Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress
Congressional research reportSep 12, 2013
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria:
Issues for Congress
-name redacted-, Coordinator
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
-name redacted-, Coordinator
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
September 12, 2013
Congressional Research Service
7-....
www.crs.gov
R43201
Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress
Summary
Reports of a mass casualty chemical weapons attack in the suburbs of Damascus are reshaping
the long-running and contentious debate over possible U.S. intervention in Syria’s bloody civil
war. Obama Administration officials and some foreign governments report that on August 21,
2013, forces loyal to Syrian President Bashar al Asad attacked opposition-controlled areas in the
suburbs of the capital with chemical weapons, killing hundreds of civilians, including women and
children. The Syrian government has denied the accusations categorically and blames the
opposition for the attack. United Nations inspectors who were in Syria to investigate other alleged
chemical weapons attacks collected and are analyzing information related to the incident. Varying
accounts suggest that several hundred to more than 1,000 people were killed from exposure to a
poisonous gas, with symptoms consistent with exposure to the nerve agent sarin.
Possible punitive U.S. military action against the Asad regime is now the subject of intense
debate, amid the broader ongoing discussion of U.S. policy toward the Syrian civil war and its
regional consequences. The August 21 incident is the latest in a string of reported instances where
Syrian forces appear to have used chemical weapons despite President Obama’s prior statement
that the transfer or use of chemical weapons is “a red line” that would “change his calculus.” The
President and senior members of his Administration have argued that the United States has a
national security interest in ensuring that “when countries break international norms on chemical
weapons they are held accountable.” At the same time, President Obama still maintains that
extensive, sustained U.S. military intervention to shape the outcome of Syria’s civil conflict is
undesirable. Prior to the August 21 incident, U.S. military leaders had outlined options to
accomplish a range of U.S. objectives, while warning that U.S. military involvement “cannot
resolve the underlying and historic ethnic, religious and tribal issues that are fueling this conflict.”
Alternatives to military action also are under intense consideration. On September 10, Syrian
officials responded to a Russian disarmament proposal by signaling their willingness “to disclose
the locations of chemical weapons, to stop producing them, and to reveal these locations to
representatives of Russia, other states, and the United Nations” with the goal of “ending our
possession of all chemical weapons.” Members of the United Nations Security Council began
discussing proposals to implement an international framework for such a disarmament initiative.
Members of Congress have expressed a broad range of views on the question of an immediate
U.S. military response and the proposed disarmament initiative. Some express support for
military action and others express opposition or question how a military response would advance
broader U.S. policy goals. Similarly, some Members seek to explore the potential of disarmament
proposals and others warn that it may delay a forceful U.S. response or undermine U.S. policy
with regard to Syria’s civil war. For more than two years, many Members of Congress have
debated the potential rewards and unintended consequences of deeper U.S. involvement in Syria.
Some Members express concern that the Administration’s policy of providing support to the
fractured Syrian opposition could empower anti-American extremist groups, while others warn
that failure to back moderate forces could prolong fighting and strengthen extremists.
As Members of Congress consider the merits of possible military intervention in Syria, they also
are reengaging in long-standing discussions about the proper role for Congress in authorizing and
funding U.S. military action abroad and the use of force in shaping global events or deterring
dictatorships from committing atrocities. This report attempts to provide answers to a number of
policy questions for lawmakers grappling with these short- and long-term issues.
Congressional Research Service
Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress
Congressional Research Service
Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress
Contents
Update as of September 12, 2013 .................................................................................................... 1
Overview and Summary of Recent Developments .......................................................................... 2
Assessment ...................................................................................................................................... 4
Summary of U.S. Intelligence on August 21 Incident ............................................................... 6
Conflict Update ................................................................................................................................ 7
Proposed Authorizations for the Use of Military Force............................................................. 9
Historical Perspective .......................................................................................................... 9
Current Proposals and the Situation in Syria..................................................................... 10
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 12
Chemical Weapons Issues........................................................................................................ 12
War Powers .............................................................................................................................. 17
Cost and Budgetary Resources for Intervention ...................................................................... 19
Military Planning ..................................................................................................................... 24
U.S. Aid to the Opposition ...................................................................................................... 28
Arming the Syrian Opposition .......................................................................................... 28
Non-Lethal Aid to the Opposition and Economic Sanctions against the Regime ............. 29
U.S. Humanitarian Response ................................................................................................... 31
International Response................................................................................................................... 32
The United Nations Security Council...................................................................................... 32
Russia ...................................................................................................................................... 33
China ....................................................................................................................................... 35
Iran........................................................................................................................................... 37
European and NATO Perspectives .......................................................................................... 39
United Kingdom ................................................................................................................ 40
France ................................................................................................................................ 40
Germany ............................................................................................................................ 41
NATO ................................................................................................................................ 42
European Union................................................................................................................. 42
Turkey...................................................................................................................................... 43
Arab States............................................................................................................................... 44
Israel and Its Concern for Potential Retaliation ............................................................................. 44
Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 49
Figures
Figure 1. U.S. Intelligence Community Map of August 21, 2013, Incident .................................... 6
Figure 2. Syria Conflict Map ........................................................................................................... 8
Figure 3. Possible Ranges of Rockets and Missiles from Hezbollah and Gaza-Based
Militants ...................................................................................................................................... 48
Figure 4. Potential Ranges of Syrian SCUD Missiles Vis-à-vis Israel .......................................... 49
Congressional Research Service
Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress
Tables
Table A-1. Proposed Authorizations for the Use of Military Force as of September 6,
2013 ............................................................................................................................................ 52
Appendixes
Appendix. Analysis of Proposed Authorizations for the Use of Military Force as of
September 6, 2013 ...................................................................................................................... 51
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 73
Congressional Research Service
Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress
Update as of September 12, 2013
The Syrian government’s apparent acceptance of a Russian proposal for Syria to acknowledge its
chemical weapons and place them under international control has recast the ongoing debates over
how to respond to an August 21 chemical weapons attack and bring an end to the Syrian civil war.
Other parties including Senator Richard Lugar had proposed a U.S.-Russian-facilitated
disarmament initiative prior to the announcement.1 On September 10, Syrian officials signaled
their willingness “to disclose the locations of chemical weapons, to stop producing them, and to
reveal these locations to representatives of Russia, other states, and the United Nations” with the
goal of “ending our possession of all chemical weapons.”
On September 12, in an interview on Russian television, President Asad reportedly said that
“Syria is placing its chemical weapons under international control because of Russia. The U.S.
threats did not influence the decision.” President Asad also stated that his government will be
sending documents “in the next few days” to the United Nations for joining the international
convention that bans the use of chemical munitions.
Speaking in a national address on September 10, President Barack Obama said:
... over the last few days, we've seen some encouraging signs, in part because of the credible
threat of U.S. military action, as well as constructive talks that I had with President Putin.
The Russian government has indicated a willingness to join with the international
community in pushing Assad to give up his chemical weapons. The Assad regime has now
admitted that it has these weapons and even said they'd join the Chemical Weapons
Convention, which prohibits their use.
It's too early to tell whether this offer will succeed, and any agreement must verify that the
Assad regime keeps its commitments, but this initiative has the potential to remove the threat
of chemical weapons without the use of force, particularly because Russia is one of Assad's
strongest allies.
I have therefore asked the leaders of Congress to postpone a vote to authorize the use of
force while we pursue this diplomatic path. I'm sending Secretary of State John Kerry to
meet his Russian counterpart on Thursday, and I will continue my own discussions with
President Putin.
I've spoken to the leaders of two of our closest allies -- France and the United Kingdom -and we will work together in consultation with Russia and China to put forward a resolution
at the U.N. Security Council requiring Assad to give up his chemical weapons and to
ultimately destroy them under international control.
President Obama and senior members of his Administration continue to seek authorization from
Congress for a limited use of military force against the Asad regime while exploring the potential
for the establishment of international control over Syria’s chemical weapons stockpiles and
related elements of its chemical weapons program.
1
David M. Herszenhorn, “Lugar Urges U.S. and Russia to Team Up to Rid Syria of Chemical Weapons,” New York
Times, August 7, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
1
Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress
The governments of China, the United Kingdom, and France have responded favorably to the
proposal, and, as of September 11, Russia had rejected a French plan for a binding United Nations
Security Council resolution that could be enforced with military action. U.S. Secretary of State
John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov are scheduled to meet in Geneva,
Switzerland, on September 12 to discuss the proposal further. Some Syrian rebel leaders have
rejected the proposal and characterized it as a delaying tactic while maintaining their calls for
international assistance and punishment of the Syrian government.
Overview and Summary of Recent Developments
On August 30, the Obama Administration presented intelligence analysis stating with “high
confidence” that the Syrian government was responsible for an August 21 chemical weapons
attack against civilians in rebel-held areas of the suburbs of Damascus. The Syrian government
continues to categorically deny any responsibility for any chemical weapons attack.
President Obama called the Syrian government’s reported use of chemical weapons “an assault on
human dignity” that “presents a serious danger to our national security.”2 He further requested
that Congress authorize the use of force for military operations “against Syrian regime targets” to
“hold the Assad regime accountable for their use of chemical weapons, deter this kind of
behavior, and degrade their capacity to carry it out.” According to the President, such military
operations would be “limited in duration and scope” and “would not put boots on the ground.”
In the wake of the Russian disarmament proposal, President Obama requested that lawmakers
pause in their formal consideration of proposed legislation to authorize the use of force in Syria.
Nevertheless, debate continues among Members of Congress about the pros and cons of proposed
authorization approaches as well as the disarmament proposal now under discussion. President
Obama has stated his view that “the credible threat of U.S. military action” contributed to the
emergence of the disarmament initiative, and has underscored that he has “ordered our military to
maintain their current posture to keep the pressure on Assad and to be in a position to respond if
diplomacy fails.”
A draft resolution authorizing the use of force submitted to Congress by the White House would
authorize the President:
to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and
appropriate in connection with the use of chemical weapons or other weapons of mass
destruction in the conflict in Syria in order to –
(1) prevent or deter the use or proliferation (including the transfer to terrorist groups or other
state or non-state actors), within, to or from Syria, of any weapons of mass destruction,
including chemical or biological weapons or components of or materials used in such
weapons; or
(2) protect the United States and its allies and partners against the threat posed by such
weapons.3
2
3
Statement by President Barack Obama, White House, August 31, 2013.
CNN, Text of draft legislation submitted by Obama to Congress, August 31, 2013.
Congressional Research Service
2
Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress
Lawmakers in the Senate and House are considering alternative authorization proposals, amid
concerns that the Administration’s proposed text may not sufficiently limit the scope or duration
of any potential military response.4 Others reportedly are drafting proposals that would reflect the
disarmament proposal under consideration and could seek to make an authorization for the use of
U.S. military force contingent on the satisfaction of criteria related to the enforcement of a
disarmament agreement.
On September 4, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee debated and adopted an alternative
resolution authorizing the use of military force for specific purposes, including to deter further
use of chemical weapons and to prevent the transfer to terrorist groups or other state or non-state
actors within Syria of any weapons of mass destruction. The provision would limit the
deployment of U.S. forces on the ground for “combat operations” but may not constrain the
deployment of U.S. forces in Syria for other purposes. As of September 11, the House had not
formally considered an alternative authorization proposal, although some Members had circulated
draft proposals or introduced measures that would restrict the availability of funds for U.S.
military operations or support for opposition groups in Syria.
In Syria, the brutal civil war continues, even as Syrian government forces were reported to be
taking measures to prepare for potential U.S.-led military operations against them. President
Bashar al Asad has stated that the United States and others accusing it of carrying out chemical
weapons strikes have not presented any evidence to support their allegations, and he has warned
that external military intervention in Syria’s civil war risks igniting a regional conflict. U.S.
military officials have confirmed that the Syrian government has taken steps to prepare for
potential attacks, but as of September 10, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin
Dempsey testified that “The indications are, today, that [Syria’s chemical weapons capability]
does remain under the firm control of the regime.” Syrian officials have requested that the United
Nations Security Council act to prevent aggression against Syria.
Iran’s Supreme Leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i, has said that a U.S. attack on Syria
would be a “disaster for the region.” There have been similar statements from other senior Iranian
leaders, but these leaders have not threatened that Iran itself would conduct any retaliation.
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Commander Major General Mohammed Ali Jafari has stated that,
“The U.S. imagination about limited military intervention in Syria is merely an illusion, as
reactions will be coming from beyond Syria’s borders.”5
Russian and Chinese officials remain opposed to the U.S. proposal for punitive military strikes,
while the Arab League has modified its original position insisting on United Nations Security
Council action to call for the Security Council and the international community to “take the
deterrent and necessary measures against the culprits of this crime for which the Syrian regime
bears responsibility.” The Arab League has welcomed the Russian disarmament proposal, but
Arab League Secretary General Nabil al Arabi has emphasized that the group remains focused on
punishment for the August 21 incident and international action to bring an end to the civil war.
4
See for example, Politico, “Patrick Leahy: New Syria draft text coming,” September 1, 2013; and, Niels Lesniewski,
“Syria War Resolution Will Be Narrowed, Lawmakers Say,” Roll Call - #WGDB Blog, September 1, 2013.
5
Fars News Agency, “IRGC Commander: US Possible Military Aggression against Syria to Face Tough Int’l
Reaction,” August 31, 2013.
Congressional Research Service
3
Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress
United Kingdom leaders stated prior to the Russian proposal that they have no intention of
seeking new authorization from Parliament to participate in any international military operation
following Parliament’s rejection of a measure to do so. French government officials have
proposed measures to implement the Russian proposal and presented supporting intelligence on
September 2 to French legislators concerning what they describe as “the massive use of chemical
agents” by Syrian government forces.
U.S. military assets remain in place in the vicinity of Syria. As of September 2, five guided
missile destroyers were reported to be deployed in the eastern Mediterranean Sea: the USS Stout,
USS Gravely, USS Mahan, USS Barry, and USS Ramage. The USS San Antonio, carrying forces
from the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, and unspecified attack submarines also were reported
to be nearby. The USS Kearsarge and the USS Nimitz aircraft carrier strike group were reported
to be deploying westward toward the Red Sea.
In announcing his decision that punitive military action was required on August 31, President
Obama stated, “I'm comfortable going forward without the approval of a United Nations Security
Council that, so far, has been completely paralyzed and unwilling to hold Asad accountable.”
President Obama also said, “I believe I have the authority to carry out this military action without
specific congressional authorization.”
Assessment
The war in Syria and the debate over possible punitive U.S. military action against the Asad
regime for its alleged use of chemical weapons pose a uniquely challenging series of questions
for policy makers. The overarching questions remain how to define, prioritize, and secure the
core interests of the United States with regard to Syria’s complex civil war. The immediate
questions are whether and how best to respond to the apparent use of chemical weapons in Syria
and how such a response might affect U.S. interests and standing regionally and globally. In
weighing these questions, many Members of Congress and Administration officials are seeking
both to protect concrete U.S. national security interests and to preserve abstract international
security principles that may serve those interests.
