Prospects for Democracy in Hong Kong: The 2017 Election Reforms (Update)

Congressional research reportJul 1, 2015

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Prospects for Democracy in Hong Kong:

The 2017 Election Reforms (Update)

(name redacted)

Specialist in Asian Affairs

July 1, 2015

Congressional Research Service

7-....

www.crs.gov

R44031

Prospects for Democracy in Hong Kong: The 2017 Election Reforms (Update)

Summary

The United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-383) declares that, “Support for

democratization is a fundamental principle of U.S. foreign policy. As such, it naturally applies to

United States policy toward Hong Kong.” China’s law establishing the Hong Kong Special

Administration Region (HKSAR), commonly referred to as the “Basic Law,” declares that “the

ultimate aim” is the selection of Hong Kong’s Chief Executive (CE) and Legislative Council

(Legco) by universal suffrage. The year 2015 may be a pivotal year for making progress toward

the objectives of both of these laws. It could also be a year in which the democratic aspirations of

many Hong Kong residents remain unfulfilled.

Hong Kong’s current Chief Executive, Leung Chun-ying, initiated a six-step process in July 2014

whereby Hong Kong’s Basic Law could be amended to allow the selection of the Chief Executive

by universal suffrage in 2017. On August 31, 2014, China’s National People’s Congress Standing

Committee (NPCSC) completed the second step of the reform process when it issued a decision

setting comparatively strict conditions on the adoption of universal suffrage for the 2017 CE

elections that seemingly preclude the nomination of a pro-democracy candidate. The third step of

the process, the CE submitting legislation to Legco to amend the Basic Law, came on June 17. On

June 18, Legco defeated the proposed election reforms by a vote of 28 against and 8 in favor of

the legislation, completing the fourth step and terminating one path to universal suffrage.

Public opinion in Hong Kong over the proposed CE election reforms is split, with opinion

surveys showing a sharp division of opinion on accepting the NPCSC’s conditions. In the autumn

of 2014, anger in Hong Kong over the NPCSC’s August 2014 decision precipitated the

occupation of several major Hong Kong roads by thousands of Hong Kong residents. These

occupations were ended in December 2014 by the deployment of thousands of police officers, but

scattered protests continue.

The democratization of Hong Kong not only has implications for U.S. relations with Hong Kong,

but also for U.S. relations with China and the political development of Taiwan and cross-Strait

relations.

In response to the pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong, Members of the 113th Congress

introduced the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act (H.R. 5696 and S. 2922), to amend

the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992. The Senate version of the legislation was

amended by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and placed on the Senate Legislative

Calendar on December 11, 2014, but did not receive consideration by the full Senate.

The Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act has been reintroduced in the 114th Congress

in the House of Representatives (H.R. 1159) with some changes, but not in the Senate. In

addition, the 114th Congress may consider continuing appropriations for existing programs to

promote the democratization of Hong Kong.

Because the process of possibly reforming Hong Kong’s election laws is underway, this report

will be updated as circumstances or conditions in Hong Kong significantly change. This update

reflects Legco’s defeat of the proposed resolution and possible next steps in election reforms.

Congressional Research Service

Prospects for Democracy in Hong Kong: The 2017 Election Reforms (Update)

Contents

Overview.......................................................................................................................................... 1

The Core Issue: The Nomination of Candidates .............................................................................. 2

Current Process for Selecting the Chief Executive .......................................................................... 3

Process for Amending the Selection of the Chief Executive and Past Attempts to Make

Amendments ................................................................................................................................. 4

The 2017 Election Reforms ............................................................................................................. 5

Step 1: CE Report to the NPCSC .............................................................................................. 5

Step 2: The NPCSC Decision of August 31, 2014 .................................................................... 7

The Political Reaction in Hong Kong to the NPCSC Decision........................................... 8

The “Umbrella Movement” ................................................................................................. 9

Public Opinion Polls.......................................................................................................... 10

Step 3: Proposing Legislation to the Legislative Council........................................................ 11

The Consultation Document.............................................................................................. 12

The Response to the Consultation Document ................................................................... 13

The Consultation Report and the Government’s Proposal ................................................ 13

Resolution Submission to Legco ....................................................................................... 14

Step 4: Legco’s Vote ................................................................................................................ 15

Moving Forward ............................................................................................................................ 15

The Joint Declaration and Democracy........................................................................................... 16

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ....................................................... 17

The NPCSC’s August 2014 Decision and the Joint Declaration ............................................. 17

Implications for U.S. Policy Toward Hong Kong .......................................................................... 18

The Obama Administration’s Policy........................................................................................ 19

Implications for Political Reform in China.................................................................................... 21

Implications for Taiwan ................................................................................................................. 22

Issues for the 114th Congress ......................................................................................................... 23

The Response of the 113th Congress ........................................................................................ 23

Legislation ............................................................................................................................... 25

Hearings................................................................................................................................... 26

Promoting Democratization in Hong Kong ............................................................................. 26

Access to China and Hong Kong............................................................................................. 27

Tables

Table A-1. Industrial, Commercial and Financial Sectors ............................................................. 28

Table A-2. The Professions ............................................................................................................ 28

Table A-3. Labor, Social Services, Religious and Other Sectors ................................................... 29

Table A-4. Members of the Legislative Council, Representatives of District-based

Organizations, Hong Kong Deputies to the National People’s Congress, and Hong

Kong Members of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political

Consultative Conference............................................................................................................. 29

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Prospects for Democracy in Hong Kong: The 2017 Election Reforms (Update)

Table B-1. Legco Members by Factions ........................................................................................ 30

Table C-1. Legco Functional Constituency Members ................................................................... 32

Appendixes

Appendix A. Composition of Election Committee ........................................................................ 28

Appendix B. Legislative Council Members: Pro-establishment and Pan-democrat

Factions....................................................................................................................................... 30

Appendix C. Functional Constituency Members by Constituency and Electorate ........................ 32

Appendix D. Full Text of Resolution to Amend Annex I of the Basic Law .................................. 34

Contacts

Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 35

Congressional Research Service

Prospects for Democracy in Hong Kong: The 2017 Election Reforms (Update)

Overview

The manner by which Hong Kong selects its next Chief Executive (CE) in 2017 may be a

bellwether for the prospects for the democratization of the city’s governance system. Although

China’s leaders have agreed in principle that the Chief Executive for the Hong Kong Special

Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China (HKSAR) may be chosen by universal

suffrage in 2017, the conditions placed on the method of nominating candidates may prove to be

unacceptable to the people of Hong Kong and the city’s legislature, the Legislative Council

(Legco).

Hong Kong’s current Chief Executive, Leung Chun-ying (C.Y. Leung), submitted his proposed

resolution to change the CE selection process to Legco on June 17, 2015. Controversies over

restrictions on the CE’s proposal to Legco imposed by an August 2014 decision of China’s

National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) have led to ongoing protests across

Hong Kong and serious opposition from some Legco members. On June 18, 2015, Legco voted

28 against and 8 in favor, thereby defeating the resolution. It remains to be seen if this effectively

ends prospects for reforming the CE selection method before the 2017 election, or if the NPCSC,

CE Leung, or Legco will identify a new path toward the CE’s election by universal suffrage.

Since Hong Kong’s reversion from British to Chinese sovereignty in 1997, many of the people of

Hong Kong have looked forward to and campaigned for the fulfilment of the promise contained

in the city’s Basic Law—the election of the Chief Executive and Legco by universal suffrage.

Past attempts to reform Hong Kong’s election process have had mixed results. In December 2005,

Legco voted down proposed CE election reforms after up to 250,000 people rallied against the

proposed reforms.1 On December 29, 2007, in response to a request from then CE Donald Tsang

Yam-kuen, the NPCSC issued “Decision on Issues Relating to the Methods of Selecting the Chief

Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and for Forming the Legislative

Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 2012 and on Issues

Relating to Universal Suffrage,” which stated that the Chief Executive may be elected by

universal suffrage in 2017.2 Despite the apparent promise in the NPCSC’s December 2007

decision, legislation in 2010 to make modest changes in the CE selection process were approved

by Legco only after the PRC government and Hong Kong’s Democratic Party struck a last-minute

agreement.3

The prospects for democratic election reforms in Hong Kong are of potential interest to Congress

for several reasons. First, the U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 5731; P.L. 102-383)

states, “Support for democratization is a fundamental principle of U.S. foreign policy. As such, it

naturally applies to United States policy toward Hong Kong.” Second, how China handles the

The 2005 proposal would have doubled the size of the election committee to 1,600 members. Opponents to the

proposal viewed the changes as marginal, and were pushing for a commitment for when Hong Kong could select the

CE by universal suffrage. For more about the large rally and failed 2005 CE election reforms, see Keith Bradsher, “ProDemocracy Protesters March in Hong Kong,” New York Times, December 4, 2005; and Philip P. Pan and K.C. Ng,

“Hong Kong Rejects Modest Reforms,” Washington Post, December 22, 2005.

For more details on the 2007 Decision, see CRS Report RS22787, Prospects for Democracy in Hong Kong: China’s

December 2007 Decision, by (name redacted).

The 2010 reforms expanded the Election Committee to 1,200 members and increased the size of Legco to 70

members. For more about the 2012 election reforms, see CRS Report R40992, Prospects for Democracy in Hong

Kong: The 2012 Election Reforms, by (name redacted).

Congressional Research Service

Prospects for Democracy in Hong Kong: The 2017 Election Reforms (Update)

possible democratic election reforms in Hong Kong is one indicator of its commitment to its “one

country, two systems” policy as it applies to Hong Kong, as well as its tolerance of political

reform in general. Third, Hong Kong plays an important role for U.S. economic interests in Asia.

If the Chinese and Hong Kong governments are unable to formulate CE election reforms

acceptable to Legco and the people of Hong Kong, possibly continued and intensified political

unrest could harm Hong Kong’s ability to function as an economic hub for U.S. interests in Asia.

Fourth, the resolution of Hong Kong’s political reforms may have an impact on relations between

China and Taiwan.

The Core Issue: The Nomination of Candidates

The crux of the political controversy around the possible CE election reforms is the process of

nominating the official candidates. Article 45 of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special

Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China (generally referred to as the “Basic

Law”) states

The method for selecting the Chief Executive shall be specified in the light of the actual

situation in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and in accordance with the

principle of gradual and orderly progress. The ultimate aim is the selection of the Chief

Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative

nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures. [Emphasis added.]

In its August 2014 decision, the NPCSC approved the selection of the Chief Executive in 2017 by

universal suffrage, but restricted the number of nominees to either two or three candidates, and

also stipulated that the nominating committee (NC) be “made in accordance with the number of

members, composition and formation method of the Election Committee for the Fourth Chief

Executive [C.Y. Leung].”4 In addition, the NPCSC decision stipulated that to be officially

nominated, a candidate “must have the endorsement of more than half of all the members of the

nominating committee.”

Pan-democrats and Pro-establishment:

In the eyes of the pro-democracy Legco

Political Labels in Hong Kong

members (see text box, “Pan-democrats and

Pro-establishment: Political Labels in Hong

In the local political discourse, Hong Kong’s politicians

and political parties are frequently divided into two

Kong”), many Hong Kong political analysts,

groups. One group is commonly referred to as either

and the participants in the ongoing protests in

“pro-democracy” or “pan-democrats,” who are

Hong Kong, the constraints contained in the

supportive of the early adoption of universal suffrage for

August 2014 NPCSC decision effectively

the election of the CE and Legco members, as well as

preclude the nomination of a pro-democracy

greater autonomy for Hong Kong. The other group is

generally referred to as either “pro-establishment” or

candidate for Chief Executive, and give the

“pro-Beijing,” and prefer a more gradual adoption of

Chinese government indirect control over the

universal suffrage and are more open to China’s central

official nomination process. All of the progovernment’s involvement in Hong Kong’s governance.

democracy Legco members, commonly

See Appendix B for a listing of the current Legco

referred to as the “pan-democrats,” have stated members into the two political groups.

they will vote against any proposal that

complies with the August 2014 NPCSC decision. The various pro-democracy voices in Hong

An English translation of the NPCSC’s August 2014 decision is available online at http://www.2017.gov.hk/

filemanager/template/en/doc/20140831a.pdf.

