North Korea: Back on the State Sponsors of Terrorism List?
Congressional research reportJan 21, 2015
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North Korea: Back on the State Sponsors of
Terrorism List?
-name redactedSpecialist in Asian Affairs
-name redactedSpecialist in Asian Affairs
-name redactedSpecialist in Foreign Policy Legislation
-name redactedAnalyst in Asian Affairs
-name redactedSpecialist in Terrorism and National Security
January 21, 2015
Congressional Research Service
7-....
www.crs.gov
R43865
North Korea: Back on the State Sponsors of Terrorism List?
Summary
From 1988 until 2008, the United States designated the government of North Korea, officially
known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), as a state sponsor of terrorism.
The Reagan Administration designated the DPRK after it was implicated in the 1987 bombing of
a South Korean airliner, in which more than 100 people died. The George W. Bush
Administration removed the designation from the DPRK in 2008, one of the measures the United
States took in exchange for North Korea’s agreement to take steps to disable its nuclear program.
As of early 2015, only the governments of Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria remain on the lists.
The State Department can designate a government as a state sponsor of acts of international
terrorism pursuant to three laws: the Export Administration Act of 1979; the Arms Export Control
Act; and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Thus, there effectively are three state sponsors of
terrorism “lists.” The State Department can use a variety of criteria when assessing whether a
government should be added to and removed from the lists. In North Korea’s case, policy
considerations appear to have weighed heavily in the designation of the DPRK from 1988-2007,
as well as in the decision to remove the designation in 2008. In the 114th Congress, H.R. 204
expresses the sense of Congress that the State Department should redesignate the DPRK as a state
sponsor of terrorism.
According to the State Department, North Korea has not been conclusively linked to any terrorist
acts since 1987. Some observers have questioned the Department’s claim. These observers
support their contention by citing seizures of cargo ships carrying North Korean missile parts and
conventional weapons, apparently to Syria and Burma (Myanmar). U.S. government agencies
have stated that North Korea helped Syria build a nuclear reactor, and that North Korea and Iran
cooperate closely in missile development. According to press reports, North Korea has provided
support to Hamas and Hezbollah, and has targeted North Korean refugees living overseas for
kidnapping and assassination. The 2010 sinking of a South Korean naval vessel also triggered
calls to redesignate the DPRK. To date, cyber-related incidents such as the late 2014 attack on
Sony have not been used as justification for designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. The 2009
and 2013 seizures of chemical protection equipment bound for Syria appear to be the only DPRK
actions since 2008 that both (1) were recognized by official U.S. or U.N. bodies, and (2)
conceivably could have met the statutory criteria for designation.
Redesignating the DPRK as a terrorism sponsor appears unlikely to inflict significant direct
economic punishment on North Korea, particularly in the short term. However, a decision to
redesignate North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism could have a significant impact on
international diplomacy with North Korea. The Kim regime could perceive redesignation as a
threat to its two-track policy of nuclear development and economic development, with the latter
goal partially dependent upon influxes of foreign investment. Placing North Korea back on the
lists could forestall future diplomatic initiatives between Washington and Pyongyang, particularly
if North Korean leaders—as well as Chinese leaders—interpret it as a sign that the United States
is not interested in dialogue. Given previous patterns of North Korean behavior, it is possible that
Pyongyang would respond to a redesignation by taking additional provocative actions, such as
more nuclear-weapon or long-range-missile tests. North Korea has not conducted such tests since
early 2013. Returning Pyongyang to the terrorism sponsor lists also could complicate the South
Korean government’s initiatives to improve relations with North Korea. Assessing the merits of
these implications depends heavily on whether or not one believes the United States should adopt
a harsher stance toward Pyongyang.
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North Korea: Back on the State Sponsors of Terrorism List?
Contents
Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1
Possible Implications of Redesignating North Korea ...................................................................... 1
Nuts and Bolts of the Sponsors of Terrorism Lists .......................................................................... 3
Listing a Country as a State Sponsor of Terrorism .................................................................... 3
Restrictions as a Result of Terrorism Designation..................................................................... 5
Removing the State Sponsor of Terrorism Designation ............................................................ 7
Brief History of the Diplomacy over North Korea’s Removal............................................ 7
Actions Since 2008 Not Deemed Sufficient for Redesignating North Korea ........................... 8
Does a Cyberattack Equate to an Act of “Terrorism?” The 2014 Hacking of Sony Pictures .......... 9
Questions About North Korea’s Relationship with Terrorists, State Sponsors of Terrorism,
and Terrorist Activities................................................................................................................ 11
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 14
Tables
Table 1. Restrictions on U.S. Interaction with Any Foreign Government Designated as a
State Sponsor of Terrorism ........................................................................................................... 6
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 15
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North Korea: Back on the State Sponsors of Terrorism List?
Introduction
From 1988 until 2008, the State Department designated the government of North Korea, officially
known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), as a state sponsor of terrorism.
Since the Bush Administration’s October 2008 removal of the DPRK from the three state
sponsors of terrorism lists (see “Listing a Country as a State Sponsor of Terrorism,” below),
provocative actions by North Korea periodically have been followed by calls for the Obama
Administration to redesignate Pyongyang as a terrorism sponsor. The state sponsors lists include
governments that the Secretary of State determines have “repeatedly provided support for acts of
international terrorism.”1 As of January 2015, the governments of Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria
are on the lists.
The calls to redesignate North Korea were particularly intense in 2010, following the sinking of a
South Korean naval vessel, as well as in late 2014, following a cyberattack against Sony Pictures
Entertainment and a threat against theater-goers to Sony’s movie, The Interview. The film depicts
the fictional assassination of North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un. U.S. and foreign government
sources have implicated North Korea in all three incidents. Interdictions of North Korean missile
and conventional arms shipments to Iran and Syria, and from Cuba—as well as reports of North
Korean arms sales to and training of known terrorist actors such as Hezbollah and Hamas—also
have fueled the calls to redesignate the DPRK government as a state sponsor of terrorism.
