Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 114th Congress

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Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy:

Issues for the 114th Congress

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Specialist in Asian Affairs

September 17, 2015

Congressional Research Service

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R43964

Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 114th Congress

Summary

This report examines human rights issues in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), including

ongoing rights abuses, and legal developments. Major events of the past two years include a

clampdown on political dissent and civil society and an escalation of violence in Xinjiang, which

many experts attribute at least in part to repressive government policies. Some observers view the

closing of the “Re-education Through Labor” penal system as a potentially positive development,

although many PRC citizens still are subject to various forms of extra-legal detention. Other,

ongoing human rights problems in China include the following: arbitrary use of state security

laws against political dissidents; torture of persons in custody; persecution of unsanctioned

religious activity; state controls on expression and the flow of information; coercive family

planning practices; and mistreatment of North Korean refugees. Tibetans, Uighur Muslims, and

Falun Gong adherents continue to receive especially harsh treatment from authorities. For

additional information, including policy recommendations, see CRS Report R41007,

Understanding China’s Political System; the Congressional-Executive Commission on China’s

Annual Report 2014; the U.S. Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices

for 2014; and other resources cited below.

Human rights conditions in China reflect contradictory trends. In recent years, the ruling Chinese

Communist Party (CCP) has implemented some reforms that may help to reduce some human

rights abuses, while rejecting concepts related to universal values, individual rights, and

constitutional democracy. In 2014, the CCP announced some measures aimed at reducing

government influence over the courts, particularly at the local level. However, the Party

leadership has not fundamentally altered the institutions that permit the Party and its policies to

remain above the law. Xi Jinping, who became General Secretary of the CCP in 2012, has carried

out a crackdown on dissent and activism that has surprised many observers for its scope and

severity, including the detentions and arrests of hundreds of government critics, human rights

lawyers, well-known bloggers, investigative journalists, outspoken academics, civil society

leaders, and ethnic minorities. Indictments for state security crimes, which often are political in

nature, rose in 2013 to 1,384 cases, the highest level since the Tibetan unrest of 2008. The

government has imposed growing restrictions on Chinese microblogging and mobile text

services, which have become important sources of news for many Chinese people and platforms

for public opinion. During the past several months, the Chinese government has passed or

considered new laws that appear to do the following: strengthen the role of the state security

apparatus in overseeing a wide range of social activities, including those of foreign nongovernmental organizations; place additional restrictions on defense lawyers; and authorize

greater governmental controls over the Internet.

The PRC government’s aim of maintaining social stability gradually has become more

complicated, according to many observers. Chinese society has become more diverse and

individuals and groups have become more assertive regarding their interests. PRC citizens have

become increasingly aware of their legal rights, while emerging networks of lawyers, journalists,

and activists have advanced the causes of many aggrieved individuals and groups. Public protests

are frequent and widespread, although they predominantly are focused on local or economic

issues rather than national political ones. Economic, social, and demographic changes and other

factors have fueled labor unrest. The Internet has made it impossible for the government to

restrict information as fully as before.

Many experts and policymakers have sharply disagreed over the best policy approaches and

methods to apply toward human rights issues in China. The United States Congress has been at

the forefront of U.S. human rights policy toward China, and has formed the legislative pillars of

Congressional Research Service

Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 114th Congress

that policy. Possible approaches range from supporting incremental progress and promoting

human rights through bilateral and international engagement to conditioning the further

development of bilateral ties on improvements in human rights in China. Congress and the

executive branch have developed an array of policy tools aimed at promoting democracy and

human rights in China, including the following: open censure of China; quiet diplomacy;

congressional hearings; U.S. support for rule of law and civil society programs in the PRC;

support for dissidents and pro-democracy groups in China and the United States; sanctions;

coordinating international pressure; bilateral dialogue; Internet freedom efforts; and public

diplomacy.

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Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 114th Congress

Contents

Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1

Assessing Human Rights Conditions in China ................................................................................ 2

Public Protests ........................................................................................................................... 4

Public Attitudes ......................................................................................................................... 5

Selected Developments ................................................................................................................... 6

Political Dissent ........................................................................................................................ 6

Arrests of Lawyers .................................................................................................................... 7

New Legislation ........................................................................................................................ 7

National Security Law ........................................................................................................ 7

Draft Overseas NGO Management Law ............................................................................. 8

Other Proposed Legislation................................................................................................. 9

Nongovernmental Organizations............................................................................................... 9

The Internet .............................................................................................................................. 11

Weibo and WeChat............................................................................................................ 13

Re-education Through Labor (RETL) ..................................................................................... 14

Selected Human Rights Issues....................................................................................................... 16

Prisoners of Conscience .......................................................................................................... 17

Liu Xiaobo ........................................................................................................................ 18

Gao Zhisheng .................................................................................................................... 18

Xu Zhiyong ....................................................................................................................... 18

Religious Freedom and Ethnic Minority Issues ...................................................................... 19

Christians .......................................................................................................................... 20

Tibetans ............................................................................................................................. 21

Uighur Muslims ................................................................................................................ 24

Falun Gong ....................................................................................................................... 29

China’s Family Planning Policies ........................................................................................... 32

Labor Unrest............................................................................................................................ 33

Legal Reforms ............................................................................................................................... 34

U.S. Efforts to Advance Human Rights in China .......................................................................... 36

Selected Policy Tools .............................................................................................................. 37

Congressional Actions ...................................................................................................... 38

Rule of Law and Civil Society Programs.......................................................................... 39

National Endowment for Democracy ............................................................................... 40

Sanctions ........................................................................................................................... 40

United Nations Human Rights Council ............................................................................ 41

Human Rights Dialogue.................................................................................................... 42

Internet Freedom ............................................................................................................... 45

International Broadcasting ................................................................................................ 45

Appendixes

Appendix. Selected Legislation Related to Human Rights in China ............................................. 46

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Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 114th Congress

Contacts

Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 47

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Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 114th Congress

Introduction

Human rights conditions in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) remain a central issue in U.S.China ties. Different perceptions of human rights are an underlying source of mutual

misunderstanding and mistrust. Frictions on human rights issues affect other issues in the bilateral

relationship, including those related to economics and security. China’s weak rule of law and

restrictions on information affect U.S. companies doing business in the PRC. People-to-people

exchanges, particularly educational and academic ones, are often hampered by periodic Chinese

government campaigns against “Western values.”

For many U.S. policymakers, human rights conditions in China represent a test of the success of

overall U.S. policy toward the PRC. Some analysts contend that the U.S. policy of cultivating

diplomatic, economic, and cultural ties with China has failed to promote meaningful political

reform, and that without fundamental progress in this area, mutual trust and cooperation in other

areas will remain difficult to achieve. They add that U.S. efforts to support human rights and

democracy in the PRC are constrained by the overarching policy of U.S. engagement with China,

which reflects other U.S. interests, particularly economic ones. Many U.S. and Chinese human

rights advocates have urged the Obama Administration to place a higher priority upon human

rights in the bilateral relationship, and to forge deeper contacts with Chinese reformers, activists,

and dissidents.1 Other experts argue that change in China will come mostly from within, and that

Washington has little direct leverage over Beijing’s policies. They contend that U.S. engagement

has helped to accelerate economic and social transformations and create the necessary conditions

for political reform in China, particularly over the long term. Some observers add that public

censure and efforts to condition further development of the bilateral relationship upon

improvements in human rights in China have not been very effective.2 Some experts suggest that

U.S. human rights policies should seek common ground and appeal as much as possible to

China’s own interests.3

The U.S. government has employed an array of efforts and tactics aimed at promoting democracy,

human rights, and the rule of law in China, although their effects have been felt primarily along

the margins of the PRC political system. Many analysts have observed that China’s leaders have

become less responsive to international pressure on human rights in recent years.4 Policy tools

include open criticism of PRC human rights policies; quiet diplomacy; hearings; foreign

Daniel Blumenthal, “Tiananmen’s Anniversary is a Chance for Obama to Fight for Human Rights in China,” Foreign

Policy, June 4, 2014; Joint Letter to President Obama on Forthcoming China Visit, October 10, 2014,

http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/

Joint%20Letter%20to%20President%20Obama%20on%20Forthcoming%20China%20Visit.pdf.

David M. Lampton, “‘The China Fantasy,’ Fantasy,” The China Quarterly, No. 191 (September 2007); James Mann,

“Rejoinder to David M. Lampton,” The China Quarterly, No. 191 (September 2007); “Not So Obvious: The Secretary

of State Underestimates the Power of Her Words,” Washington Post, February 2009; “A Bow to Reality, Not China,”

USA Today, February 27, 2009; Thomas J. Christensen, “Shaping the Choices of a Rising China: Recent Lessons for

the Obama Administration,” The Washington Quarterly, July 2009; William F. Schulz, “Strategic Persistence: How the

United States Can Help Improve Human Rights in China,” Center for American Progress, January 2009; Simon

Denyer, “Will the U.S.-Cuba Opening Mirror Engagement with China?” Washington Post, December 20, 2014; Robert

Daly, “China 101 Series: Human Rights and Social Change,” U.S. China Working Group and the U.S.-Asia Institute,

July 14, 2014.

Winston Lord, Former U.S. Ambassador to the People’s Republic of China, Testimony before the CongressionalExecutive Commission on China, “Tiananmen at 25: Enduring Influence on U.S.-China Relations and China’s Political

Development,” May 20, 2014.

See John Kamm, Dui Hua Foundation, “China’s Human Rights Diplomacy: Past, Present, Future,” Center for

Strategic and International Studies, March 28, 2014.

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Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 114th Congress

assistance programs; support for dissidents and pro-democracy groups in China and the United

States; sanctions; international pressure; bilateral dialogue; Internet freedom efforts; and public

diplomacy.

Assessing Human Rights Conditions in China

The PRC government is led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), whose rule is referenced in

the preamble to China’s Constitution. The legislature and judiciary lack powers to check the CCP

and the state. The PRC Constitution guarantees many civil and political rights, including, in

Article 35, the freedoms of speech, press, assembly, demonstration, and religious belief.

However, the state restricts these rights in practice. China’s leaders view these rights as

subordinate to their own authority and to the policy goals of maintaining state security and social

stability, promoting economic development, and providing for economic and social rights. They

assert that perspectives on human rights vary according to a country’s level of economic

development and social system, implying that human rights are not “universal” as some

statements by U.S. government officials have emphasized. PRC leaders frequently denounce

foreign criticisms of China’s human rights policies as interference in China’s internal affairs.

Over 25 years since the 1989 demonstrations for democracy in Beijing and elsewhere in China

and the subsequent military crackdown, the Communist Party remains firmly in power. Many

Chinese citizens have attained living standards, educational and travel opportunities, access to

information, and a level of global integration that few envisioned in 1989. However, little

progress has been made in the areas of political freedom and civil liberties. China’s leaders have

rejected institutional reforms that might undermine the Party’s monopoly on power, and continue

to respond forcefully to signs and instances of social instability, autonomous social organization,

and independent political activity. They seek to prevent the development of linkages among

individuals, social groups, and geographical regions that have potential political impact. The

government maintains severe restrictions on unsanctioned religious, ethnic, and labor activity and

groups, political dissidents, and rights lawyers. Government authorities have imposed harsh

policies against Tibetans and Uighurs, and continue efforts to eliminate the spiritual practice of

Falun Gong.

Human rights conditions in China reflect contradictory trends. The ruling Chinese Communist

Party (CCP) has implemented some reforms that may help to reduce some human rights abuses

and bolster its legitimacy, but the state has arrested hundreds of critics of government policy since

2013. Rights awareness among the general public, rights activism, and civil society have

developed, although many Chinese place greater importance upon political stability than change.

Public protests and demonstrations occur on a daily basis through the country, but they

predominantly are focused on local economic issues rather than national political ones. Although

some observers have referred to CCP General Secretary and State President Xi Jinping as the

most forceful Chinese leader since Deng Xiaoping, he faces daunting domestic challenges,

including internal party disputes; political corruption; a slowing national economy; a high level of

income inequality; violent unrest in Xinjiang; a national religious resurgence; severe

environmental pollution; and rising popular expectations.5

David Ignatius, “China’s Xi Jinping Consolidates Power and Brings Stability,” Washington Post, February 28, 2014;

Willy Lam, “Xi Consolidates Power at Fourth Plenum, But Sees Limits,” China Brief, vol. 14, no. 22, November 20,

2014; Jamil Anderlini, “How Long Can the Communist Party Survive in China?” Financial Times, September 20,

2013; David Shambaugh, Brookings Institution, “Obama in China: Preserving the Balance,” transcript, November 5,

2014, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2014/11/05%20obama%20apec/

(continued...)

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Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 114th Congress

In some ways, the Chinese central government has continued to demonstrate a measure of

sensitivity toward popular opinion, reflecting a style of rule that some experts refer to as

“responsive authoritarianism.”6 The CCP has striven to meet the demands and expectations of

many Chinese citizens for competent and accountable governance and fair application of the law,

while policymaking processes have become more inclusive. In recent years, the PRC government

has implemented some legal and institutional reforms aimed at preventing some rights abuses and

making government more transparent and responsive. Changes include criminal justice reforms,

formally abolishing the “Re-education Through Labor” penal system (RETL), a reduction in the

use of the death penalty, and the loosening of the one-child policy. The state has limited

repressive measures largely to selected key

China and U.N. Human Rights

individuals and groups, although the scope of

Covenants

those targeted has widened under President

China has signed (1997) and ratified (2001) the

Xi.

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural

Rights (ICESCR) and signed (1998), but not ratified, the

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

(ICCPR).

Xi Jinping has carried out a campaign against

corruption, a key source of popular discontent,

and investigated and punished thousands of

officials. However, this effort has shown little

regard for due process or procedural protections provided in China’s constitution and laws, and

has not addressed the political sources of corruption, according to experts.7 In 2014, the

government announced some measures aimed at reducing government influence over the courts,

including reducing the role and influence of the Party Central Committee’s Political and Legal

Affairs Commission in “most legal cases.” Yet the Plenum did not fundamentally alter the

institutions that permit the Party and its policies to remain above the law.8 Commenting on the

25th anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen events, Jerome Cohen, an expert on Chinese law and

politics, stated, “economic and social progress, enactment of better legislation, improvements in

legal institutions, and reformist official policy statements do not guarantee either the enjoyment

of civil and political rights or the protection of political and religious activists and their lawyers

against the arbitrary exercise of state and party power.”9

After a period of cautious optimism as Xi Jinping took over the reins of power in 2012 and early

2013, many observers have expressed deep disappointment over the PRC government’s human

rights policies. During the leadership transition period, there was talk in well-connected

intellectual circles about the need for political reform and how to address these issues.10 However,

President Xi has carried out a crackdown on political dissent and civil society. Many citizens who

(...continued)

20141105_obama_china_transcript.pdf.

For example, see Robert P. Weller, “Responsive Authoritarianism,” in Bruce Gilley and Larry Diamond, eds.,

Political Change in China: Comparisons with Taiwan, Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2008; David M. Lampton,

“How China Is Ruled: Why It’s Getting Harder for Beijing to Govern,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2014.

Euan McKirdy, “China Slips Down Corruption Perception Index, Despite High-Profile Crackdown,” CNN, December

3, 2014.

Sui-Lee Wee and Li Hui, “With Legal Reforms, China Wants Less Interference in Cases, Fewer Death Penalty

Crimes,” Reuters, March 9, 2014; Li Yang, “Road Map for Promoting the Rule of Law,” China Daily, November 12,

2014.

Jerome Cohen, “After June 4, China Is Still Fumbling Towards Respect for Rights of All,” South China Morning

Post, June 2, 2014.

Anderlini, op. cit.