Congressional Research Service

Prospects for Democracy in Hong Kong: The 2017 Election Reforms (Update)

Kong have called upon the NPCSC to revise or amend its August 2014 decision to provide for

more flexibility in the nomination process, and have pressed CE Leung to urge NPCSC to

reconsider the constraints imposed by its decision. Neither the Chinese government nor the Hong

Kong government has demonstrated a willingness to reconsider their decisions regarding the 2017

CE election reforms.

Underlying the objections to the NPCSC August 2014 decision is the perception that the

constraints violate the spirit and the intent of past commitments by the Chinese government to

allow Hong Kong a high degree of autonomy over its governance and a promise to allow the

people of Hong Kong to elect their Chief Executive through a free and fair democratic process.

These perceived promises and commitments can be traced back at least 25 years to the 1990

passage of the Basic Law, and contribute to the sense of frustration among many Hong Kong

residents with the latest NPCSC decision. However, Chinese and Hong Kong officials assert that

the NPCSC August 2014 decision complies with China’s international commitments and the laws

governing the HKSAR, and is consistent with past statements regarding the adoption of universal

suffrage in Hong Kong elections.

Current Process for Selecting the Chief Executive

Annex I of the Basic Law, as amended, stipulates that “the Chief Executive shall be elected by a

broadly representative Election Committee in accordance with this Law and appointed by the

Central People’s Government.” Annex I requires that the Election Committee be composed of

1,200 members, with 300 members from each of the following four sectors: (1) industrial,

commercial and financial sectors; (2) the professions; (3) labor, social services, religious, and

other sectors; and (4) members of the Legislative Council, representatives of district-based

organizations, Hong Kong deputies to the National People’s Congress, and Hong Kong members

of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. Election

Committee members serve for five years. Annex I also stipulates that

the delimitation of the various sectors, the organization in each sector eligible to return

Election Committee members and the number of such members returned by each of these

organizations shall be prescribed by an electoral law enacted by the Hong Kong Special

Administration Region in accordance with the principles of democracy and openness.

In addition, Annex I states that candidates for CE are to be nominated by receiving the support of

no fewer than 150 Election Committee members and that each member can nominate only one

candidate. To elect the CE, Election Committee members “shall vote in their individual

capacities” by secret ballot on a “one-person-one-vote basis,” with the specific election method

stipulated in the HKSAR electoral law.

The Chief Executive Election Ordinance (CEEO) is the main HKSAR law governing the Chief

Executive selection process.5 The CEEO establishes the specific procedures and rules by which

candidates are nominated and the future Chief Executive is selected by the Election Committee.

The CEEO also determines the specific number of seats granted to the designated subsectors of

the four sectors enumerated in Annex I of the Basic Law (see Appendix A), and stipulates who is

The English version of the CEEO is available online at http://www.legislation.gov.hk/blis_pdf.nsf/

6799165D2FEE3FA94825755E0033E532/0B621C1E1F7C5B7A482575EF001BF072/$FILE/CAP_569_e_b5.pdf.

Congressional Research Service

Prospects for Democracy in Hong Kong: The 2017 Election Reforms (Update)

eligible to vote for Election Committee members for each of the subsectors. In some cases, the

voters are individuals, and in some cases companies or organizations are entitled to vote.

According to the HKSAR government, there were just under 250,000 registered voters for the last

Election Committee subsector elections held in December 2011.6 Nearly a quarter of the 1,200

Election Committee members were chosen in uncontested subsector elections. For the contested

seats, 27.6% of the eligible voters participated in the election.7 (See Appendix A for details.)

For the last Chief Executive election held in 2012, the Election Committee nominated three

candidates—Albert Ho Chun-yan, at the time, chair of the pan-democratic Democratic Party;

Leung Chun-ying, a pro-establishment ex-Legco and Executive Council member; and Henry

Tang Ying-yen, a pro-establishment ex-Chief Secretary of Hong Kong. On March 25, 2012, the

Election Committee chose Leung Chun-ying with 689 votes. Henry Tang finished second with

285 votes, and Albert Ho received 76 votes.8

Process for Amending the Selection of the Chief

Executive and Past Attempts to Make Amendments

Annex I of the Basic Law also establishes the

procedures to amend the selection process for

the Chief Executive. Article 7 states

If there is a need to amend the method for

selecting the Chief Executives for the terms

subsequent to the year 2007, such

amendments must be made with the

endorsement of a two-thirds majority of all

the members of the Legislative Council and

the consent of the Chief Executive, and

they shall be reported to the Standing

Committee of the National People’s

Congress for approval.

Six-Step Procedure for Amending the

Selection Process for the Chief

Executive

Step 1—Chief Executive submits report to the NPCSC

“as regards to whether there is a need to make an

amendment.”

Step 2—The NPCSC determines if there is a need to

amend Annex I of the Basic Law.

Step 3—The Chief Executive submits legislation to

amend Annex I of the Basic Law to the Legislative

Council for consideration.

Step 4—The Legislative Council approves the legislation

(with possible amendments) by a two-thirds majority of

its members.

On April 6, 2004, the NPCSC issued an

Step 5—The Chief Executive consents to the approved

interpretation of article 7 of Annex I (as well

legislation and submits to the NPCSC for approval.

as Article III of Annex II) stipulating a six9

Step 6—The NPCSC approves the legislation.

step procedure to amend the selection process

for the Chief Executive (see text box, “SixStep Procedure for Amending the Selection Process for the Chief Executive”).10 That six-step

process has been followed in every subsequent attempt to amend Hong Kong’s election process

HKSAR Government, “Voter Registration Statistics: Election Committee Subsector,”

http://www.voterregistration.gov.hk/eng/statistic20115.html.

HKSAR Government, “Voter Turnout Rate,” http://www.elections.gov.hk/ecss2011/eng/turnout.html.

A total of 1,132 ballots were submitted, including 75 unmarked ballots and 7 determined to be invalid.

The HKSAR government generally refers to this as a five-step procedure by combining the introduction of legislation

by the CE to Legco and the approval of the legislation by Legco as one step.

The English version of the April 2004 NPCSC decision is available online at http://www.cmab.gov.hk/cd/eng/basic/

(continued...)

Congressional Research Service

Prospects for Democracy in Hong Kong: The 2017 Election Reforms (Update)

for either Chief Executive or Legco. In addition, the HKSAR government has usually conducted

extensive rounds of public consultation to both ascertain if conditions in Hong Kong were

appropriate for election reforms (Step 1), as well as to solicit opinions on what reforms to propose

to Legco (Step 3).

The 2017 Election Reforms

The HKSAR government has repeatedly stated it intends to follow the provisions in the Basic

Law and the various NPCSC decisions—including the six-step process—to propose possible

changes in the CE selection process in 2017. In addition, as it did during past considerations of

electoral reform, the HKSAR government has conducted public consultations to ascertain the

necessity for and the nature of the electoral reforms it will propose to Legco.

Step 1: CE Report to the NPCSC

CE Leung formally initiated the six-step procedure for possible changes in the CE selection

process in 2017, as well as the Legco elections in 2016, on July 15, 2014, with submission of the

“Report by the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to the Standing

Committee of the Nationals People’s Congress on Whether There Is a Need to Amend the

Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in

2017 and for Forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region

in 2016.”11

The CE’s report to the NPCSC was submitted after a five-month consultation period to solicit

opinions from the public on various election reform options, including possible models for

electing the CE by universal suffrage in 2017. The official consultation document, entitled “Let’s

Talk and Achieve Universal Suffrage,” sought opinions on the following issues related to the CE’s

selection in 2017: the size and composition of the nominating committee; the electorate base of

the nominating committee; the method for forming the nominating committee; the nominating

committee’s procedures for nominating CE candidates; and the voting arrangements for electing

the CE.12

During the consultation period, a range of CE election options were offered and discussed. In

March 2014, two academics, Dr. Benny Tai Yiu-ting and Chan Kin-man, and Rev. Chu Yiu-ming

released their “manifesto” for a new organization, Occupy Central with Love and Peace (OCLP),

initiating a campaign of peaceful civil disobedience and public debate to “strive for the election

of the Chief Executive by universal and equal suffrage in 2017.”13 During the spring of 2014,

OCLP held a series of public fora and informal public opinion polls on 15 different proposals on

(...continued)

pdf/es22004080554.pdf.

The English version of the report is available online at http://www.2017.gov.hk/filemanager/template/tc/doc/report/

ce_report.pdf.

The consultation document is available online at http://www.2017.gov.hk/filemanager/template/en/doc/

Con_Doc_e_(FINAL)_with_cover.pdf.

Occupy Central with Love and Peace, “OCLP: Manifesto,” press release, March 26, 2014, http://oclp.hk/index.php?

route=occupy/eng_detail&eng_id=9.

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Prospects for Democracy in Hong Kong: The 2017 Election Reforms (Update)

how to elect the CE by universal suffrage in 2017. OCLP organized an online and in-person

unofficial referendum on 3 of 15 proposals from June 20-29, 2014, in which nearly 793,000

registered Hong Kong voters—or 22.4% of eligible voters—participated.14 A plurality (42.1%) of

the participants chose a proposal from the Alliance for True Democracy (ATD), which would

allow candidates to be nominated by one-eighth of the members of a nominating committee, by

petitions signed by 1% of registered voters and verified by the nominating committee, or by

nomination by a political party that received at least 5% of the total valid votes in the last Legco

elections.15 The ATD proposal also called for a “two-round, run-off” process to elect the CE.16

Tsang’s report to the NPCSC, however, offered a more limited assessment of public opinion on

CE electoral reforms, including

•

“The mainstream opinion is that Article 45 of the Basic Law has already made

clear that the power to nominate CE candidates is vested in the NC only.… Such

power must not be undermined or bypassed directly or indirectly.”

•

“[T]here are relatively more views that the composition of the NC should be

decided by reference to the existing methods of forming the EC.…”

•

“There are different view on how the NC should nominate CE candidates.…

Some consider that the nominating procedures may be divided into two stages: in

the first stage, the persons contending for nomination shall be recommended by a

certain number of NC members, and in the second stage, the NC shall nominate a

number of candidates amongst the persons so recommended.”

•

“Regarding the number of CE candidates, there are two major views. One of the

views is that … it is necessary to fix the number of candidates. The other view is

that there is no need to restrict the number of candidates.”

•

“[T]here are relatively more views that there should be two rounds of voting so

as to enhance the legitimacy of the candidate returned by election.”

In the report’s “Conclusions and Recommendations,” CE Leung acknowledged calls for “civic

nomination,” (allowing the public a role in the nomination of candidates) stating:

Regarding the key issue of the nominating procedures, although there were professional

bodies of the legal sector and other members of the public pointing out during the

consultation period that “civic nomination” was not in compliance with the Basic Law, it is

worth noting that there were still considerable views after the conclusion of the public

consultation that the element of “civic nomination” should be included in the nominating

procedures of the universal suffrage for the CE election.

The results of the unofficial referendum are available online at http://oclp.hk/index.php?route=occupy/eng_detail&

eng_id=16.

The ATD’s proposal is available online at http://www.atd.hk/wp-content/Election_Plans/

ATD_CE_Election_Plan_ENG_v2.pdf.

To win in the first round, a candidate would have to receive at least 50% of the vote. If no candidate receives 50% or

more during the first round, a run-off election would be held between the two candidates who received the most votes

in the first round.

Congressional Research Service

Prospects for Democracy in Hong Kong: The 2017 Election Reforms (Update)

Step 2: The NPCSC Decision of August 31, 2014

The NPCSC released their response to CE Leung’s report on August 31, 2014, setting seven

requirements on moving to the election of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage in 2017.17

Those seven requirements were as follows:

1. “A broadly representative nominating committee shall be formed. The provisions

for the number of members, composition and formation method of the

nominating committee shall be made in accordance with the number of members,

composition and formation method of the Election Committee for the Fourth

Chief Executive,” [the Election Committee that selected C. Y. Leung].