Since 2008, Members of Congress have made several legislative attempts to challenge the Bush
Administration’s decision to remove North Korea’s state sponsor of terrorism designation. In the
114th Congress, H.R. 204 expresses the sense of Congress that the Secretary of State should
redesignate North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism. H.R. 1771, the North Korea Sanctions
Enforcement Act from the 113th Congress, would have imposed many of the restrictions on the
DPRK that would be triggered if it were redesignated as a state sponsor of terrorism. The House
passed H.R. 1771 in July 2014, and many expect that a similar bill will be introduced in the 114th
Congress.
Possible Implications of Redesignating North Korea
The Bush Administration’s removal of the DPRK from the state sponsor of terrorism lists does
not appear to have provided Pyongyang with significant tangible economic benefits. Two main
reasons are North Korea’s widely perceived lack of appeal as a trade and investment partner and
the numerous U.S. legal restrictions on doing business with and in North Korea.2 Commercial
U.S.-DPRK trade has remained virtually at zero, as in the years before the delisting. The U.S.
Department of Commerce continues to treat North Korea as a supporter of terrorism when it
considers export license applications for dual-use and restricted goods and services; Commerce’s
Bureau of Industry and Security keeps North Korea in its most restricted trade categories. Annual
foreign assistance appropriations laws continue to prohibit direct bilateral aid to North Korea; the
United States withholds contributions to United Nations programs proportionate to U.N. spending
1
Sec 6(j)(1)(A) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-72; 50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)(1)(A)); Section 40 of
the Arms Export Control Act (P.L. 90-629; 22 U.S.C. 2780(d)); and Section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 (P.L. 87-195; (22 U.S.C. 2371)).
2
See CRS Report R41438, North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions, by (name redacted).
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North Korea: Back on the State Sponsors of Terrorism List?
in the DPRK. Although some U.S. companies, including DHL and the Associated Press, have
opened offices in North Korea since 2008, the number and scope of these operations appear to be
small in scale, and likely would require a special license from the Treasury Department’s Office
of Foreign Assets Control if the North Korean government is redesignated. Thus, redesignating
the DPRK as a terrorism sponsor appears unlikely to inflict significant direct economic
punishment on North Korea, particularly in the short term. However, even if redesignation
directly causes only a small practical effect, North Korea-watchers who want to increase pressure
on North Korea may favor such a move because the Kim regime likely would perceive it as a sign
of a tougher U.S. approach.
For a number of reasons, a decision to redesignate the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism could
have a significant impact on diplomacy with North Korea. The Kim regime has been promoting a
two-track policy (the so-called byungjin line) of nuclear development and economic development,
with the latter goal partially dependent upon influxes of foreign investment. Some analysts of
North Korea have pointed to signs that the Kim regime is pursuing economic reforms more
earnestly than commonly is thought and is poised to accelerate the reforms in 2015.3 The DPRK
could be particularly sensitive to a redesignation, which could be perceived as a threat to the
potential economic gains the North Korean government expects from its byungjin policy.4
Therefore, those who wish to encourage North Korea’s economic reforms, in the belief that they
eventually would lead to changes in the government and/or the government’s behavior, may
oppose redesignating the DPRK. In contrast, those who wish to increase economic pressure on
North Korea by undercutting the byungjin line may favor redesignating the DPRK. For more on
U.S.-North Korea relations, see CRS Report R41259, North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear
Diplomacy, and Internal Situation, by (name redacted) and (name redacted).
Placing North Korea back on the lists could forestall any future diplomatic initiatives between the
United States and North Korea.5 One of North Korea’s long-standing foreign policy goals is
improving relations with the United States, particularly if this can be accomplished on
Pyongyang’s terms and can be paired with economic benefits. Many analysts interpreted
Pyongyang’s decision in the fall of 2014 to release three U.S. detainees as a sign that North Korea
is seeking a new diplomatic breakthrough with Washington, part of a broad outreach that also
included overtures to South Korea, Japan, and Russia. Redesignation could be interpreted by
North Korean leaders, as well as officials in other countries, as a sign that the Obama
Administration is not interested in dialogue. Additionally, given previous patterns of North
Korean behavior, it is possible that Pyongyang would respond to a redesignation by taking
additional provocative actions, such as more nuclear-weapon or long-range-missile tests. North
Korea has not conducted such tests since early 2013.
Additionally, North Korean leaders might try to use a redesignation to convince other countries,
particularly China, that the United States is to blame if tensions between Pyongyang and
3
See, for instance, “Change Is in the Air in North Korea,” NK News.com, December 9, 2014.
One proponent of redesignating the DPRK goes further, arguing that it would “send a powerful signal” to current and
prospective lenders, investors, and businesses people that doing business with North Korea is “politically and
financially risky.” “What Re-Listing N. Korea as a State Sponsor of Terrorism Would Mean,” Free Korea blog,
December 22, 2014, http://freekorea.us/2014/12/22/what-re-listing-n-korea-as-a-state-sponsor-of-terrorism-wouldmean/#sthash.3qX3NlVj.dpuf.
5
“What Re-Listing N. Korea as a State Sponsor of Terrorism Would Mean,” Free Korea blog, December 22, 2014,
http://freekorea.us/2014/12/22/what-re-listing-n-korea-as-a-state-sponsor-of-terrorism-would-mean/
#sthash.3qX3NlVj.dpuf.
4
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North Korea: Back on the State Sponsors of Terrorism List?
Washington increase. Even without encouragement from North Korea, China may be inclined to
use redesignation as a pretext for opposing U.S. and South Korean efforts to increase pressure on
North Korea through other means. Although the South Korean government of Park Geun-hye has
maintained a relatively hard line towards North Korea, she has made improved relations with
Pyongyang a signature goal for her term and has pressed North Korea to improve relations and
open negotiations over various issues. Returning Pyongyang to the terrorism sponsor list could
complicate these initiatives, particularly her desire to encourage multinational companies to
invest in the inter-Korean Kaesong Industrial Complex, which operates in North Korea.
Nonetheless, many people in South Korea—as well as in Japan—who favor adopting a tougher
approach to North Korea likely would welcome the DPRK’s redesignation as a terrorism sponsor.
One proponent of redesignating the DPRK argues that if the U.S. government explicitly links the
North Korean government to terrorism, it would give encouragement to North Korean refugees,
helping them to resist intimidation.6 North Korean refugees have become an important source of
information about and insights into North Korean politics, economics and society. Additionally,
some see these defectors as a means to spread news about the outside world into North Korea,
such as through operating radio stations in Seoul, some of which have received U.S. democracy
assistance funds. There have been reports that North Korean agents have targeted some refugees
for harassment, kidnapping, and assassination.
