Selected Issues in Homeland Security Policy for the 114th Congress
Congressional research reportMay 19, 2015
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Selected Issues in Homeland Security Policy
for the 114th Congress
(name redacted), Coordinator
Analyst in Emergency Management and Homeland Security Policy
May 19, 2015
Congressional Research Service
7-....
www.crs.gov
R44041
Selected Issues in Homeland Security Policy for the 114th Congress
Summary
In 2001, in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11th, “homeland security” went from
being a concept discussed among a relatively small cadre of policymakers and strategic thinkers
to a broadly discussed issue in Congress. Debates over how to implement coordinated homeland
security policy led to the passage of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) and the
establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Evolution of America’s response
to terrorist threats has continued under the leadership of different Administrations, Congresses,
and in a shifting environment of public opinion.
DHS is currently the third-largest department in the federal government, although it does not
incorporate all of the homeland security functions at the federal level, even if one constrains the
definition of homeland security to the narrow field of prevention and response to domestic acts of
terrorism. In policymaking terms, homeland security is a very broad and complex network of
interrelated issues. In its executive summary the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review issued
in 2014 delineates the missions of the homeland security enterprise as follows: prevent terrorism
and enhance security; secure and manage the borders; enforce and administer immigration laws;
safeguard and secure cyberspace; and strengthen national preparedness and resilience.
This report outlines an array of homeland security issues that may come before the 114th
Congress. After a brief discussion of the definitions of homeland security, the homeland security
budget, and the role of homeland security actors in the intelligence community, the report divides
the specific issues into four broad categories:
•
Counterterrorism and Security Management,
•
Border Security and Trade,
•
Disaster Preparedness, Response, and Recovery, and
•
DHS Management Issues.
Each of those areas contains a survey of topics briefly analyzed by Congressional Research
Service experts. The information included only scratches the surface of most of these issues.
More detailed information can be obtained by consulting the CRS reports referenced herein, or by
contacting the relevant CRS expert.
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Selected Issues in Homeland Security Policy for the 114th Congress
Contents
What Is Homeland Security? ........................................................................................................... 1
Homeland Security: Missions and Strategy ............................................................................... 2
The Budget and Security ........................................................................................................... 4
DHS Appropriations ............................................................................................................ 5
Homeland Security and the U.S. Intelligence Community........................................................ 6
Selected IC Issues with Homeland Security Implications................................................... 8
Counterterrorism and Security Management ................................................................................. 11
The Transnational Trend of Terrorism ..................................................................................... 11
The Homegrown Violent Jihadist Threat: Four Key Themes .................................................. 13
Cybersecurity........................................................................................................................... 16
Cyber Threats .................................................................................................................... 16
Continuity of Government Operations .................................................................................... 21
Medical Countermeasures to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
Terrorism .............................................................................................................................. 22
BioWatch: Detection of Aerosol Release of Biological Agents .............................................. 23
Food Defense ........................................................................................................................... 24
Electric Grid Physical Security................................................................................................ 26
Security of Chemical Facilities................................................................................................ 28
Transit Security........................................................................................................................ 28
Border Security and Trade ............................................................................................................. 31
Southwest Border Issues.......................................................................................................... 31
Drug Trafficking and the Southwest Border ..................................................................... 31
Illicit Proceeds and the Southwest Border ........................................................................ 33
Cross-Border Smuggling Tunnels ..................................................................................... 34
Cargo Security ......................................................................................................................... 35
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT)................................................. 36
100% Scanning Requirement ............................................................................................ 37
Port of Entry (POE) Infrastructure and Personnel............................................................. 38
Immigration Inspections at Ports of Entry............................................................................... 39
Visa Waiver Program......................................................................................................... 40
Entry-Exit System ............................................................................................................. 42
Enforcement Between Ports of Entry ...................................................................................... 42
Domestic Nuclear Detection.................................................................................................... 43
Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) ....................................................... 45
Aviation Security ..................................................................................................................... 46
Explosives Screening Strategy for the Aviation Domain .................................................. 47
Risk-Based Passenger Screening ...................................................................................... 49
The Use of Terrorist Watchlists in the Aviation Domain ................................................... 51
Security Issues Regarding the Operation of Unmanned Aircraft ...................................... 52
Security Response to Incidents at Screening Checkpoints ................................................ 54
Mitigating the Threat of Shoulder-Fired Missiles to Civilian Aircraft .............................. 55
Disaster Preparedness, Response, and Recovery ........................................................................... 56
Disaster Assistance Funding .................................................................................................... 56
Firefighter Assistance Programs .............................................................................................. 59
Emergency Communications ................................................................................................... 59
Development of the National Preparedness System ................................................................ 60
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Selected Issues in Homeland Security Policy for the 114th Congress
Hurricane Sandy Recovery ...................................................................................................... 62
Implementation of the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act ..................................................... 63
Public Health and Medical Services ........................................................................................ 64
DHS Management Issues ............................................................................................................... 65
The Management Budget ........................................................................................................ 65
Unity of Effort ......................................................................................................................... 66
DHS Financial Management Reforms ..................................................................................... 67
Headquarters Consolidation .................................................................................................... 69
Department of Homeland Security Personnel Issues............................................................... 70
Succession Management ................................................................................................... 71
Morale of DHS Employees ............................................................................................... 73
Loaned Executive Program ............................................................................................... 75
Digital Technology for Training, Recruitment, and Retention .......................................... 76
Employment of Veterans ................................................................................................... 78
Homeland Security Research and Development ..................................................................... 79
Tables
Table 1. Congressional Funding for Transit Security Grants, FY2002-FY2015 ........................... 30
Table 2. Disaster Relief Fund Total Appropriations and Carried-over Balances, FY2012FY2015 ....................................................................................................................................... 56
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 81
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Selected Issues in Homeland Security Policy for the 114th Congress
What Is Homeland Security?
There is no statutory definition of homeland security that reflects the breadth of the enterprise as
currently understood. Although there is a federal Department of Homeland Security, it is neither
solely dedicated to homeland security missions, nor is it the only part of the federal government
with significant responsibilities in this arena.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established by the Homeland Security Act of
2002 (P.L. 107-296), which was signed into law on November 25, 2002. The new department was
assembled from components pulled from 22 different government agencies and began official
operations on March 1, 2003. Since then, DHS has undergone a series of restructurings and
reorganizations to improve its effectiveness and efficiency.
Although DHS does include many of the homeland security functions of the federal government,
several of these functions or parts of these functions remain at their original executive branch
agencies and departments, including the Departments of Justice, State, Defense, and
Transportation. Not all of the missions of DHS are officially “homeland security” missions. Some
components have historical missions that do not directly relate to conventional homeland security
definitions, such as the Coast Guard’s environmental and boater safety missions, and Congress
has in the past debated whether FEMA and its disaster relief and recovery missions belong in the
department.
Some criminal justice elements could arguably be included in a broad definition of homeland
security. Issues such as the role of the military in law enforcement, monitoring and policing
transfers of money, human trafficking, explosives and weapons laws, and aspects of foreign
policy, trade, and economics have implications for homeland security policy.
Rather than trying to resolve the question of what is and is not homeland security, this report is a
survey of issues that have come up in the context of homeland security policy debates. It is
neither exhaustive nor exclusive in its scope, but representative of the broad array of issues likely
to be taken up in one way or another by Congress in the coming months. After initial discussion
of the definitions of homeland security, the homeland security budget, and the role of homeland
security actors in the intelligence community, the report groups the issues into four general
themes:
•
Counterterrorism and Security Management;
•
Border Security and Trade;
•
Disaster Preparedness, Response, and Recovery; and
•
DHS Management Issues
As each topic under these themes is introduced, the author of the section is listed, along with their
contact information. In many cases, a specific CRS report is highlighted as a source of more
detailed information.
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Homeland Security: Missions and Strategy
(name redacted), Analyst in Emergency Management and Homeland Security Policy
([redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....)
For more information, see CRS Report R42462, Defining Homeland Security: Analysis and
Congressional Considerations.
Prior to 9/11, the United States addressed threats to our homeland through the separate prisms of
national defense, law enforcement, and emergency management. Policy discussions about how
the government should confront emerging threats were made more urgent by the 9/11 attacks.
Despite the reorganization put in motion after the attacks, including the Homeland Security Act of
2002, and concurrent evolution of homeland security policy, over 30 federal departments,
agencies, and entities have homeland security responsibilities and receive annual appropriations
to execute homeland security missions.
Under the American structure of government, the executive branch is responsible for the
development and execution of homeland security strategy, and Congress is charged with
providing oversight and approving funding. It can be argued that the White House has the
responsibility of coordinating homeland security activities that cut across the federal government,
and encouraging state and local governments and the private sector to be willing and active
partners in securing the homeland.
Expression of national homeland security strategy predates DHS, and the documents by the
executive branch show an evolution in their view of national homeland security priorities. The
first homeland security strategy document issued by President George W. Bush’s Administration
was the 2003 National Strategy for Homeland Security, which was revised in 2007. In 2008, the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued the Strategic Plan—One Team, One Mission,
Securing Our Homeland. The 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security primarily focused
on terrorism, whereas the 2008 Strategic Plan included references to all-hazards and border
security. Arguably, the 2003 and 2007 national strategies for homeland security addressed
terrorism in response to such incidents as the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the attempted bombing of
American Airlines Flight 93 on December 22, 2001, whereas the 2008 Strategic Plan addressed
terrorism and all-hazards in response to natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina, which
occurred in 2005. These documents have been superseded by several other documents which are
now considered the principal homeland security strategies, but they represent evolutionary steps
in the development of the current policy.
Presentation of Homeland Security Priorities
One way the Administration presents its thinking on homeland security to Congress and the
public is through the QHSR process. This involves DHS reviewing its homeland security policy
and programs, and then reporting to Congress on the results. Arguably, the review process may
inform the development of combined national security and homeland security strategy. The 2014
QHSR endorsed the five mission areas spelled out in the 2010 QHSR, noting that the mission
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areas needed to be “refined in response to reflect the evolving landscape of homeland security
threats and hazards.”1 The five mission areas are:
•
Prevent Terrorism and Enhance Security;
•
Secure and Manage our Borders;
•
Enforce and Administer Our Immigration Laws;
•
Safeguard and Secure Cyberspace; and
•
Strengthen National Preparedness and Resilience.2
Another way of looking at the Administration’s thinking on homeland security is through the
budget process. OMB’s annual budget guidance—Circular A-11—provides federal departments
and agencies with information on how to report to Congress on its homeland security
expenditures. OMB states in its 2015 version of Circular A-11 that the six critical mission
homeland security areas are identified in the 2004 National Strategy for Homeland Security.
These six critical mission areas are:
•
Intelligence and Warning;
•
Border and Transportation Security;
•
Domestic Counterterrorism;
•
Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets;
•
Defending Against Catastrophic Threats; and
•
Emergency Preparedness and Response.3
Arguably, OMB’s continued use of 2004 homeland security strategy mission areas in current
guidance alongside the homeland security discussions in the 2014 QHSR and 2015 National
Security Strategy indicates that these original missions still contribute to the Administration’s
analysis of homeland security matters by defining the terms of the budgetary discussion.
Presentation of the Homeland Security Strategy
The current primary national homeland security strategic document is the 2015 National Security
Strategy, which is similar to the 2010 National Security Strategy that incorporated homeland
security into the nation’s national security strategy.4 The 2015 National Security Strategy
identifies guarding against terrorism as the core responsibility of homeland security. The strategy
also identifies improved information sharing, aviation and border security, and international
cooperation as homeland security priorities. Community-based efforts and local law enforcement
programs are identified as ways to counter homegrown violent extremism and protect vulnerable
1
Department of Homeland Security, 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, Washington, DC, June 2014, p. 5.
Available at http://www.dhs.gov/publication/2014-quadrennial-homeland-security-review-qhsr.
2
Ibid., pp. 6-8.
3
Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-11: Instructions for Homeland Security Data Collection, pp. 7-8,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/a11_current_year/homeland.pdf.
4
Upon taking office, President Obama combined the National and Homeland Security staffs and this may have affected
the decision to combine national and homeland security strategies into a single document.
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individuals from extremist ideologies that could lead them to join conflicts overseas or carry out
attacks in the United States. Finally, the 2015 strategy states the federal government will work
with the owners and operators of the nation’s critical cyber and physical infrastructure to decrease
vulnerabilities and increase resilience.5 At the national level, the 2015 National Security Strategy
guides not just DHS’s activities, but also all federal government homeland security activities.
Considerations for Congress
As noted above, Congress is responsible for providing oversight of and appropriating funds for
homeland security activities. For Congress to exercise effective oversight and ensure efficient
usage of taxpayer dollars, clear understanding of priorities for homeland security missions, goals
and activities needs to exist between the branches. Policymakers could then use a process based
on these defined priorities to ensure existing programs are on track and new developments can be
addressed in a more strategic fashion. While the dynamic threat environment may not allow
strategic priorities to be set in stone, Congress could encourage the use of a consistent broadlydrawn list of homeland security missions in budget and policy discussions, in order to facilitate
strategic decisionmaking.
Even though the conventional wisdom since 9/11 has often identified counterterrorism as the core
responsibility of homeland security—a mission that is often interpreted as a federal-level national
security function—it can be argued that homeland security, at its core, is about the coordination of
disparate stakeholders to confront the full range of risks to the country—not just terrorism.6
This is the ultimate challenge of strategic homeland security policymaking: arriving at a
consensus on what the current risk portfolio is, how that portfolio is evolving, what the
appropriate missions are in response, and how to prioritize them—not just once, but constantly.
This consensus isn’t just “horizontal”—at the federal level—but “vertical”—reaching down to
those with homeland security roles at the state, local, tribal and territorial levels, as well as in the
private sector.
Consistency in discussion of homeland security missions and strategy could also facilitate debate
about the appropriate role of various federal, state, local and private sector stakeholders in
ensuring homeland security. Such discussions are important in ensuring each level understands its
role and can invest the proper level of resources to carry it out.
The Budget and Security
(name redacted), Analyst in Emergency Management and Homeland Security Policy
([redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....)
For more information, see CRS Report R43796, Department of Homeland Security: FY2015
Appropriations, and CRS Report R43884, Homeland Security Appropriations: FY2015
Action in the 114th Congress.
5
Office of the President, National Security Strategy, Washington, DC, February 2015, pp. 8-9,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy_2.pdf.
6
Donald F. Kettl, System Under Stress: Homeland Security and American Politics, 2nd ed, Washington, DC, CQPress,
2007, p. 82.
