U.S. Air Force Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Sustainment, Modernization, and Recapitalization: Background and Issues for Congress

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U.S. Air Force Intercontinental Ballistic

Missile Sustainment, Modernization, and

Recapitalization: Background and Issues for

Congress

-name redactedUS Air Force Fellow

June 24, 2015

Congressional Research Service

7-....

www.crs.gov

R44103

U.S. Air Force ICBM Sustainment, Modernization, and Recapitalization

Summary

Determining the future role of U.S. nuclear weapons within the U.S. national security strategy is

currently a topic of much debate. Many senior leaders are determined to design a strategy that

defines a new role for U.S. nuclear weapons and makes those weapons responsive and relevant in

today’s global threat environment. The current U.S. nuclear enterprise consists of a triad of

options: Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles

(SLBMs), and long-range bombers. All three legs of the nuclear triad are aging, since they were

largely built to counter the threat of the Soviet Union. Policymakers in Congress and the

Executive Branch are now deciding whether to modernize or replace parts of each leg.

The Obama Administration’s 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) outlines its approach to

reducing nuclear dangers and pursuing the goal of a world without nuclear weapons, while

simultaneously advancing broader U.S. security interests. In his April 2009 speech in Prague,

President Obama highlighted the current nuclear dangers in the global environment and declared

the United States will “seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” The

Nuclear Posture Review provides the roadmap for implementing President Obama’s agenda for

reducing nuclear risks to the United States, U.S. allies and partners, and the international

community.

This raises several issues for Congress particularly regarding the Triad’s ICBM component. First,

Congress may consider whether the current plans for the nuclear enterprise are sufficient to

address the problems within the ICBM force or whether there may be other ways to sustain the

current force. Second, Congress may consider whether the United States should continue to

deploy ICBMs in the future nuclear force structure, particularly in light of expected financial

constraints. It may consider whether nuclear weapons modernization programs will compete with

each other, or with conventional weapons programs, for scarce resources. Finally, Congress may

address questions about whether the United States can afford to forgo ICBM sustainment and

modernization programs in an era of changing national security challenges.

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Contents

Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1

Current U.S. Nuclear Force Structure .............................................................................................. 2

Strategic Nuclear Submarines ................................................................................................... 3

Long-Range Strategic Bombers................................................................................................. 3

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles ............................................................................................. 4

Modernizing the ICBM Force.......................................................................................................... 5

ICBM Modernization Options ................................................................................................... 6

Addressing Operational Issues in the Current ICBM Force ............................................................ 8

Internal Review ......................................................................................................................... 9

External Review ...................................................................................................................... 10

Three Challenges with the Nuclear Force ............................................................................... 11

The Cheating Issues .......................................................................................................... 11

ICBM Combat Crew Duty ................................................................................................ 11

Creating a ‘Real’ Nuclear Enterprise................................................................................. 12

Funding the Nuclear Enterprise ............................................................................................... 13

Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 13

Are Current Plans to Sustain the Nuclear Enterprise Appropriate and Adequate? .................. 13

Should the ICBM Force be Modernized in an Era of Fiscal Constraint? ................................ 16

The Cost of Modernization ............................................................................................... 16

What Role Would a Modernized ICBM Force Play in National Defense? ............................. 18

Should ICBMs Be Sustained in an Era of Strategic Uncertainty? ........................................... 19

Emerging Nuclear Threats................................................................................................. 20

Strategic Security Challenges with Russia and China ....................................................... 20

Figures

Figure 1. Minuteman III Acquisition Investment, FY1992-FY2001 and FY2012-FY2016

(FYDP) ......................................................................................................................................... 7

Figure 2. Life-Cycle Cost Estimates Minimums and Maximums for Four Potential ICBM

Future Force Options, FY2012-FY2050....................................................................................... 8

Tables

Table 1. Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, by Department and Function ........................... 17

Contacts

Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 22

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Introduction

The United States is currently facing two key challenges related to the U.S. intercontinental

ballistic missile (ICBM) force. The first is sustainment of the current force and the

implementation of needed improvements in operations and support. The second is the planned

modernization of the ICBM force, including building new weapons, expected in the late 2020s.

Both would likely necessitate increased funding, but the Budget Control Act (BCA) limits

funding for the Department of Defense (DOD) through 2021. Moreover, the United States also

plans to modernize other components of its nuclear forces during the 2020s, which would also

likely necessitate further significant increases in spending in the 2020s. Congress has a key role in

any decisions related to these issues.

The discussion about whether to modernize or replace the ICBM force is a significant part of the

national debate about the future of U.S. nuclear weapons. Supporters argue that ICBMs have been

the cornerstone of the U.S. nuclear force posture since the 1960s, when the U.S. fielded the first

Minuteman III missile.1 While deterrence in the 21st century is more difficult for the U.S. than it

was in the past, having the right mix of nuclear capabilities to deal with new challenges is still

seen as crucial.2 The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) identifies a variety of emerging

situations in which ICBMs might play a role in deterring adversaries, stabilizing regions and

reassuring allies and partners.3 Both Russia and China are modernizing their nuclear weapons.

Moreover, the U.S. relationship with China is evolving, North Korea has developed nuclear

weapons, and Iran has pursued a nuclear program that may eventually provide a weapon

capability.4 The United States also continues to extend deterrence to allies and partner nations

with a “credible U.S. ‘nuclear umbrella.’”5 Thus, according to many observers, the United States

would need to sustain and modernize its ICBM force to manage challenges in the new global

security and threat environment.

