Latin America and the Caribbean: Key Issues and Actions in the 114th Congress
Congressional research reportJan 4, 2017
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Latin America and the Caribbean:
Key Issues and Actions in the 114th Congress
,name redacted,, Coordinator
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
January 4, 2017
Congressional Research Service
7-....
www.crs.gov
R43882
Latin America and the Caribbean: Key Issues and Actions in the 114th Congress
Summary
U.S. Interests and Policy
Geographic proximity has ensured strong linkages between the United States and the Latin
American and Caribbean region, based on diverse U.S. interests, including economic, political,
and security concerns. U.S. policy toward the region under the Obama Administration focused on
four priorities: promoting economic and social opportunity; ensuring citizen security;
strengthening effective democratic institutions; and securing a clean energy future. There was
substantial continuity in U.S. policy toward the region during the first six years of the Obama
Administration, which pursued some of the same basic policy approaches as the Bush
Administration. However, the Obama Administration made several significant policy changes,
including an emphasis on partnership and shared responsibility. Moreover, President Obama
unveiled a new policy approach of engagement with Cuba in 2014.
U.S. policy toward the region is conducted in the context of an increasingly independent Latin
America, which has diversified its economic and diplomatic ties with countries outside the
region. Over the past few years, several Latin American regional organizations have been
established that do not include the United States. Nevertheless, the United States remains very
much engaged in Latin America bilaterally and multilaterally.
Congressional Action and Oversight
Congress traditionally has played an active role in policy toward Latin America and the
Caribbean in terms of both legislation and oversight. In the first session of the 114th Congress in
2015, the most significant legislative action was enactment of the Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113). The law had numerous provisions on foreign aid to the region,
including $750 million for ramped-up funding to address Central America’s economic, security,
and governance challenges. The FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA; P.L. 11492) also had provisions regarding increased support for Central America and prohibitions against
funding for the closure of the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Also in 2015,
Congress approved an extension of the Generalized System of Preferences through 2017 in the
Trade Preferences Extension Act (P.L. 114-27) benefitting some 15 countries in the region. Late
in 2015, the House passed H.Res. 536, expressing support for freedom of the press in the region.
In the second session, Congress enacted legislation in July 2016 extending targeted sanctions for
human rights abuses in Venezuela through 2019 (P.L. 114-194), while in September 2016 the
House approved H.Res. 851 on the situation in Venezuela. Also in September, Congress enacted a
legislative vehicle (P.L. 114-223) that provided FY2016 supplemental funding to control the
spread of the Zika virus in the Americas.
As the 114th Congress neared its end in December 2016, Congress completed action on several
measures with provisions related to the region. P.L. 114-291 requires the Secretary of State to
submit a multiyear strategy for U.S. engagement with the Caribbean. P.L. 114-323, the
Department of State Authorities Act, FY2017, established a commission to review U.S. drug
control policy in the hemisphere, including an evaluation of counternarcotics assistance
programs. P.L. 114-328, the FY2017 NDAA, extends a unified counterdrug and counterterrorism
campaign in Colombia for two years; requires a report on U.S. military units that have been
assigned to do policing or other law enforcement duties in El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras; continues prohibitions on funding for the closure of the U.S. Naval Station at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; and restricts funding for Cuba’s participation in certain joint or
multilateral exercises or related security conferences. Congress did not complete action on
FY2017 foreign aid appropriations, but it enacted a continuing resolution, P.L. 114-254, in
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Latin America and the Caribbean: Key Issues and Actions in the 114th Congress
December that funded most foreign aid programs at the FY2016 level, minus an across-the-board
reduction of almost 0.2%, through April 28, 2017. The 115th Congress will face completing action
on FY2017 foreign aid appropriations.
This report, which will not be updated, provides an overview of U.S. policy toward Latin
America and the Caribbean during the 114th Congress in 2015 and 2016. It begins with an
overview of the political and economic environment affecting U.S. relations and then examines
the Obama Administration’s policy toward the region. The report then examines congressional
interests in the region and legislative action, looking at selected regional and country issues. An
Appendix provides links to hearings on the region in the 114th Congress.
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Latin America and the Caribbean: Key Issues and Actions in the 114th Congress
Contents
U.S. Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean .................................................................... 1
Political and Economic Environment in the Region ................................................................. 1
A Changed Region .............................................................................................................. 1
Latin America’s Increasing Independence .......................................................................... 4
Obama Administration’s Priorities for the Region .................................................................... 8
Economic and Social Opportunity ...................................................................................... 9
Citizen Security................................................................................................................. 10
Democratic Governance.....................................................................................................11
Clean Energy Future ......................................................................................................... 12
Continuity and Change in U.S. Policy .................................................................................... 12
Congress and Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean ................................................... 14
Overview of Action in the 114th Congress .............................................................................. 14
Regional Issues........................................................................................................................ 15
U.S. Foreign Aid ............................................................................................................... 15
Migration Issues ................................................................................................................ 16
Trade Policy ...................................................................................................................... 18
Drug Policy ....................................................................................................................... 20
Terrorism Issues ................................................................................................................ 22
Organization of American States ...................................................................................... 23
Climate Change and Clean Energy ................................................................................... 24
Zika Virus.......................................................................................................................... 26
Selected Country and Subregional Issues ............................................................................... 27
Argentina........................................................................................................................... 27
Brazil ................................................................................................................................. 28
Caribbean Security and Energy Issues .............................................................................. 30
Central America ................................................................................................................ 31
Colombia ........................................................................................................................... 33
Cuba .................................................................................................................................. 35
Guatemala ......................................................................................................................... 36
Haiti .................................................................................................................................. 37
Mexico .............................................................................................................................. 39
Nicaragua .......................................................................................................................... 41
Venezuela .......................................................................................................................... 42
Outlook.................................................................................................................................... 44
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Latin America and the Caribbean ........................................................................ 7
Tables
Table 1. Latin America and Caribbean: Real GDP Growth, 2014-2017 ......................................... 4
Table 2. U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2011-FY2016 ......................... 16
Table 3. U.S. Trade with Key Trading Partners in Latin America and the Caribbean, 20082015 ............................................................................................................................................ 19
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Table A-1. Congressional Hearings in the 114th Congress on Latin America and
the Caribbean.............................................................................................................................. 45
Appendixes
Appendix. Hearings in the 114th Congress .................................................................................... 45
Contacts
Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 48
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Latin America and the Caribbean: Key Issues and Actions in the 114th Congress
U.S. Policy Toward Latin America and the
Caribbean
U.S. interests in the Western Hemisphere are diverse, and include economic, political, security,
and humanitarian concerns. Geographic proximity has ensured strong economic linkages between
the United States and the region, with the United States being the major trading partner and
largest source of foreign investment for many countries. Free trade agreements (FTAs) have
augmented U.S. economic relations with 11 countries in the region. Latin American nations,
primarily Mexico and Venezuela, supply the United States with almost one-third of its imported
crude oil. The Western Hemisphere is also the largest source of U.S. immigration, both legal and
illegal, with geographic proximity and economic and security conditions being major factors
driving migration trends. Curbing the flow of illicit drugs from Latin America and the Caribbean
has been a key component of U.S. relations with the region and a major interest of Congress for
some three decades. In recent years, this has included close security cooperation with Mexico,
Central America, and the Caribbean to combat drug trafficking and related violence. With the
exception of Cuba, the region has made enormous strides in terms of democratic political
development over the past three decades, but the rise of undemocratic practices in several
countries, especially Venezuela, has been a U.S. concern.
Political and Economic Environment in the Region
U.S. policy toward the Latin American and Caribbean region is conducted in the context of
significant economic and political changes in the hemisphere as well as the region’s increasing
independence from the United States.
A Changed Region
The Latin American and Caribbean region
has made significant advances over the past
three decades in terms of both political and
economic development. In the early 1980s,
16 countries in the region were governed by
authoritarian regimes, both on the left and
the right, but today, all governments with the
exception of Cuba are, at least formally,
elected democracies. The threat to elected
governments from their own militaries has
dissipated in most countries.
2015-2016 Head of Government Elections
St. Kitts and Nevis—February 16, 2015
Guyana—May 11, 2015
Suriname—May 25, 2015
Guatemala—September 6 / October 25, 2015
Trinidad and Tobago—September 7, 2015
Belize—November 4, 2015
Argentina—October 25 / November 22, 2015
St. Vincent & Grenadines—December 9, 2015
Jamaica—February 25, 2016
Peru—April 10, 2016/June 5, 2016
Dominican Republic—May 15, 2016
St. Lucia—June 6, 2016
Nicaragua—November 6, 2016
Haiti—November 20, 2016
Free and fair elections have become the
norm in most countries in the region, even
though some elections have been
controversial with allegations of irregularities. In 2015, eight countries successfully completed
elections for head of government. Long-ruling parties were voted out of office in St. Kitts and
Nevis, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, and Argentina, and incumbents were reelected in Suriname,
Belize, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. In Guatemala, just ahead of its 2015 presidential
election, the country became embroiled in massive corruption scandals that led to the arrest of the
vice president in August and the resignation of President Otto Pérez Molina in September. The
country then held two presidential election rounds in September and October 2015, with former
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actor Jimmy Morales, who had campaigned on a strong anticorruption platform, winning the
second round by a large margin (see “Guatemala,” below).
2016 Elections. To date in 2016, six countries have held elections for head of government. In a
close parliamentary race in Jamaica in February, the opposition Jamaica Labour Party, led by
Andrew Holness, defeated the incumbent People’s National Party government, led by Prime
Minister Portia Simpson Miller. In the Dominican Republic, incumbent President Danilo Medina
of the center-left Dominican Liberation Party was reelected in a landslide in May. After two
presidential rounds in Peru in April and June, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski of the centrist Peruvians
for Change defeated Keiko Fujimori from the center-right Popular Force by a slim margin. Most
recently in June, St. Lucia held parliamentary elections in which the opposition United Workers
Party, led by Allen Chastanet, defeated the St. Lucia Labour party of Prime Minister Kenny
Anthony. In Nicaragua, incumbent President Daniel Ortega of the Sandinista party won a third
consecutive term in controversial elections held on November 6, 2016, which were criticized by
many, including the United States. The State Department characterized the elections as flawed
because of the government’s sidelining of opposition candidates, limits imposed on domestic
observation at the polls, and other actions that denied democratic space in the electoral process
(see “Nicaragua,” below). In Haiti, a first presidential round was held in October 2015, but
allegations of fraud ultimately led to the election’s nullification. After multiple delays, a new
presidential election was held on November 20, 2016, in which Jovenel Moise won almost 56%
of the vote and is scheduled to be inaugurated in February 2017 (see “Haiti,” below).
Challenges to Democracy. Despite significant improvements in political rights and civil
liberties, several countries in the region still face considerable challenges. In a number of
countries, weaknesses remain in the state’s ability to deliver public services, ensure accountability
and transparency, advance the rule of law, and ensure citizen safety and security. There are also
numerous examples of elected presidents over the past 25 years who left office early amid severe
social turmoil and economic crises, the presidents’ own autocratic actions contributing to their
ouster, or high-profile corruption. The September 2015 resignation of Guatemalan President
Pérez is the most recent example. In Brazil, a widespread corruption scandal and a sharp
economic downturn were key factors leading to the suspension of President Dilma Rousseff from
office in April 2016, followed by an impeachment trial by Brazil’s Senate removing her from
office in August 2016 (see “Brazil,” below).
The quality of democracy in several countries in the region has eroded in recent years. One factor
is increased organized crime. Mexico and several Central American countries have been
especially affected because of the increased use of the region as a drug transit zone and the
associated rise in corruption, crime, and violence. A second factor negatively affecting democracy
in several countries is the executive’s abuse of power. Elected leaders have sought to consolidate
power at the expense of minority rights, leading to a setback in liberal democratic practices.
Venezuela stands out in this regard. In recent years, there has also been a deterioration of media
freedom in several countries precipitated by the increase in organized crime-related violence and
by politically driven attempts to curb critical or independent media.
The human rights group Freedom House compiles an annual evaluation of political rights and
civil liberties in which it categorizes countries as free, partly free, and not free. In its 2016 report
(covering 2015), the group ranked just one country as not free: Cuba. It ranked 11 countries as
partly free—Bolivia, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Venezuela—and the remaining 21 countries of the Latin
American and Caribbean as free. According to the report, the Dominican Republic was
downgraded in part because of decreased space for independent media and the implementation of
a law preventing Dominicans of Haitian descent and Haitian migrants from exercising their civil
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and political rights. Freedom House also noted growing threats to freedom and democracy posed
by criminal gangs, political violence, and systemic corruption in the Central American countries
of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Freedom House maintains that Venezuela deserves
special scrutiny because of the resistance of the current government of President Nicolás Maduro
to the opposition’s victory in December 2015 legislative elections. It notes that the deteriorating
political and economic situation in Venezuela is one of the region’s most significant challenges
(see “Venezuela,” below).1
Some observers see the ebbing of the so-called pink tide of leftist populist governments in the
region as a positive trend. The November 2015 election of a center-right government in Argentina
ended the leftist populism known as Kirchnerismo and began to change regional dynamics in
Latin America. Despite the Venezuelan government’s efforts to thwart the opposition’s power,
some view the opposition’s triumph at the ballot box in December 2015 as the beginning of the
end of the populist leftist model of government advanced by former President Hugo Chávez.
Along these lines, some observers see the February 2016 defeat of a referendum in Bolivia that
would have allowed populist President Evo Morales to seek a third consecutive presidential term
as another setback to the pink tide.
A second factor potentially affecting democratic governance is the recent peace agreement
between the Colombian government and the leftist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC). This development has raised hopes that the hemisphere’s oldest civil conflict, which
dates back to the 1960s, is finally resolved (see “Colombia,” below).
Economic Challenges. While the 1980s were commonly referred to as the lost decade of
development as many countries were bogged down with unsustainable public debt, the 1990s
brought about a shift from a strategy of import-substituting industrialization to one focused on
export promotion, attraction of foreign capital, and privatization of state enterprises. Latin
America experienced an economic downturn in 2002 (brought about in part because of an
economic downturn in the United States), but recovered with strong growth rates until 2009,
when a global economic crisis again affected the region with an economic contraction of about
1.3%. Some countries experienced deeper recession in 2009, especially those more closely
integrated with the U.S. economy, such as Mexico, while other countries with more diversified
trade and investment partners experienced lesser downturns. The region rebounded in 2010 and
2011, with growth rates of 6.1% and 4.9%, respectively, but growth began to decline after that
and registered just 1% in 2014.