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According to data from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the entire U.S.
government spent $564 billion (in nominal dollars) on “homeland security”—defined in law as
“those activities that detect, deter, protect against, and respond to terrorist attacks occurring
within the United States and its territories” —in the 10 years after the 9/11 attacks. Such
spending peaked in FY2009 at $73.8 billion. The total budget for homeland security activities for
FY2014, the last year for which there is complete data, was $66.2 billion, a reduction of $7.6
billion from its high-water mark in nominal terms.7
By comparison, the budget for the Department of Homeland Security has grown from $31.2
billion in FY2003, when it did not have its own appropriations bill, to $59.9 billion in FY2014,
the last year for which we have complete budget data. Roughly $35.8 billion of that amount, or
58.6%, was considered “homeland security” spending by OMB’s accounting under the above
definition. Some argue that the definition in law is too focused on explicit and directly
attributable counterterrorism activities compared to broader theories that have been part of the
national discussion, which consider immigration and border control or disaster response as a part
of homeland security.
DHS Appropriations
The Administration requested $38.3 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for
DHS for FY2015, plus over $6.4 billion to pay for the costs of major disasters under the Stafford
Act. In the 113th Congress, the House Appropriations Committee reported legislation (H.R. 4903)
that would have provided $39.2 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority, plus the
requested disaster relief, and the Senate Appropriations Committee reported legislation (S. 2534)
that would have provided $39.0 billion, plus the requested disaster relief and $0.2 billion in
overseas contingency operations funding for the Coast Guard.8 Neither bill received floor
consideration in the 113th Congress, and annual appropriations for DHS were not included in P.L.
113-235, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015. As no DHS annual
appropriation was enacted, DHS continued to operate under a continuing resolution, which was
extended by P.L. 113-235 through February 27, 2015.
With the beginning of the 114th Congress, both House- and Senate-reported FY2015 annual
homeland security appropriations bills were no longer available for action. H.R. 240, a new
FY2015 annual homeland security appropriations bill, was introduced on January 9, 2015, and
considered in the House the following week under a structured rule that allowed five immigration
policy-related amendments. After adopting these five amendments, the bill passed the House on
January 14, 2015. On February 27, the Senate passed an amended H.R. 240 without the
legislative text added by the House amendments.
After the House did not pass a three-week extension of the continuing resolution, the Senate and
House passed a one week extension of the continuing resolution to avoid a lapse in annual
appropriations for DHS. On March 3, 2015, the House voted to approve the Senate version of
H.R. 240. The bill was signed into law on March 4, 2015, as P.L. 114-4. As enacted, the bill
7
Office of Management and Budget, Fiscal Year 2016 Analytical Perspective of the U.S. Government (Washington,
DC, 2015), p. 344.
8
The overseas contingency operations (also known as OCO/GWOT) funding request of $0.2 billion, was made on June
26, 2014, after the House Appropriations Committee had reported its measure, but before the Senate Appropriations
Committee had reported its measure.
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provided $39.7 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority, plus the requested disaster
relief, and $0.2 billion in overseas contingency operations funding for the Coast Guard.
For FY2016, the Administration has requested $41.2 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget
authority for DHS, plus $6.7 billion to pay for the costs of major disasters under the Stafford Act,
as part of an overall budget of almost $64.9 billion.
The current budget environment will likely present challenges to homeland security programs and
the department going forward, as the demands of the mission, ongoing capital investment efforts
and staffing needs will compete with the budget demands of the rest of the government for
limited funds. The potential impact of the changed budget environment is discussed at various
points throughout this report.
Homeland Security and the U.S. Intelligence Community
(name redacted), Analyst in Intelligence and National Security Policy
([redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....)
For more information, see CRS Report RL33539, Intelligence Issues for Congress; CRS
Report R43793, Intelligence Authorization Legislation for FY2014 and FY2015: Provisions,
Status, Intelligence Community Framework; and CRS Report R40138, Amendments to the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Extended Until June 1, 2015.
While many think of homeland security only in terms of DHS, it is a primary mission of the
entire Intelligence Community (IC). In the years since 9/11, the “wall” between foreign and
domestic intelligence has fallen and many efforts have been initiated to better integrate the
capabilities residing in intelligence and law enforcement organizations.9 “National intelligence”
has come to mean “all intelligence,” not just foreign intelligence.10
The many barriers between foreign and domestic intelligence that existed prior to 9/11 were
intended to prevent government spying on U.S. persons and focused the IC on foreign
intelligence. The tragedy of the 9/11 attacks overcame earlier concerns and led Congress and the
executive branch to enact legislation, policies and regulations designed to enhance informationsharing across the U.S. government.
The Homeland Security Act (P.L. 107-296) gave the DHS responsibility for fusing together law
enforcement and intelligence information relating to terrorist threats to the homeland. Provisions
in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 (P.L. 108-458)
established the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) as the coordinator at the federal level
for terrorism information and assessment and created the position of Director of National
Intelligence (DNI) to provide strategic management across the IC. New legal authorities
9
See, for example, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report
(Washington, DC: GPO, 2004), pp. 78-80, under “Legal Constraints on the FBI and ‘the Wall.’” See also, Jerry
Berman and Lara Flint, “Guiding Lights: Intelligence Oversight and Control for the Challenge of Terrorism,” Criminal
Justice Ethics, Winter/Spring 2003, at https://www.cdt.org/files/030300guidinglights_3.pdf. They suggest that there
were many walls: “There were really many walls, built between and within agencies.… Some walls were meant to
protect individual rights. Others were meant to protect national security interests.”
10
P.L. 108-458, §1012.
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accompanied these organizational changes.11 At the state and local level, initiatives to improve
collaboration across the federal system, such as the FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs),
have expanded—the number of JTTFs across the country grew from 34 to over 100 between 2001
and 2015—and new ones, such as DHS’s National Network of Fusion Centers (NNFC), have
been put in place.12
The “community” of U.S. government entities that perform some kind of intelligence-related
activity has gradually evolved into 17 organizations/agencies that span six separate government
departments and one independent agency (the CIA). Two intelligence elements of DHS and one
element of the FBI are most closely associated with homeland security.13
•
DHS’s missions include “preventing terrorism and enhancing security; securing
and managing our borders; enforcing and administering our immigration laws;
strengthening cyberspace and critical infrastructure; and strengthening national
preparedness and resilience to disasters.”14 DHS’s Intelligence and Analysis
(I&A) section provides intelligence support across the full range of DHS
missions. It serves as the DHS focal point for all policy issues and activities
involving the entire IC. It is the federal government lead for information and
intelligence sharing “with state, local, tribal and territorial governments and the
private sector.”15 Much of the information sharing is done through the NNFC—
with I&A providing personnel, systems and training.16
•
The U.S. Coast Guard, made part of DHS in 2002, has intelligence elements that
deal with information relating to maritime security and homeland defense. The
USCG’s responsibilities include protecting citizens from the sea (maritime
safety), protecting America from threats delivered by the sea (maritime security),
and protecting the sea itself (maritime stewardship). Its diverse mission sets and
broad legal authorities allow it to fill a unique niche within the IC.17
•
The FBI’s National Security Branch (NSB) serves as the focal point in the
department for all policy issues and activities involving the IC. The key
intelligence functions of the FBI relate to counterterrorism and counterintelligence. Law enforcement information is expected to be shared with other
11
See for example, the section below examining the three amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 which broadened the ability of federal government organizations to collect and share intelligence information
domestically.
12
Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Protecting America From Terrorist Attack: Our Joint Terrorism Task Forces,” at
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/terrorism_jttfs; and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Fusion
Centers and Joint Terrorism Task Forces, at http://www.dhs.gov/fusion-centers-and-joint-terrorism-task-forces.
13
For details on all 17 components of the IC see Office of the Director of National Intelligence, U.S. National
Intelligence: An Overview, at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/USNI%202013%20Overview_web.pdf.
14
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Homeland Security Roles and Responsibilities,” Appendix A in 2014
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, June 18, 2014, p. 83, at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
2014-qhsr-final-508.pdf.
15
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “More About the Office of Intelligence and Analysis,” March 28, 2014, at
http://www.dhs.gov/more-about-office-intelligence-and-analysis-mission.
16
Ibid.; see also Office of the Director of National Intelligence, U.S. National Intelligence: An Overview, pp. 19-20, at
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/USNI%202013%20Overview_web.pdf.
17
U.S. Coast Guard, Intelligence, Coast Guard Publication 2-0, May 2010, at https://www.uscg.mil/doctrine/CGPub/
CG_Pub_2_0.pdf.
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intelligence agencies for use in all-source products. Robert Mueller, thenDirector of the FBI when he testified in 2011, stated:
Protecting the United States against terrorism demanded a new framework for the way
the FBI carries out its mission: a threat-based, intelligence-led approach. Rather than
collecting information to solve a particular case, the new approach prioritizes the
collection and utilization of intelligence to develop a comprehensive threat picture,
enabling strategic disruptions of terrorist networks before they act. This focus on the
overall threat picture also elevates the need for information sharing, thereby changing
the FBI’s role in and relationships with both the intelligence and law enforcement
communities. Under this new model, intelligence drives how we understand threats,
how we prioritize and investigate these threats, and how we target our resources to
address these threats.18
Selected IC Issues with Homeland Security Implications
Domestic Surveillance
Domestic surveillance issues will likely be a concern for the 114th Congress principally because
three amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978 (P.L. 95-511)19
will expire on June 1, 2015, unless Congress votes to extend them.20
FISA provides a statutory framework regulating when government agencies may gather foreign
intelligence through electronic surveillance or physical searches, capture the numbers dialed on a
telephone line (pen registers) and identify the originating number of a call on a particular phone
line (with trap and trace devices), or access specified business records and other tangible things.
Authorization for such activities is typically obtained via a court order from the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), a specialized court created to act as a neutral judicial
decisionmaker in the context of FISA.
Shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Congress amended FISA to enable the government to
obtain information in a greater number of circumstances.21 Three temporary amendments to FISA
are known as the “roving” wiretap provision, the “Section 215” provision, and the “lone wolf”
provision. The first two of these provisions were part of the USA PATRIOT Act of 200122 and the
18
U.S. Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Statement of Robert S. Mueller, III; Director
FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigations, Hearing, 112th Cong., 1st sess., October 6, 2011, at http://www.fbi.gov/news/
testimony/the-state-of-intelligence-reform-10-years-after-911.
19
The original FISA legislation, P.L. 95-511 is available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-92/pdf/
STATUTE-92-Pg1783.pdf.
20
These provisions were last extended in 2011. See P.L. 112-14, “PATRIOT Sunsets Extension Act of 2011.” §2.
“SUNSET EXTENSIONS: (a) USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.—Section 102(b)(1) of
the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-177; 50 U.S.C. 1805 note, 50 U.S.C.
1861 note, and 50 U.S.C. 1862 note) is amended by striking ‘May 27, 2011’ and inserting ‘June 1, 2015’. (b)
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.—Section 6001(b)(1) of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458; 50 U.S.C. 1801 note) is amended by striking ‘May 27, 2011’ and
inserting ‘June 1, 2015’.”
21
CRS Report R40138, Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Extended Until June 1, 2015,
by (name redacted).
22
P.L. 107-56.
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third was passed as part of the IRTPA of 2004.23 Distinctions between the three temporary
amendments include:
•
Multipoint, or “roving” wiretaps allow wiretaps to follow an individual even when he or
she changes the means of communication (i.e., wiretaps which may follow a target even
when he or she changes phones). If it is allowed to expire, FISA provisions require a
separate FISA Court authorization to tap each device a target uses.24
•
“Section 215” broadens the types of records and “other tangible things” that can be made
accessible to the government under FISA. If it is allowed to expire, FISA provisions will
read as they did prior to passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, and accessible business
records will be limited to “common carrier, public accommodation facility, physical
storage facility, or vehicle rental facility.”25
•
The “lone wolf” provision allows the government to monitor individuals acting alone and
potentially engaged in international terrorism, providing that they are not citizens or
permanent residents of the United States. If it is allowed to expire, there is no provision
for individuals acting alone.26
An extension of these authorities would need to be enacted prior to June 1, 2015, in order for
them to be maintained. Otherwise, the amended FISA authorities will revert to the text as it
appeared before the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act and IRTPA. However, foreign
intelligence investigations that began prior to the sunset date may continue to use these authorities
beyond their expiration.
The National Security Agency (NSA) has been collecting bulk telephone data as “tangible things”
since 2001, and doing so using Section 215 authorities as a legal basis for that activity since
2006.27 As Congress considers extending Section 215, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit recently ruled that Section 215 does not authorize the “bulk collection” of phone records
on the scale of the NSA program “[b]ecause we find that the program exceeds the scope of what
Congress has authorized.”28 The court ruling appears to suggest that the bulk data collection
program needs a separate authorization either within Section 215, or in addition to Section 215.
At this time, three bills have been introduced in the 114th Congress to extend all three provisions.
The House and Senate versions (H.R. 2048, S. 1123), popularly known as the “USA FREEDOM
Act of 2015,”29 would not only extend the three amendments until December 15, 2019, but would
23
P.L. 108-458.
CRS Report R40138, Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Extended Until June 1, 2015,
by (name redacted).
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid.
27
U.S. Congress, House, House Judiciary Committee, “Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and
Ensuring Effective Discipline over Monitoring Act of 2015,” Report to Accompany H.R. 2048, H.Rept. 114-109, 114th
Cong., 1st sess., May 8, 2015, p. 8.
28
ACLU v. Clapper, Doc. No. 14-42-cv, (2nd Cir., 2015), p. 5. The ruling did not comment on the program’s
constitutionality.
29
U.S. Congress, House, “Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective Discipline
Over Monitoring Act of 2015,” H.R. 2048, 114th Cong., 1st sess., introduced April 29, 2015; and U.S. Congress, Senate,
“Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective Discipline Over Monitoring Act of
(continued...)
24
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also propose a number of FISA reforms.30 A separate Senate bill (S. 1035) extends the three
amendments until December 31, 2020. S. 1035 is being called a “clean bill” because it contains
no new provisions.31
Information-Sharing and Collaboration
The “wall” between domestic and foreign intelligence has come down metaphorically, but
barriers to information-sharing and collaboration32 continue between the IC and law enforcement
entities,33 between IC entities in the various levels of government—federal, state, local, tribal,
territorial—and between the public and private sector. DHS has efforts underway to overcome
those barriers. For example, in order to meet the DHS’s public‐private cybersecurity data sharing
and analytical collaboration mission, DHS has developed a Critical Infrastructure Information
Sharing and Collaboration Program (CISCP) that shares threat, incident and vulnerability
information between government and industry across critical infrastructure sectors such as the
chemical, energy, dams, and financial services sectors.34
Congress may choose to explore how the DHS is measuring progress in efforts such as CISCP,
and, based on those metrics, where DHS and the IC as a whole are in terms of informationsharing and collaboration on homeland security-related issues such as cybersecurity, border
security, transportation security, disaster response, drug interdiction, critical infrastructure
protection, and homegrown violent extremism. As Congress reviews cases of collaboration
between multiple agencies, it may examine if it is clear which agency has the lead, and whether
any single organization is accountable if a collaborative arrangement fails. Congress may also
choose to pass legislation designed to encourage information-sharing and collaboration in specific
fields, such as cybersecurity.35
(...continued)
2015,”S. 1123,114th Cong., 1st sess., introduced May 11, 2015.