While long-range nuclear bombers and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMS) are

relatively concentrated in location (and therefore may be vulnerable to attack), the size,

protection, and dispersion of ICBM forces makes them virtually impossible to destroy short of an

all-out nuclear attack. Additionally, since an ICBM force can only be crippled by a large and

unmistakable nuclear attack, land-based ICBMs can provide clarity about when a country is under

attack and who the attacker is.6

Others, however, argue that ICBMs are a relic of the Cold War and play little or no role in helping

the United States meet “21st century security challenges.”7 Further, they argue that, in an era of

Lauren Caston, Robert S. Leonard, and Christopher A. Mouton, et al., The Future of the U.S. Intercontinental

Ballistic Missile Force, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2014, p. 13, at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/

MG1210.html.

Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The Nukes We Need: Preserving the American Deterrent,” Foreign Affairs,

Nov/Dec 2009.

Ibid., p. 1.

Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010, p. 12.

Kingston Reif, Travis Sharp, and Kirk Bansak, Pruning the Nuclear Triad? Pros and Cons of Submarines, Bombers,

and Missiles, The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, May 16, 2013, at http://armscontrolcenter.org/

publications/factsheets/051613_nuclear_triad_pros_cons/.

Global Zero U.S. Nuclear Policy Commission Report, Modernizing U.S. Nuclear Strategy, Force Structure and

(continued...)

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constrained resources and declining defense budgets, U.S. security would be better served by

investing in new advanced conventional weapons than by sustaining and modernizing the ICBM

force.

Experts agree that the international security environment has changed dramatically since the end

of the Cold War. As President Obama noted in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, the

threat of global nuclear war has become remote, but the risk of nuclear attack has increased.8

Some nations may be shifting their security strategy to rely more on nuclear weapons in an effort

to counter the U.S. conventional forces.9

The Nuclear Posture Review further noted that, “as long as nuclear weapons exist,” the United

States will sustain secure and effective nuclear forces. In this view, these nuclear forces will

continue to play an essential role in deterring potential adversaries and reassuring allies and

partners around the world.10 In “A Nuclear Deterrent for the 21st Century,” Clark Murdock writes,

“much like the United States in the 1950s when it faced massive Warsaw Pact conventional

forces, other states are increasing their reliance on nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons offset

conventional military superiority. When the U.S. military declares that it is seeking ‘full spectrum

dominance”, it simply reinforces the dependence of our would-be competitors on nuclear

weapons.”11

There are several issues for Congress. First, Congress may consider whether the current plans for

the nuclear enterprise (consisting of leadership, people and things that work on the nuclear

mission) are sufficient to address the problems within the ICBM force or whether there may be

other ways to sustain the current force. Second, Congress may consider whether the United States

should continue to deploy ICBMs in the future nuclear force structure, particularly in light of

expected financial constraints. It may consider whether nuclear weapons modernization programs

will compete with each other, or with conventional weapons programs, for scarce resources.

Finally, Congress may question whether the United States can afford to forgo ICBM sustainment

and modernization programs in an era of changing national security challenges.

Current U.S. Nuclear Force Structure

The U.S. nuclear force is a “Triad” consisting of strategic ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs)

that carry submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), the land-based ICBM force, and longrange bomber aircraft. Each leg of the triad has both strengths and weaknesses, leading some

analysts to recognize the complementary capabilities of the three legs. According to the Nuclear

Posture Review, “strategic nuclear submarines and the SLBMs they carry represent the most

survivable leg of the U.S. nuclear Triad.” Some argue single-warhead ICBMs contribute to

stability, and like SLBMs are not vulnerable to air defenses. Unlike SLBMs and ICBMs, bombers

(...continued)

Posture, May 2012, p. 5, at http://www.globalzero.org/files/gz_us_nuclear_policy_commission_report.pdf.

Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010, p. 4.

Clark A. Murdock, A Nuclear Deterrent for the 21st Century, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2015,

p. 16.

Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010, p. v.

Clark A. Murdock, A Nuclear Deterrent for the 21st Century, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2015,

p. 16.

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can be visibly forward deployed, as a signal in crisis to strengthen deterrence of potential

adversaries and assurance to allies and partners.12 Others contend that, because each leg of the

triad contributes unique attributes that enhance deterrence and reduce risk, together they comprise

a robust deterrent that complicates a potential adversary’s offensive and defensive planning. In

this view, they provide a “synergistic force” that provides protection against the failure of any

single one of its legs. As a result, many analysts believe that these complementary capabilities

justify retaining all three legs for the foreseeable future.

Strategic Nuclear Submarines

The ballistic missile submarine force has been a part of the U.S. nuclear deterrent since the 1960s.

Experts argue that the SSBN leg of the Triad provides the United States with its most survivable

and enduring nuclear strike capability because they serve as an undetectable launch platform for

intercontinental missiles. The United States Navy currently deploys 14 Ohio-class SSBNs, with

12 available for deployment at any given time.13 Seven are based in Bangor, Washington, and

patrol in the Pacific Ocean, while five are based in Kings Bay, Georgia, and patrol in the Atlantic

Ocean. These submarines carry a total of 288 Trident II D5 SLBMs, each of which can carry up

to eight nuclear warheads. The Ohio-class submarines have a service life of 42 years—2 20-year

cycles with a 2-year mid-life nuclear refueling.