In its October 2016 economic forecast, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) projected that
economic growth in Latin America and the Caribbean would contract 0.6% in 2016 after no
growth in 2015 (see Table 1). The global decline in commodity prices and China’s economic
slowdown have affected the region’s economies. In 2015, economic contractions in Brazil (3.8%) and Venezuela (-6.2%) dragged down growth rates for South America and the region as a
whole. According to the IMF, business and consumer confidence appears to have bottomed out in
Brazil, although the projection for 2016 is for an economic contraction of 3.3% followed by an
increase of 0.5% in 2017. The Venezuelan economy remains in deep recession because of the
rapid decline in the price of oil and economic mismanagement; the economy is projected to
contract 10% in 2016 and 4.5% in 2017. Ecuador has also been significantly affected by the drop
in oil prices, with the economy projected to contract 2.3% in 2016 and 2.7% in 2017. 2
1
Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2016,” January 2016.
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook and World Economic Outlook Database, October
2016.
2
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Table 1. Latin America and Caribbean: Real GDP Growth, 2014-2017
(annual percentage change)
2014
2015
2016
Projection
2017
Projection
Mexico
2.2
2.5
2.1
2.3
Brazil
0.1
-3.8
-3.3
0.5
Latin America and the
Caribbean
1.0
0.0
-0.6
1.6
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, October 2016.
Since the early 2000s, Latin America has made significant progress in combating poverty and
inequality. In 2002, almost 44% of the region’s population were considered to be living in
poverty, but by 2012 that figure had dropped to 28%, representing 164 million people. Two key
factors accounting for this decline were increasing per capita income levels and targeted public
expenditures known as conditional cash transfer programs for vulnerable sectors. Brazil and
Mexico were pioneers in these targeted programs that have spread to other countries. The poverty
rate for the region was relatively unchanged at 28.1% in 2013 and 28.2% in 2014. In 2015,
however, with several countries experiencing contracting economies, poverty for the region
increased to 29.2%, with an estimated 175 million people in the region living in poverty, up from
169 million in 2014.3 With projections of economic contraction for the region in 2016, poverty
levels for the region likely will increase.
Latin America’s Increasing Independence
In recent years, Latin America’s relatively sustained political stability and, until recently, steady
economic performance (with some exceptions) increased the region’s confidence in solving its
own problems, and lessened the region’s dependency on the United States. The region’s growing
ideological diversity has also been a factor in the region’s increased independence from the
United States, as has Brazil’s rising regional and global influence.
Latin American and Caribbean countries have diversified their economic and diplomatic ties with
countries outside the region. China, for example, has become a major trading partner for many
countries in the region, ranking as one of the top two export and import markets. Total Chinese
trade with the region grew from almost $18 billion in 2002 to almost $262 billion in 2014, before
dropping to $235 million in 2015.4 Nevertheless, the United States remains the single largest
trading partner for many countries; total U.S. trade with the region amounted to $867 billion in
2014 and $797 billion in 2015, more than three times that of China’s trade with the region.5
Several Latin American regional integration organizations have been established in the past few
years, a reflection of the region’s increasing independence, growing internal cooperation, and
ideological diversity.
3
U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Social Panorama of Latin America 2015, March
2016.
4
Trade figures cited are drawn from the Global Trade Atlas, using trade statistics reported by China.
5
U.S. trade statistics are drawn from the Global Trade Atlas, using statistics reported by the U.S. Department of
Commerce.
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The Venezuelan-led Bolivarian Alliance of the Americas (ALBA, originally established as the
Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas) was launched by President Hugo Chávez in 2004 with
the goals of promoting regional integration and socioeconomic reform and alleviating poverty. In
addition to Venezuela, this 11-member group currently includes Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, and
Nicaragua, as well as the Caribbean island nations of Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada,
St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Despite its established goals,
ALBA was most often associated with the anti-American rhetoric of some of its Latin American
members. In the aftermath of President Chávez’s death in March 2013, some observers
questioned the future of the Venezuelan-founded alliance. Moreover, the precipitous decline in the
price of oil since 2014 has further challenged the ability of Venezuela to extend its influence in
the region.
Another regional organization is the 12-member Union of South American Nations (UNASUR),
established in 2008 (largely because of Brazil’s influence) to promote political, economic, and
security coordination in South America. It has served as a forum for dispute resolution. For
example, the organization played a role in defusing tensions between Colombia and Venezuela in
2008, and helped resolve internal political conflicts in Bolivia in 2008 and Ecuador in 2010.
Some analysts, however, have raised questions about UNASUR’s overall efficacy, financial
support, and ability to develop specialized capabilities and programs.6 In 2014, in an attempt to
quell political unrest in Venezuela, UNASUR foreign ministers were initially successful in
establishing a dialogue between the government and the political opposition, but talks ultimately
broke down, and were not restarted.
A regional trade integration arrangement, the Pacific Alliance, first emerged in 2011 with the
primary goal of facilitating the flow of goods, services, capital, and people among its members.
The Alliance currently includes Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. Costa Rica and Panama are
candidates for membership. Different from other initiatives described above, the Alliance
welcomed the United States as an observer in July 2013.7
A region-wide organization established in 2011, the Community of Latin American and
Caribbean States (CELAC) consists of 33 hemispheric nations, but excludes the United States and
Canada. CELAC’s goal is to boost regional integration and cooperation. While some observers
have concerns that CELAC could be a forum for countries that have tense or difficult relations
with the United States, others point out that strong U.S. partners in the region are also members.
Some observers have predicted that CELAC could diminish the role of the Organization of
American States (OAS), while others maintain that CELAC does not have a permanent staff or
secretariat that could compete with the OAS. In January 2015, China hosted the first ChinaCELAC Forum in which countries agreed to a five-year cooperation plan. Later in January 2015,
CELAC held its third summit in Costa Rica. Ecuador hosted the fourth CELAC summit in
January 2016.
To some extent, CELAC’s establishment reflects a Latin American desire to lessen U.S. influence
in the region; however, the United States remains very much engaged in the region bilaterally and
multilaterally through the OAS and its numerous affiliated organizations. Moreover, U.S. officials
have strongly supported the efforts of OAS Secretary-General Luis Almagro, elected to a fiveyear term in May 2015, to push for the protection of democracy and human rights in the region.
6
Michael Shifter, “The Shifting Landscape of Latin American Regionalism,” Current History, February 2012; also see
Clapper, op. cit.
7
See CRS Report R43748, The Pacific Alliance: A Trade Integration Initiative in Latin America, by (name redac
ted)
.
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In addition, the Summit of the Americas process, affiliated with the OAS, remains an important
mechanism for the United States to engage with Latin American nations at the highest level.
While the sixth Summit of the Americas, held in Colombia in April 2012, displayed U.S.
divergence from the region in terms of policy toward Cuba and anti-drug strategy, the meeting
also included a variety of initiatives to deepen hemispheric integration and address key
hemispheric challenges.
A looming challenge for the United States was how to deal with the seventh Summit of the
Americas to be hosted by Panama in April 2015. Cuba had expressed interest in attending the
sixth summit, but ultimately was not invited to attend. The United States and Canada had
expressed opposition to Cuba’s participation. Previous summits had been limited to the
hemisphere’s democratically elected leaders. Many Latin American countries vowed not to attend
the 2015 summit unless Cuba was invited to attend. As a result, Panama announced in August
2014 that it would invite Cuba to the summit, presenting a dilemma for the Obama
Administration. In December 2014, however, when President Obama announced a new policy
approach toward Cuba, he said that United States was prepared to have Cuba participate in the
summit. Cuba ultimately participated in the summit in Panama featuring a historic meeting
between President Obama and President Raúl Castro.
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Figure 1. Map of Latin America and the Caribbean
Source: Map Resources, edited by the Congressional Research Service (CRS).
Notes: Although Belize is located in Central America and Guyana and Suriname are located on the northern
coast of South America, all three countries are members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).
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Obama Administration’s Priorities for the Region
The Obama Administration set forth a broad framework for U.S. policy toward Latin America and
the Caribbean centered on four pillars or priorities:
promoting economic and social opportunity;
ensuring citizen security;
strengthening effective institutions of democratic governance; and
securing a clean energy future.
The State Department maintained that these policy “priorities are based on the premise that the
United States has a vital interest in contributing to the building of stable, prosperous, and
democratic nations” in the hemisphere that can play an important role in dealing with global
challenges.8 The Obama Administration stressed that its policy approach toward the region was
one emphasizing partnership and shared responsibility, with policy conducted on the basis of
mutual respect through engagement and dialogue.9 President Obama reemphasized the theme of
equal partnership at the sixth Summit of the Americas in April 2012 when he said that “in the
Americas there are no senior or junior partners, we’re simply partners.”10 In remarks at the June
2012 OAS General Assembly meeting in Bolivia, then-Assistant Secretary of State for Western
Hemisphere Affairs Roberta Jacobson reiterated the commitment of the United States to work
with hemispheric nations “in the spirit of genuine and equal partnership to advance liberty and
prosperity for all the citizens of the hemisphere.”11
In a November 2013 OAS address, Secretary of State John Kerry asserted that “the era of the
Monroe Doctrine is over.”12 Secretary Kerry emphasized the importance of the United States
working with other hemispheric nations as equal partners to promote and protect democracy,
security, and peace; to advance prosperity though development, poverty alleviation, and improved
social inclusion; and to address the challenges posed by climate change. Secretary of State Kerry
stated, “the relationship that we seek and that we have worked hard to foster is not about a United
States declaration about how and when it will intervene in the affairs of other American states.
It’s about all of our countries viewing one another as equals, sharing responsibilities, cooperating
on security issues, and adhering not to doctrine, but to the decisions that we make as partners to
advance the values and the interests that we share.”13
8
U.S. Department of State, Arturo Valenzuela, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs,
“U.S.-Latin American Relations: A Look Ahead,” January 6, 2011.
9
Ibid.; and U.S. Department of State, Arturo Valenzuela, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere
Affairs, “U.S. Foreign Policy in the Obama Era,” October 9, 2010. The same general policy approach has continued
under current Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roberta Jacobson, who was confirmed by
the Senate in March 2012.
10
White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks of President Barack Obama—As Prepared for Delivery—
Summit of the Americas Opening Plenary,” April 14, 2012.
11
U.S. Department of State, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roberta S. Jacobson,
“Remarks to the 42nd OAS General Assembly,” June 4, 2012.
12
U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State John Kerry, “Remarks on U.S. Policy in the Western Hemisphere,”
November 18, 2013. In an address to Congress in December 1823, President James Monroe warned European powers
not to interfere in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere. This policy eventually became known as the Monroe Doctrine
and emerged in the early 1900s as a foundation of U.S. foreign policy.
13
U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State John Kerry, “Remarks on U.S. Policy in the Western Hemisphere,”
November 18, 2013.
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Then-Assistant Secretary of State Jacobson reiterated in a December 2013 address in Miami, FL,
that “the administration is committed to sustained, productive engagement in the Americas.” She
emphasized that the various partnership initiatives between the United States and Latin America
involved U.S. officials sitting down with regional counterparts to understand their priorities and
needs and discussing the ways in which the United States might support them.14
In December 2014, President Obama announced major changes in U.S. policy toward Cuba,
moving away from the long-standing sanctions-based policy toward a policy emphasizing
engagement and moving toward normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations. As part of the policy
shift, the Administration eased certain sanctions on travel and commerce with Cuba, removed
Cuba from the so-called state sponsors of terrorism list, and reestablished diplomatic relations.
Latin American and Caribbean leaders as well as regional organizations such as the Caribbean
Community (CARICOM), OAS, and UNASUR hailed the change in U.S. policy. President
Obama stated at the April 2015 Summit of the Americas in Panama that the shift in U.S. policy
toward Cuba “represents a turning point for our entire region” and noted that this was “the first
time in more than a half century that all the nations of the Americas are meeting to address our
future together.”15
Vice President Joe Biden contended in a May 2016 speech on the Western Hemisphere that the
U.S. policy shift on Cuba from isolation to engagement “proved that our promise to listen rather
than dictate to the region was more than just words.” He said that many Latin American leaders
told him how the change in U.S. policy toward Cuba has enhanced their ability to build
partnerships with the United States.16
Economic and Social Opportunity
The policy priority of expanding economic opportunity focuses on one of the key problems facing
Latin America: lingering poverty and inequality. As noted above, at the end of 2015, an estimated
175 million people in Latin America were living in poverty—29.2% of the region’s population—
and 75 million people, or 12.5% of the population, were living in extreme poverty or indigence.
Although these statistics reflect a significant improvement from 2002, when almost 44% of the
region’s population lived in poverty,17 poverty began to rise again because of the region’s recent
economic downturn.
In addition to traditional U.S. development assistance programs focusing on health and education,
expanding economic opportunity also involved several innovative programs and initiatives. The
Pathways to Prosperity Initiative, initially launched in 2008, is designed to help countries learn
from each other’s experiences through the exchange of best practices and collaboration in order to
empower small business, facilitate trade and regional competitiveness, build a modern and
inclusive workforce, and encourage sustainable business practices.18 The OAS Inter-American
14
U.S. Department of State, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, “The Americas: Our Shared
Challenges,” December 13, 2013.
15
White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by President Obama at the First Plenary Session of the
Summit of the Americas,” April 11, 2015.
16
U.S. Department of State, Embassy of the United States, Panama, “Excerpts from Remarks by Vice President Joe
Biden on the Western Hemisphere,” University of Tampa, Tampa, Florida, May 11, 2016.
17
U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Social Panorama of Latin America 2015, March
2016.
18
U.S. Department of State, “Pathways to Prosperity in the Americas,” fact sheet, November 26, 2014, available at
http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/2014/234442.htm; also see the website of the Pathways initiative, available at
http://www.pathways-caminos.org/en/Home.html.
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Social Protection Network began in 2009 with U.S. support to facilitate an exchange of
information on policies, experiences, programs, and best practices in order to reduce social
disparities and inequality and reduce extreme poverty.19 President Obama launched the 100,000
Strong in the Americas initiative in 2011 to increase the number of Latin American students
studying in the United States as well as to increase the number of U.S. students studying in
countries throughout the hemisphere.20 As part of the Obama Administration’s Feed the Future
Initiative to combat global hunger and advance food security, three countries in the Americas—
Guatemala, Haiti, and Honduras—receive targeted funding for the development of poor rural
areas aimed at helping vulnerable populations escape hunger and poverty.21
At the sixth Summit of the Americas held in Colombia in April 2012, President Obama
announced several initiatives to expand economic opportunity. The Small Business Network of
the Americas (SBNA) is an initiative designed to help small businesses participate in
international trade by linking national networks of small business support centers.22 The
Women’s Entrepreneurship in the Americas (WEAmericas) program is a public-private
partnership designed to increase women’s economic participation and address barriers to women
starting and expanding small and medium enterprises.23 The Innovation Fund of the Americas,
launched by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), is an initiative to help
finance lower cost and more effective solutions to difficult development challenges.24
Citizen Security
The policy priority of advancing citizen security reflects one of the most important concerns
among Latin Americans. High levels of crime and violence, often associated with gangs and drug
trafficking, are significant problems in many countries. The Central America-Mexico corridor is
the route for the majority of illicit drugs from South America entering the United States. Drug
trafficking-related violence in Mexico rose to unprecedented levels, and murder rates in several
Central American and Caribbean countries have been among the highest in the world.
