The Evolution of Cooperative Threat Reduction: Issues for Congress
Congressional research reportNov 23, 2015
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The Evolution of Cooperative Threat
Reduction: Issues for Congress
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Specialist in Nonproliferation
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Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy
November 23, 2015
Congressional Research Service
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R43143
The Evolution of Cooperative Threat Reduction: Issues for Congress
Summary
The United States uses a number of policy tools to address the threat of attack using chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. These include a set of financial and
technical programs known, variously, as cooperative threat reduction (CTR) programs,
nonproliferation assistance, or, global security engagement. Congress has supported these
programs over the years, but has raised a number of questions about their implementation and
their future direction.
Over the years, the CTR effort shifted from an emergency response to impending chaos in the
Soviet Union to a broader program seeking to keep CBRN weapons away from rogue nations or
terrorist groups. It has also grown from a DOD-centered effort to include projects funded by the
Department of Defense (DOD), the State Department, the Department of Energy (DOE), and the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Together, these agencies sought nearly $1.67 billion
for these programs in FY2016.
Although initially focused on the former Soviet Union, these programs now seek to engage
partners around the world. The United States has used its funding and expertise to help secure or
destroy dangerous weapons and materials in nations that experience civil strife or regime
collapse, such as in Libya, and to prevent their spread outside a conflict’s borders, such as with
Syria’s neighboring countries. U.S. cooperation has nearly stopped, with many of the CTR
projects in Russia winding down after the June 2013 expiration of the Memorandum of
Understanding that governed DOD’s cooperation with Russia. The two countries could continue
to cooperate on some areas of nuclear security with a bilateral protocol under the Multilateral
Nuclear Environmental Program in the Russian Federation Agreement (MNEPR).
In its oversight of these programs, Congress has addressed questions about the coordination of
and priority given to these programs, about partner nations’ willingness to provide access to their
weapons facilities, and about metrics used to measure progress. Congress has also reviewed
efforts to engage nations around the world in cooperative threat reduction and security
engagement activities. Some Members have actively encouraged the Obama Administration to
expand these programs to the Middle East and North Africa.
This report summarizes cooperative activities conducted during the full 20 years of U.S. threat
reduction and nonproliferation assistance. Many older programs have concluded their work, while
more recent programs continue to expand their scope and their geographic reach.
Several DOD and DOE programs have helped Russia and the other former Soviet states eliminate
nuclear weapons delivery systems and secure nuclear warheads in storage. DOE has also helped
Russia strengthen security and materials accounting at facilities that store nuclear materials.
These agencies are seeking to expand this effort to other nations by sharing “best practices” with
partner countries through Centers of Excellence. DOE is also working, through the Global Threat
Reduction Initiative (GTRI), to secure, protect, and in some cases, remove vulnerable nuclear and
radiological materials at civilian facilities worldwide.
DOD has also helped Russia secure and eliminate chemical weapons by supporting the design
and construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch’ye. DOD and the State
Department also provide assistance to address concerns about the proliferation of pathogens that
might be used in biological weapons. DOD’s biological threat reduction program now accounts
for nearly 60% in the FY2016 budget request. It also has grown from a program focused on
dismantling the vast biological weapons complex in Russia into a tool used to promote “best
practices” at biological laboratories with dangerous pathogens and to develop disease surveillance
systems on several continents, particularly Southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.
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The Evolution of Cooperative Threat Reduction: Issues for Congress
The United States also supports global programs that are designed to prevent the smuggling or
illegal export of CBRN materials and technology. The State Department and DOE have also
developed programs that are designed to reduce the risk that the weapons scientists would sell
their knowledge to nations seeking their own CBRN weapons. These programs seek to prevent
terrorists from exploiting scientists, other personnel, or materials to develop these weapons. The
programs also train not only scientists, but other lab personnel about international security
standards and improve personnel reliability programs to address the “insider threat.”
This report will be updated as needed.
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Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 2
The Nunn-Lugar Amendment ................................................................................................... 2
An Evolving Program ............................................................................................................... 3
Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation .............................................................................. 3
Nonproliferation and Counterterrorism .............................................................................. 3
Global Security Engagement .............................................................................................. 4
The Future of Cooperation with Russia .............................................................................. 6
Threat Reduction After Regime Collapse ........................................................................... 8
Threat Reduction in the Middle East and North Africa ...................................................... 9
Agency Participation ................................................................................................................. 9
Department of Defense (DOD) ......................................................................................... 10
Department of Energy (DOE) ........................................................................................... 10
The State Department ........................................................................................................ 11
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) ........................................................................ 12
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 12
Coordination Across Government Agencies ........................................................................... 13
Priority Within the Executive Branch ..................................................................................... 14
Measuring Success and Metrics .............................................................................................. 15
Access and Transparency ........................................................................................................ 17
International Cooperation—The G-8 Global Partnership ....................................................... 18
The Programs ................................................................................................................................ 20
Securing and Eliminating Nuclear Weapons ........................................................................... 20
Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination .............................................................................. 20
Global Nuclear Security.................................................................................................... 21
Warhead Security and the Department of Energy ............................................................. 24
Securing and Eliminating Nuclear Materials .......................................................................... 26
CTR Fissile Materials Storage .......................................................................................... 26
DOE Nuclear Materials Security Programs ...................................................................... 27
Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence............................................................................ 29
Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI)....................................................................... 30
Securing Borders and Improving Export Controls .................................................................. 32
Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance .................................................. 32
Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative (NSOI) ............................................................... 33
Proliferation Prevention .................................................................................................... 33
Second Line of Defense .................................................................................................... 34
Container Security Initiative and Secure Freight Initiative............................................... 35
Chemical Weapons Destruction .............................................................................................. 36
Cooperative Biological Engagement ....................................................................................... 37
Biological Threat Reduction (BTR) in Russia .................................................................. 38
Central Asia and the Caucuses .......................................................................................... 39
Funding ................................................................................................................................... 41
Securing Knowledge and Expertise ........................................................................................ 42
The Science Centers.......................................................................................................... 43
Iraq and Libya Scientist Engagement Programs ............................................................... 43
Department of Energy Programs....................................................................................... 44
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Tables
Table 1. CTR Funding for Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE) .................................. 21
Table 2. CTR Funding for Transportation Security ....................................................................... 23
Table 3. DOD and DOE Authorizations for Warhead Storage Security Programs ........................ 26
Table 4. CTR Authorizations for Fissile Materials Storage ........................................................... 26
Table 5. DOE Authorizations for Nuclear Materials Security Programs ....................................... 28
Table 6. DOE Authorizations for Global Threat Reduction Initiative ........................................... 30
Table 7. DOE Funding for Second Line of Defense and Megaports ............................................. 35
Table 8. CTR Funding for Chemical Weapons Destruction .......................................................... 37
Table 9. CTR Funding for Cooperative Biological Engagement .................................................. 42
Table A-1. Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction Program ................................ 48
Table A-2. Department of State Programs ..................................................................................... 48
Table A-3. Department of Homeland Security Programs .............................................................. 48
Table A-4. Department of Energy Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs .......................... 49
Table A-5. DOE Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs—FY2016 Request ...................... 50
Table B-1. Title XIII, National Defense Authorization Acts FY2001-FY2014 ............................. 51
Appendixes
Appendix A. Funding Requests, by Agency .................................................................................. 48
Appendix B. Major Provisions in Cooperative Threat Reduction Legislation .............................. 51
Contacts
Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 53
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Introduction
Many experts have postulated that the threat of attack with chemical, biological, radiological and
nuclear (CBRN) weapons represents one of the greatest threats to U.S. national security. There is
widespread agreement—within the U.S. government, among national security policy analysts,
and across the political spectrum—that the United States faces a growing threat from the potential
use of these weapons by hostile nations and terrorist groups. Many in Congress have also
expressed concerns about the potential terrorist use of CBRN weapons and have supported U.S.
efforts to address and mitigate this threat.
President George W. Bush highlighted this threat in his 2002 National Strategy to Combat
Weapons of Mass Destruction. This report opened with the observation that “weapons of mass
destruction (WMD)—nuclear, biological, and chemical—in the possession of hostile states and
terrorists represent one of the greatest security challenges facing the United States. We must
pursue a comprehensive strategy to counter this threat in all of its dimensions.”1 President Obama
offered a similar warning in his 2010 National Security Strategy, when he noted that “there is no
greater threat to the American people than weapons of mass destruction, particularly the danger
posed by the pursuit of nuclear weapons by violent extremists and their proliferation to additional
states.”2
The United States uses a range of policy tools to address the threats posed by the potential spread
of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons to hostile nations or non-state actors. These range
from diplomatic engagement and economic sanctions to the threat of military intervention. One
key set of tools is a set of financial and technical programs known, variously, as cooperative
threat reduction programs, nonproliferation assistance, or, global security engagement. Through
these programs, the United States seeks to work with other nations to help them secure and
eliminate their CBRN weapons and material, to stem the flow of weapons and related knowledge
and materials to hostile nations or non-state actors who might seek to develop their own weapons,
and to develop training programs and share “best practices” to ensure that other nations can
protect the materials and knowledge that remain in their countries.
Many of the programs that are funded through these efforts evolved out of an initiative that
Congress created in late 1991. After an August 1991 coup in Moscow led to concerns about the
potential loss of control over Soviet nuclear weapons, Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar
amendment and authorized the use of up to $400 million in funds in the Department of Defense
(DOD) budget to help safely secure, transport, and eliminate Soviet nuclear weapons. This
initiative grew over the years, such that the United States spent around $1.65 billion in FY2013
on programs that have sought to secure and eliminate nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons
and materials in the former Soviet states; enhance border security and export controls to deter and
detect efforts to transport these materials across state lines; secure and eliminate nuclear,
chemical, or biological materials in nations outside the former Soviet Union; and redirect
weapons scientists in many nations around the world so that they will pursue programs with
peaceful purposes. This funding has, however, begun to decline, falling to $1.59 billion in
FY2014, $1.25 billion in FY2015, and a requested $1.4 billion in FY2016. In addition, these
1
The White House, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, Washington, DC, December 2002, p.
1, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-wmd.pdf.
2
The White House, National Security Strategy, Washington, DC, May, 2010, p. 4, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.
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programs are now funded and administered by DOD, the Department of Energy (DOE), the State
Department, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and several other U.S. agencies.
Over the years, Congress has offered significant support to these efforts. It has not only
authorized and appropriated increasing sums for these programs, it has generally agreed with the
executive branch on the priorities and goals for them. Nevertheless, over the years, some
Members have questioned the value of specific goals and the effectiveness of some projects.
Congress has adjusted the profile of these programs over the years, sometimes reducing funds,
sometimes increasing funds, and sometimes initiating new programs and project areas. The 113th
Congress is likely to continue to review the funding for these programs, consider the goals, and
assess their effectiveness. Moreover, Congress may continue to raise questions about the future
intent of these programs, the success of government-wide coordination in implementing them,
and the extent of international cooperation in addressing these threats. These questions may be
amplified in the future, as the United States and Russia conclude most of their cooperation.3
This report provides information on the wide range of programs that the United States is pursuing
to secure and eliminate nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and materials and to prevent
hostile nations and terrorist organizations from gaining access to these weapons or the knowledge
and materials needed to manufacture and use them. It begins with a brief review of the evolution
of these programs, demonstrating how the goals and objectives have changed over the years. It
also reviews some of the issues that Congress may confront as it seeks to provide oversight of
these programs and reviews budget requests for them. The report then provides information on
individual programs that are designed to secure and eliminate nuclear weapons, secure and
eliminate nuclear materials, secure borders and improve export controls, eliminate chemical
weapons, secure biological pathogens, and redirect scientists with knowledge of CBRN weapons.
Background
The Nunn-Lugar Amendment
Congress initiated U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance to the Soviet Union in
November 1991. A failed coup in Moscow in August 1991 and the subsequent disintegration of
the Soviet Union had raised concerns about the safety and security of Soviet nuclear weapons.
Consequently, Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar proposed an amendment to the
implementing legislation for the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty (P.L. 102228). This amendment, titled the “Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991,” authorized the
use of $400 million in FY1992 Defense Department (DOD) funds to assist the Soviet Union, and
its “successor entities” with efforts to “1) destroy nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and other
weapons, 2) transport, store, disable, and safeguard weapons in connection with their destruction,
3
The umbrella agreement that permitted cooperation on projects between DOD and Russia’s Ministry of Defense
expired on June 16, 2013. A new agreement was set to cover a more narrow set of programs not funded by DOD. Even
with this agreement in place, however, Russia reportedly terminated a number of other programs funded by DOE in late
2014 See Jordana Mishory, “Creedon: New Agreement with Russia Needed to Preserve CTR Programs,” Inside the
Pentagon, May 22, 2013, pp. http://insidedefense.com/Inside-the-Pentagon/Inside-the-Pentagon-05/23/2013/creedonnew-agreement-with-russia-needed-to-preserve-ctr-programs/menu-id-80.html. See, also Bryan Bender, “Russia Ends
U.S. Nuclear Security Alliance,” Boston Globe, January 19, 2015. http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2015/01/
19/after-two-decades-russia-nuclear-security-cooperation-becomes-casualty-deteriorating-relations/
5nh8NbtjitUE8UqVWFIooL/story.html
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and 3) establish verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of such weapons.”4 This effort
became known as the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program.
An Evolving Program
Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation
Initially, many in Congress saw U.S. assistance under the CTR program as an emergency
response to impending chaos in the Soviet Union. Senators arguing in support of the program,
including Senators Nunn and Lugar, noted that the disintegration of the Soviet Union created “the
danger that the ultimate disposition of nuclear weapons in the new political system will not be
conducive to their safety or international stability.” They warned of “a danger of seizure, theft,
sale or use of nuclear weapons or components” and argued that “any weakening of control over
weapons and components could spill outside the territory of the former Soviet Union, fueling
nuclear proliferation worldwide.”5 Senator Nunn further warned that “we are on the verge of
either having the greatest destruction of nuclear weapons in the history of the world or the
greatest proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, and scientific know-how on how to
make these weapons, as well as chemical weapons, ballistic missiles, even biological weapons the
world has ever seen.”6
Even after the sense of immediate crisis passed in 1992 and 1993, many analysts and Members of
Congress remained concerned about the potential for diversion or a loss of control of Russia’s
nuclear and other weapons. Russia’s economy was extremely weak and press accounts reported
that nuclear materials from Russia were appearing on the black market in Western Europe.
Consequently, many began to view CTR as a part of a long-term threat reduction and
nonproliferation effort. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry referred to CTR as “defense
by other means,”7 as the program helped eliminate Soviet weapons that had threatened the United
States and contain weapons and materials that could pose new threats in the hands of other
nations.