2. “The nominating committee shall nominate two to three candidates for the office

of Chief Executive in accordance with democratic procedures.”

3. “Each candidate must have the endorsement of more than half of all members of

the nominating committee,” [more than 600 members].

4. “All eligible electors in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region have the

right to vote in the election of the Chief Executive and elect one of the candidates

for the office of Chief Executive in accordance with the law.”

5. “The Chief Executive-elect, after being selected through universal suffrage, will

have to be appointed by the Central People’s Government.” [the Chinese

government in Beijing].

6. “The specific method of universal suffrage for selecting the Chief Executive shall

be prescribed in accordance with legal procedures through amending Annex I of

the Basic Law….”

7. “If the specific method of universal suffrage for selecting the Chief Executive is

not adopted in accordance with legal procedures, the method used for selecting

the Chief Executive for the preceding term shall continue to apply.”

NPCSC Deputy Secretary General Li Fei wrote an official explanation of the NPCSC August

2014 decision that describes the NPCSC’s rationale for the seven requirements.18 Regarding the

size, composition, and formation method of the NC (the first requirement), Li indicated that there

was extensive discussion of the forming of the EC during the drafting of the Basic Law, and it

was determined that the current structure ensures that it is “broadly representative” and provides

“balanced participation” from different sectors of Hong Kong society. According to Li, the

NPCSC decided to limit the number of candidates to two or three (the second requirement)

because it would “ensure a truly competitive election and present voters with real choices.” In

addition, Li wrote that having two or three candidates would avoid complicated election

procedures and possibly expensive run-off elections. He also pointed out that it is consistent with

recent CE elections which have had two or three candidates.19

The official English translation of the NPCSC’s August 31 decision is available online at http://www.2017.gov.hk/

filemanager/template/en/doc/20140831a.pdf.

The official translation of Li Fei’s explanation is available online at http://www.2017.gov.hk/filemanager/template/

en/doc/20140831a.pdf.

Tung Chee-hwa was unopposed in 2002, and Donald Tsang was unopposed in 2005. In 2007, Alan Leong and

Donald Tsang were both official candidates nominated by the Election Committee. In 2012, there were three candidates

for CE nominated by the EC—C.Y. Leung, Henry Tang, and Albert Ho. C. Y. Leung was chosen by the EC, receiving

(continued...)

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Prospects for Democracy in Hong Kong: The 2017 Election Reforms (Update)

Li stated that the rationale for the third requirement—that the candidates receive the endorsement

of more than half of all the members of the NC—was based on two concepts. First, because the

Basic Law requires the NC to follow “democratic procedures,” Li wrote the NC “should follow

the democratic principle of majority rule.” Second, to obtain endorsement by a majority of NC

members, candidates “need to obtain a certain extent of support from each sector of the

nominating committee.”

The Political Reaction in Hong Kong to the NPCSC Decision20

Reactions to the NPCSC’s decision varied widely, especially on some of the requirements

regarding the nominating process. In particular, the requirement that candidates must be endorsed

by more than half of the NC members surprised many people in Hong Kong, as it significantly

increased the threshold from the current one-eighth of the EC members. The limitation to two or

three candidates was also viewed as comparatively strict. Finally, views differed on how to

interpret the first requirement on the size, composition, and formation method of the NC.

On the day the NPCSC decision was released, CE Leung welcomed the “precious offer” from the

NPCSC.21 Tam Yiu-chung, leader of Hong Kong’s Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and

Progress of Hong Kong (DAB) party, said in an interview with China Daily, “‘One man, one

vote’ is the biggest thing about universal suffrage. It is bigger than the nominating procedure,

which may be improved after we have gained experience through implementation of universal

suffrage.”22 Other generally pro-establishment parties in Hong Kong also expressed their support

for the NPCSC decision.

Hong Kong’s pro-democracy political parties expressed a mixture of disappointment and outrage

at the decision. Emily Lau, Legco member and chair of the Democratic Party, said of the

NPCSC’s decision, “We are not North Korea. I don’t think they [the NPCSC] should insult the

intelligence of the Hong Kong people.”23 Frederick Fung Kin-kee, Legco member and co-founder

of the Hong Kong Association for Democracy and People’s Livelihood (ADPL), described the

NPCSC decision as “unacceptable.”24 Ex-Legco member and past chair of the Democratic Party

Martin Lee succinctly summarized the pan-democrats’ objections to the NPCSC’s decision,

“Hong Kong people will have one person, one vote but Beijing will select all the candidates—

puppets. What is the difference between a rotten apple, a rotten orange, and a rotten banana.”25

The 27 Legco members generally considered pan-democrats26 quickly pledged to vote against any

proposed legislation that complies with the requirements in the NPCSC’s August 31 decision.

(...continued)

689 votes.

For more about the initial response to the NPCSC’s August 2014 decision, see CRS Report IN10146, China’s

Leaders Quash Hong Kong’s Hopes for Democratic Election Reforms, by (name redacted).

Hong Kong Information Services Department, “Transcript of Remarks by CE at Media Session,” press release,

August 31, 2014, http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201408/31/P201408310944.htm.

Joseph Li, “Universal Suffrage Is What Matters: DAB Head,” China Daily, September 1, 2014.

“Democratic Camp Angry at NPCSC Decision,” RTHK, August 31, 2014.

“NPCSC Sets Highly Conservative Framework,” RTHK, August 31, 2014.

Demetri Sevastopulo and Julie Zhu, “Hong Kong Democracy Activities Vent Their Anger Against Beijing,”

Financial Times, September 1, 2014.

See Appendix B for a breakdown of Legco members into pro-establishment and pan-democrat members.

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Prospects for Democracy in Hong Kong: The 2017 Election Reforms (Update)

The “Umbrella Movement”27

Hong Kong’s reaction to the NPCSC’s August 2014 decision was not limited to Legco members

and major politicians. OCLP posted online its assessment of the decision and Li Fei’s

explanation.28 OCLP founder Chan Kin-man described Li’s explanation as “obscuring the facts

and misleading the public.” OCLP maintained that forming the nominating committee in

accordance with the election committee ensures that it is not broadly representative, and creates a

non-democratic “small circle” with control over the CE’s selection. OCLP concluded, “There

does not seem to be any room for genuine universal suffrage under this framework. Seeing that

all chances of dialogue have been exhausted, our only way is civil disobedience and occupying

Central.”

Two Hong Kong student organizations—the Hong Kong Federation of Students (HKFS)29 and

Scholarism30—organized a week-long class boycott at the end of September 2014 to protest the

NPCSC August 2014 decision. At the end of the boycott, several hundred students organized a

protest march to Tamar Park in Admiralty, where Hong Kong’s Central Government Office,

Legislative Council Complex, and Chief Executive’s Office are located. Supporters of the

students quickly swelled to the ranks of protesters to several thousand on Saturday, September 27,

and protesters began blocking major roads in Admiralty.31 On September 28, tens of thousands

people gathered in Admiralty, including the OCLP supporters, calling for the resignation of CE

Leung and “genuine universal suffrage.”

On the evening of September 28, hundreds of Hong Kong police unsuccessfully attempted to

break up the demonstration, firing 87 rounds of tear gas into the crowd, spraying protesters with

pepper spray, and striking demonstrators with batons.32 To defend themselves from the pepper

spray, protesters held up umbrellas, giving rise to the protest’s name, the “Umbrella Movement.”

The police action against the protesters in Admiralty gave rise to demonstrations in two other

locations in Hong Kong—Causeway Bay and Mong Kok—where protesters blocked roads and

erected barricades. The ranks of protesters swelled to more than 100,000 people. The three

occupation sites remained in place for over 70 days. The Mong Kok protest site was forcibly

cleared on November 24 and 25, 2014. The Admiralty protesters were removed on December 11,

2014, and the Causeway occupation was dismantled by police on December 15, 2014.

Since the protest sites were cleared, supporters of the Umbrella Movement have continued their

campaign against the NPCSC decision. Virtually every night, reportedly hundreds of people have

For more about the Umbrella Movement, see CRS Report IF10005, Protests in Hong Kong: The “Umbrella

Movement” (Update), by (name redacted)

http://oclp.hk/index.php?route=occupy/eng_detail&eng_id=21.

HKFS is a student organization comprised of the student unions from eight of Hong Kong’s universities. For more

about HKFS, see http://www.hkfs.org.hk/.

Scholarism is a political organization formed by a group of university and high school students in Hong Kong. For

more about Scholarism, see http://scholarism.com/.

Chris Buckley and Alan Wong, “Pro-Democracy Group Shifts to Collaborate with Student Protesters in Hong

Kong,” New York Times, September 27, 2014, international edition.

The Hong Kong police have stated the use of tear gas was precipitated by groups of protesters “charging” police

officers, raising concerns about their safety. However, video evidence and eyewitness accounts show that the tear gas

was deployed over a six hour period and at times in the direction of protesters moving away from the police, raising

doubts about police claims that the tear gas was used in self-defense.

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Prospects for Democracy in Hong Kong: The 2017 Election Reforms (Update)

gathered in Mong Kok carrying yellow umbrellas and signs, claiming to be “shopping.”33

Supporters have also organized “flash protests” in shopping malls and locations around Hong

Kong. In addition, a small group of protesters have camped outside the Legislative Council

Complex and the British Consulate in Hong Kong. Members of HKFS, Scholarism, and other

groups supportive of the Umbrella Movement have organized community education programs to

discuss the NPCSC decision and the goal of genuine universal suffrage.

Public Opinion Polls

Several groups and organizations have conducted public opinion polls in Hong Kong on the

issues of universal suffrage and the NPCSC August 2014 decision. While there has been some

variation in the results of these surveys, none have consistently shown a clear majority either in

favor or opposed to Legco’s passing an election reform proposal consistent with the NPCSC

decision. Most public opinion surveys found a sharply divided opinion with slight pluralities

either supporting or opposing the reforms.

A public opinion poll conducted by the Hong Kong University Public Opinion Programme

(HKUPOP), commissioned by the South China Morning Post (SCMP), Hong Kong’s leading

English-language newspaper, during early September 2014 found 48% of the respondents

supported Legco vetoing government-proposed legislation that provided for universal suffrage

based on the NPCSC August 2014 decision, and 39% said Legco should approve the legislation.34

A similar HKUPOP public opinion poll in October 2014, commissioned by the National

Democratic Institute (NDI), showed 54.7% of the respondents said Legco should veto any

proposed legislation based on the NPCSC decision and 33.1% said Legco should approve the

legislation.35

Chinese University of Hong Kong’s Centre for Communication and Public Opinion Survey at the

School of Journalism and Communication (CCPOS) has posted a series of monthly public

opinion polls on political development in Hong Kong between September and December 2014.36

One of the regular questions asked if Legco should approve or disapprove draft legislation

proposed by the HKSAR government if “the proposed draft will forbid people having different

political views from the Central Government to stand for the [CE] election.” In all four monthly

polls, a plurality of the people said that Legco should disapprove such draft legislation.

Starting in April 2015, CCPOS began posting the results of joint surveys conducted by the

CCPOS, HKUPOP, and the Centre for Social Policy Studies (CSPS) of Hong Kong Polytechnic

University.37 The first joint survey found 46.7% supported and 37.6% opposed “the government

proposal on the 2017 Chief Executive [e]lection.” In the last survey conducted before the

submission of the resolution to Legco, those percentages had shifted to 47.0% and 38.0%,

respectively.

For more about the new protest tactics, see CRS Report IN10232, Protests in Hong Kong: New Groups, New Tactics,

by (name redacted).

Results of the public opinion poll are available online at http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/report/scmpPolReform2014/

index.html.