If redesignated, North Korea might make removal from the list a precondition for cooperation in
any future talks over its nuclear, missile, chemical, biological, or cyber weapons programs.
Redesignation could create both an obstacle to future talks and a possible bargaining lever for the
United States if negotiations restart.
Nuts and Bolts of the Sponsors of Terrorism Lists
CRS Report R43835, State Sponsors of Acts of International Terrorism—Legislative Parameters:
In Brief, by (name redacted), provides more information and analysis about the state sponsors
of terrorism lists.
Listing a Country as a State Sponsor of Terrorism
The Secretary of State can designate a government of a country as a state sponsor of acts of
international terrorism pursuant to three laws: Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of
1979;7 Section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act;8 and Section 620A of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961.9 Thus, there effectively are three state sponsors of terrorism “lists.” None of the
three Acts defines the overarching term “international terrorism.” However, Section 140 of the
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, in its requirement that the
Secretary of State report annually to Congress on foreign governments supporting international
6
“What Re-Listing N. Korea as a State Sponsor of Terrorism Would Mean,” Free Korea blog, December 22, 2014,
http://freekorea.us/2014/12/22/what-re-listing-n-korea-as-a-state-sponsor-of-terrorism-would-mean/
#sthash.3qX3NlVj.dpuf.
7
P.L. 96-72 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)).
8
P.L. 90-629 (22 U.S.C. 2780(d)).
9
P.L. 87-195 (22 U.S.C. 2371).
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North Korea: Back on the State Sponsors of Terrorism List?
terrorism, defines “terrorism” as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.... ”10 Criteria considered by the
Secretary of State when assessing whether a foreign government should be added to the lists
include, but are not limited to: supplying a terrorist organization with planning, training, logistics,
and lethal material support; providing direct or indirect financial assistance; abetting the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; or providing other types of assistance that could
provide material support for the terrorist organization’s activities. Supplying weapons or weapons
technology to governments designated as state sponsors of terrorism generally has not been
considered justification for designating the supplier government as a state sponsor of terrorism.
Laws that seek to deter weapons proliferation, however, might come into play.
The enumerated criteria do not specify the type of incidents or the level or duration of terrorism
related activities that might be considered by the Secretary of State when deciding whether or not
the United States should designate a foreign government as a state sponsor of terrorism. Some
analysts suggest that the ambiguity of the criteria may be purposeful insomuch as it would give
the Secretary of State and the President a great deal of discretion when weighing competing
policy and political implications associated with placing a government on the list.
In North Korea’s case, diplomatic and policy considerations appear to have weighed heavily in
the designation of the DPRK from 2000 to 2007, as well as in the decision to remove the
designation in 2008. Originally, the government of North Korea was added to the lists because it
was implicated in the in-flight bombing of Korean Air flight 858 on November 29, 1987, which
killed all 115 passengers and crew on board. For years before 2008 the State Department’s annual
reports on global terrorist activities stated that North Korea was not known to have sponsored any
terrorist acts since the Korean Air attack. However, the Department’s reports listed a number of
other factors that merited North Korea’s continuation on the state sponsors lists, including:
•
the abductions of Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s;
•
the harboring of several Japanese Red Army terrorists who participated in a jet
hijacking in 1970;
•
the failure to take “substantial steps” to cooperate in efforts to combat
international terrorism;
•
the maintenance of ties to terrorist groups; and
•
developing a capability to manufacture weapons of mass destruction that could
be acquired by other terrorist states or non-state entities.
In 2008, the Secretary of State removed North Korea from the lists despite little change in most of
the above conditions. Instead, the decision appears to have been made primarily for diplomatic
reasons: removing the government of North Korea from the terrorism lists was part of the 2007
deal that the Bush Administration made with Pyongyang as part of the Six-Party Talks seeking to
disable North Korea’s nuclear program.11 Under the 2007 deal, North Korea agreed to disable its
nuclear installations at the Yongbyon site and provide the other five countries with a “complete
and correct” declaration of its nuclear programs. Some analysts have argued that the subsequent
10
P.L. 100-204 (22 U.S.C. 2656f).
The Six-Party Talks involved China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States. They began in
2003 and were last held in 2008.
11
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North Korea: Back on the State Sponsors of Terrorism List?
collapse of the Six-Party process, along with North Korea’s advances in its nuclear programs,
have erased the original diplomatic justification for removing North Korea from the state sponsor
of terrorism lists.12
During a January 13, 2015, House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on North Korea, the State
Department’s Special Representative for North Korea Policy, Sung Kim, said that the Department
has an “ongoing process” to assess whether North Korea meets the criteria for being designated
as a state sponsor of terrorism.13
North Korean Agents’ Abductions of Japanese Citizens
From 2000 to 2008, both the Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations made progress on settling the Japanese
abduction issue a condition for North Korea’s removal from the state sponsors of terrorism lists. A key reason for
adding and then keeping the emphasis on the abductions issue appears to have been maintaining Japan’s support for
U.S. policy toward North Korea. Japan has made resolving the abductions issue a priority since the late 1990s, and it
is widely presumed that normalizing Japan-North Korean ties would be accompanied by Japan providing North Korea
with billions of dollars in aid, in recognition of the damage and suffering Imperial Japan inflicted during its rule of
Korea from 1910 to 1945. In various rounds of talks with North Korea, U.S. policy makers often have presumed that
Japanese aid would help fund any final settlement package.14 Linking the abductions issue to the state sponsors of
terrorism lists was one way to maintain Japanese support for U.S. negotiations with Pyongyang. At the same time,
when Tokyo has negotiated with Pyongyang over the abductions issue, keeping a firm linkage between the abductions
and the terrorism lists was a way U.S. officials sought to make sure that Japanese officials did not make compromises
on WMD issues in discussions with their North Korean counterparts.