Nonproliferation and Counterterrorism
By the mid-1990s, many observers also began to view U.S. assistance to the former Soviet states
as a part of the effort to keep weapons of mass destruction away from terrorists. In 1996, experts
testified to Congress that Russian nuclear and chemical facilities, with their crumbling security
and lack of accounting procedures, could provide a source for terrorists seeking nuclear or
chemical materials. In response, Congress expanded the programs that provided security at
facilities with nuclear materials and suggested that more attention be paid to security at facilities
with materials that could be used in chemical or biological weapons.8
In January 2001, a task force sponsored by the Department of Energy stated that “the most urgent
unmet national security threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass
4
For more information on this legislation, see CRS Report 94-985, The Nunn-Lugar Program for Soviet Weapons
Dismantlement: Background and Implementation, by Theodor Galdi. (Available from (name redacted), on request.)
5
See the comments of Senator Richard Lugar in the Congressional Record, November 25, 1991. p. S18005.
6
Ibid., p. S18004.
7
See, for example, U.S. Department of Defense. Cooperative Threat Reduction. April 1995. Washington, DC, p. 1.
8
The March 1995 nerve agent attack in the Tokyo subway system by the Aum Shinryo cult raised the profile of this
type of threat.
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destruction or weapons-usable materials in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile
nation states and used against American troops abroad or citizens at home.”9 Since September 11,
2001, virtually all analysts who follow U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance have
argued that, by helping Russia protect its weapons, related materials, and knowledge, the United
States could make it more difficult for terrorists to acquire CBRN weapons.10
The George W. Bush Administration clearly considered U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation
programs in the former Soviet states to be a part of U.S. efforts to keep weapons of mass
destruction away from terrorists, explaining, in early 2003, that it had “expanded the strategic
focus of the CTR program” to support the war on terrorism.11 In its budgets presented in the years
after FY2004, the Administration increased funding for several export and border control
programs, for programs designed to stem the leakage of knowledge out of the former Soviet
Union, and for an effort to find and recover “radiological sources”—a type of device that could
provide terrorists with nuclear materials for use in a “dirty bomb.” 12
All of these initiatives focused more on stemming proliferation than on eliminating nuclear
weapons in the former Soviet states. But the programs did not completely lose the initial focus.
During a February 2005 summit in Bratislava, Presidents Bush and Vladimir Putin agreed to
accelerate some of the efforts to secure Soviet-era nuclear weapons. This agreement shifted
additional funding into some of the DOD CTR projects and hastened the completion of some
warhead storage and security efforts. As a result, in the years leading up to the 2013 expiration of
the agreement governing these programs, U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation programs in
Russia completed much of the work focused on eliminating retired Soviet-era nuclear weapons
delivery systems, transporting and securing nuclear warheads, and paving the way for the
destruction of Soviet-era chemical weapons.
Global Security Engagement
Over the past decade, U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation programs have expanded beyond
the borders of the former Soviet Union, as the United States has sought to secure and eliminate
nuclear, chemical, and biological materials around the world by working with a diverse set of
countries to build capacity on nuclear security, biological pathogen security, and border security.
This is done through a combination of training programs and equipment, the majority of which is
provided to non-nuclear-weapon states.
The Obama Administration endorsed the expansion of these programs, noting that they could help
contain proliferation and reduce the threat from terrorists who might seek CBRN weapons.
According to Administration officials, these programs are designed to keep these weapons “out of
9
The report went on to state that “unless protected from theft of diversion, the former Soviet arsenal of weapons of
mass destruction threatens to become a goldmine for would-be proliferators the world over.” Baker, Howard and Lloyd
Cutler, Co-Chairs, Russia Task Force. A Report Card on the Department of Energy’s Nonproliferation Programs with
Russia. The Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, United States Department of Energy. January 10, 2001. p. 1.
10
Senator Sam Nunn has stated that “Preventing the spread and use of nuclear biological, and chemical weapons and
materials should be the central organizing principle on security for the 21 st century.” Remarks by Former U.S. Senator
Sam Nunn, Chairman, Nuclear Threat Initiative. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. International
Nonproliferation Conference. November 14, 2002.
11
U.S. Department of Defense. Fiscal Year 2004/2005 Biennial Budget Estimates. Former Soviet Union Threat
Reduction Appropriation. February 2003. p. 1.
12
Many analysts believe that this type of weapon, which could disperse radioactive materials across a wide area, might
be particularly attractive to terrorists. For details see CRS Report R41891, ”Dirty Bombs”: Background in Brief, by
(name redacted)
.
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the hands of terrorists and states of concern, [to lock down] dangerous nuclear and biological
materials, [to eliminate] chemical weapons, [to destroy] legacy weapons, and [to build]
capabilities and conduct operations to prevent acquisition, contain and roll back threats, and
respond to [CBRN] crises.”13 President Obama specifically placed a priority on securing
vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide, and has both engaged international partners through the
Nuclear Security summit process and accelerated funding for the Global Threat Reduction
Initiative (GTRI) with this goal in mind.
Funding requests have demonstrated the new priorities, with support for programs that move
beyond the program’s historical base in the former Soviet Union. Nations in Africa, the Middle
East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia can now participate in cooperative programs supported by
this funding. According to the Obama Administration, by 2013, DOD was “now funding roughly
as much work outside of the former Soviet Union as we are inside the former Soviet Union.” Its
goal is to increase “the flexibility of the program to be successful as a global effort.”14 This shift
in funding has continued in recent years, as much of the cooperation with Russia has concluded.
While many in Congress now support this global expansion of U.S. threat reduction and
nonproliferation programs, Congress took several years to approve this new authority. For
example, during the debate over the FY2003 Defense Authorization Bill, the Senate approved an
amendment, proposed by Senator Richard Lugar, that would allow DOD to use up to $50 million
in FY2003 CTR funds “outside the states of the former Soviet Union” to resolve “critical
emerging proliferation threats and to take advantage of opportunities to achieve long-standing
United States nonproliferation goals.”15 The Bush Administration supported Senator Lugar’s
proposal but the House objected and the language was removed in conference. The Bush
Administration requested the same authority the following year and the Senate again offered its
unqualified support, but many in the House again objected. The conference committee included
the authority to spend $50 million in CTR funds outside the former Soviet Union in the FY2004
Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 108-136), but, indicated that this funding could be used only for
short-term projects. The Bush Administration exercised this authority for the first time in mid2004, when it provided assistance to Albania for the elimination of chemical weapons.16
Congressional support for the expansion of these programs had grown more wide-spread by the
end of the Bush Administration. For example, in the FY2008 Defense Authorization Act (P.L.
110-181, §1306), Congress indicated that CTR should be “strengthened and expanded, in part by
developing new CTR initiatives.” It suggested that these new initiatives could include “programs
and projects in Asia and the Middle East; and activities relating to the denuclearization of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.” Congress added $10 million to the CTR authorization
to fund these programs, streamlined the process of identifying and approving projects, and
eliminated the requirement that limited the program to short-term projects that addressed sudden,
emergency proliferation concerns. Congress also mandated that the National Academy of
Sciences conduct a study “to analyze options for strengthening and expanding the CTR Program.”
When it released the required report in 2009, the National Academy recommended that the United
States use a new, broader CTR program to engage nations around the world in a global effort to
13
U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services, Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Proliferation Prevention Programs,
Hearing, 113th Cong., 1st sess., April 23, 2013. Testimony of Madelyn R. Creedon, Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Global Strategic Affairs.
14
Ibid.
15
S. 2026, H.R. 4546, §1203.
16
Warrick, Joby. Albania’s Chemical Cache Raises Fears About Others. Washington Post. January 10, 2005. p. A1.
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secure dangerous weapons and materials.17 It also suggested that Congress authorize DOD to
accept funds from other nations for use in CTR efforts. The FY2010 Defense Authorization Bill
included this provision. The Obama Administration supported these efforts and its budget request
for FY2011 included funds for this purpose in several program areas.
Some Members of Congress actively encouraged the Obama Administration to expand
cooperative threat reduction efforts in the Middle East and North Africa. Senator Jeanne Shaheen
introduced the “Next Generation Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 2013” (S. 1021) and
Representative Jeff Fortenberry introduced the Cooperative Threat Reduction Modernization Act
(H.R. 2314). Both of these bills direct the Administration to provide a strategy for the expansion
of CTR programs in the Middle East and North Africa. Similar provisions were part of both
House and Senate versions of the National Defense Authorization Act of FY2014 (H.R. 1960,
§1304; S. 1197, §1326) which became P.L. 113-66.
The Future of Cooperation with Russia
While the United States has broadened and deepened its nonproliferation and security
engagement with nations outside the former Soviet Union, it has scaled back, and, in some cases,
concluded, programs of cooperation with Russia. Some of these changes have occurred because
ongoing projects were completed or because Russia had the resources to manage the programs on
its own. However, more significant changes to the future of U.S.-Russian nonproliferation
cooperation derive from the June 17, 2013, expiration of the long-standing Memorandum of
Understanding, known as the “umbrella agreement,” that has governed these programs since
1992. This agreement provided the legal framework that allowed for program implementation.
Reports indicate that the United States presented Russia with a draft extension of the umbrella
agreement in mid-2012. This draft contained most of the same provisions as the original
agreement, which was signed at a time when Russia lacked the financial resources and political
will to secure its nuclear weapons and materials on its own. Russia is not only able to finance
many of these programs itself now, but according to some observers, is more than willing to do
so.18 Moreover, Russian officials seemed to be unwilling to allow U.S. contractors access to
sensitive Russian military facilities, even if that meant that Russia would no longer have access to
U.S. financial resources. As a result, in early October 2012, Russian officials indicated that they
were prepared to allow the agreement to lapse and to conclude the programs. In a report for
Congress prepared in March 2013, the Pentagon indicated that, without adequate legal protections
in a new agreement, the United States would have to begin to shut down some of the ongoing
projects.19
After the United States and Russia failed to reach an agreement on the extension of the original
umbrella agreement, they agreed to continue cooperation under a bilateral protocol to the
Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in the Russian Federation (MNEPR) Agreement.
The MNEPR was negotiated to allow European partners to give funds to nonproliferation and
radiological clean-up projects in Russia under the G-8 Global Partnership. The United States
signed the MNEPR agreement in 2003, but did not sign the associated Protocol on Claims, Legal
17
National Academy of Sciences, Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction,
Washington, DC, April 2009.
18
Douglas Birch, “Letting Go of “Loose Nukes,” Foreign Policy, October 31, 2012.
19
Jordana Mishory, “Creedon: New Agreement with Russia Needed to Preserve CTR Programs,” Inside the Pentagon,
May 22, 2013, pp. http://insidedefense.com/Inside-the-Pentagon/Inside-the-Pentagon-05/23/2013/creedon-newagreement-with-russia-needed-to-preserve-ctr-programs/menu-id-80.html.
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Proceedings and Indemnification, since the preexisting CTR umbrella agreement covered those
issues already. Nine countries as well as several European institutions20 have used this protocol
for liability protection and tax exemption for threat reduction assistance in Russia for the past
decade. These protections apply to the United States now, since it signed such a MNEPR protocol
with Russia on June 14, 2013.
In a fact sheet released on June 19, 2013, the State Department noted that the United States and
Russia will continue to cooperate “in a broad array of nuclear security and nonproliferation
areas.” These will include, but are not limited to
improving security of nuclear and radiological material;
customs control of nuclear and radioactive material;
recovery and securing of radioactive sources;
consolidation of nuclear material and conversion of excess highly enriched
uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU);
conversion of HEU research reactors to operate with LEU; and
nuclear submarine dismantlement.21
Russia’s Ministry of Defense will not participate in projects under this agreement, and, as a result,
the United States and Russia will no longer cooperate on projects that eliminate strategic
offensive arms or transport and secure nuclear warheads. According to the State Department fact
sheet, “Russia will now take full responsibility over this mission.” Projects in both areas were
already winding down after many years of successful cooperation. At the same time, the United
States will continue to monitor Russia’s deployed strategic offensive forces under the 2010 New
START Treaty. The United States and Russia also will not continue ongoing projects designed to
eliminate chemical weapons, although the State Department indicated that the United States and
Russia “continue to discuss potential technical cooperation on chemical weapons destruction
outside the new framework.”22
The Department of Energy, however, expected that it would continue to cooperate with its
counterpart in Russia, Rosatom, to secure Russian nuclear facilities and materials. As is noted
below, DOE programs that enhance security at Russian warhead storage facilities had already
concluded, in part because of the conclusion of the work and in part because of the lapse in
cooperation with Russia’s Ministry of Defense. However, the expectation that remaining
programs would continue proved false. In late 2014, Russia informed the United States that it
would no longer accept U.S. assistance in securing weapons-grade uranium and plutonium.23
Even before Russia suspended cooperation, some in Congress had questioned whether the
remaining projects should continue in light of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine during 2014.
The House version of the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4435, Secs. 1303
and 3120) specified that neither DOD nor DOE could spend funds authorized for threat reduction
20
MNEPR instruments of ratifications are managed by the OECD’s Nuclear Energy Agency. http://www.oecd-nea.org/
law/mnepr-ratification.html.
21
U.S. Department of State, A New Legal Framework for U.S.-Russian Cooperation in Nuclear Nonproliferation
Security, Fact Sheet, Washington, DC, June 19, 2013, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/06/210913.htm.
22
The largest of these projects, the construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch’ye is described
on page 26, below.
23
Bryan Bender, “Russia Ends US Nuclear Security Alliance,” Boston Globe, January 19, 2015. Some existing
programs may be completed. Cooperation with Russia on programs such as reactor fuel clean-out in third countries
does continue (no funds are transferred to Russia for that work).
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and nonproliferation cooperation in Russia until the Secretaries of Defense or Energy certified
that Russian forces were no longer occupying areas of Ukraine and that Russia was in full
compliance with its arms control obligations under the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF)
Treaty and the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. The final version of the
FY2015 NDAA that became law (P.L. 113-291) did not include these certification requirements.
Section 3122 allowed the programs to continue, but stated that material protection, control and
accounting activities in the Russian Federation should be completed no later than 2018 (except
for activities under the Plutonium Management Disposition Agreement).
The FY2016 version of the NDAA (S. 1356, Sec. 3121), however, does contain limitations on
U.S. threat reduction cooperation with Russia. The legislation states that “none of the funds
authorized to be appropriated by this Act … for defense nuclear nonproliferation activities may be
obligated or expended to enter into a contract with, or otherwise provide assistance to, the
Russian Federation.” The legislation does contain a waiver, allowing the Secretary of Energy to
waive the prohibition and enter into contracts after notifying Congress that the waiver is in the
national security interest of the United States and providing the justification for the waiver.