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Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 114th Congress

had openly discussed political issues, engaged in political or civic activism, attempted to defend

dissidents or rights activists in court, or tried to expose corrupt officials have been punished.11

Public Protests

Awareness of legal rights among Chinese citizens, in some ways promoted by the government,

continues to rise. At the same time, a small but increasing number of activists, journalists,

lawyers, and others have championed human rights causes.12 Despite strict controls on civil and

political rights, many Chinese citizens have become more assertive in claiming rights that exist

on paper and have developed a greater sense of political efficacy. Some of them have engaged in

public demonstrations against mistreatment by local authorities and employers, invoking the rule

of law and expressing their views and plans of action on the Internet.13 Despite the risks, the

number of lawyers taking on human rights cases continues to grow. By one estimate, roughly 200

attorneys refer to themselves as human rights lawyers. They are becoming increasingly assertive

about their own rights and protecting members of their profession.14 Public protests occur on a

daily basis in China and are growing in frequency. Estimates of the number of “mass incidents”

vary—there are between roughly 110,000 to nearly 200,000 public protests annually, according to

reports.15 Common sources of protest include the following: labor disputes; land seizures and

forcible evictions; misconduct by government officials, police, and “urban management officers”

(chengguan); environmental degradation brought about by development projects and industrial

enterprises; violations of legal rights; and failures to enforce procedural protections provided

under China’s constitution and laws.

The political impact of public protests has been limited. Protests largely have focused on local,

economic, and environmental issues rather than national political ones. The PRC government

takes action to prevent participants in such protests from forging organizational links with other

movements or across cities and regions. In recent years, China’s leaders have focused on

strengthening institutions that address social unrest. In 2011, the Central Commission for

Comprehensive Social Management, which oversees public security, expanded its presence from

29 party and government departments and agencies to 40.16 The Chinese government reportedly

increased funding for “public safety” by 9% in 2013, to $124 billion, a level that exceeded the

formal defense budget. It did not release full domestic security budget numbers in 2014.17

Robert Daly, “China in 2014: The Three Rs,” CNN.com Blogs, December 16, 2013; Zachary Keck, “Four Things

China Learned from the Arab Spring,” The Diplomat, January 4, 2014.

Linda Yeung, “Reform School,” South China Morning Post, November 28, 2010; Sophie Richardson, “Let a

Hundred Volunteers Bloom,” Foreign Affairs, October 11, 2012.

Nicholas Bequelin, “Does the Law Matter in China?” International Herald Tribune, May 14, 2012.

Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Annual Report 2014, October 9, 2014; Malcolm Moore, “Chinese

Lawyers Warn Communist Party Will Target Legal Teams,” The Telegraph, January 28, 2014; Chinese Lawyers

Setting Up Mutual Defence Pacts As Communist Party Targets Dissidents’ Representatives,” The Telegraph Online,

January 28, 2014.

Joseph A. Bosco, “The Implications of China’s Anti-Corruption Drive,” The Diplomat, July 15, 2014; Human

Watch, World Report 2014: China, January 2014.

Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Annual Report 2012, October 10, 2012.

Henry Sanderson and Michael Forsythe, “China Boosts Defense Spending as Military Modernizes Arsenal,”

Bloomberg News, March 5, 2013; Ben Blanchard and John Ruwitch, “China Hikes Defense Budget, to Spend More on

Internal Security,” Reuters, March 5, 2013; “China Withholds Full Details of 2014 Domestic Security Budget,” South

China Morning Post, March 5, 2014.

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Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 114th Congress

Freedom House Special Report on Human Rights in China

A 2015 study by Freedom House, The Politburo’s Predicament, assesses the CCP’s evolving methods of political control.

The report concludes that the overall degree of repression in China has increased under the leadership of General

Secretary Xi Jinping. However, it says Xi’s policies also have fueled resentment, while “fear of the regime appears to

be diminishing.” Part IV of the report provides a list of recommendations for policymakers.18

Public Attitudes

Many experts have argued that economic development will lead to democratization in China in

the long term.19 Some of them posit that the growing Chinese middle class, a manifestation of

such development, will likely be a key agent of political change.20 However, China’s burgeoning

middle class has not yet become a catalyst for democracy, despite its rising awareness of its own

interests, greater demands placed on the government, and growing participation in public

protests.21 Surveys show that urban Chinese, the leading edge of China’s middle class, feel

strongly about clean and responsive government, support civil liberties, and are politically aware.

However, in many ways, they are dependent upon the state for their material well-being and may

be somewhat politically conservative. Most urban residents are not prone to agitate for democracy

if they perceive that their economic needs are being met. They have been careful not to jeopardize

their hard-won economic gains, and have expressed some fear of grassroots democracy.22

According to some surveys, Chinese in more economically developed cities tend to place less

trust in government, particularly at the local level, and are more democratic in orientation.

However, in one public opinion poll, 40.5% of those surveyed supported a multi-party political

system, while 51.3% did not.23 According to another set of surveys, most members of the Chinese

middle class “are vigilant about the individual rights that are closely related to their own

interests.” However, they are reluctant to engage in public demonstrations or to organize to

protect their rights if doing so would disrupt social stability. The middle class may even be less

supportive of some key democratic principles and institutions than the lower income groups.24

Furthermore, while protests and distrust aimed at local governments may be on the rise, support

Freedom House, The Politburo’s Predicament: Confronting the Limitations of Chinese Communist Party Repression,

January 2015, https://freedomhouse.org/report/china/politburo-predicament. Freedom House is an advocacy

organization for human rights and democracy. The organization publishes an annual report, Freedom in the World,

which classifies countries around the world based upon political rights and civil liberties.

Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy,” American Political Science Review, vol. 53, no. 1

(1959). Lipset argued that socioeconomic development, including higher levels of wealth, industrialization,

urbanization, and education, are correlated with democracy.

Henry S. Rowen, “When Will the Chinese People Be Free,” in Andrew J. Nathan, Larry Diamond, and Marc F.

Plattner, eds, Will China Democratize? Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013; Stapleton Roy, Former U.S.

Ambassador to the People’s Republic of China, Testimony before the Congressional-Executive Commission on China,

“Tiananmen at 25: Enduring Influence on U.S.-China Relations and China’s Political Development,” May 20, 2014.

According to one study, China’s “upper middle class”—with annual household incomes of between $17,350 and

$37,500—accounted for 14% of urban Chinese households in 2012 but will account for 54% of households in less than

a decade. Anderlini, op. cit.

Jie Chen, “Attitudes Toward Democracy and the Behavior of China’s Middle Class,” in Cheng Li, ed. China’s

Emerging Middle Class, Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2010.

Yang Zhong, “Do Chinese People Trust Their Local Government and Why?” Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 61,

no. 3, May-June 2014; Bruce Dickson, “Economic Growth and Political Trust,” The 7 th Annual Conference on U.SChina Economic Relations and China’s Economic Development,” Elliot School of International Affairs, George

Washington University, November 21, 2014.

Jie Chen, A Middle Class without Democracy, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.

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Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 114th Congress

for the national government appeared to remain high through 2014, according to some polls. A

Pew study found that in China, nearly 9 people in 10 were satisfied with “the way things are

going in our country.”25

Selected Developments

Less than one year into the 2012 leadership transition that brought Xi Jinping to power, PRC

authorities began to carry out a clampdown on political dissent, civil society, free expression, and

religious practice. The government abolished the “Re-education Through Labor” penal system,

although many citizens still are subject to various forms of extra-legal detention. The state also

imposed restrictive measures on new social media, which had become vibrant platforms for

expression. These policies emerged despite the government’s encouragement of civil society’s

role in providing public services and grudging appreciation of the value of the Internet in helping

to expose government corruption, particularly during the final years of the leadership term of Hu

Jintao, Xi’s predecessor. In Xinjiang, violent protests and attacks allegedly carried out by Uighur

Muslims (see section on “Uighur Muslims,” below), but reportedly often provoked by human

rights abuses and excessive security measures in the region, led to even more repressive measures

and hundreds of deaths.

Political Dissent

While the PRC government has engaged in cycles of reform and repression during the post-1989

era, recent security measures have been striking for their scope and severity, according to many

observers. The crackdown has included detentions and arrests of well-known bloggers,

investigative journalists, outspoken academics, civil society leaders, human rights attorneys, and

ethnic minorities. Many of them had no apparent political agenda, or for years had avoided

criminal charges. An estimated 160-200 activists were arrested or detained in 2013, and this trend

accelerated in 2014.26 In May 2013, the CCP issued a classified directive (Document No. 9)

identifying seven “false ideological trends, positions, and activities,” largely aimed at the media

and liberal academics. According to the document, topics to be avoided in public discussion

include universal values, constitutional democracy, freedom of the press, civil society, civil rights,

an independent judiciary, and criticism of the CCP.27 Universities have been warned against using

textbooks that spread “Western values” and making remarks that “defame the rule of the

Communist Party.”28 In May 2014, Beijing authorities detained several organizers of a small

gathering to discuss the events of June 4, 1989, in which the participants reportedly called for a

public inquiry into the military crackdown.29 The U.S. government urged China to release public

“Global Public Downbeat about Economy,” Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, September 9, 2014.

See “Silencing the Messenger: 2014 Annual Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in China,” March

15, 2015, http://chrdnet.com/2015/03/silencing-the-messenger-2014-annual-report-on-the-situation-of-human-rightsdefenders-in-china/; Rachel Chang, “Security Dragnet in China Tightens,” Straits Times, May 13, 2014; Andrew

Jacobs and Chris Buckley, “Beijing Goes After Grass-Roots Activists; Many Who Applauded a Call to End Corruption

Are Now Behind Bars,” New York Times (International), January 17, 2014; Fred Hiatt, “A Courageous Chinese

Lawyer Urges His Country to Follow its Own Laws,” Washington Post, November 6, 2013.

Asia Society, “Document 9: A ChinaFile Translation,” November 8, 2013, http://www.chinafile.com/document-9chinafile-translation http://www.chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-translation.

Linda Yeung, “Campus Crackdown on ‘Western Values’,” University World News, February 6, 2015.

“Chinese Activist Denied Lawyer amid Widening Clampdown on Dissent,” Legal Monitor Worldwide, May 13,

2014.

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Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 114th Congress

interest lawyer Pu Zhiqiang and other activists involved in the meeting. Pu was arrested in June

2014 on the charges of subversion and fanning ethnic hatred, among other crimes.30

Arrests of Lawyers

In July 2015, roughly 300 human rights lawyers and activists were arrested, detained, or put

under surveillance. Some analysts say these arrests are unprecedented in scale, surpassing the

crackdown on rights lawyers in 2011.31 Many of the lawyers were released after receiving

warnings to cease their activities, but over 20 remain in detention or their whereabouts remain

unknown. Chinese authorities accused lawyers of the Fengrui Law Firm in Beijing, which had

represented Ilham Tohti and taken on other sensitive cases, of disrupting public order, spreading

rumors, and paying people to engage in demonstrations.32 Prominent missing rights attorneys

include Wang Yu and Zhou Shifeng of the Fengrui Law Firm; Li Heping, who had represented

activist Cheng Guangcheng; and Guangzhou-based Sui Muqing.33 In July 2015, the trial of rights

attorney Tang Jingling, arrested in 2014 on the charge of subversion of state power, resumed. The

U.S. government called for the immediate release of lawyers still being held, and stated that “such

a widespread attack against the legal profession threatens one of the few conduits Chinese

citizens have for peaceful redress of grievances, whether they are concerned about corruption or

environmental problems or property rights or any other issue.”34

New Legislation

National Security Law

During the past several months, the Chinese government has passed or considered new laws that

appear to strengthen the role of the state security apparatus over a wide range of social activities,

including those of foreign non-governmental organizations, place additional restrictions on

defense lawyers, and authorize greater government controls over the Internet. In July 2015, the

National People’s Congress passed a new National Security Law that provides legal grounds for

greater and more proactive scrutiny and control of social activities. Article 9 emphasizes “putting

prevention first” in the preservation of national security and calls for “widely mobilizing citizens

and organizations to guard against and punish conduct endangering national security.” According

to the law, the state shall guard against “negative cultural influences,” punish “activities dividing

ethnicities,” and oppose “foreign influences” that interfere with domestic religious affairs, among

other provisions. The National Security Law brings control of the Internet, including “the

dissemination of unlawful and harmful information,” under its purview.35 Article 62 establishes a

national security crisis management and control system. Some critics argue that the law’s

expansiveness and vague wording may allow the government space to violate human rights in

“almost every domain of public life” in the name of national security, and that the law will bolster

“U.S. Calls on China to Free Tiananmen Anniversary Activists,” Reuters, May 7, 2014; Didi Tang, “Chinese Rights

Lawyer Pu Denies All Police Charges,” Associated Press, December 10, 2014.

“Mass Suppression of Lawyers Reveals True Nature of Xi’s ‘Rule by Law,’” Human Rights in China, July 14, 2015,

http://www.hrichina.org/en/press-work/mass-suppression-lawyers-reveals-true-nature-xis-rule-law.

Cao Yin, “Lawyers ‘Tried to Influence Verdicts,’” China Daily, July 13, 2015.

“Chinese Lawyers, Activists Call for a Rights Dialogue with Teeth,” Radio Free Asia, August 12, 2015.

Department of State, “On-the-Record Briefing on the 19th U.S.-China Human Rights Dialogue,” August 13, 2015.

China Law Translate, “National Security Law,” July 1, 2015, http://chinalawtranslate.com/2015nsl/?lang=en.

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the new National Security Commission led by Xi Jinping.36 The Department of State expressed

concern that “the broad scope of the new National Security Law is being used as a legal facade to

commit human rights abuses.” It urged the PRC government to “respect the rights of all of its

citizens and to release all those who have recently been detained for seeking to protect the rights

of Chinese citizens.”37

Draft Overseas NGO Management Law

Draft legislation on the management of foreign and overseas nongovernmental organizations

(NGOs) would place them and their activities under the oversight of Public Security departments

and impose greater limitations or controls upon their supervision, funding, and staffing.38 The

draft law tightens registration requirements on foreign organizations in China, mandating that

they find a government agency (“professional supervisory unit”) to sponsor them.39 Many of them

have been operating without official ties or status and have been loosely supervised by the

Ministry of Civil Affairs. A Ministry of Public Security official stated that the bill aims to regulate

and protect foreign NGOs and to provide a legal basis for the government to investigate funding

activities, while a Chinese NGO expert suggested that the law would prevent NGOs that had

“political agendas.” There are an estimated 1,000 foreign NGOs in China, many of them

American, and up to 6,000 foreign NGOs if short-term activities or projects are included.40

Critics assert that the proposed legislation reflects Xi Jinping’s perception of foreign NGOs as a

security threat. Chinese NGO leaders fear that the law would give the government and the state

security apparatus expanded legal powers over civil society. While it may be selectively enforced,

some argue, the “vague and broad” provisions would leave foreign NGOs, particularly those

working in politically sensitive areas, vulnerable to arbitrary applications of the law. Human

rights groups say that the law would deal “a very severe blow” to foreign NGOs and the domestic

NGOs that they often partner with.41 During a public consultation period that closed on June 4,

2015, Chinese civil society leaders, academics, and lawyers, and foreign governments, human

rights groups, and NGOs, including international business groups and the American Bar

Association, criticized the law and expressed their concerns.42 A bipartisan group of U.S.

Senators, in a letter to President Obama, urged him to raise concerns about human rights and civil

society in China during President Xi’s visit to Washington, DC, in September 2015. They asked

Obama to call on the Chinese leader to release detained lawyers and activists and to protect the

Edward Wong, “Chinese Security Laws Elevate the Party and Stifle Dissent. Mao Would Approve,” New York

Times, May 29, 2015; Ankit Panda, “The Truth About China’s New National Security Law,” The Diplomat, July 1,

2015; Council on Foreign Relations, “National Security Law of the People’s Republic of China,” July 1, 2015; Edward

Wong, “China Approves Sweeping Security Law, Bolstering Communist Rule,” New York Times, July 1, 2015.

Department of State, “U.S. Condemns Detention of Human Rights Defenders in China,” July 12, 2015.

The law applies to NGOs from foreign countries, Hong Kong, and Macau.

China Development Brief, “CDB English Translation of the Overseas NGO Management Law (Second Draft),” May

8, 2015, http://chinadevelopmentbrief.cn/articles/cdb-english-translation-of-the-overseas-ngo-management-law-seconddraft/.