Robert Chung Ting-Yiu, Karie Pang Ka-Lai, and Frank Lee Wai-Kin, et al., Survey on Political Reform in Hong

Kong, University of Hong Kong Public Opinion Programme, Hong Kong, October 27, 2014.

For the results of the public opinion polls, see http://www.com.cuhk.edu.hk/ccpos/en/.

See http://www.com.cuhk.edu.hk/ccpos/research/rollingsurvey-en.html.

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Prospects for Democracy in Hong Kong: The 2017 Election Reforms (Update)

In January 2015, Ming Pao, a major Chinese-language newspaper, commissioned HKUPOP to

conduct a public opinion poll with a different approach to the preceding polls.38 When asked their

view of the NPCSC decision, 23% considered it a step forward, 29% considered it a step

backward, and 39% considered it neither a step forward nor backward for democracy. When

asked what they would do if they were a Legco member, 56% said they would vote for legislation

based on the NPCSC decision that would allow universal suffrage based on one person-one vote,

and 34% said they would vote against the legislation “so that Chief Executive will be elected

according to the old way.” To a third question in which the Hong Kong government promises

“progress toward democratic election system” in 2022, 64% of the respondents said they would

support legislation based on the NPCSC for the 2017 election and 23% said they would vote

against the legislation.

Step 3: Proposing Legislation to the Legislative Council

In the past, the HKSAR government began a second round of public consultation after the

NPCSC responded to the CE’s report on the need for election reform (Step 2) to discuss specific

issues related to the contents of the legislation to introduce to Legco. This time, however, Chief

Secretary (CS) Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor announced an indefinite delay of the second round

of consultations on September 29, 2014, following the outbreak of the Umbrella Movement.

When asked when the second round of consultation might begin, CS Lam replied:

I don’t have an exact date for the time being. I think what is important is we have to monitor

the situation closely and find the right timing, the right opportunity, the right atmosphere for

us to engage with different stakeholders in society in order to achieve the objective of the

second-round consultation.39

CS Lam formally announced the start of the second round of public consultation to Legco on

January 7, 2015.40 The second round of consultation ended on March 7, 2015. Individuals and

organizations were to submit their views by mail, facsimile, or email.41

Nearly all of the pan-democrats in the Legco chamber walked out on CS Lam’s announcement on

January 7, carrying yellow umbrellas, chanting for CE Leung to step down, and calling for

“genuine universal suffrage.” In a press conference following their walkout, the pan-democrats

restated their intent to vote against any proposed legislation that complies with the requirements

in the NPCSC August 2014 decision.42

Details of the Ming Pao poll are available online (in Chinese) at http://www.gcyouth.net/newsdetails.php?id=2850.

Hong Kong Information Services Division, “Transcript of Remarks by CS at Media Session,” press release,

September 29, 2014, http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201409/29/P201409290995.htm.

The text of CS Lam’s statement to Legco is available online at http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201501/07/

P201501070519.htm.

Submissions were to be sent to Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau, 12/F, East Wing, Central Government

Offices, 2 Tim Mei Avenue, Tamar, Hong Kong; facsimile number: (852) 2563 9292; email address:

views@2017.gov.hk.

Tony Cheung, Jeffie Tam, and Peter So, et al., “Politicians Condemn Public Consultation That Gives ‘Little Leeway’

for Reform Debate,” South China Morning Post, January 8, 2015.

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Prospects for Democracy in Hong Kong: The 2017 Election Reforms (Update)

The Consultation Document

The consultation document, titled “2017—Seize the Opportunity: Method for Selecting the Chief

Executive by Universal Suffrage,” reiterated the HKSAR government stance that any proposal

submitted to Legco must abide by the Basic Law and the NPCSC August 2014 decision.43 It also

delineated four issues to be considered during the second round of consultation: (1) the

composition and formation method of the nominating committee; (2) the procedures for the

nominating committee to nominate Chief Executive candidates; (3) the voting arrangements for

selecting the Chief Executive by universal suffrage; and (4) other related issues.

Regarding the composition and formation method of the Nominating Committee, the consultation

document stated, “depending on whether there is sufficient support, appropriate adjustments to

the composition of subsectors under the four sectors of the NC, the number of members of each

subsector, and the electorate base of such subsectors may be made during the stage of enacting

local legislation.” However, the consultation document recommended that the existing subsectors

be maintained, and suggested that new subsectors may be added or the distribution of seats

among the 38 subsectors be adjusted if “there is sufficient support.” As for the electorate base of

the subsectors, the consultation report recommended that either the base remain unchanged or

“appropriate adjustments” be made if “there is sufficient support and that such adjustments are

practical and practicable, are conducive to electing persons who could genuinely represent

respective subsectors, and that the wishes of such subsectors are respected.”

On the nominating process, the consultation document suggested that the nomination process

could be divided into two stages. In the first stage, the NC members would recommend

candidates for the NC to consider; in the second stage, the NC would select two or three

candidates among the recommended candidates. The consultation document recommended that if

the nomination process is divided into two stages, a candidate must obtain the support of either

100 or 150 NC members, and that each NC member should be limited to supporting only one

candidate. As for the selection of the candidates, the consultation document offered several

different voting systems—“one person, three votes”; “one person, two or three votes”; “one

person, maximum three votes”; and “voting on each person seeking nomination”—that could be

adopted to select the required two or three candidates. Finally, the consultation document pointed

out that a procedure needs to be adopted if fewer than two candidates obtain the endorsement of

more than half of the NC members.

The key issue discussed in the consultation document regarding the voting arrangements was if a

“first past the post” procedure should be adopted, or if some form of run-off should be held if no

candidate obtains a majority of the vote. If a run-off system were adopted, it could take the form

of an “instant run-off” where voters rank the candidates or voters subsequently choose between

the two candidates with the most votes.

The other related issues cited in the consultation document included consideration of whether the

terms of the NC members should terminate after the CE is sworn into office; and arrangements

for selecting a new CE-elect if the winner of the CE election is not appointed by the Central

People’s Government. The consultation document also recommended that the Chief Executive

“should not have any political affiliation,” and as a result, the CE candidates should disavow any

political party affiliation after they are nominated.

The consultation document is available online at http://www.2017.gov.hk/en/second/document.html.

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Prospects for Democracy in Hong Kong: The 2017 Election Reforms (Update)

The Response to the Consultation Document

The response to the consultation document generally mirrored the reaction to the NPCSC August

2014 decision. The pro-establishment Legco members were generally supportive of the start of

the second round of consultation and the contents of the document. The pan-democrats in Legco,

as well as the organizers of the Umbrella Movement and OCLP, were very critical of the

consultation document.

Alan Leong Kah-kit, Legco member and CE candidate in 2007, said, “The [HKSAR] government

is selling fake [democracy] and cheating the people.”44 OCLP founder Benny Tai Yiu-ting stated

the consultation document provided “no room to accept any proposal that has a chance of

satisfying global standards of universal suffrage.”45 HKFS deemed the consultation “pointless” if

the reforms must comply with the NPCSC August 2014 decision.46 Former CS Anson Chan Fang

On-sang said that the consultation document focuses on issues that “do nothing to make the

overall method of electing the Chief Executive in 2017 more fair, more just or more

transparent.”47

Liberal Party leader Vincent Fang Kang concurred with Chan’s assessment, stating “the room for

consultation is not big.”48 However, Fang and fellow Liberal Party member James Tien Pei-chun

indicated that they would support the HKSAR government’s election reform legislation when it is

introduced to Legco. The pro-establishment DAB said it would conduct a series of public fora to

gauge popular opinions about the CE election reforms.

The Consultation Report and the Government’s Proposal

On April 22, 2015, CS Lam presented the results of the second round of public consultation to

Legco, and announced the main elements of the CE election reform legislation that would be

introduced to Legco. The main elements were

•

A 1,200-member Nominating Committee (NC) shall be formed consisting of the

same 4 sectors and 38 subsectors that constitute the current Election Committee

EC), and NC members serve a five-year term.

•

The allocation of NC seats among the subsectors, the manner of selecting the

members of each subsector, and the electorate of each subsector shall remain

largely unchanged (except for technical adjustments).

•

The NC shall approve two or three nominees in two stages. In the first stage,

each NC member may recommend one person for consideration. To be eligible

for NC consideration, a person must receive 120 recommendations from the NC

members. Each potential candidate will be allowed to receive no more than 240

recommendations. In the second stage, each NC member shall vote by secret

Tony Cheung, Jeffie Lam, and Peter So, et al., “Politicians Condemn Public Consultation That Gives ‘Little Leeway’

for Reform Debate,” South China Morning Post, January 8, 2015.

Ibid.

“Govt. Launches Second Consultation on Reform,” RTHK, January 7, 2015.

Tony Cheung, Jeffie Lam, and Peter So, et al., “Politicians Condemn Public Consultation That Gives ‘Little Leeway’

for Reform Debate,” South China Morning Post, January 8, 2015.

Ibid.

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Prospects for Democracy in Hong Kong: The 2017 Election Reforms (Update)

ballot for at least two candidates and the two or three candidates who receive the

most votes and at least 601 votes shall be the official nominees presented for a

vote by all eligible Hong Kong voters.

•

the popular vote will be held using the “first-past-the-post” system, in which the

nominee with the most votes is declared the winner. To win, a nominee will not

have to receive a majority of the popular vote.

During Lam’s presentation to Legco, most of the pan-democrats displayed black placards with a

yellow X, indicating their intended opposition to the proposed CE election reforms. Following

Lam’s presentation, the pan-democrats reiterated their pledge to vote against any proposal that

complies with the NPCSC’s August 2014 decision. All but one of the 43 pro-establishment Legco

members announced they would vote in favor of the proposal. Outside the Legco Building,

protesters both supporting and opposing the Hong Kong government proposal gathered to express

their respective views.

Resolution Submission to Legco

On June 2, 2015, the Hong Kong government informed Legco of its intent to submit the formal

resolution to amend the Basic Law on June 17, 2015.49 Secretary of Constitutional and Mainland

Affairs Raymond Tam Chi-yuen reportedly said that the proposal would be unchanged from those

announced by CS Lam in April.50 The announcement came two days after most of the Legco

members met with several senior Chinese officials in Shenzhen to discuss the CE election

reforms. The Shenzhen meeting reportedly did not result in any breakthroughs, with Chinese

officials stating that NPCSC would not reconsider its August decision and pan-democrats

reiterating their intention to vote against any proposal that complies with that decision.51

Chief Secretary Carrie Lam presented the official text of the resolution to Legco on June 17,

2015.52 As previously indicated by the Hong Kong government, the resolution complies with the

restrictions contained in the NPCSC’s August 2014 decision.

The resolution stipulated that, starting in 2017, the Chief Executive would be selected by

universal suffrage, and that a 1,200 member Nominating Committee would nominate 2-3

candidates. The Nominating Committee would be composed of 4 groups of 300, identical in

description to those constituting the current Election Committee. According to the resolution, a

local electoral law would determine the manner by which the individual Nominating Committee

members would be selected to serve a five-year term. To be considered as a possible candidate,

the resolution provided that a person would have to receive the recommendation of not less than

120 members of the Nominating Committee. To be an official nominee, a person would have to

receive the support of more than half of all members of the Nominating Committee (601 or more)

in a secret ballot. The specific manner by which the Nominating Committee would nominate

candidates would be prescribed in a local electoral law.

Hong Kong Government Information Services Department, “Government Gives Notice to LegCo of Intention to

Move Motion on Amendment to the Method for Selecting the Chief Executive,” press release, June 2, 2015,

http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201506/02/P201506020753.htm.

“Reform Package to be Tabled on June 17,” RTHK, June 2, 2015.

Monica Chan, “Legco Vote on Reform Will Show Who’s Loyal to ‘One Country, Two Systems,’ Warns Basic Law

Panel Chief,” South China Morning Post, May 31, 2015.

Full text of the resolution provided in Appendix D.

