to the

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), “Information on Avian Influenza,” http://www.cdc.gov/flu/

avianflu/index.htm.

CDC, “Recommendations for Worker Protection and Use of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) to Reduce

Exposure to Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A H5 Viruses,” updated June 2, 2015, http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/

topics/avianflu/default.html; and OSHA, “Guidance for Protecting Employees Against Avian Flu,” https://

www.osha.gov/dsg/guidance/avian-flu.html.

CDC, “Bird Infections with Highly-Pathogenic Avian Influenza A (H5N2), (H5N8), and (H5N1) Viruses:

Recommendations for Human Health Investigations and Response,” CDC Health Advisory, June 2, 2015,

http://emergency.cdc.gov/han/han00378.asp.

Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee hearing, Stopping an Avian Influenza Threat to

Animal and Public Health, July 8, 2015, testimony of Dr. Anne Schuchat, MD, Director, National Center for

Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, CDC.

AHPA, 7 U.S.C. §8316.

For information on CCC, see CRS Report R43669, Agriculture and Related Agencies: FY2015 Appropriations,

Agriculture and Related Agencies: FY2015 Appropriations.

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Update on the Highly-Pathogenic Avian Influenza Outbreak of 2014-2015

1980s outbreak could cost in excess of $1 billion for control and indirect costs to the poultry

industry.17

The Senate and House Agriculture Committees, in a recent letter to OMB, expressed concern

about the need for adequate funding and encouraged USDA to pursue whatever funding is

necessary.18 USDA has received approval to use additional funds for HPAI from the CCC of

nearly $700 million.19 As of July 7, 2015, APHIS has committed over $500 million to help

producers control the spread of HPAI, including $190 million for indemnity payments.20

Separately, the ongoing annual appropriation to APHIS for avian health has been about $52

million in recent years. According to USDA, the avian health program includes AI prevention and

control activities; avian health and management studies; disease threat planning and response for

the livestock, poultry, and zoological industries; comprehensive poultry disease surveillance

(including wildlife surveillance); and zoonotic disease prevention and response. The National

Poultry Improvement Plan (NPIP), a cooperative federal-state-industry program focused on AI

surveillance, is funded through the avian health appropriation.21

On July 8, 2015, the House Committee on Appropriations marked up the FY2016 agriculture

appropriations bill (H.R. 3049), which includes $55 million for avian health, $3 million more than

appropriated for FY2015. The House bill also includes an additional $5 million, on top of a base

of $7 million, for the APHIS portion of funding for the National Animal Health Laboratory

Network (NAHLN). APHIS has been utilizing funds apportioned from CCC to reimburse the

NAHLN for HPAI testing.

On July 16, 2015, the Senate Committee on Appropriations marked up the FY2016 agriculture

appropriations bill (S. 1800), which would provide APHIS with $52 million for avian health,

unchanged from FY2015.

The House and Senate Appropriations Committee reports (H.Rept. 114-205 and S.Rept. 114-82)

accompanying the FY2016 agriculture appropriations bills also would direct USDA to use its

existing authority to transfer funds from CCC as needed to address the HPAI outbreak.

Economic Impacts of the HPAI Outbreak

The cost of the HPAI outbreak to the poultry industry is high. The direct losses from euthanized

turkeys and egg-laying hens are estimated at nearly $1.6 billion, $530 million for turkeys and

APHIS, 2016 Explanatory Notes, Congressional Justification, February 2015, p. 20-21, http://www.obpa.usda.gov/

20aphis2016notes.pdf.

Senate and House Agriculture Committees, “Agriculture Committee Leadership Ask for Avian Flu Emergency

Assistance,” press release, April 29, 2015, http://agriculture.house.gov/press-release/agriculture-committee-leadershipask-avian-flu-emergency-assistance.

Table of CCC fund transfer history, provided by APHIS.

Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza: The Impact on the

U.S. Poultry Sector and Protecting U.S. Poultry Flocks, July 7, 2015, testimony of Dr. John Clifford, DVM, Deputy

Administrator, Veterinary Services, APHIS, http://www.ag.senate.gov/hearings/highly-pathogenic-avian-influenza-theimpact-on-the-us-poultry-sector-and-protecting-us-poultry-flocks. (Hereinafter referred to as the Senate Agriculture

Committee HPAI hearing.)

APHIS, 2016 Explanatory Notes, p. 20-21.

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Update on the Highly-Pathogenic Avian Influenza Outbreak of 2014-2015

$1.04 billion for laying hens. These estimates do not cover such activities as clean-up and

restocking, or future lost production. Other sectors of the economy, such as feed and trucking,

have suffered losses from lost business with the poultry industry, and egg shortages have caused

higher prices for food processors and consumers in retail markets. The economy-wide impact to

date is estimated at $3.3 billion.22

Turkeys

The nearly 7.8 million turkeys euthanized during the outbreak amounts to about 3% of the turkeys

produced in the United States in 2014. In February 2015, before HPAI began infecting turkey

flocks, USDA forecasted that turkey meat production would rise 6% in 2015. As a result of HPAI,

USDA expects 2015 production to be more than 3% lower than in 2014.23 With decreased

supplies, USDA raised its forecast for national wholesale turkey prices for 2015. Recovery from

the HPAI outbreak is also expected to slow turkey production into 2016. USDA reports that fewer

poults (young turkeys) are being placed on feed for growout through May. Turkey operations

affected by HPAI in early March did not come back online until June because of the time needed

to clean, disinfect, and test to ensure farms are free of the HPAI virus.

The potential for Thanksgiving supply disruptions may be relatively small because the industry

has had time to prepare. According to agricultural economists from the University of Illinois,

stock building of whole turkeys held in cold storage typically starts in December and continues

through the summer.24 USDA cold storage data shows that supplies of whole turkey at the end of

May 2015 were 3% higher than a year ago.

Eggs

On June 22, 2015, USDA reported that there were 341 million egg-laying hens on U.S. farms

during May, down 5% from a year earlier. Hardest hit has been Iowa, where the number of laying

hens was down 26% from a year earlier. Hens euthanized because of HPAI account for 11% of

the total U.S. egg-laying flock. USDA forecasts 2015 egg production to decline 4% in 2015, and

its benchmark New York Grade A large egg price is forecast to be 19% higher than in 2014.

Wholesale egg prices increased significantly in May, topping out at nearly $2.50 per dozen in

early June. Prices retreated some by the end of June and leveled off during July (see Figure 3).

Senate Agriculture Committee HPAI hearing, testimony of Dr. Tom Elam, FarmEcon LLC.

World Agricultural Outlook Board (WAOB), World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates, July 10, 2015, p.

31, http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/usda/current/wasde/wasde-07-10-2015.pdf. USDA forecast data for broilers,

turkeys, and eggs are sourced from the July 10, 2015 WAOB report.

Newton, J., and T. Kuethe, “Economic Implications of the 2014-2015 Bird Flu,” farmdoc daily (5):104, Department

of Agricultural and Consumer Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, June 5, 2015.

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Update on the Highly-Pathogenic Avian Influenza Outbreak of 2014-2015

Figure 3. U.S. Wholesale Egg Prices

Source: USDA, Agricultural Marketing Service.

Many of the egg farms infected with HPAI in Iowa supplied breaking eggs (used to produce eggs

in liquid form) to food manufacturers, particularly the baking sector. When supplies of breaking

eggs tightened, the price of table eggs sold in retail or the food service sectors increased. Food

manufacturers began to bid up the price of eggs to pull supplies away from the table egg market

and into the breaking market. Reportedly, H.E.B., a Texas grocery chain, limited the number of

eggs that could be purchased in its stores in order to prevent commercial buyers from emptying

retail supplies.25

Imports of eggs and egg products are limited. In order to address tight egg supplies, on June 1,

2015, the USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) certified that five establishments in

the Netherlands would be eligible to ship pasteurized egg products to the United States.26 Canada

is also eligible to ship egg products to the United States.