A mass casualty chemical weapons attack in the Damascus suburbs on August 21 was the latest
and most deadly of a string of reported instances where Syrian forces allegedly have used
chemical weapons despite President Obama’s prior statement that the transfer or use of chemical
weapons is “a red line” that would “change his calculus.” The President and senior members of
his Administration have argued that the United States has a national security interest in ensuring
that “when countries break international norms on chemical weapons they are held accountable.”
Administration officials and some observers believe that by failing to respond after setting out a
so-called “red line,” the United States would risk not only undermining any international norms
against the use of such weapons but would risk undermining its own credibility.
By his own account, President Obama believes that extensive, sustained U.S. military
intervention to shape the outcome of Syria’s civil conflict is undesirable. Instead, the Obama
Administration has worked with Congress to increase U.S. assistance to non-radical elements of
the opposition. In response to previous instances of alleged chemical weapons use, the
Administration reportedly notified Congress in July 2012 of its intent to begin covert U.S. arming
Congressional Research Service
4
Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress
of select groups.6 On August 31, the President stated his conclusion that the United States should
respond to alleged Syrian chemical weapons use with limited militarily strikes.
Administration officials have cited a number of reasons for their skepticism of direct military
involvement to shift the balance of power in the underlying conflict, including fears of
exacerbating the violence; inviting greater regional spillover or intervention; or opening a power
vacuum that could benefit extremists. Other foreign policy priorities also have influenced the
Administration’s position, such as a desire to maintain limited international consensus on Iran’s
nuclear program and concern that sectarian and strategic competition in Syria could ignite a
regional conflict and threaten U.S. allies and security interests. While condemning Asad as a thug
and a murderer and aiding some of his adversaries, U.S. officials have continued to stress the
need for a negotiated political solution to the conflict in the hopes of keeping the Syrian state
intact, securing its chemical weapon stockpiles and borders, and combating extremist groups now
active there.
Some critics have argued that the potential risks that even a limited military response could pose
to these objectives outweigh the potential benefits to the United States of reasserting an
international standard or being seen to have reliably followed through on a commitment to act.
These arguments suggest that if a military strike makes the political solution desired by U.S.
officials less likely, then the destabilizing conflict could continue or worsen. Similarly, this line of
argument suggests that if military operations were to dramatically degrade remaining state
authority—whether intentionally or unintentionally—then undesired outcomes with regard to
terrorism, proliferation, or mass atrocities could occur.
Still other critics of the Administration, including some Members of Congress, charge that U.S.
hesitation to intervene militarily to protect Syrian civilians and/or help oust the Asad government
has unnecessarily prolonged the fighting. Over time, these critics argue, the costs of inaction have
grown intolerably as the humanitarian situation has deteriorated, violent extremist groups have
seized the initiative, and Syria’s neighbors, including several U.S. partners, have been
overwhelmed by refugees and threatened with violence. Others have argued that by failing to halt
the fighting in Syria, the United States and others are exacerbating already volatile Sunni-Shiite
sectarian tensions throughout Middle East, thus posing risks to other strategically important
countries. Finally, some critics argue that U.S. global credibility is being diminished by Asad’s
reluctance to step down or end abuses of civilians despite U.S. demands.
The Russian disarmament proposal and Syria’s reported acceptance of its basic terms have
introduced even further complication to these debates. At present debate centers on the
parameters of the proposal, the feasibility of implementation, the risks and rewards it poses
relative to U.S. regional security and nonproliferation goals, and its implications for U.S.
international leadership. Syrian opposition leaders’ rejection of the proposal and their calls for
punitive action and assistance in their struggle against the Asad regime may complicate U.S.
relations with opposition groups moving forward. Reconciling immediate U.S. goals with regard
to the August 21 incident, medium-term U.S. goals with regard to the conflict and Syria, and
overarching goals related to weapons of mass destruction may prove challenging.
Sorting through these competing perspectives and prescriptions now falls to Members of
Congress as they consider the President’s proposed course of action, his request that Congress
6
“Divided Over Arming Syrian Rebels, Congress Declines to Block Obama's Plan,” CQ News, July 23, 2013.
Congressional Research Service
5
Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress
authorize the use of force, the feasibility of international disarmament proposals for Syria, and the
future of U.S. policy with regard to the conflict in Syria and its regional consequences.
Figure 1. U.S. Intelligence Community Map of August 21, 2013, Incident
(released to the public on August 30, 2013)
Source: U.S. Government.
Summary of U.S. Intelligence on August 21 Incident
An unclassified summary of the U.S. intelligence community’s assessment released by the White
House concludes, among other things, that:7
7
•
The United States Government assesses with high confidence that the Syrian
government carried out a chemical weapons attack in the Damascus suburbs on
August 21, 2013.
•
A preliminary U.S. government assessment determined that 1,429 people were
killed in the chemical weapons attack, including at least 426 children.
•
The U.S. intelligence community has intelligence that leads it to assess that
Syrian chemical weapons personnel—including personnel assessed to be
associated with the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC), the
entity responsible for Syria’s chemical weapons program—were preparing
chemical munitions prior to the attack.
Government Assessment of the Syrian Government’s Use of Chemical Weapons on August 21, 2013.
Congressional Research Service
6
Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress
•
The U.S. intelligence community assesses that the opposition has not used
chemical weapons and the scenario in which the opposition executed the attack
on August 21 is highly unlikely.
•
Satellite detections corroborate that attacks from a regime-controlled area struck
neighborhoods where the chemical attacks reportedly occurred—including Kafr
Batna, Jawbar, 'Ayn Tarma, Darayya, and Mu'addamiyah (see Figure 1 above).
On September 1, Secretary of State John Kerry further stated that tests of blood and hair samples
from Syrian first responders obtained by the United States indicated exposure to the nerve agent
sarin.
United Nations weapons inspectors have departed Syria, and U.N. Secretary Ban Ki-moon has
requested that the team “expedite the mission's analysis of the samples and information it had
obtained without jeopardizing the scientific timelines required for accurate analysis, and to report
the results to him as soon as possible.”8
Conflict Update
The August 21 incident occurred as the popular-uprising-turned-armed-rebellion in Syria is in its
third year and has devolved into a bloody struggle of attrition between the government and a
diverse array of opposition militias. Over the course of Syria’s civil war, momentum has shifted
between government and rebel forces. Support provided by Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah fighters
appears to have helped the Asad regime wrest the initiative from the opposition near the city of
Homs and to launch counteroffensives on the outskirts of the capital. The August 21 attack
appears to have been part of a fierce and ongoing Syrian military bombardment of rebel-held
eastern suburbs of Damascus.
Various opposition forces control areas of northwestern, eastern, and southern Syria (see Figure 2
below). In areas near the northern city of Aleppo, diverse rebel forces have announced limited
tactical successes in recent weeks, including the fall of a key military air base.9 According to
close observers of the conflict, some extremist militia groups are seeking to assert political and
social control over some areas in which they operate,10 while they and others among the range of
“extraordinarily fractured”11 militia groups continue to battle regime forces for contested areas.
Reportedly, the Supreme Military Council (SMC), to which the United States has provided aid,
“is still far from a functioning rebel leadership.”12 European press reporting contends that
offensives by rebels in northern Syria and by foreign trained rebels in the vicinity of Damascus
have caused serious alarm among regime leaders since mid-August.13
8
U.N. News Center, “Syria: samples collected at site of alleged chemical weapons use to be sent to labs tomorrow –
UN,” September 1, 2013.
9
“In Syria, Seized Weapons Caches boost Rebels’ Hopes after Weeks of Setbacks,” Washington Post, August 21,
2013.
10
Aaron Zelin, “Al-Qaeda in Syria: A Closer Look at ISIS Parts I & II,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
September 10-11, 2013.
11
Aron Lund, “The Non-State Militant Landscape in Syria,” United States Military Academy Combatting Terrorism
Center (CTC) Sentinel, August 27, 2013.
12
Ibid.
13
Christoph Reuter and Holger Stark, “Chemical Watershed: Momentum Shifts again in Syrian Civil War,” Der
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
7
Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress
Figure 2. Syria Conflict Map
As of September 1, 2013
Source: Der Speigel (Germany) adapted from BBC News and Syria Needs Assessment Project data.
United Nations officials cite estimates that over 100,000 Syrians have been killed in the conflict.
As many as 4.25 million Syrians have been displaced inside the country and more than 2 million
Syrian refugees are in neighboring countries. The Syrian conflict and the humanitarian crisis it
has created have deepened the economic and political challenges facing the region and
exacerbated sectarian tensions and violence, particularly in Iraq and Lebanon. To date, the United
States has provided over $1 billion in humanitarian aid in Syria and neighboring countries, with
U.N. appeals seeking over $4 billion in assistance.
President Obama called for Syrian President Bashar al Asad’s resignation in August 2011, but, as
noted above, the Obama Administration has rejected calls for more direct U.S. intervention in
Syria. Nevertheless, the intensifying regional costs of the Syrian crisis and reports of chemical
weapons use by Syrian government forces have placed increasing pressure on the Obama
Administration to respond. Secretary Kerry has signaled that the Administration may seek to
(...continued)
Spiegel, September 2, 2013; and Isabelle Lasserre, “Syrie : l'opération anti-Assad a commencé,” Le Figaro (France),
August 22, 2013.
Congressional Research Service
8
Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress
further augment U.S. support to some opposition elements in parallel with any limited military
operations focused on chemical weapons.
In the 113th Congress, some Members have introduced proposed legislation that would authorize
expanded assistance to the opposition. H.R. 1327, the Free Syria Act of 2013, would, among
other things, authorize the President, under certain conditions and with various reporting and
certification requirements, to supply nonlethal and/or lethal support to Syrian opposition groups.
S. 960, the Syria Transition Support Act of 2013, would, among other things, authorize the
President, notwithstanding any other provision of law that restricts assistance to Syria, to provide
assistance, including defense articles, defense services, and training to vetted opposition forces.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved S. 960 as amended by a 15-3 vote in May
2013.
Proposed Authorizations for the Use of Military Force
Current debate focuses on the possible ramifications of an authorization for the use of military
force with regard to Syria. Key subjects of debate include the purposes of any such authorization;
potential location and targets of military force; the type of force that may be employed, including
whether or not U.S. ground forces are authorized; the potential duration of military operations;
and the resources available for such operations.
Historical Perspective
Legal scholars have continually compared and contrasted congressional authorizations of the use
of force over time, and generally categorize them in terms of their relative limits on or
permissiveness of executive authority and action. According to one study:
The primary differences between limited and broad authorizations are as follows: In limited
authorizations, Congress restricts the resources and methods of force that the President can
employ, sometimes expressly restricts targets, identifies relatively narrow purposes for the
use of force, and sometimes imposes time limits or procedural restrictions. In broad
authorizations, Congress imposes few if any limits on resources or methods, does not restrict
targets other than to identify an enemy, invokes relatively broad purposes, and generally
imposes few if any timing or procedural restrictions.14
Some argue, however, that provisions attempting to circumscribe the President’s ability to
conduct military operations improperly interfere with the President’s commander-in-chief powers
under Article II of the Constitution. Past cases suggest that limits on appropriations may provide
the most direct and effective means of asserting congressional control over military operations.
For CRS analysis of these questions, see “War Powers” below and CRS Report R41989,
Congressional Authority to Limit Military Operations, by (name redacted), (name redacted),
and (name redacted), and CRS Report RL31133, Declarations of War and Authorizations for the
Use of Military Force: Historical Background and Legal Implications, by (name redacted) and
(name redacted).
14
Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, “Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism,” Harvard Law
Review, Volume 118, Number 7, May 2005, p. 2078.
Congressional Research Service
9
Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress
Current Proposals and the Situation in Syria
For a side-by-side comparison of three proposed resolutions to authorize the use of military force
in Syria with commentary, see the Appendix. The following analysis is based on texts available
as of September 6, 2013.
As described above, a draft resolution authorizing the use of force submitted to Congress by the
White House would authorize the President:
to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and
appropriate in connection with the use of chemical weapons or other weapons of mass
destruction in the conflict in Syria in order to –
(1) prevent or deter the use or proliferation (including the transfer to terrorist groups or other
state or non-state actors), within, to or from Syria, of any weapons of mass destruction,
including chemical or biological weapons or components of or materials used in such
weapons; or
(2) protect the United States and its allies and partners against the threat posed by such
weapons.
Alternate proposals are under consideration in both the Senate and House of Representatives.
On September 4, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee debated and adopted, by a vote of 10-7
(with one “present”) a resolution (S.J.Res. 21)15 to authorize the President, subject to required
certifications, to:
use the Armed Forces of the United States as the President determines to be necessary and
appropriate in a limited and specified manner against legitimate military targets in Syria,
only to—
(1) respond to the use of weapons of mass destruction by the Government of Syria in the
conflict in Syria;
(2) deter Syria’s use of such weapons in order to protect the national security interests of the
United States and to protect United States allies and partners against the use of such
weapons;
(3) degrade Syria’s capacity to use such weapons in the future; and
(4) prevent the transfer to terrorist groups or other state or non-state actors within Syria of
any weapons of mass destruction.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee proposal states that it does not “authorize the use of the
United States Armed Forces on the ground in Syria for the purpose of combat operations.” The
resolution does not define “combat operations.” It remains unclear whether the resolution as
reported by the committee would authorize members of the U.S. Armed Forces to operate on the
ground in Syria in non-combatant (i.e., advisory, logistical, intelligence, or other enabling) roles
15
Available at: http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/S.%20J.%20Res.%2021.pdf
Congressional Research Service
10
Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress
to carry out the purposes specified in the resolution. As reported, the resolution includes a sunset
clause of 60 days for the authorization, with provision for one 30-day extension.
Representatives Chris Van Hollen and Gerald Connolly have circulated a draft authorization for
the use of military force that would authorize the President “to use the United States Armed
Forces to prevent and deter the further use of chemical weapons in Syria or by Syria against any
other group or country.”16 The authorization would expire “upon the conclusion of each military
action conducted by the United States Armed Forces beginning after the initial military action
conducted by the United States Armed Forces” unless the President certifies to Congress in
writing that the President finds “with high confidence” that Syria has used chemical weapons
subsequent to the conclusion of “the immediately preceding military action conducted by the
United States Armed Forces.” As of September 4, the draft proposal does not define “military
action.” The authorization would expire completely after 60 days.17
With regard to Syria, matters for possible consideration may include whether or not allies of the
Syrian government, such as Iran, Lebanese Hezbollah, or other non-state actors who may gain
access to chemical or biological weapons or components, are intended as potential targets of U.S.
military action and if so, what the implications of conflict with those actors might be. The costs
and duration of any potential operation may be relevant, as well as the potential for retaliatory
action by the Syrian government and its supporters that could threaten allies to whom the United
States has made various security commitments, including Turkey, Jordan, and Israel.