Threat Reduction After Regime Collapse
The United States government has grown increasingly concerned about its ability to address the
security of stocks of weapons of mass destruction and the facilities that produce them in the event
of a regime collapse in countries where such capabilities exist. This scenario presented itself
during regime transitions in Libya and Iraq, and, more recently, in the international efforts to
remove chemical weapons from Syria. North Korea has also been discussed as a possible future
scenario should its regime collapse, or should the current government agree to disarmament
measures. The concern over loss of control of WMD during conflict or regime change is the same
concern that motivated the original CTR programs in the former Soviet Union. Providing
assistance in these cases can be difficult, primarily because CTR and related nonproliferation
programs are not designed work in a non-cooperative environment; they require the agreement of
the host country.
Libya and Iraq provide two examples of CTR during a time of transition. In Libya, the
dismantlement process after Libya became a party to the Conventional Weapons Convention
(CWC) in 2004 was initially cooperative with the agreement of the regime. In 2011, after the fall
of the Qaddafi regime, the chemical stocks were first secured by forces aligned with the United
States. Later, the new government in Libya agreed to work with the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW),24 to complete the destruction of CW stocks. In Iraq,
much of the dismantlement work had been accomplished by the United Nations inspectors prior
to Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, and stockpiles and capacity turned out to have been
overestimated. As described above, a major focus of CTR and nonproliferation programs in both
Iraq and Libya has been engaging former WMD weapons scientists in civilian projects to prevent
the proliferation of their expertise.
The Syrian case may be the first time the international community has faced a protracted civil war
in a state with a known stockpile of chemical weapons. Due to the threat of access to these
weapons by unauthorized groups including terrorists, the United States government had been
preparing for scenarios to secure the weapons in the event of the loss of control by the Assad
24
The OPCW was established by the Chemical Weapons Convention, and is tasked with assisting countries with the
elimination of chemical weapons stockpiles and chemical weapons production facilities subject to the verification
measures provided for in the Convention.
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regime. U.S. officials, however, noted the extreme difficulty of accomplishing that goal, which
would have probably required ground troops.25 Therefore, instead the United States focused on
working with neighboring countries to bolster their border controls to prevent proliferation of
these weapons and materials from Syria.
After the Syrian government made the decision in September 2013 to join the Chemical Weapons
Convention and destroy its chemical weapons programs, the United States provided technical and
financial support to the international community to destroy Syrian chemical weapons stocks
under international supervision.26 This is a unique case for the CTR program since the primary
U.S. threat reduction work—destruction of Syrian chemical weapons—was done outside of the
country of origin. Details on U.S. efforts on Syrian chemical weapons destruction are detailed
below in “Chemical Weapons Destruction.”
Threat Reduction in the Middle East and North Africa
Some in Congress have advocated dedicating more funds to regions of concern and prioritizing
work in the Middle East and North Africa. In the FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act
(P.L. 113-66), Congress mandated that the Administration produce a strategy for “a strategy and
implementation plan for preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related
materials in the Middle East and North Africa not later than March 31, 2014.” The Administration
did provide a strategy report to key congressional committees as mandated, but the report has not
been made public. S.Rept. 113-44 said that
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region represents a new generation of
immediate and growing WMD-related proliferation challenges. Factors lending urgency
to regional threat dynamics in this region include Syria’s chemical weapons program,
Iran’s nuclear program and the influence of terrorist groups operating in the region. The
Committee believes that it is critical that the United States develop a comprehensive,
effective and efficient cooperative threat reduction (CTR) and nonproliferation strategy to
address the challenge of WMD-related proliferation in the MENA region.
Senator Jeanne Shaheen introduced a bill, the Next Generation Cooperative Threat Reduction Act
of 2013 (S. 1021), in May 2013. This bill proposed a multiyear assistance strategy to coordinate
and advance CTR and related nonproliferation efforts in the Middle East and North Africa. Some
of this bill’s language was included as Section 1304 of the FY2014 NDAA (P.L. 113-66),
“Strategy to Modernize Cooperative Threat Reduction and Prevent the Proliferation of Weapons
of Mass Destruction and Related Materials in the Middle East and North Africa Region.”
Agency Participation
When Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar Amendment in 1991, it authorized the use of $400
million from the Defense Department budget to fund U.S. threat reduction assistance to the
former Soviet states. Experts from other agencies, such as the State Department and Department
of Energy, participated in the projects when their expertise was required. In FY1997, as the
programs expanded and funding increased, these agencies each took budgetary and management
responsibility for the projects that relied on their expertise. The overwhelming majority of the
funding for U.S. threat reduction, nonproliferation, and cooperative engagement programs now
25
In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 7, 2012, Secretary of Defense Panetta said,
“It’s 100 times worse than what we dealt in with in Libya. And for that reason, that’s why it’s raised even greater
concerns about our ability to address how we can secure those sites.”
26
CRS Report R42848, Syria’s Chemical Weapons: Issues for Congress, coordinated by (name redacted)
.
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resides in the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Energy (DOE), and Department of
State. The Department of Homeland Security also participates with some programs designed to
deter or detect efforts to ship nuclear or radiological materials into the United States. Together,
these agencies are seeking nearly $1.65 billion for these programs in FY2014.27
Department of Defense (DOD)
According to the CTR program’s budget request for FY2015, the CTR programs “overarching
mission” is to work with other countries “to reduce the threat from weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) and related materials, technologies, facilities, and expertise.” The program “focuses on
eliminating, securing, or consolidating” weapons, materials, delivery systems, and infrastructure
in these “partner countries.” DOD further indicates that the program “focuses on eliminating,
securing, and consolidating WMD, related materials, and associated delivery systems and
infrastructure at their source in partner countries” and in “building partner capacity to prevent the
proliferation of WMD materials in transit across international borders.”28 DOD divides the
projects funded by the CTR program into several categories, including strategic offensive arms
elimination, chemical weapons destruction, global nuclear security, cooperative biological
engagement, and proliferation prevention. These program areas are described in more detail
below.
DOD requested, and Congress authorized, $358.5 million for the CTR program in FY2016. This
represents a small decline of less than 2% from the FY2015 budget of $365.1 million, but a sharp
decline of nearly 40% from the FY2014 level of 581.5 million.29 As discussed below, a significant
portion of this reduction comes from the conclusion of strategic offensive arms elimination and
chemical weapons elimination programs in Russia. Some of the reductions also reflected the
conclusion of programs in other countries. For example, according to DOD, the $71 million
reduction in funding for the Proliferation Prevention program represents “the anticipated
completion of work supporting the Jordan border security surveillance network project.” Further,
as has been the case for the past several years, DOD’s CTR program continues to work with nonRussian countries in the former Soviet Union (FSU), and continues to expand cooperative
programs outside the former Soviet Union.
DOD CTR funds are requested through the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs provides long-range planning and
guidance. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological
Defense Programs provides program budget and implementation oversight. The Defense Threat
Reduction Agency (DTRA) is the implementing agency and manages CTR programming and
contracting. DOD CTR programs are appropriated by the House and Senate Defense
Appropriations subcommittees and authorized by the Armed Services committees.
Department of Energy (DOE)
The Department of Energy has contributed to U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation
assistance to the former Soviet states since the early 1990s, when DOD’s CTR budget included a
27
Appendix A at the end of this report contains tables that detail recent appropriations and the FY2014 budget request
for threat reduction and nonproliferation programs in each of these agencies.
28
U.S. Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Estimates: Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, February
2015, p. CTR-13. http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2016/budget_justification/pdfs/
01_Operation_and_Maintenance/O_M_VOL_1_PART_2/CTR_OP-5.pdf
29
Ibid.
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small amount of funding for materials control and protection. DOE officials and their DOD
counterparts participated in early efforts to outline projects and reach agreement with Russian
officials on assistance to secure nuclear materials. This effort grew into the International Nuclear
Materials Protection and Cooperation Program, which seeks to increase “the security of
vulnerable stockpiles of nuclear materials worldwide, preventing the loss of such material, and
significantly improving the ability to deter, detect, and interdict their illicit trafficking.”30
Between FY1993 and FY2014, Congress appropriated around $6.4 billion for this effort. In 1994,
DOE also initiated efforts to help retrain and redirect Soviet-era nuclear scientists and engineers
so that they would not sell their knowledge to other nations seeking their own nuclear weapons.
In addition, DOE established in 2004 the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) to secure,
protect, and in some cases, remove vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials at civilian
facilities worldwide. These program areas are described in more detail below.
The Department of Energy, in its budget request for FY2015, requested a total of $643 million for
these nonproliferation assistance programs. This total represents a significant reduction from the
$870 million appropriated in FY2014 and the $1.26 billion provided in the Consolidated Further
Appropriations Act, 2013 (P.L. 113-6).31 As is noted below, within this total budget, DOE reduced
funding for several program areas that had been a high priority in previous years. DOE claims
that, in some areas, these reductions are a sign of progress because they reflect the completion of
many ongoing projects. Some of the reductions, however, are due to the lapse in the MOU
governing the CTR program. Although DOE could continue much of its work under the bilateral
protocol to the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in the Russian Federation (MNEPR)
Agreement, it can no longer work with the Russian Ministry of Defense. This affected the amount
of funding requested for some of its warhead security work. Moreover, as was noted above,
Russia withdrew from most cooperative efforts with DOE in late 2014.
The DOE budget request for nonproliferation programs in FY2016 reflects a significant change in
the organizational structure. Most of the programs discussed in this report are now consolidated
in two areas known as Global Material Security and Material Management and Minimization.
According to DOE’s budget request, the projects in these two program areas received funding of
around $698 million in FY2015. The FY2016 budget request increases that amount to $738.4
million. There have been significant shifts in funding among the programs; these are described
below.
DOE funds these activities through the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA’s)
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation account. DOE nonproliferation programs are authorized by the
House and Senate Armed Services committees, and are appropriated by the House and Senate
Energy and Water Development Appropriations subcommittees.
The State Department
The State Department has played an integral role in U.S. nonproliferation and threat reduction
programs since their inception. It has taken the lead in negotiating the broad agreements needed
before recipient nations can receive U.S. assistance and in providing for broad policy
coordination among the U.S. agencies and between the United States and recipient nations. The
State Department also manages the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF), which
“undertakes rapid-response activities to reduce threat that are unforeseen and unanticipated
30
Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, FY2014 Budget Request, Washington, D.C, April
2013, pp. DN-80, http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/04/f0/Volume1.pdf.
31
The FY2013 appropriation for DOE programs also does adjust for potential sequestration reductions.
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around the globe.” NDF has received between $15 million and $40 million per year since 1993,
with most funds used on projects outside the former Soviet Union. It currently is funding ongoing
activities the Middle East, such as Syria chemical weapons destruction efforts.32 The State
Department also contributes to U.S. nonproliferation goals through its Export Control and Related
Border Security Assistance (EXBS) program, which addresses concerns about the illicit
trafficking of CBRN materials and dual use goods and technologies. The State Department also
funds the Global Threat Reduction (GTR) program, which manages programs designed to engage
scientists to prevent proliferation of WMD materials or expertise, with priority placed on projects
in Yemen, Pakistan, and Iraq. The WMD Terrorism program assists others nations’ capacity to
respond to a WMD terrorist event and to detect, deter, and respond to nuclear smuggling. These
programs are described in more detail below.
The State Department is seeking $25 million for the NDF, $58.7 million for its EXBS program,
$64.3 million for its GTR program and $6.15 for the WMD terrorism program for FY2016. This
request reflects an increase of approximately $3 million from the FY2015 request for these
programs. The State Department nonproliferation programs are housed in the International
Security and Nonproliferation Bureau (ISN), and are funded out of the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Activities (NADR) account in the State Department budget.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
The Department of Homeland Security also implements programs that seek to stem the illicit
transfer of CBRN materials. The International Cargo Screening program33 screens cargo overseas
to prevent a nuclear or radiological device from being brought into the United States. DHS
personnel work with foreign customs officials to target and examine high-risk cargo before the
cargo containers are placed on vessels bound for the United States. DHS also works with the
DOE Megaports Initiative to install technology at foreign ports that rapidly scans shipping
containers for radiological or nuclear materials. Overall, these programs are shifting from relying
heavily on placing DHS inspectors overseas to installing and maintaining detection equipment.
DHS has requested $69.9 million for the International Cargo Screening program in FY2016,
funded out of the Customs and Border Protection portion of the DHS budget. These programs are
described in more detail below.
Issues for Congress
Over the years, Congress has addressed a number of issues that came up during implementation
of U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation programs in Russia and the former Soviet Union.
Many of these issues may continue to resonate as the programs grow into global security
partnerships.
32
NDF has “notwithstanding authority” to use funds regardless of the restraints of any other law, and was originally
authorized for the former Soviet Union states. Since 1994, Congress, through annual appropriations, has given NDF the
authority to use funds anywhere in the world and carry forward unspent balances as needed. For a list of past projects,
see http://www.state.gov/t/isn/58382.htm.
33
This program includes both the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI). Prior to
FY2009, this program area was called “Container Security Initiative.”
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Coordination Across Government Agencies
The United States implements programs that seek to secure CBRN weapons, materials, and
knowledge through several different government agencies. In some cases, different agencies fund
programs that seek to achieve the same goals. For example, the State Department and Energy
Department both fund programs that seek to secure borders, redirect scientists, and establish “best
practices in partner countries.” DOD and DHS also fund programs that seek to prevent the illicit
transfer of CBRN materials across international borders. At the same time, personnel from
different agencies may work together to implement a specific project.
This overlap, and the potential for redundant efforts, has led many analysts to suggest that the
United States identify a single coordinating authority, which could be either an individual or a
committee, to make sure the agencies establish agreed priorities and share resources and
expertise. A high-level program coordinator might also help resolve competing demands for
budgetary resources, eliminate overlap and redundancy, and coordinate implementation across
agencies. In the Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L.
110-53), Congress called for the creation of an Office of the United States Coordinator for the
Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism within the Executive
Office of the President (§1841). Others, however, have rejected the call for a single program
coordinator, noting that the job can be achieved through the regular NSC structure.34 They note
that a new coordinator might complicate the existing interagency coordinating process.35
President Obama’s May 2010 National Security Strategy stated that “work remains to foster
coordination across departments and agencies. Key steps include more effectively ensuring
alignment of resources with our national security strategy, adapting the education and training of
national security professionals to equip them to meet modern challenges, reviewing authorities
and mechanisms to implement and coordinate assistance programs, and other policies and
programs that strengthen coordination.” This challenge was also highlighted in the 9/11
Commission’s report, the report of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and
Terrorism, as well as oversight hearings.36
In response to concerns about program coordination, the Obama Administration designated a new
director on the NSC staff who would serve as the coordinator for the prevention of WMD
proliferation and terrorism. This NSC director had a deputy director who focused specifically on
threat reduction efforts, and sought to coordinate the threat reduction and nonproliferation
programs across agencies. This director did not, however, have direct control over the budgets of
the participating agencies. Nevertheless, officials in the Obama Administration have indicated
that the Administration has succeeded in coordinating program implementation across agencies.
