Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress

Congressional research reportDec 12, 2014

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

Chemical Facility Security:

Issues and Options for the 113th Congress

-name redactedSpecialist in Science and Technology Policy

December 12, 2014

Congressional Research Service

7-....

www.crs.gov

R42918

Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress

Summary

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has had statutory authority to regulate chemical

facilities for security purposes since the 109th Congress. The 113th Congress extended this

authority through December 13, 2014, and has passed H.R. 4007, which provides new statutory

authority. Congressional policy makers have debated the scope and details of reauthorization and

continue to consider establishing an authority with longer duration. Some Members of Congress

support an extension, either short- or long-term, of the existing authority. Other Members call for

revision and more extensive codification of chemical facility security regulatory provisions.

Questions regarding the current law’s effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the

sufficiency of federal chemical facility security efforts exacerbate the tension between continuing

current policies and changing the statutory authority.

Congressional policy makers have questioned DHS’s effectiveness in implementing the

authorized regulations, called chemical facility anti-terrorism standards (CFATS). The DHS

finalized CFATS regulations in 2007. Since then, the site security plans for 900 chemical facilities

have been approved in the CFATS process, which starts with information submission by chemical

facilities and finishes with inspection and approval of facility security measures by DHS.

Additionally, DHS has inspected some facilities for subsequent compliance activities. Several

factors, including the amount of detailed information provided to DHS, the effectiveness of DHS

program management, and the availability of CFATS inspectors, likely complicate the inspection

process and lead to delays in inspection. Policy makers have questioned whether the compliance

rate with CFATS is sufficient to mitigate this homeland security risk. For additional analysis of

CFATS implementation, see CRS Report R43346, Implementation of Chemical Facility AntiTerrorism Standards (CFATS): Issues for Congress.

Key policy issues debated in previous Congresses contribute to the current reauthorization debate.

These issues include the adequacy of DHS resources and efforts; the appropriateness and scope of

federal preemption of state chemical facility security activities; the availability of information for

public comment, potential litigation, and congressional oversight; the range of chemical facilities

identified by DHS; and the ability of inherently safer technologies to achieve security goals.

The 113th Congress considered various approaches to this issue. Both the House and Senate

homeland security appropriations acts would extend the duration of the statutory authority until

October 4, 2015. The House and the Senate have passed an amended version of H.R. 4007. This

bill will repeal Section 550 of P.L. 109-295 on the effective date of the act (30 days after

enactment), and authorize the DHS to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes through

the Homeland Security Act. Many of the existing authorities are present in H.R. 4007, but it also

provides DHS with new authorities, such as the ability for certain covered chemical facilities to

self-certify the sufficiency of their security plans. The DHS may use the existing regulations and

issue new regulations as necessary to implement the new authority.

Congressional Research Service

Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress

Contents

Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1

Overview of Statute and Regulation ................................................................................................ 1

Implementation ................................................................................................................................ 4

Staffing and Funding ................................................................................................................. 5

Number of Regulated Facilities ................................................................................................. 6

Facility Inspections and Plan Approval ..................................................................................... 8

Program Reviews..................................................................................................................... 10

Internal Review of CFATS Program ................................................................................. 10

Office of the Inspector General Review ............................................................................ 12

Government Accountability Office Review ...................................................................... 13

Executive Order 13650 ............................................................................................................ 14

Policy Issues .................................................................................................................................. 16

Funding and Infrastructure and Workforce Capabilities.......................................................... 16

Inspection Rate ........................................................................................................................ 17

Federal Preemption of State Activities .................................................................................... 19

Transparency ........................................................................................................................... 20

Definition of Chemical Facility ............................................................................................... 21

Identification of Non-Responsive Facilities ............................................................................ 23

Inherently Safer Technologies ................................................................................................. 25

Personnel Surety ...................................................................................................................... 27

Policy Options ............................................................................................................................... 29

Continue Congressional Oversight .......................................................................................... 29

Maintain the Existing Regulatory Framework ........................................................................ 30

Extend the Sunset Date ..................................................................................................... 30

Codify the Existing Regulations ....................................................................................... 31

Alter the Existing Statutory Authority ..................................................................................... 31

Accelerate or Decelerate Compliance Activities ............................................................... 31

Incorporate Excluded Facilities ......................................................................................... 32

Harmonize Regulations ..................................................................................................... 34

Increase Interagency Coordination.................................................................................... 35

Consider Inherently Safer Technologies ........................................................................... 37

Modify Information Security Provisions........................................................................... 39

Preempt State Regulations................................................................................................. 40

Congressional Action ..................................................................................................................... 41

Modify the Existing Authority................................................................................................. 41

H.R. 4007 .......................................................................................................................... 41

H.R. 68 .............................................................................................................................. 45

S. 67................................................................................................................................... 45

S. 68................................................................................................................................... 45

S. 814................................................................................................................................. 45

Extend the Existing Authority ................................................................................................. 46

H.J.Res. 130 ...................................................................................................................... 46

P.L. 113-164 ...................................................................................................................... 46

H.R. 4903 .......................................................................................................................... 46

S. 2534............................................................................................................................... 47

Congressional Research Service

Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress

P.L. 113-76 ........................................................................................................................ 48

P.L. 113-73 ........................................................................................................................ 50

P.L. 113-46 ........................................................................................................................ 50

P.L. 113-6 .......................................................................................................................... 50

Figures

Figure 1. Overview of CFATS Regulatory Process ......................................................................... 3

Tables

Table 1. DHS Funding for Chemical Facility Security Regulation by Fiscal Year.......................... 5

Table 2. High-Risk Facilities Regulated by DHS under CFATS ..................................................... 7

Table 3. DHS Authorization and Approval of Facility Site Security Plans ..................................... 9

Table 4. Facilities Regulated Under CFATS by Primary Risk Category ....................................... 22

Contacts

Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 50

Congressional Research Service

Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress

Introduction

Recognizing the potential harm that a large, sudden release of hazardous chemicals poses to

nearby people, state and federal governments have long regulated safety practices at chemical

facilities. Historically, chemical facilities have engaged in security activities on a voluntary basis.

Even before the terrorist attacks of 2001, congressional policy makers expressed concern over the

security vulnerabilities of these facilities. After the 2001 attacks and the decision by several states

to begin regulating security at chemical facilities, Congress again considered requiring federal

security regulations to mitigate these risks.