30
Reforms include: “Pen Register and Trap and Trace Reform,” “FISA Acquisitions Targeting Persons Outside the
United States Reforms,” “Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Reforms,” and “National Security Letter Reform.”
These and other suggested changes are not discussed in this report.
31
U.S. Congress, Senate, “A bill to extend authority relating to roving surveillance, access to business records, and
individual terrorists as agents of foreign powers under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 and for other
purposes,” S. 1035, 114th Cong., 1st sess., introduced April 22, 2015.
32
Barriers to information-sharing and collaboration include different uses of information collected by various
organizations (e.g., data gathered for intelligence purposes vs. evidence gathered to prosecute a criminal), access to
classified materials, complications associated with information technology, differing organizational cultures, and
concerns over the damage caused by leaked information. Various types of DHS, IC, and law enforcement centers exist
to “fuse” or bridge the gaps between organizations at all levels of but the system for integrating intelligence-related
information is far from perfect.
33
A large part of the statutory basis for the ‘wall’ between law enforcement and intelligence information was removed
with passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, which made it possible to share law enforcement information with analysts in
intelligence agencies, but many obstacles remain.
34
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, CIKR Cyber Information and Collaboration Program, at http://csrc.nist.gov/
groups/SMA/ispab/documents/minutes/2013-06/ispab_june2013_menna_ciscp_one_pager.pdf. See also DHS, “Critical
Infrastructure and Key Resources Cyber Information Sharing and Collaboration Program,” at https://www.us-cert.gov/
sites/default/files/c3vp/CISCP_20140523.pdf; and DHS, “Critical Infrastructure Sectors,” at http://www.dhs.gov/
critical-infrastructure-sectors.
35
For additional information, see the “Cybersecurity” section, below.
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Counterterrorism and Security Management
The Transnational Trend of Terrorism
John Rollins, Specialist in Terrorism and National Security ([redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....)
For more information, see CRS Report R41004, Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Foreign
Policy Issues for Congress.
Terrorism remains a transnational threat that entails risks to U.S. global interests emanating from
and manifesting in both the international and domestic environment. Central to U.S. efforts to
address transnational terrorism are actions taken to detect, deter, and defeat Al Qaeda and the
Islamic State. While recognizing that numerous other terrorist groups may wish to harm U.S.
global security interests, the Administration primarily focuses on addressing threats from Al
Qaeda, its affiliated organizations, and adherents to its violence-based philosophy and the Islamic
State. Understanding how Al Qaeda and the Islamic State continue to evolve into global entities
with a diverse set of actors and capabilities is central to formulating sound strategic policy and
overseeing its effective implementation.
Al Qaeda
The past few years have witnessed an increase in terrorist actions by entities claiming some
affiliation with or philosophical connection to Al Qaeda. Many of the past year’s global terrorist
attacks were conducted by individuals or small terrorist cells that received support ranging from
resources and training to having minimal connections, if any, with the terrorist groups to which
they claim allegiance. Some argue that recent U.S. counterterrorism successes may be reducing
the level of terrorist threats to the nation emanating from core Al Qaeda. U.S. officials suggest
that the killing of Osama bin Laden in May 2011 coupled with continuous post-9/11 global
military and intelligence counterterrorism actions have significantly degraded Al Qaeda’s ability
to successfully launch a catastrophic terrorist attack against U.S. global interests. Others suggest
that Al Qaeda has changed from an organization to a philosophical movement, making it more
difficult to detect and defeat. These security experts suggest that Al Qaeda and associated
affiliates will remain viable, due in part to the prospective security implications related to the
nation’s budgetary situation. Counterterrorism analyst Daveed Gartenstein-Ross argues that “The
U.S. will not be (defeated) by Al Qaeda. But one can see that as the national debt increases, we
(will) have to make spending cuts and as Al Qaeda gets stronger in multiple countries
simultaneously—Somalia, Yemen, Pakistan, maybe Mali—suddenly you’re looking at multiple
theaters from where catastrophic strikes can be launched.”36
36
Spencer Ackerman, “Even Dead, Osama Has a Winning Strategy,” Wired, July 20, 2011, http://www.wired.com/
dangerroom/2011/07/even-dead-osama-has-a-winning-strategy-hint-its-muhammad-alis/.
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The Islamic State37
The Islamic State (IS, also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ISIL, or ISIS) is a
transnational Sunni Islamist insurgent and terrorist group that has expanded its control over areas
of parts of Iraq and Syria since 2013. There is debate over the degree to which the Islamic State
organization might represent a direct terrorist threat to U.S. facilities and personnel in the region
or to the U.S. homeland. The forerunners of the Islamic State were part of the insurgency against
coalition forces in Iraq, and the organization has in the years since the 2011 U.S. withdrawal from
Iraq expanded its control over significant areas of both Iraq and Syria. The Islamic State has
thrived in the disaffected Sunni tribal areas of Iraq and taken control of some eastern provinces of
Syria affected by the civil war. In 2014, Islamic State-led forces, supported by groups linked to
ousted Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and some Sunni Arabs, advanced along the Tigris and
Euphrates rivers in Iraq, taking population centers including Mosul, one of Iraq’s largest cities.
Since then, IS forces have killed Syrian and Iraqi adversaries, including some civilians, often
from ethnic or religious minorities, and killed hostages, including U.S. citizens. Islamic State
attempts to make further gains continue. The group’s tactics have drawn international ire, and
raised U.S. attention to Iraq’s political problems and to the war in Syria.
Considerations
The balance between ensuring effective counterterrorism policies and being mindful of the
current budget environment is not lost on senior Administration officials. In recent years John
Brennan, in his former capacity as the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, now the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, has spoken of Osama bin Laden’s often stated
objective of pursuing global acts of terrorism against the nation’s interests with the desire to
“bleed [the U.S.] financially by drawing us into long, costly wars that also inflame anti-American
sentiment.”38
The terrorist threat to U.S. global interests will likely remain an important issue for the
Administration and the 114th Congress. Over the past few years numerous individuals were
arrested in the homeland and abroad for conducting attacks and planning terrorism-related
activities directed at U.S. national security interests. All of the attacks—successful and
unsuccessful—were of a transnational dimension and ranged from a lone shooter who appears to
have become radicalized over the Internet to terrorist organizations wishing to use airliners as
platforms for destruction to individuals attempting to detonate large quantities of explosives in
symbolic areas frequented by large groups of people.
The 113th Congress undertook efforts, largely through hearings, to better understand the nature of
terrorism in various geographic regions and assess the effectiveness of U.S. and partnering
nations’ counterterrorism efforts. Programs and policies that Congress has reviewed include
public diplomacy efforts; imposition of sanctions; terrorism financing rules; the nexus between
international crime, narcotics, and terrorism; and the relationship between domestic and
international terrorism activities. The 114th Congress may continue to assess the Obama
Administration’s counterterrorism-related strategies, policies, and programs to ascertain if
37
For additional information, see CRS Report R43612, The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy, by (name redacted)
et al.
38
Remarks by the John Brennan, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, before the
Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, June 29, 2011.
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additional guidance or legislation is required. These assessments will likely entail considerations
of how best to balance perceived risks to U.S. global security interests with concerns about the
long-term fiscal challenges facing the nation.
The Homegrown Violent Jihadist Threat: Four Key Themes
(name redacted), Specialist in Organized Crime and Terrorism ([redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7....)
Homegrown violent jihadist39 activity since 9/11 defies easy categorization. CRS analysis of
homegrown violent jihadist plots and attacks since 9/11 suggests four broad themes:
•
Various Endgames for Plans: Plots have involved individuals interested in a
variety of ways to harm U.S. interests. Some individuals focused on becoming
foreign fighters in conflict zones, such as Somalia. Others planned attacks using
explosives, incendiary devices, or firearms. Yet others incorporated multiple,
unspecific, or unique tactics. Finally, outside of the post-9/11 violent plots,
additional individuals intended only to fund or materially support jihadist
activities.
•
Little Interest in Martyrdom: Only a minority of homegrown jihadists clearly
exhibited interest in killing themselves while engaged in violent jihad.
•
Success of Lone Wolves: Individuals acting alone, so-called “lone wolves,”
conducted all four successful homegrown attacks since 9/11.
•
Divergent Capabilities: The operational capabilities of participants diverge
greatly. Some evinced terrorist tradecraft such as bomb-making skills. Others
appeared to be far less experienced.
Congress may wish to keep these four themes in mind as it considers responses to the threat of
homegrown terrorism as opposed to foreign plots.
One aspect of the overall threat picture is the potential threat posed by “foreign fighters” from the
United States and elsewhere involved in the Syrian civil war.40 These foreign fighters join
terrorist groups such as the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIS or ISIL). According to Nicholas
J. Rasmussen, the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), more than 20,000
39
For the purposes of this report, homegrown describes terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United States or
abroad by American citizens, lawful permanent residents, or visitors radicalized largely within the United States.
Violent jihadist describes radicalized individuals using Islam as an ideological and/or religious justification for their
belief in the establishment of a global caliphate—a jurisdiction governed by a Muslim civil and religious leader known
as a caliph—via violent means. Plots include schemes by homegrown individuals or groups to either join terrorist
organizations abroad or to commit violent attacks. Attack describes a plot in which ideologically-driven physical
violence was committed by homegrown jihadists. To qualify as an attack, the violence has to harm a person or people
in the United States or those targeted as Americans abroad. Lawful permanent residents refers to foreign nationals who
are legally admitted to reside permanently in the United States. For more information on homegrown violent jihadists,
see CRS Report R41416, American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat, by (name redacted).
40
For the purposes of this report, “foreign fighters” from the United States are American citizens, lawful permanent
residents, or aliens who radicalized in the United States and plotted to or traveled abroad to join a foreign terrorist
group.
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foreign fighters from approximately 90 nations have traveled to Syria. Most are from the Middle
East and North Africa, with about 3,400 westerners who have joined the influx.41
U.S. intelligence officials have pointed out that not all individuals traveling to Syria take on the
role of a “foreign fighter.” According to James Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence, 180
people from the United States have gone to Syria. Not all have joined the Islamic State, and about
40 have returned.42
The federal government’s terrorist watchlisting process plays a key role in tracking people
suspected of having ties to the Islamic State.43 When federal law enforcement or intelligence
agencies identify someone known or reasonably suspected of terrorism, they are required to share
that information to help create a federal consolidated watchlist of known or suspected terrorists.
The watchlist supports “the ability of front line screening agencies to positively identify known or
suspected terrorists trying to obtain visas, enter the country, board aircraft, or engage in other
activity.... ”44
Preempting and Monitoring Potential Terrorists
Preemption and monitoring of possible IS terrorist activity by U.S. law enforcement can be
broadly described in terms of interdiction, investigation, and countering violent extremism in the
United States.
Interdiction involves—among other things—stopping a suspected terrorist from entering the
United States. For example, within DHS, components such as Customs and Border Protection
draw on information from the federal government’s consolidated terrorist watchlist as they
engage in intelligence-driven screening to mitigate the risk posed by certain travelers destined for
the United States.45 DHS Secretary Jeh C. Johnson has broadly alluded to U.S. coordination with
allies on foreign fighters. In an August 29, 2014, press release, he noted:
This government, in close collaboration with our international partners, has ... taken a series
of steps to track foreign fighters who travel in and out of Syria, and we are contemplating
additional security measures concerning foreign fighters. Some of the security measures will
be visible to the public and some understandably will be unseen.46
41
Nicholas J. Rasmussen, Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, statement for the record for a hearing
before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 12, 2015.
42
Mark Hosenball, “U.S. Spy Chief Says 40 Americans Who Went to Syria Have Returned,” Reuters, March 2, 2015.
43
Christopher M. Piehota. Director, Terrorist Screening Center, Federal Bureau of Investigation, written statement for a
House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Transportation Security hearing, “Safeguarding Privacy and
Civil Liberties While Keeping our Skies Safe,” September 18, 2014.
44
See http://www.ise.gov/terrorist-watchlist.
45
In 2012, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) described commercial air travel as “the primary target of terrorist
organizations seeking to attack the homeland or move operatives into the United States.... ” See Kevin McAleenan,
then-Assistant Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Office of Field Operations, written statement for a
House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security hearing, “Eleven Years
Later: Preventing Terrorists from Coming to America,” September 11, 2012.
46
The press release discussed the United Kingdom’s decision to raise its threat level from “substantial” to “severe”
because of developments in Syria and Iraq. See Department of Homeland Security, press release, “Statement by
Secretary Johnson on the United Kingdom’s Decision to Raise Their Threat Level,” August 29, 2014.
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Johnson has also mentioned enhanced screening at select overseas airports.47 One of the known
efforts targeting foreign fighters pursued by DHS involves enhancements to the Electronic
System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) used by Customs and Border Protection to vet
prospective travelers from visa waiver countries “to determine if they pose a law enforcement or
security risk before they board aircraft destined for the United States.”48
Investigation largely focuses on Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) led by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) and supported by local, state, and federal agencies—including DHS.49 The
task forces fill the chief role in coordinating federal counterterrorism cases across the United
States, bringing together federal, state, and local participants in the process. JTTFs have been
involved in stopping individuals trying to leave the United States to fight with the Islamic State as
well as investigating people who have returned from the conflict zone. Beyond U.S. borders, the
FBI has legal attachés around the world that coordinate with foreign law enforcement partners to
fight terrorist activity. Additionally, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has worked to expand its
presence in countries that serve as transit points for foreign fighters.50
Countering violent extremism (CVE) involves the intricacies of radicalization. It focuses on
determining when individuals are in danger of shifting from radical activity involving First
Amendment-protected behavior to violent extremism.51 In part, CVE programs endeavor to
prevent this shift without relying on traditional policing techniques such as investigation and
prosecution. U.S. CVE programs can help keep people from traveling abroad to join terrorist
groups. Additionally, such efforts provide law enforcement with vital links to U.S. communities
that may provide tips regarding people who have returned from fighting in Syria and Iraq. Much
of the federal work in this area includes outreach to local communities. Regarding the Islamic
State, the FBI, DHS, and NCTC are striving to understand the motivations driving people to
radicalize and join the group.52 Also, DHS and NCTC provide information to U.S. community
groups about the recruitment efforts of violent extremist groups including those based in Syria
and Iraq.53 Finally, largely in response to the Islamic State, the federal government is pursuing a
program “in cities across the country to bring together community representatives, public safety
47
Jeh C. Johnson, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, written statement for a House Homeland Security
Committee hearing, “Worldwide Threats to the Homeland,” September 17, 2014.
48
For details see CBP, “Strengthening Security of the VWP Through Enhancements to ESTA,” at http://www.cbp.gov/
travel/international-visitors/esta/enhancements-to-esta-faqs. For background see CRS Report RL32221, Visa Waiver
Program, by (name redacted). See also Tom Warrick, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Counterterrorism Policy,
Department of Homeland Security, written statement for a House Committee on Foreign Affairs joint subcommittee
hearing, “ISIS and the Threat from Foreign Fighters,” December 2, 2014.
49
See http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/terrorism_jttfs.