Broilers

Because HPAI has not hit major commercial broiler-producing areas, the primary impact of HPAI

on the broiler sector has been in the trade arena (see “Trade Implications” below). Broiler meat

production is expected to increase 5% in 2015. With a slowdown in broiler meat exports, USDA’s

cold storage data at the end of May 2015 shows a 21% increase in broiler meat stocks compared

with a year ago. Lower exports and higher stocks have pushed down broiler meat prices. For the

week ending July 10, 2015, wholesale broiler prices were 12% lower than a year earlier.

Strom, S., “Bird Flu Send Egg Prices Up, But Slowing Demand Prevents Shortages,” New York Times, June 16,

2015.

FSIS, Netherlands - Eligible Plants Certified to Export Egg Products to the United States, June 1, 2015, http://www.

fsis.usda.gov/wps/wcm/connect/3e46dda8-4669-4f71-b2ff-60f90d05f394/Netherlands_Egg_establishments.pdf

?MOD=AJPERES.

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Update on the Highly-Pathogenic Avian Influenza Outbreak of 2014-2015

Trade Implications

In 2014, the United States exported to global markets over 4 million metric tons of poultry meat,

valued at $5.5 billion (see Table 2). The vast majority of exports was broiler meat ($4.1 billion),

followed by turkey ($767 million) and other poultry meat ($671 million). In addition, the United

States exported $637 million worth of eggs and egg products in 2014. In 2014, the United States

exported 19% of its broiler meat production, 14% of turkey output, and 5% of eggs.

For 2015, USDA forecasts broiler meat exports to be more than 6% lower than in 2014, turkey

exports 26% lower, and egg exports nearly 8% lower. Data for 2015 U.S. poultry exports are

available for the January-May period. Broiler meat exports are 9% lower compared with the same

period a year ago. Turkey exports are 17% lower, but egg exports are up 11% because of strong

shipments to Mexico.27

Table 2. Top 10 Poultry Meat Export Markets in 2014

$ million

Current Bans on U.S. Poultry due to HPAI

Mexico

1,282

Regional

Canada

589

Regional

Hong Kong

521

Regional

China

315

Total

Angola

264

Russia

150

Total

Cuba

148

Regional

Taiwan

143

Regional

South Korea

113

Total

Guatemala

104

Regional

Top 10 Total

3,630

All Poultry Meat Exports

5,501

Sources: USDA, Foreign Agricultural Service, Global Agricultural Trade System Online. Poultry meat includes

broiler meat, turkey, and other poultry meat. Ban information is from the Export Library, Food Safety and

Inspection Service, USDA.

Notes: * Information on Angola is not included in the Export Library. http://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/portal/fsis/

topics/international-affairs/exporting-products/export-library-requirements-by-country.

Totals may add due to rounding.

Since the HPAI findings in December 2014, 18 trading partners have imposed bans on all

shipments for U.S. poultry and products, and 38 trading partners have imposed partial, or

regional, bans on shipments from states or parts of states experiencing cases (see Figure 4).

China, Russia, and South Korea, 3 of the top 10 destinations for U.S. poultry meat in 2014, have

banned all imports of U.S. poultry. Based on World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) avian

USDA, Economic Research Service, Livestock & Meat International Trade Data, http://www.ers.usda.gov/dataproducts/livestock-meat-international-trade-data.aspx.

Congressional Research Service

Update on the Highly-Pathogenic Avian Influenza Outbreak of 2014-2015

influenza guidelines, regional, or compartmental, bans are acceptable for handling concerns with

disease and effects on trade.28 If USDA decides to implement a vaccine strategy to address an

HPAI outbreak should it occur later this year, the U.S. poultry industry could experience

increased disruptions in trade. Some trading partners have already told APHIS that if the United

States adopts a vaccination strategy for HPAI, they will halt all trade until risk assessments of the

U.S. strategy can be evaluated (see “Vaccine Use Policy”).