The Ohio-class SSBNs were first deployed in 1981 and are to reach the end of their planned

service life at a rate of approximately one boat per year between 2027 and 2040. The Navy plans

to replace each retiring boat, starting in 2031, with a new class of ballistic missile submarine,

referred to as the SSBNX, or the Ohio-class replacement. The Navy originally planned to begin

using the replacement boats in 2029, but in 2012 the Pentagon announced a two-year delay to the

SSBNX program. This would push back completion of the first SSBNX to 2031.14 The FY2015

budget includes $1.4 billion for the Ohio-replacement program.

The Navy is also modernizing the Trident II D5 SLBMs with which both boats are armed. They

are planned to remain in the arsenal until 2042. The FY2016 budget includes $1.2 billion for this

Trident II Life Extension Program (LEP).15

Long-Range Strategic Bombers

The United States currently bases 18 B-2 Spirit stealth bombers at Whiteman Air Force Base in

Missouri, and 76 B-52H Stratofortress bombers at Minot Air Force Base, ND, and Barksdale Air

Force Base, LA, that can be equipped for nuclear missions. The B-2 bombers are equipped to

carry B61 gravity bombs, while the B-52s can deliver gravity bombs or nuclear-armed airlaunched cruise missiles (ALCMs).

Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010, p. p. 22.

Arms Control Association, U.S. Nuclear Modernization Fact Sheet, at http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/

USNuclearModernization.

For details on the Ohio-replacement program, see CRS Report R41129, Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) Ballistic

Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).

Arms Control Association, U.S. Nuclear Modernization Fact Sheet, at http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/

USNuclearModernization.

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Some analysts attribute a number of advantages to the strategic bomber leg of the triad. Unlike

land- or sea-based missiles, bombers can be recalled after launch. Bombers can launch quickly

from their bases in an effort to survive a nuclear first strike. U.S. bombers also carry the nuclear

weapons with the lowest yield, which means they offer a more diverse range of less devastating

options for the President.16

The Air Force is developing a new long-range penetrating bomber with nuclear capabilities,

known as the LRS-B. The 2012 Aircraft Procurement Plan anticipates a procurement of 80-100

bombers at an estimated per unit cost of $550 million, for a total of $40-60 billion. The

Pentagon’s FY2014 budget includes $359 million for research and development of the bomber.

The Air Force plans to spend $32.1 billion over the next ten years on research and development of

the new bomber.17 The Air Force has also begun development of a new nuclear-armed cruise

missile, known as the LRSO, which would replace the existing ALCM after 2030 and allow the

bomber force to launch stand-off weapons in future contingencies.

In addition to developing a new long-range bomber, the Air Force is also modernizing the current

B-2 fleet. These aircraft became operational in 1997 and have a planned service life of six

decades. In order to continue delivering long-range direct attack munitions in an anti-access

environment, the B-2 will need upgrades in communication, offensive, and defensive systems.

According to the Nuclear Posture Review, the Pentagon is to invest over $1 billion over the next

five years on upgrades for the B-2 survivability and mission effectiveness.18

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

The United States Air Force currently bases 450 Minuteman III ICBMs, with 150 each located at

F.E. Warren Air Force Base, WY; Malmstrom Air Force Base, MT; and Minot Air Force Base,

ND. In order to meet warhead levels set by START II, the U.S. permanently reduced the number

of warheads in all Minuteman III missiles from three warheads to a single warhead.19 The Air

Force plans to retain 400 ICBMs as the United States reduces its forces under the 2010 New

START Treaty. Many observers have noticed that, because these ICBMs are geographically

dispersed in hardened, underground silos, the ICBMs would be difficult for any adversary to

destroy in an attack on the United States. ICBMs are also cited as the “promptest leg of the triad,

offering the U.S. the ability to launch a nuclear attack more quickly than the other two legs.”20

Over the past 15 years, the Air Force has pursued several programs that are designed to improve

the accuracy and reliability of the Minuteman fleet and to support the operational capability of the

Minuteman ICBM through 2030. These programs have addressed aging and technology issues in

Kingston Reif, Travis Sharp, and Kirk Bansak, Pruning the Nuclear Triad? Pros and Cons of Submarines, Bombers,

and Missiles, The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, May 16, 2013, at http://armscontrolcenter.org/

publications/factsheets/051613_nuclear_triad_pros_cons/.

Arms Control Association, U.S. Nuclear Modernization Fact Sheet, at http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/

USNuclearModernization.

Ibid.

Federation of American Scientists, LGM-30 Minuteman III, February 17, 2015, at http://fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/icbm/

lgm-30_3.htm.

Kingston Reif, Travis Sharp, and Kirk Bansak, Pruning the Nuclear Triad? Pros and Cons of Submarines, Bombers,

and Missiles, The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, May 16, 2013, at http://armscontrolcenter.org/

publications/factsheets/051613_nuclear_triad_pros_cons/.

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the missiles’ propulsion, guidance, and reentry vehicle systems.21 Currently, the Air Force is

pursuing the ICBM fuse modernization program, which is to replace the current MK21 warhead

fuse so that the missiles can operate through 2030. The Air Force plans to procure 693

modernized fuses for the Minuteman fleet, at a cost of $830 million. It has requested $13.7

million for this program in FY2016, and expects to spend around $65 million through 2020.22 The

Air Force is also funding, through its RDT&E budget, a number of programs under the ICBM

demonstration and validation (Dem/Val) title that would allow it to create technologies that might

support both the existing Minuteman fleet and the future ICBM program (known as the Ground

Based Strategic Deterrent.).