50
Tal Kopan, “Holder: DOJ Expanding International Capacity to Stem Foreign Fighters,” Politico, November 13,
2014. In a capacity that combines interdiction and investigation, in September 2014, DOJ has noted that one of its
components, Interpol Washington, announced the creation of a program dedicated to thwarting foreign fighters. It will
draw on the investigative work of law enforcement agencies in more than 30 countries. DOJ, “Interpol Washington
Spearheads Foreign Terrorist Fighter Program, Serves as Catalyst for Global Information Sharing Network,” press
release, September 24, 2014.
51
For more information see CRS Report R42553, Countering Violent Extremism in the United States, by (name reda
cted).
52
Brookings Institution, “A National Counterterrorism Center Threat Assessment of ISIL and Al Qaeda in Iraq, Syria,
and Beyond,” “Proceedings,” September 3, 2014.
53
Nicholas J. Rasmussen, then-Deputy Director National Counterterrorism Center, written statement for a hearing
before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, “Cybersecurity, Terrorism, and
Beyond: Addressing Evolving Threats to the Homeland,” September 10, 2014.
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officials and religious leaders to counter violent extremism.”54 DOJ, DHS, and NCTC have
chosen Boston, MA; Los Angeles, CA; and Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN, as pilot cities for the
program.55
Cybersecurity
John Rollins, Specialist in Terrorism and National Security ([redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....)
For more information, see CRS Report R40836, Cybersecurity: Current Legislation,
Executive Branch Initiatives, and Options for Congress.
Cyber threats to the United States are a current and growing concern to policymakers. Technology
is ubiquitous and relied upon in almost every facet of modern life, such as supporting government
services, corporate business processes, and individual professional and personal pursuits. Many of
these technologies are interdependent and the disruption to one piece of equipment may have a
negative cascading effect on other devices. A denial of service, theft or manipulation of data, or
damage to critical infrastructure through a cyber-based attack could have significant impacts on
national security, the economy, and the livelihood of individual citizens. These concerns raise
many questions for Congress, among them,
•
Who are the aggressors in cyberspace and what are their intentions and
capabilities?
•
What are the impacts and implications of cyberattacks?
•
What legislative and policy actions have the executive branch and Congress
taken to respond to threats from cyberspace? What further steps should be taken?
Cyber Threats
Cyber-based technologies56 are now ubiquitous around the globe. The vast majority of their users
pursue lawful professional and personal objectives. However, criminals, terrorists, and spies also
rely heavily on cyber-based technologies to support organizational objectives. These malefactors
may access cyber-based technologies in order to deny service, steal or manipulate data, or use a
device to launch an attack. Entities using cyber-based technologies for illegal purposes take many
forms and pursue a variety of actions counter to U.S. global security and economic interests.
The threats posed by these cyber-aggressors and the examples of types of attacks they can pursue
are not mutually exclusive. For example, a hacker targeting the intellectual property of a
corporation may be categorized as both a cyberthief and a cyberspy. A cyberterrorist and
cyberwarrior may be employing different technological capabilities in support of a nation’s
security and political objectives. Commonly recognized cyber-aggressors and representative
examples of the harm they can inflict include the following:
54
DOJ, “Attorney General Holder Announces Pilot Program to Counter Violent Extremists,” press release, September
15, 2014.
55
DOJ, “Pilot Programs Are Key to our Countering Violent Extremism Efforts,” press release, February 18, 2015.
56
Defined as an electronic device that accesses or relies on the transfer of bytes of data to perform a mechanical
function. The device can access cyberspace (the Internet) through the use of physical connections or wireless signals.
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Cyberterrorists are state-sponsored and non-state actors who engage in cyberattacks as a form of
terrorism. Transnational terrorist organizations, insurgents, and jihadists have used the Internet as
a tool for planning attacks, radicalization and recruitment, a method of propaganda distribution,
and a means of communication.57 While no unclassified reports have been published regarding a
cyberattack on a critical component of the nation’s infrastructure, the vulnerability of critical lifesustaining control systems being accessed and destroyed via the Internet has been demonstrated.
In 2009, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) conducted an experiment that revealed
some of the vulnerabilities to the nation’s control systems that manage power generators and
grids. The experiment, known as the Aurora Project, entailed a computer-based attack on a power
generator’s control system that caused operations to cease and the equipment to be destroyed.58
Cyberspies are individuals who steal classified or proprietary information used by governments or
private corporations to gain a competitive strategic, security, financial, or political advantage.
These individuals often work at the behest of, and take direction from, foreign government
entities. For example, a 2011 FBI report noted, “a company was the victim of an intrusion and
had lost 10 years’ worth of research and development data—valued at $1 billion—virtually
overnight.”59 Likewise, in 2008 the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) classified computer
network system was unlawfully accessed and “the computer code, placed there by a foreign
intelligence agency, uploaded itself undetected onto both classified and unclassified systems from
which data could be transferred to servers under foreign control.”60 2013 was the last time the
intelligence community reportedly produced a classified National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)
focused on cyberspying against U.S. targets from abroad. The NIE reportedly addressed activities
relating to the “Chinese government’s broad policy of encouraging theft of intellectual property
through cyberattacks.”61 Around the time the classified report was due to be issued then-DOD
Secretary Leon Panetta stated, “it’s no secret that Russia and China have advanced cyber
capabilities.”62
Cyberthieves are individuals who engage in illegal cyberattacks for monetary gain.63 Examples
include an organization or individual who illegally accesses a technology system to steal and use
or sell credit card numbers and someone who deceives a victim into providing access to a
financial account. One estimate has placed the annual cost of cybercrime to individuals in 24
countries at $388 billion.64 However, given the complex and sometimes ambiguous nature of the
57
For additional information, see CRS Report RL33123, Terrorist Capabilities for Cyberattack: Overview and Policy
Issues, by (name redacted) and (name redacted).
58
See Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, “Challenges Remain in DHS’ Efforts to Security
Control Systems,” August 2009. For a discussion of how computer code may have caused the halting of operations at
an Iranian nuclear facility see CRS Report R41524, The Stuxnet Computer Worm: Harbinger of an Emerging Warfare
Capability, by (name redacted), (name redacted), and (name redacted).
59
Executive Assistant Director Shawn Henry, Responding to the Cyber Threat, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Baltimore, MD, 2011.
60
Department of Defense Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn III, “Defending a New Domain,” Foreign
Affairs, October 2010.
61
Ken Dilanian, “U.S. Spy Agencies to Detail Cyberattacks from Abroad,” Los Angeles Times, December 6, 2012.
62
Ibid.
63
For discussions of federal law and issues relating to cybercrime, see CRS Report 97-1025, Cybercrime: An Overview
of the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Statute and Related Federal Criminal Laws, by (name redacted), and CRS
Report R41927, The Interplay of Borders, Turf, Cyberspace, and Jurisdiction: Issues Confronting U.S. Law
Enforcement, by (name redacted).
64
Symantec, “Symantec Internet Security Threat Report: Trends for 2010,” vol. 16, April 2011. Plain text summary
with calculations available at http://www.symantec.com/about/news/release/article.jsp?prid=20110907_02.
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costs associated with cybercrime, and the reluctance in many cases of victims to admit to being
attacked, there does not appear to be any publicly available, comprehensive, reliable assessment
of the overall costs of cyberattacks.
Cyberwarriors are agents or quasi-agents of nation-states who develop capabilities and undertake
cyberattacks in support of a country’s strategic objectives.65 These entities may or may not be
acting on behalf of the government with respect to target selection, timing of the attack, and
type(s) of cyberattack and are often blamed by the host country when accusations are levied by
the nation that has been attacked. Often, when a foreign government is provided evidence that a
cyberattack is emanating from its country, the nation that has been attacked is informed that the
perpetrators acted of their own volition and not at the behest of the government. In August 2012 a
series of cyberattacks were directed against Saudi Aramco, the world’s largest oil and gas
producer and most valuable company, according to the New York Times. The attacks compromised
30,000 of the company’s computers and the code was apparently designed to disrupt or halt the
production of oil. Some security officials have suggested that Iran may have supported this attack.
However, numerous cyberwarrior groups, some with linkages to nations with objectives counter
to those of Saudi Arabia, have claimed credit for this incident.66
Cyberactivists are individuals who perform cyberattacks for pleasure, philosophical, or other
nonmonetary reasons. Examples include someone who attacks a technology system as a personal
challenge (who might be termed a “classic” hacker), and a “hacktivist” such as a member of a
group who undertakes an attack for political reasons. The activities of these groups can range
from simple nuisance-related denial of service attacks to disrupting government and private
corporation business processes.
Ascertaining information about the aggressor and their capabilities and intentions is very
difficult.67 The threats posed by these aggressors coupled with the United States’ proclivity to be
an early adopter of emerging technologies,68 which are often interdependent and contain
vulnerabilities, make for a complex environment when considering operational responses,
policies, and legislation designed to safeguard the nation’s strategic economic and security
interests.
65
For additional information, see CRS Report RL31787, Information Operations, Cyberwarfare, and Cybersecurity:
Capabilities and Related Policy Issues, by (name redacted).
66
Perlroth, Nicole, “Cyberattack on Saudi Firm Disquiets U.S.,” New York Times, October 24, 2012, p. A1. Available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/24/business/global/cyberattack-on-saudi-oil-firm-disquiets-us.html?pagewanted=
all.
67
The concept of attribution in the cyber world entails an attempt to identify with some degree of specificity and
confidence the geographic location, identity, capabilities, and intention of the cyber-aggressor. Mobile technologies and
sophisticated data routing processes and techniques often make attribution difficult for U.S. intelligence and law
enforcement communities.
68
Emerging cyber-based technologies that may be vulnerable to the actions of a cyber-aggressor include items that are
in use but not yet widely adopted or are currently being developed. For additional information on how the convergence
of inexpensive, highly sophisticated, and easily accessible technology is providing opportunities for cyber-aggressors to
exploit vulnerabilities found in a technologically laden society, see Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, National
Intelligence Council, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, December 10, 2012.
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Legislative Branch Efforts to Address Cyber Threats69
More than 50 federal statutes address various aspects of cybersecurity either directly or indirectly,
but there is no overarching cybersecurity framework legislation in place.
Since the 111th Congress, many bills have been introduced that would address specific
cybersecurity issues. The main topics addressed by the bills include:
•
Information Sharing—easing access of the private sector to classified threat
information and removing barriers to sharing within the private sector and with
the federal government. Issues: Roles of DHS and the Intelligence Community
(IC), impacts on privacy and civil liberties, and risks of misuse by the federal
government or the private sector.
•
Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) Reform—updating
the 2002 law to reflect changes in information and communications technology
and the threat landscape. Issues: Role of DHS, OMB, and Commerce, and
flexibility of requirements.
•
Research and Development (R&D)—updating agency authorizations and
strategic planning requirements. Issues: Agency roles, topics for R&D, and levels
of funding.
•
Workforce—improving the size, skills, and preparation of the federal and
private-sector cybersecurity workforce. Issues: Hiring and retention authorities,
occupational classification, recruitment priorities, and roles of DHS, NSA, the
National Science Foundation (NSF), and NIST.
•
Privately Held Communications Infrastructure (CI)—improving protection of
private-sector CI from attacks with major impacts. Issues: Roles of DHS and
other federal agencies, and regulatory vs. voluntary approach.
•
Data-Breach Notification—requiring notification to victims and other responses
after data breaches involving personal or financial information of individuals.
Issues: Federal vs. state roles and what responses should be required.
•
Cybercrime Laws—updating criminal statutes and law-enforcement authorities
relating to cybersecurity. Issues: Adequacy of current penalties and authorities,
impacts on privacy and civil liberties.
Although comprehensive cybersecurity legislation was not enacted by the 113th Congress, five
bills that contained cybersecurity provisions were passed and signed into law in December, 2014:
•
Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (S. 2521; P.L. 113283)—amended FISMA to clarify the cybersecurity authorities for the Office of
Management and Budget and DHS.
•
Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act (H.R. 2952; P.L. 113-324)—
provided for an annual review of the DHS cybersecurity workforce and required
the development of a DHS cybersecurity workforce strategy.
69
Information derived from CRS Report R42114, Federal Laws Relating to Cybersecurity: Overview of Major Issues,
Current Laws, and Proposed Legislation, by (name redacted)
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•
Sections 3 and 4 of the Border Agency Pay Reform Act of 2014 (S. 1691; P.L.
113-277)—mandated an assessment of the DHS cybersecurity workforce and
authorized special recruitment and retention measures for cybersecurity
personnel.
•
National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014 (S. 2519; P.L. 113-240)—
authorized establishment of a national cybersecurity and communications
integration center within DHS;
•
Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014 (S. 1353, P.L. 113-274)—addressed a
broad range of themes, including NSF and NIST activities in cybersecurity
research and development, standards, workforce development, the NIST
Framework, and cybersecurity awareness and education programs.
Many observers believe that enactment of comprehensive cybersecurity legislation will be
attempted again in the 114th Congress.
Executive Branch Actions to Address Cyber Threats70
In 2008, the George W. Bush Administration established the Comprehensive National
Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) through National Security Presidential Directive 54/Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 23 (NSPD-54/HSPD-23). Those documents are classified, but the
Obama Administration released a description of them in March 2010.71 Goals of the 12 initiatives
in that description include consolidating external access points to federal systems; deploying
intrusion detection and prevention systems across those systems; improving research coordination
and prioritization and developing “next-generation” technology, information sharing, and
cybersecurity education and awareness; mitigating risks from the global supply chain for
information technology; and clarifying the federal role in protecting critical infrastructure.
In December 2009, the Obama Administration created the position of White House Cybersecurity
Coordinator. The responsibilities for this position include government-wide coordination of
cybersecurity-related issues, including overseeing the implementation of the CNCI. The
Coordinator works with both the National Security and Economic Councils in the White House.
However, the Coordinator does not have direct control over agency budgets, and some observers
argue that operational entities such as the DOD’s National Security Agency (NSA) have far
greater influence over federal cybersecurity issues.72 Reportedly, in October 2012 President
Obama signed a classified Presidential Decision Directive that “enables the military to act more
aggressively to thwart cyberattacks on the Nation’s web of government and private computer
networks.”73
70
Information contained in this section was derived from multi-authored reports and memos produced by numerous
CRS analysts working on cybersecurity.
71
The White House, “The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative,” March 5, 2010. For additional
information about this Initiative and associated policy considerations, see CRS Report R40427, Comprehensive
National Cybersecurity Initiative: Legal Authorities and Policy Considerations, by (name redacted) and (name re
dacted).
72
See, for example, Seymour M. Hersh, “Judging the Cyber War Terrorist Threat,” The New Yorker, November 1,
2010.
73
Nakashima, Ellen, “Obama Signs Secret Directive to Help Thwart Cyberattacks,” The Washington Post, Nov. 14,
2012.