Secretary of State Kerry also has discussed some hypothetical contingencies, including the
prospect that U.S. forces may be required to act to secure Syria’s stockpiles of chemical weapons.
The Administration has not indicated in recent testimony whether such actions may require U.S.
“boots on the ground.” In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee he said,
in the event Syria imploded, for instance, or in the event there was a threat of a chemical
weapons cache falling into the hands of al-Nusra or someone else, and it was clearly in the
interests of our allies and all of us -- the British, the French and others -- to prevent those
weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of the worst elements, I don't want to take
off the table an option that might or might not be available to a president of the United States
to secure our country.
Congress also may wish to assess criteria for measuring the success of any specific planned
action and how such action fits within broader U.S. regional and international policy goals; for
example if limited strikes fail to deter or prevent the use or proliferation of chemical weapons in
Syria, will the United States pursue continued or wider military action? Similarly, if the Syrian
government refrains from further use of chemical weapons but continues indiscriminate attacks
on rebel held areas using conventional weaponry, will a limited U.S. military action be deemed
successful? What effect might strikes on Syrian military targets have on the current dynamics of
16
Draft circulated to legislative staff via email, September 3, 2013. Available at: http://www.lawfareblog.com/wpcontent/uploads/2013/09/165278488-House-Van-Hollen-Connolly-Syria-Resolution.pdf.
17
A September 10 press release from the two Representatives announces a revised proposal that includes a 30-day
delay in activating the President’s authority to use the Armed Forces, requiring the President to certify both that Syria
has not become party to the Chemical Weapons Convention and that no credible plan exists to place Syrian chemical
weapons under international control. The 60-day authorization period of the original proposal could be extended under
the proposal announced in the press release by 30 days if the President requires additional time to complete a plan to
place Syrian chemical weapons under international control.
Congressional Research Service
11
Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress
the Syrian civil war and how might rebel groups, whether moderate or extremist, potentially
exploit U.S. military action?
Issues for Congress
Chemical Weapons Issues18
On the night of August 21, an alleged chemical weapons attack killed hundreds in a neighborhood
on the outskirts of Damascus. If confirmed, this would be the largest number of casualties from a
chemical weapons attack in this conflict to date. The United States, the United Kingdom, and
France have issued statements saying that the Syrian government used chemical weapons in the
attack. The White House released a detailed intelligence assessment on August 30.19As with past
cases of alleged chemical weapons use in Syria this year, the Syrian government denied that it
had conducted the attack and blamed opposition groups. Most experts observing the victims of
the attack say that symptoms are consistent with the use of the nerve agent sarin, a type of
chemical weapon in Syria’s large arsenal.
The August 30, 2013, White House statement said that the U.S. intelligence community assesses
that the Asad regime used a nerve agent in a “large-scale coordinated rocket and artillery attack,”
which killed approximately 1,429 people. It also said that the opposition has not used chemical
weapons. The U.S. government assesses that the Asad regime has used chemical weapons,
including the nerve agent sarin, on a small scale against the opposition multiple times in the last
year. These assessments say that the Syrian government has used chemical weapons “primarily to
gain the upper hand or break a stalemate in areas where it has struggled to seize and hold
strategically valuable territory.”
President Obama and other world leaders have said that the use of chemical weapons against the
civilian population would be met with consequences, which could include the use of military
force. In statements reacting to alleged chemical weapons incidents in Syria, U.S. officials have
referred to several distinct reasons why the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian government
raises fundamental concerns for the United States:
•
the unacceptability of any use of chemical weapons, given the large international
consensus that views chemical weapons as having inherently malicious qualities;
•
the targeting of a civilian population, especially in large numbers, regardless of
the weapons employed;
•
the potential for the proliferation of chemical weapons to other parties, such as
those hostile to the United States; and
•
the potential ramifications of escalated or expanded violence in Syria, including
the loss of control of chemical weapons and/or their use on neighboring countries
and U.S. interests in the region.
18
Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in Nonproliferation.
“Government Assessment of the Syrian Government’s Use of Chemical Weapons on August 21, 2013,” The White
House, August 30, 2013. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/30/government-assessment-syriangovernment-s-use-chemical-weapons-august-21.
19
Congressional Research Service
12
Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress
These concerns are reflective of major trends in national security strategy from the past decade,
including intervention on humanitarian grounds,20 preventing the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction to terrorists, and the upholding of international nonproliferation norms.
What is the status of the United Nations chemical weapons inspectors report on
Syria?
A team of United Nations (U.N.) chemical weapons inspectors went to Syria to examine several
sites where attacks were alleged to occur. The inspectors collected samples from the sites,
including the site of the August 21 attack, and those samples are being studied. The team’s
mandate is not to assess who used the weapons, but rather to determine to the extent possible
whether or not chemical weapons were used and what type. According to the U.N., the inspectors
are to “collect as many facts as possible and assess the nature of the extent of any attack using
chemical weapons and its consequences.” The determination of what chemical agents were used
could also be used to draw conclusions on the source of the agents (i.e., weaponized sarin versus
organo-phosphates from fertilizer or other chemicals). The inspectors were invited to Syria by the
Syrian government, but they only arrived in the country on August 18—just before the apparent
August 21 attack—after months of negotiating terms of access for the inspections. Press reports
say the team will issue its report next week.
Was it too late for U.N. investigators to collect evidence?
Media reports have noted that the Syrian military continued to bomb the site of the August 21
attack with conventional weapons. While some physical evidence may have been destroyed at the
site, blood and tissue samples from the victims themselves would help the inspectors determine
what chemical agent was used. An August 27 United Kingdom joint intelligence committee
assessment says, “There is no immediate time limit over which environmental or physiological
samples would have degraded beyond usefulness. However, the longer it takes inspectors to gain
access to the affected sites, the more difficult it will be to establish the chain of evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt.”21 The U.N. inspectors were reportedly given access to the site and to victims
of the attack.
20
The issue of international humanitarian intervention is not a new phenomenon and predates the concept of the
Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which is more narrowly defined. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a concept that
was adopted by heads of state and government at the 2005 U.N. World Summit (U.N. General Assembly Resolution
60/1). R2P includes three primary elements: (1) each State has a responsibility to protect its populations from genocide,
war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity; (2) the international community, through the United
Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate means to help protect populations from these same conditions;
and (3) the international community is prepared to take collective action through the U.N. Security Council on a caseby-case basis, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations.
The concept of R2P and its possible application to Syria is currently being debated among some experts and policy
makers both in the United States and the international community. The R2P concept, as adopted by the Assembly in
2005, remains a work in progress. Although many have referred to it as a “doctrine,” it is neither a doctrine nor a fully
developed principle. A clear decision-making process and standard operating procedure for implementing R2P
decisions have not been developed. For more information on R2P, please contact (name redacted), Specialist in
International Relations; and (name redacted), Sp ecialist in International Humanitarian Policy.
21
UK Joint Intelligence Committee Assessment of 27 August on Reported Chemical Weapons Use in Damascus.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/235094/Jp_115_JD_PM_Syria_Reporte
d_Chemical_Weapon_Use_with_annex.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
13
Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress
What evidence is used to determine CW use?
White House statements have described the types of information that has gone into the
intelligence assessments about the April 2013 use of sarin. Both the June and August 2013
intelligence assessments have said these sources of information included reporting about Syrian
military attack planning and execution, descriptions of attacks, physiological symptoms
consistent with exposure to chemical weapons agents, and analysis of physiological samples from
multiple victims. Congress may wish to ask the Administration for information on the credibility
of this evidence.
What countries have chemical weapons? What international norms exist against
their use?
The U.S. intelligence community cites Iran, North Korea, and Syria as having active chemical
weapons programs. For decades, there has been a strong norm against the use of chemical
weapons. For the past 25 years, no chemical weapons have been used in civil or cross-border
warfare.22 Most countries that have had chemical weapons arsenals in the past have destroyed
these weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), or are in the process of
destroying them. The CWC addresses the destruction of existing stocks, prevention of
proliferation to new states, and assistance to countries that are victims of an attack, but does not
prescribe consequences for CW use. Syria is not a party to the CWC.
When were chemical weapons last used on civilians?
The Iraqi government used chemical weapons in an attack on Kurdish civilians in the town of
Halabja, northern Iraq, on March 16, 1988, killing an estimated 5,000 people. This is considered
the largest chemical attack against a civilian population since German atrocities during World
War II. The United States did not respond militarily to the attack. Iraq also systematically used
chemical weapons against Iran during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s without a U.S. or
international military response.
What has the Obama Administration said about the importance of the August
21 case?
As has been widely reported in the press and in public statements, the Obama Administration has
emphasized that it believes this particular use of chemical weapons may necessitate a response of
some kind. Echoing a similar statement he made in August 2012, President Obama stated in an
interview on August 28, 2013, that “I have no interest in any kind of open-ended conflict in Syria,
but we do have to make sure that when countries break international norms on weapons like
chemical weapons that could threaten us, that they are held accountable.” The Administration has
confirmed the use of the nerve agent sarin in incidents earlier this year; however, the August 21
attack killed civilians on a larger scale than in past incidents. The Administration has stated that it
aims to deter future use of these weapons by Syria and others, as well as to prevent these weapons
from being diverted to terrorists or used against U.S. interests or allies in the region.
22
The terrorist group Aum Shinrikyo used sarin gas in the Tokyo subway system in 1995.
Congressional Research Service
14
Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress
The Administration has also emphasized the norm against the use of chemical weapons. Secretary
Kerry said in a speech on August 26 that “all peoples and all nations who believe in the cause of
our common humanity must stand up to assure that there is accountability for the use of chemical
weapons so that it never happens again.” These views were reiterated in more extensive remarks
by the Secretary on August 30, discussed above. However, although media speculation about
possible military action abounds, U.S. officials have not directly provided specifics on what kind
of response might take place and how that response could prevent future use of chemical weapons
in Syria or elsewhere.
Could the United States destroy Syria’s chemical weapons stocks through
military action? What would be needed to secure chemical weapons sites during
an intervention?
While it is possible that military strikes could render chemical weapons agents unusable,
according to many observers, there would be considerable risk to nearby civilian populations if
Syrian chemical weapons facilities were attacked in a military strike from the air. This is because
nerve agents could be dispersed into the air in the course of any strike against these facilities.
One major concern of the United States is the risk that chemical weapons would fall into the
hands of terrorist groups if the Syrian military lost control of or diverted them. The scale of the
CW stocks in Syria would present a great challenge for physical security. General Martin
Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, wrote in a July letter to Congress that
“[t]housands of special operations forces and other ground forces would be needed to assault and
secure critical sites.” The operation would result in the “control of some, but not all chemical
weapons” and “would also help prevent their further proliferation into the hands of extremist
groups,” the letter said. U.S. military efforts to date have focused on bolstering security near
Syria’s borders with neighboring countries such as Jordan and Turkey, perhaps partly to help
deter any transfer of chemical weapons out of Syria.
What international legal instruments ban chemical weapons use?
Chemical weapons have been banned under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) since
1997. The CWC bans the development, production, transfer, stockpiling, and use of chemical and
toxin weapons, mandates the destruction of all chemical weapons production facilities, and seeks
to control the production and international transfer of the key chemical components of these
weapons. The 189 member states may ask for assistance and protection if they are attacked with
chemical weapons. The following countries are not parties to the CWC: Angola, Egypt, Israel,
Myanmar, North Korea, South Sudan, and Syria.23
The 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare bans the use of chemical or biological
agents in warfare against other states, but does not address the use of these weapons in internal
conflicts. Syria did sign the Geneva Protocol.
23
Israel and Myanmar have signed but not ratified the Convention.
Congressional Research Service
15
Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress
How would the international community take control of and destroy the Syrian
chemical weapons stockpile?
The Syrian government has reportedly accepted a proposal by Russia that it turn over all its
chemical weapons to international control. The United Nations Security Council may discuss
proposals to accomplish this goal. President Obama said on September 10 that any deal would
have to ensure “verifiable and enforceable destruction." Key issues would be verification, access,
and security of international personnel.
The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is the international agency
that oversees the destruction of chemical weapons once a state has joined the Chemical Weapons
Convention. Because Syria is not yet a party to that convention, it would either have to join the
CWC or a separate disarmament mechanism may be set up directly by the U.N. Security Council,
as happened with Iraq in 1991 (U.N. Security Council Resolution 687). This would most likely
use the OPCW as an implementing organization for verification and dismantlement.
The United Nations and the OPCW have had experience successfully monitoring the destruction
of chemical weapons in several countries. In most cases, the country would first declare its stocks
and production facilities, and then destroy the weapons under international supervision. The
inspectors would verify that the amounts declared were then destroyed. In the case of Syria, as
with Iraq in the 1990s, the U.N. Security Council may also mandate that Syria give access to sites
that have not been declared but are suspected of holding chemical weapons.
However, because Syria is in the midst of civil war, there are many risk factors that have not been
present in other cases. First, a top priority is securing the chemical weapons stocks themselves.
Second, the inspectors would be at great physical risk without a ceasefire in place. The conflict
also would limit access of inspectors to sites of suspicion. Third, destruction of chemical weapons
is a time-consuming, expensive process with great need for safety precautions. Therefore, the
initial stage may focus on securing the chemical weapons at predetermined locations or shipped
out of the country for storage awaiting destruction. It is not clear who would be guarding this
centralized storage locations if they were inside Syria.
In addition, due to the fear that the Assad regime is using the chemical weapons destruction
proposal as a way to stave off military strikes, the United States and others may choose to set
deadlines for certain steps.
What did the French government propose to the U.N. Security Council?
On September 10, French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius announced France’s intention to
present a U.N. Security Council Resolution that would call on the Asad government to dismantle
its chemical weapons program. Fabius said the resolution would be proposed under the auspices
of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which would allow member states to use all possible means,
including military action, to enforce it. Among other things, the resolution would (1) condemn the
August 21 chemical weapons attack and punish the perpetrators of the attack in the international
justice system; (2) demand that the Asad government’s chemical weapons program be placed
under international control and be dismantled, with mechanisms for inspection and monitoring;
Congressional Research Service
16
Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress
and (3) provide for “extremely serious” consequences for Syrian violation of its obligations under
this agreement.24
Press reports say that the draft resolution France has presented to the U.N. Security Council
would give Syria 15 days to issue a full declaration of its chemical weapons and facilities and
open those facilities immediately to international inspectors.25 CRS has not independently
verified the proposed draft text. The version described in press reports would also authorize
measures under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter if Syria does not comply. It would appear that
the U.N. Secretary General would retain the lead role in inspecting chemical facilities in
coordination with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. This may be to
avoid a possible delay while Syria took the necessary legal steps to accede to the Chemical
Weapons Convention, which requires member states to declare and destroy their chemical
weapons. As noted above, Russian officials reportedly have rejected elements of the French
proposal and discussions are ongoing concerning the way forward.