U.S. support to counter drug trafficking and production in the region has been a key focus of U.S.
policy toward the region for more than 30 years. The most significant U.S. support program was
Plan Colombia, begun in FY2000, which helped Colombia to combat both drug trafficking and
terrorist groups financed by the drug trade. The Colombia Strategic Development Initiative
(CSDI) was begun in 2011 to align U.S. assistance with the follow-up strategy to Plan Colombia
designed to develop a functioning state presence in remote, but strategically important, areas. In
19
U.S. Department of State, “Inter-American Social Protection Network,” fact sheet, April 23, 2013, available at
http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/2013/208096.htm; also see the website of the Inter-American Social Protection
Network at http://www.socialprotectionet.org/.
20
U.S. Department of State, “Progress in Innovation:100,000 Strong in the Americas,” fact sheet, April 9, 2015,
available at http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/240543.htm; also see the 100,000 Strong in the Americas website,
launched in May 2014, available at http://www.100kstrongamericas.org/.
21
See the website of Feed the Future, The U.S. Government’s Global Hunger and Food Security Initiative, available at
http://www.feedthefuture.gov/.
22
U.S. Department of State, “Small Business Network of the Americas,” fact sheet, April 8, 2015, available at
http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/240432.htm.
23
U.S. Department of State, “WEAmericas: Women’s Entrepreneurship in the Americas,” April 6, 2015, available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/240759.pdf.
24
USAID, “Innovation Fund of the Americas,” fact sheet, December 4, 2013, available at http://www.usaid.gov/newsinformation/fact-sheets/innovation-fund-americas.
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its FY2017 foreign aid budget request, the Administration began planning for U.S. support to
Colombia in a post-peace accord era (also see “Colombia,” below).
U.S. support to combat drug trafficking and reduce crime has also included a series of
partnerships with other countries in the region: the Mérida Initiative, which began in 2007, and
has led to unprecedented bilateral security cooperation with Mexico; the Central America
Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), begun in 2008, and the Caribbean Basin Security
Initiative (CBSI), begun in 2009. (Also see “Mexico,” “Central America,” and “Caribbean
Security and Energy Issues,” below.)
Democratic Governance
The policy priority of strengthening democratic governance has the goal of building on progress
that the region made over the past three decades, not only in terms of regular free and fair
elections, but also in terms of respect for political rights and civil liberties. Despite this progress,
many countries in the region still face considerable challenges. The United States provides
foreign aid to support the rule of law and human rights, good governance (including
anticorruption efforts), political competition, and consensus-building and civil society. Improving
and strengthening democratic governance includes support to improve the capacity of state
institutions to address citizens’ needs through responsive legislative, judicial, law enforcement,
and penal institutions, as well as support to nongovernmental organizations working on
democracy and human rights issues. It also includes defending press freedoms and democratic
rights, such as free and fair elections and the protection of minority rights. The Obama
Administration also committed to advance the human rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender,
and intersex (LGBTI) individuals as part of its human rights engagement in the hemisphere.25
U.S. officials continued to speak out about human rights abuses in countries such as Cuba and
Venezuela, threats to political rights and civil liberties in other countries in the region, such as
Nicaragua, and the erosion of full respect for freedom of expression in the region. The
Administration also contended that hemispheric nations should collectively remain on guard
against efforts to weaken the Inter-American human rights system.26
U.S. officials also spoke out about the threat that corruption has posed to many countries in the
region and the need to strengthen democratic institutions and the rule of law. In April 2016, thenAssistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roberta Jacobson said that without the rule
of law being deeply rooted and entrenched throughout the hemisphere, it will be impossible to
confront such challenges as climate change, transnational gangs, or authoritarian despots. She
noted that President Obama pointed out that corruption siphons billions of dollars that could feed
children or build schools or infrastructure and that corruption stifles economic growth, promotes
inequality, abets human rights abuses, and fuels organized crime and instability.27
25
U.S. Department of State, “Engagement on LGBTI Issues in the Western Hemisphere,” fact sheet, July 8, 2015,
available at http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/244725.htm.
26
U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Policy Toward the Americas: The Summit and Beyond,” remarks by Assistant
Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roberta Jacobson, May 11, 2012.
27
U.S. Department of State, “Anti-Corruption in the Western Hemisphere,” remarks by Assistant Secretary of State for
Western Hemisphere Affairs Roberta Jacobson, April 4, 2016.
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Clean Energy Future
In 2009, the Obama Administration introduced the Energy and Climate Partnership of the
Americas (ECPA), designed to strengthen inter-American collaboration on clean energy. Many
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean are vulnerable to climate change and struggle with
energy security. ECPA includes voluntary bilateral and multi-country initiatives to promote clean
energy, advance energy security, and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Some of the initiatives
involve international and regional organizations and the private sector.28 At the sixth Summit of
the Americas in 2012, President Obama joined with Colombia in Connecting the Americas
2022, an initiative with the goal of achieving universal access in the hemisphere to reliable, clean,
and affordable electricity.29 In 2014, the Administration launched a Caribbean Energy Security
Initiative to promote cleaner and more sustainable energy in the region. In 2015, a clean energy
financing facility for the Caribbean and Central America was established. (Also see “Climate
Change and Clean Energy” and “Caribbean Security and Energy Issues,” below.)
Continuity and Change in U.S. Policy
During the Obama Administration’s first six years, there was significant continuity in U.S. policy
toward Latin America, with the Administration pursuing some of the same basic policy
approaches as the Bush Administration. Nevertheless, the Obama Administration also made
several changes, including an overall emphasis on partnership and shared responsibility. At the
sixth Summit of the Americas in April 2012, President Obama reemphasized the theme of equal
partnership when he said that “in the Americas there are no senior or junior partners, we’re
simply partners.”30
Like the Bush Administration, the Obama Administration provided significant anti-drug and
security support to Colombia and significant support to Mexico and Central America to combat
drug trafficking and organized crime through the Mérida Initiative and CARSI. Assistance to
Mexico, however, has shifted toward more support for rule of law programs (including police,
judicial, and penal reform) and programs to help communities withstand the pressures of crime
and violence. In anticipation of a potential “balloon effect” of drug trafficking shifting to the
Caribbean region, the Obama Administration also established CBSI, the origin of which,
however, dates back to the Bush Administration. Assistance for Colombia became more evenly
balanced between enhancing rule of law, human rights, and economic development programs on
the one hand, and continuing efforts on security and drug interdiction on the other. Overall U.S.
assistance levels to Colombia began to decline as the country began taking over responsibility for
programs once funded by the United States.
On trade matters, implementing bills for FTAs with Colombia and Panama that were negotiated
under the Bush Administration ultimately were introduced and enacted into law in October 2011
(P.L. 112-42 and P.L. 112-43) after extensive work by the Obama Administration to resolve
outstanding congressional concerns related to both agreements. In 2015, Congress enacted P.L.
114-27, an extension of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) through 2017, benefitting
15 countries in the region. Another trade initiative begun informally under the Bush
28
U.S. Department of State, fact sheet, “Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas,” April 8, 2015, available at
http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/240498.htm; also see the website of the ECPA at http://www.ecpamericas.org/.
29
U.S. Department of State, fact sheet, “Connecting the Americas 2022,” April 9, 2015, available at
http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/240497.htm.
30
White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks of President Barack Obama—As Prepared for Delivery—
Summit of the Americas Opening Plenary,” April 14, 2012.
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Administration and continued by the Obama Administration through formal trade negotiations
was the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement with Mexico, Chile, Peru, and
eight other Pacific countries. TPP trade ministers concluded the agreement in October 2015, and
the President released the text of the agreement and notified Congress in November 2015. The
114th Congress, however, did not take any action on implementing legislation, and President-elect
Trump announced in November 2016 his intention to withdraw from the TPP.31 The agreement
could have had significant implications for U.S. trade and investment ties with the three Latin
American countries that are parties to the agreement, as well as with other Latin American
countries that could possibly have joined in the future.
Just as the Bush Administration had, the Obama Administration expressed support for
comprehensive immigration reform, an especially important issue in U.S. relations with Mexico
and Central America. In the absence of congressional action on comprehensive reform, President
Obama took executive action in 2012 providing relief from deportation for certain immigrants
who arrived in the United States as children. President Obama took further executive action in
2014 that would have provided relief from deportation and work authorizations for more
categories of unauthorized migrants, but court challenges prohibited implementation of the
initiatives.32
In other areas, the Obama Administration made policy changes on Latin America that more
clearly differentiated it from the Bush Administration. As described above, the Administration
early on put more of an emphasis on partnership and shared responsibility in its policy toward the
region. It established numerous partnership programs in such areas as security, energy, and
economic and social opportunity. It emphasized policy conducted on the basis of mutual respect
through engagement and dialogue.
Perhaps most significantly, as noted above, the Obama Administration announced major changes
in Cuba policy in late 2014, moving away from a policy of isolation toward a normalization of
relations. The policy shift on Cuba was lauded throughout the region and has changed the
dynamics of a long-standing irritant in U.S. relations with Latin America.
Beyond Cuba, the Administration pursued several other policy shifts. While it pressed for
dialogue in Venezuela, the Administration also imposed sanctions (including visa restrictions and
asset blocking) on current or former Venezuelan officials involved in human rights abuses. In
Central America, spurred in part by a surge in 2014 of unaccompanied children and other
migrants seeking to enter the United States, the Administration developed a broader approach in
2015 known as the Strategy for Engagement in Central America, which goes beyond security
concerns to address economic development and governance issues. In the Caribbean, the
Administration also moved beyond security concerns to address the energy needs of countries
that are heavily dependent on energy imports, launching a Caribbean Energy Security Initiative
(CESI) in 2014 with the goal of promoting a cleaner and sustainable energy future.
31
See CRS In Focus IF10000, TPP: An Overview, by (name redacted) and (name redacted) .
See CRS Legal Sidebar WSLG1607, Frequently Asked Questions Regarding the Supreme Court’s 4-4 Split on
Immigration, by (name redacted) .
32
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Congress and Policy Toward Latin America and
the Caribbean
Overview of Action in the 114th Congress
Congress traditionally has played an active role in policy toward Latin America and the
Caribbean in terms of both legislation and oversight. In the 113th Congress, legislative action
included a measure directing the Secretary of State to develop a strategy for adoption of proposed
reforms at the OAS (P.L. 113-41); approval of the U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons
Agreement (a provision in P.L. 113-67); the 2014 farm bill (P.L. 113-79), with provisions
modifying the U.S. cotton program related to a trade dispute with Brazil and requiring State
Department reports on a U.S.-Mexico water dispute in the Rio Grande Basin; omnibus
appropriations measures for FY2013 (P.L. 113-6), FY2014 (P.L. 113-76), and FY2015 (P.L. 113235), which included foreign aid appropriations with numerous provisions on Latin America; a
measure requiring an annual report through 2017 on the status of post-earthquake recovery and
development efforts in Haiti (P.L. 113-162); and a measure to impose sanctions on those persons
responsible for certain human rights abuses in Venezuela (P.L. 113-278).
The most significant legislative action on Latin America and the Caribbean in the first session of
the 114th Congress was the enactment of the FY2016 omnibus appropriations measure (P.L. 114113) in December 2015. The law included numerous provisions on foreign aid to the region,
including $750 million for ramped up funding for Central America to address economic, security,
and governance challenges. The FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 114-92),
enacted in November 2015, also has provisions regarding increased support for Central America
as well as prohibitions against funding for the closure of the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba. Earlier in the year, Congress approved an extension of the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP) through 2017 in the Trade Preferences Extension Act (P.L. 114-27), enacted in
June, which benefits some 15 countries in the region. In other action, the House passed H.Res.
536 in December 2015, expressing support for freedom of the press in the region and condemning
violations of press freedom and violence against journalists.
In the second session in 2016, Congress took action on several measures related to the region. In
July, Congress enacted legislation extending the termination date of the requirement to impose
targeted sanctions on individuals for human rights abuses in Venezuela (P.L. 114-194). In
September, the House approved H.Res. 851, also related to Venezuela, which among its
provisions expressed profound concern about the humanitarian situation, urged the release of
political prisoners, and called for the Venezuelan government to hold a presidential recall
referendum in 2016. Also in September, Congress enacted a legislative vehicle (P.L. 114-223,
Division B) that provided FY2016 supplemental funding to control the spread of the Zika virus in
the Americas.
As the 114th Congress neared its end in December 2016, Congress completed action on several
additional measures with provisions on Latin America and the Caribbean. P.L. 114-291 requires
the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of USAID, to submit a multiyear
strategy for U.S. engagement with the Caribbean. P.L. 114-323, the FY2017 Department of State
Authorities Act, in Title VI established a Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission to
conduct a comprehensive review of U.S. drug control policy in the Western Hemisphere,
including an evaluation of counternarcotics assistance programs. The FY2017 National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA), P.L. 114-328 (S. 2943), signed into law by the President on
December 23, has several provisions on the region, including those extending a unified
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counterdrug and counterterrorism campaign in Colombia for two years (Section 1013);
continuing a prohibition on use of funds for realigning forces at or the closure of the U.S. Naval
Station and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (Section 1035); requiring the Secretaries of Defense and
State to submit a joint report on military units that have been assigned to do policing or other law
enforcement duties in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, and detailing U.S. government
assistance for those units (Section 1069); and restricting FY2017 funding for Cuba’s participation
in certain joint or multilateral exercises or related security conference between the U.S. and
Cuban governments (Section 1286).
With regard to FY2017 foreign aid appropriations, Congress did not complete action on standalone legislation, although committee-reported House and Senate bills H.R. 5912 and S. 3117 had
numerous provisions on assistance to the region. Instead, Congress enacted a continuing
resolution (P.L. 114-254) in December funding most foreign aid programs at the FY2016 level,
minus an across-the-board reduction of almost 0.2%, through April 28, 2017. The 115th Congress
will face completing action on FY2017 foreign aid appropriations.
Oversight attention in the 114th Congress focused on such issues as U.S. interests in Latin
America and the Caribbean; the Administration’s policy shift on Cuba, including issues related to
U.S. national security, human rights, U.S. trade, U.S. property claims, security concerns
surrounding the resumption of regular air service with Cuba, and U.S. agricultural trade with
Cuba; the Administration’s aid request for Central America and the migration crisis in that
subregion; Venezuela’s economic and political crisis; an overview of the situation in Haiti; the
activities of Iran in Latin America; energy issues; the status of Colombia’s peace talks; threats to
press freedom in the Americas; Chinese and Russian engagement in the region; the human rights
situation in both Cuba and Venezuela; the Zika epidemic in the hemisphere; U.S. engagement
with the Caribbean; and the democratic setback in Nicaragua. (See the Appendix for a listing of
hearings.)