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The complex federal role in cybersecurity involves securing federal systems, assisting in
protecting nonfederal systems, and pursuing military, intelligence, and law enforcement
community detection, surveillance, defensive, and offensive initiatives. Under current law, all
federal agencies have cybersecurity responsibilities relating to their own systems and dozens of
agencies have government-wide aggressor, issue, and critical infrastructure sector-specific
responsibilities and legislative authorities. The cybersecurity roles and responsibilities of these
agencies are often complementary but at times are overlapping or competing. In the absence of
enactment of overarching cybersecurity legislation, during the past two years the White House
has issued a number of executive orders and presidential directives addressing intelligence issues,
critical infrastructure protection, and safeguarding of classified materials.74
Continuity of Government Operations
(name redacted), Specialist in American National Government, Government and Finance
Division ([redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....)
Continuity of government operations refers to programs and initiatives to ensure that governing
entities are able to recover from a wide range of potential operational interruptions. Government
continuity planning may be viewed as a process that incorporates preparedness capacities,
including agency response plans, employee training, recovery plans, and the resumption of
normal operations. These activities are established in part to ensure the maintenance of civil
authority, provision of support for those affected by an incident, infrastructure repair, and other
actions in support of recovery. Arguably, any emergency response presumes the existence of an
ongoing, functional government to fund, support, and oversee recovery efforts. Interruptions for
which contingency plans might be activated include localized acts of nature, accidents,
technological emergencies, and military or terrorist attack-related incidents.
Current authority for executive branch continuity programs is provided in the 2007 National
Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) on National Continuity Policy, NSPD-51.75 To support the
provision of essential government activities, NSPD-51 sets out a policy “to maintain a
comprehensive and effective continuity capability composed of continuity of operations76 and
continuity of government77 programs in order to ensure the preservation of our form of
government78 under the Constitution and the continuing performance of national essential
functions (NEF) under all conditions.”
74
The White House, “Cybersecurity,” last accessed March 19, 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreignpolicy/cybersecurity.
75
White House, Office of the Press Secretary, National Security and Homeland Security Presidential Directive, May 9,
2007. NSPD-51 is also identified as Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 20. A more detailed discussion
of national continuity policy is available in CRS Report RS22674, National Continuity Policy: A Brief Overview, by (na
me redacted). Original document available at https://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/org/ncp/nspd_51.pdf.
76
NSPD-51 identifies continuity of operations (COOP) as “an effort within individual executive departments and
agencies to ensure that Primary Mission-Essential Functions continue to be performed during a wide range of
emergencies, including localized acts of nature, accidents, and technological or attack-related emergencies.”
77
NSPD-51 identifies continuity of government (COG) as “a coordinated effort within the federal government’s
executive branch to ensure that national essential functions continue to be performed during a catastrophic emergency.”
78
The directive notes “that each branch of the federal government is responsible for its own continuity programs,” and
requires an executive branch official to “ensure that the executive branch’s COOP and COG policies ... are
appropriately coordinated with those of the legislative and judicial branches in order to … maintain a functioning
federal government.” The legislative branch and the federal judiciary maintain continuity programs consonant with
(continued...)
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Executive Order (E.O.) 12656, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities, was
issued in 1988,79 and assigns national security emergency preparedness responsibilities to federal
executive departments and agencies. E.O. 12656 requires the head of each federal department and
agency to “ensure the continuity of essential functions in any national security emergency by
providing for: succession to office and emergency delegation of authority in accordance with
applicable law; safekeeping of essential resources, facilities, and records; and establishment of
emergency operating capabilities.” Subsequent sections require each department to carry out
specific contingency planning activities in its areas of policy responsibility.
Although contingency planning authorities are chiefly based on presidential directives, Congress
could consider whether current authorities accurately reflect current government organization and
goals, the costs of these programs, potential conflicts that might result from departments and
agencies complying with different authorities, and the extent to which government contingency
planning ensures that the federal executive branch will be able to carry out its responsibilities
under challenging circumstances.
Medical Countermeasures to Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
and Nuclear Terrorism
(name redacted), Specialist, Science and Technology Policy ([redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....)
The 2014 Ebola outbreak highlighted the lack of available medical countermeasures against many
of the highest risk chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats. Following the
2001 anthrax attacks, the federal government created several programs to develop, procure, and
distribute CBRN medical countermeasures. Despite these efforts, many of the CBRN threats that
the government deems likely to pose the highest risk lack available countermeasures, and some
experts question the government’s ability to distribute countermeasures quickly. The 114th
Congress may consider the effectiveness of federal efforts and whether current programs should
be continued, modified, or ended.
Federal efforts to support the research, development, and procurement of CBRN medical
countermeasures include components from the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, and
Health and Human Services (HHS). In light of the current fiscal environment and demonstrated
gaps in available countermeasures, Congress may increase its scrutiny of the planning,
coordination, and accountability of this complicated multiagency enterprise. Policymakers may
be aided in their evaluation of these programs by the first iterations of the annual countermeasure
strategy and implementation plan and coordinated multiyear budget mandated by the Pandemic
and All-Hazards Preparedness Reauthorization Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-5).
To help HHS procure new medical countermeasures, Congress passed the Project BioShield Act
(P.L. 108-276) in 2004. Through Project BioShield, HHS can encourage the private sector to
develop CBRN medical countermeasures by creating a guaranteed federal market. Project
BioShield allows the government to agree to buy a countermeasure up to 10 years before the
(...continued)
their positions as coequal branches of government. NSPD-51 does not specify the nature of appropriate coordination
with continuity planners in the legislative and judicial branch.
79
53 Federal Register 47491; November 23, 1988.
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product is likely to finish development. The federal government used this program to acquire
medical countermeasures against anthrax, smallpox, botulinum toxin, some nerve agents, and
some radiological and nuclear threats. However, many threats, including Ebola, continue to lack
effective medical countermeasures. Congress funded Project BioShield through a $5.6 billion
advance appropriation for FY2004-FY2013. Since FY2014, Congress has provided annual
appropriations for this program. Some countermeasure developers assert that another multiyear
advance appropriation would increase their ability to develop countermeasures.80 The 114th
Congress may consider whether modifying the funding amount or providing an advance
appropriation would improve the program’s efficiency or performance.
Distribution of existing medical countermeasures during a CBRN emergency remains a challenge
for the federal government and its partners. The federal government maintains programs,
including the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Strategic National Stockpile, that
stockpile and distribute stores of medical countermeasures. Some experts question the sufficiency
of these federal programs, and whether state governments have the capacity to receive and
effectively disseminate federal stockpiles.81 Congress may continue evaluating the effectiveness
of federal programs and may consider additional stockpiling and distribution methods. Such
methods may include stockpiling countermeasures in homes or businesses or using the U.S.
Postal Service to distribute countermeasures. These proposals may raise concerns regarding
program costs, unintended use of countermeasures, and local implementation.
BioWatch: Detection of Aerosol Release of Biological Agents
(name redacted), Specialist in Public Health and Epidemiology ([redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....)
The BioWatch program—begun in 2003—deploys pathogen sensors in more than 30 large U.S.
cities to detect the possible aerosol release of a bioterrorism pathogen, in order that medications
can be distributed before exposed individuals become ill.82 The DHS Office of Health Affairs
(OHA) manages the system. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) oversees
some aspects of laboratory testing. Local jurisdictions would manage the public health response
to a bioterrorism incident.
BioWatch has not detected a bioterrorism incident since its inception, although it has detected
pathogens of interest; scientists believe that natural airborne “background” levels of these or
related pathogens exist in certain regions. In July 2012, the Los Angeles Times published the first
in a series of investigative articles criticizing the performance of BioWatch, claiming that the
system is prone to false alarms and is also insufficiently sensitive to detect an actual incident.83
DHS disputed these claims.84 In addition, some state and local health officials defended the
80
U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services,
Education, and Related Agencies, Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related
Agencies Appropriations for 2011, Part 6, Statements of Members of Congress and Other Interested Individuals and
Organizations, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., May 12, 2010 (Washington: GPO, 2010), pp. 197-204.
81
See for example, Christopher Nelson, Andrew M. Parker, and Shoshana R. Shelton, et al., Analysis of the Cities
Readiness Initiative (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2012), pp. 31-34.
82
For more information, see the BioWatch current services program description in Department of Homeland Security,
Congressional Budget Justification, FY2016, Office of Health Affairs, pp. OHA-4-5, http://www.dhs.gov/dhs-budget.
83
David Willman, “The Biodefender That Cries Wolf,” Los Angeles Times, July 8, 2012.
84
Dr. Alexander Garza, Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs, DHS, “The Truth About BioWatch: The Importance of
(continued...)
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program, saying, among other things, that it has fostered collaboration among federal, state, and
local officials, who would be called upon to work together in response to an actual incident.85
Timely treatment can reduce casualties during a bioterrorism incident. Federal officials have
sought to improve the responsiveness of the BioWatch system by replacing daily sensor filter
collection and analysis with so-called autonomous sensors, which would transmit pathogen
detection findings in near-real time. Beginning in 2007, OHA pursued procurement of this type of
sensor, which it termed Generation 3, or Gen-3. However, after a critical GAO review,86 several
procurement delays, and growing skepticism among some Members of Congress,87 DHS
announced the termination of further Gen-3 procurement activities in April 2014.88
Congressional appropriators have at times sought to limit funding for BioWatch program
expansion and called for program reviews.89 Authorizing committees in each Congress since the
108th have held hearings on the program. In addition, Members of the House Committee on
Energy and Commerce began an investigation of the program in the 112th Congress.90 The
Administration requested FY2015 and FY2016 funding solely to maintain current BioWatch
operations without upgrade. Congress provided funding for FY2015 slightly above the request to
replace aging system components. Both House and Senate Appropriations Committees urged
OHA to continue its efforts to improve the program’s detection capability.91
Food Defense
(name redacted), Specialist in Public Health and Epidemiology ([redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....)
Foods may be intentionally contaminated for purposes of terrorism, fraud (e.g., the dilution of a
valuable commodity), or other harmful intent. Food safety efforts have long focused on protecting
against unintentional contaminants, such as infectious pathogens or pesticide residues. Since the
(...continued)
Early Detection of a Potential Biological Attack,” July 12, 2012. Statistics cited in this blog posting were later reported
to be inaccurate by a DHS official. See comments of BioWatch Program Manager Dr. Mike Walter before the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Continuing Concerns over
BioWatch and the Surveillance of Bioterrorism, 113th Cong., 1st sess., June 18, 2013, CQ transcription.
85
See for example Robert Roos, “Public Health Officials Respond to Critique of BioWatch,” CIDRAP News, August
17, 2012, http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/bt/bioprep/news/aug1712biowatch.html.
86
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Biosurveillance: DHS Should Reevaluate Mission Need and Alternatives
before Proceeding with BioWatch Generation-3 Acquisition, 12-810, September 10, 2012, http://gao.gov/products/
GAO-12-810.
87
See BioWatch discussions in CRS Reports on annual DHS appropriations, http://www.crs.gov/pages/subissue.aspx?
cliid=2345.
88
DHS, “Cancellation of the BioWatch Autonomous Detection Technology Acquisition,” spot report, April 24, 2014.
See also David Willman, “Homeland Security Cancels Plans for New BioWatch Technology,” Los Angeles Times,
April 25, 2014.
89
See BioWatch discussions in CRS Reports on annual DHS appropriations, http://www.crs.gov/pages/subissue.aspx?
cliid=2345.
90
House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, “Oversight and
Investigations Subcommittee Continues Investigation of BioWatch and Surveillance of Bioterrorism,” press release,
June 18, 2013, with links to committee report and other documents, http://energycommerce.house.gov/news/pressreleases.
91
H.Rept. 113-481, pp. 96-97; S.Rept. 113-198, pp. 109-110.
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2001 terrorist attacks, regulators and others have added a focus on food defense, the protection of
the food supply from deliberate or intentional acts of contamination or tampering.92 Large-scale
foodborne outbreaks can sicken hundreds of people. Sales of affected commodities—as well as
unaffected commodities that the consuming public perceives to be involved—can suffer. An
intentional incident of food contamination, especially if it were an act of terrorism, could have
serious economic consequences, in addition to any illnesses it caused.
Federal food safety responsibility rests primarily with the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection
Service (FSIS) regulates most meat and poultry and some egg products; FDA is responsible for
the safety of most other foods.93 State and local authorities assist with inspection, outbreak
response, and other food safety functions, and regulate retail establishments. DHS notes
The Food and Agriculture Sector is almost entirely under private ownership and is composed
of an estimated 2.2 million farms, 900,000 restaurants, and more than 400,000 registered
food manufacturing, processing, and storage facilities. This sector accounts for roughly onefifth of the nation’s economic activity.94
The 111th Congress enacted a comprehensive food safety law, the Food Safety Modernization Act
(FSMA, P.L. 111-353), focused mainly on foods regulated by FDA.95 FSMA attempts to prevent
both intentional and unintentional contamination of foods through a variety of production and
processing strategies and through enhanced regulatory authorities. However, FDA has not yet
implemented some of the law’s provisions.96 Among other things, FSMA requires the Secretaries
of Health and Human Services and Agriculture to develop a National Agriculture and Food
Defense Strategy, implementation plan, and research agenda. This strategy and the accompanying
documents have not yet been published.97 FDA has published a proposed rule that would require
food facilities to address vulnerabilities to intentional contamination,98 and is under a court order
to finalize this rule by May 2016.99
GAO has named food safety as a high-risk issue, citing the fragmentation of federal oversight,
among other concerns.100 GAO specifically noted delays in the implementation of the nation’s
food and agriculture defense policy, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 (HSPD-9). This
directive, issued by the George W. Bush Administration in 2004, assigns various emergency
response and recovery responsibilities to USDA, FDA, DHS, and other agencies. GAO found that
there is no centralized coordination of HSPD-9 implementation efforts, and recommended that
92
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), “Food Defense,” http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodDefense.
CRS Report RS22600, The Federal Food Safety System: A Primer, by (name redacted).
94
DHS, “Food and Agriculture Sector, Sector Overview,” June, 2014, http://www.dhs.gov/food-and-agriculture-sector.
95
CRS Report R40443, The FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (P.L. 111-353), coordinated by (name redacted).
96
See FDA FSMA implementation information, http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/FSMA/default.htm;
and CRS Report R43724, Implementation of the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA, P.L. 111-353), by (name
redacted).
97
FDA, “FSMA Reports and Studies,” http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/FSMA/ucm271961.htm.
98
FDA, “FSMA Proposed Rule for Focused Mitigation Strategies to Protect Food Against Intentional Adulteration,”
http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/FSMA/ucm378628.htm.
99
FDA, “President’s FY2016 Budget Request: Key Investments for Implementing [FSMA],” fact sheet, February 2,
2015, http://www.fda.gov/food/guidanceregulation/fsma/ucm432576.htm.
100
GAO, “Improving Federal Oversight of Food Safety,” High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-15-290, February 11,
2015, http://www.gao.gov/highrisk/revamping_food_safety.
93
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DHS take on this role to assure that the nation’s food and agriculture defense policy is fully in
place. In addition, GAO recommended that the executive branch develop a government-wide
performance plan for all of its food safety activities. These and several other GAO
recommendations regarding food defense have not been implemented as of March 2015.101
Electric Grid Physical Security
Paul Parfomak, Specialist in Energy Policy, Resources, Science and Industry Division
([redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....)