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Prospects for Democracy in Hong Kong: The 2017 Election Reforms (Update)

Step 4: Legco’s Vote

After two days of debate, Legco defeated the proposed resolution on June 18, 2015, by a vote of

28 against and 8 for the motion. To pass, the resolution needed the support of at least 47 (twothirds) of the 70 Legco members. Voting against the motion were all 27 pan-democrats, plus

Leung Ka-lau, member for the medical functional constituency. Voting in favor of the motion

were Chan Kin-por, Chan Yuen-han, Tommy Cheung Yu-yan, Chung Kwok-pan, Vincent Fang

Kang, Lam Tai-fai, James Tien Pei-chun, and Frankie Yick Chi-ming.

The final tally was the result of a walkout by 32 of the pro-establishment members conducted just

after Legco President Tsang called for a vote on the motion. One Legco member, Lau Wong-fat,

was not present and by tradition, the President does not vote except to cast a deciding vote. Initial

reports indicated that the walkout was undertaken to provide time for Lau to arrive and cast his

vote. Subsequent accounts state that the walkout was a failed attempt to stop the vote by denying

a quorum (35 members).

Moving Forward53

Under the terms of the NPCSC’s August 2014 decision, the current CE selection system will be

used in 2017, given the resolution failed to pass Legco. Legco’s defeat of the Hong Kong

government’s proposal does not necessarily end the possibility of CE election reforms by 2017,

but prospects appear dimmed. Legco could reconsider the motion, but it is unlikely that a

sufficient number of pan-democrats would change their vote to alter the outcome. The Hong

Kong government could submit a new resolution designed to gain some support among the pandemocrats, but CE Leung has indicated he has no plans to consider that option. On June 30, CE

Leung dismissed a call by Anson Chan to reopen the election reform discussion.54

Another alternative would be for the NPCSC to revise or amend its August 2014 decision. The

day after the Legco vote, China’s official news agency, Xinhua, published a story in China Daily

stating that the NPCSC’s August 2014 decision “would remain in force despite being vetoed by

city lawmakers.”55 According to the article, an NPCSC statement released after the Legco vote

declared, “The [August 2014] decision will continue to serve as the constitutional ground for

Hong Kong in the future, as it enforces universal suffrage in the chief executive election, and its

legal force is unquestionable.”

Finally, CY Leung could resubmit a report to the NPCSC on the conditions in Hong Kong,

indicating that circumstances have changed since he submitted the previous report in July 2014.

However, it seems unlikely that the NPCSC will significantly alter the conditions stated in its

August 2014 decision if CE Leung submits such a report.

Following the defeat of the election reforms, focus in Hong Kong has shifted to the District

Council elections to be held in November, as well as the 2016 Legco elections. Elections for

Hong Kong’s 18 District Councils are scheduled for November 22, 2015, with all 431 members to

The analysis contained in this section is based in part on CRS interviews, as well as media, academic, think tank, and

NGO reporting in Hong Kong.

“CY Leung Dismisses Call to Restart Reform Debate,” RTHK, June 30, 2015.

Xinhua, “Decision on Reform ‘Stays Despite Veto,’” China Daily, June 19, 2015.

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be elected by a popular vote.56 This will be the first District Council election in which all the seats

will be filled by a popular vote. During the Umbrella Movement, the organizers encouraged

people to register to vote. Some of the newly emerged groups involved in the protests are

reportedly forming new political parties and may field candidates for the District Council

elections. Also, the pan-democratic parties reportedly are trying to coordinate candidates in the

District Council elections to increase their candidates’ chances of being elected.

The 2015 District Council elections are important for two major reasons. First, the results will

widely be construed as an indicator of public support or opposition to the pan-democrats’ defeat

of the CE election reforms. Second, as indicated in Appendix A, 117 of the District Council

members will sit on the 2017 CE Selection Committee, and 5 of them will be elected as Legco

members in 2016.

The 2016 Legco elections also are important for the prospects for democracy in Hong Kong.

Their outcome likely will be interpreted as an expression of popular support for either the pandemocrats or pro-establishment parties, and their stances on the proposed CE election reforms. In

addition, the 2016 Legco may have an opportunity to consider CE election reforms during their

term in office, if the CE selected in 2017 chooses to restart the reform process, and the NPCSC

amends or supersedes its August 2014 decision on CE election reforms.

The Joint Declaration and Democracy

For 155 years, the city of Hong Kong was a British Crown Colony, governed by an appointed

Governor and British civil servants. On December 19, 1984, the United Kingdom’s then-Prime

Minister Margaret Thatcher and China’s then-Premier Zhao Ziyang signed the “Joint Declaration

of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the

Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong,”57 commonly

referred to as the “Joint Declaration,” agreeing to transfer sovereignty of Hong Kong to China on

July 1, 1997. Both nations also agreed to register the Joint Declaration with the United Nations as

a binding international treaty.58

The Joint Declaration contains no direct reference to democracy or universal suffrage. It does,

however, state that the Chief Executive will be selected either by local elections or consultations.

In addition, the Joint Declaration states that the “International Covenant on Civil and Political

Rights (ICCPR) as applied to Hong Kong shall remain in force.”

Under the terms of the Joint Declaration, China promised that Hong Kong would “enjoy a high

degree of autonomy,” and “the current social and economic systems in Hong Kong will remain

unchanged” for 50 years. The Joint Declaration also required China’s National People’s Congress

(NPC) to pass “a Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region” stipulating

In the last District Council elections in 2011, 412 members were elected by popular vote; 68 members were

appointed by the Chief Executive and 27 are ex officio members representing rural committees in Hong Kong’s New

Territories. There will be 431 members elected by popular vote in 2015.

The English version of the Joint Declaration is available online at http://www.cmab.gov.hk/en/issues/joint3.htm.

The Joint Declaration is registered as No. 23391 in Volume 1399 of the United Nations’ Treaty Series, available

online at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201399/v1399.pdf.

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China’s policies on Hong Kong that were to be consistent with the terms of the Joint Declaration.

The National People’s Congress passed the required Basic Law on April 4, 1990.

On the selection of Hong Kong’s Chief Executive, paragraph 3 of the Joint Declaration states,

“The chief executive will be appointed by the Central People’s Government on the basis of the

results of elections or consultations to be held locally.” Annex I of the Joint Declaration, entitled,

“Elaboration by the Government of the People’s Republic of China of Its Basic Policies

Regarding Hong Kong,” states, “The chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative

Region shall be selected by election or through consultations held locally and be appointed by the

Central People’s Government.”

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

Annex I also stipulates that “The provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political

Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as applied to

Hong Kong shall remain in force.”

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)59 stipulates in Article 25

Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions

mentioned in article 260 and without unreasonable restrictions: (a) To take part in the conduct

of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; (b) To vote and to be

elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall

be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors; (c) To

have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.

At the time of the United Kingdom’s accession to the ICCPR in 1976, it reserved “the right not to

apply article 25(b) in so far as it may require the establishment of an elected Executive or

Legislative Council in Hong Kong.”61 China signed the ICCPR in 1998, but has yet to ratify the

covenant.

The NPCSC’s August 2014 Decision and the Joint Declaration

In the opinion of some legal analysts and other interested parties, the provisions of the NPCSC

August 2014 decision violate the ICCPR, and thereby China’s commitments under the Joint

Declaration. Some Chinese and Hong Kong officials and scholars have responded by asserting

that the Joint Declaration no longer remains in effect, and that NPCSC decision is not inconsistent

with the ICCPR as it applies to Hong Kong.

According to one Hong Kong legal scholar, the Joint Declaration “contrary to Beijing’s

assertions, imposes substantive requirements on how Hong Kong’s Chief Executive can be

elected.”62 In this scholar’s opinion, the United Kingdom’s reservation on the application of

English version of ICCPR available online at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx.

The distinctions mentioned in Article 2 include race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,

national or social origin, property, birth, or other status.

See https://treaties.un.org/doc/db/survey/humanrightsconvs/Chapt_IV_4/reservations/UK.pdf.

Alvin Y. H. Cheung, “Guest Post: The International Law Case for Democracy in Hong Kong,” Opinio Juris, October

3, 2014.

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Article 25(b) of the ICCPR will no longer remain in effect once the Chief Executive is chosen by

an election. Given that the CE election must comply with the provisions of the ICCPR, the

scholar maintains that the restrictions contained in the NPCSC August decision contravene the

ICCPR’s prohibition on “unreasonable restrictions.”

However, in an opinion article in China Daily, a Mainland scholar maintained that the NPCSC

decision does not place unreasonable restrictions on the CE election.63 According to this scholar,

Article 2(2) of the ICCPR allows China to establish “laws and other measures” governing the CE

election so long as they comply with the rights recognized in the ICCPR. Since the ICCPR

contains no provisions regarding the nomination of candidates, the NPCSC decision is consistent

with China’s ICCPR obligations.

On November 12, 2014, in response to a question posed by Legco member Emily Lau regarding

the applicability of the ICCPR to the proposed CE election reforms, Hong Kong’s Acting

Secretary for Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Lau Kong-wah stated

As regards the Covenant, when the Covenant was applied to Hong Kong in 1976, a

reservation was made by the British government reserving the right not to apply Article

25(b). After the establishment of the HKSAR, in accordance with the Central People’s

Government’s notification to the United Nations Secretary-General in June 1997 and Article

39 of the Basic Law, only the provisions as applied to Hong Kong should remain in force,

and their implementation has to be through the laws of the HKSAR. Hence, the basis for the

ultimate aim of universal suffrage for Hong Kong’s constitutional development lies in the

Basic Law and the relevant Interpretation and Decisions of the NPCSC, but not the

Covenant.64

China’s Deputy Ambassador to the United Kingdom reportedly told the U.K.’s House of

Commons’ Foreign Affairs Committee that the “Joint Declaration signed by China and Britain is

now void and only covered the period from the signing in 1984 until the handover in 1997.”65

However, other officials have stopped short of stating that the Joint Declaration is void, while

pointing out that the Chinese and HKSAR governments have done nothing to violate the

provisions of the Joint Declaration.

Implications for U.S. Policy Toward Hong Kong

The United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 effectively continues U.S. relations with Hong

Kong after China’s resumption of authority over the city as it did during the time the city was a

British colony, so long as China abides by its international obligations with respect to Hong

Kong, including the Joint Declaration. Among those international obligations are China’s pledge

that it would allow the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) “a high degree of

autonomy on all matters other than defense and foreign affairs,” and the provisions of the

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights shall remain in force. In addition, the act

states U.S. support for the democratization of Hong Kong “will remain equally true after June 30,

1997,” the day before China resumed sovereignty over the city.

Song Siu-chong, “NPCSC Decision Imposes No Unreasonable Restrictions,” China Daily, September 11, 2014.

Hong Kong Government Information Centre, “LCQ2: Selecting CE by Universal Suffrage,” press release, November

12, 2014.

Grace Tsoi, “Does China Think the Sino-British Joint Declaration Is Void?,” Foreign Policy, December 18, 2014.

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Section 202 of the act grants the President the authority to suspend treating Hong Kong

differently from China with respect to a particular law if the President determines that Hong

Kong “is not sufficiently autonomous to justify” such treatment. In making the determination, the

President “should consider the terms, obligations, and expectations expressed in the Joint

Declaration with respect to Hong Kong.”

Section 301 of the act originally mandated that the State Department produce an annual report on

“conditions in Hong Kong of interest to the United States,” through 2001. That mandate was

extended by subsequent legislation until 2006, but was not been extended beyond that date until

Congress passed the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113235) in December 2014.66 That law required the State Department provide Congress with a onetime report on the status of Hong Kong.67 The report, released on April 10, 2015, contained a

section on “electoral reforms,” including the following statement:

The United States has called for the conduct of a multi-candidate competitive election for

Chief Executive in 2017, which would enhance the legitimacy of Hong Kong’s Chief

Executive, would be a major step forward in Hong Kong’s political development and would

bolster Hong Kong’s stability and prosperity

The Obama Administration’s Policy

The White House and the State Department have been seemingly cautious about their statements

with regards to the proposed CE election reforms and the pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong.