By late 2007, in the context of negotiations over North Korea’s nuclear program, the Bush Administration had
dropped its linkage between the progress on the abductions and removal from the terrorism lists. The Bush
Administration’s 2008 decision to remove North Korea from the state sponsors of terrorism lists despite little
change in the abductions issue created considerable tension in U.S.-Japan relations.15 Since 2008, the Bush
Administration and then the Obama Administration have continued to publicly support Japan’s stance on the
abductions issue.16
Restrictions as a Result of Terrorism Designation17
A foreign government on the state sponsors of terrorism lists is subject to restrictions on trade,
investment, and assistance. (See Table 1.) A listed country is subject to U.S. export controls—
12
“What Re-Listing N. Korea as a State Sponsor of Terrorism Would Mean,” Free Korea blog, December 22, 2014,
http://freekorea.us/2014/12/22/what-re-listing-n-korea-as-a-state-sponsor-of-terrorism-would-mean/
#sthash.3qX3NlVj.dpuf.
13
U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Briefing: The North Korean Threat: Nuclear, Missiles and
Cyber, 114th Cong., 1st sess., January 13, 2015.
14
For more on the size of the economic package Japan is widely expected to offer if relations with North Korea are
normalized, see CRS Report RL32161, Japan-North Korea Relations: Selected Issues, by (name redacted).
15
On January 22, 2008, Dell Dailey, the State Department’s coordinator for counterterrorism reportedly stated that “it
appears that North Korea has complied with those criteria” for removal from the terrorism support list because North
Korea had not committed an act of terrorism for the past six months. He reportedly added that despite the unresolved
Japanese kidnapping issue, “we think that even with that on the table that they still comply with the ... delisting
criteria.” Arshad Mohammed, “N. Korea Seems to Meet US Criteria on Terror Listing,” Reuters, January 22, 2008.
16
For more information, see CRS Report RS22845, North Korea’s Abduction of Japanese Citizens and the Six-Party
Talks, by (name redacted).
17
For more details, see CRS Report R41438, North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions, by (name r
edacted).
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particularly of dual-use technology—and trade in defense goods and services is prohibited.
Placement on the list also may trigger denial of beneficial trade designation (such as normal trade
relations (NTR) or inclusion in the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program),18
unfavorable tax status for investors, and stricter licensing requirements for financing trade with
the United States in agriculture, medicine, and medical supplies. Providing most foreign aid under
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Millennium Challenge Act is also prohibited. There
are exceptions to address unanticipated humanitarian disasters; the United States provided
hundreds of millions of dollars in food, energy, and medical assistance to North Korea while
Pyongyang was on the terrorism lists.19 By law, the United States must oppose membership in and
financial assistance from international financial institutions—such as the World Bank, Asian
Development Bank, and the International Monetary Fund—for any foreign government on the
U.S. terrorism lists. Additionally, U.S. citizens are prohibited from conducting transactions with
designated governments without a license from the Office of Foreign Assets Control.
Table 1. Restrictions on U.S. Interaction with Any Foreign Government Designated
as a State Sponsor of Terrorism
Authority to
Impose
Restriction
Statutory Basis
Authority to Lift or Waive
Limits the export of
goods or technology
§6(j), Export
Administration Act of
1979 (50 U.S.C. App.
2405(j))
Secretary of State
Secretary of State, after the
President notifies Congress
Prohibits transactions
related to defense
articles and defense
services
§40, Arms Export
Control Act (22 U.S.C.
2780)
Secretary of State
Secretary of State, after the
President notifies Congress.
President may also waive per
each transaction. Congress may
block a rescission by joint
resolution
Prohibits most foreign
aid, agricultural aid,
Peace Corps
programs, ExportImport Bank funding
§620A, Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961
(22 U.S.C. 2371)
Secretary of State
Secretary of State, after the
President notifies Congress.
President may also waive if he
finds “that national security
interests of humanitarian reasons
justify a waiver.”
Denies Millennium
Challenge Account
funding
§607, Millennium
Challenge Act of 2003
(22 U.S.C. 7707)
Millennium Challenge
Corporation, though
based on
determination
pursuant to §620A,
Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961 (above)
No waiver; assessed each fiscal
year
Denies Export-Import
Bank financing
§2(b)(1)(B), ExportImport Bank Act of
1945 (12 U.S.C.
President
President
18
Extending NTR status, also known as “most favored nation” treatment, to North Korea would significantly reduce
U.S. tariffs on most imports from North Korea. The GSP program extends duty-free treatment to certain products that
are imported from designated developing countries.
19
For more information, see CRS Report R40095, Foreign Assistance to North Korea, by (name redacted) and (name
redacted). The assistance was channeled through United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations
operating in North Korea.
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Restriction
Statutory Basis
Authority to
Impose
Authority to Lift or Waive
635(b)(1)(B))
Opposes loans or
funding through
international financial
institutions
§1621, International
Financial Institutions
Act (22 U.S.C. 262p4q)
Secretary of the
Treasury, if a country
is listed under §6(j),
EAA, or §620A, FAA
Secretary of the Treasury (no
waiver authority)
Prohibits lethal military
equipment exports,
bilateral assistance
§7021, Department of
State, Foreign
Operations, and
Related Programs
Appropriations Act,
2015 (128 Stat. 2611)
President
President, if he finds it in the
national security interest, or for
humanitarian reasons
Prohibits financial
transactions with the
foreign government
18 U.S.C. 2332d
Secretary of State
Secretary of the Treasury (can
license activities)
Removing the State Sponsor of Terrorism Designation
There are two possible paths for removing a foreign government from designation as a state
sponsor of terrorism. The first procedure requires the President to provide a written certification
to Congress stating that there has been a fundamental change in the leadership and policies of the
designated government, that it is not supporting acts of international terrorism, and that the
current government leaders have given assurances to the United States that the country will not
support terrorism in the future. The second procedure, which the Bush Administration used in
North Korea’s case, requires the President to submit, 45 days prior to removing the designated
foreign government from the list, a written report to Congress certifying that it has not provided
support to terrorism-related activities during the preceding six months and that current
government leaders have provided assurances that it will not support terrorism-related activities
in the future.20 Congress may pass a joint resolution blocking a government’s removal from the
list, though such legislation would require the President’s signature to become law. In the 110th
Congress (2007-2008), Members introduced at least three measures objecting to the Bush
Administration’s delisting of the DPRK. None was enacted.21
Brief History of the Diplomacy over North Korea’s Removal
The issue of removing North Korea from the U.S. lists of state sponsors of terrorism appears to
have first become a significant issue in U.S.-North Korean diplomacy in 2000. In U.S.-DPRK
negotiations that year over North Korea’s long-range missile program, Pyongyang demanded that
it be removed from the list of terrorism-sponsoring governments as well as from the restrictions
required under the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA). The Clinton Administration reportedly
presented to North Korea in February 2000 four steps that North Korea would have to take to be
removed from the terrorism lists: (1) issue a written guarantee that it no longer is engaged in
terrorism; (2) provide evidence that it has not engaged in any terrorist act in the past six months;
20
State Department Press Spokesman, “Fact Sheet: Presidential Action on State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST) and the
Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA),” June 26, 2008. The removal came the same day North Korea issued a
declaration of elements of its plutonium nuclear program. The moves were part of a U.S.-North Korean agreement.