For more information, see CRS Report R43604, Physical Security of the U.S. Power Grid:
High-Voltage Transformer Substations.
The electric utility industry operates as an integrated system of generation, transmission, and
distribution facilities to deliver electric power to consumers. In the United States, this system
consists of over 9,000 electric generating units connected to over 200,000 miles of high-voltage
transmission lines strung between large towers and rated at 230 kilovolts (kV)102 or greater.103
This network is interspersed with hundreds of large electric power transformers whose function is
to adjust electric voltage as needed to move power across the network. High voltage (HV)
transformer units make up less than 3% of transformers in U.S. power substations, but they carry
60%-70% of the nation’s electricity.104 Because they serve as vital transmission network nodes
and carry bulk volumes of electricity, HV transformers are critical elements of the nation’s
electric power grid.
The various parts of the electric power system are all vulnerable to failure due to natural or
manmade events. However, HV transformers are considered by many experts to be the most
vulnerable to intentional damage from malicious acts. Security analysts have long asserted that a
coordinated and simultaneous attack on multiple HV transformers could have severe implications
for reliable electric service over a large geographic area, crippling its electricity network and
causing widespread, extended blackouts. Such an event could have severe electric reliability
consequences, demonstrated in recent grid security exercise, as well as serious economic and
social consequences.105 A handful of recent physical attacks on individual transformer
substations—most notably a 2013 attack on an HV transformer substation in Metcalf, CA—did
101
GAO, four open recommendations from Homeland Security: Actions Needed to Improve Response to Potential
Terrorist Attacks and Natural Disasters Affecting Food and Agriculture, GAO-11-652, August 19, 2011, from database
of open recommendations, http://www.gao.gov/openrecs.html, searched March 9, 2015.
102
1 kV=1,000 volts.
103
North American Electric Reliability Corporation, “Understanding the Grid,” fact sheet, August 2013,
http://www.nerc.com/AboutNERC/Documents/Understanding%20the%20Grid%20AUG13.pdf. Note that there is no
industry consensus as to what voltage rating or other operating characteristic constitutes “high voltage.” This report
uses 230 kV as the high voltage threshold, but other studies may use a different threshold, such as 115/138 kV, or may
include an additional “extra high voltage” category above 345 kV. See, for example, U.S. Department of Energy, Large
Power Transformers and the U.S. Electric Grid, April 2014, p. 4.
104
C. Newton, “The Future of Large Power Transformers,” Transmission & Distribution World, September 1, 1997;
William Loomis, “Super-Grid Transformer Defense: Risk of Destruction and Defense Strategies,” Presentation to
NERC Critical Infrastructure Working Group, Lake Buena Vista, FL, December 10-11, 2001.
105
North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), Grid Security Exercise (GridEx II): After-Action Report,
March 2014, p.15; Matthew L. Wald, “Attack Ravages Power Grid. (Just a Test.),” New York Times, November 14,
2013.
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not cause widespread blackouts, but did highlight the physical vulnerability of HV transformer
substations and drew the attention of both the media and federal officials to the utility industry’s
substation security efforts.106
Over the last decade or so the electric utility industry and government agencies have engaged in a
number of initiatives to secure HV transformers from physical attack and to improve recovery in
the event of a successful attack. These initiatives include coordination and information sharing,
spare equipment programs, security standards, grid security exercises, and other measures.
Several grid security guidelines or standards have been developed or proposed to address the
physical security of the grid, including HV transformers. These standards have been promulgated
by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation as voluntary best practices since at least
2002, with subsequent revisions. However, in late 2014, following the Metcalf attack, the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission ordered the imposition of mandatory physical security standards
for HV transformer substations.107
There is widespread agreement among state and federal government officials, utilities, and
manufacturers that HV transformers in the United States are vulnerable to terrorist attack, and that
such an attack potentially could have catastrophic consequences. But the most serious, multitransformer attacks would require acquiring operational information and a certain level of
sophistication on the part of potential attackers. Consequently, despite the technical arguments,
without more specific information about potential targets and attacker capabilities, the true
vulnerability of the grid to a multi-HV transformer attack remains an open question. Incomplete
or ambiguous threat information may lead to inconsistency in physical security among HV
transformer owners, inefficient spending of limited security resources at facilities that may not
really be under threat, or deployment of security measures against the wrong threat.
Congress has long been concerned about grid security in general, but the recent security
exercises, together with the Metcalf attack have focused congressional interest on the physical
security of HV transformers, among other specific aspects of the grid.108 Legislative proposals in
the 113th Congress, especially the Grid Reliability and Infrastructure Defense Act (H.R. 4298 and
S. 2158), sought to strengthen federal authority to secure the U.S. grid. As the electric utility
industry and federal agencies continue their efforts to improve the physical security of critical HV
transformer substations, the 114th Congress may consider several key issues as part of its
oversight of the sector: identifying critical transformers, confidentiality of critical transformer
information, adequacy of HV transformer protection, quality of federal threat information, and
recovery from HV transformer attacks.
106
RTO Insider, “Substation Saboteurs ‘No Amateurs,’” April 2, 2014, http://www.rtoinsider.com/pjm-grid2020-111303/; Chelsea J. Carter, “Arkansas Man Charged in Connection with Power Grid Sabotage,” CNN, October 12, 2013;
Max Brantley, “FBI Reports Three Attacks on Power Grid in Lonoke County,” Arkansas Times, October 7, 2013;
Rebecca Smith, “U.S. Risks National Blackout From Small-Scale Attack,” Wall Street Journal, March 12, 2014.
107
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Physical Security Reliability Standard, Docket No. RM14-15-000; Order
No. 802, November 20, 2014.
108
See, for example, Senators Dianne Feinstein, Al Franken, Ron Wyden, and Harry Reid, letter to the Honorable
Cheryl LaFleur, Acting Chairman, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, February 7, 2014, http://www.ferc.gov/
industries/electric/indus-act/reliability/chairman-letter-incoming.pdf.
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Security of Chemical Facilities
(name redacted), Specialist in Science and Technology Policy ([redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....)
For more information, see CRS Report R43346, Implementation of Chemical Facility AntiTerrorism Standards (CFATS): Issues for Congress, and CRS Report R43070, Regulation of
Fertilizers: Ammonium Nitrate and Anhydrous Ammonia.
The 113th Congress authorized DHS to regulate security at chemical facilities through P.L. 113254, the Protecting and Securing Chemical Facilities from Terrorist Attacks Act of 2014. This act
repealed the prior statutory authority that had been granted in the Homeland Security
Appropriations Act, 2007 (P.L. 109-295, §550). The new authority expires in January 2019. As
Congress has recently enacted chemical facility security legislation, the focus of many
congressional policymakers in the 114th Congress will likely shift from enacting new legislation
to increasing oversight. Even before the 2013 explosion of the West Fertilizer Company in West,
TX, various stakeholders had criticized the content of DHS chemical facility security regulation,
known as the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS), and the effectiveness and
pace of its implementation. With the new authority granted by the 113th Congress, DHS may
move forward with regulations implementing this authority.
P.L. 113-254 maintained aspects of the existing regulatory scheme identified by experts as
potentially containing security or implementation challenges. The Obama Administration and
other stakeholders have determined that existing regulatory exemptions, such as for community
water systems and wastewater treatment facilities, pose potential risks. Environmental and “rightto-know” groups additionally advocate that Congress include requirements for facilities to adopt
or identify “inherently safer technologies” and widely disseminate security-related information to
first responders and employees. The regulated industry generally opposes granting DHS the
ability to require implementation of inherently safer technologies or other specific security
measures. They question the maturity and applicability of the inherently safer technology concept
as a security measure and cite the need to tailor security approaches for each facility. The Obama
Administration has identified potential security concerns if chemical security-related information
is more broadly disseminated. However, the discovery that information about the chemical
inventory of the West Fertilizer Company was not effectively shared between federal agencies has
led to reconsideration of existing information-sharing policies. Starting with Executive Order
13650, “Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security,” the Obama Administration is engaged
in a multiagency effort to coordinate federal chemical safety and security activities.
Policymakers performing oversight of the CFATS program face critical decisions regarding DHS
program changes. The DHS regulatory program is still in its early stages. Historically, it has
experienced implementation challenges and delays. Many regulated entities have not yet received
approval of their security plans. The current rate of facility security plan approval indicates that it
will be still two or more years before DHS has completed its review and approval of information
submitted by regulated facilities.
Transit Security
(name redacted), Analyst in Transportation Policy ([redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....)
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Bombings of passenger trains in Europe and Asia have illustrated the vulnerability of passenger
rail systems to terrorist attacks. Passenger rail systems—primarily subway systems—in the
United States carry about five times as many passengers each day as do airlines, over many
thousands of miles of track, serving stations that are designed primarily for easy access. The
increased security efforts around air travel have led to concerns that terrorists may turn their
attention to “softer” targets, such as transit or passenger rail. A key challenge Congress faces is
balancing the desire for increased rail passenger security with the efficient functioning of transit
systems, with the potential costs and damages of an attack, and with other federal priorities.
The volume of ridership and number of access points make it impractical to subject all rail
passengers to the type of screening all airline passengers undergo. Consequently, transit security
measures tend to emphasize managing the consequences of an attack. Nevertheless, steps have
been taken to try to reduce the risks, as well as the consequences, of an attack. These include
vulnerability assessments; emergency planning; emergency response training and drilling of
transit personnel (ideally in coordination with police, fire, and emergency medical personnel);
increasing the number of transit security personnel; installing video surveillance equipment in
vehicles and stations; and conducting random inspections of bags, platforms, and trains.
The challenges of securing rail passengers are dwarfed by the challenge of securing bus
passengers. There are some 76,000 buses carrying 19 million passengers each weekday in the
United States. Some transit systems have installed video cameras on their buses, but the number
and operation characteristics of transit buses make them all but impossible to secure.
The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53), passed
by Congress on July 27, 2007, included provisions on passenger rail and transit security and
authorized $3.5 billion for FY2008-FY2011 for grants for public transportation security. The act
required public transportation agencies and railroads considered to be high-risk targets by DHS to
have security plans approved by DHS (§1405 and §1512). Other provisions required DHS to
conduct a name-based security background check and an immigration status check on all public
transportation and railroad frontline employees (§1414 and §1522), and gave DHS the authority
to regulate rail and transit employee security training standards (§1408 and §1517).
In 2010 TSA completed a national threat assessment for transit and passenger rail, and in 2011
completed an updated transportation systems sector-specific plan, which established goals and
objectives for a secure transportation system. The three primary objectives for reducing risk in
transit are
•
increase system resilience by protecting high-risk/high-consequence assets (i.e.,
critical tunnels, stations, and bridges);
•
expand visible deterrence activities (i.e., canine teams, passenger screening
teams, and anti-terrorism teams); and
•
engage the public and transit operators in the counterterrorism mission.109
TSA surface transportation security inspectors conduct assessments of transit systems (and other
surface modes) through the agency’s Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement (BASE)
program. The agency has also developed a security training and security exercise program for
109
Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration, Surface Transportation Security
FY2016 Congressional [Budget] Justification, p. 11.
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transit (I-STEP), and its Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams conduct
operations with local law enforcement officials, including periodic patrols of transit and
passenger rail systems, to create “unpredictable visual deterrents.”
In the most recent Congressional action prior to the 114th Congress, the House Committee on
Homeland Security’s Subcommittee on Transportation Security held a hearing in May 2012 to
examine the surface transportation security inspector program. The number of inspectors had
increased from 175 in FY2008 to 404 in FY2011 (full-time equivalents). Issues considered at the
hearing included the lack of surface transportation expertise among the inspectors, many of whom
were promoted from screening passengers at airports; the administrative challenge of having the
surface inspectors managed by federal security directors who are located at airports, and who
themselves typically have no surface transportation experience; and the security value of the tasks
performed by surface inspectors.110 The number of surface inspectors decreased to 300 (full-time
equivalent positions) in FY2014, as a result of a reduction in the number of VIPR surface
inspectors.111
DHS provides grants for security improvements for public transit, passenger rail, and
occasionally other surface transportation modes under the Transit Security Grant Program. The
vast majority of the funding goes to public transit providers (see Table 1).
Table 1. Congressional Funding for Transit Security Grants, FY2002-FY2015
(millions of dollars)
Appropriation
(nominal $)
Appropriation
(constant 2015 $)
2002
$63
$82
2003
65
83
2004
50
62
2005
108
131
2006
131
154
2007
251
287
2008
356
394
2009
498a
549
2010
253
275
2011
200
213
2012
88b
92
2013
84
86
2014
90
91
Fiscal Year
110
United States House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Transportation
Security, Hearing on TSA’s Surface Inspection Program: Strengthening Security or Squandering Resources?, May 31,
2012, http://homeland.house.gov/hearing/subcommittee-hearing-tsa%E2%80%99s-surface-inspection-programstrengthening-security-or-squandering.
111
Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration, Surface Transportation Security
FY2014 Congressional [Budget] Justification, p. 18; FY2015 Congressional [Budget] Justification, p. 19.
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Fiscal Year
Appropriation
(nominal $)
Appropriation
(constant 2015 $)
87c
87
2015
Source: FY2002: Department of Defense FY2002 Appropriations Act, P.L. 107-117; FY2003: FY2003 Emergency
Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, P.L. 108-11; FY2004: Department of Homeland Security FY2004
Appropriations Act, P.L. 108-90; FY2005-FY2011: United States Government Accountability Office, Homeland
Security: DHS Needs Better Project Information and Coordination among Four Overlapping Grant Programs, GAO-12303, February 2012, Table 1; FY2012-2014: DHS, Transit Security Grant Program annual funding opportunity
announcements; FY2015: P.L. 114-4.
Notes: FY2002 funding represents post -9/11 appropriations through the Defense Appropriations Act to
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority and the Federal Transit Administration. In FY2003-FY2004,
grants were made through the Urban Areas Security Initiative. The Transit Security Grant Program was formally
established in FY2005. Does not include funding provided for security grants for intercity passenger rail
(Amtrak), intercity bus service, and commercial trucking. Nominal dollar amounts adjusted to constant 2015
dollars using the Total Non-defense column from “Table 10: Gross Domestic Product and Deflators Used in the
Historical Tables: 1940-2020,” published in the Historical Tables volume of the Budget of the United States
Government, Fiscal Year 2016 (http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals).
a.
Includes $150 million provided in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.
b.
Congress did not specify an amount for transit security grants, but provided a lump sum for state and local
grant programs, leaving funding allocations to the discretion of DHS.
c.
Estimated by CRS; Congress provided $100 million for Public Transportation, Amtrak, and Over-the-Road
Bus Security grants, and specified that no less than $10 million was for Amtrak and no less than $3 million
was for bus grants (P.L. 114-4).