In 2006, the 109th Congress passed legislation providing the Department of Homeland Security

(DHS) with statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. Subsequent

Congresses have extended this authority, which currently expires on December 13, 2014.

Advocacy groups, stakeholders, and policy makers have called for Congress to reauthorize this

authority, though they disagree about the preferred approach. The 113th Congress has passed H.R.

4007, which provides new statutory authority through the Homeland Security Act and extends the

termination date of this authority for four years.

The explosion on April 17, 2013, at the West Fertilizer Company fertilizer distribution facility in

West, TX, has led to additional focus on DHS’s ability to identify noncompliant facilities. The

West Fertilizer Company had not reported to DHS under the CFATS program, though it appeared

to have possessed more than screening threshold quantities of chemicals of interest.1 While DHS

had engaged in previous activity to identify facilities that had not complied with CFATS reporting

requirements, DHS did not identify the West Fertilizer Company. Congressional policy makers

have questioned the sufficiency of DHS efforts to identify these noncompliant “outlier” facilities.2

This report provides a brief overview of the existing statutory authority and implementing

regulation. It describes several policy issues raised in previous debates regarding chemical facility

security and identifies policy options for congressional consideration. For additional analysis of

CFATS implementation, see CRS Report R43346, Implementation of Chemical Facility AntiTerrorism Standards (CFATS): Issues for Congress.

Overview of Statute and Regulation

The 109th Congress provided DHS with statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for

security purposes.3 The statute explicitly identified some DHS authorities and left other aspects to

the discretion of the Secretary of Homeland Security. The statute contains a “sunset provision”

1

Personal communication between CRS and DHS staff, April 23, 2013.

Representative Michael T. McCaul, Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security; Representative Fred Upton,

Chairman, Committee on Energy and Commerce; and Representative John Carter, Chairman, Homeland Security

Appropriations Subcommittee, Letter to Janet Napolitano, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, July 22,

2013; Senator Tom Carper, Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Letter to Janet

Napolitano, Secretary, and Suzanne Spaulding, Acting Under Secretary, National Protection and Programs, U.S.

Department of Homeland Security, June 28, 2013; and Representative Henry A. Waxman, ranking Member, Committee

on Energy and Commerce, and Representative Bennie G. Thompson, ranking Member, Committee on Homeland

Security, Letter to President Barack Obama, May 2, 2013.

3

Section 550, P.L. 109-295, Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007.

2

Congressional Research Service

1

Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress

that causes the statutory authority to expire on December 13, 2014.4 This section reviews the

chemical facility security statute and regulation, focusing on the regulatory compliance process.

The 113th Congress has passed H.R. 4007, which will provide new statutory authority through the

Homeland Security Act to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The regulations

issued by DHS under the authority of previous statutory authority may be used to implement the

new authority, and DHS may issue additional regulation to implement the new authorities.

On April 9, 2007, DHS issued an interim final rule regarding the chemical facility anti-terrorism

standards (CFATS).5 This interim final rule entered into force on June 8, 2007. The interim final

rule implements statutory authority explicit in P.L. 109-295, Section 550, and authorities DHS

found that Congress implicitly granted. In promulgating the interim final rule, DHS interpreted

the language of the statute to determine what DHS asserts was the intent of Congress.

Consequently, much of the rule arises from the Secretary’s discretion and interpretation of

legislative intent rather than explicit statutory language.

Under the interim final rule, the Secretary of Homeland Security determines which chemical

facilities must meet regulatory security requirements, based on the degree of risk posed by each

facility. The DHS lists 322 “chemicals of interest” for the purposes of compliance with CFATS.6

The DHS considers each chemical in the context of three threats: release; theft or diversion; and

sabotage and contamination. Chemical facilities with greater than specified quantities, called

screening threshold quantities, of chemicals of interest must submit information to DHS to

determine the facility’s risk status. See Figure 1. The statute exempts several types of facilities

from this requirement: facilities defined as a water system or wastewater treatment works;

facilities owned or operated by the Department of Defense or Department of Energy; facilities

regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC); and those facilities regulated under the

Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-295).

Based on the information received from the facility, DHS determines whether a facility is or is

not high-risk. Facilities that DHS deems high risk must meet CFATS requirements. The DHS

assigns high-risk facilities into one of four tiers based on the magnitude of the facility’s risk.

Facilities in higher risk tiers must meet more stringent requirements. The statute mandated the use

of performance-based security requirements.7 The DHS created graduated performance-based

requirements for facilities assigned to each risk-based tier.

4

The original statutory authority expired on October 4, 2009, three years after enactment. Congress has incrementally

extended this authority through many appropriation acts and continuing resolutions. H.J.Res. 130 extends the statutory

authority through December 13, 2014.

5

72 Federal Register 17688-17745 (April 9, 2007). An interim final rule is a rule that meets the requirements for a

final rule and that has the same force and effect as a final rule, but contains an invitation for further public comment on

its provisions. After reviewing comments to the interim final rule, an agency may modify the interim final rule and

issue a “final” final rule. The DHS first issued the proposed rule in December 2006 and solicited public comments. 71

Federal Register 78276-78332 (December 28, 2006).

6

72 Federal Register 65396-65435 (November 20, 2007).

7

According to the White House Office of Management and Budget, a performance standard is a standard

that states requirements in terms of required results with criteria for verifying compliance but

without stating the methods for achieving required results. A performance standard may define the

functional requirements for the item, operational requirements, and/or interface and

interchangeability characteristics. A performance standard may be viewed in juxtaposition to a

prescriptive standard which may specify design requirements, such as materials to be used, how a

requirement is to be achieved, or how an item is to be fabricated or constructed.

(continued...)

Congressional Research Service

2

Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress

Figure 1. Overview of CFATS Regulatory Process

(July 2012)

Source: Office of Infrastructure Protection, National Protection and Programs Directorate, Department of

Homeland Security, Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) and Ammonium Nitrate Security Regulation

Update, July 31, 2012.

Notes: COI = Chemical of Interest; STQ = Screening Threshold Quantity; CVI = Chemical-terrorism

Vulnerability Information; CSAT = Chemical Security Assessment Tool; SVA = Security Vulnerability Assessment;

ASP = Alternative Security Program; SSP = Site Security Plan.