Regional Issues
U.S. Foreign Aid
Although many Latin American and Caribbean nations have made significant development
progress over the past two decades, foreign aid remains an important tool for advancing U.S.
policy priorities in the hemisphere. Current aid programs reflect the diverse needs of the countries
of the region. Some nations receive a broad range of U.S. assistance, with projects in areas such
as democracy promotion, economic reform, education, health, environmental protection, citizen
security, and counternarcotics. Others no longer require traditional development assistance but
continue to receive low levels of aid, usually targeted toward strengthening security capabilities.
The Obama Administration’s FY2017 foreign aid budget request included $1.74 billion for Latin
America and the Caribbean to be provided through the State Department and USAID, which is
roughly equal to the amount that Congress appropriated for the region in FY2016. Aid to the
region has increased each year since FY2014 but remains below what was provided in FY2012.
In recent years, the vast majority of U.S. assistance for the region has been dedicated to
implementing a new U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America and ongoing programs in
Colombia, Haiti, and Mexico. In addition to State Department and USAID funding, some
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean receive assistance through U.S. agencies such as
the Department of Defense (DOD), the Inter-American Foundation, the Millennium Challenge
Corporation, and/or the Peace Corps.
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Table 2. U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2011-FY2016
(appropriations in billions of U.S. dollars)
FY2011
FY2012
FY2013
FY2014
FY2015
FY2016
(Est.)
FY2017
(Req.)
1.86
1.82
1.68
1.46
1.58
1.74
1.74
Source: CRS Correspondence with USAID Budget Office, June 2016.
Key Policy Issues: The Senate and House Appropriations Committees reported out their
respective FY2017 State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations
bills, S. 3117 and H.R. 5912, in June and July 2016; however, those measures never received
floor consideration. Instead, Congress opted to fund foreign aid programs through a series of
stopgap measures. On December 10, 2016, President Obama signed into law a continuing
resolution (P.L. 114-254) that will fund most foreign aid programs at the FY2016 level, minus an
across-the-board reduction of 0.1901% (hereafter referred to as almost 0.2%), until April 28,
2017. The measure replaced a previous continuing resolution (P.L. 114-223) that funded most
foreign aid programs at the FY2016 level, minus an across-the-board reduction of 0.496%,
between October 1, 2016, and December 9, 2016. P.L. 114-223 also included $145.5 million in
supplemental FY2016 appropriations for global health assistance to address the Zika virus
outbreak. All of the supplemental global health assistance was allocated to Latin America and the
Caribbean to provide targeted support to those affected by the Zika virus. The incoming 115th
Congress will need to complete action on FY2017 appropriations for the balance of the fiscal
year.
The 114th Congress enacted two other legislative measures that affect U.S. foreign aid to Latin
America and the Caribbean. As noted above, in December 2016, President Obama signed into law
P.L. 114-323, which among its provisions established a Western Hemisphere Drug Policy
Commission. The new commission will conduct a comprehensive review of U.S. drug control
policy in the hemisphere, including an evaluation of counternarcotics assistance programs, such
as the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative, the Merida Initiative, the Caribbean Basin
Security Initiative (CBSI), and the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI).
As noted above, the FY2017 NDAA, P.L. 114-328, enacted in December 2016, modified and
codified a number of authorities that allow DOD to provide security assistance to foreign nations.
Among its provisions, the law extended DOD’s authority to support a unified counterdrug and
counterterrorism campaign in Colombia for two years; mandated that DOD submit an annual
budget request for all security cooperation programs; and required DOD to develop an
assessment, monitoring, and evaluation framework for security cooperation programs.
In addition to these legislative initiatives, the 114th Congress held several oversight hearings that
examined the implementation and effectiveness of foreign aid programs in Latin America and the
Caribbean (see Appendix for hearings).
For additional information, see CRS Report R44647, U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America
and the Caribbean: Trends and FY2017 Appropriations, by (name redacted)
.
Migration Issues
Latin America is a leading source of both legal and illegal migration to the United States. Mexico,
El Salvador, Cuba, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic are among the top 10 countries of
origin for the U.S. foreign-born population. Factors that have fueled Latin American migration to
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the United States have included familial ties, poverty and unemployment, political and economic
instability, natural disasters, proximity, and crime and violence.
Since the mid-1990s, increased border enforcement has made unauthorized entry into the United
States more difficult and expensive. This has prompted migrants to rely on alien smugglers
(coyotes), many of whom collude with Mexican criminal groups, to transit Mexico and cross the
U.S.-Mexico border. During the journey, migrants have been vulnerable to kidnapping, human
trafficking, and other abuses.
Latin American governments have supported the enactment of comprehensive immigration
reform in the United States that would normalize the status of illegal immigrants and create guest
worker programs to facilitate circular migration. The House and the Senate considered
immigration measures on a variety of issues in the 114th Congress, but comprehensive
immigration reform was not on the agenda.33 In the absence of comprehensive reform,
governments welcomed President Obama’s 2012 executive action that provided relief from
removal (deportation) for certain immigrants who arrived to the country as children.34
El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, and Nicaragua have advocated for extensions of their eligibility for
temporary protected status (TPS) and Guatemala has requested inclusion in the program. TPS is a
discretionary, humanitarian benefit granted to eligible nationals after the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) determines that a country has been affected by ongoing armed
conflict, natural disaster, or other extraordinary conditions that limit the country’s ability to accept
the return of its nationals from the United States. Eligibility for TPS currently is scheduled to
expire for Haiti in July 2017, for Honduras and Nicaragua in January 2018, and for El Salvador in
March 2018.
Latin America and the Caribbean is also the top destination for U.S. removals (deportations). In
FY2015, DHS deported 235,413 individuals worldwide, some 94% of whom were returned to
Mexico and the “northern triangle” countries of Central America (El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras).35 Mexico remains concerned about the safety of Mexican deportees arriving into
dangerous localities. Caribbean and Central American countries are concerned about the effect of
U.S. deportations of those with criminal records on their countries. These countries have asked
the U.S. government to provide better information on deportees with criminal records and to
provide reintegration assistance to help support returning nationals. DHS has begun to provide
criminal history information to certain countries, and USAID has provided reception and
reintegration assistance to the northern triangle countries. Mexico and Central American
governments are providing increased consular services to their citizens living in the United States,
including referrals to legal services for those facing deportation.
As illegal emigration from Mexico has declined, illegal emigration of both families and
unaccompanied children from Central America’s northern triangle countries surged in mid-2014
and has remained at elevated levels since then. Migration flows of children and families declined
somewhat in 2015 due to Mexico’s increased immigration enforcement but resurged in 2016.
Analysts maintain that sustainable reductions in those flows, which include asylum-seekers,
33
CRS Report R44230, Immigration Legislation and Issues in the 114th Congress, coordinated by (name redacted).
Latin American governments also supported the President Obama’s 2014 executive action that would have given
more categories of unauthorized immigrants in the United States relief from deportation and work authorizations. In
November 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a lower court decision that barred
implementation of the 2014 executive action.
35
DHS, Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations Report:
FY2015, December 22, 2015. FY2016 removal figures have yet to be released.
34
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would require the countries of origin and the international community to take steps to address the
poor security and socioeconomic conditions causing Central Americans to migrate.
Over the past several years, the number of undocumented Cubans entering the United States by
land has increased significantly, with a majority entering through the U.S. southwest border.
Although this route is not new for Cubans, the Cuban government’s 2013 relaxation of its exit
rules for citizens and concerns that the United States might change its immigration policy for
Cubans have prompted a large increase in the number of Cubans making the overland journey. In
the past year, thousands of Cubans became stranded in Central American transit countries due to
changes in visa and migration policies of those governments. These developments required
Mexico and Central American governments to negotiate ways for the Cubans to pass through the
region and on to the U.S. southwestern border.
The Dominican government has taken steps to address the citizenship status and rights of people
of Haitian descent and undocumented individuals living in the Dominican Republic through
implementation of a naturalization law and regularization plan. The U.S. government and others
are seeking to ensure that the naturalization and regularization plans benefit all who should
qualify and that deportations are conducted transparently. U.S. humanitarian and protection
assistance is being provided through U.N. and other entities.
Key Policy Issues: The 114th Congress provided foreign assistance to help address some of the
factors fueling migration from Central America, to support Mexico’s migration management and
border security efforts, and to support migration-related programs implemented by the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees and the International Organization for Migration (see “Central
America” and “Mexico” sections, below). Congress held a hearing on border security challenges
in the Western Hemisphere, including the rise in African, Asian, and Haitian migration to the
southwestern border that has occurred this year. Congress also conducted oversight of State
Department assistance that is being implemented by DHS to bolster country and regional
responses to migration challenges, and of the Central American Minors (CAM) in-country
refugee/parole processing program established by the Obama Administration in late 2014.
Legislation was introduced in both houses, the Secure the Northern Triangle Act (S. 3106 and
H.R. 5850), which would have authorized foreign assistance to address migration push factors in
Central America, increased efforts against alien smuggling, and provided legal aid to Central
American asylum seekers in the United States.
For additional information, see CRS Report R43702, Unaccompanied Children from Central
America: Foreign Policy Considerations, coordinated by (name redacted)
; CRS In Focus IF10371,
U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America: Background and FY2017 Budget Request, by
(name redacted) and (name redacted)
; CRS Report R44020, In-Country Refugee Processing:
In Brief, by (name redacted); CRS In Focus IF10215, Mexico’s Recent Immigration Enforcement
Efforts, by (name redacted)
; CRS Insight IN10317, The Dominican Republic: Tensions with
Haiti over Citizenship and Migration Issues, by (name redacted), (name redacted), and
(name redact ed)
; CRS Report RL33200, Trafficking in Persons in Latin America and the
Caribbean, by (name redacted)
; and CRS Report R43926, Cuba: Issues and Actions in the
114th Congress, by (name redacted) .
Trade Policy
The Latin American and Caribbean region is one of the fastest-growing regional trading partners
for the United States. Despite challenges such as diplomatic tensions or violence in certain
countries, economic relations between the United States and most of its trading partners in the
region remain strong. The United States accounts for roughly 40% of the Latin American and
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Caribbean region’s imports and 30% of its exports. Most of this trade is with Mexico, which
accounted for 72% of U.S. imports from the region and 61% of U.S. exports to the region in
2015. In 2015, total U.S. exports to Latin America and the Caribbean were valued at $388.3
billion while U.S. imports were valued at $412.3 billion (see Table 3).
The United States has strengthened economic ties with Latin America and the Caribbean over the
past two decades through the negotiation and implementation of free trade agreements (FTAs).
Starting with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which entered into force in
January 1994, the United States has entered into six FTAs involving 11 countries, including
Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and Peru. The United States concluded trade negotiations for a
Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, a proposed free trade agreement among 12 countries, which
include Chile, Mexico, and Peru. Some of the largest economies in South America, however, such
as Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela, have resisted the idea of forming comprehensive free trade
agreements with the United States. As a result, there are numerous other bilateral and plurilateral
trade agreements throughout the Western Hemisphere that do not include the United States. In
addition to FTAs, the United States has extended unilateral trade preferences to some countries in
the region through trade preference programs such as the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act
(CBTPA) and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). GSP was renewed in June 2015,
under the Trade Preferences Extension Act (P.L. 114-27), which authorizes GSP through
December 31, 2017. Most countries in the region also belong to the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and are engaged in WTO multilateral trade negotiations.
Table 3. U.S. Trade with Key Trading Partners in Latin America and the Caribbean,
2008-2015
(in millions of U.S. dollars)
Partner
Country
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
Mexico
151,539
128,998
163,665
198,289
215,875
225,954
240,331
235,745
Brazil
32,910
26,175
35,418
43,019
43,771
44,106
42,434
31,651
Colombia
11,439
9,458
12,068
14,336
16,357
18,371
20,068
16,287
Total LAC
289,384
238,845
302,241
367,301
399,059
410,370
424,287
388,278
World
1,300,136
1,056,932
1,278,495
1,482,508
1,545,821
1,578,517
1,621,172
1,502,572
Mexico
215,915
176,537
229,986
262,874
277,594
280,556
295,739
296,408
Brazil
30,459
20,074
23,958
31,737
32,123
27,541
30,021
27,468
Venezuela
51,401
28,094
32,707
43,257
38,724
31,998
30,220
15,564
Total LAC
375,890
284,665
361,412
437,165
449,385
438,985
445,994
412,283
World
2,100,141
1,557,876
1,913,857
2,207,954
2,276,267
2,267,987
2,356,366
2,248,232
U.S. Exports
U.S. Imports
Source: United States International Trade Commission (ITC) Interactive Tariff and Trade DataWeb.
Notes: Provides statistics on top three countries followed by ITC totals with Latin America and the Caribbean.
As productivity increases in countries that have an FTA with the United States, such as Mexico,
numerous analysts have proposed that the United States employ trade policy to further
hemispheric cooperation and focus on improving regional supply networks. The next possible
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step toward trade integration appeared to be the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade
agreement, which potentially could have significant implications for U.S. trade and investment
ties with Mexico, Chile, and Peru, as well as with Canada and seven other countries in the Pacific
(other Latin American countries could possibly join in the future). The proposed TPP would have
altered some rules governing trade related to NAFTA and provided updated provisions in areas
such as intellectual property rights (IPR) protection, investment, services trade, worker rights, and
the environment. Central American and other countries in the region were concerned that it could
weaken their relative trade competitiveness, especially in the apparel and textiles industries.
Key Policy Issues: During the 114th Congress, the proposed TPP was of congressional interest,
especially in the areas of worker rights, IPR protection, the environment, services trade,
investment, regulatory cooperation, and rules-of-origin provisions. Congress also took an interest
in the possible effects of a TPP on Central America. Given that three countries from Latin
America are parties to the TPP, some policymakers considered options on whether the United
States should broaden trade policy efforts to the region as a whole. Another issue of congressional
interest was the Pacific Alliance, a trade liberalization initiative among Chile, Colombia, Mexico,
and Peru. The United States was granted observer status to the Alliance in July 2013, allowing it
to attend negotiating rounds and participate in other Pacific Alliance activities. Energy reform in
Mexico and the implications for U.S. oil imports from Mexico and for U.S. business and
investment opportunities were also of interest to Congress (also see “Mexico,” below.)
Looking ahead, President-elect Trump announced in November 2016 his intention to withdraw
from the TPP. The President-elect also has stated his desire to examine the ramifications of
withdrawing from NAFTA once he is in office.
For additional background, see CRS In Focus IF10047, North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), by (name redacted)
; CRS Report R42965, The North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), by (name redacted) and (name redacted)
; CRS Report R44489, The
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): Key Provisions and Issues for Congress, coordinated by (name r
edacted) and (name redacted ) ; CRS In Focus IF10000, TPP: An Overview, by (name red
acted) and (name redacted)
and CRS Report R43748, The Pacific Alliance: A Trade
Integration Initiative in Latin America, by (name redacted)
.