Figure 4. Bans on U.S. Poultry

Trade bans as of June 15, 2015

Source: USDA, Economic Research Service.

Note: Excluding the United States, information not available for gray areas.

Selected Issues

On July 7, 2015, the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry held a hearing on

the HPAI outbreak and its impact on the poultry sector, and on July 8, 2015, the Senate Homeland

Security and Governmental Affairs Committee held a hearing reviewing the threat of avian

influenza to animal and public health.29 The hearings covered the experiences and lessons learned

OIE, Terrestrial Animal Health Code, Chapter 10.4, Infection with Avian Influenza Viruses, http://www.oie.int/

index.php?id=169&L=0&htmfile=chapitre_avian_influenza_viruses.htm.

Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza: The Impact on the

U.S. Poultry Sector and Protecting U.S. Poultry Flocks, July 7, 2015, http://www.ag.senate.gov/hearings/highlypathogenic-avian-influenza-the-impact-on-the-us-poultry-sector-and-protecting-us-poultry-flocks; and Senate

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Stopping an Avian Influenza Threat to Animal and Public

Health, July 8, 2015, http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/stopping-an-avian-influenza-threat-to-animal-and-public(continued...)

Congressional Research Service

Update on the Highly-Pathogenic Avian Influenza Outbreak of 2014-2015

from containing and eliminating the current outbreak, and touched on issues to be addressed for

the future.

It is believed that an HPAI outbreak is likely to occur again in the fall when wild birds begin their

migrations through the four flyways. This may likely result in more spread of AI, possibly in the

poultry-producing eastern and southeastern regions untouched during the current outbreak. In

response to questions from the Agriculture Committee, APHIS stated that it is preparing for the

worst-case scenario this fall and defined this as 500 HPAI cases spread through 20 major poultry

producing states, infecting turkey, laying hen, and broiler premises.

The following sections discuss several issues that were raised during the hearings and are

expected to be the focus of preparations for another potential outbreak in the fall/winter: vaccine

use, biosecurity, timeliness, indemnification, and stakeholder communications.

Vaccine Use Policy

The World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) recommends that poultry flocks be depopulated

to eliminate the AI virus. The OIE recognizes, however, that some countries may choose

vaccination as part of their HPAI containment and elimination strategy. OIE states that:

Culling may be complemented by a vaccination policy for poultry in a high-risk area.

Vaccination aims to protect the susceptible population of birds from potential infection

thereby reducing the incidence or the severity of disease. Vaccination strategies can

effectively be used as an emergency effort in the face of an outbreak or as a routine measure

in an endemic area. Careful consideration must be given prior to implementing a vaccination

policy and requires that the recommendations from the World Organisation for Animal

Health (OIE) on vaccination and vaccines are closely followed. Any decision to use

vaccination must include an exit strategy.30

Vaccination is often considered a last resort in HPAI control. Among other concerns, it can mask

continued transmission of the disease, making it more difficult for animal health officials to

understand, and trade partners to trust, a country’s status. Accordingly, OIE recommends that a

country plan to adopt vaccination for HPAI control includes a plan to transition back to the

preferred culling approach, without vaccination, once it has achieved control through vaccination.

USDA has not approved a vaccine for HPAI.31 According to USDA, current AI vaccines are only

effective about 60% of the time in chickens. Effectiveness in turkeys is still being evaluated.32

The Southeast Poultry Research Lab (SEPRL), part of USDA’s Agricultural Research Service

(ARS), develops and evaluates AI vaccines. According to testimony by Dr. David Swayne of

SEPRL before the Senate Agriculture Committee, for the next several months the lab will be

working on vaccines and vaccination protocols for use in the fall. The challenge for vaccine

(...continued)

health. Hearing videos and witness statements are available on each Senate committee’s website. Transcripts are

available from CQ Transcripts, http://www.cq.com/transcripts/congressional?1.