21
The three measures were S.Res. 399 (Brownback), H.R. 3650 (Ros-Lehtinen), and H.R. 6420 (Sherman).
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(3) join international anti-terrorism agreements; and (4) address issues of past support of
terrorism.22 Although the two countries issued a joint statement on September 27, 2000, in which
North Korea restated its opposition to terrorism, the issue largely lapsed in this phase of U.S.North Korean diplomacy, as the Clinton Administration rejected North Korean demands that it be
delisted.
The discussions were revisited in 2003-2004, during the first stages of the Six-Party Talks over
the North Korean nuclear issue. Removal from the terrorism support list was near the top of
North Korean demands for concessions that the United States provide in return for North Korean
concessions, such as a “freeze” of its plutonium nuclear programs. The Bush Administration
resisted these demands, giving significant emphasis to the Japanese abduction issue.
The final phase of negotiations over North Korea’s inclusion on the terrorism lists occurred in the
2006-2008 period, following North Korea’s first nuclear test in October 2006. In February 2007,
the six parties reached an agreement under which North Korea agreed to freeze and then disable
its nuclear programs, and the United States agreed to take steps that included removing North
Korea from the terrorism sponsor list. On January 22, 2008, Dell Dailey, the State Department’s
coordinator for counterterrorism, reportedly stated that it appeared that North Korea had complied
with the criteria for removal from the terrorism support lists because North Korea had not
committed an act of terrorism for the past six months. He added that despite the unresolved
Japanese kidnapping issue, “we think that even with that on the table that they still comply with
the ... delisting criteria.”23 Later that year, after considerable back-and-forth in the nuclear
negotiations, the Bush Administration removed North Korea from the terrorism sponsorship lists,
as well as from the TWEA strictures.
Actions Since 2008 Not Deemed Sufficient for Redesignating North
Korea
Since the United States removed North Korea from the terrorist list, Pyongyang has taken or been
linked to a number of actions that have led to calls to place the North Korean government back on
the list of state sponsors of terrorism. These actions have included multiple nuclear and missile
tests, in violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions, and the 2010 attacks against a
South Korean naval vessel, the Cheonan, and Yeonpyeong Island.24 Since 2008, the State
Department has responded to questions about whether to re-list North Korea by answering that
although North Korea’s actions are being continually reviewed, they do not fit the criteria for
inclusion on the list.25
22
Agence France-Presse (Hong Kong) report, February 8, 2000. Yonhap News Agency (Seoul) report, February 8,
2000.
23
Arshad Mohammed, “N. Korea Seems to Meet US Criteria on Terror Listing,” Reuters, January 22, 2008.
24
The Cheonan sank on March 26, 2010. All 46 South Korean sailors on the Cheonan died. A multinational team led
by South Korea investigated the sinking and determined that the ship was sunk by a North Korean submarine. The
cause of the Cheonan’s sinking has become highly controversial in South Korea. While most conservatives believe that
North Korea was responsible for explosion, many who lean to the left have criticized the investigation team as biased
or argue that its methodology was flawed. On November 23, 2010, North Korea fired over 150 shells toward the South
Korean island of Yeonpyeong-do, killing four South Koreans (two Marines and two civilians), wounded dozens, and
destroyed or damaged scores of homes and other buildings.
25
In May 2010, then-Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said that State Department “continually reviews North
Korea’s actions” to determine its actions meet the criteria for designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. A month later,
(continued...)
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North Korea: Back on the State Sponsors of Terrorism List?
For instance, in response to North Korea’s April 2009 long-range missile test and May 2009
nuclear weapon test, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs Philip Crowley said that North
Korea’s tests of a nuclear weapon and long-range missile (in April 2009) did not meet the legal
definition of terrorism.”26 In June 2010, following the determination that a North Korean
submarine had sunk the Cheonan, the State Department issued a press release indicating that
North Korea had not been placed back on the terrorism lists because it had not “repeated[ly]
provide[d] support for acts of international terrorism,” as required by statute.27 Furthermore,
Crowley said that the Department had determined that while the Cheonan’s sinking was a
violation of the 1953 armistice agreement that brought an end to the major fighting of the Korean
War, it was not an act of international terrorism because it was “taken by the military or the state
against the military of another state.” Therefore, Crowley said, the sinking “by itself would not
trigger placing North Korea on the state sponsor of terrorism list.” 28
Does a Cyberattack Equate to an Act of “Terrorism?”
The 2014 Hacking of Sony Pictures
Events in late 2014 again led to calls to redesignate the government of North Korea as a state
sponsor of terrorism. In June 2014 North Korean officials reacted to Sony Pictures
Entertainment’s forthcoming film, The Interview, about the fictional assassination of North
Korean leader Kim Jong-un. North Korea’s Foreign Ministry said that “a movie of a plot to hurt
our top-level leadership is the most blatant act of terrorism and war” and threatened a “merciless
countermeasure” if The Interview was released.29 On November 24, Sony Pictures Entertainment
experienced a cyberattack that disabled its IT systems, destroyed data, and released to the public
internal emails. North Korea denied involvement in the attack, but praised the hackers, who
called themselves the “Guardians of Peace,” as having done a “righteous deed.” Weeks later,
anonymous emails threatened “9/11-style” terrorist attacks on theaters showing the film, leading
some theaters to cancel screenings and subsequently to Sony’s cancelling the film’s scheduled
widespread Christmas Day release. In responding to the possibility of such attacks, Department of
Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson noted that the United States has “no specific, credible
intelligence of a plot to launch attacks on movie theaters.”30 Sony later announced the film would
be shown in a small number of theaters and available on some online streaming services.