In general, U.S. government officials have stated support for the adoption of universal suffrage

for the CE election, and for providing Hong Kong voters a “meaningful choice” (see below), but

have refrained from commenting directly on the NPCSC August decision or the stated positions

of the Chinese and HKSAR governments on CE election reforms.

On September 29, 2014, White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest stated that the United States

“supports universal suffrage in Hong Kong in accordance with the Basic Law and we support the

aspirations of the Hong Kong people.”68 He indicated that the White House thinks that “the basic

legitimacy of the Chief Executive in Hong Kong will be greatly enhanced if the Basic Law’s

ultimate aim of selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage is fulfilled.” Earnest also

said, “We’ve consistently made our position known to Beijing and we’ll continue to do so.”

On that same day, the U.S. Consulate in Hong Kong released a statement supporting the Basic

Law’s “protections of internationally recognized fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of

peaceful assembly, freedom of expression, and freedom of the press.”69 The statement also

included the following, “We do not take sides in the discussion of Hong Kong’s political

development, nor do we support any particular individuals or groups involved in it.” However, on

The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 included the Department of State, Foreign

Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2015 (H.R. 5013), as well as its accompanying H.Rept. 113499, which stated, “The Committee directs the Secretary of State, not later than 45 days after enactment of this Act, to

update the report delineated in section 301 of the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 and transmit it to the

appropriate congressional committees.”

A copy of that report is available online at http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/reports/2015/240585.htm.

White House, “White House Daily Press Briefing,” press release, September 29, 2014.

U.S. Consulate in Hong Kong, press release, September 29, 2014.

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December 11, 2014, State Department Press Secretary Jen Psaki said, “we encourage Hong Kong

authorities and the people of Hong Kong to work together to ensure there is a competitive process

for selection of the Chief Executive through universal suffrage.” When asked whether the United

States “would support universal suffrage contingent upon approval by Beijing of candidates,” she

replied, “I don’t think that’s what we said, no.”70

President Obama and National Security Advisor Susan E. Rice met with China’s Foreign Minister

Wang Yi on October 1, 2014, to discuss the President’s upcoming trip to Beijing scheduled for

November 10-12, 2014. During the meeting, President Obama and Ambassador Rice indicated

that the United States was “following the developments in Hong Kong closely and expressed their

hopes that differences between Hong Kong authorities and protesters will be addressed

peacefully.”71 They also stated, “The United States has consistently supported the open system

that is essential to Hong Kong’s stability and prosperity, universal suffrage, and the aspirations of

the Hong Kong people.”

Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Russel testified at a Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

subcommittee hearing on Hong Kong on December 2, 2014, during which he summarized the

Obama Administration’s position with respect to Hong Kong’s potential CE election reforms.72

According to Secretary Russel, “the legitimacy of Hong Kong’s Chief Executive will be greatly

enhanced if the promise of universal suffrage is fulfilled. By this I mean an election that provides

the people of Hong Kong a meaningful choice of candidates representative of the voters’ will.”

With regards to the NPCSC August decision, he stated, “While the NPCSC’s decision conformed

to requirements in the Basic Law in the literal sense, it was criticized by many Hong Kong groups

and triggered the public protests that are still underway.” Secretary Russel also “categorically

denied allegations from China that the United States is in any way involved in the protests.” He

concluded by stating

The United States and China each have a vested interest in Hong Kong’s continued stability,

autonomy, and prosperity.… It is in all of our interests to see electoral reform in Hong Kong

that provides the people of Hong Kong with a meaningful choice of candidates, and that the

2017 elections in Hong Kong will be transparent, fair, and reflective of the opinions of the

Hong Kong people.

Following the release of the CE election reform proposal on April 22, 2015, a spokesperson for

the U.S. Consulate in Hong Kong was quoted as saying, “[W]e believe that the legitimacy of the

CE will be greatly enhanced if the Chief Executive is selected through universal suffrage and

Hong Kong’s residents have a meaningful choice of candidates.”

In their joint written testimony submitted to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs

Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific for its June 11, 2015, hearing on democracy in Asia,

Assistant Secretary of State Tom Malinowski, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Scot

Marciel, and USAID Assistant Administrator Jonathan Stivers stated:

Department of State, “Daily Press Briefing,” press release, December 11, 2014, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/

2014/12/234953.htm#HONGKONG.

White House, “Readout of National Security Advisor Susan E. Rice’s Meeting with Foreign Minister Wang Yi of

China,” press release, October 1, 2014, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/10/01/readout-nationalsecurity-advisor-susan-e-rice-s-meeting-foreign-ministe.

U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Evaluating

the Impact of the ‘Umbrella Movement,’ 113th Cong., 2nd sess., December 3, 2014.

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We believe that the legitimacy of Hong Kong’s Chief Executive and its overall governance

would be greatly enhanced if the people of Hong Kong were given the opportunity to select

their Chief Executive through a competitive election featuring a meaningful choice of

candidates who represent the voters’ will, and we have consistently called for an electoral

process that would produce that result.73

In this testimony, the three officials also stated with respect to the upcoming Legco vote, “We do

not take a position on how Legislative Council members should vote. This is a decision for the

legislators, after hearing and considering the views of the people of Hong Kong.”

The U.S. Consulate in Hong Kong issued no official statement following the Legco vote. In his

official remarks to celebrate U.S. independence day, Consul General Clifford A. Hart, Jr., said:

Hong Kong’s 18th celebration of Establishment Day tomorrow comes less than two weeks

after the Legislative Council made its decision on the Government’s universal suffrage

package. The preceding debate revealed sharply divergent perspectives, and, following

LegCo’s decision, politics in Hong Kong are, frankly, a little raw.

We encourage the Hong Kong authorities, the national government, and the Hong Kong

people to continue to work together towards the goal of achieving universal suffrage in

accordance with the Basic Law and the aspirations of the Hong Kong people. For now, as

Hong Kong takes its breath, as a friend, I would merely urge local friends of all perspectives

to fall back on their hallmark civility, forbearance, and patience in dealing with one another

as they address the myriad challenges of governance before them.74

It also was reported that electoral reform in Hong Kong was among the topics discussed during

the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue held in Washington, DC, on June 22-24, 2015.75

However, the State Department did not mention Hong Kong in its post-Dialogue releases.

Implications for Political Reform in China

Ever since the Joint Declaration confirmed Hong Kong’s reversion to Chinese sovereignty, some

observers have speculated that aspects of Hong Kong’s political system and traditions could

influence prospects for political reform in Mainland China. According to some analysts,

democratic reforms in Hong Kong would engender social pressure for similar political changes in

Mainland China’s political system. Other analysts suggested that the Chinese government may

use Hong Kong as a testing ground for political reforms that might be adapted and adopted for

implementation in Mainland China. The notion was that the “one country, two systems” policy

would provide China’s leaders with the leeway to permit democratic reforms in Hong Kong

without what they perceived to be a risk of creating “political instability” on the Mainland.

Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State Tom Malinowski, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Scot

Marciel, and USAID Assistant Administrator Jonathan Stivers, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs

Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Retreat or Revival—A Status Report on Democracy in Asia, 114th Cong., 1st

sess., June 11, 2015.

U.S. Consulate in Hong Kong, “Independence Day Reception Remarks in Hong Kong,” press release, June 30, 2015,

http://hongkong.usconsulate.gov/cg_ch_2015063001.html.

Adam Renton, “Hong Kong Reform to Feature in High-Level US Talks with Chinese Officials,” South China

Morning Post, June 19, 2015.

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The NPCSC August decision and the Chinese government’s response to the Umbrella Movement,

however, have fostered a growing concern among some Hong Kong residents about the

“Mainlandization” of Hong Kong. Some observers of Hong Kong/Mainland relations perceive a

gradual drift in Hong Kong towards its taking on characteristics associated with Mainland China.

Such observers argue that this drift has in part been caused by greater interaction between Hong

Kong and Mainland China, and has in part been the result of Chinese government policies toward

Hong Kong. According to this analysis, rather than Mainland China taking on characteristics of

Hong Kong, Hong Kong is slowly becoming more and more like Mainland China.

The NPCSC August decision fits with the notion that some observers have described as the

“Mainlandization” of Hong Kong. The decision established a nomination process that can be

controlled by the Chinese government while giving the appearance of implementing democratic

reforms. In addition, the Chinese government’s criticism of the Umbrella Movement—which it

refers to as the “Occupy Movement” or “Occupy Central”—is seen by some as more evidence

that the Chinese government intends to transform Hong Kong into a society that follows

Mainland culture and norms.

Other signs that some observers suggest are indicators of the Chinese government’s efforts to

make Hong Kong more like Mainland China are the past attempt to pressure the HKSAR

government to introduce a “moral and national education” curriculum in Hong Kong schools that

critics saw as pro-Beijing propaganda, and recent suggestions that the HKSAR government

introduce Mainland sedition laws for adoption by Legco. Critics also note that the Liaison Office

of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (Liaison

Office) has commented publicly about local political issues in Hong Kong with greater frequency.

The possible “Mainlandization” of Hong Kong may be attributable not only to the direct or

indirect actions of the Chinese and HKSAR government, according to some observers. Hong

Kong’s economy has become increasingly reliant on the Mainland economy, and a growing

number of businesses in Hong Kong are owned by or are subsidiaries of Mainland companies. In

addition, Hong Kong’s retail sector is increasingly geared to serving the demand of the over 50

million Mainland visitors, and the thousands of new Mainland immigrants to Hong Kong each

year. The Hong Kong press routinely contains accounts of conflict between Mainland tourists and

immigrants and local Hong Kong residents over cultural and behavioral differences. Some Hong

Kong residents have expressed fear that their city is being taken over by Mainland companies and

immigrants.

It is too early to determine in which direction the impact of political interaction will be greater in

the long run. At present, observers appear to be more concerned about the “Mainlandization” of

Hong Kong than optimistic about Hong Kong’s traditions of respect for human rights, the rule of

law, and the aspirations for democracy spreading into Mainland China. The outcome of the

current debate over CE election reforms is likely to be a significant factor in future assessments of

the flow of political influence across the Hong Kong/Mainland border.

Implications for Taiwan

The “one country, two systems” model was originally intended to apply to the possible

reunification of Mainland China and Taiwan—not Hong Kong. When China and the United

Kingdom began negotiating the Joint Declaration in 1984, the Chinese government applied the

concept for use in Hong Kong. At the time, Chinese officials apparently hoped that if they could

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Prospects for Democracy in Hong Kong: The 2017 Election Reforms (Update)

successfully demonstrate that “one country, two systems” worked in Hong Kong, they could

persuade the Taiwanese government and people that it was a viable model for Mainland-Taiwan

unification.

According to some observers, the events of 2014 in Hong Kong have undermined support in

Taiwan for closer relations between Mainland China and Taiwan.76 Some analysts maintain that

disenchantment with China’s handling of events in Hong Kong may have contributed to the poor

showing of Taiwan’s Kuomintang (KMT) party in local elections held in November 2014, but

others point to local economic problems as the main cause of the KMT’s election losses. In

addition, Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement has established ties with Taiwan’s Sunflower

Movement, during which young activists occupied Taiwan’s parliament building to protest the

KMT’s allegedly rushed review of a trade deal with Mainland China.77 The political situation in

Hong Kong has allegedly contributed to a recent increase in Hong Kong residents emigrating to

Taiwan.78

The success or failure of Hong Kong to adopt CE election reforms may resonate in Taiwan. Hong

Kong’s movement to a system whereby the election of its Chief Executive by universal suffrage

allows Hong Kong residents to choose between candidates of differing political views would

likely be well-received in Taiwan. However, failure to adopt universal suffrage in Hong Kong

may swing more Taiwanese voters towards opposition to closer ties with Mainland China, and

possible greater support for Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).