OIE, Avian Influenza, General Disease Information Sheets, http://www.oie.int/doc/ged/D13947.PDF.

The APHIS Center for Veterinary Biologics regulates vaccines for use in animals.

APHIS, Additional Criteria Must Be Met Before Emergency Use of Vaccine for Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza

Can Be Approved, Stakeholder Announcement, June 3, 2015.

Congressional Research Service

Update on the Highly-Pathogenic Avian Influenza Outbreak of 2014-2015

development is finding one that will be effective against circulating H5 strains, recognizing that

the strains change over time. The experience of countries using vaccines for H5N1 strains (99%

of H5N1 vaccines are used in China, Egypt, Vietnam, and Indonesia) shows that vaccines fail,

effectiveness diminishes over time, and resistance develops.33

The decision to adopt a vaccine strategy is made by USDA and not state animal health officials.

APHIS expects that an effective vaccine could be developed by fall to late fall.

The use of vaccines negatively affects exports of poultry products. According to APHIS, some

trading partners have stated that if the United States adopts a vaccination policy, they would

immediately ban shipments of U.S. poultry products. The trading partners would conduct risk

assessments of U.S. vaccination policy before allowing shipments to resume. APHIS is already

engaging with other countries to mitigate impacts on trade if the USDA changes its policy. In

order to address the trade issue, SEPRL is engaged in research to distinguish whether immunity in

a bird is due to infection or vaccination. This concept has been demonstrated experimentally but

is less successful in the field.

The poultry industry is divided over whether or not vaccines should be used to fight HPAI

outbreaks. The United Egg Producers (UEP) position is one of caution about vaccine use, in part

due to trade issues, and also because the three-vaccine regime in a laying hen would mean

increased contact with the birds in the houses. Handling hens during production could cause a

decrease in egg output. Other witnesses from the turkey and egg sectors were ready to adopt

vaccines as a tool to use against HPAI.34

Biosecurity Practices

USDA’s June 2015 epidemiological report identified pathways for the transmission of HPAI.

Besides wild birds shedding the AI virus, APHIS found that HPAI may have been spread through

lax biosecurity measures. These include sharing of equipment and employees between infected

and non-infected farms, the inadequate cleaning of vehicles moving between farms, and the

presence of rodents or small wild birds inside poultry barns. APHIS also found that

environmental factors could play a role as the HPAI virus was found in air samples that could be

transmitted by wind to other farms.35

Scrupulous biosecurity practices may not fully protect against AI. The poultry industry increased

biosecurity after the 1980s HPAI outbreak. Other regulations, such as the Food and Drug

Administration’s Egg Safety Rule,36 require egg producers to implement certain biosecurity

measures. But as the UEP witness pointed out in testimony, his farm, one of the largest egg farms

in Iowa, received a perfect score on a USDA biosecurity audit two months before being infected

with HPAI.

Senate Agriculture Committee HPAI hearing, testimony of Dr. David Swayne, Laboratory Director, SEPRL, ARS.

Senate Agriculture Committee HPAI hearing, testimony of Brad Moline, on behalf of the National Turkey

Federation.

APHIS, Epidemiologic and Other Analyses of HPAI-Affected Poultry Flocks: June 15, 2015 Report.

21 C.F.R. §118.4 Salmonella Enteritidis (SE) prevention measures.

Congressional Research Service

Update on the Highly-Pathogenic Avian Influenza Outbreak of 2014-2015

Biosecurity has often been thought of in terms of farm biosecurity. Biosecurity at the barn or hen

house level for operations with multiple facilities may be more effective for an HPAI outbreak.

For example, this could mean restricting movement between barns or hen houses on the same

farm, requiring different clothing for each, and boosting disinfection measures for equipment

shared between each barn. Producers may need to consider adding filtration systems in barns and

hen houses because of potential airborne contamination.37

Poultry groups such as the National Turkey Federation and the U.S. Poultry and Egg Association

recommend that producers reevaluate their biosecurity programs to prepare for future outbreaks.