All high-risk facilities must perform a security vulnerability assessment, develop an effective site

security plan, submit these documents to DHS, and implement their security plan.8 The security

vulnerability assessment serves two purposes under the interim final rule. One is to determine or

confirm the placement of the facility in a risk-based tier. The other is to provide a baseline against

which to evaluate the site security plan activities.

The site security plans must address the security vulnerability assessment by describing how

activities in the plan correspond to securing facility vulnerabilities. Additionally, the site security

plan must address preparations for and deterrents against specific modes of potential terrorist

attack, as applicable and identified by DHS. The site security plans must also describe how the

activities taken by the facility meet the risk-based performance standards provided by DHS.

(...continued)

For example, a performance standard might require that a facility perimeter be secured. In contrast, a prescriptive

standard might dictate the height and type of fence to be used to secure the perimeter. See Office of Management and

Budget, The White House, “Federal Participation in the Development and Use of Voluntary Consensus Standards and

in Conformity Assessment Activities,” Circular A-119, February 10, 1998.

8

High-risk facilities may develop security vulnerability assessments and site security plans using alternative security

programs so long as they meet the tiered, performance-based requirements of the interim final rule.

Congressional Research Service

3

Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress

The DHS must review and approve the submitted documents, audit and inspect chemical

facilities, and determine regulatory compliance. The DHS may disapprove submitted security

vulnerability assessments or site security plans that fail to meet DHS performance-based

standards, but not because of the presence or absence of a specific security measure. In the case

of disapproval, DHS must identify in writing those areas of the assessment and/or plan that need

improvement. Owners or operators of chemical facilities may appeal disapproval of site security

plans to DHS.

Similarly, if, after inspecting a chemical facility, DHS finds the facility not in compliance, the

Secretary must write to the facility explaining the deficiencies found, provide an opportunity for

the facility to consult with DHS, and issue an order to the facility to comply by a specified date. If

the facility continues to be out of compliance, DHS may fine and, eventually, order the facility to

cease operation. The interim final rule establishes the process by which chemical facilities can

appeal such DHS decisions and rulings, but the statute prohibits third-party suits for enforcement

purposes.

The statute requires certain protections for information developed in compliance with this act.

The interim final rule creates a category of information exempted from disclosure under the

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and comparable state and local laws. The DHS named this

category of information “Chemical-terrorism Vulnerability Information” (CVI). Information

generated under the interim final rule, as well as any information developed for chemical facility

security purposes identified by the Secretary, comprise this category. Judicial and administrative

proceedings shall treat CVI as classified information. The DHS asserts sole discretion regarding

who will be eligible to receive CVI. Disclosure of CVI may be punishable by fine.

The interim final rule states it preempts state and local regulation that “conflicts with, hinders,

poses an obstacle to, or frustrates the purposes of” the federal regulation.9 States, localities, or

affected companies may request a decision from DHS regarding potential conflict between the

regulations. Since DHS promulgated the interim final rule, Congress amended P.L. 109-295,

Section 550, to state that such preemption will occur only in the case of an “actual conflict.”10

The DHS has not issued revised regulations addressing this change in statute.

Implementation

The National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) within DHS is responsible for

chemical facility security regulations. In turn, the Office of Infrastructure Protection, through its

Infrastructure Security Compliance Division (ISCD), oversees the CFATS program within

NPPD.11 This section reviews implementation of the chemical facility security regulations,

focusing on funding, the number of regulated facilities, rate of facility inspection, and reviews of

DHS implementation efforts.

9

72 Federal Register 17688-17745 (April 9, 2007) at 17739.

Section 534, P.L. 110-161, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008.

11

The budget request for the Infrastructure Security Compliance Project contains the Infrastructure Security

Compliance Division funding and personnel allocations for implementing CFATS and ammonium nitrate regulations.

10

Congressional Research Service

4

Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress

Staffing and Funding

The availability of staff, infrastructure, and funds is a key factor in implementing the CFATS

program. Congress has not authorized specific appropriations for the CFATS program. As seen in

Table 1, the staffing and funding for this program generally increased since its creation, but

decreased since FY2011. The full-time-equivalent (FTE) staffing peaked in FY2011 at 257 FTE.

Appropriations for this program peaked in FY2010 at $103 million.

Table 1. DHS Funding for Chemical Facility Security Regulation by Fiscal Year

Fiscal Year

Request

($ in millions)

Appropriation

($ in millions)

Full-time

Equivalents

FY2007

10

22a

0

FY2008

25

50

21

FY2009

63

78b

78

FY2010

103c

103d

246

FY2011

105

96

257

FY2012

99

93

242

FY2013

75

72e

230

FY2014

86

81

242

FY2015

87

f

263

Sources: Department of Homeland Security, congressional justifications FY2007-FY2015; H.Rept. 109-699; P.L.

110-28; the explanatory statement for P.L. 110-161 at Congressional Record, December 17, 2007, p. H16092; the

explanatory statement for P.L. 110-329 at Congressional Record, September 24, 2008, pp. H9806-H9807; H.Rept.

111-298; P.L. 111-242, as amended; S.Rept. 112-74; H.Rept. 112-331; P.L. 112-175; P.L. 113-6; Department of

Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Homeland Security Fiscal Year 2013 Post-Sequestration Operating Plan; Fiscal

Year 2013 Report to Congress, April 26, 2013; P.L. 113-46; H.Rept. 113-91; S.Rept. 113-77; and the joint

explanatory statement for P.L. 113-76 at Congressional Record, January 15, 2014, p. H935.

Notes: Congress has not enacted specific authorization of appropriations for chemical facility security. Funding

levels rounded to nearest million. A full-time equivalent equals one staff person working a full-time work

schedule for one year. The DHS requests funding for chemical facility security through the Infrastructure

Security Compliance Project. Beginning in FY2009, DHS designated some of this funding for activities related to

regulation of ammonium nitrate.

a.

Includes funds provided in supplemental appropriations (P.L. 110-28).

b.

Of this amount appropriated for the Infrastructure Security Compliance Project, $5 million were designated

for activities related to the development of ammonium nitrate regulations.

c.

Of this amount requested for the Infrastructure Security Compliance Project, $14 million were designated

for activities related to the development of ammonium nitrate regulations.

d.

Of this amount appropriated for the Infrastructure Security Compliance Project, $14 million were

designated for activities related to the development of ammonium nitrate regulations. The ISCD reports an

additional $4.8 million rescission in FY2010. See House Committee on Energy and Commerce,

Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy, The Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Program: A

Progress Report, Serial No. 112-172, September 11, 2012, p. 123.

e.