Modernizing the ICBM Force

In October 2010, the Air Force produced an ICBM Master Plan that outlined its approach to

sustaining and modernizing the Minuteman (MM) force. This report indicated that the Air Force

would sustain the Minuteman III missiles through 2030 and deploy a follow-on system after

2030.23

The plan states that “beginning in 2020, large-scale investment will be required to sustain MM III

through 2030. These modernization efforts must support both sustainment through 2030 and

recapitalization for a Minuteman Follow-on after 2030.”24 Also stated is “MM III sustainment

funding must continue until Initial Operational Capability (IOC)25 of a new or replacement

weapon system....”26 This is currently projected to occur in the Dem/Val program described

above.

The Air Force has reportedly decided to pursue a “hybrid” plan for the next generation ICBM. It

would maintain the basic design of the missile, the current communications system, and the

existing launch silos, but would replace the rocket motors, guidance sets, post-boost vehicles, and

re-entry systems. In other words, the Air Force would deploy a new missile in its existing

Minuteman infrastructure. Reports also indicate that, although this missile would be deployed in

fixed silos, the design would allow the missiles to be deployed on mobile launchers sometime in

the future.27 The Air Force has requested $75 million for this program in FY2016, but expects to

spend $945 million through FY2020.

For descriptions of these programs, see CRS Report RL33640, U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background,

Developments, and Issues, by (name redacted).

Air Force, RDT&E Budget Item Justification ICBM Fuze Modernization, pp. 1-9.

Jeffrey F. Smith, Brig Gen, U.S. Air Force, ICBM Master Plan, Headquarters Air Force Global Strike Command,

Barksdale AFB, LA, October 2010.

Ibid., p. 25.

IOC is described as the first attainment of the capability to effectively employ a weapon, item of equipment, or

system of approved specific characteristics that is manned or operated by an adequately trained, equipped, and

supported military unit or force per the Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms from the DOD.

Jeffrey F. Smith, Brig Gen, U.S. Air Force, ICBM Master Plan, Headquarters Air Force Global Strike Command,

Barksdale AFB, LA, October 2010, p. 26.

Elaine Grossman, “Key Targeting Tech for Future U.S. Nuclear Missile has Gone Unfunded,” Nextgov.com, August

19, 2014.

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While the Air Force appears committed to pursuing the development of a new ground-based

strategic deterrent, there is growing recognition among analysts that fiscal constraints may alter

this approach.

ICBM Modernization Options

The RAND Corporation published a 2014 study that outlined six options to modernize the ICBM

force.28 System characteristics go from rather well defined and narrowly scoped to much broader

and ambiguous. The first two options, which would not replace the current Minuteman system,

would either continue basic sustainment until the system is ineffective or unsustainable or

continue indefinite incremental modernization (IIM) until the system is ineffective or

unsustainable. The last four options would replace the Minuteman with a new system, with

increasing levels of sophistication. These four options would

1. Acquire “Minuteman IV” (MM IV) (which RAND defines to be “Minuteman

III–like”). Replace the current system with one of similar capability and with a

virtually identical employment concept.

2. Acquire an all-new-design ICBM to be based in existing Minuteman silos with a

similar employment concept.

3. Acquire an all-new-design ICBM with an alternative basing scheme but using

existing U.S. Air Force military base infrastructure and footprint.

4. Acquire an all-new-design ICBM with an alternative basing scheme requiring use

of public lands or enhanced U.S. Air Force military base infrastructure and

footprint.29

Detailed analysis from the RAND study indicates that an “all-new ICBM system will likely cost

almost twice (and perhaps even three times) as much as incremental modernization and

sustainment of the Minuteman III system.” Specifically, the RAND study estimated that the

lifecycle costs for incrementally modernizing the Minuteman III would be $60 to $90 billion,

while a new silo-based ICBM would cost between $84 billion and $125 billion. Rail- and roadmobile versions would cost significantly more, from $124 billion to $219 billion. This

modernization program results in essentially a “new” missile that provides expanded targeting

options along with improved accuracy and survivability.

RAND found that the cost to replace the Minuteman force would likely be considerably lower

than the cost of upgrading and modernizing the current arsenal over the period of FY2012

through FY2050. The historical and projected future cost of maintaining the current Minuteman

force and the comparisons of modernization costs are illustrated in Figure 1 and Figure 2.

Lauren Caston, Robert S. Leonard, and Christopher A. Mouton, et al., The Future of the U.S. Intercontinental

Ballistic Missile Force, The RAND Corporation, Washington, DC, 2014, (hereinafter, RAND study) at

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1210.html.

Entire section adapted from RAND study, p. 87.

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Figure 1. Minuteman III Acquisition Investment, FY1992-FY2001 and

FY2012-FY2016 (FYDP)

Source: RAND Study 2014.

Note: Accumulated all costs associated with Minuteman III include acquisition costs and those for operations

and support (O&S). O&S costs include system-related operations and maintenance (O&M) and military

personnel (MilPers) expenditures.

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Figure 2. Life-Cycle Cost Estimates Minimums and Maximums for Four Potential

ICBM Future Force Options, FY2012-FY2050

Source: RAND Study, 2014.

Note: This research was conducted in FY2011. In each case, life-cycle costs are shown as a stacked bar of the

four primary cost categories: RDT&E, procurement, MilCon, and O&S.

Addressing Operational Issues in the Current

ICBM Force

Ever since 2007, when crews at Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota mistakenly loaded six

cruise missiles carrying nuclear warheads on B-52s, transported them to Barksdale Air Force

Base in Louisiana, and left them unguarded for 36 hours before anyone realized they were

missing, the Air Force has faced questions about morale and operations within its nuclear

enterprise. Studies completed at the time identified a number of issues plaguing the community,

including a disregard for safety and security rules and an overall sense of “lack of professional

pride.”30 Although the Air Force implemented a number of changes in its command structure and

operational procedures, new issues have emerged.