War Powers26
Any deployment of U.S. Armed Forces into the territory, airspace, or waters of Syria implicates
generally the war powers vested in Congress under the Constitution, the foremost of which is the
authority to declare war.
What are the roles and responsibilities of Congress and the President pursuant
to the provisions of the War Powers Resolution?
The War Powers Resolution, as amended (WPR; P.L. 93-148), is intended to provide a process for
congressional-executive branch cooperation and the assertion of congressional oversight and
authority related to involving U.S. Armed Forces in armed conflict. The WPR requires the
President to consult with Congress prior to introducing U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities or
situations in which hostilities are imminent, and to report to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate within 48 hours of:
•
introducing U.S. Armed Forces into current or imminent hostilities;
•
deploying combat-equipped U.S. Armed Forces into a foreign country’s territory,
airspace, or waters; or
•
increasing substantially the number of U.S. Armed Forces already located in a
foreign country.
Such report is required to include the reasons necessitating such actions, the President’s authority
to undertake such actions, and the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or other
involvement. Authority to use force, according to the WPR, is not to be inferred from other
provisions of law or treaties unless those instruments specifically authorize the introduction of
24
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Syria/introductory remarks by M. Laurent Fabius, Minister of Foreign Affairs
during his press conference,” Paris, September 10, 2013.
25
Louis Charbonneau, “Revealed: French draft would give Syria chemical arms ultimatum,” Thomson Reuters,
September 10, 2013.
26
Prepared by (name redacted), Analyst in Foreign Policy Legislation.
Congressional Research Service
17
Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress
U.S. Armed Forces that has occurred in each circumstance. The WPR states that unless Congress
enacts a declaration of war or statutory authorization for the use of force, or Congress cannot
convene due to an attack on the United States, the President must withdraw U.S. Armed Forces
60 days after introducing them into current or imminent hostilities. The 60-day period begins the
day the President was required to report to Congress on such introduction of U.S. Armed Forces.
The President may extend the period by 30 days to safely withdraw U.S. Armed Forces from
hostilities. Each President since the WPR’s enactment has refused to concede that this withdrawal
requirement is appropriate under the Constitution, presumably given its possible interference with
the President’s powers as commander-in-chief under Article II.
The WPR provides for expedited consideration of legislative proposals to either authorize
continuing the involvement of U.S. Armed Forces in hostilities through joint resolution, or to
require a withdrawal of U.S. Armed Forces at any time after introduction of such forces through a
concurrent resolution. The use of the concurrent resolution to require U.S. Armed Forces
withdrawal is considered to be an example of a “legislative veto,” a mechanism that has been
deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court when included in other legislation.
What are some possible considerations if Congress takes up authorization for
the use of military force against Syria?
A congressional declaration of war against Syria is seen as unlikely, given historical practice
since World War II. If Congress considers a proposal to statutorily authorize the use of force
against Syria, it might consider provisions to specify the purpose of such authorization and the
objectives of the use of military force, and to place limits on the scope and duration of such
authorization. It is asserted generally that statutory authorizations place the President in a stronger
position legally and politically to prosecute armed conflict.
Congress has included provisions limiting the use of funds for the military in defense
authorization and appropriation acts, and could include them in an authorization for use of force
in Syria. H.J.Res. 58, introduced on September 9, 2013, would state that:
No funds available to any United States Government department or agency may be used for
the use of force in, or directed at, Syria by the United States Armed Forces unless a
subsequent Act of Congress specifically authorizes such use of force or there is an attack or
imminent attack on the United States, its territories or possessions, or the United States
Armed Forces.
Some argue, however, that any provisions attempting to circumscribe the President’s ability to
conduct military operations would improperly interfere with the President’s commander-in-chief
powers under Article II of the Constitution. In any case, if Congress does not otherwise act to
limit appropriations that can be used to continue such military operations, constricting provisions
in an authorization to use force will likely fail to limit the President’s ability to continue any
commenced military operations in Syria.
Congressional Research Service
18
Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress
Cost and Budgetary Resources for Intervention27
Since the President’s September 10, 2013, speech on Syria, congressional concerns have
broadened to include the potential costs and funding sources that would be tapped to carry out
either various U.S. military actions in Syria or to secure Syria’s chemical weapons (CW)
stockpiles and eliminate its CW capabilities. Speaker of the House John Boehner, for example,
raised the question of whether the Administration plans to submit a supplemental appropriations
request to Congress if “the scope and duration of the potential military strikes exceed the initial
planning” in an August 28, 2013, letter to President Obama.28
In testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 3, 2013, Secretary of State
John Kerry said that President Obama is asking for authorization “to degrade and deter Bashar al
Asad’s capacity to use chemical weapons,” with no American boots on the ground; Secretary
Hagel characterized the operation as “limited in duration and scope . . . [and] tailored to respond
to the use of chemical weapons.” Details about specific military plans have not been made
publicly available so estimating the cost is speculative at this point with some potential
benchmarks based on the bombing of Libya in March 2011.
In response to a question about whether members of the Arab League supporting U.S. operations
would “offset any of the costs,” Secretary of State John Kerry said that some of the Arab
countries have offered to “bear costs and to assist . . . and to [possibly] carry that cost.”29 In recent
days, some observers have suggested that the cost of securing and destroying Syria’s chemical
weapons stocks and possibly deliver options could be substantial but there is considerable
uncertainty about both the potential cost and the sharing of those costs.
The cost of any military intervention or to secure chemical weapons stocks could range widely
depending on the type and length of U.S. military actions or role in providing force protection in
chemical disarmament efforts, the participation and cost-sharing by U.S. allies, and Syrian and
Syrian-allied responses. Funding sources could also vary depending not only on the amount
required, but also the timing. Congressional participation in decision making on costs depends on
whether the Administration (1) taps currently available funding for FY2013, which appears
unlikely now; (2) uses appropriations provided in FY2014 if actions take place after October 1,
2013; or (3) requests reprogrammings of existing funds or supplemental appropriations. The
availability of funds may also be affected by the timing as well as the scope of costs since it is
now close to the last month of the FY2013, and the Department of Defense is closely tracking
funds so as to implement required sequestration cuts.
What are the range and factors that would affect the potential cost of U.S.
military intervention in Syria?
In a July 19, 2013, response to a letter from Senators Levin and Inhofe, chair and ranking
Member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, outlined the costs of various military options but did not recommend any
27
Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget.
Speaker of the House, John Boehner, Letter to President Obama, September 28, 2013; http://www.speaker.gov/pressrelease/boehner-seeks-answers-president-obama-syria.
29
Ibid.
28
Congressional Research Service
19
Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress
particular option since this is a presidential decision. According to his letter, costs could range
from $500 million initially to train, advise, and assist opposition forces in a safe area outside
Syria to “as much as a billion dollars per month over the course of a year” (up to $12 billion) to
use military force to establish either a no-fly zone that would prevent the regime from using its
military aircraft or a buffer zone to protect border areas next to Turkey or Jordan.
General Dempsey estimated the cost could be “billions” to conduct a major military campaign
that appears to more extensive than the limited strike that the Administration was considering. He
described that option as using “lethal force to strike targets that enable the regime to conduct
military operations, proliferate advanced weapons, and defend itself,” by destroying military
forces and units, air defense, military facilities, or headquarters.30 This range of options shows
that the factors affecting cost include the scope of military operations (e.g., the numbers and types
of forces used), and the length of the operation, which may, in turn, depend on Syrian and allied
responses, as well as any participation or cost-sharing by allies.
In testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on September 4, 2013, Secretary of
Defense Chuck Hagel said that DOD provided a range of costs based on different options and that
the current option (of a limited strike) “would [cost] in the tens of millions of dollars, that kind of
range.”31 On September 4, 2013, two days later, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan
Greenert suggested that the naval costs of the Syrian operation are “not extraordinary at this
point,” partly because many of the ships involved were already forward-deployed so that their
costs would already be covered in the budget but that lengthening the deployment of the Nimitz
carrier and replenishing Tomahawk missiles used, which cost about $1.5 million each, could add
costs.32
Some observers have questioned whether these informal estimates that costs of a strike would be
minimal costs are realistic.33 The resolution authorizing the use of force in Syria, as revised and
reported by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, requires that the President report to
Congress and the Senate Foreign Relations and the House Foreign Affairs on both the status of
the operation, and the “financial costs of operations to date ten days after initiation of military
operations and every 20 days thereafter until completion.”34
What are the range and factors that would affect the potential cost of disarming
Syria’s chemical weapons capability?
In the July 19, 2013, letter, General Dempsey also estimated that destroying portions of Syria’s
chemical weapons stockpiles could require more than $1 billion a month because “hundreds of
30
Ibid, p. 1.
Testimony of Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel before House Foreign Affairs Committee, transcript, “Hearing on
the Authorization for Use of Military Force in Syria,” September 4, 2013.
32
American Enterprise Institute,” Squaring the Circle: Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert on American military strategy in
a time of declining resources,” September 5, 2013; http://www.aei.org/events/2013/09/05/squaring-the-circle-admiral31
jonathan-w-greenert-on-american-military-strategy-in-a-time-of-declining-resources/. Agence France-Presse, “Costs of Syria
Strikes would not be ‘Extraordinary’: U.S. Navy,” September 5, 2013.
33
Reuters,”Cost Of A U.S. Strike Against Syria Could Top Hagel's Estimate,” September 5, 2013; Agence France-
Presse, “Costs of Syria Strikes would not be ‘Extraordinary’: U.S. Navy,” September 5, 2013.
34
See Sec. 7 in S.J. Res _, “To authorize the limited and specified use of the United States Armed Forces against
Syria;” http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/DAV13973.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
20
Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress
aircraft, ships, submarines, and other enablers” and “thousands of special operations forces and
other ground forces” would be needed to secure critical sites.35 This estimate may have reflected a
DOD study conducted and reported to the White House in late 2012, according to press reports,
that estimated that a military effort to seize Syrian weapons stocks would require “upwards of
75,000 troops.”36 Recent press reports have repeated this 75,000 figure as suggesting that the
costs of securing Syrian weapons stocks would be substantial.37
This estimate of 75,000 U.S. troops does not appear to be an apt analogy because it assumes
forcible entry by the United States. That scenario is very different from the international effort
currently in the early stages of negotiation that is exploring a chemical disarmament effort that
would be conducted with Syrian agreement under international auspices. The potential U.S. cost
of such an effort would depend on Syria’s agreement about who would participate in such an
effort, which would provide force protection for inspectors, potential cost-sharing of inspection
costs that could be conducted by a combination of government and contractor personnel, and the
extent and length of the effort. While the potential costs of chemical disarmament could well be
greater than a limited military strike, it is not possible at this stage to estimate those costs.
What funding sources are available for U.S. military intervention in Syria?
With the end of FY2013 fast approaching, it is unlikely that FY2013 funds will be tapped for
either a limited military strike, temporarily off-the-table, or a chemical disarmament effort, a fact
recently noted by Secretary of Defense Hagel.38 Funding sources would likely be FY2014 funds,
reprogramming of available funds, or supplemental appropriations if expenses to conduct military
intervention or chemically disarm Syria proved to be substantial. These options would be
available for either a limited military strike or a chemical disarmament effort though the scope
and timing of a chemical disarmament effort are unknown at this time.
According to Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, the United States now has “moved assets in
place,” including four DDG-51 Arleigh Burke destroyers in the Mediterranean, that could meet
“whatever [military] option the president wishes to take.”39 To the extent that DOD relies on U.S.
military assets now or planned to be in-place to conduct military operations, the cost of deploying
those ships (military personnel, fuel, spare parts) is presumably funded with FY2013 DOD
35
General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Memo to Chair of the Senate Armed Services
Committee,” July 19, 2013, pp. 1-2; http://www.levin.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/gen-dempsey-responds-tolevins-request-for-assessment-of-options-for-use-of-us-military-force-in-syria.
36
New York Times, “Pentagon Says 75,000 Troops Might Be Needed to Seize Syria Chemical Arms,” November 15,
2012 by David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt; http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/16/world/middleeast/pentagonsees-seizing-syria-chemical-arms-as-vast-task.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
37
See “A Pentagon study concluded that doing so would take more than 75,000 troops. That rough estimate has been
questioned, but the official said it gave “a sense of the magnitude of the task” in New York Times, Chemical
Disarmament Hard Even in Peacetime,” September 10, 2013; “ and Defense One, “Obama's Wrong, Syria's Chemical
Weapons Require Boots on the Ground,” 9-12-13; http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2013/09/how-do-you-securechemical-weapons-syria-without-boots-ground/70218/.
38
See Hagel testimony before House Armed Services Committee, “Hearing on the Authorization for Use of Military
Force in Syria, “September 10, 2013: “Now your question. If, in fact, there is a strike in Syria, it is now the middle of
September. We go into another fiscal year in about two weeks. So a significant amount of the cost of that strike -obviously, anything that goes beyond October 1st would be in F.Y. 2014. It would not apply to 2013.”
39
BBC, “U.S. ready to launch Syria strike, says Chuck Hagel,” August 27, 2013; http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-uscanada-23847839.
Congressional Research Service
21
Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress
appropriations for Military Personnel and Operation and Maintenance (O&M) that were provided
in the FY2013 Consolidated and Continuing Appropriations Act (P.L. 113-6). The deployment of
the four destroyers to the Mediterranean in preparation for Syrian operations appears to be part of
the Navy’s planned peacetime presence mission, and for that reason would be funded within the
Navy’s base budget for regular activities rather than Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) or
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), which pays for incremental war costs primarily for the
Afghan war.40
Brief U.S. military operations to establish a no-fly zone conducted in Libya in 2011 relied almost
exclusively on existing appropriations. DOD’s estimated costs were about $800 million, including
offsets or savings from lower peacetime flying hours during operations.41 The Administration also
estimated that the short-lived Libyan operation would not have significant operational impacts on
the Afghan or Iraq wars.42 The Administration did not request supplemental appropriations for
Libyan operations, relying instead on available funds and existing inventories of munitions.43
There is no restriction that prevents the President from using available funds to conduct wartime
operations. DOD transferred OCO funds originally appropriated for another purpose to replenish
the inventory of missiles expended in that operation at a later date after receiving approval from
the four congressional defense committees.44
However, possible U.S. military intervention in Syria could be significantly different from the
2011 Libyan operation. If the scope of operations and costs proved to be larger than the Libyan
operation, the Department of Defense could face some difficulties in accommodating costs within
its existing budget or by shifting funds among activities—particularly in view of sequestration,
which was not applicable in 2011. This could also be complicated because there is uncertainty
about the enactment of FY2014 appropriations. If Congress enacts a Continuing Resolution for
FY2014, that funding would be available for Syrian military operations by “cash flowing,” a term
40
Press reports indicate that the Navy extended the deployment date of one ship; see, for example, RT News, “US
readies possible missile strike against Syria – report,” published August 24, 2013; edited, August 25, 2013.