Issues for the 114th Congress

The level of congressional interest in Hong Kong’s possible CE election reforms may depend on

what transpires as the reform process moves through the third and fourth step of the proscribed

six-step procedure. In addition, the HKSAR government’s treatment of alleged protest organizers

may also influence congressional interest in Hong Kong, and the 114th Congress’s potential to

take action. Legislation has been introduced to amend or alter current U.S. policy toward Hong

Kong. Congress may also examine U.S. support for democratization in Hong Kong.

The Response of the 113th Congress

During the 113th Congress, both chambers of Congress introduced legislation that would have

amended the U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, as well as made it possible for Hong Kong to

qualify for the U.S. visa waiver program. Subcommittees of the House Committee on Foreign

Affairs and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held hearings about Hong Kong’s

possible election reforms and the ongoing pro-democracy protests. Although none of the

proposed legislation became law, some Members and committees of the 113th Congress closely

For example, see Kerry Brown, “How Hong Kong’s Protests Swayed Taiwan’s Elections,” The Diplomat, December

1, 2014; or Barclay Bram Shoemaker, “Hong Kong: Taiwan’s Broken Mirror,” The Diplomat, December 11, 2014.

For more about the Sunflower Movement, see J. Michael Cole, “Was Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement Successful?,”

The Diplomat, July 1, 2014.

“Increasing Number of Hong Kong People Want to Emigrate to Taiwan,” Focus Taiwan, February 23, 2015.

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monitored the events in Hong Kong and some Members of Congress were critical of what they

saw as an inadequate response from the Obama Administration and the Department of State.79

The Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act (HKHRDA; H.R. 5696 and S. 2922) was

introduced in both the House of Representatives and the Senate on November 13, 2014. The

legislation reaffirmed “the principles and objectives set forth in the United States-Hong Kong

Policy Act of 1992,” including “support for democratization” as a “fundamental principle of

United States foreign policy.” The bill also supported “the democratic aspirations of the people of

Hong Kong, as guaranteed to them by the Joint Declaration, the Basic Law, the International

Covenant on Civil and Human Rights, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”

HKHRDA supported, as well, “the establishment by 2017 of a genuine democratic option to

freely and fairly nominate and elect the Chief Executive of Hong Kong.…”

Section 4 of the HKHRDA would have reinstated the State Department’s annual report on the

status of Hong Kong as provided by Section 301 of the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of

1992 for 10 years. The reinstated report was to also include an accounting of “matters in which

Hong Kong is given separate treatment under the laws of the United States from that accorded to

the People’s Republic of China and in accordance with this Act.”

Section 5 of the HKHRDA was the source of some controversy as the Obama Administration, the

HKSAR government and some supporters of the Hong Kong pro-democracy demonstrations

expressed opposition to its provisions. The original version of H.R. 5696 and S. 2922 rendered

Hong Kong

ineligible for treatment different from that afforded the People’s Republic of China under

United States laws, agreements, or arrangements enacted or entered into after the date of the

enactment of this Act unless the President certifies to Congress that Hong Kong is

sufficiently autonomous to justify such different treatment.

The section did provide for a presidential waiver if the President determined that such a waiver is

“in the national security interests of the United States.” The Obama Administration indicated that

it would prefer the certification be done by the Secretary of State.80 The Hong Kong government

and some pro-democracy advocates from Hong Kong objected to the presumption that Hong

Kong was no longer sufficiently autonomous to justify separate treatment from China.81

The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations amended and approved S. 2922 on December 12,

2014, changing the provisions of Section 5. The amended version of S. 2922 would have required

the Secretary of State (not the President) to certify to Congress “[n]ot later than 90 days after the

date of the enactment of the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, and annually

thereafter” that “Hong Kong is sufficiently autonomous to justify separate treatment different

from that accorded to the People’s Republic of China in any new laws, agreements, treaties, or

arrangements.…”

For example, see transcripts of U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asia and the

Pacific, “Hong Kong: A Broken Promise?,” 113th Cong., 2nd sess., December 2, 2014; and U.S. Congress, Senate

Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, “Evaluating the Impact of the

‘Umbrella Movement,’” 113th Cong., 2nd sess., December 3, 2014.

CRS interviews.

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Neither H.R. 5696 nor S. 2922 was voted on by either the House of Representatives or the Senate.

Besides the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, the 113th Congress considered other

legislation explicitly dealing with Hong Kong. As noted previously, Congress passed the

Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235) in December 2014,

requiring the State Department submit to a report on the status of Hong Kong to designated

congressional committees (see “Implications for U.S. Policy Toward Hong Kong”). S. 703 would

have amended the Immigration and Nationalization Act to make the Hong Kong Special

Administrative Region eligible for designation as a visa waiver program country.82 In addition,

H.R. 1923, S. 266, and S. 744 contained provisions that would have made Hong Kong eligible for

the visa waiver program. None of these bills was enacted into law.

The political situation in Hong Kong was the subject of hearings during the 113th Congress. The

House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific held a hearing

entitled, “Hong Kong: A Broken Promise?” on December 2, 2014.83 The Senate Committee on

Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs held a hearing entitled,

“Evaluating the Impact of the ‘Umbrella Movement,’” on December 3, 2014.84 In addition, the

Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) held a hearing entitled, “The Future of

Democracy in Hong Kong,” on November 20, 2014.85

Legislation

On February 27, 2015, Representative Christopher Smith introduced the Hong Kong Human

Rights and Democracy Act (H.R. 1159). The act reaffirms U.S. interest in “the continued vitality,

prosperity, and stability of Hong Kong,” and “support for democratization” as “a fundamental

principle of United States foreign policy.” It also states that it is U.S. policy “to support the

establishment by 2017 of a genuine democratic option to freely and fairly nominate and elect the

Chief Executive of Hong Kong.…”

The provisions of H.R. 1159 are very similar to the amended version of S. 2922 approved by the

Senate Foreign Relations Committee during the 113th Congress. Section 4 of the act would

reinstate the State Department’s annual report to Congress as provided for in Section 301 of the

United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 5731) for 10 years or “until such earlier

date that the Secretary of State certifies that Hong Kong has held free and fair elections for two

consecutive Chief Executive and two consecutive Legislative Council periods.”

Section 5 of the act would amend the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 by adding

Section 202a, which would require the Secretary of State to certify to Congress not later than 90

after enactment and annually thereafter “whether Hong Kong is sufficiently autonomous to justify

separate treatment different from that accorded the People’s Republic of China in any new laws,

For more information about the visa waiver program, see CRS Report RL32221, Visa Waiver Program, by (name r

edacted).

U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Hong Kong: A Broken

Promise?, 113th Cong., 2nd sess., December 2, 2014.

U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs,

“Evaluating the Impact of the ‘Umbrella Movement,’” 113th Cong., 2nd sess., December 3, 2014.

Congressional-Executive Commission on China, The Future of Democracy in Hong Kong, November 20, 2014,

http://www.cecc.gov/events/hearings/the-future-of-democracy-in-hong-kong.

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agreements, treaties, or arrangements entered into between the United States and Hong Kong

after the date of the enactment of such Act.” The section also provides for the Secretary of State

to waive the certification requirement if the Secretary determines that such a waiver is in the

national interest of the United States.

On June 18, 2015, Senator Bob Corker submitted the Department of State Operations

Authorization and Embassy Security Act, Fiscal Year 2016 (S. 1635), which would reinstate and

extend the annual State Department report required by Section 301 of the United States-Hong

Kong Policy Act of 1992 through 2020, and would require the Secretary of State to certify to

Congress within 90 days of enactment and annually thereafter

whether Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is sufficiently autonomous to justify

different treatment for its citizens from the treatment accorded to other citizens of the

People’s Republic of China in any new laws, agreements, treaties, or arrangements entered

into between the United States and Hong Kong after the date of the enactment of this Act.

The bill does provide waiver authority if the Secretary determines that such a waiver is in the

national interests of the United States, and provides prior notice and justification to the Senate

Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Hearings

The House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific held a June 11,

2015, entitled, “Retreat or Revival—A Status Report on Democracy in Asia.”86 Among the

locales under examination in the hearing was Hong Kong (along with Burma and Thailand). The

Senate has not held a hearing on democracy and/or electoral reforms in Hong Kong during the

114th Congress.

Promoting Democratization in Hong Kong

For many years, Congress has appropriated funds through various programs to promote

democracy around the world, including China and Hong Kong. These programs are administered

by the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), the U.S.

Agency for International Development (USAID), and the National Endowment for Democracy

(NED). The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235)

provided for the continuation of funding for these programs. In the Congressional Budget

Justification for Fiscal Year 2015, NED stated, “The Endowment will maintain its focus on the

four priority countries in Asia—Pakistan, Burma, North Korea, and China (including Tibet,

Xinjiang, and Hong Kong).”87

Past U.S. programs in Hong Kong have focused on providing technical assistance on membership

recruitment, voter and media communications, and fundraising to Hong Kong’s political parties

and political groups. NED and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) are currently providing

U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Retreat or Revival—A

Status Report on Democracy in Asia, 114th Cong., 1st sess., June 11, 2015.

Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Appendix 1: Department of State Operations, April 7,

2014.

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assistance to the Design Democracy Hong Kong project, a web-based forum

(http://designdemocracy.hk/) where Hong Kong residents can create different models for the

selection of the Chief Executive and Legco by universal suffrage. As of January 27, 2015, 716 CE

election models have been created and 15 Legco models. In April 2014, NED hosted ex-CS

Anson Chan and Martin Lee, who gave a talk in Washington, DC, on democracy in Hong Kong.

Some Mainland and Hong Kong publications have published allegations that the United States

and other foreign sources were funding and advising the pro-democracy protesters in Hong Kong.

CE Leung has on several occasions claimed that he has evidence to prove foreign support of the

Umbrella Movement, but to date he has not publicly released the alleged evidence. As a result,

some pro-democracy organizations and individuals in Hong Kong are apprehensive about contact

and/or association with Congress, the U.S. government, and other foreign governments and

diplomats.

Access to China and Hong Kong

Since the beginning of the pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong, the Chinese and HKSAR

governments have periodically restricted the movement of Hong Kong residents and people from

other countries allegedly associated with the protest movement. Several Legco members and

students involved in HKFS or Scholarism have been denied entry into Mainland China even

though they possessed the necessary official documents. At least one Hong Kong resident was not

allowed to board his original return flight to Hong Kong from Taiwan reportedly because of his

alleged involvement in the Umbrella Movement.88

On December 2, 2014, members of the British Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Select Committee

were informed by Chinese government officials that they could not travel to Hong Kong to

investigate the political situation in Hong Kong.89 The committee’s chairman, Richard Ottaway,

was reportedly told by China’s deputy ambassador to Britain Ni Jian that the refusal of entry was

related to the Occupy movement.90 The denial was unusual as the decision was made by the

Chinese government and not the HKSAR government, which under the Basic Law has autonomy

with respect to immigration policy and procedures.

“Democracy Activists Worry Hong Kong Government Is Keeping a Travel ‘Blacklist,’” Wall Street Journal, January

5, 2015.

Stuart Lau, “British MPs Postpone Hong Kong Trip after Beijing Denies Entry over Occupy Fears,” December 2,

2014.

L Gordon Crovitz, “China ‘Voids’ Hong Kong Rights,” Wall Street Journal, op-ed, December 14, 2014.

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Appendix A. Composition of Election Committee

Hong Kong’s Chief Executive Election Ordinance (CEEO) allocates the 300 seats in each of the

four sectors stipulated in Annex I of the Basic Law into 35 subsectors as indicated in the tables

below. Also listed is the number of registered voters—with corporate and individual voters in

separate columns—for each subsector in the 2011 Election Committee elections, according to the

Hong Kong’s Electoral Affairs Commission.91

Table A-1. Industrial, Commercial and Financial Sectors

Subsector

Seats

Corporate Voters

Individual Voters

Catering

728

7,206

Commercial (first)

860

Commercial (second)

662

1,121

Employers’ Federation of Hong Kong

122

Finance

125

Financial Services

568

Hong Kong Chinese Enterprises Association

306

Hotel

101

Import and Export

806

628

Industrial (first)

610

Industrial (second)

695

Insurance

135

Real Estate and Construction

482

272

Textiles and Garment

3,055

133

Tourism

1,118

Transport

201

Wholesale and Retail

1,795

5,084

Table A-2.The Professions

Subsector

Seats

Accountancy

24,630

Architectural, Surveying and Planning

6,778

Chinese Medicine

5,864

Education

86,618

Engineering

9,052

Health Services

39,128

Corporate Voters

Individual Voters

See http://www.eac.gov.hk/pdf/chief/en/2012_CE_Report/2012ce_appendix_II.pdf.