Catherine Wong Tsoi-lai, “New Draft Law Strengthens Overseas NGO Oversight,” Global Times, December 23,

2014.

Simon Deyer, “In China, Civic Groups May Face New Controls,” Washington Post, March 25, 2015; Human Rights

Watch, “China: Scrap Repressive Foreign Organizations Law,” June 2, 2015.

“NGOs in China: Public Consultation and Party Creep,” China Digital Times, June 3, 2015; “30 Lawyers’ Proposal

to National People’s Congress on Halting the Enactment of Foreign NGO Management Law,” China Digital Times,

June 3, 2015.

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Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 114th Congress

gains made by Chinese civil society, in partnership with American NGOs, calling the rise of civil

society “one of the only human rights success stories of the past two decades.”43

Other Proposed Legislation

Human rights advocates argue that some proposed amendments to the Criminal Law would

provide the government with greater legal means with which to silence defense lawyers. Article

36 would penalize lawyers for “insulting, defaming, or threatening judicial personnel” and

engaging in other acts deemed disruptive to the court.44 Some Chinese lawyers and legal experts

worry that the terms as drafted could be used broadly and arbitrarily against lawyers, particularly

in politically sensitive cases.45

Provisions of the draft Cybersecurity Law give the government broad powers to control the flow

of information online, including granting local governments the authority to cut off access to the

Internet “to fulfill the need to protect national security and social public order.” Article 9 of the

bill requires that those using the Internet “observe public order and respect social morality,” and

“not use the network to engage in activities harming national security, propagating terrorism and

extremism, inciting ethnic hatred and ethnic discrimination, disseminating obscene and sexual

information, slandering or defaming others, upsetting social order, [or] harming the public

interest....” Article 40 requires network operators to “strengthen management of information

published by users, and where discovering information that the law or administrative regulations

prohibits the publication or transmission of, they shall immediately stop transmission of that

information....”46 According to some analysts, the bill may not significantly add to existing

restrictions on Internet use and operation. Rather, it provides a legal framework for better

coordination of China’s Internet controls, and elevates local and economic regulations to the level

of national law.47

Nongovernmental Organizations

In recent years, the impact of nongovernmental organizations, also known as social or civil

society organizations, on Chinese society has grown.48 China has over 500,000 registered NGOs,

roughly double the number of a decade ago, and an estimated 1.5-2 million unregistered NGOs.49

“Senators Urge President Obama to Raise Human Rights Concerns during upcoming September Visit by Chinese

President Xi Jinping to the United States,” August 11, 2015, http://www.cardin.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/

senators-urge-president-obama-to-raise-human-rights-concerns-during-upcoming-september-visit-by-chinesepresident-xi_jinping-to-the-united-states44

People’s Republic of China Criminal Law Amendment (9) (Second reading draft), China Law Translate, July 7,

2015, http://chinalawtranslate.com/criminallawam92/?lang=en

Dui Hua Foundation, “Draft Law Amendment Takes Aim at Defense Lawyers in China,” Human Rights Journal,

August 18, 2015.

China Law Translate, “Cybersecurity Law (Draft),” July 6, 2015, http://chinalawtranslate.com/cybersecuritydraft/?

lang=en.

Austin Ramzy, “What You Need to Know about China’s Draft Cybersecurity Law,” New York Times, July 9, 2015.

PRC commentators often prefer to use the term “social organization” rather than “nongovernmental organization” in

order to avoid suggesting an adversarial relationship between society and the state. Some Western analysts use the term

“civil society organization” rather than “nongovernmental organization” to reflect Chinese NGOs’ lack of real

autonomy.

According to some estimates, China may have up to several million NGOs, including government organized NGOs

(GONGOs); social associations; private, non-commercial enterprises; foundations; business entities; and grassroots

organizations. Kristie Lu Stout, “People Power in the People’s Republic of China,” CNN, June 26, 2014;

Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Annual Report 2014, op. cit. See also Ministry of Civil Affairs, “2013

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Chinese non-state entities play a small but growing role in the provision of social welfare

services, policymaking, and advocacy. Environmental NGOs have been at the forefront of this

growth, and other types of social organizations have emerged in the areas of legal aid, public

health, education, rural development, poverty alleviation, policy research, and gay and lesbian

rights.

The PRC government has acknowledged the importance of civil society in helping to address

social and environmental problems. In 2012, commentary in China’s official press upheld NGOs

as important partners in the government’s social management and “social innovation” efforts. An

editorial in the Global Times opined that civil society played a significant role in addressing and

reducing social conflicts.50 The emergence of cooperative arrangements between the government

and NGOs in some areas of public policy has produced a new model of governance referred to as

“consultative authoritarianism,” according to some scholars.51 The government has encouraged

the involvement of social organizations in charitable activities and increasingly has contracted the

provision of social services to NGOs. In January 2015, the Supreme People’s Court announced

rules that would better enable social organizations to sue firms and individuals that violate

China’s environmental protection laws.52

Although NGOs have established a presence in Chinese society, many social organizations

continue to face daunting and complicated challenges related to their legality, financing, and

political survival. Most social organizations are required to secure an official or quasi-official

sponsor, such as a state agency or educational institution, in order to register with the

government. Many groups experience difficulties finding an official organization willing to back

them. Unregistered social organizations are more vulnerable to arbitrary government policies,

including closure, and are not eligible for tax exemptions. Some civil society groups that cannot

secure a sponsor choose to register as businesses.

In 2013, the PRC government announced that the process by which many NGOs could register

would be simplified, allowing them to apply to the Bureau of Civil Affairs and acquire legal

status without also obtaining an official sponsor.53 One Chinese social scientist heralded the new

registration policy as “the partial realisation of freedom of association.”54 Implementation of the

new policy has been incremental and inconsistent, however; generally it does not apply to social

organizations in Tibetan areas and Xinjiang or to NGOs engaged in rights advocacy, particularly

religious, ethnic, and labor rights.55 The government has continued to shut down organizations

(...continued)

Social Services Development Statistics Bulletin,” June 17, 2013, http://www.mca.gov.cn/article/zwgk/mzyw/201406/

20140600654488.shtml

Yu Keping, “Growing Importance of Social Innovation,” China Daily, February 8, 2012; Chen Chenchen, “Civil

Society Solid Base for Nation’s Future,” Global Times, November 4, 2012.

China Development Brief, Policy Brief No. 13 (September 2013): “On the Eve of the Third Plenum, Are We Seeing

a Depoliticization of the NGO Sector?” September 17, 2013; Jessica Teets, “Civil Society and Consultative

Authoritarianism in China,” The 7th Annual Conference on U.S-China Economic Relations and China’s Economic

Development,” Elliot School of International Affairs, George Washington University, November 21, 2014.

“China Encourages Environmental Groups to Sue Polluters,” The Guardian, January 7, 2015.

The new policy would apply to industry associations, science and technology organizations, charities, and

community service groups.

“Chinese Civil Society: Beneath the Glacier,” The Economist, April 12, 2014; Shawn, Shieh, “The Changing

Contours of Civil Society in China: The Growth of Grassroots NGOs and Public Advocacy,” Wilson Center, Kissinger

Institute on China and the United States, July 18, 2013.

Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013 (China), April 19, 2014, and Department

of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2014 (China), June 25, 2015.

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Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 114th Congress

that it considers to be politically threatening. Furthermore, Chinese social organizations remain

constrained by laws that prevent them from raising money publicly and establishing branches in

different provinces.

PRC leaders have displayed a growing wariness about the potential autonomy, intentions, and

foreign contacts of many Chinese social organizations. In 2014, many NGOs, particularly those

with foreign support, reportedly experienced more frequent and aggressive monitoring by

authorities. Many U.S.-based and other international NGOs engaged in rule of law, civil society,

political participation, and advocacy work in China have faced increasing scrutiny. Some civil

society activists fear that the increasing difficulties of accepting foreign support will increase

their reliance upon government funding, reducing their independence, and discouraging risk

taking and rights advocacy. As a result, “social conflicts will become worse.”56 Although the

number of civil society organizations may be growing, the “space in which civil society may

operate is actually shrinking,” according to a Hong Kong expert.57

The Internet58

The PRC is ranked near the bottom in the world for media and Internet freedom, according to

human rights organizations. The government, however, exercises less control over news and

information than it did a decade ago, due to the commercialization of the press, the development

of the Internet, and the rise of social media.59 In 2014, 44 Chinese journalists were imprisoned,

according to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), compared to 33 in 2013. CPJ and other

sources attribute the rise of arrests in recent years to crackdowns on Tibetans, Uighurs, dissidents,

and investigative reporters.60

China has the world’s largest number of Internet users, estimated at over 630 million people. The

number of Internet users in China has reached about 47% of the population, compared to 87% in

the United States.61 Some analysts view Internet communication as one of the main political

challenges to the CCP. The Web has served as a lifeline for political dissidents, activists, and civil

society actors. “Netizens” have helped to curb some abuses of government authority and

compelled some officials to conduct affairs more openly.62

With one of the most thorough and aggressive Internet censorship systems in the world, the PRC

government has attempted to control and monitor Internet use in China, with mixed results.

Internet users have developed ways to circumvent censorship, and politically sensitive news and

opinion often get widely disseminated, if only fleetingly, due to the sheer volume of online traffic.

The government and Chinese netizens have engaged in a game of cat and mouse, with new

Simon Deyer, “China Taking the Putin Approach to Democracy,” Washington Post, October 1, 2014; Josh Chin,

“Beijing Aims to Blunt Western Influence in China,” Dow Jones, November 12, 2014.

“Chinese Civil Society: Beneath the Glacier,” op. cit.

Christopher Scott, Master’s Candidate, Hopkins-Nanjing Center, provided research and analysis for this section.

See Reporters without Borders, World Press Freedom Index 2014, January 31, 2014, http://rsf.org/index2014/data/

index2014_en.pdf; Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2014, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/resources/

FOTN%202014%20Summary%20of%20Findings.pdf.

Bob Dietz, “In China, Mainstream Media As Well As Dissidents under Increasing Pressure,” Committee to Protect

Journalists, December 17, 2014, https://cpj.org/blog/2014/12/China-mainstream-media-as-well-as-dissidents-underincre.php#more

Michael Kan, “China’s Internet Adoption Sags to Levels Not Seen in 8 Years,” PCWorld, July 21, 2014.

Yanqi Tong and Shaohua Lei, “Creating Public Opinion Pressure in China: Large-Scale Internet Protest,” East Asian

Institute (Singapore) Background Brief No. 534, June 17, 2010.

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Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 114th Congress

communications technologies and services and novel censorship circumvention methods

challenging the government’s technological and human efforts to control the Web, followed by

new government regulations and counter efforts, and then a repeat of the cycle.

The state has the capability to block news of events and to partially shut down the Internet. In

Xinjiang, the government blocked the Internet for 10 months following the ethnic unrest in 2009

and it continues to do so in selected areas of the country from time to time.63 The monitoring and

disruption of telephone and Internet communications reportedly were widespread in Xinjiang and

Tibetan areas in 2013.64 Google services, including Gmail, were intermittently blocked in 2014.

Censorship of microblog posts reportedly increased five-fold during the height of the Hong Kong

democracy protests in September 2014.65

Continuously blocked websites, social networking sites, and file sharing sites include Radio Free

Asia, Voice of America (Chinese language), international human rights websites, including those

related to Tibet and Falun Gong, many Taiwanese news sites, Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube.

Many English language news sites, including the Washington Post and the Wall Street Journal,

are generally accessible or occasionally or selectively censored. The New York Times and

Bloomberg websites have been blocked since 2012 after they reported on the personal wealth of

Chinese leaders. In 2014, access to the BBC was interrupted.

Commonly barred Internet searches and microblog postings include those with direct and indirect

or disguised references to Tibetan policies; the Tiananmen suppression of 1989; Falun Gong;

PRC leaders and dissidents who have been involved in recent scandals, events, or issues that

authorities deem to be politically sensitive; discussions of democracy; sensitive foreign affairs

issues; and sexual material. Other major areas that authorities target for occasional censorship

include the following: controversial policies and government wrongdoing; public health and

safety; foreign affairs; civil society; and media and censorship policies.66 In addition to the

effectiveness of censorship, some studies have shown that the majority of Internet users in China

do not engage the medium for political purposes, or that they accept the government’s

justification that it regulates the Internet in order to control illegal, harmful, or dangerous online

content, services, and activities.67

A reported 2 million censors, mostly young college graduates, are employed as “public opinion

analysts” in the government and at major Internet service providers to scan messages already

screened by computer and delete or block posts with sensitive or inappropriate political or social

content.68 The government reportedly also has employed tens of thousands of students and other

Internet commentators, known as the “50 Cent Army,” to post pro-government comments and

express views critical of the United States and democracy on websites, bulletin boards, and chat

Loretta Chao and Jason Dean, “Analysis: China Is Losing a War over Internet,” Wall Street Journal, December 31,

2009; Simon Denyer, “China’s Clampdown on Islam Stokes Resentment and Violence,” Washington Post, September

20, 2014.

Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013 (China), op. cit.

In terms of the number of weibo posts that could not be accessed, Patrick Boehler, “Record Censorship of China’s

Social Media as References to Hong Kong Protests Blocked,” South China Morning Post, September 29, 2014.

Sarah Cook, Freedom House, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,

“Stability in China: Lessons from Tiananmen and Implications for the United States,” May 15, 2014.

Ed Zhang, “Does Blogs’ Blooming Mean Schools of Thought Can Contend?” South China Morning Post, December

4, 2011; Rebecca MacKinnon, “Bloggers and Censors: Chinese Media in the Internet Age,” China Studies Center, May

18, 2007; John Pomfret, “U.S. Risks Ire with Decision to Fund Software Maker Tied to Falun Gong,” Washington Post,

May 12, 2010; MacKinnon, Consent of the Networked, Basic Books: New York, 2012.

Katie Hunt and CY Xu, “China ‘Employs 2 Million to Police Internet,” CNN, October 7, 2013.

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Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 114th Congress

rooms.69 Despite its focus on words it deems to be sensitive, the government appears to be chiefly

concerned about netizens using the Internet to organize or engage in collective action, according

to some experts. Limited discussion of political issues and political debate is considered valuable

by the government for three reasons, according to analysts: to allow citizens to “let off steam”; to

monitor public opinion; and to garner public support for some policy decisions.70

For Chinese Internet users in search of blocked information from outside the PRC’s Internet

gateways, or “Great Firewall,” circumventing government controls (also known as fanqiang or

“scaling the wall”) is made possible by downloading special software. These methods mainly

include proxy servers, which are free but somewhat cumbersome, and virtual private networks

(VPNs), which are available for a small fee, but also enable secure communication.71 Proxy

servers and VPNs allow some motivated Internet users to avoid censorship, but impose just

enough inconvenience and financial cost to discourage most Chinese Internet users from using

them. According to some observers, Chinese authorities have tolerated circumvention tools as

long as they do not pose political problems, and occasionally have attempted to curtail their use.

In January 2015, major VPN providers reported customer access problems due to government

efforts to disrupt VPN access.72

During the past two years, China’s leaders have renewed efforts to assert greater controls over the

Internet, some of which are said to have had a “chilling effect on online discourse.”73 In

December 2012, the government enacted a new law requiring those who apply for Internet,

mobile service, and social networking accounts to use their real names.74 In 2013, the Supreme

People’s Court issued a judicial interpretation by which bloggers can face up to three years in

prison if content deemed defamatory is reposted 500 times or viewed 5,000 times. Many

observers viewed this policy as an attempt to protect government officials from allegations of

corruption by ordinary citizens. Prominent online political commentators and whistle-blowers

have been harassed, arrested or temporarily detained, including over 100 microbloggers in the

past year.75 In 2014, China’s leaders established an Internet security and development task force

headed by President Xi Jinping.

Weibo and WeChat

Although Twitter and Facebook are blocked in China, Chinese versions of microblogging services

(weibo) similar to Twitter and social networking sites have become important sources of news

and platforms for public opinion. An estimated 70% of Chinese social-media users rely upon the

Chinese Internet users have dubbed them the “50 Centers” because they allegedly are paid 50 cents per post.