In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in April 2013, Administration officials
34
For example, the George W. Bush Administration said that it coordinated these programs through a committee
chaired by a National Security Council senior director, with assistant secretary-level representatives from State,
Defense, Energy and other concerned agencies. U.S. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on
International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services. Hearing. Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD) with Non-proliferation Programs: Non-proliferation Assistance Coordination Act of 2001.
Statement of Vann Van Diepen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation. November 29, 2001.
35
Ibid. Statement of Marshall Billingslea, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Negotiations.
36
For example, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee Hearing, “Nuclear Terrorism:
Strengthening Our Domestic Defenses, Part I”, June 30, 2010, and Part II on September 15, 2010.
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emphasized that effective coordination allows the United States to pool expertise and maximize
the effectiveness of U.S. programs when resources are limited.37
Several agencies have their own coordinators for related activities. The Department of Homeland
Security has a role in coordinating executive branch programs to combat nuclear terrorism. The
DHS Domestic Nuclear Detection Office was tasked with formulating a “Global Nuclear
Detection Architecture” by the Safe Port Act (P.L. 109-347) to protect the United States against
nuclear or radiological attack.38 The “global” architecture is to be guided by DNDO. However,
DNDO was given authority to implement this architecture in the United States, while the
Departments of Defense, State, and Energy were to continue their activities related to nuclear
detection internationally. This has resulted in DNDO performing a coordinating function where
the other agencies submit lists of activities that DNDO then places in its overall framework to
assess where gaps or duplication might occur. A Joint Interagency Review is performed annually.
In addition, the State Department named a coordinator for threat reduction activities at the
beginning of the Obama Administration, Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins. Ambassador Jenkins is the
State Department’s lead for the Nuclear Security Summit, coordinates the State Department’s
activities toward the four-year nuclear security effort, and coordinates “a number of interagency
CTR programs to help ensure a coordinated U.S. approach when promoting these programs
internationally.”39
Policy coordination committees are a tool that can be used to formalize communication across
agencies. The WMD Commission in its December 2009 report identified “nearly 200 interagency
committees and working groups that address WMD, counterproliferation and counterterrorism
issues.”40 Some have suggested that an alternative to policy coordinating committees, especially
in the implementation-heavy work of nuclear terrorism prevention and nuclear security (i.e.,
border guard training, material removal from research reactors, etc.), may be informal
coordination between working level employees. Officials have told CRS that this kind of
coordination happens on a daily basis without need for formal mandates, for example on specific
threat reduction initiatives in a foreign country. Analysts and officials have pointed to the longterm professional relationships amongst current senior officials across agencies that may lead to
more effective and regular (but not necessarily formal) coordination of tasks and responsibilities.
This raises the question of the sustainability of such coordination.
Priority Within the Executive Branch
Over the years, many analysts have argued that the United States can best succeed in securing
CBRN weapons, materials, and knowledge when the programs that support this goal receive a
high level of attention from senior government officials. This attention might signal that the
programs should be of high priority for the agencies, and this priority could then be reflected in
agency budgets. President Bush followed this pattern during his Administration, when he and
President Putin agreed at Bratislava to accelerate warhead and materials security programs. The
President’s budget requested additional funds for these programs, and the two countries
completed a number of projects on a shorter time frame.
37
See, for example, the testimony of Madelyn R. Creedon, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Global Strategic Affairs,
U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services, Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Proliferation Prevention Programs,
Hearing, 113th Cong., 1st sess., April 23, 2013.
38
See CRS Report RL34574, The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture: Issues for Congress, by (name redacted)
.
39
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/126045.htm.
40
CRS has not independently confirmed this number.
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In the Obama Administration, the President has also often emphasized the importance of these
programs and their goals. He highlighted his Administration’s concerns with the threat of nuclear
terrorism repeatedly in his first term—in his April 2009 speech in Prague, when he chaired a
special U.N. session on nuclear security, and when he established the Nuclear Security Summit
process and convened the first summit in Washington in 2010. He reiterated his support for U.S.
threat reduction and nonproliferation programs in a speech in December 2012, when celebrating
the 20th anniversary of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. He not only
stated, at that time, that his Administration had “continued to make critical investments in our
threat reduction programs” over the previous four years, but also that he intended to “keep
investing in these programs because our national security depends on it.”41
Some analysts outside government, however, have questioned President Obama’s commitment to
the future of these programs. They note, specifically, that the President’s budget requests for
FY2013, FY2014, and FY2015 reduced funding for programs, such as the Global Threat
Reduction Initiative, that are designed to secure and eliminate nuclear materials. They also note
that the Administration has scaled back its goals for the Second Line of Defense Program, which
is designed to help secure borders and prevent smuggling of nuclear materials. Some analysts
outside government argue that these reductions will undercut the programs and reflect a change in
Administration priorities.
There are a number of reasons why funding and the pace of effort in these programs may have
declined. For example, these programs require cooperation from partner countries, and that
cooperation often comes through detailed, written agreements. Delays in reaching these
agreements can slow the start of a program, which can reduce the required level of funding in
subsequent years. Moreover, as some in the Administration have noted, a decline in funding can
be an indicator of a program’s success. This is the case for many of the early CTR programs, such
as strategic offensive arms elimination, through which Russia and Ukraine have nearly completed
the elimination of strategic weapons limited by arms control agreements.
Overall, the decline in some major programs such as DOE’s IMPC&A and some DOD work, such
as CW destruction, generally reflects a wrapping up of major construction projects in the Russian
Federation. New areas of work related to facilitate security and border control training may be
less expensive than past projects. In some areas, DOD and State Departments budgets have
remained steady, as is seen in Appendix A. Arguably, the DOE budget has been reduced in areas
where existing program goals have been accomplished. However, some critics of reductions point
out that funding should remain at least at the same level so that the agencies can identify and
work against new threats and in new geographical areas. Others advocate for an expansion of
funds for specific regions of the world, such as the Middle East.
Measuring Success and Metrics
During its oversight of U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation programs, Congress has often
questioned whether U.S. assistance is achieving the desired goals. Members have questioned
whether specific programs, or areas of focus for several programs, have produced sufficient
results to justify the continued allocation of U.S. funds to the effort. In the National Defense
Authorization Act for FY2010 (P.L. 111-84) Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to
develop and implement metrics to measure the impact and effectiveness of DOD’s CTR activities.
41
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President at the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat
Reduction Symposium, Washington, DC, December 3, 2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/12/03/
remarks-president-nunn-lugar-cooperative-threat-reduction-symposium.
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For many of the DOD’s CTR programs, measuring success has been a relatively straightforward
exercise. Senator Lugar often referred to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s CTR Scorecard
to describe the numbers of nuclear weapons and delivery systems that were no longer actively
deployed in Russia’s nuclear arsenal.42 DOD and DOE have also reported the numbers of nuclear
weapons transported to secure storage locations and the numbers of storage locations for nuclear
warheads and nuclear materials that received upgrades to their security systems. Other examples
of successes that are measurable are the removal of weapons-usable material and nuclear
enrichment technology from Libya, the destruction of chemical munitions and chemical weapons
agents in Libya, and the dismantlement of biological weapons infrastructure in Iraq.
As the United States has expanded its threat reduction assistance to nations outside the former
Soviet states, and as the programs have emphasized cooperative engagement, capacity-building,
and best practices instead of weapons dismantlement and facility security, the problem of
measuring progress has grown more complicated. As the National Academy of Sciences noted in
its 2012 report, “It is complex and challenging to develop metrics for the partner’s capabilities
and the personal and institutional relationships established.... ”43 While participants in the
program may be confident in their ability to share knowledge and build cooperative relationships,
they may be less confident in their ability to measure the relationship between funding and
progress in cooperation.
However, most of the threat reduction assistance currently underway is more difficult to quantify.
In many cases, progress is evident in access to decision makers and operators, and success is
reflected in the growth of relationships. In some cases, however, it may be possible to devise
metrics to measure progress. For example, the State Department’s EXBS program uses a Rating
Assessment Tool with a 419-point survey to score a country’s licensing, enforcement, industry
outreach, and nonproliferation regime adherence. According to the State Department, this tool
allows the program “to determine weaknesses in each partner country’s strategic trade control
system, ascertain effectiveness of prior bilateral EXBS assistance activities, and pinpoint areas
where limited assistance dollars can achieve the greatest impact.” This tool is also used to
measure how the EXBS assistance has improved the country’s strategic trade controls over time.
The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010 (P.L. 111-84) also mandated that DOD
contract with the National Academy of Sciences to review the report developed by DOD. The
National Academy completed this review, and published its report, Improving Metrics for the
Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs, in 2012.44 This report
specifically addressed the challenges of measuring the success of programs focused on capacitybuilding or scientist engagement. It noted that it is not only difficult to measure progress in these
programs, but also difficult to identify how these programs reduce threats to U.S. national
security. As a result, the NAS report indicates that before measuring whether or not the programs
are successful, the U.S. agencies responsible for the programs should identify clear, measurable
objectives and outline how those objectives relate to U.S. national security goals. The report also
notes that the effort to measure progress in some programs may be further complicated by the fact
that both the objectives and the steps taken to reach these objectives can change over time.45 In
42
Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Nunn–Lugar CTR Scorecard, February 2013. http://www.dtra.mil/docs/defaultdocument-library/20130101_fy13_ctr-scorecard_slides_jan13.pdf?sfvrsn=0.
43
National Academy of Sciences, Improving Metrics for the Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction
Programs, Washington, DC, 2012. p. 3. http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13289.
44
National Academy of Sciences, Improving Metrics for the Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction
Programs, Washington, DC, 2012. http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13289.
45
National Academy of Sciences, Improving Metrics for the Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction
(continued...)
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addition, regardless of how precise the metrics or how well the measures of success are related to
addressing threats to U.S. national security, the process of measuring success may find it difficult
to capture the value of newly developed personal relationships and a more cooperative
atmosphere. Moreover, the programs are choosing partner countries and projects on the basis of
their proliferation risk (the assessment of which varies somewhat by agency) before starting a
project. Identifying threats and prioritization of work based on risk appears to be becoming
increasingly important in program management.
As the United States continues to shift its focus from “threat reduction” to “global security
engagement,” with the programs doing more to build capacity than eliminate weapons, Congress
may continue to question how to measure progress and identify success. This is evident in Section
1344 of the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 113-291) which calls on the
Secretary of Defense to implement metrics “to measure the impact and effectiveness” of DOD’s
CTR activities.
Access and Transparency
Over the years, as the United States provided assistance to Russia, it insisted on a level of
transparency and openness that would allow it to confirm that the equipment and assistance paid
for with U.S. funds were used for their intended purposes and that the equipment was installed
and operated correctly. Russia, however, in some cases, sought to limit access and transparency to
protect sensitive facilities and information from foreign inspection. For example, Russia did not
provide complete information about or access to facilities in its biological weapons complex,
which limited the implementation of cooperative biological engagement programs. In addition, it
did not provide the United States with access to many facilities in Russia’s nuclear weapons
complex, leaving large holes in the U.S. understanding of the potential security challenges
regarding security for the nuclear materials at those facilities.
Press reports indicate that Russia cited its concerns about U.S. demands for access and
transparency in the 2012 and 2013 discussions on the future of the CTR umbrella agreement.
According to some reports, Russian officials argued that the provisions that provide the United
States with extensive access to Russian facilities and Russian strategic forces, without offering
Russia similar access to U.S. nuclear facilities and forces, are inequitable and unfair.46 Russian
officials have indicated that a future agreement, if it exists, should provide for a more balanced
approach.
Some U.S. analysts have indicated that they do not think Russia was being unreasonable in
seeking changes, and more balance, in the CTR umbrella agreement. They note that times had
changed in the 20 years since the programs began. Russia’s financial position had improved and
Russia expected to be treated as more of a partner, rather than an aid recipient, when pursuing
cooperative security programs.47 There were limits, however, to how much the United States
could alter the access and transparency provisions in the umbrella agreement. DOD contracting
rules, for example, obligate the recipient to allow DOD access to confirm that the equipment is
used correctly and operating properly. Moreover, although Russia’s interest in protecting secret
(...continued)
Programs, Washington, DC, 2012. p. 5. http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13289.
46
“Russia Scours Budget for Funds to Replace U.S. Disarmament Assistance,” Global Security Newswire, October 19,
2012.
47
See, for example, William Tobey, “Boost Phase,” Foreign Policy, October 19, 2012. See, also, Douglas Birch,
“Letting Go of “Loose Nukes,” Foreign Policy, October 31, 2012.
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details about its nuclear weapons programs may be understandable, this secrecy, and the resulting
delays in program implementation, served to undermine support in the United States for threat
reduction work in Russia.
As the United States expands it threat reduction and nonproliferation programs to a growing
number of countries around the world, it may face additional questions about the level of access
and transparency required for these programs. The dynamics of this problem are different in
countries that do not possess WMD. Therefore, working with states that possess nuclear weapons
such as India, Pakistan, and China, the access and transparency challenges will be greater than
with other partners. The majority of partner countries at present do not have WMD, and the
“cooperative engagement” model seems to presume that partner countries will willingly open
their facilities to U.S. experts so that they can work to improve security and share “best practices”
when handling dangerous materials. But these programs may still encounter legal or procedural
barriers to implementation, particularly if officials in other countries view U.S. interest in their
programs as a sign of U.S. concern about threats emanating from those countries. For example, if
a particular country is sensitive about working with a security-related United States government
agency, then other federal agencies, such as HHS or DOE, may take the lead for that project.
International Cooperation—The G-8 Global Partnership
There is near-universal agreement, both within the U.S. government and among analysts outside
the U.S. government, that the potential proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to rogue
nations or terrorist groups presents a global problem that requires an international response.
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States decided to appeal to other
countries to increase the resources dedicated to preventing a terrorist attack using WMD. This
effort first expanded the number of donor countries contributing to threat reduction work in
Russia and the former Soviet Union (FSU), and later expanded the number of recipient countries
beyond the FSU borders.