(...continued)
State Department spokesman Philip Crowley said that there is a “never-ending” process of reviewing whether to re-list
North Korea, and that the Administration “will not hesitate to take action” if the Department determines that North
Korea has taken actions that “demonstrate a consistent support for international terrorism.” State Department, “Hillary
Rodham Clinton Briefing on the Republic of Korea for the Traveling Press Corps,” Beijing, China, May 24, 2010. State
Department, “Daily Press Briefing,” June 28, 2010.
26
State Department, “Press Briefing,” June 3, 2009.
27
State Department, “Question Taken at the June 23, 2010 Daily Press Briefing, North Korea: State Sponsor of
Terrorism?” June 28, 2010.
28
State Department, “Daily Press Briefing,” June 28, 2010.
29
Korean Central News Agency of DPRK, “DPRK FM Spokesman Blasts U.S. Moves to Hurt Dignity of Supreme
Leadership of DPRK,” June 25, 2014. North Korean pronouncements frequently use bombastic and threatening
language.
30
Andrew Grossman, “U.S. Weighs Options to Respond to Sony Hack, Homeland Security Chief Says,” Wall Street
Journal, December 18, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-weighs-options-to-respond-to-sony-hack-homelandsecurity-chief-says-1418926834.
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North Korea: Back on the State Sponsors of Terrorism List?
As concerns about the violent threats and challenge to freedom of expression grew in U.S. media,
the U.S. government more publicly weighed in on the incident. The Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), which had been investigating the cyberattacks, and the Director of National
Intelligence (DNI) declared that North Korean government was responsible for the intrusions into
Sony’s systems.31 During a December 19, 2014, press conference, President Obama pledged to
“respond proportionally” against North Korea.32 In an interview with CNN, Obama called the
incident “cyber-vandalism,” implying that it was not an act of war.33 On December 20, cyber
analysts and news media reported that the North Korean network providing access to the Internet
faltered and then eventually went offline for approximately 10 hours. Many cyber analysts said
the disruption pointed to an attack on North Korea’s network, although they could not rule out
either an overload or a preventive shutdown by North Korea. Two groups linked to the hacker
collective Anonymous claimed responsibility for shutting down North Korea’s Internet
connection using denial-of-service attacks.34 U.S. officials would not comment on whether this
constituted the “proportional response” promised by Obama. On January 2, 2015, the White
House issued an Executive Order authorizing additional sanctions on North Korean individuals
and entities, calling it a “first aspect” of its proportional response.
Pyongyang denied any responsibility for the cyberattack on Sony, and some cybersecurity experts
expressed skepticism that the North Korean government executed the attack,35 while others point
to evidence of growing North Korean capabilities in cyber warfare. The FBI claimed that the
Sony attack used the same malware as previous attacks attributed to North Koreans, but some
cyber experts say that evidence is circumstantial and speculative. Administration officials have
claimed that other intelligence used to make the determination is classified and unavailable for
public consumption.36 On January 7, 2015, at a cybersecurity conference in New York City, FBI
Director James Comey, in discussing whether North Korea was behind the cyberattack, stated
“There is not much in this life that I have high confidence about—I have very high confidence
about this attribution, as does the entire intelligence community.”37 At this same event DNI James
Clapper noted that this cyberattack was “the most serious ever against U.S. interests.”38
As of January 2015, a cyber-related incident directed at the United States has never been used as
justification for inclusion on the state sponsors of terrorism lists. It could be argued that current
laws relating to the state sponsor of terrorism lists may be viewed as sufficiently broad and
ambiguous to allow for the inclusion of cyber-based incidents as a designation criterion.
Conversely, it might be argued that the laws supporting the state sponsor of terrorism designation
were focused on physical acts of politically motivated violence and amendments to existing
31
FBI National Press Office, “Update on Sony Investigation,” December 19, 2014.
The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President in Year-End Press Conference,”
December 19, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/19/remarks-president-year-end-pressconference.
33
Eric Bradner, “Obama: North Korea’s Hack Not War, but ‘Cybervandalism,’” CNN, December 24, 2014,
http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/21/politics/obama-north-koreas-hack-not-war-but-cyber-vandalism.
34
Cecilia Kang, Drew Harwell, and Brian Fung, “North Korean Web Goes Dark Days After Obama Pledges Response
to Sony Hack,” Washington Post, December 22, 2014.
35
See, for instance, Kim Zetter, “The Evidence That North Korea Hacked Sony Is Flimsy,” Wired, December 17, 2014.
36
“U.S. Spies Say They Tracked ‘Sony Hackers’ for Years,” The Daily Beast. January 2, 2015.
37
Tal Kopan, “FBI: ‘Sloppy’ Sony Hackers Left Clues,” Politico, January 7, 2015, http://www.politico.com/story/
2015/01/james-comey-sony-hackers-114041.html.
38
“FBI: Sony Hackers ‘Sloppy,’ Used North Korean Servers,” VOA News, January 7, 2015, http://www.voanews.com/
content/fbi-sony-hackers-sloppy-used-north-korean-servers/2589224.html.
32
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North Korea: Back on the State Sponsors of Terrorism List?
legislation would be required to include unauthorized cyber-based intrusions of networks owned
by U.S. entities as a viable criterion. However, changing current legislation to include cyberrelated incidents as acts of terrorism could lead to calls for designating other governments as state
sponsors of terrorism. For instance, on May 19, 2014, the U.S. Department of Justice indicted
five Chinese military hackers for computer hacking and economic espionage directed at six
American victims in the U.S. nuclear power, metals, and solar products industries. In discussing
the details related to this indictment, U.S. Department of Justice Attorney General Eric Holder
stated “this is a case alleging economic espionage by members of the Chinese military and
represents the first ever charges against a state actor for this type of hacking.” 39 A suggestion to
add the government of China to the state sponsors of terrorism lists does not appear to have been
voiced after this incident.