Drug Policy
Latin America and the Caribbean feature prominently in U.S. counternarcotics policy due to the
region’s role as a source and transit zone for several illicit drugs destined for U.S. markets—
cocaine, marijuana, methamphetamine, and opiates. Heroin abuse and opioid-related deaths in the
United States have grown in recent years, raising questions among policymakers about how to
address foreign sources of opioids—particularly Mexico, which has experienced an uptick in
recent years in the cultivation of opium poppy and the production of heroin. Policymakers are
also considering the effect of Colombia’s widely anticipated peace accord with the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), an organization that has long played a significant role in
Latin American drug trafficking.
Contemporary drug trafficking and transnational crime syndicates in the region have contributed
to degradations in citizen security and economic development, often resulting in record levels of
violence and drug trafficking-related homicides. Despite significant efforts to combat the drug
trade, many governments in Latin America continue to suffer from overtaxed criminal justice
systems and overwhelmed law enforcement and border control agencies. Moreover, extensive
government corruption, entrenched by deeply influential criminal kingpins, frustrates efforts to
interdict drugs, investigate and prosecute traffickers, and recover illicit proceeds. There is a
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widespread perception, particularly among many Latin American observers, that continuing U.S.
demand for illicit drugs is largely to blame for the Western Hemisphere’s ongoing crime and
violence problems.
Ongoing struggles to deal with the violent and destabilizing effects of the illicit drug trade have
spurred some Latin American leaders and others to explore drug policy alternatives.36 Many Latin
American stakeholders hoped that the April 2016 U.N. General Assembly Special Session on
illicit drugs would spur further consideration of alternative drug policy options, including in
particular changes in policy approaches to marijuana-related crimes. Some countries in Latin
America have already begun the process of modifying domestic drug laws to decriminalize and
reduce or alter the penalties and consequences of certain aspects of the drug control regime, such
as for drug possession and consumption as well as for drug supply reduction.
In an unprecedented move, Uruguay enacted legislation to establish a nationally regulated legal
market for domestic, recreational consumption of cannabis in late December 2013. Bolivia has
also sought a different approach to counternarcotics policy, including ending its reliance on U.S.
antidrug support and decriminalizing certain activities involving coca leaf. In a major reversal
that ends a central tenet of U.S.-supported counternarcotics activities in Colombia, the Colombian
government announced in May 2015 the end of its campaign of aerial eradication.37 The decision
to halt such spraying, which had been implemented with substantial U.S. support since the 1990s,
followed a March 2015 World Health Organization announcement that the herbicide used to
eradicate coca crops “probably” causes cancer in humans.
Key Policy Issues: Because of the region’s role as a source and transit zone, U.S.
counternarcotics policy will continue to be a major aspect of U.S. relations with Latin America
and the Caribbean. The 114th Congress was engaged in regional debates on drug policy reform,
particularly as it evaluated the Obama Administration’s counternarcotics goals in the Western
Hemisphere, including counternarcotics and foreign aid budget plans as well as the distribution of
domestic and international drug control funding, and the relative balance of civilian, law
enforcement, and military roles in regional anti-drug efforts. As noted above, Congress enacted
P.L. 114-323 in December 2016, which, among its provisions, established a drug policy
commission directed to review and report on U.S. foreign policy efforts and programs in the
hemisphere to combat drug trafficking, abuse, and related consequences.
For additional information, see CRS Report RL34543, International Drug Control Policy:
Background and U.S. Responses, by (name redacted). Also see CRS Report R41349, U.S.Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond, by (name redacted) and
(name redacted); CRS Report R41731, Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background
36
For example, at the sixth Summit of the Americas, held in April 2012, several Latin American presidents criticized
current international drug control efforts. As a result, summit participants tasked the OAS Inter-American Drug Abuse
Control Commission (CICAD) to prepare two interrelated reports to evaluate current Latin American drug policies and
provide policy options for alternative drug control approaches. The first of these two OAS reports assessed the scope of
the drug problem in the Americas and suggested that regional responses may benefit from greater policy flexibility that
allows for a diversity of approaches tailored to the problems facing individual countries. Such flexibility may include
changes in national legislation or international law to permit the decriminalization or legalization of marijuana. The
second report presented several potential scenarios for the future direction of the drug problem in the Americas,
depending on the policy decisions taken by regional actors between 2013 and 2025. The OAS drug reports were also
highlighted at its General Assembly session in June 2013. See OAS, “Declaration of Antigua Guatemala ‘For a
Comprehensive Policy Against the World Drug Problem in the Americas,’” press release, June 7, 2013,
http://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=S-010.
37
William Neuman, “Defying U.S., Colombia Halts Aerial Spraying of Crops Used to Make Cocaine,” New York
Times, May 14, 2015.
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and Policy Issues for Congress, by (name redacted) and (name redacted)
; and CRS In Focus
IF10400, Heroin Production in Mexico and U.S. Policy, by (name redacted) and (name red
acted).
Terrorism Issues
Compared to other parts of the world, the potential threat emanating from terrorism is low in most
countries in Latin America. Most terrorist acts occur in the Andean region of South America,
committed by two Colombian guerrilla groups—the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN)—and one Peruvian guerrilla group, the Shining
Path (SL). All three of these groups have been designated by the U.S. State Department as
Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). The FARC, however, has been engaged in peace
negotiations with the Colombian government since 2012, culminating in a peace accord signed in
September 2016. Although the accord was narrowly rejected by a national plebiscite in early
October, both sides hammered out a new peace accord in November 2016, which was ratified by
Colombia’s Congress at the end of that month. Negotiations between the Colombian government
and the smaller ELN had several false starts in 2016, although to date formal talks with the
government have not started. The Shining Path has been significantly diminished because of
Peruvian military operations.
For a number of years, there also has been U.S. concern about Iran’s increasing activities in the
region as well as those of Hezbollah, the radical Lebanon-based Islamic group with close ties to
Iran. Both are reported to be linked to the 1994 bombing of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual
Association (AMIA) that killed 85 people in Buenos Aires. More recently, U.S. concerns have
included financial and ideological support in South America and the Caribbean for the Islamic
State (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ISIL/ISIS), including the issue of
individuals from the region leaving to fight with the Islamic State.
The United States employs various policy tools to counter terrorism in the region, including
sanctions, antiterrorism assistance and training, law enforcement cooperation, and multilateral
cooperation through the Organization of American States (OAS). In addition to sanctions against
U.S.-designated FTOs in the region, the United States has imposed an arms embargo on
Venezuela since 2006 because the Department of State has determined that Venezuela is not fully
cooperating with U.S. antiterrorism efforts. The United States has also imposed sanctions on
several current and former Venezuelan officials for assisting the FARC and on numerous
individuals and companies in Latin America for providing support to Hezbollah. Cuba had been
on the State Department’s so-called list of state sponsors of terrorism since 1982, but in May
2015, the Obama Administration rescinded Cuba’s designation as part of its overall policy shift
on Cuba.
Over the past several years, Congress has introduced legislation and held oversight hearings
pertaining to terrorism issues in the Western Hemisphere. The 112th Congress enacted the
Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-220) 2012, which required the
Administration to conduct an assessment and present “a strategy to address Iran’s growing hostile
presence and activity in the Western Hemisphere.” An unclassified portion of the 2013 report
contended that Iranian influence was waning.
Key Policy Issues: The 114th Congress continued oversight of terrorism concerns in the Western
Hemisphere, with House hearings on the activities of Iran and Hezbollah, the peace agreement in
Colombia, border security management and concerns, and terrorist financing in South America
(see Appendix). As noted above, a provision in the FY2017 NDAA, P.L. 114-328 (Section 1013),
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enacted in December 2016, extended a unified counterdrug and counterterrorism campaign in
Colombia for two years.
Several legislative initiatives were introduced but ultimately not approved or considered. The
House passed H.R. 4482 in April 2016, which would have required the Secretary of Homeland
Security to prepare a southwestern border threat analysis and strategic plan, including efforts to
detect and prevent terrorists and instruments of terrorism from entering the United States. With
regard to the AMIA bombing and Iran, two Senate resolutions were introduced: S.Res. 167 would
have called for an internationally backed investigation into the January 2015 death of the AMIA
special prosecutor in Argentina, Alberto Nisman, and urged the President to continue to monitor
Iran’s activities in Latin America and the Caribbean, and S.Res. 620 would have, among its
provisions, encouraged Argentina to investigate and prosecute those responsible for the AMIA
bombing and the death of Nisman. Several initiatives dealt with Cuba’s harboring of U.S.-wanted
fugitives, an issue that had been noted for many years in the State Department’s annual terrorism
report.
For additional information, see CRS Report RS21049, Latin America: Terrorism Issues, by (name
redacted) and (name redacted); CRS Report R43926, Cuba: Issues and Actions in the 114th
Congress, by (name redacted) ; CRS Insight IN10591, Colombia Adopts Revised Peace Accord:
What Next?, by (name redacted)
; CRS Report R43816, Argentina: Background and U.S. Relations,
by (name redacted) and (name redacted)
.
Organization of American States
The OAS is the oldest multilateral regional organization in the world. Since its foundation in
1948, the OAS has served as a forum through which the United States has sought to foster
regional cooperation and advance U.S. priorities in the Western Hemisphere. OAS actions
reflected U.S. policy for much of the 20th century, as other members sought to closely align
themselves with the dominant economic and political power in the region. This dynamic has
changed to a certain extent over the past 15 years, as Latin American and Caribbean governments
have adopted more independent foreign policies. Although the core pillars of the organization’s
mission—democracy promotion, human rights protection, economic and social development, and
regional security cooperation—still generally align with U.S. policy toward the region, the OAS
has become less receptive to U.S. initiatives and more prone to inaction. The organization also
has struggled to obtain the funding it needs to carry out its mandates.
As OAS decisions have begun to reflect the increasing independence of the organization’s
member states, U.S. policymakers occasionally have expressed concerns about the direction of
the organization. Some Members of Congress have asserted that the OAS is failing in its mission
to support democracy and human rights, and they have argued that the U.S. government should
use its influence in the organization, including funding, to compel stronger action on those issues.
Others contend that the OAS remains an important forum for advancing U.S. relations with the
other nations of the hemisphere and that U.S. policy should seek to strengthen the organization so
it can more effectively carry out its mission.
Key Policy Issues: The 114th Congress continued to appropriate funding for the OAS and oversee
U.S. policy at the organization. The FY2016 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 114-113)
provided funding for the U.S. assessed contribution to the OAS, which accounts for nearly 60%
of all membership dues paid to the organization. It also provided a $2.3 million voluntary
contribution for OAS development assistance programs and a $4.1 million voluntary contribution
for the OAS Fund for Strengthening Democracy, which included $2 million for the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights (IACHR). Congress passed a continuing resolution
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(P.L. 114-254) in December 2016 that will fund most foreign operations in FY2017 at the
FY2016 level, minus an across-the-board reduction of about 0.2%, until April 28, 2017.
The Senate Appropriations Committee’s FY2017 foreign operations appropriations bill, S. 3117,
would have increased assistance to the OAS, but it never received floor consideration. According
to the bill’s report, S.Rept. 114-290, the bill would have provided at least $16.5 million for
voluntary contributions to the OAS: $1 million for OAS development assistance programs, $4
million for the OAS Fund for Strengthening Democracy, $7 million for the IACHR (which was
facing a budget crisis), and $4.5 million for a recently established OAS Mission to Support the
Fight Against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (MACCIH). S.Rept. 114-290 also noted the
budgetary challenges faced by the OAS and urged the Secretary-General to “develop a 5-point
financial plan that emphasizes the comparative advantages of the OAS in supporting democracy,
monitoring electoral processes, and protecting human rights.”
The 114th Congress took action on several other legislative measures that included provisions
related to the OAS. As noted above, Congress enacted P.L. 114-323 in December 2016, which
established a drug policy commission to conduct a comprehensive review of U.S.
counternarcotics policy in the hemisphere. The law directed the new commission to consult with
the OAS’s Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) as it carries out its work.
In December 2015, the House adopted H.Res. 536, which urged countries in the Western
Hemisphere to uphold the principles outlined in the Inter-American Democratic Charter and to
implement recommendations from the IACHR’s Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of
Expression. In September 2016, the House passed the Nicaraguan Investment Conditionality Act
(H.R. 5708), which, among its provisions, directed the U.S. Permanent Representative to the OAS
to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to advocate for OAS electoral
observation missions to Nicaragua in 2016 and 2017.
For additional information, see CRS Report R42639, Organization of American States:
Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted)
.
Climate Change and Clean Energy
Latin America and the Caribbean face numerous risks from climate change, according to many
sources. Paradoxically, these countries have contributed only a modest portion of the world’s
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, the primary component of greenhouse gases. The region
generates only an estimated 7% of the world’s greenhouse gases—10% if emissions from forest
and land degradation are included.38 This is in part due to the region’s clean energy matrix. Some
countries are endowed with abundant water resources, such as rivers and glaciers, and produce
hydroelectric power. Still, Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, and other nations have high rates of
deforestation that release carbon dioxide to the atmosphere.
Tourism and agriculture are important sources of income in the region. Increased erosion and
projected increases in severe weather events, such as more violent storms and flooding, and
predicted sea-level rise could undermine coastal tourism. As global temperatures increase, Latin
America may face more frequent crop declines or failures, risks to livestock productivity,
declining biodiversity, lower fish catches, coral reef die-offs, and other threats to livelihoods.
More widespread risk from certain diseases has been forecast. Three mosquito-borne illnesses
have spread from Latin America and the Caribbean to the United States in recent years, including
38
World Resources Institute, CAIT Climate Data Explorer 2.0, data extracted August 4, 2015. Estimates represent total
GHG emissions excluding Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF), and total GHG emissions including LULUCF,
respectively, in 2012. See http://cait.wri.org/.
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an epidemic of Zika virus infections in 2016 (see “Zika Virus” section, below). Severe drought
struck parts of Brazil and Central America in 2015 and Bolivia and Venezuela in 2016.
The December 2014 U.N. climate conference, known as COP 20,39 held in Lima, Peru, drew
attention to the challenge of climate change in the Western Hemisphere. Latin American countries
have showcased advances in low-carbon energy production, such as solar, wind, or biofuels.
Brazil has made significant headway over the past decade in reducing deforestation in the
Amazon—protecting the earth’s largest trap for CO2.40 Mexico has been a regional and global
leader during the administrations of Felipe Calderón (2006-2012) and Enrique Peña Nieto (2012present). In March 2015, Mexico was the first developing country in the world to submit its
climate change pledge—or an Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC)—for the
U.N. climate conference to be held in Paris in December 2015. The Twenty-First Conference of
the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 21) lasted
from November 30 through December 12, 2015 and produced the so-called Paris Agreement.
With nearly worldwide attendance, the COP21 conference convened delegations from 195
countries. At the end of the conference, the delegates announced that the agreement they had
hammered out pledged nations to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and cooperate on a
common goal of adapting to climate change, and they also agreed on ways to provide financial
and other support. The agreement went into force on November 4, 2016, after more than 72 states
(representing more than 56% of global CO2 emissions), deposited their instruments of ratification.
The Paris Agreement aims at ambitious goals of greenhouse gas emission reduction and
mitigation through voluntary pledges and will depend on country peer pressure to realize those
goals.