41
By late 2011, DOD said the overall Libya mission cost was roughly $1 billion.
42
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate, “S.J. Res. 20, A Joint Resolution authorizing the limited use of United
States Armed Forces in support of the NATO Mission in Libya as reported by the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations on June 29, 2011”; http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/123xx/doc12306/sjres20.pdf; Department of State, DOD,
Report to Congress, United States Activities in Libya, p. 21, June 15, 2011;
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/files/fp_uploaded_documents/110615_United_States_Activities_in_Libya_-_6_15_11.pdf. This report notes that operational impacts on DOD’s other missions were not significant: “There has not
been a significant operational impact on United States activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. All the forces that were
briefly diverted from other operations have been replaced, with the exception of one Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG).
That capability will be replaced during June 2011. In some cases, forces were delayed in arriving in Iraq and
Afghanistan, but the operational impact was mitigated by forces already supporting these operations.” See also
testimony by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in a March 27, 2011 interview about Libya operations: “Sec. Gates: . .
. But a lot of these -- a lot of the forces that we will have available other than the ISR are forces that are already
assigned to Europe or have been assigned to Italy or at sea in the Mediterranean.” U.S. Department of Defense, News
Transcript, ABC’s This Week” interview with Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, and Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton March 27, 2011; http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=4800.
43
See p. 15 in State, United States Activities in Libya: “These operating costs will be offset through reductions in lower
priority support activities, and there will be some reduction to the peacetime flying hour program in part as a result of
the Libya operation. The Department plans to replace munitions used in the Libyan operation as part of its normal
programming and budgeting process.”
44
DOD, Reprogramming Action, Omnibus, Final, Various Appropriations, 11-21-R_PA, 66, 9-13-11;
http://comptroller.defense.gov/execution/reprogramming/fy2011.html.
Congressional Research Service
22
Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress
sometimes often used by budget officials that means using currently available funds that may
have been intended for either peacetime or Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) operations.
If the cost of military intervention in Syria proved to be larger than anticipated, DOD could shift
funds from less urgent programs or activities by using reprogramming authority provided in
DOD’s annual authorization and appropriations acts. Moving funds from one appropriations
account to another or, in some cases, from one type of activity to another requires the written
approval of the four congressional defense committees.45 If the costs of the operation expanded
further, the Administration might need to request supplemental appropriations, which would
require full congressional approval.
How might Congress limit funding for either a limited strike or a chemical
disarmament effort?
In addition to voting on any supplemental appropriations should they prove necessary, Congress
can and has placed restrictions on the use of funds in any appropriations bill. Such restrictions can
prohibit obligating (putting on contract or paying civilians) or expending (spending or outlays)
funds and can be included in any appropriations act.
Past statutory language has included funding restrictions that apply:
•
to all or only specific types of military operations (e.g., combat), or particular
types of activities;
•
after a particular date or passage of time, or are contingent on certain events
taking place (e.g., negotiation of a cease-fire) or a presidential determination.
Finally, funding prohibitions can be applied to the funds in a particular bill, all previous bills, or
any appropriation act. Restrictions can also be placed in authorization acts.46
Most recently, Representative Ted Poe introduced a resolution, H.J.Res. 58, that states that
No funds available to any United States Government department or agency may be used for
the use of force in, or directed at, Syria by the United States Armed Forces unless a
subsequent Act of Congress specifically authorizes such use of force or there is an attack or
imminent attack on the United States, its territories or possessions, or the United States
Armed Forces.
This amendment prohibiting the use of funds for a military actions would apply broadly—to all
enacted appropriations acts, past or FY2014 when enacted, with an exception should a
congressional authorization be passed or in the case of a direct attack on the United States.
While the recently proposed Manchin-Heitkamp resolution (S.J.Res. 22) does not directly include
a funding restriction, it states that it is U.S. policy that the United States can consider using “all
elements of national power,” (presumably referring to military action) only if the Syrian
45
See, for example, Sec. 8005, P.L. 113-6, the FY2013 Consolidated and Continuing Appropriations Act of 2013. See
DOD, “Budget Execution Flexibility Tutorial” at http://comptroller.defense.gov/BudgetExecution.html.
46
CRS Report RL33803, Congressional Restrictions on U.S. Military Operations in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos,
Somalia, and Kosovo: Funding and Non-Funding Approaches, by (name redacted) et al., p. 3ff.
Congressional Research Service
23
Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress
government does not sign and comply with the Chemical Weapons Convention within 45 days.
This follows the pattern of prohibitions that are contingent on certain conditions and the passage
of time.
How might the cost of Syrian military intervention or chemical disarmament
efforts be affected by ongoing sequestration cuts in FY2013 or in FY2014 if
sequestration again occurs?
Since current ship deployments in the Mediterranean are largely following current plans (with
minor adjustments in schedule), ongoing sequestration cuts would not necessarily have an effect
on the option of a limited military strike. In addition, the Administration’s and DOD’s policy has
been to minimize effects on DOD’s core readiness-related activities such as those deployments.47
The President also exempted military personnel accounts from sequestration for both FY2013 and
FY2014.
The services have focused ongoing sequestration cuts on lower priority Operation & Maintenance
(O&M) activities such as travel, conferences, non-training flying hours, facility upgrades,
Information Technology, and depot maintenance. Although the services initially reduced some
training activities to meet sequestration cuts, many of these cuts were later reversed as savings
became available in other areas. At the same time, some Members of Congress and DOD
spokesmen have raised concerns about readiness in later years from the current sequestration or
from later cuts to the DOD budget in FY2014, which could be exacerbated by a lengthy Syrian
intervention.
If Congress were to enact supplemental appropriations to cover the cost of Syrian military
intervention or chemical disarmament efforts, and designated that funding as emergency, those
monies would not be subject to the budget caps in the Budget Control Act (BCA). On the other
hand, if Congress does not meet BCA caps, FY2014 sequestration cuts would be levied by the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in early January 2014 and funds for any operations
involving Syria would be part of the budgetary resources subject to those cuts. As in the case of
Afghan war costs, however, DOD could choose to shield those costs from cuts by levying higher
reductions on other operational activities.
Military Planning48
As of September 6, U.S. military planning information is, in unclassified sources, largely
speculative. Congress may, as the situation warrants, consider the following questions regarding
its role in relation to U.S. and allied military plans:
•
Which strategic objectives are proposed military operations designed to secure?
How are the proposed operations tailored to meet those specific objectives? What
47
OMB, Jeffrey D. Zients, Deputy Director for Management, ”Planning for Uncertainty with Respect to Fiscal Year
2013 Budgetary Resources,” January 14, 2013;
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2013/m-13-03.pdf. DOD, Memorandum from Under
Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter to the Military Departments, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Defense agencies and others,
”Handling Budgetary Uncertainty in Fiscal Year 2013,” January 10, 2013.
48
Prepared by (name redacted), Section Research Manager, Defense Policy and Arms Control.
Congressional Research Service
24
Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress
targets would U.S. or allied military forces strike in Syria? Why? What would
constitute success and how would that success advance broader U.S. policy
objectives in Syria, in the region, and internationally? What would constitute
failure and how might that affect U.S. objectives?
•
Should an authorization for the use of military force be limited in terms of
purpose, territory, potential targets, potential means, potential cost, or potential
duration? Why or why not? Does the Administration believe that the draft
authorization submitted to Congress would allow it to conduct military
operations outside of Syria? Against non-state actors in Syria or elsewhere?
Against the military forces of governments other than Syria?
•
What U.S. forces and capabilities are currently able to engage targets in Syria?
What potential coalition forces and capabilities are available? Which countries
are willing to take part in military strikes? Which countries are willing to allow
their territory, waters, and airspace to be used to facilitate proposed operations?
With what conditions? How do the current prospects for international support
impact the U.S. military mission in terms of risk, cost, feasibility, and likely
duration?
•
What force might the Syrian government bring to bear to resist or respond to a
military operation against it? How might Syrian allies such as Russia, Iran, and
non-state actors like Hezbollah respond to any U.S. military intervention? How
might extremist groups seek to take advantage of any U.S. operations? How
might opposition groups receiving U.S. support benefit or be put at risk by U.S.
military operations? What are the “known unknowns” with regard to a potential
U.S. military response to the alleged use of chemical weapons?
•
Who are the most capable armed groups operating in Syria? What are their longterm political goals? Should proposed military operations be conducted in
conjunction with an increase in direct support to armed or unarmed opposition
groups? Why or why not?
•
How can the United States best limit opportunities for violent extremist groups to
take advantage of any proposed military strike? What threats to U.S. security and
regional security might follow from these groups in the event of regime change?
•
What have leaders in Israel, Jordan, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Lebanon,
the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar told the Administration regarding their
individual views of the August 21 incident and the proposed U.S. response? How
does the Administration envision assisting other countries in mitigating the
impact of any potential retaliation or provocation?
•
If the U.S. conducts military strike operations in Syria, what are the next steps
that military forces would take? Is the U.S. military in a position to sustain
military operations in the region?
•
Given the impact of sequestration on U.S. military operations and maintenance,
as well as the continued deployment of military assets in support of operations in
Afghanistan and elsewhere, are U.S. forces fully prepared to undertake both
planned and contingent military operations in Syria? Would the possible
dedication of already constrained U.S. military and/or DOD-contracted
commercial airlift and sealift to a Syrian contingency operation have an adverse
impact on U.S. retrograde operations currently underway in Afghanistan?
Congressional Research Service
25
Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress
What are some military options reportedly under consideration?49
Several media reports indicate that the United States is considering a military strike against Syria
in response to the regime's alleged use of chemical weapons against civilians on August 21.
Numerous accounts suggest that the strategic goal of such a punitive strike would be to deter
future chemical weapons use and degrade the Assad regime's capabilities to carry out future
attacks. Some analysts question whether limited strikes can successfully accomplish the strategic
objective of deterrence. For example, Chris Harmer, a senior naval analyst at the Institute for the
Study of War, has argued that "the Assad regime has shown an incredible capacity to endure pain
and I don't think we have the stomach to deploy enough punitive action that would serve as a
deterrent."
A report by the RAND Corporation outlined five broad possible missions for a Syrian attack
using airpower.50 They included negating Syrian airpower; neutralizing Syrian air defenses;
defending “safe areas” within Syria; enabling opposition forces to defeat the regime; and
preventing the use of Syrian chemical weapons. These missions are in many ways
complementary.
The United States has developed munitions specifically designed to neutralize chemical
weapons.51 Called “agent defeat munitions,” these devices use a large, high-temperature fireball
to incinerate chemical agents. CRS has not yet been able to determine the number of such
munitions currently in U.S. inventory. However, their potential use may be complicated by
several factors:
•
First, the current generation of agent defeat munitions is believed to be
deliverable only by aircraft, not cruise missiles; whether the United States would
engage in air strikes without first suppressing Syrian air defenses is questionable.
•
Second, due to their limited range of effects, agent defeat munitions require a
precise knowledge of where the chemical weapons are stored. Syria is believed to
have dispersed its chemical stocks in recent days.
•
Third, a direct attack on chemical stocks raises the possibility of a collateral
release of chemical agent.
However, degrading Syria’s capability to employ chemical weapons would not necessarily
require strikes on the chemical stockpiles themselves. Potential U.S. attacks against the command
and control network used to direct chemical use; the missiles, rocket launchers, and aircraft
potentially used to deliver such weapons; and Syrian military command centers could all
“degrade” Syria’s CW capabilities without risking collateral release of chemical agents.
“Deterring” further chemical use by Syria is a more complicated prospect, as it depends on
understanding what could affect the Syrian command’s calculations of gain vs. loss when
considering whether to again employ chemical weapons. However, some strike options are viable
49
Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs and JJ Gertler, Specialist in Military Aviation.
Karl P. Mueller, Jeffrey Martini, and Thomas Hamilton, Airpower Options for Syria: Assessing Objectives and
Missions for Aerial Intervention, The RAND Corporation, RR-446-CMEPP, September 3, 2013.
51
See, inter alia, Kris Osborn, "Air Force Developed Bombs Capable of Destroying Syria's Chemical Weapons,"
DefenseTech.org, August 30, 2013, http://defensetech.org/2013/08/30/air-force-developed-bombs-capable-ofdestroying-syrias-chemical-weapons/.
50
Congressional Research Service
26
Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress
and offer significant deterrent value. For example, a strike designed to degrade or disrupt Syria’s
air defense network could leave Syria exposed, with its leaders conscious of the potential for
severe retaliation following any further CW use. Similarly, an attack to destroy the Syrian air
force would reduce Syria’s ability to deliver some types of chemical weapons, while also
inhibiting its ability to defend against air attacks and to prosecute the civil war from the air.
The Institute for the Study of War planned a notional strike to “significantly degrade” the Syrian
air force.52 While not necessarily the U.S. plan, it gives a rough idea of the munitions required for
such a strike. The plan required 133 Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAM), 24 Joint StandOff Weapons, and 24 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles. The Tomahawks could be launched
from surface ships or submarines in the Mediterranean; the other weapons would be delivered by
aircraft. The benefit of using so-called "stand-off weapons" such as a TLAM fired from a
destroyer is that the firing vessel can be stationed beyond the range of Syrian anti-ship missiles.53
U.S. aircraft, such as the B-2 and B-52 bombers, also can carry air-launched cruise missiles.
Other proposed military options, such as establishing no-fly zones54 inside or outside Syria, may
require a more extensive and longer-term U.S. commitment. According to Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey, "Lethal force would be required to defend the zones
against air, missile, and ground attacks.... This would necessitate the establishment of a limited
no-fly zone, with its associated resource requirements. Thousands of U.S. ground forces would be
needed, even if positioned outside Syria, to support those physically defending the zones."55
Operationally, Congress may wish to scrutinize the U.S. military's evaluation of the situation in
evaluating a potential no-fly zone. In evaluating the situation, one may consider the nature and
density of adversary air defenses, the quantity and quality of adversary air assets, geography, and
availability of "friendly" assets. In evaluating adversaries, one may consider their strategy and
tactics, their possible responses, their concept of operations, and their rules of engagement.
If the United States and others were to conduct manned aerial strikes against Syria, the United
States may employ its F-16 aircraft stationed in Jordan. Additionally, the Air Force's 39th Air Base
Wing is based at Incirlik air base in southern Turkey, and U.S. military action against Syria could
originate from there, though it might require prior approval from Turkey's parliament. The United
States may also have access to the British base at Akrotiri, Cyprus, where additional British
military aircraft have been reportedly been deployed in recent days. If France were to take part in
military action against Syria, it has access to an air base in the United Arab Emirates.