Specifically, in January 2014 the Air Force announced that it uncovered cheating on the monthly

proficiency exams required of missileers at the 341st Missile Wing at Malmstrom Air Force Base

in Montana. Reports of drug use among some airmen and morale problems at Air Force bases

renewed concerns with the state of the Air Force nuclear enterprise.31

Adam Lowther, A Year Later: Responding to Problems in the ICBM Force, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,

February 2, 2015, at http://thebulletin.org/year-later-responding-problems-icbm-force7984.

Ibid.

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In response to these concerns, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel initiated two reviews, one

internal and one external to DOD. These reviews were not about nuclear warheads or nuclear

weapons, and the reviews did not focus on the U.S. nuclear force posture or policy. Rather, both

reviews focused on the people, systems, and infrastructure of the DOD to support the nuclear

triad. The internal review also focused on training, testing, command oversight, mission

performance, and investment. Thousands of personnel were interviewed, from officers to enlisted

personnel as well as civilians and contractors from across the armed services.32

Internal Review

The internal review disclosed systemic problems across the nuclear enterprise. In general, these

problems can be divided into several categories: “long-standing, known problems that remained

unaddressed and so became, over time, under-reported; known problems that were addressed but

the corrective actions made the problem worse (or created new problems); and problems that

were common knowledge in the field but which were never communicated to leadership.”33

The internal review found that the nuclear deterrent is safe, secure, and effective, today. However,

it said, action needs to be taken now to ensure that this remains the case in the future. The review

organized its inquiry, findings, and recommendation into four categories: personnel, inspections,

organization and investment.

In terms of personnel issues, the review identified issues with accountability, manning and skills

mix, career development, morale and recognition, the personnel reliability program, and security

forces. More specifically, there was a blurring of the lines between accountability and perfection

and a lack of promotion opportunities and a lack of a defined, sustainable career path for nuclear

officers in the Air Force. Also, the implementation of the personnel reliability program was found

to be burdensome, overly technical, and excessively risk-averse.

Regarding inspections, the review found that the nuclear enterprise is subject to a culture of

excessive inspections. In the Air Force, an additional issue is the demand for perfection at all

times and lack of a meaningful self-assessment program.

Regarding investment, the review surveyed an aging nuclear enterprise and determined that as the

infrastructure continues to age, sustainment will become increasingly more difficult, timeconsuming and expensive. Findings included the “lack of a ‘weapons system’ approach to the

ICBM force, leading to disparate and insufficient sustainment and investment decisions for

different system components; component issues resulting from an aging, unique, and small-sized

programs; and serious shortfalls in basic O&M requirements.”34

Department of State, Department of Defense Reforms to the NuclearEnterprise, November 14, 2014, at

http://fpc.state.gov/234084.htm.

Department of Defense, Summary of DOD Internal Nuclear Enterprise Review, at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/

Summary-Internal-NER.pdf.

Summary of DOD Internal Nuclear Enterprise Review.

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External Review

The independent review was tasked with examining the nuclear deterrent mission in the

Departments of the Navy and the Air Force. The mission was to identify leadership, organization,

investment, morale, policy, procedural, and/or other shortcomings that adversely affected the

mission. The review team found the following:

•

There were significant disconnects between what the DOD and service leadership

expected and what the leadership did to empower the forces to meet those

expectations.

•

There were also disconnects between what leadership says and presumably

believes and what the sailors, airmen, and Marines who must execute the mission

actually experience.

•

The interpretation of how the personnel system measures adequacy of manning

differed from the total workload in the field associated with mission and other

demands.

•

Additional disconnects existed between the drive for efficiency in logistics

support and what those in the field experience in actually getting needed parts in

a timely manner.

•

Many divides existed between leadership and the forces on the quality of the

training.

•

Finally, there were serious inefficiencies noted from micromanagement,

excessive security demands, and the need to address a plethora of requirements

not directly contributing to the mission.35

The review team outlined several initiatives that could be instituted immediately at various levels

of leadership. The team recommended that the Secretary of Defense

•

Take back the nuclear mission with direct meetings with senior leaders to ensure

programs are in place and follow up on status.

•

Establish support programs and bring together the federated nuclear activities

within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Air Force.

•

Establish the nuclear mission has first priority and ensure equal personnel,

logistics, and funding support to match.

•

Acknowledge problems have continued since additional focus has been placed on

the nuclear enterprise in 2007-2008.

•

Direct a move from a culture of micromanagement by commanders/supervisors

to a culture of empowerment of qualified people to do their work.

Larry D. Welch and John C. Harvey, Jr., Independent Review of the Department of Defense Nuclear Enterprise,

Department of Defense, June 2, 2014, p. 1, at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/Independent-Nuclear-Enterprise-ReviewReport-30-June-2014.pdf.