The appropriation reported here is after reduction due to rescissions and sequestration. Funding as

appropriated, prior to rescission and sequestration, was $78 million.

f.

According to H.Rept. 113-481 accompanying H.R. 4903, Department of Homeland Security Appropriations

Act, 2015, the House Committee on Appropriations would recommend $83 million for the Infrastructure

Security Compliance Division. According to S.Rept. 113-198 accompanying S. 2534, Department of

Congressional Research Service

5

Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress

Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2015, the Senate Committee on Appropriations would recommend

$87 million for the Infrastructure Security Compliance Division.

When DHS received statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities in 2006, it did not possess a

chemical facility security office or inspector cadre. The general increase in FTE over time reflects

the creation and staffing of the office and the development of an inspector cadre. In February

2012, DHS testified that it had hired most of the inspector cadre.12 In March 2013, the DHS

Inspector General reported that a working group within ISCD requested an additional 64

inspectors for FY2014 and FY2015 to increase the rate of facility inspection. According to the

DHS Inspector General, this request was not approved.13

For FY2014, Congress appropriated $81 million for ISCD, an increase in funding from FY2013.14

The joint explanatory statement accompanying FY2014 appropriations also directed DHS to

provide reports to Congress on CFATS implementation, coordination of chemical security

responsibilities, how ISCD will improve its review process, and how NPPD is avoiding program

duplication and is ensuring facility security in its personnel surety efforts. It also requires DHS

provide a comprehensive update on efforts to address facilities not reporting under CFATS.

Number of Regulated Facilities

The DHS has received more than 48,000 Top-Screen submissions from over 36,000 chemical

facilities (step 4 in Figure 1).15 Of these facilities, DHS required more than 7,800 to submit a

security vulnerability assessment to determine whether they were high-risk. From the submitted

security vulnerability assessments, DHS currently identifies approximately 3,700 facilities as

high-risk. The DHS considers the other facilities as low-risk, and they need meet no further

CFATS requirements at this time.16 The DHS assigned each high-risk facility, in some cases

preliminarily, to one of four risk tiers (step 7 in Figure 1). Table 2 shows the number of high-risk

facilities in each tier, with Tier 1 those facilities of highest risk.

In May 2010, DHS identified an anomaly in one of the risk-assessment tools it used to determine

a facility’s risk tier. At that time, DHS believed that it had resolved the anomaly. In June 2011, a

new acting ISCD Director “rediscovered” this issue, identified its potential effect on facility

tiering, brought the issue to the attention of NPPD leadership,17 and notified facilities of their

change in risk tier.18 Subsequent review of this risk-assessment tool resulted in DHS reviewing

12

Testimony of Rand Beers, Under Secretary, National Protection and Programs Directorate, Department of Homeland

Security, before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy,

February 3, 2012.

13

Office of the Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security, Effectiveness of the Infrastructure Security

Compliance Division’s Management Practices to Implement the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Program,

OIG-13-55, March 2013, p. 20.

14

This amount is an increase compared to FY2013 funding both before and after reductions due to sequestration.

15

Department of Homeland Security, Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, December 2014.

16

This determination might change, for example, if the facility changed its chemical holdings. The DHS considered

approximately 3,000 facilities as high-risk before the facilities voluntarily removed, reduced, or modified their holdings

of chemicals of interest.

17

Oral testimony of Rand Beers, Under Secretary, National Protection and Programs Directorate, Department of

Homeland Security, before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Environment and the

Economy, February 3, 2012.

18

Department of Homeland Security, DHS Notifies Chemical Facilities of Revised Tiering Assignments, July 5, 2011,

(continued...)

Congressional Research Service

6

Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress

the tier determination of approximately 500 facilities.19 The DHS lowered the number of facilities

allocated at that time to the highest-risk tier from 219 to 102, a greater than 50% reduction.20 In

some cases, DHS determined that facilities no longer qualified as a high-risk facility and thus

were not subject to the CFATS regulations.

Table 2. High-Risk Facilities Regulated by DHS under CFATS

(as of April 21, 2014)

Risk

Tier

Facilities with

Final Tier Decision

Facilities Awaiting

Final Tier Decision

Total Facilities

1

111

10

121

2

334

48

382

3

933

155

1,088

4

1,914

628

2,542

Total

3,292

841

4,133

Source: Testimony of Suzanne Spaulding, Under Secretary for National Protection and Programs, and David

Wulf, Director, Infrastructure Security Compliance Division, Office of Infrastructure Protection, National

Protection and Programs Directorate, Department of Homeland Security before the Senate Committee on

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, May 14, 2014.

Notes: The DHS has preliminarily assigned some facilities to a risk tier. Final assignment to a risk tier occurs

after final review of submitted security vulnerability assessments. The DHS has released more recent information

regarding the total number of facilities (3,669) but has not identified them by risk tier. Department of Homeland

Security, Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, December 2014.

Overall, the total number of chemical facilities assigned a risk tier by DHS has declined since the

CFATS program began. The DHS asserts that the observed reduction in regulated chemical

facilities indicates that the CFATS program and its statutory authority are increasing security by

inducing regulated entities to voluntarily reduce the chemical holdings to levels below the

regulatory threshold. Several other factors may have contributed to this decline, including

erroneous filing by regulated entities, process changes on the part of regulated entities, and

business operations and decisions.

The reported total number of facilities may not fully reflect the actual number of facilities

possessing chemicals of interest above screening threshold quantities. Since the CFATS program

relies on facilities possessing such chemicals to report their holdings, it is possible that additional

facilities exist that have not reported possessing chemicals of interest.21 For example, DHS did

(...continued)

http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/cfats-revised-tiering-assignments.shtm.

19

Response to Questions for the Record by Rand Beers, Under Secretary, National Protection and Programs

Directorate, Department of Homeland Security, before the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on

Homeland Security, March 1, 2012.

20

CRS analysis of facilities with either final or preliminary tier assignment. See National Protection and Programs

Directorate, Department of Homeland Security, Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, 13th Annual

DOE/EFCOG Chemical Safety and Lifecycle Management Workshop, March 23, 2011; Personal communication

between CRS and DHS staff, September 15, 2011; and AcuTech Consulting Group, A Survey of CFATS Progress in

Securing the Chemical Sector, September 6, 2011.