52
Christopher Harmer, Required Sorties and Weapons to Degrade Syrian Air Force Excluding Integrated Air Defense
System (IADS), Institute for the Study of War, July 31, 2013, http://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/requiredsorties-and-weapons-degrade-syrian-air-force.
53
An earlier attack designed to degrade an opponent’s ability to deploy weapons of mass destruction and force
international inspections, Operation Desert Fox vs. Iraq in 1998, required 325 TLAMs and 90 air-launched cruise
missiles against a larger target set, so these numbers appear a reasonable first-order approximation.
54
This issue is discussed in depth in CRS Report R41701, No-Fly Zones: Strategic, Operational, and Legal
Considerations for Congress, coordinated by (name redacted).
55
"Syria: What are the West's military options?" Agence France Presse, August 22, 2013.
Congressional Research Service
27
Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress
U.S. Aid to the Opposition
Arming the Syrian Opposition56
Secretary of Defense Hagel in a September 3, 2013, hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee stated that the Administration is currently taking steps to provide arms to Syrian
rebels under covert action authorities.57 On September 4, in a hearing before the House Foreign
Affairs Committee, Secretary of State Kerry said, “we have seen the president take steps in
response to the initial attacks of chemical weapons to increase lethal aid to the opposition. That is
now known.” The statute concerning covert action thus shapes both how the Administration can
intervene in Syria under those authorities and the way in which the Administration engages with
Congress and the public about any intervention.
What are the limits and extent of covert action authorities with respect to
Syria?
Covert action is defined in statute as “an activity or activities of the United States Government to
influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of
the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.”58 Section 503 of
the National Security Act of 1947 authorizes the President to conduct covert action if that action
is necessary to support identifiable foreign policy objectives of the United States and is important
to the national security of the United States. The statute requires the President to write a “finding”
that specifies the identifiable foreign policy objectives. The President must provide the finding to
the congressional intelligence committees as soon as possible and before the initiation of the
covert action.59 The President is not required to provide the finding to Members who are not on
the intelligence committees.
The “apparent or acknowledged” language in the statute may limit what the Administration is
willing to say publicly about its aid to the Syria opposition. The language also provides a vague
limitation on the extent to which covert action authorities can be utilized to broaden support for
the opposition or to take additional action in Syria beyond aid to the opposition. During past
covert actions in other countries, the role of the U.S. government has sometimes become apparent
56
Prepared by Marshall Erwin, Analyst in Intelligence and National Security.
Secretary Hagel said, “it was June of this year that the president made the decision to support lethal assistance to the
opposition. As you all know, we have been very supportive with hundreds of millions of dollars of non-lethal
assistance. The vetting process that Secretary Kerry noted has been significant, but -- I'll ask General Dempsey if he
wants to add anything -- but we, the Department of Defense, have not been directly involved in this. This is, as you
know, a covert action. And, as Secretary Kerry noted, probably to [go] into much more detail would -- would require a
closed or classified hearing.” In June 2013, National Security Council spokesman Ben Rhodes had said that the
President had, “authorized the expansion of our assistance to the Supreme Military Council (SMC)” in an effort “aimed
at strengthening the effectiveness of the SMC, and helping to coordinate the provision of assistance by the United
States and other partners and allies. Put simply, the Assad regime should know that its actions have led us to increase
the scope and scale of assistance that we provide to the opposition, including direct support to the SMC. These efforts
will increase going forward.”
58
50 U.S. C. 413b
59
Section 503 provides a number of exceptions to this notification requirement. Among those, the President may limit
notification to the “gang of eight”—the leaders of the intelligence committees and the leaders of the House and
Senate—to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States.
57
Congressional Research Service
28
Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress
or acknowledged in the course of public debate. This has not always proven to be a limiting factor
regarding whether covert action authorities are applicable. Nonetheless, the broader the U.S.
actions and the more those actions require an Administration to make a case to the American
public, the more difficult it may become to justify activities under these authorities.
What organizations may conduct covert action?
Although covert action is generally the domain of the Central Intelligence Agency, the statute
does not identify specific departments or agencies that may conduct covert action. Executive
Order 12333, concerning United States Intelligence Activities, notes that, “No agency except the
Central Intelligence Agency (or the Armed Forces of the United States in time of war declared by
the Congress or during any period covered by a report from the President to the Congress
consistent with the War Powers Resolution, P.L. 93-148) may conduct any covert action activity
unless the President determines that another agency is more likely to achieve a particular
objective.”60
Non-Lethal Aid to the Opposition and Economic Sanctions against the
Regime61
The Administration’s decision and the means otherwise available to provide material support to
Syria’s opposition—in the form of humanitarian goods and services, non-lethal aid, or military
assistance—face obstacles from a robust U.S. economic sanctions regime maintained against
Syria for decades. These sanctions were triggered by the Syrian government’s support of
international terrorism, poor human rights record, and weapons proliferation.62
Considering the economic sanctions, can the United States currently provide
foreign aid to the Syrian opposition?
Laws authorizing U.S. foreign aid programs are constructed generally to provide assistance stateto-state, and Syria is explicitly prohibited from eligibility under current appropriations. The U.S.
growing interest in supporting Syrian opposition forces is further complicated by international
obligations that require the United States to control exports and identify end-users to meet
standards relating to terrorism, regional stability, and weapons proliferation. The President,
however, has authority, notwithstanding the restrictions, to provide humanitarian aid, fund
emergency response efforts in neighboring states, contribute to multinational programs that are
engaged in the international response to Syria’s crisis, and reprogram assistance from other
programs to those that address disasters or unanticipated events. Specific laws that the President
can draw upon include:
60
Executive Order 12333, “United States Intelligence Activities.”
Prepared by Dianne E Rennack, Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation.
62
More recently, in a series of Executive Orders based on authority granted his office in the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act, the President declared that Syria’s occupation of Lebanon, pursuit of weapons of mass
destruction, and destabilization efforts in Iraq posed an extraordinary threat to the United States’ national security,
foreign policy, and economy. In ensuing years, he further determined that the Syrian government was implicated in the
assassination of Lebanon’s prime minister, massive public corruption, human rights abuses including the use of torture,
arbitrary detention, and escalating violence against the Syrian people.
61
Congressional Research Service
29
Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress
•
Section 2(c) of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962 (22 U.S.C.
2601(c)) authorizes the President to respond to “unexpected urgent refugee and
migration needs” if he determines it is important to U.S. national interests to do
so.
•
Section 451 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2261) authorizes
the President to draw upon up to $25 million in foreign aid in a fiscal year to
respond to “unanticipated contingencies....” Current foreign operations
appropriations (at Section 7034(f) of P.L. 112-74, as continued and amended by
P.L. 113-6) raises the Section 451 limit to $100 million for FY2013.
•
Section 552(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2348a(c))
authorizes the President to provide peacekeeping operations funds (up to $15
million in funds and up to $425 million in commodities and services in a fiscal
year) to respond to any “unforeseen emergency” if he finds it “important to the
national interests” to do so.
•
Section 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2364) authorizes
the President to provide assistance “without regard” to any other restriction in
that Act or other foreign aid- or military aid-related laws if he finds it “important
to the security interests of the United States” to do so. He may make up to $250
million available, but not more than $50 million to one country, in a given fiscal
year.
•
In addition, section 202(a) of the Food for Peace Act (7 U.S.C. 1722(a))
authorizes the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development to
“provide agricultural commodities to meet emergency food needs through
governments and public or private agencies including intergovernmental
organizations such as the World Food Program and other multilateral
organizations....”
How has the Obama Administration been able to provide aid to Syria in recent
years?63
Most U.S. foreign aid going to Syria is for humanitarian assistance. In FY2013, the United States
is providing over $1 billion of humanitarian assistance and more than $250 million in nonhumanitarian aid to the people of Syria to support the opposition. According to the Department of
State, transfer authority for Overseas Contingency Operations provided within appropriations
laws, and Section 451 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which authorizes the President to
use up to $25 million in one fiscal year for unanticipated contingencies, has been and continues to
be crucial for providing both humanitarian and non-humanitarian aid to Syria since 2011. Current
foreign operations appropriations (at Section 7034(f) of P.L. 112-74, as continued and amended
by P.L. 113-6) raises the Section 451 limit to $100 million for FY2013.
The Obama Administration has acknowledged the funding challenges that the Syria crisis
presents and worked with Congress to increase the balances in global humanitarian assistance
accounts in the FY2013 final appropriations bill to better meet Syria related needs. However, the
63
Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in Foreign Policy and Christopher Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern
Affairs.
Congressional Research Service
30
Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress
Administration has not identified specific additional Syria assistance funding requests in its
FY2014 appropriations budget and all indications suggest that the Administration intends to
continue to fund Syria opposition assistance efforts on an ad hoc basis by presenting
reprogramming requests and emergency contingency notifications to Congress.
The Administration did request $580 million for a new Middle East and North Africa Incentive
Fund (MENA IF) that would have provided a multiyear source of funding to respond to
contingencies in Arab countries, including Syria, as needed. However, the House Appropriations
Committee has declined to include funds for the Incentive Fund in its markup of H.R. 2855.
Senate appropriators similarly declined to provide funds and authorities for MENA IF as
requested by the Administration and has proposed a $575 million Complex Foreign Crises Fund
to meet region wide assistance needs in their markup of S. 1372.
Who is involved with defining and implementing the U.S. sanctions regime?
Congress enacts annual foreign operations appropriations, can amend restrictions stated in
authorizations, and can enact legislation to incrementally or fully remove restrictions. The
President can exercise any or all of the foreign aid authorities listed above. He also is authorized,
under the National Emergencies Act (particularly 50 U.S.C. 1621) and the International
Emergencies Economic Powers Act (particularly 50 U.S.C. 1702) to restrict all transactions any
U.S. person or entity might enter into with Syria or designated individuals therein. The State
Department oversees arms sales and transfers, visas, and U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) programs. The Department of Commerce issues export licenses after
taking into consideration a recipient country’s compliance with international standards relating to
terrorism, regional stability, and proliferation. The Department of the Treasury controls financial
transactions relating to trade and economic engagement, and is also guided by those international
standards.
U.S. Humanitarian Response64
The ongoing conflict in Syria has created one of the most pressing humanitarian crises in the
world. An estimated 6.8 million people in Syria, almost one-third of the population, have been
affected by the conflict, including more than 4.2 million displaced inside Syria and more than 2
million Syrians displaced as refugees with 97% fleeing to countries in the immediate surrounding
region, including Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, and other parts of North Africa.65 The
situation is fluid and continues to worsen, while humanitarian needs are immense and increase
daily. The United States has a critical role and voice regarding humanitarian access in Syria, the
pace of humanitarian developments and contingency planning, support to neighboring countries
that are hosting refugees, and burden sharing among donors.
64
Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in Internati onal Humanitarian Policy. For more information, see CRS
Report R43119, Syria: Overview of the Humanitarian Response, by (name redacted) and (name redacted).
65
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, “Number of Syrian Refugees Tops 2 Million Mark with More on the Way,”
September 3, 2013.
Congressional Research Service
31
Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress
How much humanitarian assistance has the United States provided to date?
The United States is the largest donor of humanitarian assistance and is part of the massive,
international humanitarian operation in parts of Syria and in neighboring countries. In FY2012
and to date in FY2013, the United States has allocated more than $1 billion to meet humanitarian
needs using existing funding from global humanitarian accounts and some reprogrammed
funding. U.S. humanitarian policy is guided by concerns about humanitarian access and
protection within Syria; the large refugee flows out of the country that strain the resources of
neighboring countries (and could negatively impact the overall stability of the region); and the
potential for further escalation and protraction of the humanitarian emergency. The international
humanitarian response is immense and complex, but struggles to keep pace with urgent
developments that have risen above anticipated needs. Access within Syria is severely constrained
by violence and restrictions imposed by the Syrian government on the operations of humanitarian
organizations. Two U.N. emergency appeals, which identify a total of $4.4 billion in humanitarian
needs, are less than 47% funded.
What have been some of the possible humanitarian policy considerations for
Congress to date? What effect might military action have on the humanitarian
crisis?
As U.S. policy makers and the international community deliberate over what, if any, actions they
can or should take on the Syria crisis, possible humanitarian policy considerations for Congress
include (1) issues related to U.S. resources and determination of priorities, including other
humanitarian or foreign aid concerns and domestic needs; (2) and the potential costs and benefits
of labeling or “branding” of humanitarian aid delivered to Syria so that recipients and possibly
other actors are aware of its American origins. It is unclear what effect military action may have
on the humanitarian situation in Syria and in the region. Since mid-August refugee outflows have
increased in anticipation of foreign military strikes and an intensification of fighting inside Syria.
International Response
The United Nations Security Council66
Under the United Nations (U.N.) Charter, the U.N. Security Council is the primary mechanism
for addressing issues related to the maintenance of international peace and security. Decisions of
the Council are binding on member states. Adoption of resolutions is the most prevalent method
for Council decision-making.67 The Council has 15 members—five permanent (China, France,
Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, hereinafter “P-5”) and 10 non-permanent
(currently Argentina, Australia, Azerbaijan, Guatemala, Luxembourg, Morocco, Pakistan,
Republic of Korea (South Korea), Rwanda, and Togo). Decisions on non-procedural or
substantive matters require nine affirmative votes, including the concurring votes of the
permanent members. Thus, a negative vote by any of the P-5 is a veto over adoption of a draft
66
67
Prepared by (name redacted) and Marjorie Browne, Specialists in International Relations.
The Council may also make decisions by consensus (i.e., without voting).
Congressional Research Service
32
Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress
resolution.68 Few observers expect consensus on Syria to be reached among the P-5. Since the
conflict began, both China and Russia have vetoed three draft Council resolutions addressing the
conflict. The Council may meet to consider a proposal to enforce a chemical weapons
disarmament agreement with Syria.
What is the role of the Security Council in authorizing use of force?
Any Security Council decisions to authorize the use of force would likely be taken under Chapter
VII of the U.N. Charter, entitled, “Action with respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the
Peace, and Acts of Aggression.” Article 42 of this Chapter authorizes the Council to take “action
by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and
security.” Such actions might include a variety of military operations by the forces of U.N.
member states, including but not limited to demonstrations and blockades.
Russia69
Russia has provided consistent diplomatic and military support to the Asad regime in Syria during
the civil war. Russia recognizes the Asad regime as the currently legitimate government of Syria
and asserts a sovereign right to provide arms to the regime under existing arms sales contracts.
Russia also has a lease on a naval docking facility at Tartus, Syria. Russia has vetoed three U.N.
Security Council (UNSC) resolutions aimed at addressing the Syrian conflict on the grounds that
they would have unduly interfered with the domestically involved parties’ efforts to reach a
peaceful political solution to the conflict.70
How has Russia reacted to the potential for a military response by the United
States?