Christina Sterbenz, “China Banned the Term ‘50 Cents’ to Stop Discussion of an Orwellian Propaganda Program,”

Business Insider, October 17, 2014.

“Secretive World of the Young, Low-Paid Weibo Censors Is Revealed,” South China Morning Post, September 12,

2013; Andrea Chen, “Chinese Internet Censors Target Collective Activities More Than Sensitive Subjects, Says

Harvard Report,” South China Morning Post, August 23, 2014.

Amy Nip, “HK Firms Help Mainlanders Get Around the ‘Great Firewall,’” South China Morning Post, March 15,

2011.

Michael Kan, “China Signals Censors Will Continue to Crack Down on VPN Services,” PCWorld, January 27, 2015.

Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013 (China), op. cit.; “China Threatens

Tough Punishment for Online Rumor Spreading,” Reuters, September 9, 2013.

Joe McDonald, “China Requires Internet Users to Register Names,” Associated Press, December 28, 2012. The

Supreme People’s Court approved this policy in 2014. Angela Meng, “China’s Top Court Puts Tighter Grip on Internet

and Social Media,” South China Morning Post, October 10, 2014.

Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Annual Report 2014, op. cit.

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Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 114th Congress

medium as their main source of news, compared to 9% of Americans.76 Between roughly 2009

and 2012, Sina Corp’s weibo quickly became the “most prominent place for free speech,” and the

country’s “most important public sphere,” where netizens posted both news and commentary.77

Many Chinese, including political activists with international contacts, also communicate via

Twitter and Facebook using censorship circumvention methods.

Due in part to growing restrictions affecting blogging, weibo has declined significantly in

popularity, while Tencent Holdings’ weixin (“microchannel”), also known as WeChat, has gained

widespread use. WeChat, an instant messaging app launched in 2011, offers its users a platform

for posting messages and photographs, voice and video chats, following celebrities, e-commerce,

and online gaming. It differs from weibo in that it primarily is a service that connects an account

holder with a private circle of friends rather than a public audience. It thus initially raised less

government scrutiny because of its limited reach.

Nonetheless, two years after it was released, China’s leaders became alarmed as some of

WeChat’s nearly 400 million users began posting politically sensitive comments and news stories.

Some users owning public accounts designed for companies and celebrities gained millions of

followers. In 2014, dozens of public accounts were shut down by authorities.78 New regulations

mandated that microblogging and instant messaging services could only repost news on current

events, and only after they obtained a permit from the State Internet Information Office. Only

authorized news agencies and websites could publish original news content.79

Re-education Through Labor (RETL)

Established in the mid-1950s, China’s Re-education Through Labor (laojiao) penal system was

long used to detain citizens who posed a threat to social stability or political control, but whose

offenses were not serious enough to warrant criminal prosecution. RETL, an administrative

measure that did not involve courts or judicial processes, empowered the police to sentence

persons deemed guilty of minor or non-criminal offenses to a maximum of three to four years in

labor camps without trial. These offenses included petty theft, illegal drug possession, and

prostitution, as well as activities that authorities deemed to be politically sensitive, such as

participating in unauthorized religious groups and alleged cults such as Falun Gong, disrupting

social order, presenting formal complaints against the government (petitioning), and rights

advocacy. Estimates of the RETL population vary, from roughly 160,000 to 260,000 detainees at

any time in roughly 350 centers in recent years80 According to some estimates, the facilities held

up to 300,000 to 400,000 prisoners at their peak, especially when they swelled with Falun Gong

practitioners during the mid-2000s.81

Evan Osnos, Age of Ambition: Chasing Truth and Faith in the New China, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux,

2014.

Mary Kay Magistad, “How Weibo Is Changing China,” Yale Global Online, August 9, 2012; Kathrin Hile, “China’s

Tweeting Cops Blog to Keep Peace,” Financial Times, December 5, 2011; Keith B. Richburg, “In China,

Microblogging Sites Become Free-Speech Platform,” Washington Post, March 27, 2011; Ed Zhang,"Does Blogs’

Blooming Mean Schools of Thought Can Contend?” South China Morning Post, December 4, 2011.

G. E., “A Crackdown on WeChat,” The Economist, March 14, 2014.

Adrian Wan, “China Regulates Original News Feeds on Messenger Apps Such as WeChat,” South China Morning

Post, August 8, 2014.

Maya Wang, “Rights Group: China May Not Be Ready for Labor Camp Reforms,” CNN, January 16, 2013; Minnie

Chan, “Kinder Face for Notorious Re-education Camps,” South China Morning Post, February 21, 2007; Jim Yardley,

“Issue in China: Many Jails without Trial,” New York Times, May 9, 2005.

Julie Makinen, “China’s Closure of Labor Camps Gets Qualified Applause,” Los Angeles Times, January 18, 2014;

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According to some estimates, in recent years, between 2% and 10% of the RETL population were

political prisoners.82 Despite calls for abolishing the system, the question about what to do with

Falun Gong detainees may have delayed closing them for several years. According to one source,

in 2013, drug offenders constituted the largest group in the RETL system, or about 200,000

people.83 Although RETL conditions and sentences were in many cases less severe than prison

terms, human rights groups reported many abuses in RETL centers, including forced labor,

beatings, psychological torment, sexual assaults, lack of proper food, and inadequate access to

medical care, in some cases resulting in death.84

Following the government’s formally abolishing the RETL system, some camps have closed, but

many have been converted into drug rehabilitation facilities. Many analysts believe that public

security bureaus continue to administratively detain many citizens for minor political offenses,

often in extra-legal and quasi-legal forms of detention, such as “black jails”; Legal Education

Centers, said to hold many Falun Gong members; “community correction” centers; and criminal

detention. These forms of incarceration

Forms of Administrative Detention

deprive detainees of procedural protections

Black jails: unofficial, secretive detention centers in

provided for under China’s constitution and

various unmarked places such as hotels, residences,

laws, and can be more secretive than the

government offices, and abandoned buildings.

RETL facilities. Some detainees who have

Legal Education Centers: Purpose-built and ad hoc

resisted being “reformed,” particularly Falun

locations often used to “transform” Falun Gong

Gong adherents, are reported to have been sent practitioners or to persuade or coerce them to

to drug rehabilitation centers or mental health

renounce their beliefs.

(ankang) facilities.87 Nonetheless, some

Community Correction Centers: Under this system,

observers contend that the formal abolishment

parolees, juveniles, and other minor offenders are

restricted in traveling but generally live in their own

of the RETL system indicates the

residences while attending classes on “public morality,”

government’s recognition of its abuses and

current affairs, and the law, and taking part in social

thus represents a symbolic victory. An

service activities.85

editorial in the Global Times, a state-backed

daily, acknowledged that Legal Education

Centers for Falun Gong members were not well-defined in the law and that further reforms were

necessary. However, it argued that four lawyers who had been detained for leading a protest

against the detention of Falun Gong adherents had “incited illegal activities rather than offering

legal assistance through legitimate channels.”88

(...continued)

Changing the Soup but Not the Medicine: Abolishing Re-education Through Labor in China, Amnesty International,

2013.

Falun Gong adherents at one time constituted up to one-half of all RETL detainees, according to some estimates.

Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2009, March 11, 2010; Falun Gong organizations

have placed the number as far higher.

Dui Hua Foundation, January 2013.

Changing the Soup but not the Medicine: Abolishing Re-education through Labor in China, op. cit.; Department of

State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013 (China), op. cit.

Dui Hua Foundation, “Community Correction Expands as RTL Contracts,” December 19, 2013; Dui Hua

Foundation, “Criminal Detention as Punishment in Post-RTL Era,” January 22, 2014.

“11 Detained after Protesting ‘Black Jail’ in China,” NYT Blogs, April 1, 2014; Frank Langfitt, “China Ends One

Notorious Form of Detention, But Keeps Others,” NPR, February 5, 2014.

Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013 (China), op. cit.

“11 Detained after Protesting ‘Black Jail’ in China,” NYT Blogs, April 1, 2014; “Radical Lawyers Undermine Legal

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Selected Human Rights Issues

The following list provides a selection of human rights issues in China, some of which are

discussed at greater length elsewhere in this report. For more detailed descriptions of human

rights topics, see the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC), Annual Report

2014 and the Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2014.89 Many

of these issues relate to civil, political, and other legal rights, particularly political speech and

independent organization, unapproved religious practice and association, ethnic autonomy,

criminal justice, and civil society. Major, ongoing human rights violations in China include the

following: excessive use of violence by security forces or plain-clothes agents; unlawful and

abusive detention; arbitrary use of state security and other laws against political dissidents and

Uighurs; coercive implementation of family planning policies; and harassment and persecution of

people involved in some religious activities. The government appears to have attempted to reduce

rights violations in some of these areas and to exercise political control more judiciously.

However, the lack of checks on state power at all levels and the CCP’s subordination of the law to

its objective of maintaining authority lead to human rights abuses and violations of China’s own

constitution. According to the State Department, the CECC, and human rights groups, major

problems include the following:



Harassment, unlawful detention, beatings, house arrest, and residential

surveillance of protest leaders, civil society activists, journalists covering

sensitive stories, petitioners, and political dissidents and their family members.

Arbitrary use of state security and social stability laws against political

dissidents.

Holding dissidents incommunicado for long periods and failing to comply with

legal provisions that require authorities to notify family members of their

detention.

Strict controls and punishments for public gatherings and speech that authorities

deem to be politically sensitive; heavy censorship of online communication and

expression.

Forced closure of law offices and suspension or revocation of law licenses;

unlawful detention, physical assaults, house arrest, and prison terms of attorneys

who take on politically sensitive cases.

Physical abuse and the use of torture by the state against criminal suspects and

administrative detainees, often resulting in forced confessions; unlawful killings

of persons in state custody.

Harsh religious and ethnic policies and the arbitrary use of state security laws

against Tibetans and Uighurs; punishment of monasteries, villages, and family

members related to or associated with Tibetan self-immolators.

Harassment and arrests of some Christians worshipping in unregistered churches;

demolition or forced alterations of church properties in some localities.

Detention of Falun Gong adherents and forced denunciations of their beliefs.

(...continued)

Authority,” Global Times, April 4, 2014.

Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Annual Report 2014, op. cit. and Department of State, Country

Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2014 (China), op. cit.

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Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 114th Congress



Reports of coercive abortions, forced sterilizations, and other related, unlawful

government actions against women.

Repatriation of North Korean nationals residing in China, who commonly face

severe forms of punishment after returning to North Korea, in violation of U.N.

conventions; mistreatment of North Korean female refugees and their children.90

Government harassment and intimidation of independent or non-CCP candidates

and their supporters in local elections; manipulation of ballots and electoral

procedures in order to exclude independent candidates.91

Prisoners of Conscience

The number of political prisoners in China is difficult to determine. The Dui Hua Foundation, a

U.S.-based human rights organization that focuses on the treatment of prisoners as well as

criminal justice and women’s rights in China, estimated that there were 5,500-7,000 “core

political prisoners,” or those charged with state security crimes, in 2014.92 According to the State

Department, tens of thousands of Chinese prisoners are incarcerated for their political or religious

views.93 In 2013, Dui Hua estimated that 15,000-20,000 Chinese were being held in RETL

facilities for following what Chinese authorities deem to be “cults,” particularly Falun Gong.94

According to Dui Hua, the number of reported cult cases—estimated to be a fraction of the

total—dropped by 25% between 2012 and 2014, due to a number of factors.95

According to Dui Hua, indictments for state security crimes, which often are political in nature,

rose in 2013 to 1,384 cases, the highest level since the Tibetan unrest of 2008, although the total

number of arrests has decreased.96 In addition, the government increasingly has used prosecutions

for non-political crimes, such as “gathering a crowd to disturb public order,” “picking quarrels

and provoking trouble,” and illegal assembly to punish citizens for political reasons. The

Congressional-Executive Commission on China’s Political Prisoner Database contains

The U.N. Refugee Convention and the U.N. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading

Treatment or Punishment. Many North Korean female refugees in China are victims of trafficking for the purposes of

sexual exploitation or forced marriage. Many of the estimated 20,000 children born to North Korean women in China

remain largely ineligible for basic social services, including education and health care. Many lack official documents or

legal status of birth for fear that their mothers will be extradited. United Nations, Human Rights Council, 25th Session,

“Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” February 7,

2014.

PRC citizens can directly elect officials to village committees and assemblies and to the larger township, county, and

municipal district People’s Congresses. Although voters generally have a choice of candidates, who are not required to

be Communist Party members, CCP election committees may disqualify candidates at any level, and they effectively

control most candidate lists.

Dui Hua Foundation, May 2014.

Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013 (China), op. cit.

Dui Hua Foundation, January 2013. Under Article 300 of the Criminal Law, individuals who participate in cult

organizations may be charged with “organizing/using a cult to undermine implementation of the law.”

Dui Hua Foundation, January 2013 and May 2014. According to experts, this decline may be attributable to the

decreasing number of Falun Gong adherents who have not recanted their beliefs, a relaxation of the crackdown on

Falun Gong practitioners, and/or the increasing difficulty of verification. Dui Hua Foundation experts caution that it is

difficult to determine how many political and religious prisoners there are in China due to limited data and varied

definitions.

Dui Hua Foundation, “State Security Indictments, Cult Trials Up in Xi Jinping’s 2013,” Human Rights Journal,

January 7, 2015; Dui Hua Foundation, “A Safer, More Harmonious China?” March 11, 2014; Dui Hua Foundation,

Annual Report 2013, http://duihua.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/2013ar_eng.pdf.

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information on 1,275 cases of political and religious prisoners known or believed to be detained

or imprisoned, and notes that the actual total is much higher.97 The number of people who remain

in prison for crimes committed during the 1989 demonstrations is estimated to be less than a

dozen.98

Liu Xiaobo

In October 2010, the Nobel Committee awarded Liu Xiaobo, a longtime political dissident,

activist, and writer, the Nobel Peace Prize for his “long and non-violent struggle for fundamental

human rights.” In December 2008, Liu helped draft “Charter ’08” commemorating the 60th

anniversary of the United Nations’ adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.99 The

document, signed by 300 Chinese citizens and posted on the Internet, called for human rights and

fundamental changes in China’s political system. The Charter eventually garnered roughly 10,000

additional signatures online. In December 2009, a Beijing court sentenced Liu to 11 years in

prison on charges of “inciting subversion of state power.” Although she has not been accused of

any crimes, Liu Xia, Liu Xiaobo’s wife, was placed under house arrest after the announcement of

her husband’s Nobel prize and her movements remain severely restricted. In June 2013, a court

outside of Beijing sentenced Liu Hui, Liu Xia’s brother, to 11 years in prison for fraud, which

some observers view as a trumped-up charge. In December 2014, Secretary of State John Kerry

referred to Liu Xiaobo as a “courageous and eloquent spokesperson recognized throughout the

world for his long and non-violent advocacy for human rights and democracy in China” and

called on the PRC government to release Liu and remove all restrictions on Liu Xia.100

Gao Zhisheng

Gao Zhisheng, a prominent rights lawyer, was named one of China’s top 10 lawyers by the

Ministry of Justice in 2001. However, as his rights advocacy expanded to protect citizens who

had run afoul of policies that authorities deemed to be sensitive, including family planning,

religious practice, and Falun Gong, Gao was detained numerous times. In late 2011, he reportedly

began serving a three-year prison term that had been handed down in 2006, but was suspended

for five years. During his periods of detention, prison officials reportedly tortured him, denied

him access to legal counsel and regular visits from his family, and withheld information about his

location.101 Authorities released Gao in August 2014 but he remains under house arrest and

constant surveillance by security agents.102

Xu Zhiyong

In January 2014, constitutional rights advocate Xu Zhiyong was tried and convicted of “gathering

a crowd to disturb public order” and sentenced to four years in prison. Xu, a lawyer, scholar,

district people’s congress deputy, and rights activist, helped found the New Citizen’s Movement,

Dui Hua Foundation, January 2013; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, http://ppdcecc.gov/.