In the past, the Government Accountability Office has found opportunity for duplication among
four DHS state and local security grant programs with similar goals, one of which was the public
transportation security grant program.112 The Obama Administration has repeatedly proposed
consolidating several of these programs in annual budget requests. This proposal has not been
supported by Congress in the appropriations process to date, though appropriators have expressed
concerns that grant programs have not focused on areas of highest risk and that significant
amounts of previously appropriated funds have not yet been awarded to recipients.
Border Security and Trade
Southwest Border Issues
Drug Trafficking and the Southwest Border
Kristin M. Finklea, Specialist in Domestic Security ([redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....)
The United States is the world’s largest marketplace for illegal drugs and sustains a multi-billion
dollar market in illegal drugs.113 An estimated 24.6 million Americans (9.4% of the 12 and older
112
United States Governmental Accountability Office, Homeland Security: DHS Needs Better Project Information and
Coordination Among Four Overlapping Grant Programs, GAO-12-303, February 2012.
113
Oriana Zill and Lowell Bergman, “Do the Math: Why the Illegal Drug Business Is Thriving,” PBS Frontline,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/.
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population) were current users of illicit drugs in 2013.114 The most recent National Drug Threat
Assessment Summary indicates that Mexican drug trafficking organizations continue to dominate
the U.S. drug market.115 Indeed, U.S. officials have outlined this threat:
Mexican transnational criminal organizations pose the greatest criminal drug threat to the
United States; no other group is currently positioned to challenge them. These Mexican polydrug organizations traffic heroin, methamphetamine, cocaine, and marijuana throughout the
United States, using established transportation routes and distribution networks. They control
virtually all drug trafficking across the Southwest Border and are moving to expand their
share, particularly in heroin and methamphetamine markets.116
Mexican criminal networks either (1) transport or (2) produce and transport drugs north across the
United States-Mexico border. After being smuggled across the border by criminal networks, the
drugs are distributed and sold within the United States. The illicit proceeds may then be laundered
or smuggled south across the border. The proceeds may also be used to purchase weapons in the
United States that are then smuggled into Mexico. While drugs are the primary goods trafficked
by the criminal networks, those networks also generate income from other illegal activities, such
as the smuggling of humans and weapons, counterfeiting and piracy, kidnapping for ransom, and
extortion.
One of the current domestic drug threats fueled, in part, by Mexican traffickers is heroin. Not
only has there been an increase in heroin use in the United States over the past several years, but
there has been a simultaneous increase in its availability. This availability is driven by a number
of factors, including increased production and trafficking of heroin by Mexican criminal
networks.117 Some Mexican farmers have reported abandoning marijuana cultivation in favor of
growing opium poppies; the switch may be partly due to the decline in wholesale prices of
marijuana in Mexico—which some claim is linked to increased marijuana legalization in the
United States—and an increase in U.S. heroin demand.118 Increases in Mexican heroin production
and its availability in the United States have been coupled with increased heroin seizures at the
Southwest border. Reportedly, these seizures increased by over 320% between 2008 and 2013.119
The 114th Congress may consider a number of supply-reduction and demand-reduction options in
attempting to reduce drug trafficking from Mexico to the United States. For instance,
policymakers may be interested in examining the implementation of the 2013 National Southwest
Border Counternarcotics Strategy, of which the overarching strategic goal is to “[s]ubstantially
reduce the flow of illicit drugs, drug proceeds, and associated instruments of violence across the
Southwest border.”120 To accomplish this, the strategy aims to enhance intelligence and
114
Current means within the past month. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Substance Abuse and Mental
Health Services Administration, Results from the 2013 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: Summary of National
Findings, September 2014.
115
Drug Enforcement Administration, National Drug Threat Assessment Summary 2014, November 2014, p. 3.
116
Drug Enforcement Administration, Statement of the Honorable Michele Leonhart, Administrator Drug Enforcement
Administration, Before the United States House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on
Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies, April 2, 2014, p. 2.
117
Drug Enforcement Administration, National Drug Threat Assessment Summary 2014, November 2014, p. 10.
118
See, for example, Nick Miroff, “Tracing the U.S. Heroin Surge Back South of the Border as Mexican Cannabis
Output Falls,” The Washington Post, April 6, 2014.
119
U.S. Department of Justice, “Attorney General Holder, Calling Rise in Heroin Overdoses ‘Urgent Public Health
Crisis,’ Vows Mix of Enforcement, Treatment,” press release, March 10, 2014.
120
Office of National Drug Control Strategy, National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy, 2013, p. 4.
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information sharing; interdict drugs, money, and weapons both at and between the ports of entry
as well as through air and marine operations; disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking organizations;
stem the trans-border flow of illicit proceeds and weapons; bolster border communities; and
increase bilateral U.S.-Mexico cooperation.121
Illicit Proceeds and the Southwest Border
Kristin M. Finklea, Specialist in Domestic Security ([redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....)
The flow of money outside legal channels not only presents challenges to law enforcement, but it
also has a significant nexus with homeland security policy. Proceeds from illegal enterprises are
sometimes used to fund broader destabilizing activities, such as smuggling, illegal border
crossings, or more violent activities, such as terrorist operations—including those controlled by
the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) in Colombia.122 While this is an issue with
a global scope, this section focuses specifically on the policies affected by movement of illicit
funds across the Southwest border.
As noted in the State Department’s 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, “drug
trafficking organizations send between $19 and $29 billion annually to Mexico from the United
States.”123 Money from the traffickers’ illegal sale of drugs in the United States is moved across
the border into Mexico, and these funds fuel the drug traffickers’ criminal activities. This money
is not directly deposited into the U.S. financial system, but rather is illegally laundered through
mechanisms such as bulk cash smuggling and the Black Market Peso Exchange,124 or placed in
financial institutions, cash-intensive front businesses, prepaid or stored value cards, or money
services businesses.125
New technologies have provided additional outlets through which drug trafficking organizations
may conceal their illicit proceeds. The use of stored value cards,126 mobile banking systems, and
other technologies allows traffickers to move profits more quickly and stealthily. In addition,
profits that the Mexican drug traffickers generate from the sale of Colombian cocaine can be
moved directly from the United States to the source country without traversing through
middlemen.127 There has been debate, however, as to the extent that these technologies may be
used relative to other laundering techniques.128
121
Ibid., pp. 4-9.
U.S. Department of State, 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Volume II, Money Laundering and
Financial Crimes, March 2014.
123
Ibid., p. 161.
124
The Department of the Treasury defines the BMPE as “a large-scale money laundering system used to launder
proceeds of narcotic sales in the United States by Latin American drug cartels by facilitating swaps of dollars in the
U.S. for pesos in Colombia through the sale of dollars to Latin America businessmen seeking to buy U.S. goods to
export,” http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/html/advis04282006.html.
125
According to the Department of the Treasury, a money services business is any person or entity engaging in
activities including exchanging currency; cashing checks; issuing, selling, or redeeming travelers’ checks, money
orders, or stored value cards; and transmitting money. For more information, see http://www.fincen.gov/
financial_institutions/msb/definitions/msb.html.
126
According to the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, stored value are “funds or monetary value represented in digital
electronics format (whether or not specially encrypted) and stored or capable of storage on electronic media in such a
way as to be retrievable and transferable electronically,” 31 C.F.R. §103.11(vv).
127
Douglas Farah, “Money Laundering and Bulk Cash Smuggling: Challenges for the Mérida Initiative,” in Shared
(continued...)
122
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Various departments and agencies—including the Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)—share responsibility for
combating drug-related activity and the flow of illicit proceeds both along the Southwest border
and throughout the United States. Many of these agencies are also represented in Mexico,
increasing U.S.-Mexican bilateral cooperation. Further, while some efforts explicitly target
money laundering and bulk cash smuggling, other efforts are more tangentially related. For
instance, operations targeting southbound firearms smuggling may intercept individuals
smuggling not only weapons, but cash proceeds from illicit drug sales as well. As such, the 114th
Congress may examine interagency coordination to reduce the flow of illicit money (and other
goods) across the Southwest border.
Cross-Border Smuggling Tunnels
Kristin M. Finklea, Specialist in Domestic Security ([redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....)
Mexican traffickers rely on cross-border tunnels to smuggle persons and drugs, as well as other
contraband, from Mexico into the United States. The use of smuggling tunnels has increased not
only in frequency but in the sophistication of the tunnels themselves.129 More than 150 tunnels
have been discovered along the Southwest border since the 1990s;130 notably, there has been an
80% uptick in tunnels detected since 2008.131 Early tunnels were rudimentary “gopher hole”
tunnels dug on the Mexican side of the border, traveling just below the surface, and popping out
on the U.S. side as close as 100 feet from the border. Slightly more advanced tunnels relied on
existing infrastructure, which may be shared by neighboring border cities such as Nogales, AZ, in
the United States and Nogales, Sonora, in Mexico. These interconnecting tunnels may tap into
storm drains or sewage systems, allowing smugglers to move drugs further and more easily than
in tunnels they dug themselves. The most sophisticated tunnels can have rail, ventilation, and
electrical systems. One of the most elaborate and sophisticated of such tunnels discovered to date
was found in November 2011 in San Diego, CA. It stretched 612 yards in length, boasted electric
rail cars, lighting, reinforced walls, and wooden floors, and its discovery resulted in the seizure of
32 tons of marijuana.132 In April 2014, two sophisticated drug smuggling tunnels were uncovered
in the San Diego area of the Southwest border in less than a week.133
(...continued)
Responsibility: U.S.-Mexico Policy Options for Confronting Organized Crime, ed. Eric L. Olson, David A. Shirk, and
Andrew D. Selee (2010), p. 144.
128
National Drug Intelligence Center, National Drug Threat Assessment 2011. More recent National Drug Threat
Assessment Summaries produced by the Drug Enforcement Administration do not contain information on illicit
finance.
129
Ken Stier, “Underground Threat: Tunnels Pose Trouble from Mexico to Middle East,” Time, May 2, 2009.
130
Statement of James A. Dinkins, Executive Associate Director, Homeland Security Investigations, U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement, before the U.S. Congress, Senate United States Senate Caucus on International Narcotics
Control, Illegal Tunnels on the Southwest Border, 112th Cong., 1st sess., June 15, 2011.
131
Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, “CBP’s Strategy to Address Illicit Cross-Border
Tunnels,” http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2012/OIG_12-132_Sep12.pdf.
132
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, “Second Major Cross-Border Drug Tunnel Discovered South of San Diego
This Month: Investigators Seize 32 Tons of Marijuana, Arrest 6 Suspects,” press release, November 30, 2011,
http://www.justice.gov/dea/divisions/sd/2011/sd113011.shtml.
133
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “ICE-Led Task Force Shutters 2 San Diego-Area Smuggling
(continued...)
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U.S. law enforcement uses various tactics to detect these cross-border tunnels. Law enforcement
may use sonic equipment to detect the sounds of digging and tunnel construction and seismic
technology to detect blasts that may be linked to tunnel excavation. Another tool for tunnel
detection is ground penetrating radar.134 However, factors including soil conditions, tunnel
diameter, and tunnel depth can limit the effectiveness of this technology.
Despite these tools, U.S. officials have acknowledged that law enforcement currently does not
have technology that is reliably able to detect sophisticated tunnels.135 Rather, tunnels are more
effectively discovered as a result of human intelligence and tips. U.S. officials have noted the
value of U.S.-Mexican law enforcement cooperation in detecting, investigating, and prosecuting
the criminals who create and use the cross-border tunnels.136 As a result, the 114th Congress may
not only consider how to best help U.S. law enforcement develop technologies that can keep pace
with tunneling organizations, but also examine whether existing bi-national law enforcement
partnerships are effective and whether they may be improved to enhance investigations of
transnational criminals. Policymakers may also question how prominently the issue of combating
cross-border smuggling tunnels may play within the larger border security framework.
Cargo Security
(name redacted), Section Research Ma
nager ([redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....)
For more information, see CRS Report R43014, U.S. Customs and Border Protection: Trade
Facilitation, Enforcement, and Security.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), within DHS, is America’s primary trade enforcement
agency, and CBP seeks to balance the benefits of efficient trade flows against the demand for
cargo security and the enforcement of U.S. trade laws. Thus, the overarching policy question with
respect to incoming cargo is how to minimize the risk that weapons of mass destruction, illegal
drugs, and other contraband will enter through a U.S. port of entry (POE), while limiting the costs
and delays associated with such enforcement.
CBP’s current trade strategy emphasizes “risk management” and a “multi-layered” approach to
enforcement.137 With respect to cargo security, risk management means that CBP segments
importers into higher and lower risk pools and focuses security procedures on higher-risk flows,
while expediting lower-risk flows. CBP’s “multi-layered approach” means that enforcement
occurs at multiple points in the import process, beginning before goods are loaded in foreign ports
and continuing after the goods have been admitted into the United States. In recent years,
congressional attention to cargo security has focused on one of CBP’s primary tools for risk
(...continued)
Tunnels,” press release, April 4, 2014.
134
For more information, see http://www.geophysical.com/militarysecurity.htm.
135
Statement of Laura E. Duffy, U.S. Attorney, Southern District of California, U.S. Department of Justice, before the
U.S. Congress, Senate United States Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, Illegal Tunnels on the
Southwest Border, 112th Cong., 1st sess., June 15, 2011.
136
Ibid.
137
See Senate Committee on Appropriations Subcomittee on Homeland Security, DHS Hearing: Strengthening Trade
Enforcement to Protect American Enterprise and Grow American Jobs. Testimony of CBP Office of International
Trade Acting Assistant Commissioner Richard DiNucci.
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management, the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) trusted trader program,
and on the statutory requirement that 100% of incoming maritime cargo containers be scanned
abroad prior to being loaded on U.S.-bound ships. Congress also faces perennial questions about
spending levels for POE infrastructure and personnel.
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT)
(name redacted), Section Research Ma
nager ([redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....)
The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) is a voluntary public-private and
international partnership that permits certain import-related businesses to register with CBP and
perform security tasks prescribed by the agency. In return C-TPAT members are recognized as
low-risk actors and are eligible for expedited import processing and other benefits.138 CBP
established C-TPAT in November 2001 following the September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks,
and the program was authorized as part of the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of
2006 (SAFE Port Act, P.L. 109-347).
Proponents of C-TPAT favor increased participation in the program as a way to facilitate legal
trade flows.139 Some businesses, however, have criticized the program for providing inadequate
membership benefits, especially in light of the time and financial investments required to become
certified as C-TPAT members.140
Yet there may be no easy way to substantially expand C-TPAT benefits. In the case of land ports,
the primary trusted trader benefit is access to dedicated lanes where wait times may be shorter
and more predictable. But adding lanes at land ports is difficult because many of them are located
in urban areas with limited space for expansion and with limited ingress and egress
infrastructure.141 In the case of maritime imports, the primary trusted trader benefit is a reduced
likelihood of secondary inspection.142 But only about 6% of all maritime containers are selected
138
See U.S. CBP, “C-TPAT: Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, http://www.cbp.gov/border-security/portsentry/cargo-security/c-tpat-customs-trade-partnership-against-terrorism. Commercial truck drivers who are CustomsTrade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) members also are eligible to join the Free and Secure Trade System
(FAST), which permits expedited processing at land ports of entry; and C-TPAT members who are residents of the
United States and are known importers that have businesses physically established, located, and managed within the
United States may be eligible for the Importer Self-Assessment Program (ISA), which exempts importers from certain
post-entry enforcement audits. See ibid., and CBP FAST: Free and Secure Trade for Commercial Vehicles,
http://www.cbp.gov/travel/trusted-traveler-programs/fast.