21

The DHS has recognized this potential challenge since at least 2009, when it identified these types of facilities as

“outliers.” In 2009, DHS engaged in a pilot program with the state of New York and the state of New Jersey in part to

(continued...)

Congressional Research Service

7

Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress

not receive any submissions from the West Fertilizer Company.22 Reportedly DHS was not aware

of the chemical holdings at the facility prior to its explosion.23

If such facilities did not report their holdings, DHS would not assess whether they were high-risk

and thus regulated. A potential mitigating factor might be if other federal agencies that receive

information about facility chemical holdings through different regulatory programs shared such

information with DHS. Such information sharing might allow DHS to identify facilities that had

not reported to it but had reported to other federal agencies.

Facility Inspections and Plan Approval

The DHS originally planned to begin inspections of Tier 1 facilities as soon as 14 months after it

issued regulations implementing CFATS (step 11 of Figure 1).24 Several factors have delayed

inspections, including the release of additional regulatory requirements in the form of an

appendix and the need to build an inspector cadre, establish a regional infrastructure, and assist

facilities in complying with the regulation. Chemical inspectors must be able to assess the

security measures at a chemical facility using the performance-based criteria developed by DHS.

Performance-based security measures are likely more difficult to assess than prescriptive

measures and thus inspectors may require greater training and experience. To overcome this

challenge, DHS established a Chemical Security Academy, a 10-week training course for

inspectors. Such training, while likely improving the quality of inspection, also introduces

additional time between the hiring of new inspectors and their deployment in the field.

Since 2007, DHS officials have provided numerous dates for beginning inspections.25 The DHS

began inspections of Tier 1 facilities in February 2010.26 At that time, DHS testified that it

planned to inspect all Tier 1 facilities by the end of calendar year 2010,27 but by the end of

calendar year 2011, DHS had only authorized 10 site security plans (step 10 of Figure 1) and had

approved no implementation of any site security plan.28 Since then, DHS has implemented an

(...continued)

identify such facilities. See testimony of Philip Reitinger, Deputy Under Secretary, National Protection and Programs

Directorate, Department of Homeland Security, before the House Committee on Homeland Security, June 16, 2009;

and testimony of Rand Beers, Under Secretary, National Protection and Programs Directorate, Department of

Homeland Security, before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, March 3, 2010.

22

Personal communication between CRS and DHS staff, April 23, 2013.

23

Joshua Schneyer, Ryan McNeill, and Janet Roberts, “Texas Fertilizer Company Didn't Heed Disclosure Rules Before

Blast,” Reuters, April 20, 2013.

24

Department of Homeland Security, Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Interim Final Rule Regulatory

Assessment, DHS-2006-0073, April 1, 2007, p. 15.

25

In July 2007, DHS provided testimony that formal site inspections of a selected group of facilities would begin by

the end of 2007 (Testimony of Robert B. Stephan, Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, National Protection

and Programs Directorate, Department of Homeland Security, before the House Committee on Homeland Security,

Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure, July 24, 2007).

26

Testimony of Rand Beers, Under Secretary, National Protection and Programs Directorate, Department of Homeland

Security, before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, March 3, 2010.

27

Oral testimony of Rand Beers, Under Secretary, National Protection and Programs Directorate, Department of

Homeland Security, before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, March 3, 2010.

28

Oral testimony of Rand Beers, Under Secretary, National Protection and Programs Directorate, Department of

Homeland Security, before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity,

Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies, February 11, 2011.

Congressional Research Service

8

Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress

interim site security plan review process that it asserts is more effective and timely. The DHS has

used this interim review process to authorize additional site security plans. As of December 2014,

DHS had authorized or conditionally authorized 2,456 site security plans. The DHS also reported

that it had successfully inspected and approved the site security plan at 1,366 facilities.29 The

DHS has not identified the tier assignment of these facilities. In April 2014, DHS identified the

tier assignments of facilities with authorized and approved site security plans. This data showed

that DHS has focused on authorizing and approving site security plans for facilities assigned to

the higher risk tiers. See Table 3.

Table 3. DHS Authorization and Approval of Facility Site Security Plans

(as of April 2014)

Tier

Facilities

Authorized Site Security Plans

Approved Site Security Plans

1

121

107

100

2

382

262

213

3

1,088

590

317

4

2,542

365

26

Total

4,133

1,324

656

Source: Testimony of Suzanne Spaulding, Under Secretary for National Protection and Programs, and David

Wulf, Director, Infrastructure Security Compliance Division, Office of Infrastructure Protection, National

Protection and Programs Directorate, Department of Homeland Security before the Senate Committee on

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, May 14, 2014.

Notes: The facilities column includes facilities with preliminary tier assignments. Site security plans include plans

submitted under alternative security programs. The DHS no longer regulates some facilities that have authorized

or approved site security plans but still accounts for those security plans in its data on authorizations and

approvals by tier. The DHS has released more recent information regarding the total number of authorized

(2,456) and approved (1,366) site security plans but has not identified them by risk tier. Department of

Homeland Security, Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, December 2014.

According to DHS, ISCD inspected and approved more facilities than it had expected to in

FY2013, but some of these approvals were for facilities in tiers lower than planned.30 In March

2013, DHS testified that it planned to have all Tier 1 facilities approved by October 201331 and all

Tier 1 and Tier 2 facilities approved by May 2014.32 The DHS did not meet this milestone and

now estimates that, by the end of FY2014, it will have approved over 90% of all Tier 1 and Tier 2

facilities that have authorized site security plans. The DHS notes that regulated facilities may

move between tiers, and new regulated facilities may be assigned any tier. As a consequence,

29

Department of Homeland Security, Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, December 2014.

Personal communication between CRS and DHS staff, October 28, 2013.

31

Testimony of Rand Beers, Under Secretary, and David Wulf, Director, Infrastructure Security Compliance Division,

National Protection and Programs Directorate, Department of Homeland Security, before the House Committee on

Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy, March 14, 2013.

32

Testimony of Rand Beers, Under Secretary, and David Wulf, Director, Infrastructure Security Compliance Division,

National Protection and Programs Directorate, Department of Homeland Security, before the House Committee on

Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy, March 14, 2013; and Office of the Inspector

General, Department of Homeland Security, Effectiveness of the Infrastructure Security Compliance Division’s

Management Practices to Implement the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Program, OIG-13-55, March

2013, p. 22.