Dui Hua Foundation, “China Releases Last June 4 Counterrevolutionary Imprisoned in Beijing,” May 30, 2013;

Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013 (China), op. cit.

“Charter ’08” was inspired by “Charter 77,” the Czechoslovakian democratic movement that began in 1976.

100

U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, “Kerry on 5th Anniversary of Liu Xiaobo’s Conviction,”

December 24, 2014.

101

Edward Wong, “Family’s Visit Pierces Silence on Jailed Chinese Dissident,” New York Times (International),

January 24, 2013.

102

“Chinese Rights Lawyer’s Phone Calls Limited Under House Arrest,” Agence France Presse, January 8, 2015.

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a loosely organized network numbering roughly 5,000 people that promoted the rule of law,

government transparency, citizens’ rights, civic engagement, and social justice. Its members,

some of whom also have been arrested, reportedly met informally across the country to discuss

politics and engaged in small street rallies in 2012 and 2013.103 The Open Constitution Initiative,

which Xu also helped organize, was a nongovernmental legal research and aid organization that

the government shut down in 2009, ostensibly for tax evasion.104 In January 2014, the State

Department issued a statement expressing deep disappointment in Xu’s sentence, and called on

Chinese authorities to release Xu and other political prisoners immediately.105

Religious Freedom and Ethnic Minority Issues

The extent of religious freedom and activity in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) varies

widely by religion, region, ethnic group, and jurisdiction. Hundreds of millions of PRC citizens

openly practice one of five officially recognized religions (Buddhism, Protestantism, Roman

Catholicism, Daoism, and Islam), although Communist Party members are required to be

nominally atheist. Article X of the PRC Constitution protects “normal” religious activities and

those that do not “disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the

educational system of the state.” Religious organizations in China are playing growing roles in

providing social and charitable services. However, the PRC government has imposed often harsh

and arbitrary policies and measures upon many unregistered Christian churches, Tibetan

Buddhists, Uighur Muslims, and Falun Gong practitioners. This is largely due to the potential for

these groups to become independent, organized social forces or cultivate foreign support. The

Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report for 2013 stated that during the

year, “the government harassed, assaulted, detained, arrested, or sentenced to prison a number of

religious adherents for activities reported to be related to their religious beliefs and practices.”106

Critics say the Chinese government often has conflated the religious and cultural activities of

Tibetan Buddhists and Uighur Muslims with “extremist,” “separatist,” and “terrorist” activities.

In Tibetan and Uighur regions, the government largely has focused on social and economic

development, with associated employment opportunities often going disproportionately to Han

Chinese, while frequently violating political rights and civil liberties, often to a greater degree

than elsewhere in China. The government also has severely restricted access by foreign

journalists and diplomats to Tibetan areas, making it difficult to determine accurately human

rights conditions.

The Department of State has identified China as a “country of particular concern” (CPC) for

“particularly severe violations of religious freedom” for 14 consecutive years (2000-2013). Due

103

Didi Kirsten Tatlow, “Chinese Court Sentences 4 Activists to Jail,” New York Times Blogs, April 18, 2014.

Andrew Jacobs and Chris Buckley, “China Sentences Xu Zhiyong, Legal Activist, to 4 Years in Prison,” New York

Times (International), January 26, 2014; Xu Zhiyong Tried for Advocacy of Education Equality and Official

Transparency,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, January 24, 2014.

105

U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, “State Department on Conviction of Xu Zhiyong in China,”

January 26, 2014.

106

Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, International Religious Freedom Report for

2013, July 28, 2014. The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-292) established an Office of

International Religious Freedom within the Department of State and the United States Commission on International

Religious Freedom (USCIRF), an independent, bipartisan U.S. government commission dedicated to defending the

universal right to freedom of religion or belief abroad. The Department of State and USCIRF publish annual reports on

international religious freedom pursuant to the act. See also U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom,

Annual Report 2014, April 30, 2014, http://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/

USCIRF%202014%20Annual%20Report%20PDF.pdf.

104

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Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 114th Congress

to China’s designation as a CPC, the U.S. government restricts the U.S. export of crime control

and detection equipment to the PRC.107 In April 2013, U.S. Ambassador at Large for International

Religious Freedom Suzan Johnson Cook traveled to China to discuss religious freedom issues.108

The Administration also has raised religious freedom issues through various other channels,

including the annual U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) and the bilateral

Human Rights Dialogue. In 2013, then-U.S. Ambassador to China Gary Locke made separate

trips to Tibet and Xinjiang. Locke visited Xinjiang University where he gave a speech

emphasizing the importance of ethnic diversity in the United States. In Lhasa, the capital of the

Tibet Autonomous Region, the U.S. Ambassador spoke of the importance of preserving Tibetan

culture and urged Chinese authorities to open the region to foreign diplomats, journalists, and

tourists.109

Christians

According to various estimates, between 40 million and 70 million Chinese Christians (over

three-fourths are Protestant and the rest are Catholic) worship in officially registered and

unregistered churches. Membership in both types of churches continues to grow steadily and

somewhat haphazardly, according to observers.110 Many Chinese Protestants have rejected the

official church, known as the Three Self Patriotic Movement, for political or theological reasons.

Some independent or “house” church leaders claim that they have attempted to apply for official

status and been rejected by local government Religious Affairs Bureaus.111 Although in many

localities, unsanctioned religious congregations may receive little state interference, they still are

vulnerable to arbitrary restrictions. Many house churches have faced harassment by government

authorities, their leaders have been beaten, detained, or imprisoned, and their properties have

been confiscated or demolished. Beijing authorities have attempted forcibly to prevent members

of the Shouwang church in Beijing, who number over 1,000, from gathering en masse. They have

restricted the movements of Shouwang pastor Jin Jianming and regularly detained members. The

U.S.-based China Aid Association reported worsening levels of persecution in 2013, including

1,470 detentions and 12 criminal sentences of Chinese Christians.112

Increasingly, local authorities have clashed with registered churches. In July 2014, a Henan

provincial court sentenced pastor Zhang Shaojie to 12 years in prison for fraud and “gathering a

crowd to disrupt social order,” charges that his lawyer called “without foundation.” Zhang,

president of the local Three Self branch, reportedly was arrested after he attempted to help local

parishioners in a dispute with county officials over land for a new church.113 The U.S.

107

International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-292). This restriction originally was imposed as part of the

“Tiananmen sanctions” following the 1989 Chinese military crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators in Beijing.

108

Cook’s predecessor, John V. Hanford III, visited China in 2008.

109

Embassy of the United States, “Gary F. Locke, United States Ambassador to China, Xinjiang University,” April 25,

2013, http://beijing.usembassy-china.org.cn/20130425ambassador-locke-remarks-at-xinjiang-university.html; “U.S.

Ambassador to China Gary Locke Makes Rare Visit to Tibet, Urges Beijing to Open Region Up,” Associated Press,

June 27, 2013.

110

Pew Research Center, The Global Religious Landscape, December 2012, http://www.pewforum.org/files/2014/01/

global-religion-full.pdf; Brookings Institution, Christianity in China: Force for Change? June 3, 2014; Zachary Keck,

“Is Communist China Christianity’s Future?” The Diplomat, April 26, 2014.

111

“Three Self” refers to self-governance, self-support, and self-propagation, or independence from foreign missionary

and other religious groups and influences.

112

ChinaAid Association, 2013 Annual Report: Chinese Government Persecution of Christians and Churches in

Mainland China, January-December 2013, February 2014.

113

Didi Kirsten Tatlow, “Christian Pastor Sentenced to 12 Years in Chinese Prison,” New York Time (International),

(continued...)

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government called on Chinese authorities to release Zhang and end harassment of his family

members and congregants, and allow all Chinese citizens to worship freely in accordance with

China’s laws.114

Since 2013, authorities in Zhejiang province, where there is a large and growing Christian

population, and some other locations have carried out efforts against “excessive religious sites”

and “illegal” structures. Zhejiang officials reportedly ordered crosses to be removed from

churches located near prominent roadways. According to some reports, roughly 400 churches in

the province have been forced to remove crosses or have been destroyed. One church, the

officially registered, privately financed Sanjiang Church in Wenzhou in southeastern Zhejiang,

was demolished after a month-long standoff between authorities and parishioners.115

Catholics in China often are divided between remaining loyal to the Pope and heeding the official

Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association (CCPA), which does not recognize Papal authority. Most

Chinese bishops have received approval from both Beijing and the Holy See; however since

2010, the CCPA has ordained several bishops without Rome’s consent, which has been a key

point of contention between Beijing and the Vatican. In July 2012, Thaddeus Ma Daqin, a new

bishop approved by both Beijing and the Vatican, renounced his ties to the CCPA. The

government stripped Ma of his title and confined him to a seminary outside Shanghai. In April

2015, a Chinese bishop was ordained in Guangdong province with the tacit consent of the

Vatican. Beijing and Pope Francis have expressed interest in improving relations. Obstacles

remain, however, particularly regarding the appointment of bishops, the Vatican’s diplomatic ties

with Taiwan, and the Vatican’s stances on religious freedom in China.116

Tibetans117

Although Beijing has controlled Tibet since 1951, it continues to face resistance to its rule, with

some Tibetans in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and other Tibetan areas in China viewing

Chinese government policies as hostile to their religion, culture, and identity. The TAR, formally

established in 1965, constitutes just under half of the area that Tibetan exile groups consider to be

historical Tibet.118 It is home to just under half of the ethnic Tibetans in China, 2.7 million of an

ethnic Tibetan population of 6 million.119 Tensions between the PRC government and many

Tibetans have been high, while talks between the Tibetan spiritual leader, the 14th Dalai Lama

Tenzin Gyatso, and Beijing have stalled, the last round taking place in early 2010. China’s leaders

(...continued)

July 8, 2014.

114

U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, July 7, 2014.

115

This government action reportedly drew the criticism of official Chinese church leaders. Ian Johnson, “Church-State

Clash in China Coalesces around a Toppled Spire,” New York Times (International), May 29, 2014; Laura Zhou, “More

Zhejiang Churches to Be Torn Down in Demolition Campaign,” South China Morning Post, June 20, 2014; Robert

Marquand, “In ‘China’s Jerusalem,’ Party Members Must Now Profess Atheism,” Christian Science Monitor, February

3, 2015.

116

“China Urges the Vatican for Better Ties—Xinhua,” BBC, January 21, 2015.

117

Portions of this section were written by Susan Lawrence, Specialist in Asian Affairs, Congressional Research

Service.

118

The Tibet Autonomous Region is a provincial-level, ethnic minority administrative region. The PRC also

established ethnic Tibetan-majority, Tibetan Autonomous prefectures and counties in other PRC provinces.

119

National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China, 西藏自治区2010年第六次全国人口普查主要数据公报

(Public Notice of Important Statistics from the 2010 Sixth National Census in the Tibet Autonomous Region）(in

Chinese), February 28, 2012, http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/tjgb/rkpcgb/dfrkpcgb/201202/t20120228_30406.html.

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convened the Sixth Work Forum on Tibet and issued a white paper on Tibet in August and

September of 2015, both of which touted PRC achievements in Tibet, reaffirmed PRC policies,

and condemned the Dalai Lama’s “separatist activities” and “Middle Way approach.”120

Increasingly expansive government controls on Tibetan religious life and practice have caused or

contributed to discontent in Tibetan areas, particularly since a period of unrest in the spring of

2008.121 These policies include a heightened official and security presence within monasteries,

increased surveillance of cultural and religious activities, political education campaigns in

monasteries and villages, including pressure to denounce the Dalai Lama, and limitations on use

of the Tibetan language in schools (despite provisions in China’s constitution and laws that appear

to offer some limited protections for religious, cultural, and linguistic rights). In the past year,

authorities reportedly searched some Tibetan private homes and businesses for photographs of the

Dalai Lama, examined cell phones for “reactionary music” from India, and monitored

correspondence.122

The State Department reported “serious human rights abuses” of Tibetans in 2014, including

extrajudicial detentions and killings, arbitrary arrests, and severe mistreatment, torture, and deaths

of Tibetan detainees and prisoners of conscience. Tibetan religious leaders, academics, writers,

and activists using social media have been especially targeted.123 The State Department also noted

“severe repression of Tibet’s unique religious, cultural, and linguistic heritage by, among other

means, strictly curtailing the civil rights of China’s ethnic Tibetan population, including the

freedoms of speech, religion, association, assembly, and movement,” including domestic and

foreign travel. It added, “The government routinely vilified the Dalai Lama and blamed the ‘Dalai

clique’ and ‘other outside forces’ for instigating instability....” As of September 2014, the

Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) had identified 639 Tibetan political

prisoners and detainees, the vast majority of whom were apprehended following the 2008

unrest.124 In January 2015, 15 Communist Party officials in central Tibet reportedly were accused

of assisting a Tibetan independence organization and punished for violating party discipline.125

China’s leaders have cited social and economic development in the TAR, including economic

growth and progress in the areas of infrastructure, public health and education, the environment,

cultural preservation, and religion. However, according to the CECC, the PRC government has

failed “to respond to Tibetan grievances in a constructive manner or accept any accountability for

Tibetan rejection of Chinese policies.”126 In addition to chafing at religious controls, many

Tibetans complain of the domination of the local economy by Han Chinese, particularly in urban

areas; forced resettlement; cultural preservation that amounts to cultural regulation; and the

120

“China Issues White Paper on Tibet,” Xinhua, September 6, 2015; Tenzin Monlam, “China Will Never Accept

Middle Way Approach,” Phayul.com, August 27, 2015. The Dalai Lama has proposed a “middle way” or “genuine

autonomy” without independence, while Beijing has referred to the middle way as “independence in disguise.”

121

See CRS Report RL34445, Tibet: Problems, Prospects, and U.S. Policy, by (name redacted) .

122

Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2014 (Tibet), June 25, 2015.

123

Ibid.

124

Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Annual Report 2014, October 9, 2014. The actual number of

Tibetan prisoners is likely to be much higher. Of the 621 Tibetan political prisoners who were detained on or after

March 10, 2008, 251 were believed or presumed to be detained or imprisoned in Sichuan province, 202 in the TAR,

103 in Qinghai province, 64 in Gansu province, and one in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, according to the

CECC.

125

Edward Wong, “Communist Officials in Tibetan Region Punished for Separatism, China Says,” New York Times,

January 28, 2015.

126

Ibid.

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adverse environmental effects of Beijing’s development projects in the region. Officially, Han

Chinese, the country’s majority ethnic group, form a minority in the TAR, or about 8% of the

region’s total population, according to Chinese census figures.127 However, some observers

believe that Han people actually constitute over half of the population of the TAR capital, Lhasa,

as many Han laborers, business persons, officials, police, and para-military forces have migrated

there while remaining registered as residents of other parts of China.128

Since 2009, at least 141 Tibetans within China are known to have self-immolated, many

apparently to protest PRC policies or to call for the return of the Dalai Lama; 114 are believed to

have died.129 Several additional self-immolations by Tibetans have occurred in India and Nepal.

The PRC government has implemented policies that punish relatives, friends, and other associates

of self-immolators. Between 2012 and 2014, 11 Tibetans were sentenced to prison terms or death

on “intentional homicide” charges for allegedly “aiding” or “inciting” others to self-immolate,

according to the State Department.130 The Dalai Lama has declined either to endorse or condemn

the self-immolations publicly, describing them as “very sad,” and saying that they “probably had

little effect” on Chinese policy.131 Dr. Lobsang Sangay, elected head (Sikyong) of the Dharamsala,

India-based Central Tibetan Administration and leader of the Tibetan exile community, said that

“[w]e have consistently and categorically urged the Tibetan community not to resort to any kind

of drastic action, including self-immolations,” and blamed PRC repression.132

The Chinese Communist Party has sought to control the reincarnation process for Tibetan

spiritual leaders. After Tibet’s exiled spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, identified Gedhun Choekyi

Nyima as Tibetan Buddhism’s 11th Panchen Lama, or second-highest leader, in 1995, Chinese

authorities placed him in “protective custody” and named a different boy to be the 11th Panchen

Lama. Gedhum Choekyi Nyima’s whereabouts have remained unknown for two decades.133

Beijing also has asserted that the government has the prerogative to determine the reincarnation

of the Dalai Lama, while the 14th Dalai Lama has suggested that he may not be reincarnated at all.