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•

Hold senior leaders accountable and make it clear that individual behavior is a

matter of personal responsibility and that failure to meet performance is a

military discipline issue to be addressed by commanders.36

Over the course of the past year, the parallel reviews have provided Air Force leaders with almost

1,000 pages of observations and recommendations for the missile force. Based on this, the Air

Force has commenced a significant number of reforms that involve training, funding and

increasing staffing the missile force.37

Three Challenges with the Nuclear Force

The Cheating Issues

Cheating on tests in both the Navy and the Air Force raised questions about the integrity and

ethics of the personnel in the nuclear force. The incidents occurred despite Services cultures

placing a premium on integrity. The review team found that in both incidents the tests had

evolved from a focus on measuring task-based qualifications to career-defining events that had

direct, major impact on the professional futures of the participants.38 The cheating thus arose from

pressures associated with the testing program itself, according to the review’s authors. Most

missileers perceived these tests as important for career progression and believed that these tests

had a direct impact on their livelihood. The review recommended that Navy and Air Force senior

leadership ensure that training and skill testing should focus on measuring whether the person’s

knowledge is necessary and sufficient for the mission, but does not transform into a

counterproductive demand for higher grades.

ICBM Combat Crew Duty

The independent review raised two significant issues regarding Air Force missiles officers

assigned to ICBM combat crew duty: the intensity of the assignment itself, and the uncertainty

associated with the missileer career path. ICBM combat crew duty is complex and characterized

by high pressure to avoid errors in execution. Many officers on missile duty feel that the rewards

of such work are not commensurate with the effort required, despite the knowledge that the work

is vital to national security. Therefore, missile crews seek ways to minimize their exposure to

primary combat crew duty. One way to do so is to score high marks on proficiency examinations,

which can lead to designation as a crew instructor and a reduction in duty on missile alert. This

attitude is completely opposite to Air Force flight crews who are generally motivated to spend as

much time as possible performing crew duty in the air.39

Another issue is the long-term viability of the ICBM officer career. While the Air Force needs a

large number of junior officers on combat crews, it does not need as many in other ICBM-related

assignments such as instructors or working daily operations. Consequently, missileers must

Ibid., pp. 10-11.

A Year Later.

Welch and Harvey, p. 13.

Ibid., p. 15.

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anticipate either leaving the service after only one or two duty assignments or applying for a

significant change of career paths.

The review team offered several recommendations to overcome these issues. First, they

recommended that the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF)

should initiate a program to enhance recognition and reward for ICBM duty. This program would

address everything from narrowing choices for follow-on career paths, with a guarantee the

operators would get one of their three choices, to special pay incentives. The team also suggested

the Commander, Air Force Global Strike Command, should return full authority to Missile

Combat Crew Commanders for the execution of the duties of the crew and to hold them

accountable.40 Doing so would display trust in Mission Crew Commanders and afford them the

opportunity to train and test in their working environment.

Creating a ‘Real’ Nuclear Enterprise

A third issue that the review team uncovered was the absence of a “nuclear enterprise” across the

services and DOD. The “nuclear enterprise” consists of leadership, people and things that work

on the nuclear mission. The review team characterized the current nuclear activities across the

OSD, Joint Staff, Air Force, and Navy as a “loose federation of separate activities scattered across

multiple organizations without clarity in responsibility and accountability.”41

The team’s recommendations began with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint

Staff. During the Cold War, the Joint Staff had personnel with expertise on nuclear operational

and systems requirements, but this has atrophied over the past three decades. Up through the early

1990s, a triad of officials within the OSD looked across the whole of the nuclear enterprise:

•

The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy (ATSD/AE) was

responsible for the nuclear warheads and stockpile management on behalf of

DOD.

•

The Director, Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces, within Acquisition,

Technology and Logistics (AT&L), was responsible for the development of new

nuclear platforms and weapons systems.

•

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy focused on

nuclear weapons policy and strategy. Together the three offices focused across

the enterprise, synchronizing policy, mission, weapons, and platforms.42

These offices no longer plan the guidance and sustainment of all nuclear forces. The Nuclear

Weapons Council was created to address this issue. The Nuclear Weapons Council serves as the

focal point of DOD and the National Nuclear Security Administration to maintain the U.S.

nuclear weapons stockpile. Although the Nuclear Weapons Council addresses many of these

issues, there is no forum or office effectively integrating across OSD to form a complete nuclear

enterprise. Therefore, the review team recommended that OSD and the Joint Staff realign their

Ibid., p. 17-18.

Ibid., p. 18.

Ibid., p. 19.

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structures to plan nuclear activities across the entire enterprise: policy, strategy, mission,

platforms, weapons, and support.43

The review team also identified issues within the Air Force that have created strains within the

missile force: logistics structure changes, base closures, and organizational realignment that have

reduced dedicated support for nuclear forces. The team recommended that the Air Force create a

nuclear enterprise that encompasses Air Force Headquarters, Air Force Materiel Command, U.S.

Air Forces in Europe and Air Force Global Strike Command.

Funding the Nuclear Enterprise

Proposed changes to the nuclear weapons arsenal may require the commitment of significant

funding. DOD is asking for 10% annual spending increases over the next five years to implement

the recommendations of the recent reviews. This is in addition to the tens of billions of dollars the

Pentagon has asked Congress to provide to modernize each leg of the nuclear triad. In the near

future, says DOD, the funds are needed to improve morale, such as providing incentive pay,

creating new officer positions, and the refurbishment of the 45 underground Minuteman III

launch centers—none of which reportedly have been thoroughly vacuumed in more than

50 years.44

The current strategic nuclear forces in the triad are reaching the end of their service lifetimes.

Over the next two decades, Congress will face decisions about the extent to which all of the U.S.

nuclear delivery systems would be modernized or replaced with new systems.45 The

Congressional Budget Office (CBO) is required under the National Defense Authorization Act of

2015 to periodically update its estimate of the cost of nuclear forces. CBO estimates that over the

2015-2024 time period, the Administration’s plans for nuclear forces would cost $348 billion, an

average of about $35 billion a year.46 (Note: both estimates are provided in nominal dollars; they

do not include the effects of inflation.)