30

Congressional Research Service

9

Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress

DHS asserts it is likely that a small percentage of facilities in each tier will not have approved site

security plans at any given time.33

The DHS has identified an additional factor in the delay of the inspection schedule: iteration

between DHS and regulated entities regarding their site security plans.34 The DHS has issued at

least 66 administrative orders to compel facilities to complete their site security plans.35 In

addition, DHS established a pre-authorization inspection process to gain additional information

from facilities to fully assess the submitted site security plan and potentially reduce the number of

requests for additional information from DHS to regulated facilities. Once DHS completes a preauthorization inspection at a facility, the facility may amend its site security plan to reflect the

results of the pre-authorization inspection. The DHS had performed approximately 180 preauthorization inspections as of February 2012.36 The DHS has since included this type of

inspection in its more general compliance assistance visit program. As of December 2014, DHS

had conducted 1,691 compliance assistance visits.37

Program Reviews

The CFATS program has undergone three reviews of its processes and progress. The first was an

internal review conducted by program management to identify programmatic challenges. Since

that review, both the DHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and the Government

Accountability Office (GAO) have released reports addressing the CFATS program.

Internal Review of CFATS Program

In December 2010, NPPD initiated a management review of ISCD through the NPPD Office of

Compliance and Security. In July 2011, new leadership took charge of ISCD and, at the direction

of Under Secretary Beers, began a review of the goals, challenges, and potential corrective

actions to improve program performance. In November 2011, ISCD leadership presented Under

Secretary Beers with a report containing the results of both reviews. According to DHS, the report

was intended as a candid, internal assessment that focused predominantly on the challenges faced

by ISCD rather than on the program’s successes and opportunities.38

33

Personal communication between CRS and DHS staff, October 28, 2013.

The DHS identified such iteration on the contents of site security plans as one factor delaying the start of the

inspection process from December 2009 to February 2010. Oral testimony of Rand Beers, Under Secretary, National

Protection and Programs Directorate, Department of Homeland Security, before the Senate Committee on Homeland

Security and Governmental Affairs, March 3, 2010.

35

Department of Homeland Security, DHS Responses to Rep. McCaul and Rep. Meehan’s May 2, 2013 Letter

Regarding the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) Program, June 2013. This number is unchanged

since March 2011 (Testimony of Rand Beers, Under Secretary, National Protection and Programs Directorate,

Department of Homeland Security, before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on

Environment and the Economy, March 31, 2011).

36

Testimony of Rand Beers, Under Secretary, National Protection and Programs Directorate, Department of Homeland

Security, before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy,

February 3, 2012.

37

Department of Homeland Security, Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, December 2014.

38

Oral testimony of David Wulf, Deputy Director, Infrastructure Security Compliance Division, National Protection

and Programs Directorate, Department of Homeland Security, before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce,

Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy, February 3, 2012.

34

Congressional Research Service

10

Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress

At the time of the report, DHS had received approximately 4,200 site security plans but had not

approved any. The review report identified several factors that contributed to the absence of

approvals. These factors included the inability to perform compliance inspections and the lack of

an established records management system to document key decisions.39 Other difficulties facing

ISCD reportedly included human resource issues, such as having employees with insufficient

qualifications and work training, erroneous impressions of inspector roles and responsibilities,

and the use of contractors to perform inherently governmental work.40 Additional reported

challenges included difficulty in quickly altering workplace requirements, resolving personnel

security requirements, detailing site security compliance inspections, managing workplace

behavior and perceptions, and dealing with a unionized workforce. Additionally, ISCD lacked a

system for tracking the usage of consumable supplies, potentially allowing for waste, fraud, and

abuse; faced challenges in hiring new qualified individuals; and suffered from a lack of morale.

The report identified three top priorities to address the challenges addressing ISCD:

•

clearing the backlog of site security plans;

•

developing a chemical inspection process; and

•

addressing ISCD statutory responsibilities for regulating ammonium nitrate and

managing personnel surety as part of the CFATS program.41

The ISCD developed an action plan with discrete action items to address identified challenges. In

addition to the action plan, NPPD requested ISCD leadership to provide milestones and a

schedule for completion of the action plan tasks. The ISCD implemented this plan with the

oversight of NPPD leadership.42 According to GAO, ISCD developed at least eight sequential

versions of the action plan, updating each additional version, and in some cases adding additional

detail, milestones, or timelines.43

As of July 2013, DHS had completed 90 of the 95 action items included in the action plan.44

Completed action items include updated internal policy and guidance materials for inspections, a

monthly ISCD newsletter, increased staff engagement and dialogue, and additional supervisory

training and guidance.

The GAO reviewed the DHS action plan and stated that “ISCD appears to be heading in the right

direction, but it is too early to tell if individual items are having their desired effect because ISCD

39

Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Is Taking Action to Better Manage Its

Chemical Security Program, but It Is Too Early to Assess Results, GAO-12-515T, July 26, 2012.

40

Mike Levine, “EXCLUSIVE: Beset by Strife at Chemical Security Office, DHS Internal Report Claims AntiTerrorism Program Now in Jeopardy,” FoxNews.com, December 21, 2011.

41

Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Is Taking Action to Better Manage Its

Chemical Security Program, but It Is Too Early to Assess Results, GAO-12-515T, July 26, 2012.

42

In 2012, ISCD program leadership met with the Principal NPPD Deputy Under Secretary at least weekly to discuss

progress on the action plan. Oral testimony of Rand Beers, Under Secretary, National Protection and Programs

Directorate, Department of Homeland Security, before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee

on Environment and the Economy, February 3, 2012.

43

Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Is Taking Action to Better Manage Its

Chemical Security Program, but It Is Too Early to Assess Results, GAO-12-515T, July 26, 2012.

44

Testimony of David Wulf, Director, Infrastructure Security Compliance Division, National Programs and Protection

Directorate, Department of Homeland Security, before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on

Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies, on August 1, 2013.

Congressional Research Service

11

Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress

is in the early stages of implementing corrective actions and has not established performance

measures to assess results.”45 The GAO provided several caveats to its assessment, including that

it did not have available documentary evidence about the causes of the issues identified in the

ISCD memorandum. For example, GAO stated, “Program officials did not maintain records of

key decisions and the basis for those decisions during the early years of the program.”46

Office of the Inspector General Review

In March 2013, the DHS OIG released a report on its review of the CFATS program through the

end of FY2012.47 The DHS OIG review addressed whether:

•

management controls were in place and operational to ensure that CFATS is not

mismanaged;

•

NPPD and ISCD leadership misrepresented program progress; and

•

nonconforming opinions of program personnel were suppressed or met with

retaliation.