In an interview on September 3, 2013, President Putin made four points:
•
He asserted that Russia will only be convinced to support a resolution in the
UNSC authorizing retaliation against Syria for chemical weapons use against
civilians if the evidence is compelling beyond a shadow of a doubt, particularly
since faulty data had been presented by the United States in the past as grounds
for U.S. action in Iraq, he alleged. He also raised the possibility that the rebels
may have gassed civilians to trigger Western action against the Asad government.
•
He underlined that only the UNSC may approve the legitimate use of force
against a sovereign state, and that the use of force outside U.N. approval is
aggression. He stressed that Russia was not defending the Asad regime, but was
upholding the norms and principles of international law, and warned that if
illegitimate force is used against the Asad regime, there is a danger that it might
again be used “against anybody and on any pretext.”
68
P-5 abstentions are not considered vetoes.
Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs.
70
For background information, see “Bilateral Relations and Syria,” in CRS Report RL33407, Russian Political,
Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests, coordinated by (name redacted).
69
Congressional Research Service
33
Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress
•
He reiterated that Russia is supplying arms under contracts with the legitimate
government of Syria, so is not violating any international laws. He admitted that
some components of the S-300 surface-to-air missile system had been delivered,
but the delivery of remaining components had been suspended.
•
He stressed that Russia would not become militarily involved in the Syrian
conflict.71
Supporting President Putin’s statement, the Russian Foreign Ministry the next day reported that a
Russian investigation into an alleged March 2013 chemical attack in Syria had found evidence
that the rebels had used the gas against civilians and the Syrian Army, and the Ministry suggested
that evidence pointed to the rebels in the case of the August 21 attack.72
During his testimony on September 3, 2013, before the SFRC, Secretary Kerry raised the hope
that Presidents Obama and Putin would discuss Syria during the G-20 summit in Russia, and that
President Putin would have a “change of heart” on Syria. The Secretary stated that Russia and the
United States were cooperating on efforts toward a negotiated settlement of the Syria conflict.73
On September 4-5, 2013, the Russian government rejected U.S. and Polish government
statements that the former Soviet Union and Russian sources had assisted Iraq in developing
chemical weapons, with Russian presidential administration head Sergey Ivanov terming such
statements “raving nonsense,” since Russia is against the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.74
The Russian presidential press secretary on September 5 urged that the international community
wait for the U.N. inspectors to issue their report on whether chemical weapons have been used in
Syria. He stated that, based on this report, a further investigation could then be undertaken to
determine who used them.75
On September 5, 2013, Deputy Defense Minister Anatoliy Antonov warned that any U.S. military
action against Syria threatened tourists in the eastern Mediterranean, as well as commercial ships,
and raised concerns that a U.S. missile might hit a Russian warship. He also warned that support
for Syrian rebels will at least indirectly boost Syrian terrorist groups that will later expand their
71
President of Russia, Interview to Channel One and Associated Press News Agency, September 4, 2013, at
http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/5935.
72
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Commentary by the Information and Press Department of the Russian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs in connection with the situation concerning the investigations into the use of chemical weapons in
Syria, September 4, 2013. On Putin’s assertion of U.S. action as “aggression,” see Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Comment by the Information and Press Department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding a possible US
military action against Syria, September 4, 2013.
73
“Senate Foreign Relations Committee Holds Hearing on the Authorization for Use of Military Force in Syria,” CQ
Congressional Transcripts, September 3, 2013.
74
Interfax, September 5, 2013. Ivanov was responding to testimony by Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel that Russia had
supplied chemical weapons to Syria (later stated to be components). See “House Foreign Affairs Committee Holds
Hearing on the Authorization for Use of Military Force in Syria,” CQ Congressional Transcripts, September 4, 2013.
See also Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Commentary by the Russian Foreign Ministry's Information and Press
Department in connection with statements by Polish Foreign Minister R. Sikorski, which have appeared in the mass
media, regarding Syria's chemical weapons, September 3, 2013.
75
Interfax, September 5, 2013.
Congressional Research Service
34
Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress
operations elsewhere in the Middle East. The Foreign Ministry also warned that U.S. missiles
could threaten nuclear contamination if they hit a Syrian research reactor.76
Presidential administration head Ivanov stated on September 5 that warships being sent to the
Mediterranean Sea were intended for the possible evacuation of Russian citizens from Syria.
Deputy Defense Minister Antonov stressed that the deployment of more warships to the
Mediterranean was aimed to cover possible contingencies that could threaten Russia’s national
interests, and “to hold back other forces which are ready to unleash hostilities,” but that Russia
did not intend to become involved in conflict. The deployment includes intelligence-gathering
and anti-submarine warfare vessels, a missile cruiser, a destroyer, and landing craft.77
Leaders of the Russian Federal Assembly (legislature) have received support from Putin for a
planned delegation trip to the United States to try to convince Congress not to approve the use of
military force against the Syrian government.
Why did Russia block a recent draft UNSC resolution on Syria?
On August 28, Russia (and China) blocked discussion in the UNSC of a possible resolution
introduced by the United Kingdom condemning the August 21 gas attack in Syria and authorizing
necessary measures—including military action—to protect civilians, with Foreign Minister
Lavrov stating that any such resolution should await the findings of the mission of U.N.
inspectors. He stressed that possible military action in Syria without UNSC authorization would
violate international law and vitiate efforts to find a peaceful solution to the conflict, such as the
planned Syrian government-rebel conference that was being organized by the United States and
Russia prior to the gas attack. He also alleged that the chemical weapons attack may have been a
provocation by the rebels, as Russia has asserted in previous cases, and warned that any Western
military action could further destabilize the Middle East.78
China79
As one of the five veto-wielding permanent members of the United Nations Security Council,
China’s support or abstention is necessary for any Security Council actions related to the conflict
in Syria. That would include any resolution to implement a Russian proposal that Syria put its
chemical weapons under international control. China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman has said that
China welcomes and supports the Russian proposal, describing it as offering “an important
76
Interfax, September 5, 2013; Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by the Russian Foreign Ministry's
official representative A.K. Lukashevich in connection with possible consequences of a military action against Syria for
nuclear safety and nuclear nonproliferation, September 4, 2013.
77
Interfax, September 5, 2013; see also Open Source Center, Central Eurasia: Daily Report (CEDR), September 4,
2013, Doc. No. CEL-46255244, Doc. No. CEL-39116041, and Doc. No. CEL-37879698.
78
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, On a Telephone Conversation between Russian Foreign
Minister Sergey Lavrov and British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs William Hague, reported
in Open Source Center, Central Eurasia: Daily Report (CEDR), August 28, 2013, Doc. No. CEL-65802960; Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Statement by Russian Foreign Affairs Minister S. V. Lavrov and His
Responses to Questions Posed by the Mass Media in the Course of a Press Conference on the Topic of Chemical
Weapons in Syria and the Situation Surrounding the Syrian Arab Republic, CEDR, August 27, 2013, Doc. No. CEL45634080. See also Statement by Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman A.K. Lukashevich in Connection with the U.S.
Defense Secretary’s Remarks, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 25, 2013.
79
Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in Asian Affairs.
Congressional Research Service
35
Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress
opportunity to ease the current tension and properly address the international community’s
concerns about Syria’s chemical weapons.”80
China has consistently opposed outside military intervention in Syria in response to the August
21, 2013 chemical weapons attack. In a closed-door session of the Security Council on August 28,
2013, China joined Russia in blocking a resolution drafted by the U.K. government that would
have authorized the use of force against the Syrian government. China has also spoken out against
the possibility of the United States bypassing the United Nations and undertaking unilateral U.S.
military action against the Asad regime. To do so, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said on
September 12, 2013, “goes against the international law and basic norms governing international
relations and will add to turmoil in Syria and the region as a whole.”
What is Driving China’s Syria Policy?
China’s opposition to outside military intervention in Syria is rooted in its long-standing policy of
non-interference in the affairs of other sovereign nations. That policy is thought to be related to
China’s desire to head off any foreign intervention in its own affairs. China fears, for example, the
possibility of calls for international intervention in response to future Chinese efforts to unite
forcibly with Taiwan, or over China’s treatment of its Tibetan and Uighur ethnic minority
populations. The most notable occasion on which China strayed from the principle of noninterference was in March 2011, when China joined Russia in abstaining on a U.N. resolution
authorizing military action against the Gaddafi regime in Libya, allowing the resolution to pass.
Despite its abstention, just three days after the vote, Beijing criticized publicly military action
authorized by the resolution.81 Many in China now see the Libya resolution as having been
“abused by the U.S. and NATO to pursue regime change.”82
China’s Syria policy also appears to be influenced by China’s close relationship with Russia, with
which it often coordinates on foreign policy. Unlike Russia, however, China has limited economic
interests in Syria and, according to the Chinese government, only “20-plus” citizens in the
country.83
China says it has not taken sides in the Syrian civil war. According to China’s Foreign Ministry,
“China has no selfish interests on the Syrian issue and has no intention to protect any party.”84
China has in the past hosted visits from both Syrian government envoys and representatives of an
opposition group, the Syrian National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change.85 A six80
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular
Press Conference on September 12, 2013,” transcript, September 10, 2013,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t1076098.shtml.
81
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu's Remarks
on Multinational Military Strike against Libya,” statement, March 21, 2013,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng//xwfw/s2510/t808094.htm.
82
Chen Weihua, “U.S. divided on possible Syria strike,” China Daily, September 5, 2013.
83
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular
Press Conference on September 2, 2013,” transcript. September 2, 2013,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t1072085.shtml.
84
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei's Remarks
on the U.N. General Assembly's Adoption of the Resolution on the Syrian Issue,” statement, May 16, 2013,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2535/t1040948.shtml.
85
"Chinese FM meets Syrian opposition group delegation," Xinhua English News, September 18, 2012; Ministry of
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
36
Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress
person delegation from another Syrian opposition group, the Syrian National Dialogue Forum,
arrived in Beijing on September 10, 2013.86
Iran87
The Syrian regime’s apparent chemical attack has created a major dilemma for Iran. Since the
1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, Syria has been Iran’s closest Arab ally, and, as discussed below,
Iran has provided substantial resources to help the Asad regime combat the armed rebellion. Yet,
perhaps in an effort to compel Iran to distance itself from the Asad regime, the international
community has pointed out that Iran has long stressed that it is the foremost victim of chemical
weapons use at the hands of Saddam Hussein’s regime during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war.
United Nations investigations confirmed Iraqi chemical weapons against Iranian forces during
that war, although it found that Iran has conducted some chemical attacks as well. Iran is a party
to the Chemical Weapons Convention.
What are Iran’s interests in Syria?
Syria under the Asad regime is a linchpin of Iranian strategy in the region—Iran takes advantage
of Syria’s geographical location and prominence in the Arab world to pressure Israel, the United
States, and Sunni Arab states allied with the United States. The Asad regime and Iran are linked
by similar sectarian identities that distinguish them from Sunni Muslims: the Asads come from
the Alawite community whose religious beliefs are distantly derived from Shiism, which is the
overwhelmingly dominant sect in Iran. Along with geopolitical and other factors, this bond
helped Iran and Syria transcend the Arab-Persian differences that would tend to divide them, as
well as the contrasts between the Islamist nature of Iran’s regime and Asad’s secular rule. The
regime of Bashar al Asad’s father, Hafez al Asad, provided support to Iran during the 1980-1988
Iran-Iraq war, even though Iraq and Syria are both Arab states and were led by leaders from the
Baathist movement.
Syria’s value to Iran increased in the early to mid-1980s, when Lebanese Shiite clerics of the proIranian Lebanese Da’wa Party began to organize in 1982 into what later was unveiled in 1985 as
Hezbollah.88 Hezbollah identified itself as a “resistance” movement to Israel. Under the Asads,
Syria has been the main transit point for Iranian weapons shipments to Hezbollah. Both Iran and
Syria have viewed Hezbollah as leverage against Israel to try to achieve their regional and
territorial aims.
Syria has also been a base for some Iran-supported Palestinian militant groups that the United
States has accused of committing acts of terrorism in attempts to undermine Israeli-Palestinian
peace efforts and Israel’s overall security. The State Department report on terrorism for 2012,
(...continued)
Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Liu Weimin’s Regular Press
Conference on February 9, 2012,” transcript, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t904275.htm.
86
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular
Press Conference on September 10, 2013,” transcript, September 10, 2013,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t1075140.shtml.
87
Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, on September 4, 2013
88
Shimon Shapira, "The Origins of Hizballah," The Jerusalem Quarterly, 46 (Spring 1988): 115-30.
Congressional Research Service
37
Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress
released May 30, 2013, repeated previous years’ reports’ assertions that Iran provides funding,
weapons, and training to Hamas, Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC).89 However, Hamas and PIJ are Sunni
Muslim movements, and Hamas, in particular, has sought to distance itself from the Asad regime
and—to some extent—Iran.
How is Iran supporting Asad?
To try to prevent Asad’s downfall, Iran is supporting the Syrian regime, including with funds,
weapons, and fighters.90 Iran says it bases that aid on a long-standing defense relationship with
Syria. Iran reportedly has provided the Asad regime military advisers and personnel, including
members of its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), the unit of the IRGC
that supports pro-Iranian movements abroad, as well as an unknown number of IRGC-Ground
Forces (IRGC-GF).91 The IRGC-GF has not previously deployed outside Iran, and its apparent
deployment in Syria suggests that Iran is sparing no effort to try to keep Asad in power.
Iran has also helped in the recruitment of irregular forces and external pro-Asad groups. Iran
reportedly has helped Syria set up its own popular militia forces to relieve some of the burden on
the manpower-strapped Syrian army.92 Iran also was reportedly instrumental in persuading
Hezbollah to become directly involved in the conflict and in the deployment of Iraqi Shiite
militias that have come to Syria to help Asad.
There is little dispute among experts and officials that Iran also is sending substantial quantities
of arms to the Asad regime. It is not known from open sources the approximate dollar value of the
Iranian arms deliveries, or the exact types or quantities of arms being shipped. It has not been
reported that Iran has delivered any heavy weapons to Syria such as tanks or armored personnel
carriers—such weapons are not especially plentiful in Iran’s own arsenal. Delivery of heavy arms
to Syria appears to be beyond Iran’s airlift capabilities. Since the start of 2013, Iran reportedly has
increased the frequency of its resupply flights to Syria to at least one per day. The flights typically
overfly Iraq en route to Syria, and U.S. officials, including Secretary of State John Kerry, have—
apparently without consistent success—urged Iraqi officials to interdict the flights and inspect
them for arms deliveries.
Iran has also provided non-military forms of support to Asad, largely to counter threats to the
regime from civil unrest and economic distress. As early in the uprising as April 14, 2011, and on
several occasions since, U.S. officials have said that Iran is providing Syria with equipment to
suppress crowds and to monitor and block use of the Internet.93 Particularly during the early
periods of the Syria uprising, Iran advised the Asad regime on how to use such equipment to track
down dissenters. Iran also has provided funds to try to stabilize the Syrian economy. In May
2013, Iran extended a $4 billion line of credit to the Asad regime, and is considering additional
credits.