Under Canada’s initiative, during the G-8 summit in Kananaskis in July 2002, the United States,
Russia, and other G-8 leaders agreed to establish a long-term program—the G-8 Global
Partnership (GP) Against Weapons of Mass Destruction—to stop the spread of weapons of mass
destruction and related materials and technology. Under this program, known as 10+10 over 10,
the United States pledged to provide $10 billion over 10 years to sustain ongoing threat reduction
programs in Russia; this amount of $1 billion per year was essentially equal to existing U.S.
spending on threat reduction and nonproliferation programs in Russia. The other G-8 nations also
agreed that they would provide, together, up to $10 billion over 10 years. This included a Russian
pledge to contribute $2 billion of its own money. According to the State Department, Global
Partnership funding has totaled $21 billion since 2002. The United States has promised an
additional $10 billion in Global Partnership funds in the 2012-2022 timeframe, subject to
congressional appropriations.
Russia and other Global Partnership funding recipients must adopt a set of guidelines that provide
for “effective monitoring, auditing, and transparency measures” and “adequate access for donor
representatives at work sites.” The guidelines stipulate that the assistance would be free from
taxes and other charges and that it would ensure adequate liability protections for donor countries
and their personnel.48 These provisions mirrored those in the U.S.-Russia CTR umbrella
agreement, and the guarantees were considered key to convincing new donor states to participate.
48
“The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.” Statement by the
(continued...)
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In 2002, the G-8 leaders agreed that this program would initially focus on threat reduction and
nonproliferation programs in Russia; they have since extended it to countries around the world.
The first Latin American partner, Mexico, joined in 2012. As of April 2014, there were 27
members of the Global Partnership: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russian Federation,
United Kingdom, United States, Australia, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, European Union,
Finland, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Republic
of Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, Hungary, and the Philippines. The GP also coordinates
activities with relevant international organizations.
Analysts initially questioned how the group would set priorities and divide up responsibilities
over different types of nonproliferation projects. In the statement released after the Kananaskis
summit, they listed several projects, including the destruction of chemical weapons,
dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines, disposition of fissile materials, and
employment of former weapons scientists as high-priority projects.49 The Global Partnership does
not rely on a single coordinating body to either identify new projects or set priorities among
competing projects. Each nation allocates its own funds to those programs that it views as highpriority endeavors. Partners then share experiences and project information in a working group
and through the annual publication of the GP Annex, which lists all projects by donor country.50
This document shows continuing interest in nuclear security and the disposition of fissile
materials, chemical weapons destruction, and the decommissioning of Russia’s nuclear
submarines. The United States has advocated for expanded funding in the area of biosecurity in
recent years, and made this subject the focus of its 2012 G8 GP chairmanship.
The United States held the G-8 presidency in 2012, and the Obama Administration continued its
policy of actively promoting expansion of the Partnership to new geographical regions.51 Mexico
joined in December 2012, the first Latin American state to participate. The United States has also
promoted greater attention to bio-security in the context of the Global Partnership. Under its 2012
chairmanship, it created a sub-working group on biological security to encourage and coordinate
projects in this area.
The United Kingdom’s 2013 presidency focused on increasing projects, expanding GP
membership, strengthening information security, and implementing UN Security Council
Resolution 1540. Russia was to hold the G8 presidency in 2014, but the planned meeting in Sochi
was cancelled after the remaining seven nations suspended Russia’s participation in response to
its annexation of Crimea and aggression against Ukraine. The remaining members met as the G-7
in Belgium on June 4-5, 2014.52 In their Declaration on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament for
2014, the G-7 participants reaffirmed their commitment to the Global Partnership and highlighted
the program’s expansion to include additional nations around the world. The statement did not,
however, make any references to continuing or future efforts to support programs in Russia,
possibly due to the fact that most Global Partnership activities in Russia are already winding
(...continued)
Group of Eight Leaders. Kananaskis, Canada. June 27, 2002.
49
“The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.” Statement by the
Group of Eight Leaders. Kananaskis, Canada. June 27, 2002.
50
For more information on the project areas funded by participating nations, see U.S. Department of State,
Consolidated Report Data, 2012, Global Parntership Working Group Annual Report, Washington, DC,
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/208032.pdf.
51
“Global Partnership 2012,” State Department website, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c12743.htm.
52
“G-7 Leaders Statement,” The White House, March 2, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/
02/g-7-leaders-statement.
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down.53 Germany held the G-7 Presidency in 2015, and emphasized biosecurity as the main focus
for the Global Partnership. Japan will hold the G-7 Presidency in 2016.
The Programs
Securing and Eliminating Nuclear Weapons
Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination
When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, it had more than 11,000 warheads deployed on nearly
1,400 land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 940 submarine launched ballistic
missiles (SLBMs), and 162 heavy bombers. These weapons were deployed in four of the former
Soviet republics—Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia. In 1994, Russia agreed to reduce its
nuclear forces to the limits outlined in the original Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START),
while the other three all agreed to eliminate all the nuclear weapons on their territories. Promises
of U.S. financial and technical assistance through DOD’s CTR program helped win this
agreement.54 The United States has provided these nations with technology and expertise needed
to deactivate and dismantle missiles, launchers, submarines, and bombers. More than half of the
CTR funding in the program’s early years served this purpose, although that proportion declined
in recent years as the work was completed in Belarus and Kazakhstan and as the level of effort
declined in Russia and Ukraine.
According to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the CTR program had, as of January 31,
2014, helped deactivate 7,616 warheads, 2,531 missiles, 1,187 launchers and launch silos, 155
bombers, and 33 submarines.55 Much of the work is now complete and the Memorandum of
Understanding governing these projects has expired. According to DOD, the United States no
longer supports strategic launcher and missile elimination in Russia.
Through this program, the United States helped eliminate and dismantle SS-18 and SS-19
ICBMs, disassemble and eliminate components of the SS-N-20 SLBM, eliminate SS-25 ICBMs
and their road-mobile launchers, and destroy rail-mobile SS-24 ICBMs and their launchers.
Funding in this project area also supported efforts to assist Russia in eliminating SS-19 and SS-25
ICBMs and their launchers, and in completing the dismantlement of Russian Delta-III and
Typhoon submarines. These were partnership programs, with the United States responsible for
some of the dismantlement activities, and Russia responsible for others.56
In Ukraine, the United States and Ukraine have been working on a method to eliminate rocket
motors from SS-24 ICBMs. DOD did not request any more funding for this project area in
FY2006 and, at that time, planned to complete ongoing work with prior year funds, because the
two nations could not agree on a method to eliminate these rocket motors. However, a low level
of funding has resumed in recent years, with $1 million requested for FY2015, as the United
States now funds the safe storage of 160 rocket motors from SS-24 missiles and plans to buy the
53
G-7 Brussels, 2014, “Declaration on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament for 2014,” http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/143120.pdf.
54
U.S. Department of Defense. Cooperative Threat Reduction. April 1995. Washington, DC, p. 1.
55
For the full CTR scorecard, see Defense Threat Reduction Agency, http://www.dtra.mil/Portals/61/Documents/
CTR%20Scorecards/Nunn-Lugar%20CTR%20Scorecard%202014.pdf
56
Department of Defense, Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, Annual Report to Congress Fiscal Year 2013,
Washington, D.C, March 2013, pp. 13-14.
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casings from Ukraine after Ukraine has removed the propellant. Ukraine has been financing, on
its own, the construction and operation of a water washout facility for this purpose. The United
States has purchased the empty motor cases, and has helped Ukraine begin construction of an
elimination facility for them. According to recent reports, the facility opened in late May 2013.57
According to DOD, the United States will help Ukraine maintain this facility, but will cease its
support after the last of the motors has been washed-out and eliminated.
Over the past decade, Congress routinely appropriated $50 million-$70 million per year for
strategic offensive arms elimination. In recent years, the Obama Administration requested, and
Congress appropriated, $60 million-$70 million per year. The Obama Administration requested
$23.3 million for this project area in FY2013. This amount included funding for both strategic
offensive arms elimination activities in Russia and those in Ukraine. The Administration
requested $10 million for this project area in FY2014, noting that the amount of funding needed
in this program area had declined sharply because most elimination activities necessitated by the
New START Treaty were complete.
Because these programs were governed by the MOU that expired in June 2013, they ceased
operations in June 2013. As a result, in its version of the FY2014 Defense Authorization Bill (S.
1197, §1302), the Senate Armed Services Committee reduced funding for this program area to
$5.7 million. The committee noted in its report that it would transfer $75 million from programs
that will end in Russia “to CTR nonproliferation efforts in the Middle East, particularly related to
Syrian chemical weapons.”58 The Obama Administration requested only $1 million in FY2015
and $1.3 million in FY2016, for continuing support to the program in Ukraine.
Table 1 summarizes the amount of funding appropriated by Congress for strategic offensive arms
elimination projects.
Table 1. CTR Funding for Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE)
(in $ millions)
Nation
Fiscal years
Total appropriation
Russia
FY1993-FY2014
$1,774.4
Ukraine
FY1993-FY2015
$594
Kazahkstan
FY1994-FY1996
$64.6
Belarus
FY1994-FY1996
$3.3
Source: CRS Estimates.
Global Nuclear Security
DOD altered the structure of its CTR program areas in the FY2012 budget, creating a new
program area, Global Nuclear Security. This combined the program areas that had funded the
secure transport of nuclear warheads and other qualifying nuclear material to secure storage
facilities and dismantlement facilities, security enhancements for storage areas for nuclear
warheads, weapons-usable nuclear material, and efforts to establish Centers of Excellence with
57
“Ukraine, U.S. Jointly Pursue Missile Destruction,” Worldwise News Ukraine, May 21, 2013.
U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Senate Committee on Armed Services Completes Markup of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Press Release, Washington, DC, June 14, 2013, p. 21,
http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/press/.
58
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partner countries to enhance training for nuclear security, material control, and inventory
management. According to DOD, this program supports not only efforts to secure nuclear
weapons and materials in the former Soviet states, but also “new initiatives to secure nuclear
materials across the globe.”
When funded separately in FY2011, Congress appropriated $164.5 million for the programs
captured by GNS. In FY2012, this funding declined to $151 million. The Obama Administration
requested $72.3 million for FY2013 and $86.5 million for FY2014. The budget documents did
not provide details on how the money would be divided among the constituent programs.
However, it is likely that the focus of these programs is shifting to nations outside the former
Soviet Union, given the Administration’s added emphasis on global cooperation and the
completion of many projects in Russia. In addition, many of the projects funded concluded in
mid-2013, as a result of the expiration of the MOU with Russia. As a result, Congress
appropriated only $$19.4 million for this program area in FY2014.
DOD requested $20.7 million for this program area in the CTR budget for FY2015 and $20.6
million in FY2016. Within the FY2015 total, $3 million was allocated to projects in Russia. One
was designed to transport highly enriched spent nuclear reactor fuel to safe storage or to a facility
that will bled it down into a lower-enriched product. The other was a project that provided Russia
with assistance in dismantling the launch tubes and reactor on a ballistic missile submarine. This
project would receive no additional funding in FY2016, although the United States will continue
to allocate a small amount of funding to support the transport of spent naval fuel in Russia. Most
of the remaining funds in this program area will support the nuclear security centers of
excellence; provide equipment and training for partner countries to secure vulnerable nuclear
material; and provide equipment and training to enhance nuclear security capabilities of partner
countries to perform key security functions such as secure transportation, inventory management,
and emergency response.
Transportation Security
When the Soviet Union collapsed in late 1991, thousands of nuclear weapons were spread among
four states (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan), and, within each state, the weapons were
dispersed among hundreds of deployment and storage areas. The governments in these states
agreed to remove the nuclear warheads from non-Russian republics and to store them in a smaller
number of facilities in Russia. The United States has helped Russia improve the safety and
security of nuclear weapons in transit after they have been removed from deployment.
In its early years, the program provided armored blankets to protect warheads in transit from
potential attacks, storage containers to hold the warheads during transit, and assistance to enhance
the safety and security of rail cars used to transport warheads from deployment to storage or
dismantlement facilities. Transportation security projects also provided Russia with emergency
response vehicles, training, and support equipment that it might need to respond to a nuclear
weapons transportation accident. The funding for these programs, through 2012 when they were
aggregated in the GNS program area, appears on Table 2.
According to DOD’s budget request for FY2014, the United States supported the transportation of
“approximately 48 trainloads of deactivated nuclear warheads (1,000 to 1,500 warheads) from
deployed locations to enhanced security storage sites or dismantlement and from storage to
dismantlement facilities.” According to DOD, remaining transportation security projects
transitioned to the Russian Ministry of Defense in June 2013.
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Table 2. CTR Funding for Transportation Security
(in $ millions)
Project
Fiscal years
Total appropriation
Armored Blankets
FY1992-FY1993
$3.1
Emergency Response
FY1992-FY1996
$29.2
Railcar security enhancements
FY1992-FY1994
$21.5
Weapons Transportation Security
FY1995-FY2011
$355.4
Source: Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan, by Matthew Bunn, et al. Project
on Managing the Atom. March 2003; Updated Funding Analysis of FY09 International WMD Security Programs,
by Michelle Marchesano. Partnership for Global Security. July 2009.
Nuclear Security Enhancements
Over the years, the CTR program has helped Russia improve security at storage facilities for
strategic and tactical nuclear warheads, a program initially referred to as “Weapons Storage
Security.” DOD now refers to this program as “Nuclear Security Enhancements.” Russia has
three types of storage sites—operational sites, storage sites for weapons removed from
deployment, and rail transfer points. The United States does not provide assistance at operational
sites. Under the CTR program, DOD has enhanced security at both large “national stockpile
storage sites” and smaller storage sites at Navy, Air Force, and Strategic Rocket Force (SRF)
bases.59 DOD provided perimeter fencing as a “quick fix” for vulnerable sites, and more
comprehensive upgrades, including alarm systems and inventory control and management
equipment to keep track of warheads in storage. The Department of Energy has also addressed
security needs at rail transfer points that store warheads from the Russian Navy, and storage sites
for warheads belonging to the Strategic Rocket Forces.
For several years, this effort was slowed by Russia’s reluctance to provide the United States with
information about the precise number of sites in need of security upgrades and its refusal to allow
the United States access to sites to design appropriate upgrades.60 The United States and Russia
completed agreements in February 2003 that provided the United States with a degree of access
to these sites so that U.S. personnel could begin to plan the installation of physical security
upgrades.61 In 2005, Presidents Bush and Putin pledged to accelerate work on weapons storage
security. After Russia identified all the sites in need of upgrades, the United States agreed to
provide assistance at 15 sites, 8 with funding from the CTR program and 7 with funding from the
DOE nonproliferation budget. With the accelerated effort, both DOD and DOE reported that they
completed the installation of security upgrades by the end of 2008. DOD then shifted funding
towards sustainment activities, rather than further upgrades.