Issues for Congress

Given the complexity and cost of the proposed changes to the nuclear workforce and arsenal,

several issues arise before Congress.

Are Current Plans to Sustain the Nuclear Enterprise Appropriate

and Adequate?

As the Air Force begins to revamp the ICBM leg of the nuclear triad, three significant issues

suggest themselves for potential consideration in Congress. As is noted above, the Air Force is

Ibid.

Rachel Oswald, “Decisions on Upgrading Nuclear Arsenals Will Wait for Next Defense Secretary’s Attention,” CQ

Roll Call, vol. 60, no. 46 (December 3, 2014).

Congressional Budget Office, Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2015-2024, January 2015, at

https://www.cbo.gov/publication/49870.

Ibid.

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pursuing several tracks to sustain the current Minuteman force. The first track includes the

ongoing projects funded through the Air Force O&M accounts and the Dem/Val program, while

modernization programs needed to recapitalize the ICBM force are planned to be funded in the

late 2020s. Included in the President’s Budget request in FY2016 are requests to fund nuclear

enterprise improvements. These include upgrades to facilities, improvements in manning and

safety procedures, as well as technology improvements.47

The other issue is addressing the recommendations from the internal and external review teams

for the nuclear enterprise. Many argue that in the year since those reports were issued, much has

improved. DOD leadership is requesting funds to continue to improve the nuclear enterprise.

Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel stated the Pentagon would add 10% a year over the next five

years to nuclear spending in order to correct the problems. The Pentagon currently spends

between $15 billion and $16 billion, so this increase would equate to at least a $7.5 billion

increase between 2016 and 2020.48 The 2016 budget request calls for $8 billion in new spending

on the nuclear force over the next five years, including about $1 billion for FY2016.49

In addition to money, Secretary Hagel promised more troops, more trainers, more equipment and

more leadership to nuclear forces, all of which have experienced decades of neglect and

deterioration.50 Also, the Department of Defense began the Force Improvement Program (FIP).

Under the DOD FIP program, the Air Force has approved incentive pay and bonuses for

missileers, exchange programs across bases and with the Navy, and infrastructure upgrades at

missile bases.51

Air Force Secretary Deborah Lee James has supported implementing the identified changes from

both the internal and external reviews of the nuclear forces. James has said “there is no mission

more important to our nation’s security than the nuclear mission,” and the changes to the nuclear

force are “aimed at improving morale and shifting from a culture of always preparing for the next

test and next inspection.”52 After a year, there is a stark contrast from earlier attitudes in each of

the missile wings, with the workforce mostly positive toward leadership actions. Approximately

98% of the Force Improvement Program’s recommendations either have been or are being

implemented.53

To ensure focus on each of these programs, Secretary Hagel established the Nuclear Deterrent

Enterprise Review Group (NDERG) to establish senior leader accountability and bring together

all the elements of the nuclear force into a coherent enterprise. This group is led by Deputy

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Request, February 2015, at

http://www.defense.gov/pubs/FY16_Budget_Request_Rollout_Final_2-2-15.pdf.

Marcus Weisgerber, DOD To Spend Billions More on Nukes, Defense One, November 14, 2014, at

http://www.defenseone.com/management/2014/11/dod-spend-billions-more-nukes/99092/.

David Alexander, After Neglect, U.S. Nuclear Force Seeing Improvement: Official, Reuters, February 11, 2015, at

http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/12/us-usa-defense-nuclear-idUSKBN0LG07I20150212.

Weisgerber.

Brian Everstine, Spotlight on Nuclear Force Prompts Ongoing Reform, Air Force Times, September 15, 2014, at

http://www.airforcetimes.com/article/20140915/NEWS/309150037/Spotlight-nuclear-forces-prompts-ongoingreforms.htm.

Brian Everstine, James presents first round of Air Force nuclear service medals, Air Force Times, November 6,

2014, at http://www.airforcetimes.com/article/20141106/NEWS/311060046/James-presents-first-round-of-Air-Forcenuclear-service-medals.html.

Lowther, A Year Later.

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Secretary Bob Work and is to review the actions taken and the progress made in the health of

nuclear forces. In addition, Secretary Hagel directed Office of the Secretary of Defense/ Cost

Assessment and Program Evaluation (OSD/CAPE) to lead an effort to track and assess the

implementation of the over 100 recommendations from the internal and external reviews. CAPE

is to also conduct analysis to determine if corrective actions are having the desired effect as well

as to continue assessing the health of the nuclear deterrent enterprise.54

Congress may remain concerned about the implementation of these programs and ask for updates.

In the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2016, the House Committee

on Armed Services stated

As a result of the NER and NDERG, the fiscal year 2016 budget request contained

approximately $1.00 billion in additional funding for the Department of Defense nuclear

enterprise, with a total of $8.00 billion in additional funding planned over the next 5 years.

The committee believes sustained leadership, follow-through, and investment will be

required to ensure the revitalization of our nuclear enterprise, including in certain instances

improving or changing the culture and leadership standards. The committee believes the

NDERG seems to be successful in this regard, but cautions that institutionalization of such a

process may be required to ensure sustained attention after key leaders depart. The

committee expects the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary, and all leaders within the

Department of Defense to ensure continued focus and resources for the Department’s

“highest priority mission.55

Many experts believe these programs have made a difference and are improving conditions for

airmen.56 The increased retention of missile combat crews (and other supporting metrics) may

indicate that the Air Force initiative is having an effect. Renewed focus on the nuclear forces is

paying dividends, some say, but more work is seen as necessary to continue to move the program

forward.