139
See for example, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Evaluating
Port Security: Progress Made and Challenges Ahead, 113th Cong., 2nd sess. June 4, 2014.
140
See for example, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Trade, Supporting
Economic Growth and Job Creation through Customs Trade Modernization, Facilitation, and Enforcement, 112th
Cong., 2nd sess. May 17, 2012.
141
See U.S. Department of Commerce, Draft Report: Improving Economic Outcomes by Reducing Border Delays,
Facilitating the Vital Flow of Commercial Traffic Across the US-Mexican Border, Washington, DC, 2008,
http://grijalva.house.gov/uploads/
Draft%20Commerce%20Department%20Report%20on%20Reducing%20Border%20Delays%20Findings%20and%20
Options%20March%202008.pdf.
142
Secondary inspection may include both non-intrusive imaging (NII) scans and/or physical inspection, in which the
container may be opened and unpacked so that materials can be examined.
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for such an inspection,143 so C-TPAT membership may offer little practical advantage in this
regard.
100% Scanning Requirement
(name redacted), Section Research Ma
nager ([redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....)
Section 231 of the SAFE Port Act directed DHS, in coordination with the Department of Energy
(DOE), the private sector, and foreign governments, to pilot an integrated system in three foreign
ports to scan 100% of cargo containers destined for the United States from those ports.144 Section
232 of the law required that 100% of cargo containers imported into the United States be screened
by DHS to identify high-risk containers, and that 100% of containers identified as high risk also
be scanned through non-intrusive inspection (NII) and radiation detection equipment before
arriving in the United States.145 In 2007, Section 1701 of the Implementing Recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Act; P.L. 110-53) amended the SAFE Port Act to require
that by July 1, 2012, 100% of maritime containers imported to the United States—that is, from all
ports, whether or not they are identified as high-risk—be scanned by NII and radiation detection
equipment before being loaded onto a U.S.-bound vessel in a foreign port.
On May 2, 2012, however, then-DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano notified Members of Congress
that she would exercise her authority under the 9/11 Act to extend the deadline for 100%
scanning.146 The decision to delay implementation of the 100% scanning program partly reflects
the department’s findings from its evaluation of the pilot program. In its final report to Congress
on the program, CBP identified three main obstacles to implementing 100% scanning at all
foreign ports.147 First, 100% scanning requires significant host state and private sector
cooperation, but some foreign governments and business groups do not support 100% scanning.
Second, 100% scanning would be logistically difficult. Initial pilots were deployed in relatively
low-volume ports with natural chokepoints, but many cargo containers pass through large volume
ports with more varied port architectures. Third, 100% scanning would be costly. In February
2012, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that 100% scanning at foreign ports
would cost an average of $8 million per shipping lane to implement, or a total of about $16.8
billion for all 2,100 shipping lanes.148 Port operators and foreign partners also absorb additional
143
CRS analysis of data provided by CBP Office of Legislative Affairs, April 28, 2014.
The 100% scanning pilot program is known as the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI). Following DHS’s evaluation of
the SFI in 2012, the program was scaled back to a single port, Port Qasim, in Pakistan.
145
The risk-based scanning program is known as the Container Security Initiative (CSI).
146
Letter from Janet Napolitano, Secretary of Homeland Security, to Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Senator, May 2, 2012.
The 9/11 Act permits the Secretary to extend the deadline by two years and in additional two-year increments by
certifying that two of the following conditions exist: that scanning systems are not available, are insufficiently accurate,
cannot be installed, cannot be integrated with existing systems, will significantly impact trade and the flow of cargo,
and/or do not provide adequate notification of questionable or high-risk cargo. In her notification to Congress,
Secretary Napolitano certified that the use of systems to scan containers would have a significant and negative impact
on trade capacity and cargo flows, and that systems to scan containers cannot be purchased, deployed, or operated at
overseas ports due to limited physical infrastructure.
147
See CBP, Report to Congress on Integrated Scanning System Pilots (Security and Accountability for Every Port Act
of 2006, §231). Also see U.S. GAO, Supply Chain Security: Container Secuirty Programs Have Matured, but
Uncertainty Persists over the Future of 100 Percent Scanning, GAO-12-422T, February 7, 2012, http://www.gao.gov/
assets/590/588253.pdf. Also see letter from Janet Napolitano, Secretary of Homeland Security, to Hon. Joseph I.
Lieberman, Senator, May 2, 2012.
148
Spoken response by Kevin McAleenan, Acting Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, U.S. CBP, U.S.
(continued...)
144
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costs associated with fuel and utilities, staffing, and related expenses. In a May 2014 letter to
Members of Congress, the current Secretary of Homeland Security, Jeh Johnson, reaffirmed the
conditions cited by his predecessor in support of another two-year extension of the deadline.149
Some Members of Congress have expressed frustration that DHS has made little progress toward
implementing 100% scanning.150 Congress may continue to monitor the 100% scanning
requirement and encourage DHS to scan a higher proportion of inbound cargo. On the other hand,
in light of the difficulties DHS has identified, Congress may consider changes to the 100%
scanning requirement, potentially including provisions to allow DHS to scan less than 100% of
U.S.-bound cargo or to allow certain scanning to occur within U.S. ports rather than abroad. In its
report to accompany the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Bill, 2015 (H.R.
4903), the House Appropriations Committee directed DHS, in light of the Secretary of Homeland
Security extending the 100% scanning deadline by an additional two years and the “unlikeli[ness]
that the ... requirement will be met ... ,” to submit an alternative strategy for cargo scanning to
Congress that could be realistically achieved within the next two years.151
Port of Entry (POE) Infrastructure and Personnel
(name redacted), Section Research Ma
nager ([redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....)
In light of the substantial flow of cargo and travelers at ports of entry (also see “Immigration
Inspections at Ports of Entry”), one perennial issue for Congress is how to allocate additional
resources for CBP Office of Field Operations (OFO) personnel and for port infrastructure. Some
in Congress have argued that inadequate personnel and infrastructure have contributed to costly
delays and unpredictable wait times at ports of entry, particularly at land ports on the U.S.Mexico border.152 In general, Congress has invested more heavily since 2004 in enforcement
personnel between ports of entry (i.e., U.S. Border Patrol agents) than in OFO officers (also see
“Enforcement Between Ports of Entry”).153
(...continued)
Department of Homeland Security, before the Border and Maritime Security Subcommittee of the Homeland Security
Committee, U.S. House, hearing “Balancing Maritime Security and Trade Facilitation: Protecting Our Ports, Increasing
Commerce and Securing the Supply Chain—Part I,” February 7, 2012. CBP reports that the U.S. government spent a
total of about $120 million during the first three years of the Secure Freight Initiative; CBP, Report to Congress on
Integrated Scanning System Pilots, p. 13.
149
See Stephen L. Caldwell, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office,
testimony before the U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Evaluating
Port Security: Progress Made and Challenges Ahead, 113th Cong., 2nd sess. June 4, 2014.
150
See for example, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Evaluating
Port Security: Progress Made and Challenges Ahead, 113th Cong., 2nd sess. June 4, 2014; and U.S. Congress, House
Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, Balancing Maritime Security and
Trade Facilitation: Protecting Our Ports, Increasing Commerce, and Securing the Supply Chain—Part I, 112th Cong.,
2nd sess., February 7, 2012.
151
H.Rept. 113-481, p. 38.
152
See, for example, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime
Security, Using Technology to Facilitate Trade and Enhance Security at Our Ports of Entry, 112th Cong., 2nd sess.,
May 1, 2012. On border wait times, also see GAO, CBP Action Needed to Improve Wait Time Data and Measure
Outcomes of Trade Facilitation Effort, GAO-13-603, July 24, 2013.
153
According to a CRS analysis of data provided by CBP Office of Congressional Affairs in January 2013, staffing for
enforcement between ports of entry more than doubled between FY2004 and FY2012 (increasing from 10,819 to
21,394), while staffing at ports of entry increased just 20% during this period (from 18,110 to 21,790).
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Recent fiscal pressures have been a barrier to POE personnel increases. During the FY2014
budget process, the Administration proposed to hire 3,477 additional CBP officers (about half
through increased appropriations and half through fee increases), but Congress approved a slower
personnel growth, with half the proposed funding.154 Congress also authorized a pilot program in
the FY2013 appropriations bill that permitted CBP to enter into public-private partnerships
(PPPs) with certain localities and permitted the private sector to fund improvements in border
facilities and port services, including by funding additional CBP officers and underwriting
overtime hours.155 In its FY2014 budget, the Administration proposed expanding the pilot
program by permitting CBP to accept donations to expand port operations. Approving the
Administration’s request, Congress extended the pilot program in the FY2014 DHS
appropriations bill.156 The current pilot program permits CBP to accept donations to expand port
operations, among other things.157
Immigration Inspections at Ports of Entry
(name redacted), Section Research Ma
nager ([redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....)
For more information, see CRS Report R43356, Border Security: Immigration Inspections at
Ports of Entry.
At ports of entry, CBP’s Office of Field Operations (OFO) is responsible for conducting
immigration, customs, and agricultural inspections of travelers seeking admission to the United
States. The vast majority of people entering through U.S. ports are U.S. citizens, U.S. legal
permanent residents (LPRs),158 and legitimate visitors. Thus, as with cargo security (see “Cargo
Security”), CBP officers’ goals are to identify and intercept dangerous or unwanted (high-risk)
people, while facilitating access for legitimate (low-risk) travelers. CBP seeks to accomplish
these tasks without excessive infringement on privacy or civil liberties while controlling
enforcement costs.
Travelers seeking admission at ports of entry are required to present a travel document, typically
a passport or its equivalent and (for non-U.S. citizens) either a visa authorizing permanent or
temporary admission to the United States or proof of eligibility for admission through the Visa
Waiver Program (VWP; see “Visa Waiver Program”).159 Foreign nationals are subject to securityrelated and other background checks prior to being issued a visa or to receiving travel
authorization through the VWP. CBP officers at U.S. ports of entry verify the authenticity of
travelers’ documents and that each document belongs to the person seeking admission (i.e.,
confirm the traveler’s identity). Identity confirmation relies in part on biometric checks against
154
For a fuller discussion, see CRS Report R43147, Department of Homeland Security: FY2014 Appropriations,
coordinated by (name redacted).
155
See Section 560 of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, FY2013 (P.L. 113-6, Div. D). The
FY2013 pilot program permitted five such partnerships in Dallas, TX, Houston, TX, and Miami, FL, and land POEs in
El Paso, TX, and Laredo/McAllen, TX.
156
See Section 559 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2014 (P.L. 113-76, Div. F).
157
Ibid.
158
Legal permanent residents (LPRs) are foreign nationals authorized to live lawfully and permanently within the
United States; see CRS Report RL32235, U.S. Immigration Policy on Permanent Admissions, by (name redacted).
159
For a fuller discussion of travel requirements, see CRS Report RL31381, U.S. Immigration Policy on Temporary
Admissions, by (name redacted); and CRS Report RL32221, Visa Waiver Program, by (name redacted).
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DHS’s Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) database (see “Entry-Exit System”).
Database interoperability allows CBP officers to check travelers’ records against other biographic
and biometric databases managed by the Departments of Justice, State, and Defense.
The concentration of inspection activity at the border—for travelers and imports—means that
sufficient resources must be present in order to minimize congestion and ensure efficient
operations. CBP faces pressure to provide for the rapid processing of individuals crossing the
border, but expedited processing can lead to missed opportunities for interdicting threats.
Moreover, investment in ports of entry arguably has not kept pace with rapid growth in
international travel and trade, and there may be inadequate infrastructure to manage flows at
some ports of entry (also see “Port of Entry (POE) Infrastructure and Personnel”).
In an effort to streamline admissions without compromising security, CBP has implemented
several trusted traveler programs. Trusted traveler programs require applicants to clear criminal
and national security background checks prior to enrollment, to participate in an in-person
interview, and to submit fingerprints and other biometric data.160 In return, trusted travelers—like
trusted traders (see “Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT)”)—are eligible for
expedited processing at ports of entry. CBP currently operates three main trusted traveler
programs: Global Entry, which allows expedited screening of passengers arriving at 34 major
U.S. airports and 10 preclearance airports;161 NEXUS, which is a joint U.S.-Canadian program
for land, sea, and air crossings between the United States and Canada, including through
dedicated vehicle lanes at 19 land ports;162 and the Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid
Inspection (SENTRI), which allows expedited screening at land POEs on the U.S.-Mexican
border, including through dedicated vehicle lanes at 11 land ports.163
Visa Waiver Program
(name redacted), Specialist in Immigration Policy ([redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....)
For more information, see CRS Report RL32221, Visa Waiver Program.
The 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels, and the possible threats posed by European
citizens fighting abroad for terrorist groups such as the Islamic State,164 has increased
congressional focus on the possible security risk posed by the visa waiver program (VWP).165 The
160
Individuals are ineligible to participate in a trusted traveler program if they are inadmissible to the United States;
provide false or incomplete information on trusted traveler applications; have been convicted of a criminal offense,
have outstanding warrants, or are subject to an investigation; or have been found in violation of customs, immigration,
or agriculture laws. Trusted travel enrollees are re-checked against certain security databases every 24 hours, every
time they enter the United States, and every time they renew their trusted traveler membership.
161
CBP, “About Global Entry,” http://www.cbp.gov/global-entry/about.
162
CBP, “NEXUS” http://www.cbp.gov/travel/trusted-traveler-programs/nexus.
163
CBP, “About SENTRI,” http://www.cbp.gov/travel/trusted-traveler-programs/sentri.
164
For information on the Islamic State and foreign fighters, see CRS Report R43612, The “Islamic State” Crisis and
U.S. Policy, by (name redacted) et al.; and CRS Report IN10209,
European Security, Islamist Terrorism, and
Returning Fighters, by (name redacted) and (name redacted).
165
For example, see U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime
Security, One Flight Away: An Examination of the Threat Posed by ISIS Terrorists with Western Passports, 113th
Cong., 2nd sess., September 10, 2014; and Jerry Markon, “Visa Waivers Under Scrutiny on Hill,” The Washington Post,
January 28, 2015, p. A2.
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visa waiver program (VWP) allows nationals from 38 countries,166 most of which are in Europe,
to enter the United States as temporary visitors (nonimmigrants) for business or pleasure without
first obtaining a visa from a U.S. consulate abroad. Temporary visitors for business or pleasure
from non-VWP countries must obtain a visa from Department of State (DOS) officers at a
consular post abroad before coming to the United States. While a foreign national from a VWP
country does not need a vi
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