The U.S. government has criticized Beijing’s involvement in reincarnation matters. In June 2015

remarks, Under Secretary of State Sarah Sewall, who serves as the U.S. government’s Special

Coordinator for Tibetan Issues, stated that, “The basic and universally recognized right of

religious freedom demands that any decision on the next Dalai Lama must be reserved to the

current Dalai Lama, Tibetan Buddhist leaders, and the Tibetan people.”134

The Obama Administration has sought to show its support for religious freedom for Tibetans in

China through presidential meetings with the Dalai Lama; other meetings with Tibetan religious

and cultural figures; official visits to the TAR; statements; and a blog post by First Lady Michelle

Obama during a visit to China in 2014, in which she noted that, “The Tibetan people have

127

Hans constitute 92% of the population in the PRC, according to numerous sources.

Ananth Krishnan, “Trust Deficit in Tibet,” India Today, July 2, 2015.

129

International Campaign for Tibet, “Self Immolations by Tibetans,” June 1, 2015, http://www.savetibet.org/

resources/fact-sheets/self-immolations-by-tibetans/.

130

Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2014 (Tibet), op.cit.

131

Frank Jack Daniel, “Interview—Back-Channel Talks with China Go On, Says Tibetan Leader-in-Exile,” Reuters

News, June 5, 2014; Rick Gladstone and Henrik Pryser Libell, “Dalai Lama Urges Outside Inquiry into Spate of SelfImmolations Among Tibetans,” New York Times (International), May 9, 2014.

132

Anuradha Sharma, “Interview: Lobsang Sangay,” The Diplomat, April 7, 2014.

133

Gyaincain Norbu is the 11th Panchen Lama as recognized by the Chinese government.

134

U.S. Department of State, “Under Secretary Sewall at the ‘Lockdown in Tibet’ Event,” June 15, 2015,

http://www.humanrights.gov/dyn/2015/06/under-secretary-sewall-at-the-lockdown-in-tibet-event/.

128

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struggled to preserve their unique religious and cultural traditions....”135 Presidential meetings

with the 14th Dalai Lama have been the most high-profile expressions of U.S. support for

religious freedom for Tibetans. President Barack Obama has met three times with the Dalai Lama,

in 2010, 2011, and 2014. In the February 2014 meeting, the President reportedly expressed his

“strong support for the preservation of Tibet’s unique religious, cultural, and linguistic traditions

and the protection of human rights for Tibetans in the People’s Republic of China.” He also

explicitly “reiterated the U.S. position that Tibet is part of the People’s Republic of China and that

the United States does not support Tibet independence.”136 After the 2014 meeting, Chinese ViceForeign Minister Zhang Yesui expressed China’s “strong indignation and firm opposition.”137 A

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman described the Tibetan spiritual leader as “a political exile

who has long been engaged in anti-China separatist activities under the cloak of religion” and

accused him of “essentially pursuing ‘independence in disguise.’”138 In February 2015, the Dalai

Lama attended the National Prayer Breakfast, where President Obama called the Tibetan spiritual

leader a “good friend.”139

U.S. Policy Toward Tibetan Areas of China

The Tibetan Policy Act of 2002, incorporated into the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY2003 (P.L. 107-228,

Title VI, Subtitle B), directs the executive branch to encourage the PRC government to enter into a dialogue with the

Dalai Lama or his representatives; call for the release of Tibetan political and religious prisoners in China; support

economic development, cultural preservation, environmental sustainability, and other objectives in Tibet; and carry

out other activities to “support the aspirations of the Tibetan people to safeguard their distinct identity.” For further

information, see CRS Report R43781, The Tibetan Policy Act of 2002: Background and Implementation, by (name red

acted) , and CRS Report RS22663, U.S. Assistance Programs in China, by (name redacted)

Chinese officials and representatives of the Dalai Lama participated in nine rounds of talks

between 2002 and January 2010 on issues related to Tibetan autonomy and the return of the Dalai

Lama. The ninth round failed to bring about any fundamental progress. The Dalai Lama’s

representatives pledged respect for the authority of the PRC central government, but continued to

push for “genuine autonomy” for the Tibetan people, while a senior Chinese official dismissed

the proposal as tantamount to “half independence.” In 2012, the two envoys who represented the

Dalai Lama in the talks, Lodi Gyari and Kelsang Gyaltsen, resigned from their positions. U.S.

officials, including President Obama, have regularly called for a resumption of the dialogue, but

Beijing so far has declined to schedule a tenth round of talks.

Uighur Muslims140

The Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR), referred to by some Uighurs as East

Turkestan, has experienced a rise in violent attacks against government institutions and civilians

allegedly perpetrated by ethnic Uighur Muslims in recent years.141 Human rights groups have

135

The White House, “The First Lady’s Travel Journal: A Taste of Tibetan Culture,” March 26, 2014,

http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/03/26/first-ladys-travel-journal-taste-tibetan-culture.

136

The White House, “Readout of the President’s Meeting with His Holiness the XIV Dalai Lama,” February 21, 2014,

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/02/21/readout-president-s-meeting-his-holiness-xiv-dalai-lama.

137

“China Expresses ‘Strong Indignation, Firm Opposition’ Against Obama-Dalai Lama Meeting,” Xinhua, February

22, 2014; “China Voices Strong Indignation, Objection to Obama-Dalai Meeting,” Xinhua, July 17, 2011.

138

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s

Remarks on US President Obama’s Tibet-related Comments When Meeting with the Dalai Lama,” February 23, 2014.

139

David Jackson, “Obama Praises Dalai Lama at Prayer Breakfast,” USA Today, February 5, 2015.

140

For additional information, see CRS In Focus IF10281, Uyghurs in China, by (name redacted) and (name redacted).

141

Many Uighur exile groups prefer the name East Turkestan rather than the Chinese name of Xinjiang.

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argued that the Chinese government’s pervasive controls on Uighurs, a Turkic ethnic group that

traditionally has practiced a moderate form of Sunni Islam, have exacerbated tensions in

Xinjiang. By contrast, another large Muslim minority group in China, the Hui, who are

geographically dispersed and more culturally assimilated than the Uighurs, reportedly engage in

some Islamic religious practices with less government interference. Hui Muslims number an

estimated 11 million in China.142

In the past decade, Chinese authorities have carried out especially harsh religious and ethnic

policies against Uighurs. Once the predominant ethnic group in the XUAR, Xinjiang’s roughly 10

million Uighurs now constitute less than half of the region’s population of 22 million as many

Han Chinese have migrated there, particularly to Urumqi, the capital.143 Uighurs have complained

of restrictions on religious and cultural practices, the regulation and erosion of ethnic identity,

economic discrimination, arbitrary harassment by PRC public security forces, and a lack of

consultation on regional policies. Government restrictions affect the training and role of imams,

the celebration of Ramadan, participation in the hajj, and use of the Uighur language. Uighur

children are forbidden from entering mosques or studying the Koran while CCP members, civil

servants, and teachers are not allowed to openly practice Islam and are discouraged from fasting

during Ramadan. In December 2014, the Urumqi government banned the wearing of veils in

public areas. The XUAR government’s redevelopment of the ancient heart of Kashgar, a center of

Islamic and Uighur history and culture, also has angered many Uighurs.144

PRC leaders often have conflated the religious and cultural practices of Uighurs in Xinjiang with

criminal and subversive activities or the “three evils of religious extremism, splittism, and

terrorism.” Local police reportedly have targeted and regularly harassed young men, perceived as

potential anti-government militants or terrorists. Official reports say that arrests in the XUAR

nearly doubled in 2014, while the number of criminal trials grew by 40%.145 According to some

experts, crimes related to unauthorized religious activity and to challenges to China’s ethnic

harmony policies likely accounted for a large share of the increase in trials.146 The Dui Hua

Foundation estimated that there were 3,850-5,600 Uighurs serving prison sentences for

endangering state security in 2014.147 Some observers say that government attempts to discourage

or abolish Uighur religious and cultural traditions have backfired, and instead fueled trends

toward more conservative Islam and popularized some Muslim practices, such as the wearing of

veils.148

142

The Hui number an estimated 11 million in China. Hannah Beech, ”If China Is Anti-Islam, Why Are These Muslims

Enjoying a Faith Revival?” Time.com August 12, 2014; Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report

for 2013, op. cit.

143

Uighurs make up 46% and Hans constitute 39% of the population of Xinjiang. “Up to 23 Dead in Xinjiang Clash:

Reports,” Agence France Presse, August 29, 2013. The ratio of Uighurs to Hans in Urumqi is now 2 to 8, compared to

8 to 2 roughly two decades ago. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013 (China),

op. cit.

144

Ishaan Tharoor, “Tearing Down Old Kashgar: Another Blow to the Uighurs,” Time, Wednesday, July 29, 2009.

145

“Arrests in China’s Xinjiang Nearly Doubled in 2014: Report,” Agence France Presse, January 22, 2015.

146

Dui Hua Foundation, “Xinjiang State Security Trials Flat, Criminal Trials Sour in 2014,” March 10, 2015.

147

Dui Hua Foundation, May 2014.

148

Dan Levin, “Uighurs’ Veils Signal Protest Against China’s Restrictions,” New York Times (International), August

7, 2014; Ting Shi, “China’s Ban on Islamic Veils Sends Uighurs Westward to Pray,” Bloomberg News, January 6,

2015.

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The PRC government has blamed the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and the

Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) for violent attacks in China since the 1990s.149 ETIM and TIP are

Uighur groups that advocate the creation of an independent Islamic state in Xinjiang, are believed

to be based in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and have had some ties to Al Qaeda and the Taliban.

PRC officials assert that Islamic fundamentalism, jihad, and terrorist techniques, much of it

promoted over the Internet, have contributed to violence in Xinjiang, and have referred to

Islamist-inspired attacks as “the greatest threat since the founding of the PRC.”150 They also claim

that 100-300 Uighur Muslims have been identified among ISIS fighters.151

In Xinjiang, a cycle of violence has emerged involving Uighur protests and attacks against

security forces, government offices, and civilians, on the one hand, and police actions against

unarmed Uighur demonstrators and Uighur assailants, on the other. Often reports of these

incidents give conflicting accounts, and PRC authorities have prevented independent reporting of

them. Clashes between Uighurs and police have resulted in hundreds of deaths in the past two

years, including those of Uighurs alleged to be plotting or preparing to carry out attacks.152 In

July 2014, a clash between Uighur protesters and police in Kashgar prefecture reportedly resulted

in the deaths of 96 people, including 59 assailants who allegedly had attacked a police station,

government offices, and passing cars, and 37 others (35 Hans and 2 Uighurs). The state media

described the event as a terrorist attack while Uighur groups claimed that tensions flared out of

control after police fired upon townspeople protesting harsh government measures during

Ramadan.153 In recent years, hundreds, and possibly thousands, of Uighurs reportedly have fled

China via trafficking rings, many to escape persecution and seek political asylum.154

In 2013 and 2014, several attacks purportedly involving Uighur perpetrators were carried out in

public places in cities in China, killing over 80 civilians and prompting tighter security measures.

No groups, including ETIM and TIP, claimed responsibility.155 According to some experts, despite

apparently growing levels of planning, there has been little, if any, evidence to back PRC

government claims directly linking violent incidents to organized terrorist groups within or

outside China. Other observers, including Chinese experts speaking privately, have argued that

149

The United States designated ETIM as a terrorist organization under Executive Order 13224 in 2002 (to block

terrorist financing) and placed it on the Terrorist Exclusion List in 2004 (to prevent entry of terrorists). ETIM also is on

the United Nations’ lists of terrorist organizations.

150

Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Yesui, remarks before a U.S. congressional delegation, Beijing, August 11, 2014.

151

Simon Denyer, “China Faces Jihadist Threat at Home and Abroad,” Washington Post, September 18, 2014; “About

300 Chinese Said Fighting Alongside Islamic State in Middle East,” Reuters, December 15, 2014.

152

According to various reports, there were roughly 300 deaths between April 2013 and September 2014, including

Uighurs, security personnel, and others. Gillian Wong, “Killings by China Anti-Terror Cops Raise Concerns,”

Associated Press, September 8, 2014; Tom Hancock, “Blasts in China’s Xinjiang Kill Two, Injure ‘Many’: Govt,”

Agence France Presse, September 22, 2014; Anne Steele, “Ilham Tohti: Why Chinese Court Gave Life Sentence to

Muslim Uighur Scholar,” Christian Science Monitor, September 23, 2014; “China Says 50 Dead, 54 Injured in Sunday

Terror Attacks in Restive Xinjiang,” South China Morning Post, September 26, 2014.

153

According to official figures. Barbara Demick, “Deadly Clash in China: An Ambush by Uighurs or a Government

Massacre?” Los Angeles Times, August 7, 2014; Simon Denyer, “China’s Clampdown on Islam Stokes Resentment and

Violence,” Washington Post, September 20, 2014.

154

Tetsuya Abe, “Terrorists Without Borders: Have Hundreds of China’s Uighurs Joined Islamic State?” Nikkei

Report, December 17, 2014; Jeremy Page and Emre Peker, “As Muslims Flee, China Sees Jihad Risk; As Homeland

Grows Violent, Some Uighurs Seek Haven in Turkey,” Wall Street Journal, February 1, 2015. Major Uighur migration

routes reportedly include traveling from China through Vietnam to Thailand and Malaysia. Many Uighurs extend their

journeys onto Indonesia and Turkey.

155

ETIM took responsibility for two attacks in 2011 targeting government officials. Beina Xu, “The East Turkestan

Islamic Movement (ETIM),” Council on Foreign Relations, December 3, 2013.

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PRC security campaigns and U.S. counterterrorism efforts against Al Qaeda and the Taliban have

significantly hampered the ability of Uighur groups in the PRC to organize attacks or to develop

linkages to the outside.156 Deadly incidents include the following:



In October 2013, a family identified as Uighur reportedly drove into a crowd near

Tiananmen Square, killing 2 tourists and 3 occupants of the car and injuring

40.157

On March 1, 2014, five Uighurs allegedly carried out a knife attack at a train

station in Kunming, killing 29 people.158

In April 2014, assailants identified as Uighur engaged in a bomb and knife

attacks at Urumqi South railway station. Three people (including two attackers)

were killed and 79 were injured.159

On May 22, 2014, two “off road” vehicles purportedly driven by Uighurs plowed

into an Urumqi street market filled with ethnic Hans while explosives from the

vehicles were thrown at morning shoppers. Around a dozen bombs detonated and

one vehicle also exploded. The vehicles and explosives reportedly killed 39

people and injured over 90. Police stated that four Uighur assailants were killed

in the attack, and one was captured.160

In September 2014, 50 people, including 40 assailants, were killed in an attack

involving multiple explosions and a police counterattack in Luntai county,

Xinjiang. Some Uighur witnesses claimed that the violence stemmed from local

anger over forced mass evictions of Uighurs to make way for Han migrants.161

On November 29, 2014, 4 civilians reportedly were killed and 14 injured in an

attack in a street lined by food stalls by men armed with knives and explosives in

Shache county, near the city of Kashgar. In addition, 11 of the assailants

reportedly were killed by police.162

The Obama Administration appears to have been cautious about referring to incidents of violence

allegedly involving Uighur perpetrators as acts of terrorism, noting that PRC authorities often

have failed to provide detailed evidence of terrorist involvement and have restricted the ability of

foreign journalists and international observers to verify Chinese government accounts

independently. The State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism reported that in 2014, the

U.S. government “identified sufficient evidence to consider” three incidents of violence as

156

CECC staff, June 2014. “Uighur Attacks in China Likely To Be Opportunistic Rather than Planned and Will Not

Significantly Raise Terrorism Risks,” IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis, March 31, 2014; Gillian Wong, “China Train

Station Blast Seen as Suicide Attack,” Associated Press, May 2, 2014; “China Seeking Alleged Terrorist Organizer

behind Deadly Train Station Attack Last Month,” Associated Press, May 19, 2014; Didi Kirsten Tatlow, “Attack in

Xinjiang Kills 31 and Injures 94,” New York Times Blogs, May 21, 2014; “Suspects Behind Xinjiang Attacks

‘Belonged to Terrorist Groups’,” South China Morning Post, June 6, 2014.