89
http://www.state.gov/j/dt/rls/crt/2012/209985.htm
Details and analysis on the full spectrum of Iranian assistance to Asad is provided by the Institute for the Study of
War. “Iranian Strategy in Syria,”by Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, and Sam Wyer. May 2013.
91
Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, and Sam Wyer. “Iranian Strategy in Syria.” Institute for the Study of War, May 2013.
92
Ibid. p. 19.
93
Adam Entous and Matthew Rosenberg. “U.S. Says Iran Helps Crackdown in Syria.” Wall Street Journal, April 14,
2011.
90
Congressional Research Service
38
Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress
How might a U.S. Strike affect Iran? How might Iran respond?
Several major questions arise with respect to Iran and U.S. policy toward Iran, should the United
States strike Iran’s ally Syria. One major issue is whether Iran might conduct military attacks
against Israel, U.S. forces in the region, or U.S. allies in the Persian Gulf. According to official
U.S. reports and assessments, Iran has the conventional weapons and missile arsenal to strike
such targets, were there a decision to do so.
Most experts believe that direct Iranian retaliation is unlikely. Iran’s Supreme Leader, Grand
Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i, has said that a U.S. attack on Syria would be a “disaster for the region.”
There have been similar statements from other senior Iranian leaders but these leaders have not
threatened that Iran itself would conduct any retaliation. There are no indications that Iran is
positioning forces in the region to prepare for any retaliation. Iran also has a new president,
Hassan Rouhani, a mid-ranking cleric, who has pledged to ease tensions with the international
community—a goal that would most likely be significantly set back were Iran to retaliate for any
U.S. strike on Syria.
However, sources purportedly close to Iran’s ally, Hezbollah (cited elsewhere in this report) have
indicated that it might retaliate against Israel under certain circumstances. Additionally, Iran and
Hezbollah have agents and cells in the Middle East, Europe, Latin America, Asia, and elsewhere
that could conduct future acts of terrorism as a response to a U.S. attack on Syria. Such actions
might have an element of deniability that Iran perceives could prevent any immediate U.S.
retaliation.
Some experts believe that a U.S. strike on Syria might not cause Iranian retaliation, but could
cause Iran to break off talks with the international community over its nuclear program.94 Talks
have been conducted, without firm conclusions, since 2003, but international negotiators have
become more optimistic for the prospects of the talks since Rouhani assumed Iran’s presidency on
August 4, 2013. Iran has not, to date, threatened to boycott a new round of talks if and when a
date for them is set.
Others argue that a U.S. refusal to respond militarily to Asad’s apparent use of chemical weapons
could affect Iran’s nuclear calculations. According to this argument, Iran might interpret a U.S.
failure to act militarily as an indication that the Obama Administration might not enforce its
stated policy of preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, if Iran were to undertake an
effort to produce a nuclear weapon.
European and NATO Perspectives95
The 28 member states of the European Union (EU) have said that there is strong evidence that the
Asad regime is responsible for a chemical attack on August 21 and have called for a “clear and
strong” international response. There is disagreement, however, on what form such a response
should take, and widespread skepticism and reluctance on the question of possible offensive
military action. Collective military operations against the Asad government through the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the EU therefore do not appear to be a possibility.
94
Robert Worth. “In Syria Crisis, U.S. Keeps Eye on Iran Policy.” New York Times, September 3, 2013.
Prepared by (name redacted), Analyst in European Affairs (NATO, France, and Germany), Derek Mix, Analyst in
European Affairs (EU and UK), and (name redacted), Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs (Turkey).
95
Congressional Research Service
39
Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress
European leaders have also emphasized the importance of working through the U.N., saying on
September 7 that any further action against the Asad regime should not come before an expected
preliminary U.N. report on the alleged chemical weapons attack.96
According to the State Department, as of September 5, the following European countries had
“publicly and explicitly expressed support for U.S. military action,” against Asad: Albania,
Kosovo, Denmark, France, Poland, Romania, and Turkey.97 France appears to be the only
European country considering participating in such military action, however, and has said it
would not act alone.98
United Kingdom
The UK government has been leading international pressure against the Asad regime in Syria.
Alongside France, the UK has pushed for United Nations action, has been a leading voice in
passing EU sanctions against the Asad regime, and successfully argued for lifting the EU arms
embargo in order to assist opposition forces. Although it has not openly delivered weapons to the
opposition, the UK has reportedly provided non-lethal equipment, humanitarian assistance, and
some training. Following the report of chemical weapons attacks by Syrian forces on August 21,
the UK’s National Security Council “decided unanimously that the use of chemical weapons by
the Assad regime is unacceptable and that the world can not stand by in the face of that.”99 The
government’s campaign to build a case for military action abruptly deflated, however, when the
House of Commons voted on August 29 against UK participation in any prospective strikes on
the Asad regime, and Prime Minister Cameron subsequently ruled it out. Prime Minister Cameron
has since refuted suggestions that the government might go back to Parliament for a second vote
on the use of force if circumstances in Syria change significantly, or following a vote by the U.S.
Congress. Speculation about a potential second vote nevertheless continues, but as of early
September, UK involvement is expected to consist primarily of intelligence support, diplomatic
pressure, and increased humanitarian aid.
France100
Along with the UK, the French government has been leading international efforts to pressure the
Asad regime. France was the first country to recognize the Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC) as
the “sole legitimate representative of the Syrian people.” Officials in Paris have said there is “no
96
European Union, Remarks by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton following the informal meeting of EU
Foreign Ministers, September 7, 2013.
http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/138691.pdf.
97
U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing, September 5, 2013.
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2013/09/213851.htm.
98
Michael Birnbaum, “France will not act alone against Syria, prime minister says,” Washington Post, September 4,
2013.
99
UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Foreign Secretary calls for strong international response to chemical attack
in Syria, August 28, 2013, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-calls-for-strong-internationalresponse-to-chemical-attack-in-syria.
100
Unless otherwise noted, information in this section comes from: Open Source Center, OSC Report: Europe, Saudi
Arabia Favor Forceful Answer to Syria CW Use, OSC Report EUL2013082703203597, August 27, 2103; Open Source
Center Report: France—Media Question Paris’s Role as U.S. Ally After President Obama’s Call for Vote on Syria,
September 4, 2013; “Hollande Willing to Strike Syria even Without Public, Parliamentary, UN Support,” LeFigaro.fr,
September 7, 2013, Open Source Center EUL2013090760367055. .
Congressional Research Service
40
Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress
doubt” that Asad has used chemical weapons and have said that they favor military strikes against
Asad in response.101 France reportedly has deployed an anti-aircraft frigate and other military
assets off the Syrian coast in anticipation of such an operation. Officials in Paris have indicated,
however, that French military action would come only in support of a U.S.-led operation. Since
President Obama’s announcement that he would seek congressional approval for U.S. military
action, French President François Hollande has faced growing public pressure to follow suit. The
French parliament debated the merits of a possible intervention in early September, but has not
held a vote on the issue and parliamentary approval for such action is not required. Nonetheless,
in the view of some commentators, Hollande could become increasingly sensitive to public
opposition to possible military intervention—some opinion polls indicate that more than twothirds of respondents in France are opposed. In what was perceived as an effort to build public
and international support, on September 6, Hollande said he would not authorize military action
before the release of an anticipated U.N. report on the use of chemical weapons in Syria.
On September 10, French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius announced France’s intention to
present a U.N. Security Council Resolution that would call on the Asad government to dismantle
its chemical weapons program. Fabius said the resolution would be proposed under the auspices
of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which would allow member states to use all possible means,
including military action, to enforce it. Among other things, the resolution would (1) condemn the
August 21 chemical weapons attack and punish the perpetrators of the attack in the international
justice system; (2) demand that the Asad government’s chemical weapons program be placed
under international control and be dismantled, with mechanisms for inspection and monitoring;
and (3) provide for “extremely serious” consequences of Syrian violation of its obligations under
this agreement.102 French officials reportedly have said they are willing to amend their resolution
in response to Russian concerns.103
Germany104
The German government has strongly condemned the Asad regime, calling its alleged use of
chemical weapons a “horrific crime against humanity ... that cannot go unpunished.” Berlin is
reportedly reluctant, however, to endorse a military response that is not authorized by the U.N.
Security Council. Germany is also considered unlikely to participate in any military operation in
Syria, even if under a U.N. or NATO mandate. Analysts note that the German government could
be particularly sensitive to public opposition to potential offensive military action ahead of a
federal election scheduled for September 22. The German government reportedly has agreed to
allow 5,000 Syrian refugees to resettle in Germany by the end of the year.105
101
On September 2, the French government published an intelligence dossier blaming forces loyal to Asad for the
August 21 chemical weapons attack in Damascus.
102
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Syria/introductory remarks by M. Laurent Fabius, Minister of Foreign Affairs
during his press conference,” Paris, September 10, 2013.
103
“France Remains Poised for Military Action in Syria,” RFI.com, September 11, 2013.
104
Information in this section comes from: OSC Report: International—Worldwide Views of Possible Western Strike
on Syria, PLO2013082784193195, August 27, 2013; Charles Hawley, “Syria Intervention May Endanger Merkel’s ReElection,” Spiegelonline, August 26, 2013.
105
Nick Cumming-Bruce, “Germany to Accept Syrian Refugees,” New York Times, September 11, 2013.
Congressional Research Service
41
Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress
NATO
What is NATO’s role?
At the request of NATO member state Turkey, since the beginning of 2013, NATO has carried out
an air defense mission along Turkey’s southeastern border with Syria, “to augment Turkey’s air
defence capabilities in order to defend the population and territory of Turkey and contribute to the
de-escalation of the crisis along the Alliance’s border.” NATO officials have emphasized that the
deployment of six Patriot missile batteries “is defensive only. It will in no way support a no-fly
zone or any offensive operation.”106 The United States, Germany, and the Netherlands are each
operating two Patriot batteries, deployed to military bases near the population centers of
Gaziantep, Karamanmaras, and Adana, respectively.
Some Members of Congress, as well as Air Force General Philip Breedlove, Supreme Allied
Commander, Europe, and Commander of U.S. European Command (in his Senate confirmation
hearing), have suggested that the Patriot batteries currently under NATO command could be used
to support offensive military operations against Asad, including the possible establishment of a
no-fly zone or a “humanitarian corridor” to protect civilians. Although the allies have uniformly
condemned the Asad regime, NATO has not considered establishment of a no-fly zone and key
allied officials have reiterated that the Patriot deployment is defensive only. Speaking on behalf of
the allies on August 28, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen called the use of
chemical weapons, “a clear breach of long-standing international norms and practice ... that
cannot go unanswered.”107 However, there does not appear to be a consensus within the alliance
on endorsing possible NATO-led offensive military operations against the Asad regime. Any
NATO operation would require the unanimous backing of the member states, though not all
would be obliged to participate.108
European Union
What is the European Union’s role?
The EU has been a leading voice alongside the United States in international condemnation of the
Asad regime and its actions in Syria’s armed conflict. With a stronger U.N. response blocked by
Russia and China in the Security Council, the EU has moved ahead on the basis of unanimous
agreement among its member states to impose extensive sanctions designed to put pressure on the
regime. Like the United States, in December 2012 the EU recognized the National Coalition of
Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces as the sole legitimate representative of the Syrian
people. After a British and French push to lift the EU arms embargo on Syria in order to arm
opposition forces, the embargo was allowed to expire in May 2013 despite strong objections from
a number of other EU countries. As a result, arms exports to the opposition could be authorized
on a national, case-by-case basis, with safeguards intended to prevent misuse, although the EU
member states agreed to refrain from such deliveries pending a review of the situation. Similar to
106
NATO, “First NATO Patriot Battery in Turkey Operational,” press release, January 26, 2013.
“NATO Secretary General Statement on North Atlantic Council Meeting on Syria,” August 28, 2013.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-DF4464BA-134DDF8E/natolive/news_102590.htm.
108
In the case of NATO’s air operations under a U.N. Security Council mandate to protect civilians in Libya in 2011,
all 28 member states endorsed the operation, though only 14 participated.
107
Congressional Research Service
42
Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress
NATO, there is no consensus among EU member states for military operations. In any case,
analysts have had no expectations that any such operations would be conducted under an EU
flag.109 At the G20 Summit held in St. Petersburg on September 5-6, European Council President
Herman Van Rompuy reportedly stated that there is no military solution to the Syria conflict.
Despite efforts led by France to gain backing for potential military action, this viewpoint was
subsequently conveyed as the agreed position of the 28 member states by High Representative
Catherine Ashton in a statement following an EU foreign ministers meeting on September 7.110
Turkey
Since late 2011, the government of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been an
active opponent of the Asad regime and has outspokenly advocated for U.N.-backed intervention.
It has hosted Syrian refugees and opposition figures and—reportedly—helped funnel assistance
to armed Syrian rebel groups. Following the apparent August 21 chemical weapons attack,
Erdogan has indicated that Turkey would “take part” in any international coalition against Syria.
On August 30, Erdogan was quoted as saying that any strike on Syria should not be a “24 hours
hit-and-run. What matters is stopping the bloodshed in Syria and weakening the regime to the
point where it gives up.”111
Notwithstanding Erdogan’s stated preference for a broader military response than what U.S.
officials appear to be contemplating, the nature and scope of potential Turkish involvement is
unclear.112 Turkey maintains one of NATO’s largest militaries, but political sensitivities and
potential vulnerabilities vis-à-vis bordering countries and Kurdish communities in the region
could constrain its direct participation in military operations.113 Asked what Turkey’s role might
be, as reports on September 8 indicated that it was bolstering its border defenses, Erdogan was
quoted as saying, “Whether it would be as an opposing force or supplying forces to provide
logistical support, all this would be determined by circumstances.”114 Turkey hosts U.S. and
NATO military assets in various locations throughout the country, which could be among the
targets of potential Syrian or Syrian-allied retaliation for a U.S.-led attack.115 Members of the
opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), though condemning the possible use of chemical
weapons in Syria, have warned of the risks of military intervention and insisted that Turkish law
requires parliamentary approval of any use of Turkish territory by foreign troops to attack
Syria.116 The Turkish parliament voted in 2003 against allowing the United States to invade Iraq
from its Turkish border.
109
NATO and the EU have overlapping but not identical membership. While both have 28 member countries, 22
countries belong to both, six belong to NATO but not the EU (Albania, Canada, Iceland, Norway, Turkey, and the
United States) and six belong to the EU but not NATO (Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta, and Sweden).
110
European Union, Remarks by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton following the informal meeting of EU
Foreign Ministers, op. cit..
111
Joe Parkinson (citing Turkey’s state-run Anadolu Agency)
This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.