APHIS will be holding a meeting at the end of July in Iowa to discuss biosecurity issues with

state veterinary officials and the poultry industry.

Timely Depopulation and Disposal

Depopulating AI infected birds as quickly as possible is critical to halting the spread of the virus.

Poultry producers have been concerned that it took too long between HPAI confirmation and the

start and completion of depopulation. APHIS recognizes this concern and is seeking alternatives

that could speed the process. APHIS has suggested that shutting off ventilation in barns and

laying houses and turning up the heat would humanely euthanize the flocks. This could speed up

the depopulation process and save time getting foaming or CO2 equipment for depopulation in

place. APHIS is working with the poultry industry and the American Veterinary Medical

Association on the viability of such an approach.

After depopulation, the disposal of dead birds is a considerable challenge for poultry producers.

Many of the dead birds were composted, which, once tested to be free of virus, may be used on

fields. In Iowa there was concern about moving euthanized poultry to landfills because of fear of

virus contamination through feathers, dust, or on vehicles.38 States and the poultry industry are

expected to reassess and implement disposal plans to manage a potential fall outbreak.

Indemnity Payments

Egg producers have expressed concern that APHIS, in calculating indemnity payments, is not

capturing the true value of future egg production from lost layers. According to the regulations (9

C.F.R. §53.3(b)) that govern HPAI appraisals for indemnity payments, “The appraisal of animals

shall be based on the fair market value and shall be determined by the meat, egg production, dairy

or breeding value of such animals.” Regulations for low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI)

outbreaks are in a different section (9 C.F.R. §56.4(a)) than the HPAI regulations and address

future production. The LPAI regulations specifically state that, “For laying hens, the appraised

value should include the hen’s projected future egg production.” Egg industry groups have been

in contact with APHIS and have made proposals for changing the indemnity formulas.

In addition, indemnity regulations require payment to owners of poultry, but many poultry

producers are contract growers and not the owners of the birds. This raises concerns about

whether some producers are being adequately indemnified. LPAI regulations (9 §C.F.R. 56.8(a))

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Stopping an Avian Influenza Threat to Animal

and Public Health, July 8, 2015, testimony of Dr. John Clifford, APHIS.

Clyton, C., “Iowa Dealing with Bird Deaths,” DTN, May 8, 2015.

Congressional Research Service

Update on the Highly-Pathogenic Avian Influenza Outbreak of 2014-2015

specifically address the contract issue by setting a formula for splitting the indemnity payment

between the contractor and the grower. The regulations for HPAI do not include such a provision.

Besides indemnity payments, witnesses suggested that poultry producers need other options, such

as insurance policies, to cover losses from an outbreak. The 2014 farm bill (P.L. 113-79) directed

USDA’s Federal Crop Insurance Corporation to conduct a study to determine the feasibility of

insuring poultry producers for a catastrophic event.39 The study was to be submitted to the Senate

and House Agriculture Committees one year after the farm bill was enacted (February 2014), but

it has not been submitted yet.

Communication with Producers

Some poultry producers believe that communication between APHIS and producers was a

problem, at least in the early stages of the outbreak. As APHIS rotates personnel assignments,

farms worked with different APHIS employees at different stages, and some producers said this

was frustrating and contributed to slowing the containment and elimination process. Also, some

producers believed that some APHIS contractors (APHIS has employed 3,000) were not well

trained and provided incorrect information.40 APHIS indicated that it plans to address

communication issues in the future by assigning one APHIS employee to work with each

producer dealing with an outbreak from the start to finish of the process. Also, APHIS plans to

embed an APHIS employee with each contractor team.41

Author Contact Information

(name redacted)

Analyst in Agricultural Policy

/redacted/@crs.loc.gov, 7-....

Section 11022(a)(21) of P.L. 113-79.

Senate Agriculture Committee HPAI hearing, testimony of Brad Moline, National Turkey Federation.

Senate Agriculture Committee HPAI hearing, testimony of Dr. John Clifford, APHIS.

Congressional Research Service

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