In a complementary effort, DOD established a Security Assistance Training Center to train
Russian students to use and maintain the physical security upgrades that the CTR program
provided at nuclear weapons storage sites. DOD noted that this project would also serve as a
59
The total number of sites remains classified. For details on DOD’s plans, see U.S. General Accounting Office.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security
at Russian Sites. GAO-02-482. March 2003. p. 34.
60
Ibid., p. 36.
61
U.S. House. Committee on Armed Services. Statement of Dr. J.D. Crouch, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Policy. March 4, 2003.
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model for the Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence discussed below. DOD used funds
appropriated prior to FY2011 for this Center, and did not requested additional funding after that
time.
Between FY1995 and FY2011, before this program was combined with others in the GNS
account, Congress appropriated around $840 million for weapons storage security.62 Funding for
this program peaked in FY2006, when the Bush Administration requested $74.1 million for
weapons storage security, added $10 million more in a reprogramming from the strategic
offensive arms elimination account, and requested an additional $44.5 million in the FY2006
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations package. This funding was intended to accelerate the
program, in response to agreements that President Bush reached with Russia’s President Putin. As
Table 3 below indicates, funding has declined to $10 million-$20 million per year in recent years,
after DOD completed many of the projects that had been accelerated earlier. In its FY2014 budget
request for the CTR programs, DOD indicated that it would continue to help Russia “build
capacity to sustain security at 18 nuclear weapons storage sites and 5 rail transfer points.”
However, this effort transitioned to the Russian Ministry of Defense in June 2013 after the MOU
governing the CTR program expired.
Warhead Security and the Department of Energy
Through its International Materials Protection and Cooperation program, the Department of
Energy implemented programs that “secure nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear
materials by upgrading security at nuclear sites, by consolidating these materials to sites where
installation of enhanced security systems have already been completed.... ”63 This effort is known
as the Materials Protection, Control and Accounting Program (MPC&A).64 Through this program,
DOE installed security upgrades in two phases. First, it installed rapid upgrades that were
designed to delay unauthorized access to the storage facilities. These could include the
installation of hardened doors and windows, locks and keys to control access, perimeter fences,
and moveable barriers at entry points. The second phase provided comprehensive upgrades that
were tailored to meet the security needs at each individual facility. These could include
monitoring and detection systems, the relocation of guard forces, the consolidation of materials,
central alarm systems, and electronic access control systems.
The U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) identified 105 nuclear sites, with 243
buildings, that needed assistance in improving their security systems. These include nuclear
warhead and nuclear material storage sites run by the Russian Navy and nuclear warhead storage
sites run by Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) and 12th Main Directorate, the branch of
Russia’s Ministry of Defense responsible for warhead security and maintenance. The MPC&A
program has also supported security enhancements at sites in Russia’s nuclear weapons complex
operated by Rosatom and civilian sites that store nuclear material in Russia; these two efforts are
addressed below.
DOE provided assistance to Russia’s Navy by improving security at 39 naval nuclear warhead
storage sites and 11 nuclear fuel storage sites. These sites house approximately 60 metric tons of
62
Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan, by Matthew Bunn, et al. Project on
Managing the Atom. March 2003.
63
U.S. Department of Energy. FY2004 Congressional Budget Request. Detailed Budget Justifications. February 2003.
p. 623.
64
The MPC&A program also includes efforts to improve “nuclear smuggling detection capabilities at international
borders.” To do this, DOE funds the Second Line of Defense Program, which is described below.
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weapons-useable nuclear materials and 4,000 nuclear warheads. According to DOE, it had
completed rapid and comprehensive upgrades at all naval nuclear fuel storage sites by the end of
2004, and had completed the comprehensive upgrades at warhead sites by 2009. DOE continued
to work at these sites through June 2013, providing assistance with sustainability support. This
included training and site level maintenance on the equipment at the sites, so that the security will
remain in place in the future.
DOE also worked with Russia to install security upgrades at 25 sites on 11 SRF bases; work on
these sites was completed in late October 2007, nearly two years ahead of schedule.65 Through
these projects, DOE also upgraded security at nine sites under the command of the 12th Main
Directorate. DOE completed the work on upgrades at these sites in FY2009. According to DOE,
the process for working at these sites was based on the process agreed with Russia’s Navy, with
the installation of rapid upgrades to address immediate security concerns followed by the
installation of comprehensive upgrades. As with the naval sites, DOE supported sustainment
activities at these facilities through June 2013.
Congress appropriated $367.6 million for security upgrades at Russian Navy sites and $675
million for security upgrades at SRF sites between FY2002 and FY2012. Funding for the naval
sites declined in the mid-2000s, after much of the work was completed, but, as Table 3 below
indicates, it increased towards the end of the decade in support of the sustainment activities. The
Obama Administration requested $39.9 million in FY2013 to support sustainability and training
programs and the replacement of outdated equipment at eight sites. Funding for the SRF sites
peaked at $152.8 million in FY2007, in response to the agreement between President Bush and
President Putin to accelerate security upgrades at warhead storage facilities. It then declined to
$34.4 million in FY2009. The decline reflects the completion of most of the work on upgrades
and a shift to sustainment.
As with the budget for naval sites, the budget for SRF sites increased in FY2010-FY2012 to
support the expanded sustainment program and training programs at 23 SRF sites and 3 sites of
the 12th Main Directorate. The Obama Administration requested only $8.3 million for these
projects in FY2013, but funding remained at the FY2012 level of $59.5 million under the
Consolidated Further Appropriations Act, 2013 (P.L. 113-6). The decline in requested funding
reflected the completion of most of the security efforts and a shift to sustainment programs. The
Administration planned to use this funding to support three training and maintenance centers and
to replace outdated security equipment at up to 11 sites.
In its FY2014 budget request, DOE combined the funding for these two program areas in a new
category called “Nuclear Warhead Protection.” The budget requested $23.2 million for FY2014 to
provide training and workshops and to continue upgrades and sustainability initiatives. The
decline in funding in recent years reflected the completion of most of the security projects and a
shift to sustainment efforts. DOE did not request any additional funding for this project area in
FY2015 because Russia’s MOD will no longer participate in threat reduction activities. In its
FY2016 budget request, DOE again moved these security upgrade programs, placing them in the
International Nuclear Security portion of its new Global Material Security program area, but,
again, does not expect to pursue any further projects in this area.
65
Chivers, C.J. Securing Russian Nuclear Missiles? U.S. Is Set to Say “Done.” New York Times, October 31, 2007.
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Table 3. DOD and DOE Authorizations for Warhead Storage Security Programs
(in $ millions)
Program
FY2007
FY2008
FY2009
FY2010
FY2011
FY2012
FY2013
FY2014
FY2015
Request
Nuclear
Security
Enhancementa
$74.1
$47.6
$24.1
$15.1
$9.6
na
na
na
na
Navy Complexb
$17.3
$13.2
$22.7
$33.9
$34.3
$33.6
$21.8
na
na
Strategic
Rocket Forcesb
$152.8
$121.9
$34.4
$48.6
$51.4
$59.1
$13.8
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
$23.2
0
Nuclear
Warhead
Protection
Source: DOD and DOE budget documents.
a. In FY2012, DOD began to fund this project through the Global Nuclear Security program area, without
specifying the amount allocated to weapons storage security. Estimates indicate the amount remains below
$10 million.
b. In FY2014, DOE combined these two program areas into a single Nuclear Warhead Protection Program.
Securing and Eliminating Nuclear Materials
CTR Fissile Materials Storage
According to unclassified estimates, Russia inherited more than 30,000 nuclear warheads from
the Soviet Union. Russia is dismantling thousands of these warheads and DOD’s CTR program
has provided Russia with assistance in improving the long-term security of the fissile materials
removed from these weapons. The program helped Russia design and build a highly secure
storage facility at Mayak that is intended to provide long-term safe and secure storage for these
materials, and it has provided Russia with more than 26,000 containers to hold the fissile
materials. This facility is designed to hold the equivalent of fissile material from 25,000 nuclear
warheads. The first wing of this building was completed and certified for use in December 200366
and the facility began to accept nuclear materials for storage in July 2006.
Table 4. CTR Authorizations for Fissile Materials Storage
(in $ millions)
Project
Fiscal years
Total
Fissile Material Containers
FY1992-FY2000
$82.2
Storage Facility Design
FY1993
$15
Storage Facility Construction
FY1994-FY2001
$387
Source: Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan, by Matthew Bunn, et al. Project
on Managing the Atom. March 2003.
66
The United States and Russia no longer plan to construct an expected second wing. U.S. Senate. Committee on
Armed Services. Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. Testimony of Lisa Bronson, Deputy Undersecretary of
Defense for Technology Security Policy and Counterproliferation. March 10, 2004.
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DOE Nuclear Materials Security Programs
Russia also inherited enough plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) for possible use in
thousands more warheads. DOE has helped Russia improve security at sites that house
considerably more than half of the former Soviet Union’s 600 metric tons of weapons-usable
nuclear materials.67 These include 11 sites that are a part of the Rosatom weapons complex and 31
civilian sites. Rosatom, like the Department of Energy in the United States, operates and manages
Russia’s nuclear weapons complex. More than 80% of these materials are located at the Rosatom
sites.68 As was the case at naval sites and SRF sites, DOE installed security upgrades in two
phases at these sites.
The facilities managed by Rosatom housed around 500 metric tons of “highly attractive”
weapons-useable materials.69 The pace of work at these facilities accelerated, during the Bush
Administration with increased funding and increased cooperation from Russia. DOE has also
assisted with the installation of security upgrades at 18 civilian nuclear sites throughout the
former Soviet Union. These are mainly research facilities that operate nuclear reactors. According
to DOE, these sites contain around 40 metric tons of weapons-useable materials. DOE had stated
that it has completed rapid and comprehensive upgrades at most of these facilities.
Congress appropriated more than $765 million for security upgrades at Rosatom sites and $447
million for security upgrades at civilian sites between FY2002 and FY2012. Table 5, below,
shows the amount of funds appropriated since FY2007 and the amount requested in FY2015 for
these two programs. The Administration requested $$17.1 million for the Rosatom sites in
FY2015, which represents a reduction of nearly 55% from the amount appropriated in FY2014.
According to DOE, this funding supports the completion of comprehensive MPC&A upgrades at
additional buildings that store and process weapons-usable nuclear materials and allow it to
continue to implement a comprehensive sustainability effort at five Russian sites. The reduction
in funding from FY2014 is due to the completion of sustainability efforts at two sites in the
Russian weapons complex and completed upgrades work in Belarus and sustainability activities
in Kazakhstan. The request for FY2016 declined even further, to $166,000, as this project was
near completion.
The Obama Administration did not request any additional funds for the civilian sites program in
FY2014 and FY2015, as it now considers the work to be a part of the Materials Consolidation and
Civilian Sites program area. Moreover, with DOE’s reorganization of these programs in its
FY2016 budget request, Weapons Material Protection, Material Consolidation and Civilian Sites,
and National Infrastructure and Sustainability are now a part of the International Nuclear Security
effort within the Global Material Security Program area.
67
U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Statement of Ambassador Linton Brooks. Administrator, NNSA. June
15, 2004. See also, U.S. General Accounting Office. Weapons of Mass Destruction. Additional Russian Cooperation
Needed to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites. GA)-03-482. Washington, March 2003. p. 4.
See also, U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services. Statement of Paul M. Longsworth. Deputy Administrator for
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. March 10, 2004.
68
U.S. Department of Energy. FY2004 Congressional Budget Request. Detailed Budget Justifications. February 2003.
p. 625.
69
Ibid., p. 639.
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Table 5. DOE Authorizations for Nuclear Materials Security Programs
(in $ millions)
Program
FY07
FY08
FY09
FY10
FY11
FY12
FY13
FY14
FY15
FY16
Request
Rosatom
(Minatom)
Weapons
Complex/
Weapons
Material
Protection
$94.0
$79.0
$56.1
$71.5
$93.3
$80.7
$36.4
$36.4
$17.2
$0.2
Civilian
Nuclear Sites
$52.7
$54.2
$35.5
$63.5
$53
$59.1
$60.1
na
na
na
Material
Consolidation
and
Conversion
$23.8
$19.5
$21.6
$13.6
$13.9
$14.3
$17
na
na
na
Material
Consolidation
and Civilian
Sites
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
$132.3
$138.6
$116.6
National
Programs and
Sustainability
$65.1
$69.6
$54.9
$68.5
$60.9
$60.9
$50.7
$37.8
$32.2
$1.3
Source: U.S. Department of Energy. FY2004, FY2005, FY2006, FY2007, FY2008, FY2009, FY2010, FY2011,
FY2012, FY2013, FY2014, FY2015, FY2016 Congressional Budget Requests. Detailed Budget Justifications.
Material Consolidation and Conversion
DOE’s Materials Consolidation and Conversion Program supports efforts to consolidate Russian
nuclear materials at sites where installation of enhanced security systems have already been
completed. It has also funded efforts to convert these materials to forms that might be less
attractive to nations seeking materials for nuclear weapons. Congress appropriated $243.4 million
for this program area between FY2002 and FY2012. The Obama Administration requested an
additional $17 million in FY2013.
In FY2014, DOE combined this program with MPC&A efforts at civilian sites program in a new
Materials Consolidation and Civilian Sites program. It requested $132.3 million for this new,
combined program in FY2014. This represents a significant increase of $58.9 million from the
combined level of around $73 million in FY2013. It also requested $138.5 million in FY2014. In
its budget request, DOE noted that it had combined the programs to reflect better how they were
managed within DOE. According to the budget request, the added funding would allow DOE to
expand the scope of its efforts in Russia and to support MPC&A activities with countries of
concern outside Russia. The increase in funding would also allow DOE to provide additional
support projects in former Soviet states outside Russia.
In its FY2016 budget, DOE requested $116.6 million for Material Consolidation and Civilian
sites projects, within its new Global Material Security program area. According to the budget
request documents, this program will “continue to look for partnership opportunities with
Russia,” although each side will independently bear the costs associated with cooperative
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activities. It seems unlikely, following Russia’s withdrawal from most cooperative programs at
the end of 2015, that the two sides will identify new, joint projects in this program area.
National Programs and Sustainability
The MPC&A budget also supported an effort to build an infrastructure within Russia that could
operate effectively and be sustained after the initial and comprehensive upgrades are complete.
These efforts include developing regulations, inspection capabilities, site safeguards, security
programs, and other accounting capabilities. The program operates regional technical support
facilities that can repair and maintain equipment and develop training programs for participants.
Congress appropriated $586.7 million for this program area between FY2002 and FY2012. The
Administration requested, and Congress appropriated $37.8 million for this program area for
FY2014. The Administration has also requested $32.3 million for FY2015. The funding request
declined to $1.3 million in FY2016. According to DOE, this funding supported projects that
developed the necessary training and maintenance infrastructure for sustaining long-term
MPC&A operations in Russia and other countries.
Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence
The DOD CTR program, DOE International Material Protection and Cooperation (IMPC)
program, and the State Department are coordinating efforts to help establish Nuclear Security
Centers of Excellence (COEs) around the world. This initiative was part of the commitments
made by several countries at the 2010, 2012, and 2014 Nuclear Security Summits. These centers
are designed to enhance a country’s ability to train personnel, consistent with “international best
practices, for nuclear security, material control, inventory management, transport security, and
other activities important to improving nuclear material security.”70 DOE has provided technical
support to Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence in Japan and South Korea. The United States is
also supporting the establishment of the Center of Excellence on Nuclear Security in Beijing,
China, and nuclear security engagement with India, “with the goal of developing a partnership
through India’s planned Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership.”71 Both of these countries
had not previously engaged in bilateral nuclear security efforts with the United States. Current
activities emphasize nuclear material security best practices through workshops and training.
No specific funding amounts were provided in FY2015 congressional budget documents.
However, Congress in the past has requested additional information on these programs and
limited funding amounts. Section 1304 of the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act limits
the use of FY2012 DOD CTR funds for Centers of Excellence in non-former Soviet Union (FSU)
countries. Not more than $500,000 may be obligated or expended in establishing such Centers in
non-FSU countries until Congress receives a report on the location, purpose, and funding plan for
the center. This limitation was renewed for FY2013, but not FY2014. The DOD Global Nuclear
Security request totaled was $20.7 million for FY2015. The DOE request for the IMPC program,
of which COE work is a part, was $138.6 million, but agency budget requests do not provide
specific funding estimates for the COEs within those larger programs.
70
U.S. Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2014 Budget Estimates, Cooperative Threat Reduction Program,
Washington, DC, April 2013, pp. 103-105, http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2014/budget_justification/pdfs/
01_Operation_and_Maintenance/O_M_VOL_1_PART_2/CTR_OP-5.pdf.
71
Department of Defense, Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, Annual Report to Congress Fiscal Year 2013,
Washington, D.C, March 2013, pp. 17-18.
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Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI)
Since it was established in 2004, DOE/NNSA’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) has
worked to secure, protect, and in some cases, remove vulnerable nuclear and radiological
materials at civilian facilities worldwide. The United States established this program primarily to
address the threat of terrorists obtaining nuclear material that could be used in a nuclear or
radiological device.
Research reactors all over the world have used weapons-usable nuclear material for fuel as a
legacy of U.S. and Soviet technology transfers from the Cold War era. GTRI repatriates U.S. and
Russian-origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) spent and fresh nuclear fuel from these research
reactors located in third countries. In some cases, the United States converts those reactors to
operate with low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, which is not useful for a nuclear weapon. In
addition, GTRI installs physical security upgrades at nuclear and radiological sites, and recovers
disused and unwanted radioactive sources at home and abroad.
The GTRI budget increased from a request of $131.2 million in FY2008 to $424 million in
FY2014, before declining to a request of $333.8 million for FY2015. The program activities were
reorganized in the FY2016 request and split between Material Management and Minimization
($229 million) and Global Material Security ($153.7 million), totaling $382.7 million. The early
increases were partly due to congressional support for the program, agreements from other
countries on material removal and reactor conversion, and high-level emphasis on this work by
the Bush Administration’s Bratislava Initiatives—which sped up work with the Russians—and
the Obama Administration’s global nuclear security agenda—which spurred more countries to
remove and secure material. Overall, the FY2015 request, like the FY2014 request, represents a
decrease in funding. The FY2015 request returned to the original formulation of protection or
removal. The Administration explained the program decrease by saying that the program is
accomplishing its goals, and therefore there is less material to be removed. Critics view the
decrease as a sign that the Administration is giving this program a lower priority. Other critics
urge additional funds be given for radiological security projects in the United States. International
donors have contributed to GTRI activities in the past.
In its FY2016 budget request, DOE divided the components of GTRI, placing those portions that
focus on material protection within the Global Material Security program and those that focus on
material elimination in the Material Management and Minimization program.
Table 6. DOE Authorizations for Global Threat Reduction Initiative
(in $ millions)
FY07
FY08
FY09
FY10
FY11
FY12
FY13
FY14
Enacted
FY15
Request
FY16
Request
Global
Threat
Reduction
$131.23
$193.22
$404.64
$333.5
$444.69
$503.45
$462.89
$442.1
$333.49
na
HEU Reactor
Conversion
$32.09
$33.82
$76.71
$102.77
$100.97
$139.54
$146
$162
$122.4
na
Nuclear and
Radiological
Material
Removal
$51.49
$67.76
$182.76
$144.83
$221.30
$221.05
$172
na
$101.8
na
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FY07
FY08
FY09
FY10
FY11
FY12
FY13
FY14
Enacted
FY15
Request
FY16
Request
Nuclear and
Radiological
Material
Protection
$45.91
$91.65
$135.53
$85.89
$113.72
$137.41
$142.6
na
$109.3
na
International
Nuclear and
Radiological
Material
Removal and
Protection
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
$200.1
na
na
Domestic
Radiological
Material
Removal and
Protection
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
$80
na
na
Funds from
International
Contributions
$1.74
0
$9.64
0
$8.71
$5.45
$0.65
0
0
na
Material
Management
and
Minimization
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
$311.6
Global Material
Security
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
$426.8
Source: DOE Congressional Budget Justifications.
According to the Department of Energy, GTRI accomplishments since May 2004 include the
following:72
Successfully converted to LEU fuel or verified the shutdown of 49 HEU research
reactors in 25 countries, including Argentina, Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile,
China, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Japan,
Kazakhstan, Libya, the Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, Russia, Ukraine, the
United Kingdom, United States, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam; and verified the
cessation of the use of HEU targets for isotope production in Indonesia.
Accelerated the establishment of a reliable supply of the medical isotope
molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) produced without HEU by establishing partnerships
with South Africa, Belgium, and the Netherlands to convert Mo-99 production
from HEU targets to LEU targets, and with four domestic commercial entities to
produce Mo-99 in the United States with non-HEU technologies;
Removal of 4,100 kg of highly enriched uranium and plutonium.
Complete removal of HEU from 23 countries: Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile,
Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece, Latvia, Libya, Mexico,
72
“GTRI: Removing Vulnerable Civilian Nuclear and Radiological Material,” Fact Sheet, April 12, 2013,
http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/factsheets/gtri-remove; “GTRI: Reducing Nuclear Threats,” Fact Sheet, May 29,
2014, http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/factsheets/reducingthreats.
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Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden,
Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, and Ukraine.
Recovery of more than 32,000 disused and unwanted radiological sources
domestically; and
Recovery of more than 750 radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs)
internationally.
Securing Borders and Improving Export Controls
Preventing the smuggling or illegal export of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons-related
materials and technology is a key proliferation challenge. Several U.S. threat reduction and
nonproliferation programs seek to strengthen border controls and improve export control systems.
Originally, such programs were established in response to concerns over the collapse of political
control along the Soviet-era borders. Today, the Departments of State, Defense, Energy, and
Homeland Security all manage cooperative programs with countries worldwide to prevent the
illicit transfer of WMD technology.
Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance
The State Department’s Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) program
helps nations improve their ability to interdict nuclear smuggling and stop the illicit trafficking of
all materials for weapons of mass destruction, along with dual use goods and technologies.
According to the State Department, the program “builds capacity to ensure that transfer
authorizations support only legitimate trade, and to detect and interdict illicit transfers at
borders.”73
When designing a nation-specific plan for border control assistance, the United States seeks to
address four key areas. First, if needed, it helps the recipient nation establish the legal and
regulatory basis for effective export controls. It then helps the nation develop appropriate export
licensing procedures and practices. Third, the United States helps the recipient establish and
enhance effective enforcement capabilities. When needed, it provides the recipient with detection
and interdiction equipment and training. Finally, the United States helps establish procedures that
promote effective interaction between government and industry so that business entities in the
recipient nation will abide by the laws and regulations of the new export control regime.
During the late 1990s and early 2000s, most of the funding for the EXBS program went to
projects along the periphery of the former Soviet Union. However, in the past decade, this pattern
has changed as the EXBS program has expanded its reach around the globe.74 For example, in
FY2005, approximately half of the $38 million spent on EXBS was allocated to projects in the
former Soviet states, with the rest going to other nations around the world. By FY2010, when the
Obama Administration requested $55 million for EXBS, less than $4 million was allocated to
projects in the former Soviet Union. The same is true of the budget for FY2011 and FY2012; the
State Department requested $61 million in each year, but allocated only a fraction to the former
Soviet Union. The FY2013 budget request sought $55 million for EXBS, but the continuing
resolution held the funding at the FY2012 level of $60.1 million. The Obama Administration has
73
U.S. Department of State, Function 150 and Other International Programs, Executive Budget Summary,
Washington, DC, April 2013, p. 115, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/207305.pdf.
74
U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Testimony of John S. Wolf. Assistant Secretary of State for
Nonproliferation. March 19, 2003.
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sought slight increases each year: $54 million for FY2014, $57 million for FY2015 and $58.7
million for FY2016.
Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative (NSOI)
The Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative is a State Department-led initiative meant to
strengthen a country’s capacity to detect, interdict, and prosecute any nuclear trafficking
incidents. This program had originally focused primarily on the former Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe, but its partner countries now include a wide range of states, including the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Algeria, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Afghanistan.75 The NSOI also partners
with other donor countries and organizations, including Canada, the Czech Republic, the
European Union, Finland, France, Germany, International Atomic Energy Agency, Japan, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Korea, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the U.N.
Office on Drugs and Crime. This program is funded through the State Department’s WMD
Terrorism program, which manages projects that are designed “to improve international capacities
to prepare for and respond to a terrorist attack involving weapons of mass destruction.” The
Obama Administration has requested $5 million for the WMD Terrorism program area for
FY2013 and FY2014, and $4.8 million for FY2015 ($5 million was appropriated). The request
for FY2016 was $6.15 million. This includes funding for NSOI and a related activity, the Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.
Proliferation Prevention
In 2003, the Bush Administration added a border security effort to DOD’s CTR program.
Through the Proliferation Prevention Program, the United States has cooperated with the military
establishments, internal security forces, border guards, and custom forces in Kazakhstan, Ukraine,
Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova to improve their border controls, with a focus on
the Black Sea region. DOD also helped Ukraine establish a comprehensive WMD monitoring and
interdiction capability along its border with Moldova. CTR completed the radiation portal
monitoring program in Uzbekistan in 2008. The program also assisted Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan
to develop a comprehensive capability for WMD surveillance and interdiction along their Caspian
Sea borders.
These programs are intended to help these nations deter, detect, and interrupt the unauthorized
movement of weapons or related materials across their borders. While the original focus was nonRussian FSU states, the program began in FY2012 to partner with countries in Southeast Asia,
along the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea. In FY2013, the Proliferation Prevention
program began to work with states in the Middle East by training and equipping border security
staff in Jordan, Iraq, Turkey, and other countries. DOD plans to continue to work with these
countries in FY2014 to prevent proliferation of WMD across borders shared with Syria. In
addition, Secretary Hagel told the Senate Armed Services Committee at a hearing on April 17,
2013, that approximately $70 million was being spent on projects in Jordan to prevent the transfer
of weapons of mass destruction across its 256-kilometer border with Syria.
The George W. Bush Administration requested, and Congress appropriated between $40 million
and $60 million for this program each year through FY2009. In addition, in FY2008, Congress
added $10 million to the Administration’s request, which the Bush Administration used to expand
the reach of the Proliferation Prevention Program to nations outside the former Soviet Union. As
75
See also http://www.nsoi-state.net/.
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a result of this expansion, the budget for the WMD proliferation prevention program grew to
between $80 million and $120 million per year in recent years. Funding for the Proliferation
Prevention Program decreased to $87.3 million in FY2013, but increased to $110.4 million in
FY2014, in part to support the project in Jordan mentioned above. A FY2014 reprogramming
action added $21 million to the PPP to complete projects that were postponed due to an
redirection of PPP funds to assist the Ukraine Border Guard Service on an urgent basis in 2014.
With the completion of the project in Jordan, the request for FY2015 declined again, to $40.7
million. The Obama Administration has requested $40 million for this program area in FY2016.
Second Line of Defense
The Second Line of Defense (SLD) program seeks to improve nuclear smuggling detection
capabilities at international borders. This program has two parts, the Second Line of Defense
Core Program and the Megaports Program. While the SLD Core program began with projects at
the borders of the former Soviet Union, both of these programs now work with partner countries
around the world, at the invitation of the partner country.
Under the SLD Core program, DOE places detection equipment at ports of entry, international
border crossings, and other designated points of entry and exit, to detect illicit transport of nuclear
materials at international borders. After installation, DOE works with the country on
sustainability, then, ultimately, transfers responsibility for upkeep to the host country. SLD
“strengthens the capability of foreign governments to deter, detect, and interdict illicit trafficking
in nuclear and other radioactive materials across international borders and through the global
maritime shipping system.” It also helps train law enforcement officials in the use of the
equipment installed at borders. According to DOE, the SLD Core program has signed agreements
with 24 countries under which it will provide fixed and mobile radiation detection systems at
borders. By the beginning of 2013, it had “completed over 449 priority sites and deployed 34
mobile systems to 11 countries.”76
In FY2004, Congress added $28 million to the Second Line of Defense program for a project
known as the Megaports initiative. This project is developing and deploying radiation detectors
for use at the largest foreign seaports that handle about 70% of the container traffic headed for the
United States.77 Megaports is designed “to detect the trafficking of nuclear or radioactive
materials in the world’s busiest seaports.” According to DOE, the Megaports Initiative has signed
agreements with 35 partner countries.
DOE conducted a strategic review of the SLD program in FY2013 to determine the most
effective approach to closing key gaps in the global nuclear detection architecture and to increase
the impact of detection and deterrence using fixed and mobile deployments. According to DOE,
the review recommended a plan to address remaining fixed detection gaps, expand mobile
detection, and fully fund sustainability. The review also resulted in the reorganization of SLD
Core and Megaports Programs under a joint implementation program and sustainability effort
funded in one SLD subprogram.
The funding appropriated for the SLD Core Program and Megaports appears in Table 7. The
funding requested for these two programs declined from $271 million in FY2013 to $190 million
76
Department of Energy, FY2014 Budget Request, National Nuclear Security Administration, Washington, DC, April
2013, pp. DN-107, http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/04/f0/Volume1.pdf.
77
Hoehn, William. Update on Legislation Affecting U.S-Former Soviet Union Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction.
RANSAC. November 17, 2003.