How Latin America and the Caribbean nations address climate change in 2017 and beyond may
depend on the perceived risks and benefits of low-carbon growth. A single “regional” viewpoint
is unlikely given the diversity of political perspectives, geographies, and fragmentation of efforts
between regional organizations. On the other hand, there is significant consensus in Latin
America that climate change is an important policy issue, according to a 2016 Pew Center study
of respondents globally.41 Additionally, the harsh effects of the 2015-2016 stronger-than-usual El
Niño weather phenomena has led to floods in some countries and droughts in other parts of the
region, such as Central America and Bolivia. Some observers maintain that sustainable growth
and prosperity can be achieved with low CO2-emissions development, but how Latin American
and Caribbean nations will balance projected lower growth rate—and even contraction—with
progress on climate concerns remains to be seen.
“Securing a clean energy future” was one of four pillars of the Obama Administration’s policy
approach in Latin America and the Caribbean. The Administration’s Energy and Climate
Partnership of the Americas (ECPA) was one avenue for achieving this goal. ECPA promoted
clean energy technologies, built hemispheric partnerships, and developed new clean energy
initiatives among governments, private industry, and civil society. After 40 different initiatives
and projects launched under ECPA, new U.S. assistance concluded in FY2014, but existing
projects continued through the end of FY2016. In October 2015, U.S. Secretary of State John
Kerry launched a $10 million clean energy initiative for Central America and the Caribbean. The
39
The 20th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which entered
into force in 1994.
40
Some recent data, using new remote sensing methods, suggest that deforestation rates did not fall as much as
previously estimated.
41
Richard Wike, “What the World Thinks About Climate Change in 7 Charts,” Pew Research Center, April 19, 2016.
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effort targeted the private sector to increase financial assistance and investment in clean energy
projects.42 (Also see “Caribbean Security and Energy Issues” below.)
Key Policy Issues: Western Hemisphere countries received $71.4 million in foreign assistance
under the Administration’s Global Climate Change Initiative (adaptation, clean energy, and
sustainable landscapes) in FY2015 and an estimated $70.5 million in FY2016. The FY2017
request was for $70.7 million. Members of the 114th Congress had some interest in these
programs and how they worked for nations in the region, and how the U.S. policy framework
toward climate and energy related to the pledges or INDCs of Latin American countries
announced in Paris.
For additional information, see CRS Insight IN10590, Paris Climate Change Agreement to Enter
into Force November 4, by (name redacted).
Zika Virus
During the second session, the 114th Congress considered how the United States should respond
to the spread of the Zika virus throughout the Western Hemisphere. The Zika virus is a mosquitoborne illness that has no treatment or vaccine and can cause microcephaly—a severe birth
defect—and other neurological complications. The number of people in the Western Hemisphere
affected by Zika is unknown, but nearly all countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have
recorded cases of the virus. Brazil has registered the most confirmed cases of Zika in Latin
America, as well as the vast majority of Zika-associated microcephaly.
Zika responses in the region have been led by Brazil and Colombia, multilateral organizations
such as the World Health Organization (WHO)/Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), and
the U.S. government. Health experts have expressed some concerns about the capacity of some
health systems—particularly in Central America and the Caribbean—to prevent, diagnose, and
care for Zika cases and associated complications, particularly among pregnant women.
In February 2016, the Obama Administration submitted an emergency request for almost $1.9
billion in supplemental funding to respond to the Zika outbreak, including $526 million for
international efforts. In April, the Administration announced that it would reprogram $589 million
in unobligated funds for efforts to address the Zika outbreak. USAID has reprogrammed $215
million of that funding—including a $78 million transfer to the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC)—for international efforts. USAID is prioritizing vector control, behavioral and
social change communication to help prevent the spread of Zika, and the delivery of maternal and
reproductive health services. It is also incentivizing innovations and research. USAID is focusing
on Haiti, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic. The CDC is engaging
in joint research on Zika with Brazil, Colombia, and other countries; working to develop a Zika
vaccine; and supporting other countries’ surveillance, diagnostic, and treatment capabilities.
Key Policy Issues: In May 2016, both the House and the Senate passed supplemental
appropriations measures (H.R. 5243) and (S.Amdt. 3900 to H.R. 2577) for Zika response but
never agreed to a conference agreement on the Zika supplemental request. In September 2016,
Congress enacted a FY2017 continuing resolution (P.L. 114-223) that funded most foreign aid
programs between October 1, 2016, and December 9, 2016; the measure also became the vehicle
for Congress to provide $145.5 million in supplemental FY2016 appropriations for global health
42
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), “Secretary Kerry Announces USAID-Funded Clean Energy
Initiative,” October 20, 2015.
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assistance to help governments in the region support those who have been affected by the Zika
virus outbreak.43
For more information, see CRS Report R44545, Zika Virus in Latin America and the Caribbean:
U.S. Policy Considerations, coordinated by (name redacted)
, and CRS Report R44460, Zika
Response Funding: Request and Congressional Action, coordinated by (name redacted) .
Selected Country and Subregional Issues
Argentina
Argentina, a South American country with a population of almost 43 million, has had a vibrant
democratic tradition since its military relinquished power in 1983. Current President Mauricio
Macri—the leader of the center-right Republican Proposal (PRO) and the candidate of the Let’s
Change coalition representing center-right and center-left parties—won the 2015 presidential race
and was inaugurated in December 2015. He succeeded two-term President Cristina Fernández de
Kirchner, from the center-left faction of the Peronist party known as the Front for Victory (FPV),
who was first elected in 2007 (succeeding her husband, Néstor Kirchner, who served one term).
In a close race, Macri defeated the FPV’s Daniel Scioli. Macri’s election ends the 12-year run of
so-called Kirchnerismo that helped Argentina emerge from a severe economic crisis in 2001-2002
but also was characterized by protectionist and unorthodox economic policies and at times
difficult relations with the United States.
Argentina has Latin America’s third-largest economy and is endowed with vast natural resources.
Agriculture has traditionally been a main economic driver, but the country also has a diversified
industrial base and a highly educated population. In 2001-2002, a severe economic crisis
precipitated by unsustainable debt led to the government defaulting on nearly $100 billion in
foreign debt owed to private creditors, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and foreign
governments. Subsequent Argentine administrations resolved more than 90% of the country’s
debt owed to private creditors through two debt restructurings offered in 2005 and 2010; repaid
debt owed to the IMF in 2006; and, in May 2014, reached an agreement to repay foreign
governments, including the United States.
Reaching a settlement with the private creditors that did not participate in the exchanges—the
“holdouts”—was a more protracted process. Macri made it a priority to resolve the 15-year
standoff with private creditors, and, in February 2016, the Argentine government reached an
agreement with the major remaining holdouts. In April 2016, the government successfully issued
$16.5 billion in new government bonds and paid $9.3 billion to holdout creditors, effectively
resolving the default.
U.S.-Argentine relations generally have been characterized by robust commercial relations and
cooperation in such issues as nonproliferation, human rights, education, and science and
technology. Under the Kirchner governments, however, there were periodic tensions in relations.
Macri’s election brought to power a government that has demonstrated a commitment to
improved relations with the United States.
The Obama Administration moved forward swiftly with engaging the new government on a range
of bilateral issues and pursuing cooperation on various regional and global challenges.
43
USAID, “Newly Approved Funding for Zika Sustains and Scales Up Current USAID Response Efforts,” press
release, November 15, 2016.
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Demonstrating the significant change in relations, President Obama traveled to Argentina in
March 2016 for a state visit that increased cooperation in such areas as trade and investment,
renewable energy, climate change, and citizen security. President Obama also announced a
comprehensive effort to declassify additional U.S. documents from the era of military rule in
Argentina in which thousands were killed. Secretary of State John Kerry traveled to Argentina in
August 2016 to launch a High-Level Dialogue with Argentina to serve as a mechanism to ensure
sustained engagement on bilateral issues and approaches toward regional and global challenges,
including respect for democracy and human rights in the Americas.
Key Policy Issues: U.S.-Argentine relations have largely been an oversight issue for Congress. In
the aftermath of Macri’s election, key Members of Congress urged the Obama Administration to
prioritize relations with Argentina. Over the years, an interest of Congress has been progress in
the investigation and prosecution of those responsible for the 1994 bombing of the ArgentineIsraeli Mutual Association (AMIA), which killed 85 people, and more recently in the
investigation into the January 2015 death of the special prosecutor in the AMIA investigation,
Alberto Nisman. With regard to trade, some Members of Congress have attempted to block the
lifting of U.S. import restrictions on fresh beef and lemon imports from Argentina.
Two Senate resolutions were introduced on Argentina in the 114th Congress but not considered.
As noted above, S.Res. 167 would have called for an internationally backed investigation into the
death of the AMIA special prosecutor. S.Res. 620 would have supported the partnership between
Argentina and the United States, encouraged the State Department to coordinate an interagency
strategy to increase cooperation with Argentina, commended President Macri for far-reaching
economic reforms and praised the government for resolving its dispute with international
creditors, and encouraged the government to investigate and prosecute those responsible for the
AMIA bombing and the death of Nisman.
For additional information, see CRS Report R43816, Argentina: Background and U.S. Relations,
by (name redacted) and (name redacted)
; CRS Insight IN10378, Argentina Votes for Change
in 2015 Presidential Election, by (name redacted) ; and CRS Report RS21049, Latin America:
Terrorism Issues, by (name redacted) and (name redacted).
Brazil
As a large country with tremendous natural resources, Brazil has long held potential to become a
world power. Its rise to prominence has been hindered by setbacks, however, including an
extended period of military rule (1964-1985) and uneven economic performance. Brazil gradually
consolidated liberal democracy following its political transition, and implemented economic
reforms in the 1990s that laid the foundation for stronger growth. A boom in international demand
for Brazilian commodities during the first decade of this century fueled a period of rapid
economic expansion, which contributed to, and was reinforced by, the growth of Brazil’s middle
class. In addition to providing the Brazilian government with the resources necessary to address
long-standing social disparities, this economic growth strengthened Brazil’s international stature.
After more than a decade of advancements, Brazil is once again facing economic and political
crises. The economy, which began to slow in 2011 with the end of the global commodity boom,
contracted by an estimated 3.8% in 2015 and is expected to contract by 3.3% in 2016.44 Some
Brazilians who joined the middle class during the boom years have fallen back into poverty as
44
International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2016, October 4, 2016.
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unemployment has climbed to nearly 12%.45 At the same time, a sprawling corruption
investigation involving the diversion of public sector funds to bribes and electoral campaigns has
implicated prominent business leaders and government officials. The Brazilian Congress seized
upon citizen discontent to impeach President Dilma Rousseff and permanently remove her from
office in August 2016. Although President Michel Temer, who served as vice president under
Rousseff, has pushed forward far-reaching policy reforms, the Brazilian economy has shown few
signs of recovery. Political stability also has remained elusive, as corruption allegations against
Temer and other high-profile politicians have continued to roil Brazil’s political class.
The United States traditionally has enjoyed robust economic and political relations with Brazil.
The Obama Administration considered Brazil a “major global player” and an “indispensable
partner” on issues ranging from international development to climate change.46 Nevertheless, the
relationship has been strained from time to time as the countries’ independent foreign policies and
occasionally divergent national interests have led to disagreements. Press reports in 2013 about
alleged National Security Agency (NSA) activities in Brazil contributed to a particularly frosty
period in relations, but bilateral cooperation gradually resumed, paving the way for President
Rousseff’s official visit to the White House in June 2015.
There has been considerable continuity in U.S.-Brazilian relations over the past year despite the
change in government in Brazil. Bilateral dialogues, which facilitate policy coordination,
continued throughout the impeachment process against President Rousseff. In the aftermath of
Rousseff’s removal, the Obama Administration expressed confidence that the process had been
carried out in accordance with Brazil’s constitutional framework and pledged to continue working
with the Brazilian government on issues of mutual concern.
Key Policy Issues: The 114th Congress approved two legislative measures that directly influenced
U.S.-Brazil relations. As part of the Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-27),
Congress renewed the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program, which provides nonreciprocal, duty-free tariff treatment to certain products imported from Brazil and other
designated developing countries. In the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113),
Congress authorized reforms to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that had been pending
since 2010 and provided greater voting power to Brazil and other emerging economies. The law
also provided foreign assistance for Brazil, including $10.5 million to support conservation
programs in the Brazilian Amazon. For FY2017, a continuing resolution, P.L. 114-254, is funding
most foreign aid programs at the FY2016 level, minus an across-the-board reduction of about
0.2%, until April 28, 2017.
A few other measures related to Brazil were introduced in the 114th Congress. H.Res. 815,
introduced in July 2016, would have expressed the sense of Congress that governments, including
the Brazilian government, should inform travelers about the Zika virus and take steps to prevent
its transmission. Two other bills were designed to pressure Brazil to amend its constitution to
allow the extradition of Brazilian nationals; H.R. 2784 would have suspended foreign assistance
to Brazil, and H.R. 2785 would have suspended the issuance of visas to Brazilian nationals, until
it changes its extradition policies.
In addition to considering legislation, several Members of the 114th Congress spoke out about
developments in Brazil. Some Members raised concerns about the precautions taken to prevent
45
Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, “PNAD Contínua: Taxa de Desocupação Fica Em 11,8% no Trimestre
Encerrado em Outubro de 2016,” press release, November 29, 2016.
46
White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by President Obama and President Rousseff of Brazil in Joint
Press Conference,” June 30, 2015.
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the spread of Zika as Brazil prepared to host the Summer Olympics in August 2016. Others raised
concerns about the impeachment process in Brazil, which they asserted was a threat to
democracy.
For additional information, see CRS Insight IN10471, Brazil in Crisis, by (name redacted)
; CRS
Report RL33456, Brazil: Background and U.S. Relations, by (name redacted)
; CRS In Focus
IF10447, U.S.-Brazil Trade Relations, by (name redacted)
; CRS Report R44545, Zika Virus
in Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy Considerations, coordinated by (name redacted
)
; and CRS Report R44575, The 2016 Olympic Games: Health, Security, Environmental,
and Doping Issues, coordinated by (name redacted) and (name redacted) .
Caribbean Security and Energy Issues
Because of their geographic location, many Caribbean nations are transit countries for illicit drugs
destined for the U.S. and European markets. Currently, of the 16 countries in the Caribbean
region, President Obama identified four—the Bahamas, Belize, the Dominican Republic, Haiti,
and Jamaica—as major drug-producing or drug-transit countries in September 2016, pursuant to
annual legislative drug certification requirements.47 Many other Caribbean nations, particularly in
the eastern Caribbean, are also vulnerable to drug trafficking and associated crimes. Homicide
rates in several Caribbean countries have increased in recent years because of gangs and
organized crime, competition between drug trafficking organizations, and the availability of
firearms.