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Subsector

Seats

Corporate Voters

Individual Voters

Higher Education

9,106

Information Technology

5,175

Legal

6,583

Medical

11,118

Table A-3. Labor, Social Services, Religious and Other Sectors

Subsector

Seats

Corporate Voters

Individual Voters

Agriculture and Fisheries

159

Labor

626

Religious

Social Welfare

277

14,152

Sports, Performing Arts, Culture and

Publication

2,149

209

not applicablea

The 60 religious subsector seats are allocated by the Chief Executive among the following religious

organizations: Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong; Chinese Muslim Cultural and Fraternal Association; Hong

Kong Christian Council; the Hong Kong Taoist Association; the Confucian Academy; and the Hong Kong

Buddhist Association. Each organization appoints their members to the Election Committee.

Table A-4. Members of the Legislative Council, Representatives of District-based

Organizations, Hong Kong Deputies to the National People’s Congress, and Hong

Kong Members of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political

Consultative Conference

Subsector

Seats

Corporate Voters

Individual Voters

National People’s Congress (NPC)

not applicablea

Legislative Council (Legco)

not applicableb

Chinese People’s Political Consultative

Conference (CPPCC)

151

Heung Yee Kukc

147

Hong Kong and Kowloon District Councils

200

New Territories District Councils

212

NPC deputies automatically are members of the Election Committee.

Legco members automatically are members of the Election Committee.

Heung Yee Kuk (Rural Council) is a statutory body established to represent the interest of the indigenous

people of Hong Kong’s New Territories.

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Appendix B. Legislative Council Members:

Pro-establishment and Pan-democrat Factions

The 70 members of Hong Kong’s Legislative Council are frequently divided into two factions—

the pro-establishment members and the pan-democrats. The table below provides a list of the

current Legco members and their party affiliation, divided into pro-establishment and pandemocrat members.

Table B-1. Legco Members by Factions

Current Legco members divided into pro-establishment and pan-democrats (with party affiliations)

Pro-Establishment Members (43)

Pan-Democratic Members (27)

Chan Hak-kan (DAB)

Albert Chan Wai-yip (People’s Power)

Chan Han-pan (DAB)

Chan Chi-chuen (People’s Power)

Chan Kam-lam (DAB)

Kenneth Chan Ka-lok (Civic Party)

Chan Kin-por (Independent)

Fernando Cheung Chiu-hung (Labour)

Chan Yuen-han (FTU)

Cheung Kwok-che (Labour)

Christopher Cheung Wah-fung (Independent)

Gary Fan Kwok-wai (Neo Democrats)

Tommy Cheung Yu-yan(Liberal Party)

Frederick Fung Kin-kee (ADPL)

Chiang Lai-wan (DAB)

Albert Ho Chu-yan (Democratic Party)

Christopher Chung Chu-kun (DAB)

Cyd Ho Sau-lan (Labour Party)

Chung Kwok-pan (Liberal)

Ip Kin-yuen (Independent)

Vincent Fang Kang (Liberal Party)

Dennis Kwok Wing-hang (Civic Party)

Steven Ho Chun-yin (DAB)

Kwok Ka-ki (Civic Party)

Ip Kwok-him (DAB)

Emily Lau Wai-hing (Democratic Party)

Regina Ip Lau Suk-yee (New People’s Party)

Lee Cheuk-yan (CTU)

Kwok Wai-keung (FTU)

Joseph Lee Kwok-long (Independent)

Jeffrey Lam Kin-fung (Economic Synergy)

Alan Leong Kah-kit (Civic Party)

Lam Tai-fai (Independent)

Leung Ka-lau (Independent)

Lau Wong-fat (Economic Synergy)

Kenneth Leung Kai-cheong (Professional Commons)

Starry Lee Wai-king (DAB)

Leung Kwok-hung (League of Social Democrats)

Andrew Leung Kwan-yuen (Economic Synergy)

Claudia Mo Man-ching (Civic Party)

Leung Che-cheung (DAB)

Charles Peter Mok (Professional Commons)

Priscilla Leung Mei-fun (Professional Forum)

Sin Chung-kai (Democratic Party)

Leung Yiu-chung (NWSC)

James To Kun-sun (Democratic Party)

Lo Wai-kwok (Independent)

Ronny Tong Ka-wah (Civic Party)

Martin Liao Cheung-kong (Independent)

Helena Wong Pik-wan (Democratic Party)

Ma Fung-kwok (New Forum)

Wong Yuk-man (People’s Power)

Alice Mak Mei-kuen (FTU)

Wu Chi-wai (Democratic Party)

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Pro-Establishment Members (43)

Pan-Democratic Members (27)

Ng Leung-sing (Independent)

Poon Siu-ping (FLU)

Elizabeth Quat Pui-fan (DAB)

Abraham Shek Lai-him (Professional Forum)

Tam Yiu-chung (DAB)

Tang Ka-piu (FTU)

James Tien Pei-chun (Liberal Party)

Michael Tien Puk-sun (New People’s Party)

Jasper Tsang Yok-sing (DAB)

Paul Tse Wai-chun (Independent)

Tony Tse Wai-chuen (Independent)

Wong Kwok-hing (FTU)

Wong Kwok-kin (FTU)

Wong Ting-kwong (DAB)

Frankie Yick Chi-ming (Liberal Party)

Yiu Si-wing (Independent)

Source: CRS analysis.

Notes: ADPL—Hong Kong Association for Democracy and People’s Livelihood; CTU—Hong Kong

Confederation of Trade Unions; DAB—Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong;

FLU—Federation of Hong Kong and Kowloon Labour Unions; FTU—Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions;

NWSC—Neighbourhood and Worker’s Service Centre.

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Appendix C. Functional Constituency Members by

Constituency and Electorate

The table below lists the 35 functional constituency members of Hong Kong Legislative Council

by the official name of the functional constituency they represent. In addition, it lists the number

of registered voter eligible to vote in each functional constituency.

Table C-1. Legco Functional Constituency Members

including eligible voters for each constituency

Functional Constituency

Legco Member

Eligible Voters

Accountancy

Kenneth Leung Kai-cheong

Agriculture and Fisheries

Steven Ho Chun-yin

156

Architectural, Surveying and Planning

Tony Tse Wai-chuen

6,781

Catering

Tommy Cheung Yu-yan

7,729

Commercial (First)

Jeffrey Lam Kin-fung

Commercial (Second)

Martin Liao Cheung-kong

District Council (First)

Ip Kwok-him

District Council (Second)

Chan Yuen-han

25,174

876

1,529

410

3,219,755

Frederick Fung Kin-kee

Albert Ho Chun-yan

Starry Lee Wai-king

James To Kun-sun

Education

Ip Kin-yuen

92,957

Engineering

Lo Wai-kwok

9,172

Finance

Ng Leung-sing

106

Financial Services

Christopher Cheung Wah-fung

564

Health Services

Joseph Lee Kok-long

Heung Yee Kuk

Lau Wong-fat

Import & Export

Wong Ting-kwong

Industrial (First)

Andrew Leung Kwan-yuen

562

Industrial (Second)

Lam Tai-fai

772

Information Technology

Charles Peter Mok

Insurance

Chan Kin-por

120

Labour

Kwok Wai-keung

608

37,556

147

1,363

6,687

Poon Siu-ping

Tang Ka-piu

Legal

Dennis Kwok Wing-hang

6,482

Medical

Leung Ka-lau

10,888

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Functional Constituency

Legco Member

Eligible Voters

Real Estate and Construction

Abraham Shek Lai-him

Social Welfare

Cheung Kwok-che

14,093

Sports, Performing Arts, Culture, and Publication

Ma Fung-kwok

2,395

Textiles and Garments

Chung Kowk-pan

2,844

Tourism

Yiu Si-wing

1,230

Transport

Frankie Yick Chi-ming

Wholesale and Retail

Vincent Fang Kang

738

200

7,040

Source: Handout from the Legislative Council.

Congressional Research Service

Prospects for Democracy in Hong Kong: The 2017 Election Reforms (Update)

Appendix D. Full Text of Resolution to Amend

Annex I of the Basic Law

III. Motion

Motion concerning the Amendment to the Method for the Selection of the Chief Executive of the

Hong Kong Special Administrative Region

Secretary for Constitutional and Mainland Affairs to move the following motion:

Pursuant to Article 7 of Annex I to the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative

Region of the People’s Republic of China, the Interpretation by the Standing Committee of the

National People’s Congress of Article 7 of Annex I and Article III of Annex II to the Basic Law of

the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China of 6 April 2004,

and the Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Issues Relating

to the Selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region by

Universal Suffrage and on the Method for Forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong

Special Administrative Region in the Year 2016 of 31 August 2014, the “(Draft) Amendment to

Annex I to the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s

Republic of China Concerning the Method for the Selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong

Kong Special Administrative Region” appended to this Motion is hereby endorsed by this

Council by a two-thirds majority of all Members.

Annex

(Draft) Amendment to Annex I to the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative

Region of the People’s Republic of China Concerning the Method for the Selection of the Chief

Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region

1. Starting from 2017, the Chief Executive shall be selected by universal suffrage upon

nomination by a broadly representative Nominating Committee in accordance with democratic

procedures and appointed by the Central People’s Government.

2. The Nominating Committee shall be composed of 1200 members from the following sectors:

Industrial, commercial and financial sectors - 300

The professions - 300

Labour, social services, religious and other sectors - 300

Members of the Legislative Council, representatives of members of the District Councils,

representatives of the Heung Yee Kuk, Hong Kong deputies to the National People’s

Congress, and representatives of Hong Kong members of the National Committee of the

Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference - 300

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The term of office of the Nominating Committee shall be five years. In the event that the office of

Chief Executive becomes vacant within the five-year term of office of the Nominating Committee

and a by-election is held, the term of office of the new Chief Executive shall be the remainder of

the previous Chief Executive.

3. The delimitation of the various sectors of the Nominating Committee, the organizations in each

sector eligible to return Nominating Committee members and the number of such members

returned by each of these organizations and how to return them shall be prescribed by an electoral

law enacted by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in accordance with the principles

of democracy and openness.

Corporate bodies in various sectors shall, on their own, elect members to the Nominating

Committee, in accordance with the number of seats allocated and the election method as

prescribed by the electoral law.

Members of the Nominating Committee shall discharge their duties in their individual capacities.

4. A person seeking nomination by the Nominating Committee may be recommended jointly by

not less than 120 members and not more than 240 members of the Nominating Committee. Each

member may recommend only one person.

The Nominating Committee shall, from the persons recommended as aforesaid, nominate two to

three persons seeking nomination to become Chief Executive candidates by secret ballot. Each

Nominating Committee member shall vote for at least two persons, and may at most vote for all

persons seeking nomination by the Nominating Committee. Each candidate must have the

endorsement of more than half of all the members of the Nominating Committee. The specific

nominating method shall be prescribed by the electoral law.

5. All eligible electors of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region who have registered in

accordance with the law shall, from the list of candidates nominated by the Nominating

Committee, elect one Chief Executive designate by secret ballot. The specific election method

shall be prescribed by the electoral law.

(As reported at http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr14-15/english/counmtg/agenda/cm20150617.htm.)

Author Contact Information

(name redacted)

Specialist in Asian Affairs

[redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....

Congressional Research Service

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