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in FY2014. The request declines again in FY2015, to $117.7 million. According to DOE, the
decline in funding between FY2014 and FY2015 is due to both a one-time funding increase in
FY2014 to support a key detection program and adjustments that were made in FY2015 due to
the need to fund higher NNSA priorities.
In its FY2016 budget request, DOE moved the Second Line of Defense program to the Nuclear
Smuggling, Detection, and Deterrence portion of the Global Material Security program area. It
has requested and additional $142.5 million for this program, noting that the funding will be used
to continue to install fixed and mobile radiation detectors to enhance partner capabilities.
Congress, however, has questioned this plan, and restricted funding for fixed radiation detectors.
The House sought to ban completely funding for “research and development, installation, or
sustainment of fixed site radiological portal monitors or equipment for use in foreign countries.”
Supporters of this provision argued that these monitors were ineffective because smugglers could
evade them. They noted that mobile monitors might provide a more effective defense. Those who
opposed the provision argued, however, that fixed monitors could deter smuggling, and were
often in areas where the terrain could make it difficult for smugglers to bypass the border
crossings.
The final version of the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 1356, Sec 3122),
indicates that funds cannot be used “for the installation, on or after the date of the enactment of
this Act, of fixed site radiological portal monitors or equipment in foreign countries” until the
Director of National Intelligence submits a report to the Congress and the NNSA that assesses (1)
whether fixed and mobile radiological monitors address nuclear nonproliferation and smuggling
threats; (2) and how well other nonproliferation programs address nuclear nonproliferation and
smuggling threats; and (3) which programs have the greatest impact and cost-benefit for
addressing nuclear nonproliferation and smuggling threats. The legislation also calls on the
NNSA to submit a plan to Congress “for transitioning fixed site radiological portal monitors
installed in foreign countries … to being sustained, to the greatest extent possible, by the
countries in which such monitors are located.”
Table 7. DOE Funding for Second Line of Defense and Megaports
(in $ millions)
Program
FY07
FY08
FY09
FY10
FY11
FY12
FY13
FY14
FY15
Second Line
of Defense
Core
Program
$75.8
$136.0
$71.9
$78.4
$140.3
$129.4
na
na
na
Megaports
$116.1
$130.8
$102.9
$194
$194
134.4
na
na
na
Total: SLD
$191.9
$266.8
$174.8
$272.4
$334.3
$263.8
$272
$190
$117.7
FY16
$142.5
Source: DOE budget documents.
Note: The FY2013-FY2015 budgets include a single line for both the SLD core program and Megaports.
Container Security Initiative and Secure Freight Initiative
Two overarching Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiatives, the Container Security
Initiative and the Secure Freight Initiative, work to increase the likelihood that nuclear material or
a nuclear weapon would be identified and interdicted during shipping. DHS works closely with
the DOE Megaports Initiative.
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The Department of Homeland Security Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) implements the
Container Security Initiative (CSI), which works with foreign customs authorities “to target and
examine U.S.-bound high-risk cargo while it is still at foreign ports.”78 CSI is operational in 58
ports in 35 countries, screening over 80% of the maritime cargo bound for the United States,
according to the program’s website. DHS funded this program (under the funding line
“International Cargo Screening”) at $81 million in FY2012 and $75 million in FY2013. It
requested an additional $72 million for FY2014, but received only $67.5 million. DHS requested
$69.2 million for FY2015 and $69.85 million for FY16.
The Secure Freight Initiative is jointly implemented with the Department of Energy. It gives
additional capacity to select CSI ports, and was developed to test 100 percent scanning. DOE and
DHS share the costs for this program. DHS installs communications infrastructure at the partner
port that would transmit any alarm data to the United States, and cooperates with local authorities
to resolve any alarms. Qasim, Pakistan is the only port with 100 percent scanning.
Chemical Weapons Destruction
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union amassed the largest stockpile of chemical weapons in the
world. After becoming a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Russia declared that
this stockpile contained 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons. Russia has stored these
weapons at seven sites—five sites contain nerve agents in bombs and artillery shells while three
of these sites and two additional sites house bulk stocks of blister agents.79 Under the CWC,
Russia committed to eliminate the stocks by 2012, but that deadline was extended.80 Russia has
contended that it lacks the financial resources to do the work. As a result, the international
community has provided Russia with a significant amount of assistance in eliminating its
chemical weapons. A European consortium, led by Germany, has constructed a destruction
facility at Gorny to destroy the blister agent stored there.81 Russia now plans to complete
destruction by December 2015.
The United States, with funding provided by DOD’s CTR program, assisted Russia with the
design and construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch’ye until July 2013.
The chemical weapons storage facility at Shchuch’ye contained nearly half of Russia’s stockpile
of artillery shells filled with nerve agent.82 The CTR-financed destruction facility destroyed those
stocks and those stored at the other four storage sites, an amount estimated to be around 5,450
metric tons.
The majority of DOD’s roughly $1 billion in Russian chemical weapons destruction CTR funding
has supported the design and construction of the destruction facility at Shchuch’ye, as well as the
installation of equipment and training of operating personnel at the facility. Construction on the
Shchuch’ye facility began in March 2003. The United States and Russia had hoped that
78
http://www.cbp.gov/border-security/ports-entry/cargo-security/csi/csi-brief
U.S. General Accounting Office. Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to
Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites. GAO-02-482. March 2003. pp. 58-59.
80
The United States also has not met its destruction deadlines under the CWC. The OPCW has extended the deadline
for both nations.
81
For a description of this facility and program see Glasser, Susan B. “Cloud Over Russia’s Poison Gas Disposal.”
Washington Post. August 24, 2002. p. 1
82
The Department of Defense estimates this to be 5,460 metric tons of agent in nearly 2 million rocket and artillery
warheads. See U.S. Department of Defense. Fiscal Year 2004/2005 Biennial Budget Estimates. Former Soviet Union
Threat Reduction Appropriation. February 2003. p. 4
79
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construction would be completed and the facility would begin operations by the end of 2008.
Because it would then take around 3.5 years to destroy the stocks of nerve agent, this schedule
would have allowed Russia to meet the 2012 deadline. This schedule slipped, however, and the
process has been slower than planned. The facility began operations in March 2009.
Although major construction projects have been completed in recent years, DOD requested
funding for “technical and procurement advice and assistance support” at Shchuch’ye until July
2013. The CTR program also provided technical support and design advice to Russia’s chemical
weapons destruction facility at Kizner through 2014. This facility began operations in late 2013
and will destroy 5,645 metric tons of nerve agent. The FY2015 and FY2016 budget requests did
not ask for any funds for chemical weapons destruction technical support in Russia.
In addition, the CTR program has helped Albania destroy all its chemical weapons stocks and is
now assisting the government of Libya with the elimination of legacy chemical weapons and
agents from the Qadhafi era. According to the FY2015 budget estimate, CTR is “providing safety
and security improvements to the Ruwagha Chemical Weapons Storage Facility in the form of
physical upgrades, and ongoing destruction operations.” The CTR program partners with the
German government on these efforts.
The most significant new activity for the CWD program in FY2014-15 was participation in the
removal and destruction of Syrian chemical weapons and in-kind assistance to international
inspectors. The largest contribution to the international effort has come from the DOD CTR
program.
According to DOD, the expiration of the Umbrella Agreement means that there is no longer any
cooperation between the United States and Russia on chemical weapons destruction activities.
The CWD work in Libya ended in FY2014. The Syrian chemical weapons destruction effort was
completed in FY2015, and therefore the bulk of spending for efforts in Syria was paid for in
FY2013 and FY2014. DOD did not request any additional funding for the effort in Syria in
FY2016. As a result, the budget request fell to $942,000, and will be used technical and
contracted advice in other regions to help eliminate chemical weapons and improve their safety
and security until they are eliminated.
Table 8. CTR Funding for Chemical Weapons Destruction
(in $ millions)
FY07
FY08
FY09
FY10
FY11
FY12
FY13
FY14
FY15
FY16
Request
47,700
$1
$28
$8
$12
$9.8
$69
$83
$15.7
$1.0
Source: DOD Congressional Budget Estimates.
Cooperative Biological Engagement
The DOD CTR biological threat reduction program has evolved over the past 20 years. It has
expanded financially, growing from less than 10% of the CTR budget in the late 1990s to over
60% in the FY2016 budget request. It also has expanded geographically. It began as a program
focused on dismantling the vast biological weapons complex that Russia inherited from the
Soviet Union, but has now become a tool that the United States uses to promote “best practices”
in physical security and safety at biological laboratories with dangerous pathogens, and to
develop disease surveillance systems on several continents, particularly Southeast Asia and subSaharan Africa. The name has also changed, from Biological Threat Reduction (BTR) to
Cooperative Biological Engagement (CBE), to reflect the sensitivity of new partner countries to
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being termed a “threat.” Congress has been concerned about measuring the effectiveness of these
programs in reducing threats. Section 1303 of the FY2012 NDAA set a limitation on funds for the
Cooperative Biological Engagement (CBE) Program—“not more than 80 percent may be
obligated or expended”—until certifications by the Secretary of Defense are sent to Congress
regarding the effectiveness of the CBE program.
The shift in CTR’s biological weapons programs mirrors a similar shift in focus for CTR
programs overall, from a focus on threat reduction in the former Soviet Union to the prevention
of WMD terrorism from any source world-wide. The Obama Administration has stated that the
goal of the CBE program is to counter the “threat of state and non-state actors acquiring
biological materials and expertise that could be used to develop or deploy a biological weapon.”
The program does this by destroying or securing biological agents (“Select Agents”) at their
source and building the capacity to detect, diagnose, and report a disease outbreak.83 The 2009
National Strategy for Combating Biological Threats emphasized the need for global health
security and best practices. As a result, DOD’s CTR program works with several federal agencies,
other donor countries, international organizations, and the private sector to implement this
approach.
The Department of State also funds bio-security programs, managing those that address scientist
training, biosafety and biosecurity best practices, and industry partnerships under the Global
Threat Reduction’s Biosecurity Engagement Program (see “Securing Knowledge and Expertise”
section, below). The State Department program is primarily designed to prevent terrorist access to
dangerous pathogens (or chemicals or nuclear material), and programs are concentrated in
countries with the highest current risk. In the FY16 budget request, the State Department said that
the program would focus its work on Pakistan, Turkey and Iraq, “to guard against any outflow of
WMD-applicable technology from neighboring Syria.”
Biological Threat Reduction (BTR) in Russia
Since CTR’s inception, Congress and the executive branch have sought to address the challenges
posed by the potential proliferation of biological weapons and materials from Russia.84 This was a
particular concern because the Soviet Union reportedly developed the world’s largest biological
weapons program, employing, at its peak, an estimated 60,000 people at more than 50 sites. This
weapons complex developed a broad range of biological pathogens for use against plants,
animals, and humans.85 Russia reportedly continued to pursue research and development of
biological agents into the 1990s, even as the security systems and supporting infrastructure at its
facilities began to deteriorate. The United States began to provide Russia with CTR assistance to
improve safety and security at its biological weapons sites and to help employ biological weapons
scientists during the late 1990s, even though Russia had not provided a complete inventory of the
83
Select Agents are determined by the Center for Disease Control, and defined by law as biological agents or toxins
“which have the potential to pose a severe threat to public, animal or plant health.” For more information, see
http://www.selectagents.gov and the White House page on Biosecurity, http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/
ostp/nstc/biosecurity.
84
“The security of existing pathogen libraries, the past scope of work, the current whereabouts of BW and BW-related
experts, and the future disposition of the FSU biological weapons capability are all critical concerns within the threat
reduction agenda.” Reshaping U.S.-Russian Threat Reduction: New Approaches for the Second Decade. Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace and Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council. November 2002. p. 2.
85
For background on the BWPP programs, see CRS Report RL31368, Preventing Proliferation of Biological Weapons:
U.S. Assistance to the Former Soviet States, by (name redacted) and (name r
edacted)
.
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sites or people involved in biological weapons work.86 The problem was aggravated by the fact
that Russia reduced the size of its complex in the mid-1990s, leaving many scientists potentially
unemployed or underemployed. Biological pathogens are easily transported, further increasing
the proliferation risk.87
The CTR program supported four separate BTR programs in Russia, working at dozens of sites
that include many weapons facilities: the Biological Weapons Infrastructure Elimination program,
the Biosecurity and Biosafety program, the BW Threat Agent Detection and Response program,
and Cooperative Biodefense Research. DOD has funded physical security upgrades at a small
number of facilities. Russia has not agreed to allow access or joint work at several key military
biological facilities, which has limited the scope of these programs. Many projects, such as
cooperative biodefense research, have been implemented through the International Science and
Technology Centers (ISTC), because DOD had been unable to conclude implementing
agreements with the relevant ministries in Russia.88 The Russian government has closed the
Moscow ISTC, so no new projects in Russia are now planned through that mechanism.
The FY2014 CTR budget request says that “activities are limited in Russia and Uzbekistan due to
both countries’ reluctance to cooperate with the DoD Cooperative Biological Engagement (CBE)
Program.” This appears to still be a priority for the Obama Administration, and officials have said
they will continue to make attempts to cooperate on these issues, particularly through the Russian
Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Health. The CTR program is planning to spend $2.4
million in FY2015 on CBE programs in Russia.
Central Asia and the Caucuses
The non-Russian states of the former Soviet Union have been willing partners in dismantling the
Soviet biological weapons legacy and securing pathogen collections and laboratories. Facilities in
these countries were abandoned by the Russian military when the republics became independent
states, and in many cases local governments were not aware of their existence or the dangers they
housed.
Of particular note, over time the United States learned of dangerous pathogen collections
dispersed throughout the region as part of the Soviet Anti-Plague System consisting of institutes
in 11 republics. A decade after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, these facilities lacked security
and safety measures, they had lost expert staff due to economic conditions, and many were in a
state of disrepair. The United States accelerated its assistance to these facilities starting in the late
1990s. The CTR Biological Threat Reduction program (now CBE) has supported activities in
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Armenia, and Kazakhstan, where the
Soviet Union housed much of its biological weapons production complex. For example, CTR
funding helped destroy the large-scale biological weapons production facility in Stepnogorsk,
Kazakhstan, and assisted in decontaminating the open-air BW testing site at Vozrozhdeniye Island
in the Aral Sea, Uzbekistan.
The CTR program has built a secure Central Reference Laboratories (CRL) for pathogen
collections in Ukraine and Kazakhstan, and is constructing a CRL in Azerbaijan. Currently, the
86
U.S. General Accounting Office. Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to
Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites. GAO-02-482. March 2003. pp. 48-49.
87
U.S. General Accounting Office. Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to
Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites. GAO-02-482. March 2003. pp. 44-46.
88
Ibid., p. 54.
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CTR program has completed upgr
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