In 2009, the Obama Administration developed the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI)
through a process of dialogue with Caribbean countries with the goal of reducing illicit trafficking
in the Caribbean, advancing public safety and security, and promoting social justice. U.S. funding
for the program from FY2010 through FY2016 amounted to an estimated $444 million with
assistance in the following five areas: maritime and aerial security cooperation; law enforcement
capacity building; border/port security and firearms interdiction; justice sector reform; and crime
prevention and at-risk youth. The House Appropriations Committee version of the FY2016
foreign aid appropriations measure, H.R. 2772, would have provided about $8 million in
additional assistance for the CBSI above the Administration’s request of $53.5 million, whereas
the Senate Appropriations Committee version, S. 1725, would have provided $9 million less.
Ultimately, Congress provided $57.7 million for the CBSI in FY2016, as set forth in the
explanatory statement to the FY2016 omnibus appropriations measure, P.L. 114-113, about $4.2
million above the amount requested.
Many Caribbean nations depend on energy imports and over the last decade have participated in
Venezuela’s PetroCaribe program, in which they purchase Venezuelan oil under preferential
financing terms. In 2014, the Obama Administration launched a Caribbean Energy Security
Initiative (CESI), which has the goal of promoting a cleaner and more sustainable energy future
in the Caribbean. The initiative includes a variety of U.S. activities to facilitate cleaner energy
sources, develop collaborative networks on clean energy, finance clean energy projects, increase
energy efficiency, and expand access to electricity, information, and technology. The report to S.
1725 (S.Rept. 114-79) recommended $5 million for the CESI in FY2016. Ultimately, the
explanatory statement to the FY2016 omnibus measure, P.L. 114-113, measure provided $2
million for the program.
47
Belize is located in Central America but is a member of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).
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In January 2015, Vice President Biden hosted a Caribbean Energy Security Summit in
Washington, DC; representatives from regional governments, regional and multilateral
development banks, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and the OAS reiterated their
commitment to support a cleaner and more sustainable energy future in the Caribbean. In April
2015, President Obama met with Caribbean leaders in a U.S.-Caribbean Community Summit in
Jamaica, where part of the summit focused on improving energy security, reducing energy costs,
and combating climate change. The President announced the launch of a Clean Energy Finance
Facility for the Caribbean and Central America to encourage investment in clean energy projects.
He also announced a task force of representatives from the United States, governments in the
region, and regional institutions. Secretary of State John Kerry announced the opening of the
facility in October 2015. Vice President Biden hosted a follow-up U.S.-Caribbean-Central
American Energy Summit in May 2016 in Washington, DC, and the above-noted task force issued
a report addressing energy security issues, which urged countries to diversify their energy
sources.
Key Policy Issues: Concern about drug trafficking through the Caribbean sustained
congressional interest in the CBSI program. For FY2017, the Administration requested $48.4
million for the CBSI, a 16% reduction from FY2016. The House Appropriations Committee
report to accompany the House version of the FY2017 foreign aid appropriations bill (H.Rept.
114-693 to H.R. 5912) would provide $57.7 million for the CBSI, the same amount appropriated
in FY2016, whereas the Senate Appropriations Committee’s report to accompany the Senate
version of the bill (S.Rept. 114-290 to S. 3117) would provide $53.6 million. In addition to the
CBSI, the Senate report would also provide $2 million for the Caribbean Energy Security
Initiative. Congress did not complete action on these bills, but in December 2016, it enacted a
FY2017 continuing resolution (P.L. 114-254) that funded most foreign aid programs at the
FY2016 level, minus an across-the-board reduction of almost 0.2%, through April 28, 2017.
In December 2016, Congress enacted P.L. 114-291, the United States-Caribbean Strategic
Engagement Act of 2016—which has the objective of increasing engagement with the Caribbean.
The measure requires the Secretary of State, in coordination with the USAID Administrator, to
submit a multiyear strategy to Congress for U.S. engagement with the Caribbean region. Among
other requirements, the strategy is to encourage Caribbean efforts to improve energy security and
to partner with Caribbean governments to improve citizen security, reduce drug trafficking,
strengthen the rule of law, and improve the effectiveness and sustainability of the CBSI. The bill
also requires a report evaluating the CBSI and making recommendations to make the program
more effective. As noted above, Congress also approved P.L. 114-323 in December 2016, which
among its provisions established a new commission to review U.S. drug control policy in the
Western Hemisphere, including an evaluation of the CBSI.
The House Western Hemisphere Subcommittee held oversight hearings on energy security in May
2015 and June 2016 that examined challenges for the Caribbean. The subcommittee also held a
hearing on the Caribbean in July 2016 examining U.S. engagement with the region (see
Appendix).
Central America
U.S. policymakers have expressed significant concerns about conditions in Central America over
the past decade. Countries in the region—particularly the “northern triangle” countries of El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—have long struggled to deal with high levels of crime and
violence that analysts have linked to interrelated factors such as widespread social exclusion and
weak and corrupt security and justice sector institutions. Security conditions have deteriorated
further as transnational criminal organizations have fought to control Central American territory
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in order to transport illicit narcotics from producers in South America to consumers in the United
States. From FY2008-FY2016, Congress appropriated an estimated $1.5 billion of assistance
through the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) to strengthen law enforcement,
build institutional capacity, and address underlying socioeconomic challenges in Central America.
While USAID’s CARSI-funded crime prevention programs have produced statistically significant
improvements in the communities where they are located, violence levels remain elevated
throughout the northern triangle.
Policymakers had begun to reevaluate U.S. efforts in Central America even before the United
States experienced a sharp increase in the number of unaccompanied children and other migrants
and asylum seekers from the region arriving at the southern border in 2014. The Obama
Administration launched a new whole-of-government “U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central
America” that places greater emphasis on fostering prosperity and improving governance while
continuing to address security concerns in the region. The governments of El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras—with support from the Inter-American Development Bank—are
carrying out complementary efforts under their “Plan of the Alliance for Prosperity in the
Northern Triangle.”
Many analysts are skeptical that leaders in the region are committed to far-reaching structural
changes, especially in light of recent corruption scandals that have implicated top officials. While
all three governments have begun to implement some reforms, serious challenges remain, as
demonstrated by escalating levels of violence in El Salvador, assassinations of human rights
defenders in Honduras, rising poverty in Guatemala, and increasing numbers of migrants and
asylum-seekers from the region arriving at the U.S. border.
Key Policy Issues: The 114th Congress continued to express concerns about conditions in Central
America and appropriated funding to support development and security efforts in the region. The
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113), provided $750 million to implement the
Administration’s Central America strategy but placed numerous conditions on the aid. It withheld
75% of assistance for the “central governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras” until
the Secretary of State could certify that the governments were “taking effective steps” to address
16 concerns, including improving border security, combating corruption, protecting human rights,
and resolving commercial disputes. Congress enacted a continuing resolution (P.L. 114-254) in
December 2016 that will continue funding most foreign aid programs in FY2017 at the FY2016
level, minus an across-the-board reduction of about 0.2%, until April 28, 2017. Funding provided
through the continuing resolution is subject to the same conditions as were enacted in FY2016.
The FY2016 NDAA, P.L. 114-92, expressed the sense of the Congress that “the stability and
security of Central American nations have a direct impact on the stability and security of the
United States.” The measure asserted that the United States should prioritize efforts to address
security threats in the region and called on the Department of Defense to increase its efforts to
prevent illicit trafficking into the United States, build partner capacity, support inter-agency
activities that address instability, and promote respect for human rights in the region. It also
authorized $30 million above the FY2016 request for U.S. Southern Command operational
support for Central America. The FY2017 NDAA, P.L. 114-328, requires the Secretaries of
Defense and State to submit a joint report on military units that have been assigned to do policing
or other law enforcement duties in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, and detail U.S.
government assistance for those units.
As noted above, Congress also approved P.L. 114-323 in December 2016, which, among its
provisions, established a drug policy commission charged with reviewing U.S. drug control
policy in the Western Hemisphere, including an evaluation of CARSI.
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Several other legislative initiatives related to Central America were introduced in the 114th
Congress. H.R. 439 and H.R. 530, introduced in January 2015, sought to condition aid to northern
triangle countries on those countries’ efforts to prevent unauthorized migration to the United
States. S. 3106 and H.R. 5850, introduced in June 2016 and July 2016, aimed to provide a
coordinated regional response to violence and humanitarian concerns in the northern triangle.
H.R. 5474, introduced in June 2016, would have suspended security assistance to Honduras until
the Secretary of State certified that the Honduran government had met a number of human rights
conditions.
For additional information, see CRS Report R43702, Unaccompanied Children from Central
America: Foreign Policy Considerations, coordinated by (name redacted)
; CRS In Focus IF10371,
U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America: Background and FY2017 Budget Request, by
(name redacted) and (name redacted)
; CRS Report R41731, Central America Regional
Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress, by (name redacted) and (name
redacted)
; CRS Report RL34112, Gangs in Central America, by (name redacted)
;
CRS In Focus IF10394, Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade
Agreement (CAFTA-DR), by (name redacted)
; CRS Report R43616, El Salvador:
Background and U.S. Relations, by (name redacted)
; and CRS Report RL34027, Honduras:
Background and U.S. Relations, by (name redacted)
.
Colombia
Colombia is the third-most-populous country in Latin America, with roughly 48 million
inhabitants. A key U.S. ally in the region, Colombia has endured an internal armed conflict for
half a century. In July 2016, the Colombian Constitutional Court approved a plebiscite to allow
Colombian voters to decide the fate of a peace accord negotiated between the government of
President Juan Manuel Santos and the country’s largest insurgent group, the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC). After nearly four years of negotiations and some 50 rounds of talks,
which began in Norway in October 2012 and then, as planned, moved to Havana, Cuba, a peace
accord was signed on September 26, 2016, in a public ceremony.
In a surprise loss, the first accord—known at the Cartagena Agreement—was rejected in the
peace plebiscite held a week later on October 2, 2016, by a margin of only 54,000 votes out of 13
million ballots cast. In late November 2016, the Santos government and the FARC signed a
second accord, which the government maintained responded to criticisms of the “No” campaign
leaders who objected to the first accord. On November 30, 2016, the Colombian Congress
approved the second accord, and the fast-track mechanism that would have allowed rapid
implementation of the Cartagena Agreement was upheld to apply to the second accord by the
Colombian Constitutional Court on December 13, 2016.
The leftist FARC have fought the Colombian government for decades with financing derived
from extortion, drug trafficking, and other illicit activities. Some observers consider the FARC to
have morphed from a leftist rural insurgency to essentially the country’s largest drug trafficking
organization. Other analysts maintain that favorable conditions existed for both sides to reach a
peace settlement rather than to continue hostilities, although the negotiations took far longer than
originally anticipated. Critics, however, have raised concerns that the Santos Administration gave
away too many concessions to the FARC in the final agreement.
The U.S. Congress remains deeply interested in the political future of Colombia, as the country
has become one of the United States’ closest allies in Latin America. Congress has expressed that
interest by its continued investment in Colombia’s security and stability. Over the years, the U.S.Colombian relationship has broadened from counternarcotics to include humanitarian concerns;
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justice reform and human rights; and economic development, investment, and trade. However,
Colombia is and has long been a major source country of cocaine and heroin, and drug trafficking
has helped to perpetuate civil conflict by funding both left-wing and right-wing armed groups.
Colombia, in close collaboration with the United States, through a broad strategy known as Plan
Colombia begun in 2000, made significant progress in reestablishing government control over
much of its territory, combatting drug trafficking and terrorist activities, and reducing poverty.
Between FY2000 and FY2016, the U.S. Congress appropriated more than $10 billion in
assistance to carry out Plan Colombia and its follow-on strategies.
Even with the peace accord completed with the FARC, two other illegal armed groups persist: the
National Liberation Army (ELN), whose armed combatants are estimated to number fewer than
2,000, and the criminal groups that sprang up following the demobilization of Colombia’s rightwing paramilitaries, who officially demobilized a decade ago. Some of these actors have signaled
an interest in taking over former FARC territory and criminal activities in a post-accord
environment. However, the ELN has been in preparatory peace talks with the Santos
Administration for more than a year, and both parties anticipate they may start formal peace talks
in 2017.
Precise costs of the government-FARC peace accord’s implementation remain elusive but may
exceed $30 billion over the next decade. With the tightening of U.S. foreign aid budgets and
increasing nationalization of Plan Colombia-related programs since 2008, U.S. foreign assistance
to Colombia has been on the decline. President Obama proposed a new “post-peace accord”
approach to U.S.-Colombian cooperation, called Peace Colombia (sometimes referred to in
Spanish as Paz Colombia) totaling $450 million of support, $391 million of which the Obama
Administration requested in its FY2017 congressional budget justification.
President Santos has continued the market-oriented, economic policies of prior administrations.
During his first term, the U.S. Congress approved the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement,
which went into force in April 2012. The United States is Colombia’s top trade partner. Colombia
has become an increasingly attractive location for foreign direct investment. After several years of
annual growth exceeding 4%, one of the strongest and steadiest expansion rates in the region,
Colombia’s growth rate declined to 3.1% in 2015 and is projected to slow to slightly below 2% in
2016. The decline is largely attributed to lower earnings from energy exports. Colombia’s uneven
development, high levels of rural poverty, and concentrated land ownership have contributed to
its half century of internal conflict.
Key Policy Issues: In December 2016, Congress enacted a continuing resolution (P.L. 114-254)
that funded foreign assistance to Colombia at slightly below the FY2016 level ($300 million)
through April 28, 2017, after the 115th Congress takes office. Members of the U.S. Congress may
want to assess if Peace Colombia or another type of post-accord program can help Colombia to
secure a sustainable peace. According to Secretary of State John Kerry, effectively implementing
the peace accord in Colombia would meet regional goals to stabilize the region and offer a return
on a prior U.S. investment in Plan Colombia. However, some observers, weighing the global
demands for U.S. assistance, could determine that Colombia, as an upper-middle-income country
with considerable capacity, may be able to undertake such reconstruction activities on its own.
For additional information, see CRS Report R43813, Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations,
by (name redacted)
; CRS Report R42982, Colombia’s Peace Process Through 2016, by (name re
dacted); CRS Report RL34470, The U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Background and
Issues, by (name redacted)
.
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Cuba
Cuba remains a one-party communist state with a poor record on human rights. The country’s
political succession in 2006 from the long-ruling Fidel Castro to his brother Raúl was
characterized by a remarkable degree of stability. In 2013, Raúl began his second and final fiveyear term, which is scheduled to end in February 2018, when he would be 86 years of age. Castro
has implemented a number of market-oriented economic policy changes over the past several
years. An April 2016 Cuban Communist Party congress endorsed the current gradual pace of
Cuban economic reform. Few observers expect the government to ease its tight control over the
political system. While the government has released most long-term political prisoners, shortterm detentions and harassment have increased significantly over the past several years.
Congress has played an active role in shaping policy toward Cuba, including the enactment of
legislation strengthening and at times easing various U.S. economic sanctions. U.S. policy over
the years has consisted largely of isolating Cuba through economic sanctions, while a second
policy component has consisted of support measures for the Cuban people, including U.S.
government-sponsored broadcasting and support for human rights and democracy projects.