The DHS OIG report was critical of the prior performance of the CFATS program, stating:

Program progress has been slowed by inadequate tools, poorly executed processes, and

insufficient feedback on facility submissions. In addition, program oversight had been

limited, and confusing terminology and absence of appropriate metrics led to

misunderstandings of program progress. The Infrastructure Security Compliance Division

still struggles with a reliance on contractors and the inability to provide employees with

appropriate training. Overall efforts to implement the program have resulted in systematic

noncompliance with sound Federal Government internal controls and fiscal stewardship, and

employees perceive that their opinions have been suppressed or met with retaliation.

Although we were unable to substantiate any claims of retaliation or suppression of

nonconforming opinions, the Infrastructure Security Compliance Division work environment

and culture cultivates this perception. Despite the Infrastructure Security Compliance

Division’s challenges, the regulated community views the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism

Standards Program as necessary in establishing a level playing field across a diverse

industry.48

The DHS OIG issued 24 recommendations to assist ISCD to correct identified program

deficiencies and attain intended program results and outcomes. The ISCD concurred fully or

partially with 20 recommendations and did not concur with 4 recommendations. The DHS OIG

recommendations included improving internal processes to achieve a more timely response to

information submissions and requests from regulated entities; defining, developing, and

45

Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Is Taking Action to Better Manage Its

Chemical Security Program, but It Is Too Early to Assess Results, GAO-12-515T, July 26, 2012.

46

Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Is Taking Action to Better Manage Its

Chemical Security Program, but It Is Too Early to Assess Results, GAO-12-515T, July 26, 2012.

47

Office of the Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security, Effectiveness of the Infrastructure Security

Compliance Division’s Management Practices to Implement the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Program,

OIG-13-55, March 2013.

48

Office of the Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security, Effectiveness of the Infrastructure Security

Compliance Division’s Management Practices to Implement the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Program,

OIG-13-55, March 2013, p. 1.

Congressional Research Service

12

Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress

implementing improved processes and procedures for inspections; refining and improving the

existing CFATS tiering methodology and tiering process; and reducing reliance on contractors

and improving managerial oversight within ISCD.

In response to these recommendations, ISCD provided the DHS OIG with a corrective action

plan. As of February 2014, ISCD has addressed 12 of the DHS OIG recommendations. Nine

recommendations were administrative and include selecting permanent ISCD leadership;

reducing reliance on contract personnel; developing policy for appointing acting management;

ensuring that all employees serving in an acting supervisory capacity have a supervisory position

description; ensuring that all employees receive performance reviews; disseminating ISCD

organizational and reporting structure to staff; reiterating to all employees the process for

reporting misconduct allegations; implementing a plan to ensure the long‐term authorization of

the CFATS Program; and establishing internal controls for the accountability of appropriated

funds. Three recommendations were programmatic and pertained to: revising the long‐term

review process to reduce the Site Security Plan backlog; implementing a process to improve the

timeliness of facility submission determinations; and program metrics that measure CFATS

program value accurately and demonstrate the extent to which risk has been reduced at regulated

facilities.49

The ISCD is still addressing 12 DHS OIG recommendations. Ten recommendations are

programmatic and include improving CFATS Program tools and processes; engaging regulated

industry and government partners; and finalizing program requirements. The two administrative

recommendations include providing training and guidance; and eliminating inappropriate

Administratively Uncontrollable Overtime pay.50

Government Accountability Office Review

In April 2013, GAO issued a report on the CFATS program.51 The GAO assessed how DHS

assigned chemical facilities to tiers and the extent to which it did so, how DHS revised its process

to review facility security plans, and whether DHS communicated and worked with owners and

operators to improve security. The GAO found that the approach DHS used to assess risk and

make decisions to place facilities in final tiers does not consider all of the elements of

consequence, threat, and vulnerability. For example, the risk assessment approach is based

primarily on consequences arising from human casualties, but does not consider economic

consequences. The GAO review of the risk assessment approach revealed that ISCD was

inconsistent in how it assessed threat. According to GAO, ISCD considered threat for the 10% of

facilities tiered because of the risk of release or sabotage, but not for the approximately 90% of

facilities that are tiered because of the risk of theft or diversion. Also, GAO identified that when it

did use threat data, the data was not current. In addition, GAO found that DHS had not been

tracking data on reviews of site security plans and thus could not quantify improvements to that

49

Testimony of Marcia Moxey Hodges, Chief Inspector, Office of Inspections, Office of the Inspector General,

Department of Homeland Security, before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security

Technologies, House Committee on Homeland Security, February 27, 2014.

50

Testimony of Marcia Moxey Hodges, Chief Inspector, Office of Inspections, Office of the Inspector General,

Department of Homeland Security, before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security

Technologies, House Committee on Homeland Security, February 27, 2014.

51

Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Efforts to Assess Chemical Security Risk

and Gather Feedback on Facility Outreach Can Be Strengthened, GAO-13-353, April 2013.

Congressional Research Service

13

Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress

process. The GAO estimated that it could take another seven to nine years before DHS completed

reviews on submitted site security plans. Input GAO solicited from 11 trade associations also

indicated that DHS does not obtain systematic feedback on outreach activities. The GAO

recommended that DHS:

•

develop a plan, with timeframes and milestones, that incorporates the results of

the various efforts to fully address each of the components of risk and take

associated actions where appropriate to enhance ISCD’s risk assessment

approach and

•

conduct an independent peer review, after ISCD completes enhancements to its

risk assessment approach that fully validates and verifies ISCD’s risk assessment

approach consistent with the recommendations of the National Research Council

of the National Academies.

The ISCD has taken steps to address the GAO recommendations. For example, ISCD engaged the

Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute to coordinate an examination of the CFATS risk

assessment model. According to GAO, HSSAI recommended that ISCD revise the current risktiering model and create a standing advisory committee—with membership drawn from

government, expert communities, and stakeholder groups—to advise DHS on significant changes

to the methodology. In addition, ISCD plans to modify the risk assessment approach to better

include all elements of risk.52

Executive Order 13650

On August 1, 2013, President Obama signed an executive order on improving chemical facility

safety and security.53 The executive order directs multiple federal agencies, including DHS, to

take certain actions in the areas of chemical facility safety and security. It also establishes a

Chemical Facility Safety and Security Working Group co-led by DHS, EPA, and the Department

of Labor.