However, some are skeptical that more money, more people, and more commitment is the right

way to address the issue. Many see that nuclear weapons are no longer useful in the current

security environment, especially given their destructive power. They argue that it is “unlikely that

these problems can be solved by more money, more stars, more organizational changes, reducing

burdens on airmen, or recommitting to the importance of deterrence without addressing the

underlying problem.”57 The underlying problem, according to these skeptics, is that nuclear

weapons no longer play a prominent role in U.S. national security policy.

Others also argue that these reforms will not be sufficient in addressing the underlying problems

because no amount of cleaning, paint, or increase in pay can offset the sense, in the ICBM force,

that there is no meaning to the mission.58 The morale problems facing the troops who are part of

the nuclear enterprise are unlikely to be fully resolved by any changes that DOD can make.

Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel stated in discussing the review that in order to change the

Fact Sheet: Implementing Changes to the Nuclear Enterprise at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/NER-Fact-Sheet.pdf.

H.R. 1735

Adam Lowther, A Year Later: Responding to Problems in the ICBM Force, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,

February 2, 2015, at http://thebulletin.org/year-later-responding-problems-icbm-force7984.

Marcus Weisgerber, DOD To Spend Billions More on Nukes, Defense One, November 14, 2014, at

http://www.defenseone.com/management/2014/11/dod-spend-billions-more-nukes/99092/.

Ibid.

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situation, “we must change the cultural perception of a nuclear enterprise…We must restore the

prestige that attracted the brightest minds of the Cold War era, so our most talented young men

and women see the nuclear pathway as promising in value.”59 Some argue that Hagel’s

assessment only draws further attention to the real issue—the United States is no longer in “the

Cold War era.” They state the U.S. is in a strategic transition from the Cold War to an era

characterized by threats such as al Qaeda, ISIS, and Ebola. They say those who work with nuclear

weapons (i) have not been part of the wars in Afghanistan or Iraq that have been the formative

experience for the military in recent years, and (ii) hope they are unlikely ever to be called on to

carry out their assigned mission.60

Should the ICBM Force be Modernized in an Era of Fiscal

Constraint?

Both the cost to modernize or replace the ICBM arsenal and the future role the ICBM force will

play in the nation’s defense strategy may also prove of interest to Congress.

The Cost of Modernization

The United States is currently planning a number of programs to update and modernize most

aspects of the U.S. nuclear force. In addition to pursuing sustainment and modernization

programs for the ICBM force, the Air Force is beginning work on a new long-range bomber and a

new cruise missile, and the Navy is beginning the construction of a new ballistic missile

submarine while pursuing a life extension program for its submarine launched D-5 missile.

Congress may consider whether the U.S. should continue to deploy ICBMs in the future nuclear

force structure, particularly in light of expected financial constraints. It may consider whether

nuclear weapons modernization programs will compete with each other, or with conventional

weapons programs, for scarce resources.

The Department of Energy (DOE) is currently investing in life extension programs for U.S.

nuclear warheads. During the Cold War, DOE sustained the U.S. warhead stockpile by designing,

testing, and deploying new warheads to replace aging warheads.61 Because the United States has

observed a testing moratorium since 1992, it maintains its current inventory through the Stockpile

Stewardship Program, a scientific experimentation and simulation undertaking that assesses the

status of the nuclear weapon arsenal without underground nuclear tests.62 Instead of designing

and deploying new warheads, DOE manages and maintains the stockpile by pursuing Life

Extension Programs (LEPs) for existing warheads and investing in the supporting and aging

infrastructure. Many analysts agree that investments in both the infrastructure and workforce will

help sustain the long-term safety, security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear arsenal,63 but

Eryn MacDonald, Independent Review of DOD’s Nuclear Enterprise: Money, Maintenance, and Morale, Union of

Concerned Scientists, November 21, 2014, at http://allthingsnuclear.org/independent-review-of-dods-nuclearenterprise-money-maintenance-and-morale/.

Ibid.

Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010, p. 37.

Ibid., p. 37.

Ibid., p. 41.

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these investments could add to the cost of the nuclear enterprise at the same time that DOD is

modernizing its nuclear delivery systems.

As calculated by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the costs of these programs could

reach more than $30 billion per year in the 2020s, and amount to a total of more than $1 trillion

over 30 years.64 Yet, as Frank Kendall, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology

and Logistics testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee,65 this plan could generate

“affordability problems” in the 2020s. This can raise questions of whether the United States can,

or should, pursue all of these programs.66 As a result, some have suggested that the United States

forgo the ICBM modernization programs and eventually eliminate the ICBM leg of the triad.

Over the 2015-2024 time period, the Administration’s plans for nuclear forces would cost $348

billion per CBO estimates (see Table 1). Of that total, CBO projects that $299 billion would be

budgeted by DOD and DOE:67

•

$160 billion for strategic nuclear delivery systems and weapons;

•

$8 billion for tactical nuclear delivery systems and weapons;

•

$79 billion for nuclear weapons laboratories and their supporting activities; and

•

$52 billion for nuclear-related command, control, communications, and earlywarning systems.

The remaining $49 billion represents CBO’s estimate of additional costs that would be incurred

over the coming decade if the nuclear program costs grow as expected. 68

Table 1. Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, by Department and Function

Billions of Dollars

Total

FY2015-FY2024

FY2015