In December 2014, President Obama announced a major shift in U.S. policy toward Cuba,
moving away from a sanctions-based policy toward one of engagement and a normalization of
relations. The President maintained that the United States would continue to raise concerns about
democracy and human rights in Cuba, but he emphasized that the United States could do more
through engagement than isolation. The policy change included talks to restore diplomatic
relations (relations were reestablished in July 2015); a review of Cuba’s designation as a state
sponsor of international terrorism (Cuba’s designation was rescinded in May 2015); and an
increase in travel, commerce, and the flow of information to Cuba. In order to implement this
third step, the Treasury and Commerce Departments eased the embargo regulations five times
(most recently in October 2016) in such areas as travel, remittances, trade, telecommunications,
and financial services. The overall embargo, however, remains in place, and can only be lifted
with congressional action or if certain conditions in Cuba are met, including that a democratically
elected government is in place. With the goal of advancing the normalization process, President
Obama visited Cuba in March 2016, the first visit of a U.S. President to Cuba in almost 90 years.
The outlook for U.S. policy toward Cuba under President-elect Trump is uncertain. Statements
from the President-elect, including in the aftermath of Fidel Castro’s death in late November
2016, suggest that he might reverse some of the policy changes of the Obama Administration.
Key Policy Issues: The Obama Administration’s shift in Cuba policy spurred strong interest in
Congress. Some Members lauded the initiative as in the best interest of the United States and a
better way to support change in Cuba, while others criticized the President for not obtaining more
concessions from Cuba to advance human rights and protect U.S. interests. In the 114th Congress,
numerous legislative initiatives were introduced on both sides of the policy debate. In 2015, five
FY2016 House appropriations bills had Cuba provisions that would have blocked some of the
Administration’s policy changes and introduced new economic sanctions, and one Senate
appropriations bill had provisions that would have eased certain economic sanctions. Ultimately,
none of these provisions were included in the FY2016 omnibus appropriations measure, P.L. 114113.
In 2016, three House FY2017 appropriations measures (Commerce, H.R. 5393; Financial
Services, H.R. 5485; and Homeland Security, H.R. 5634) had provisions that would have blocked
some of the Cuba policy changes, and one FY2017 Senate appropriations measure (Financial
Services, S. 3067) would have lifted certain sanctions, including restrictions on travel and
financing for agricultural exports. The Senate version of the FY2017 foreign aid appropriations
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bill, S. 3117, would have funded additional personnel costs for the U.S. Embassy in Cuba and the
Administration’s $15 million request for democracy programs, whereas the House version, H.R.
5912, would have prohibited assistance for expanding the U.S. diplomatic presence in Cuba and
provided $30 million for democracy programs. Ultimately, in December 2016, Congress enacted
a continuing resolution (P.L. 114-254), without any of the Cuba provisions noted above, which
funded foreign aid appropriations through April 28, 2017, at the FY2016 level minus a reduction
of about 0.2%.
With regard to the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, the FY2016 NDAA, P.L. 11492, and the FY2016 omnibus appropriations measure, P.L. 114-113, Division J, had provisions
prohibiting FY2016 funding to close the naval station. The FY2016 NDAA also prohibited
funding to modify a 1934 treaty in such a way that constructively closes the naval station. These
provisions were continued in the FY2017 military construction appropriations measure (Division
A of P.L. 114-223) and the FY2017 NDAA, P.L. 114-328. The FY2017 NDAA also prohibits
FY2017 Department of Defense funding to invite, assist, or otherwise assure the participation of
Cuba in certain joint or multilateral exercises.
Numerous other freestanding bills introduced in the 114th Congress would have lifted or eased
sanctions, whereas other bills would have increased restrictions on engagement with Cuba.
For additional information, see CRS Report R43926, Cuba: Issues and Actions in the 114th
Congress, by (name redacted) ; CRS In Focus IF10045, Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview, by (name re
dacted) ; CRS Insight IN10616, Fidel Castro’s Death: Implications for Cuba and U.S. Policy, by
(name redacted) ; CRS Insight IN10466, President Obama’s Historic Visit to Cuba, by (name re
dacted) ;CRS Report R43888, Cuba Sanctions: Legislative Restrictions Limiting the
Normalization of Relations, by (name redacted) and (name redacted)
; CRS Report RL31139,
Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances, by (name redacted) ; CRS Report R44119,
U.S. Agricultural Trade with Cuba: Current Limitations and Future Prospects, by (name re
dacted)
; CRS Legal Sidebar WSLG1586, House Approves Measure to Prevent Return of
GTMO to Cuba without Congress’s Say So, by (name redacted) ; and CRS Report R44137, Naval
Station Guantanamo Bay: History and Legal Issues Regarding Its Lease Agreements, by (name red
acted) and (name redacted) .
Guatemala
In what many observers see as a remarkable step forward for its democratic development,
Guatemala’s judicial system investigated government corruption, leading to the resignation and
arrest of its president and vice-president in 2015. Guatemala then proceeded lawfully and
peacefully to form an interim government and hold elections, and transferred power to a newly
elected president, Jimmy Morales, in January 2016. In addition to corruption, some of the greatest
challenges President Morales faces include high levels of crime, impunity, and poverty.
Guatemala’s income inequality is among the most extreme in Latin America.
Morales presented his General Government Policy for 2016-2020 in February 2016. The pillars of
this plan are zero tolerance for corruption; modernization of the state; food security and nutrition;
overall health and quality education; promotion of micro, small, and medium enterprises
(MSMEs); tourism and housing construction; and the environment and natural resources. In his
first months in office, Morales’ administration has been developing tax reform policies. He has
also placed experienced professionals in key finance, tax, and economic positions. His Health
Minister tendered his resignation in July 2016, however, reportedly saying the government was
not resolving the health care crisis, in which hospitals have severe shortages of medicine and
other supplies.
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Some observers have criticized the Morales Administration for failing to transfer allocated funds
to certain elements of the government. In 2016, the Guatemalan Finance Ministry did not transfer
funds to direct cash transfer programs that support some of Guatemala’s poorest people until
more than midway through the year. According to Attorney General Thelma Aldana, the lack of
funding for her Public Ministry limits her office’s ability to do its work. The Public Ministry has
been aggressively investigating corruption, human rights, and other cases. Aldana believes that a
threat made against was a response by organized crime to her efforts to dismantle corruption
networks.
In 2015, Aldana and the U.N.-backed International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala
(CICIG) uncovered a corruption ring at the national tax agency leading to the resignations and
arrests of then-President Otto Perez Molina and his vice president. Since then, authorities have
arrested and charged more than 200 officials at all levels for corruption. In March 2016, the
Public Ministry successfully prosecuted the first case for sexual violence committed during the
civil war.
In March 2016, a judge seized and made public previously unknown documents detailing
information about military counterinsurgency objectives, operations, and campaigns from 1983 to
1990. Since the Peace Accords were signed in 1996, the Guatemalan army has repeatedly denied
that such documents existed. President Morales generated controversy by planning to revive a
traditional army parade that has been suspended for almost a decade out of respect for the
memory of victims of the 1960-1996 civil war. (A 1998 truth and reconciliation report
documented over 54,000 cases of human rights violations, 90% of which it said were committed
by the army and amounted to genocide of the indigenous population.) At a scaled-down version
of the parade, Morales lauded the military as an exemplary institution. The Public Ministry is
currently investigating Edgar Ovalle, one of the president’s top advisors and a former military
officer, for his role in military operations where massacres occurred during the 1980s. In
December 2016, a court barred Ovalle, who is currently a legislator, from leaving the country
while the investigation is ongoing.
Key Policy Issues: While many see the corruption charges as a crisis, others—including many
within the Guatemalan government—also see them as an opportunity to make the government
more honest and accountable. Congress has approved aid to strengthen Guatemalan institutions as
well as placed conditions on aid based on human rights and other concerns for years, and has
supported CICIG. As noted above in the section on “Central America,” the FY2016 omnibus
appropriations measure (P.L. 114-113) provided up to $750 million to Guatemala, El Salvador,
and Honduras to address root causes of migration to the United States. Congress conditioned the
release of part of the aid package on those governments taking effective steps to combat
corruption, prosecute security forces for human rights violations, and other actions. In December
2016, a bipartisan group of Members of Congress wrote Attorney General Aldana and the
Attorneys General of El Salvador and Honduras lauding their work fighting corruption and
organized crime and pledging to push for continued assistance to their offices in coming years.
For additional information, see CRS Report R43702, Unaccompanied Children from Central
America: Foreign Policy Considerations, coordinated by (name redacted)
; and CRS In Focus
IF10371, U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America: Background and FY2017 Budget
Request, by (name redacted) and (name redacted)
.
Haiti
Haiti has been without an elected president since February 2016, but a newly elected president,
Jovenel Moise, is scheduled to take office on February 7, 2017. In 2015, after the Haitian
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government failed to complete a cycle of elections, including a second round of presidential
voting at the end of the year, former President Michel Martelly ended his term without an elected
successor to take his place. The legislature named an interim president, Jocelerme Privert, to
ensure that second-round presidential elections took place in April 2016 and a new president was
installed in May. Privert established a verification commission to investigate opposition party
charges of electoral fraud; the commission called for the first round of the presidential election to
be re-held. Meanwhile, Privert’s term expired on June 14, and the Haitian legislature repeatedly
failed to vote on extending his mandate or appointing another provisional president. The Obama
Administration said it would continue to recognize Privert until another official is named. The
electoral commission scheduled new elections for October 2016; because of Hurricane Matthew,
they were postponed until November 20.
Haiti re-held presidential elections on November 20, 2016. Preliminary results showed Jovenel
Moise of the Bald Head Party (PHTK, former President Michel Martelly’s party) winning with
almost 56% of the vote. Voter turnout was 21%. The next three candidates filed complaints, but
after a formal appeals process, the provisional electoral council (CEP) confirmed Moise’s firstround victory, and he is expected to be inaugurated on February 7, 2017. Runoff elections for
some parliamentary and local elections will be held on January 29, 2017.
January 12, 2016, marked the sixth anniversary of the earthquake that devastated Haiti’s capital.
Haiti continues to make progress in its overall recovery effort, but enormous challenges remain.
Criticism abounds that reconstruction aid and efforts are moving too slowly, contributing to
mounting public frustration with international donors and the government.
The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) has helped restore order since
2004. The mission has facilitated elections, initiated efforts against gangs and drug trafficking
with the Haitian National Police, and responded to natural disasters. MINUSTAH has been
criticized because of sexual abuse by some of its forces and scientific findings that its troops
apparently introduced cholera to the country. The U.N. says it will not compensate cholera
victims, citing diplomatic immunity. MINUSTAH has also been decreasing its number of troops
on the island. Consequently, for the first time, the Haitian National Police had primary
responsibility for election security in 2015.
To enhance citizen security, donors have encouraged Haiti to focus on further strengthening the
Haitian National Police. Despite opposition at home and abroad, former President Martelly took
steps to recreate an army, which was abolished in 1995 after decades of gross violations of human
rights and repeated coups.
The Dominican Republic ended its “immigrant regularization” process in June 2015. Since then
tens of thousands of Dominican-born people of Haitian descent have relocated to Haiti, some out
of fear of or intimidation by Dominican communities or authorities, increasing bilateral tensions.
The Dominican Republic extended the period of registration to regularize the migration status of
migrants for one year in July 2016. (Also see “Migration Issues,” above.)
The main priorities for U.S. policy regarding Haiti are to strengthen fragile democratic processes,
continue to improve security, and promote economic development. Other issues include the cost
and effectiveness of continued U.S. aid; protecting human rights; combating narcotics, arms, and
human trafficking; and alleviating poverty. Congress shares these concerns. The United States
contributed $33 million for the electoral cycle that began in 2015, assuming three rounds of
elections—a legislative first round, a simultaneous legislative second round and presidential first
round, and a presidential second round. The State Department announced in early July 2016 that
it would not provide any additional funding for the electoral process but that this did not “signal a
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reduction in U.S. support for the people or development of Haiti.”48 The Haitian government has
said it will find the funds needed to hold the elections.
The Obama Administration granted TPS to Haitians living in the United States at the time of the
2010 earthquake, and has extended it on a yearly basis since then. The DHS began to implement
the Haitian Family Reunification Parole Program in early 2015 for Haitian relatives of U.S.
citizens or permanent residents. Because this program expedites reunification only for those
scheduled to receive their entry visas within two years, only a small portion of all Haitians
approved for residency will benefit from the program.
The Assessing Progress in Haiti Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-162) directs the Secretary of State to
coordinate and transmit to Congress a three-year strategy for Haiti that includes specific steps and
benchmarks for assistance, and to report to Congress annually through December 31, 2017, on the
status of specific aspects of post-earthquake recovery and development efforts in Haiti. The State
Department submitted its first two reports in January of 2015 and 2016.
Key Policy Issues: In the FY2016 omnibus appropriations measure (P.L. 114-113), Congress
focused on the strengthening of Haitian democratic institutions and concerns over corruption and
transparency in Haiti. The law prohibits assistance to the central government of Haiti unless the
Secretary of State certifies that Haiti “is taking effective steps” to hold free and fair parliamentary
elections and seat a new Haitian Parliament; strengthen the rule of law, including by selecting
judges in a transparent manner; respect judicial independence; improve governance by
implementing reforms to increase transparency and accountability; combat corruption; and
increase government revenues and expenditures on public services. The State Department has
stated that it does not provide any direct assistance to the Haitian government.
For the remainder of the 114th Congress, congressional attention focused on Haiti’s completion of
its long-overdue elections cycle, and monitoring political tensions and their possible impact on
development and stability. A long-standing interest of Congress has been the promotion of Haiti’s
economic development.
For background information, see CRS In Focus IF10440, Haiti Declares Winner of Presidential
Election After Delays, by (name redact ed)
; CRS In Focus IF10502, Haiti: Cholera, the
United Nations, and Hurricane Matthew, by (name redact ed) and (name redact
ed)
;
and CRS Report R42559, Haiti Under President Martelly: Current Conditions and Congressional
Concerns, by (name redact ed)
.
Mexico
Congress has maintained interest in Mexico, a top trade partner and energy supplier with which
the United States shares a nearly 2,000-mile border and strong cultural, familial, and historical
ties. Economically, the United States and Mexico are heavily interdependent, and the U.S.
economy could benefit if Mexico is able to regain currency stability, fully implement the reforms
its legislature has enacted, and attract greater investment. Similarly, security conditions in Mexico
affect U.S. national security, particularly along the U.S.-Mexican border.
President Enrique Peña Nieto, former governor of the state of Mexico, is in the fifth year of his
six-year term and is ineligible for reelection. During 2013, President Peña Nieto shepherded
structural reforms through a fragmented Mexican Congress by forming an agreement among his
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), the conservative National Action Party (PAN), and the
48
U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, July 7, 2016.
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leftist Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). The reforms addressed a range of issues,
including education, te
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