157

Peter Ford, “SUV Plows into Tiananmen Square: Attack or Accident?” Christian Science Monitor, October 28,

2013.

158

Ralph Ellis, “Knife-Wielding Attackers Kill 29, Injure 130 at China Train Station,” CNN, March 2, 2014.

159

“Deadly China Blast at Xinjiang Railway Station,” BBC News, April 30, 2014.

160

Didi Kirsten Tatlow, “Attack in Xinjiang Kills 31 and Injures 94,” New York Times Blogs, May 21, 2014; “31

Killed, Scores Injured in Xinjiang ‘Terrorist’ Attack,” South China Morning Post, May 22, 2014.

161

“China Says 50 Dead, 54 Injured in Sunday Terror Attacks in Restive Xinjiang,” South China Morning Post,

September 26, 2014; “China Now Says 50 Were Killed in Xinjiang Blasts,” Today (Singapore), September 27, 2014.

162

“China Says 15 Killed in ‘Terrorist Attack’ in Xinjiang,” Agence France Presse, November 29, 2014.

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Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 114th Congress

“terrorist attacks.”163 The report also stated that U.S.-China cooperation on global

counterterrorism efforts “remained limited.” Beijing has criticized Washington for applying a

“double standard” to Uighur acts of violence by not publicly labeling many of them as

“terrorist.”164

The PRC government has implemented a three-pronged strategy in response to Uighur grievances

and unrest: (1) carrying out a “strike hard” campaign against “religious extremism,” “separatism,”

and “terrorism”; (2) developing the XUAR economy; and (3) introducing policies to assimilate

Uighurs into Han society. In 2014, the Xinjiang government announced plans to increase the

public security budget by 24%, including doubling spending on counterterrorism activities.165

Xinjiang authorities reportedly have organized networks of informers, set up surveillance

systems, and bolstered police forces, which carry out house-to-house inspections in various

trouble spots. In 2010, following the Uighur unrest of 2009, China’s top leadership held the first

“central work forum” focused on Xinjiang. The forum produced an ambitious economic

development plan for the region. The PRC government reportedly is spending $5.5 billion over

three years to construct infrastructure and industrial projects.166 At the second central work forum,

held in May 2014, President Xi Jinping pledged to alleviate poverty and protect “legal religious

activities” while “helping religion adapt to socialist society.” Xi urged all ethnic groups to “show

mutual understanding” while advocating bilingual education, interethnic interaction, and a “more

integrated social structure.”167 Assimilation policies include placing greater emphasis on

Mandarin language instruction in schools, providing monetary incentives for mixed Uighur-Han

marriages, and promoting the migration of Uighur workers to other provinces. According to

critics, the PRC government has not addressed long-standing Uighur religious, ethnic, and

political grievances, and Uighurs accused of criminal acts have been deprived of procedural

protections provided under China’s constitution and laws. Some contend that assimilation policies

may contribute to the erosion of Uighur identity and breed further resentment.168

Ilham Tohti

In September 2014, a Beijing court sentenced Ilham Tohti, a Uighur economics professor, to life

in prison for the state security crime of separatism.169 Tohti was known abroad as a moderate

advocate for Uighur rights who promoted dialogue and mutual understanding between Hans and

Uighurs and did not call for the creation of an independent East Turkestan. However, Uighur

Online, a website that he established in 2005 to serve as a platform for Uighur issues, interviews

that he gave to the foreign press, and articles that he published critical of the government’s ethnic

policies, caused alarm among PRC leaders and eventually led to his arrest in January 2014. For

163

Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2014, April 2015.

Hannah Beech, “China Reacts to Terrorism ‘Double-Standard’ After Kunming Mass Murder,” Time, March 3, 2014.

165

Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Annual Report 2014, op. cit.; “Xinjiang Doubles Terror Fight

Budget,” China Daily, January 17, 2014.

166

“China Defends Life Sentence for Uighur Scholar,” Associated Press, September 25, 2014.

167

Megha Rajagopalan, “China’s Xi Vows to Address Poverty, Ethnic Unity in Troubled Xinjiang,” Reuters, May 30,

2014; “Central Govt Pledges Better Governance in Xinjiang,” China Daily, May 20, 2014.

168

Eric Meyer, “China Offers Work Placements and Mixed Marriage Incentives as Solutions for Its Xinjiang

Problems,” Forbes Asia, November 13, 2014.

169

The charges against Tohti included advocating separatism, voicing support for terrorism, inciting ethnic hatred, and

attacking the government’s ethnic and religious policies. Simon Deyer, “China Sentences Moderate Uighur Scholar to

Life in Prison for Advocating Separatism,” Washington Post, September 23, 2014.

164

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Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 114th Congress

several years, Tohti was subjected to harassment by authorities, interrogations, and restrictions on

travel.170

Tohti’s lawyers argued that none of the scholar’s positions, interviews, articles, or lectures

advocated separatism or incited terrorism. They claimed that prosecutors manipulated evidence

and violated proper judicial procedures.171 A PRC State Ethnic Affairs Commission official

responded that the case was handled according to Chinese law, and that the decision was a matter

of punishing a violator of Chinese law rather than safeguarding the rights and interests of

minorities.172 A prominent Chinese human rights lawyer stated that the verdict “would only

exacerbate the conflict in Xinjiang.”173 In December 2014, seven of Tohti’s students (six Uighur

and one a member of the Yi minority) who had worked on his website received jail sentences of

three to eight years on charges of separatism.174 Secretary of State John Kerry stated that “Mr.

Tohti and those like him are indispensable in helping resolve the underlying causes of unrest and

violence. Silencing them can only make tensions worse.... Differentiating between peaceful

dissent and violent extremism is vital to any effective efforts to counter terrorism.” Secretary

Kerry reportedly raised Tohti’s case during the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue in

July 2014, and U.S. Ambassador to China Max Baucus called for Tohti’s release during a

September 2014 visit to Xinjiang.175

Falun Gong

Falun Gong (“law wheel practice”) combines an exercise regimen with meditation, belief in the

virtues of truthfulness, compassion, and forbearance, and belief in the benefits that the system

brings to the body and mind. The practice is derived from qigong, a set of movements said to

stimulate the flow of qi—vital energies or “life forces”—throughout the body, Buddhist and

Daoist concepts, and precepts formulated by Falun Gong’s founder Li Hongzhi. In 1995, Li

published the book Zhuan Falun, which describes the principles of Falun Gong.176 Falun Gong,

also referred to as Falun Dafa, is described by its members as “an advanced practice of selfcultivation.” Practitioners who have reached a high level of self-cultivation say that they have

attained “true health,” a higher level of being, and freedom from worldly attachments.177 Some

adherents may believe that suffering helps to develop spiritually. During the mid-1990s, the

spiritual exercise gained tens of millions of adherents, including members of the Communist

Party, across China.178

Amid growing tensions between the group and the government, on April 25, 1999, thousands of

Falun Gong adherents gathered in Beijing, near Zhongnanhai, the Chinese leadership compound,

170

“Timeline of Ilham Tohti’s Case,” Human Rights Watch, September 15, 2014.

Andrea Chen, “Ilham Tohti’s ‘Separatist’ Videos Released by Chinese State Media after Controversial Conviction,”

South China Morning Post, September 25, 2014; Minnie Chan, “Ilham Tohti to Appeal Separatism Conviction and

Jailing for Life, Lawyers Say,” South China Morning Post, September 24, 2014.

172

Tom Hancock, “China Uighur Scholar Jailed over Lecture: Xinhua,” Agence France Presse, September 25, 2014.

173

Deyer, “China Sentences Moderate Uighur Scholar to Life in Prison for Advocating Separatism,” op. cit.

174

“Seven Chinese Students of Outspoken Uyghur Scholar Ilham Tohti Jailed for Separatism,” Associated Press,

December 9, 2014.

175

John Kerry, Secretary of State, “Press Statement: Conviction and Sentencing of Ilham Tohti,” September 23, 2014.

176

Li Hongzhi is believed to live in the United States.

177

“Falun Gong: An Ancient Tradition for Mind, Body, and Spirit,” Falun Dafa Information Center, June 2, 2012,

http://faluninfo.net/topic/22/.

178

Estimates of Falun Gong practitioners in China in the late 1990s ranged from several million to 70 million, with

widely divergent levels of commitment.

171

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to protest the government’s growing restrictions on their activities. The CCP established an office,

which became known as the “610” office because it was founded on June 10, 1999, to coordinate

and administer the eradication of Falun Gong. Following a crackdown on the group that began in

summer 1999 and deepened in intensity over a period of roughly two years, adherents ceased to

practice or agitate in the open. Nonetheless, deeply committed practitioners attempted to gather in

secret, counter government propaganda about them covertly and overtly, and stage small

demonstrations in Beijing.179

In 2002 and 2005, Falun Gong members reportedly were responsible for over a dozen cases

involving the interruption of television broadcasting in China and the temporary insertion of their

own programs.180 In the United States, Falun Gong and affiliated groups have documented the

persecution of adherents in China, staged demonstrations, distributed literature on their activities,

and sponsored cultural events such as the Shen Yun Performing Arts performances. In addition,

Falun Gong is affiliated with several mass media outlets in the United States, such as the Epoch

Times and New Tang Dynasty Television.

After 1999, tens of thousands of practitioners who refused to renounce Falun Gong were sent to

prisons or RETL camps until they were deemed “transformed.” According to human rights

groups, Falun Gong members have constituted a large portion, and at times a majority, of

detainees in RETL centers.181 According to one source, in 2013, Falun Gong adherents made up

an estimated two-thirds of all prisoners and detainees of conscience in China, or roughly 15,000

people.182 Many adherents who remained “non-transformable” spent multiple terms in RETL

centers, and many continue to be held in Legal Education Centers as RETL facilities have closed.

There have been numerous reports of abuse, force-feeding of hunger strikers, torture, and deaths

of Falun Gong prisoners, especially during the height of the crackdown.183 Falun Gong

organizations claim to have documented 3,700 deaths of Falun Gong adherents during custody or

shortly after release, as of June 2014.184

Although the group reportedly declined in importance as a perceived security risk by the

government after 2004, many members have remained committed to the practice, and have

continued to perform Falun Gong exercises in private and disseminate Falun Gong literature.185

Overseas Falun Gong organizations claim that public security forces intensified their persecution

of Falun Gong during the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the 2009 Shanghai World Expo, and the 2010

Asian Games in Guangzhou.186 Since 2010, PRC authorities have launched two consecutive,

three-year campaigns to “transform” Falun Gong adherents, calling it a “decisive battle.”187

179

Ethan Gutmann, The Slaughter, Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2014.

“China Condemns Alleged Falun Gong Satellite ‘Attack,’” Dow Jones International News, July 6, 2005.

181

Changing the Soup but not the Medicine: Abolishing Re-education through Labor in China, op. cit.

182

The Dui Hua Foundation, January 2013.

183

Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report 2003, December 18, 2003.

184

Iris Cooper, “Falun Dafa Continues to Thrive Despite 15 Years of Persecution: The Story in Numbers,”

Minghui.org, July 20, 2014, http://en.minghui.org/html/articles/2014/7/20/2132p.html; Changing the Soup but Not the

Medicine: Abolishing Re-education through Labor in China, op. cit.

185

“11 Dead after Protesting ‘Black Jail’ in China,” New York Times Blogs, April 1, 2014; Gutmann, op. cit.

186

James W. Tong, Prepared Statement, “Falun Gong in China: Review and Update,” Congressional-Executive

Commission on China, December 18, 2012.

187

“Communist Party Calls for Increased Efforts to ‘Transform’ Falun Gong Practitioners as Part of Three-Year

Campaign,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, March 22, 2011; Congressional-Executive Commission

on China, Annual Report 2014, op. cit.

180

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In 2013, Lens, a Chinese magazine, published an expose on abuses and torture of female inmates

at Masanjia, an RETL camp near Shenyang, where many Falun Gong practitioners were held. Du

Bin, a journalist, soon after released a documentary video online about the detention center. Both

the report and documentary were banned in China. Du, who also published a book on the

Tiananmen crackdown which was published in Hong Kong, was detained for over a month and

continues to be monitored by police.188 In March 2014, four human rights lawyers who had

attempted to investigate claims that Falun Gong practitioners were being held in a black jail, or

extrajudicial detention center, were detained for periods of up to two weeks and reportedly

physically abused.189

Organ Harvesting

Some reports allege that tens of thousands of Falun Gong detainees were victims of organ

harvesting—the illegal, large-scale, systematic, and non-consensual removal of body organs for

transplantation—while they were still alive.190 There also have been allegations that Tibetan and

Uighur prisoners have been a source of human organs, but to a much lesser degree.191 The claims’

backers argue that the number of organ transplants in China—roughly 10,000 per year—cannot

be fully accounted for by executed prisoners or the small number of volunteer donors, and that

Falun Gong detainees have been the likely primary source. They contend that the number of

executions in China has been declining and many prisoners are not viable candidates for organ

transplants, while many Chinese hold the traditional belief that the bodies of the deceased should

remain intact and are unwilling to donate the organs of family members who have died. The

claims of organ harvesting from Falun Gong detainees are based largely upon circumstantial

evidence, interviews, and the large number of allegedly healthy Falun Gong detainees,

particularly during the 2000 to 2008 period.192 Evidence includes claims of suspicious physical

examinations and disappearances by former Falun Gong prisoners, statements from three Chinese

sources,193 and purported recordings of Chinese hospital officials who acknowledged the

practice.194

Allegations of large-scale organ harvesting have not been independently verified by international

human rights organizations. In 2006, U.S. embassy and consular officials in China visited a

hospital in Shenyang that Falun Gong groups claimed was a site of organ harvesting of Falun

Gong prisoners. They “found no evidence that the site is being used for any function other than as

188

“China Detains Photographer Who Exposed Labour Camp Abuses,” Amnesty International, June 14, 2014.

“China Falun Gong Trial Lawyer Hits Out at Police Security Cordon,” Radio Free Asia, December 17, 2014.

190

The principal sources supporting the allegations of large-scale organ harvesting of Falun Gong prisoners include the

following: David Matas and David Kilgour, Report into Allegations of Organ Harvesting of Falun Gong Practitioners

in China, July 6, 2006; David Matas and David Kilgour, Revised Report into Allegations of Organ Harvesting of Falun

Gong Practitioners in China, January 31, 2007; Ethan Gutmann, “China’s Gruesome Organ Harvest,” The Weekly

Standard, November 11, 2008; David Matas and David Kilgour, Bloody Harvest, Woodstock (ON): Seraphim Editions,

2009; Davis Matas and Dr. Torsten Trey, eds., State Organs: Transplant Abuse in China, Woodstock (ON): Seraphim

Editions, 2012.

191

Julia Duin, “Chinese Accused of Vast Trade in Organs,” Washington Times, April 27, 2010.

192

Ethan Gutmann interviewed over 100 Falun Gong practitioners, former detainees, and others. Other witnesses

included a Uighur doctor, PRC public security personnel, and Falun Gong investigators and organ transplant doctors

based outside China. See Ethan Gutmann, The Slaughter, op. cit.

193

These sources are a woman who worked at a hospital purported to perform organ transplants, a military doctor, and

a journalist.

194

“China Announcement on Organ Harvesting a Ploy,” Falun Dafa Information Center, December 6, 2014.

189

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a normal public hospital.”195 In their most recent reports on human rights conditions in China, the

Department of State and the Congressional-Executive Commission on China noted that organ

harvesting from executed prisoners and claims of transplantation from Falun Gong practitioners

continued.196 PRC government officials have denied that organ harvesting has occurred, claiming

that human organs used in PRC transplantation programs have been taken largely from executed

prisoners with their consent.