Questions About North Korea’s Relationship with
Terrorists, State Sponsors of Terrorism, and Terrorist
Activities
Since 2003, the State Department’s annual report on global terrorist activities has stated that
North Korea has not been conclusively linked to any terrorist acts since the 1987 KAL bombing.40
Some observers have questioned the basis for the State Department’s claims.41 They point to
several pieces of evidence and reports, which generally fall in five categories. For more on North
Korea’s relationship with the Iranian, Syrian, and Libyan ballistic missile and nuclear programs,
see CRS Report R43480, Iran-North Korea-Syria Ballistic Missile and Nuclear Cooperation,
coordinated by (name redacted).
Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including:42
•
U.S. government statements that North Korea helped Syria build the Al Kibar
nuclear reactor, which Israel destroyed in 2007, and could have been used to
produce plutonium for nuclear weapons.43 Three seizures—in October 2009,
November 2009, and April 2013—of shipments of North Korean chemical
39
Attorney General Eric Holder, “U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military Hackers for Cyber Espionage Against U.S.
Corporations and a Labor Organization for Commercial Advantage,” Department of Justice, May 19, 2014,
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-five-chinese-military-hackers-cyber-espionage-against-us-corporations-andlabor.
40
State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism 2013, pp. 62-63, available at http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/
index.htm.
41
See, for instance, “North Korea and Terrorism, a Response to Micah Zenko,” Free Korea blog, January 3, 2014,
http://freekorea.us/category/terrorism/#sthash.IgPvtrSJ.dpuf.
42
Criteria that could be used to justify designation as a state sponsor of terrorism include actions that “willfully aid or
abet the international proliferation of nuclear explosive devices to individuals or groups, willfully aid or abet an
individual or groups in acquiring unsafeguarded special nuclear material, or willfully aid or abet the efforts of an
individual or group to use, develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire chemical, biological, or radiological
weapons.” Section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, P.L. 90-629 (22 U.S.C. 2780(d)).
43
For more on North Korea’s relationship with Syria, see CRS Report R43480, Iran-North Korea-Syria Ballistic
Missile and Nuclear Cooperation, coordinated by (name redacted).
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North Korea: Back on the State Sponsors of Terrorism List?
protective suits, gas indicator ampoules, and gas masks to Syria, which had an
active chemical weapons program.44
•
Press reports that North Korea and Iran are cooperating in developing nuclear
capabilities or nuclear weapons. U.S. officials have stated publicly that there is
no nuclear cooperation between Iran and North Korea.45
•
U.S. government statements that North Korea provided nuclear materials to
Libya in the early 2000s.46
Missile sales to and co-development with other countries, including:47
•
Long-standing statements by various U.S. government officials that North Korea
and Iran maintain a close working relationship on various missile programs,
including ballistic missile systems;48
•
U.S. government accounts of North Korea missile sales and transfers to Syria,
buttressed by the seizure by Japanese, South Korean, Thai and other government
authorities of North Korean missile parts heading to Syria and Burma
(Myanmar);49
Conventional arms sales and transfers, including:50
•
The July 2013 interdiction in Panama of the Chong Chon Gang, a North Korean
cargo ship carrying fighter aircraft parts and engines, surface-to-air missile parts,
ammunition, and other military equipment from Cuba. The Cuban government
claimed the materials were to be “repaired” in North Korea before being returned
to Cuba, though some analysts have expressed skepticism that some of the
weapons systems were meant to be returned;51 and
44
For more on Syria’s chemical weapons program, see CRS Report R42848, Syria’s Chemical Weapons: Issues for
Congress, coordinated by (name redacted).
45
For more on North Korea’s relationship with Iran, see CRS Report R43480, Iran-North Korea-Syria Ballistic Missile
and Nuclear Cooperation, coordinated by (name redacted).
46
According to a February 2013 Defense Department report, “North Korea provided Libya with uranium
hexafluoride,” which is the material fed into the uranium enrichment process. Military and Security Developments
Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea, February 15, 2013. A September 2011 International
Atomic Energy Agency report stated that “it is very likely that” natural uranium hexafluoride contained in a cylinder
that Libya received in 2001 via the A.Q. Khan network “originated in” North Korea (Application of Safeguards in the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, GOV/2011/53-GC(55)/24), September 2, 2011).
47
Supplying weapons and/or weapons technology to governments designated as state sponsors of terrorism lists
generally has not been considered justification for designating the supplier government as a state sponsor of terrorism.
Laws that seek to deter weapons proliferation, however, might come into play.
48
For a list of some of these statements, see CRS Report R43480, Iran-North Korea-Syria Ballistic Missile and
Nuclear Cooperation, coordinated by (name redacted).
49
See, for instance, United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to
Resolution 1874 (2009), S/2014/147, New York, NY, March 6, 2014, pp. 18-21, 32-33.
50
Supplying weapons or weapons technology to governments designated as state sponsors of terrorism lists generally
has not been considered justification for designating the supplier government as a state sponsor of terrorism. For
instance, other countries—including Russia, China, Ukraine, and Belarus—have supplied arms to Iran and have not
been added to the state sponsors of terrorism lists. Laws that seek to deter weapons proliferation, however, might come
into play. For more, see CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by (name redacted).
51
For a summary of the Chong Chon Gang case, as well as of reports of other cases of arms transfers between North
Korea and Cuba, see CRS Report R43024, Cuba: U.S. Policy and Issues for the 113th Congress, by (name redacted).
(continued...)
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North Korea: Back on the State Sponsors of Terrorism List?
•
Reports of North Korean arms shipments to Iran, as well as to Syria via Iran and
via Turkey.52
Ties to Hezbollah and Hamas, both of which the State Department has designated as foreign
terrorist organizations.53 See the text box below for more information.
Kidnapping, assassination, and other direct activities against civilians, including:
•
Accounts of attempted and successful assassinations and kidnappings of North
Korean refugees, critics of the DPRK, and foreigners attempting to help North
Koreans defect.54 Notable accounts include December 2014 news reports of
North Korean agents attempting to murder a North Korean refugee in Denmark,
2013 news reports of an attempt to kidnap a North Korean student in Paris, and
accounts of the abduction and murder of the Reverend Kim Dong-shik, a KoreanAmerican, in 2000.
(...continued)
See also United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874
(2009), S/2014/147, New York, NY, March 6, 2014, p. 26-9.