House Resolution 343 (114th Congress)

In the 114th Congress, a bill, H.Res. 343, has been introduced (Ros-Lehtinen, 6/25/15), ”Expressing concern regarding

persistent and credible reports of systematic, state-sanctioned organ harvesting from non-consenting prisoners of

conscience in the People's Republic of China, including from large numbers of Falun Gong practitioners and members

of other religious and ethnic minority groups.” The bill, in part, calls on the government of China to end the practice

of organ harvesting from all prisoners of conscience, allow an independent investigation into organ transplant abuses,

and end the persecution of Falun Gong. H.Res. 343 also “calls on the United States Department of State to conduct a

more detailed analysis on state-sanctioned organ harvesting from non-consenting prisoners of conscience in the

annual Human Rights Report, and report annually to Congress on the implementation of section 1182f of title 8,

United States Code, barring provision of visas to Chinese and other nationals engaged in coerced organ or bodily

tissue transplantation.”

In response to foreign and domestic pressure, some PRC officials admitted that the

transplantation of organs from executed prisoners had been prone to abuses, and announced

measures to address the problems. In 2011, the PRC Criminal Law was revised to include organ

trafficking as a crime, and in 2012 the government announced that China would phase out the

transplantation of organs from executed prisoners and end the illegal trade in human organs

within five years.197 In December 2014, the head of a central government committee on organ

donations announced that no organs from executed prisoners would be permitted beginning in

2015. However, some observers say that the voluntary donation rate in China remains low and the

sources of transplants remain undisclosed.198 Executed prisoners reportedly have remained a

major source—over half of transplanted organs—and allegations of organ harvesting of Falun

Gong adherents have continued as well.199

China’s Family Planning Policies

China’s “One-Child Policy” was launched in 1980 to curb population growth. It has led to many

human rights abuses as well as demographic problems, such as an accelerated aging of the

population and a skewed gender ratio. The policy, along with a historical preference for boys

based upon cultural and perceived economic factors, has spurred the illegal but widespread

practice of sex-selective abortions, particularly in rural areas. Chinese census data show that in

2011, 118 baby boys were born for every 100 baby girls, down from a peak of 121 boy babies for

195

U.S. officials visited the hospital and surrounding site on two occasions—the first time unannounced and the second

with the cooperation of PRC officials. “U.S. Finds No Evidence of Alleged Concentration Camp in China—Repression

of Falun Gong, Reports of Organ Harvesting Still Worry Officials,” Washington File, April 16, 2006.

196

Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013 (China), op. cit.; CongressionalExecutive Commission on China, Annual Report 2014, op. cit.

197

“Prisoner Organ Donation to be Phased Out,” South China Morning Post, March 23, 2012; “China Accelerates Plan

to Phase Out Prisoner Organ Harvesting,” Dow Jones Global Equities News, November 2, 2012.

198

“China To Stop Harvesting Executed Prisoners’ Organs,” BBC News, December 4, 2014; Katie Hunt, “Why China

Will Struggle To End Organ Harvesting From Executed Prisoners,” CNN, December 5, 2014.

199

Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Annual Report 2014, op. cit.

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Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 114th Congress

every 100 girl babies in 2008, but well above the normal global range of 103 to 107 boys per 100

girls.200

Many jurisdictions long have allowed some couples to have more than one child, for example

ethnic minorities, rural couples for whom the first child is a girl, and couples in which both

parents are an only child. In 2013, reforms to the policy, which are to be implemented

incrementally, would allow couples to have two children if either parent is an only child.

Although many urban Chinese couples eligible to have two children reportedly have opted to

have one child due to the costs of raising a child, many Chinese have supported reforms and long

decried the policy’s abuses.201 In August 2014, a Chinese academic published an editorial calling

for further loosening of the policy, stating that “The right to reproduce is a basic human right and

public power should protect rather than trample upon private rights.”202

China’s 2002 Population and Family Planning Law does not explicitly condone abortion as a

means of dealing with violations of the One-Child Policy, stating that “Family planning shall be

practiced chiefly by means of contraception.”203 However, the national law authorizes other

penalties for violators of the policy, including heavy fines and job-related sanctions, as well as the

denial of public health and education benefits to offspring beyond the first child. The policy has

led to many human rights abuses by local level officials attempting to enforce the law. According

to the CECC, in the past year, some local officials continued to employ coercive family planning

practices, including forced abortions, forced sterilizations, and forced contraceptive use.204 In

2013, two provinces continued to have laws requiring women who violate family planning

policies to “terminate” their pregnancies.205

Labor Unrest

Labor tensions have risen steadily in the past decade. Chinese Communist Party rhetoric long has

championed the working class. At the same time, party leaders have warily viewed factory

workers as a potential source of organized political opposition. The government has attempted to

address labor grievances and unrest with ad hoc measures and incremental reforms while tightly

restricting autonomous labor activity and containing news about labor unrest. State authorities

and enterprise managers often have yielded to some demands of labor protesters but also harassed

and detained strike leaders and labor activists. In 2010, after a period of relative quiet during the

global financial crisis, China began to experience a surge in labor disputes in both domestic and

foreign enterprises, particularly in Guangdong province.206 There were an estimated 50 strikes per

month in 2013, compared to 10 per month in 2011, according to a study.207 In 2014, there were

200

“China’s Gender Imbalance Still Grave,” China Daily, March 29, 2012; “No Timetable for Full Relaxation on OneChild Policy,” China Daily, November 5, 2014.

201

Le Li, “Despite Changes to One-Child Policy, Chinese Parents Say Having Two Kids Is Too Expensive,” NBC

News, November 30, 2013.

202

Mu Guangzong, “A Two-Child Policy for All,” China Daily, August 11, 2014.

203

Population and Family Planning Law of the People’s Republic of China (Order of the President No.63), Chapter III,

Article 19, http://english.gov.cn/laws/2005-10/11/content_75954.htm.

204

Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Annual Report 2014, op. cit.

205

Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013 (China), op. cit.

206

Elaine Kurtenbach, “Companies Brace for End of Cheap Made-in-China Era,” Associated Press, July 8, 2010; Keith

Richburg, “Labor Unrest in China Reflects Changing Demographics, More Awareness of Rights,” Washington Post,

June 7, 2010.

207

Stanley Lubman, “Labor Pains: A Rising Threat to Stability in China,” Wall Street Journal, June 10, 2014; Mary E.

Gallagher, “China’s Workers Movement and the End of the Rapid-Growth Era,” Daedalus, Vol. 143, no. 2 (Spring

(continued...)

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over 100 labor disturbances per month, according to a labor rights group based in Hong Kong.208

However, labor activism so far has not sparked a national labor or political movement. For the

most part, workers have not organized on a long-term basis or developed linkages between

enterprises, or have been prevented by the government from doing so, and their aims have been

focused on wages and working conditions.

Experts attribute the rise in labor unrest to a number of factors, including the following: stronger

labor laws since the Labor Contract Law was promulgated in 2008; a growing awareness of labor

rights; greater leverage exercised by workers due to a national labor shortage; the emergence of

labor advocacy groups; rising expectations among workers, and greater sophistication in

organizing and staging protests, aided by the use of social media.209 Workers have engaged in

strikes and protests related to wage arrears and insufficient pay, poor working conditions, factory

closures and the lack of severance pay, and lack of enforcement of PRC labor laws. Due to

upward wage pressures, a growing problem is the employment of workers that lack legal

protections, such as underage workers, student interns, and “dispatch labor” sent from labor

agencies.210

PRC law does not allow independent labor unions, and although strikes occur, the right to strike

is not explicitly protected in the law. The government-affiliated All-China Federation of Trade

Unions (ACFTU) and its subsidiary organizations have a membership of 280 million.211 Although

some official labor leaders are committed to protecting the interests of workers, trade union

committees often are dominated by company management. After signs of progress in 2010-2012,

the development of collective bargaining procedures, the legal right to strike, and direct elections

of union representatives reportedly have stalled.212

Legal Reforms

Some experts argue that calling on China to abide by its own laws is one of the most effective

ways for international actors to promote human rights in the PRC. During the past several years,

the Chinese government has enacted some legal measures aimed at reducing arbitrary

applications of the law and some patterns of human rights abuse. New laws, some of which are

detailed below, include those related to criminal defendants, the use of torture, organ transplants,

the death penalty, labor conditions, and private property. The CCP remains above the law,

however, and legal reforms often are blunted by the lack of judicial independence, adequate

enforcement, and government transparency. Nonetheless, the new laws may provide some basis

on which citizens may claim their rights.

(...continued)

2014).

208

Alexandra Harney, “China’s Workforce: Smaller, More Savvy, More Restive,” Reuters, April 16, 2014; John

Ruwitch, “Labor Movement ‘Concertmaster’ Tests Beijing’s Boundaries,” Reuters, December 6, 2014; Christina

Larson, “China’s Workers Are Getting Restless,” Bloomberg Businessweek, October 15, 2014.

209

Manfred Elfstrom, Sarosh Kuruvilla, The Changing Nature of Labor Unrest in China, ILR Review (Industrial and

Labor Relations Review), Vol. 67, no. 2, April 2014.

210

Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013 (China), op. cit.; CongressionalExecutive Commission on China, Annual Report 2014, op. cit.

211

“China’s Trade Unions Have 280 Million Members,” Global Times, October 11, 2013.

212

Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013 (China), op. cit.

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

Judicial Interference: In 2014, China announced some policies aimed at

reducing government influence over central and local courts. The Party reduced

the role of the Party Political and Legal Affairs Commission, which is in charge

of law enforcement, in “most legal cases,” according to some reports.213 The 18th

Central Committee of the CCP announced reforms aimed at reducing the direct

influence of local officials and procuratorates, or prosecutor’s offices, on local

courts. The changes would transfer power over budgets and personnel

appointments of basic level courts from local to provincial governments.214

Government Lawsuits: In 2010, the National People’s Congress approved

amendments to the State Compensation Law, which would grant citizens greater

powers to obtain compensation when the state is found to have violated their

rights or acted negligently. In 2014, the National People’s Congress passed an

amendment to the Administrative Litigation Law enabling legal proceedings

against the government in 12 areas, including land and housing compensation,

illegally restricting one’s freedom of movement, and abuse of administrative

power.215

Criminal Procedure Law: Amendments to the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL),

which went into effect in January 2013, provide for greater protections against

torture and coerced confessions, expanded access to legal defense, longer trial

deliberations, mandatory appellate hearings, more rigorous judicial review, and

greater government oversight of the legal process. Other changes in the law were

designed to improve the treatment of juveniles, women, and people on death

row.216 The Ministry of Public Security reportedly is in the process of drafting a

Detention Center Law that aims to reduce abuses in pre-trial detention centers.217

Torture: In 2013, the Supreme People’s Court issued guidelines demanding an

end to the practice of extracting confessions through torture, although human

rights activists emphasized that they applied to the courts but not to the police or

prosecutors, and that there were no sanctions for non-compliance.218

The Death Penalty: The number of executions in China has declined, due in part

to a 2007 mandate that all death sentences must be reviewed by the Supreme

People’s Court. The Dui Hua Foundation estimated that 2,400 people were

executed in China in 2013, down 20% from the previous year.219 By comparison,

Dui Hua estimates that approximately 5,000 people were executed in 2008 and

213

Sui-Lee Wee and Li Hui, “With Legal Reforms, China Wants Less Interference in Cases, Fewer Death Penalty

Crimes,” Reuters, March 9, 2014.

214

Stanley Lubman, “Power Shift: Hopeful Signs in China’s Legal Reform,” Wall Street Journal, July 10, 2014;

Andrew Jacobs and Chris Buckley, “China Moves to Enact Rule of Law, with Caveats,” New York Times

(International), October 23, 2014; Ren Jin, “Judicial Reform Enforces Rule of Law,” China Daily, December 4, 2014.

215

Adrian Wan, “Revised Law Means It’s Now Easier to Sue than Petition Governments,” South China Morning Post,

November 2, 2014.

216

Dui Hua Foundation, Annual Report 2012, http://duihua.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/AR2012/

2012AR_Eng_web.pdf; “China Bans Forced Confessions in Investigations,” Xinhua, December 26, 2012.

217

Dui Hua Foundation, “Is Detention Center Law Enough to Prevent Police Abuse?” Human Rights Journal, July 2,

2014.

218

Keith Zhai, “China’s Supreme People’s Court Calls for End to Torture in New Guidelines,” South China Morning

Post, November 22, 2013; Stanley Lubman, “China Legal Reform Promises Cause for Cautious Optimism,” Wall

Street Journal, November 20, 2013.

219

“China Considers Ending the Death Penalty for 9 Crimes,” Associated Press, October 27, 2014.

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Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 114th Congress



10,000 in 2003. The government reduced the number of crimes punishable by

death from 68 to 55 in 2011, and reportedly is considering removing nine other

crimes from the list. Recent declines are likely to be offset, however, by increases

in the executions of Uighurs.220

Government Transparency: In 2008, the PRC government adopted new Open

Government Information (OGI) regulations regarding the disclosure of official

information.221 Under the regulations, governments at various levels are required

to publish information on policies that have public interest, and individuals also

may submit requests for information. Implemented first by the Ministry of

Environmental Protection, these measures also in part represented an attempt to

compel local governments to reveal financial accounts related to land takings in

rural areas. In 2012, the Guangdong provincial government launched a pilot

program requiring party and government officials to report their assets publicly.

However, in 2014, several citizens were sentenced to jail terms for their roles in

organizing and participating in demonstrations advocating the disclosure of

officials’ assets.222

U.S. Efforts to Advance Human Rights in China

Many experts and policymakers have sharply disagreed over the best policy approaches and

methods to apply toward human rights issues in China. Possible approaches range from

supporting incremental progress and promoting human rights through bilateral and international

engagement to placing human rights conditions upon improvements in bilateral ties. Some

approaches attempt to balance U.S. values and human rights concerns with other U.S. interests in

the bilateral relationship. Other approaches challenge the underlying assumption that U.S. values

and human rights concerns necessarily are in tension with other U.S. interests, arguing instead

that human rights are fundamental to other U.S. interests.

Since the end of the 1980s, successive U.S. administrations have employed broadly similar

strategies for promoting human rights in China. Some analysts have referred to the U.S. foreign

policy approach of promoting human rights and democracy in China through diplomatic and

economic engagement, without directly challenging Communist Party rule, as a strategy of

seeking China’s “peaceful evolution.”223 President Bill Clinton referred to this approach as

“constructive engagement”—furthering diplomatic and economic ties while pressing for open

markets and democracy, calling it “our best hope to secure our own interest and values and to

advance China’s.”224 President George W. Bush also came to view U.S. engagement as the most

effective means of promoting U.S. interests as well as freedom in China.225 Another theme of

220

Dui Hua Foundation, “China Executed 2,400 People in 2013,” October 20, 2014.

Edward Cody, “China Announces Rules to Require Government Disclosures,” Washington Post, April 24, 2007.

222

Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013 (China), op. cit.; CongressionalExecutive Commission on China, Annual Report 2014, op. cit.; “The Right to Know,” The Economist, May 3, 2014.

223

Warren Christopher, Secretary of State under the Clinton Administration (1993-1997), stated: “Our policy will seek

to facilitate a peaceful evolution of China from communism to democracy by encouraging the forces of economic and

political liberalization in that great country.” Warren Christopher, Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee, January 13, 1993.

224

“Clinton Defends ‘Constructive Engagement’ of China,” CNN.com, October 24, 1997.

225

“Transcript of Bob Costas’ Interview with President George W. Bush,” PRNewsChannel.com, August 11, 2008;

“Bush Woos China on Trade,” BBC News, May 30, 2001.

221

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Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 114th Congress

both the Bush and Obama Administrations has been to emphasize that China’s respect for

international human rights norms would benefit China’s success and stability.226

As China’s importance in global economic, security, environmental, and other matters has grown,

the Obama Administration has attempted to forge bilateral cooperation on many fronts, while

disagreeing with Beijing on many human rights issues. During President Obama’s first term,

then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described the Administration’s human righ

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