52
See United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874
(2009), S/2014/147, New York, NY, March 6, 2014, pp. 127-128.
53
See http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm for the State Department’s list of foreign terrorist
organizations.
54
See, for instance, Joshua Stanton, “North Korea Sponsors Terrorism,” The Weekly Standard, The Blog, August 13,
2013, http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/north-korea-sponsors-terrorism_748381.html.
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North Korea: Back on the State Sponsors of Terrorism List?
North Korea’s Ties to Hezbollah and Hamas
Analysts have reported several instances in the past decade of arms exports from North Korea to Iran and Syria,
which reportedly transferred the arms to Hezbollah and Hamas.55 It appears that Iran and Syria often served as
intermediaries and financiers, but some analysts argue that North Korea was aware that non-state terrorist groups
were the ultimate customer. Reportedly, the North Korean weapons largely consisted of 1980s-vintage conventional
arms, especially rockets and munitions. American and Israeli press reported that North Koreans advised Hezbollah in
the construction of tunnels in Southern Lebanon in 2003-2004.56 A U.S. district court determined in 2014 that North
Korea materially supported Hezbollah’s terrorist attacks on Israel in 2006.57
A 2014 review of unclassified material notes, “During [the 2008-2009 period], there appear to have been four
confirmed seizures of North Korean cargo en route to Iran or Syria, where Hamas or Hezbollah could have been the
end-users.”58 In 2009, a large shipment of North Korean conventional weapons allegedly bound for Hamas (and
possibly Hezbollah) was interdicted in Thailand. Three other seizures of North Korean arms bound for Iran or Syria
in the 2008-2009 period consisted of materiel that analysts believe was likely ultimately heading for Hamas or
Hezbollah. Analysts believe that the interdicted shipments constitute a minority of the actual arms exports from
North Korea to militant groups in the Middle East and North Africa.
A report from Britain’s Telegraph claimed that in the summer of 2014 Hamas sought to purchase rockets from North
Korea to replenish its stocks, and cited Israeli military commanders who apparently believe that North Korean
experts provided logistical advice on Hamas’s tunnel network.59 North Korea denied the report’s validity.60 Neither
the United States nor Israel or other countries have made official allegations regarding this alleged arms deal, but the
history of apparent Hamas-North Korea connections provides support for the claim’s plausibility, and past North
Korean dealings with Syria and Iran could have helped facilitate such connections. One open-source report from June
2014 has shown Hamas fighters using what appear to be North Korean anti-tank guided missiles.61 North Korea may
not have provided these arms directly, as Syria or Iran could have transferred the anti-tank missiles from their
stockpiles of arms previously purchased from North Korea.
Conclusion
Since the DPRK was removed from the state sponsors of terrorism lists in 2008, actions that
North Korea has taken and been accused of taking have fueled an ongoing discussion about
whether it should be re-listed. To date, cyber-related incidents such as the late 2014 attack on
Sony have not been used as justification for inclusion on the state sponsors of terrorism lists. The
2009 and 2013 seizures of chemical protection equipment bound for Syria appear to be the only
DPRK actions since 2008 that both (1) were recognized by official U.S. or U.N. bodies, and (2)
conceivably could have met the statutory criteria for relisting.
55
Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans, “North Korean Anti-Tank Missiles in the Middle East,” Arms Control Wonk blog,
June 25, 2014, http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/7370/oryx-blog-on-dprk-arms-exports. Bruce E. Bechtol, The
Last Days of Kim Jong-il: The North Korean Threat in a Changing Era (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2013), pp.
111-127.
56
See Bechtol (2013), op. cit., pp. 119-120.
57
The case of Chaim Kaplan v. Hezbollah was a civil action for damages pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act (“FSIA”) 28 U.S.C. §1602 et seq., against North Korea and Iran, https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/
show_public_doc?2010cv0483-54.
58
Andrea Berger, “North Korea, Hamas, and Hezbollah: Arm in Arm?,” 38North blog, U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS,
August 5, 2014, http://38north.org/2014/08/aberger080514.
59
Con Coughlin, “Hamas and North Korea in Secret Arms Deal,” Telegraph, July 26, 2014. North Korea is renowned
for its expertise in sophisticated tunneling projects.
60
Emily Rauhala, “North Korea Denies Selling Missiles to Hamas,” Time.com, July 29, 2014.
61
Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans, “North Korean Anti-Tank Missiles in the Middle East,” Arms Control Wonk blog,
June 25, 2014, http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/7370/oryx-blog-on-dprk-arms-exports.
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North Korea: Back on the State Sponsors of Terrorism List?
Official U.S. government and United Nations sources have concluded that the DPRK sold missile
parts and conventional weapons to a variety of countries, including a number of state sponsors of
terrorism. North Korea also has launched a conventional military attack against a South Korean
island that killed civilians, and has been implicated in a torpedo attack against a South Korean
naval vessel. However, none of these activities are included in the statutory criteria for adding a
government to the state sponsors of terrorism lists. The same is true of cyberattacks, such as the
2014 attack on Sony that rekindled the debate over whether to re-list the DPRK.
The North Korean government has been linked to a number of other actions—such as helping
designated terrorist organizations as well as conducting kidnappings and assassinations in foreign
countries—that some have argued should be grounds for returning the DPRK to the state sponsors
of terrorism lists. As of early 2015, the information to support these claims has not been presented
by the U.S. government. Of these alleged activities, perhaps the most significant are North
Korea’s reported weapons sales to and training of Hezbollah and Hamas.
As discussed earlier, historically, diplomatic and policy considerations appear to have played a
prominent role in the State Department’s decisions about the DPRK’s place on the state sponsors
of terrorism lists. Thus, even if the North Korean government’s actions are deemed to meet the relisting criteria, the State Department is likely to weigh the prospective positive and negative
consequences that re-listing would have on international diplomacy with North Korea.
Author Contact Information
(name redacted)
Specialist in Asian Affairs
[redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....
(name redacted)
Analyst in Asian Affairs
[redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....
(name redacted)
Specialist in Asian Affairs
[redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....
(name redacted)
Specialist in Terrorism and National Security
[redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....
(name redacted)
Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation
[redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....
Congressional Research Service
15
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