Among other topics, it contains several provisions related to information sharing and coordination

in the CFATS program. The executive order directs the working group to develop a plan that will,

among other goals, identify ways to improve coordination among the federal government, first

responders, and state, local, and tribal entities.54 It specifically directs the Secretary of Homeland

Security to assess the feasibility of sharing CFATS data with State Emergency Response

Commissions (SERCs), Tribal Emergency Planning Committees (TEPCs), and Local Emergency

Planning Committees (LEPCs).55

The executive order directs the working group to analyze the potential to improve information

collection by and sharing between agencies to help identify chemical facilities which may not

have provided all required information or may be noncompliant with federal requirements to

52

Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Observations on DHS Efforts to Identify,

Prioritize, Assess and Inspect Chemical Facilities, GAO-14-365T, February 27, 2014.

53

Executive Order 13650, Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security, August 1, 2013. See 78 Federal Register

48029-48032 (August 7, 2013).

54

Section 3(a) of Executive Order 13650, Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security, August 1, 2013.

55

Section 3(c) of Executive Order 13650, Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security, August 1, 2013.

Congressional Research Service

14

Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress

ensure chemical facility safety.56 It also directs the working group to produce a proposal for a

coordinated, flexible data-sharing process that can be used to track submitted data. The proposal

is to allow for the sharing of information with and by state, local, and tribal entities.57 The

executive order also directs the working group to convene an array of stakeholders to identify and

share successes to date and best practices to reduce safety and security risks. The executive order

specifically includes consideration of “the use of safer alternatives.”58

The executive order directs the working group to deploy a pilot program to validate best practices

and test innovative methods for federal interagency collaboration regarding chemical facility

safety and security.59 The pilot program, which DHS has implemented, is to include innovative

and effective methods of collecting, storing, and using facility information, stakeholder outreach,

inspection planning, and, as appropriate, joint inspection efforts. The results of this pilot program

are to inform comprehensive and integrated standard operating procedures for a unified federal

approach for identifying and responding to risks in chemical facilities, incident reporting and

response procedures, enforcement, and collection, storage, and use of facility information. These

best practices are to reflect best practices and are to include agency-to-agency referrals and joint

inspection procedures where possible and appropriate.60

Additionally, the executive order directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to identify a list of

chemicals that should be considered for addition to the CFATS chemical of interest list.61

Expanding the list of chemicals of interest, while not changing the mechanism by which DHS

defines a chemical facility, would likely lead to additional facilities regulated under CFATS.

In May 2014, the working group issued a report to the President on progress to date.62 The report

includes descriptions of various efforts to modify the CFATS program in order to improve its

performance individually and in conjunction with other programs. These efforts include improved

information sharing among federal agencies regarding regulated facilities with chemical holdings;

outreach to state homeland security advisors, first responders, and other state and local agencies;

comparison of federal chemical facility information with that held by states; and continued

coordination and harmonization activities among chemical facility security regulatory programs.

The report also described a planned CFATS Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM)

on potential modification of the CFATS regulations to address ammonium nitrate as a chemical of

interest, updates to the list of chemicals of interest, and other aspects of the program. On May 30,

2014, the Office of Management and Budget indicated its Office of Information and Regulatory

Affairs had received the proposed ANPRM language from DHS.63

56

Section 5(a) of Executive Order 13650, Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security, August 1, 2013.

Section 5(b) of Executive Order 13650, Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security, August 1, 2013.

58

Section 7 of Executive Order 13650, Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security, August 1, 2013.

59

Section 4(a) of Executive Order 13650, Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security, August 1, 2013.

60

Section 4(b) of Executive Order 13650, Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security, August 1, 2013.

61

Section 6(d) of Executive Order 13650, Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security, August 1, 2013.

62

Chemical Facility Safety and Security Working Group, Executive Order 13650: Actions to Improve Chemical

Facility Safety and Security-A Shared Commitment, Report to the President, May 2014, p. 46, https://www.osha.gov/

chemicalexecutiveorder/final_chemical_eo_status_report.pdf.

63

Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, The White House, Chemical

Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, RIN 1601-AA69, May 30, 2014, http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/

eAgendaViewRule?pubId=201404&RIN=1601-AA69.

57

Congressional Research Service

15

Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress

Finally, the report identifies three specific areas where the working group calls for congressional

action with regard to CFATS. These are:

•

providing permanent authorization for the CFATS program;

•

streamlining the CFATS enforcement process; and

•

removing the water and wastewater treatment facilities exemption from CFATS.64

Policy Issues

Previous congressional discussion on chemical facility security raised several contentious policy

issues.65 Some issues will exist even if Congress extends the existing statutory authority without

changes. These include whether DHS has sufficient funding and capabilities to adequately

oversee chemical facility security; whether federal chemical facility security regulations should

preempt state regulations; and how much chemical security information individuals may share

outside of the facility and the federal government. Other issues, such as what facilities DHS

should regulate as a chemical facility and whether DHS should require chemical facilities to

adopt or consider adopting inherently safer technologies, may be more likely addressed if

Congress chooses to revise or expand existing authority.

Funding and Infrastructure and Workforce Capabilities

The 2007 CFATS regulations establish an oversight structure that relies on DHS personnel

inspecting chemical facilities and ascertaining whether regulated entities have implemented their

authorized site security plans. Although the use of performance-based measures, where chemical

facilities have flexibility in how to achieve the required security performance, may reduce some

demands on the regulated entities, it may also require greater training and judgment on the part of

DHS inspectors. Congressional oversight has raised the question of whether DHS has requested

and received appropriated funds sufficient to hire and retain the staff necessary to perform the

required compliance inspections and whether DHS has properly managed the appropriated funds

received.66

The DHS has faced challenges when creating the necessary infrastructure to perform nationwide

inspections. As stated by DHS, initial expectations for inspector responsibilities and infrastructure

needs did not match the final needs.

For example, at the program’s outset, certain roles and responsibilities were envisioned for

the program staff that, in the end, did not apply. This resulted in the hiring of some

employees whose skills did not match their ultimate job responsibilities and the purchase of

64

Chemical Facility Safety and Security Working Group, Executive Order 13650: Actions to Improve Chemical

Facility Safety and Security-A Shared Commitment, Report to the President, May 2014, p. 46, https://www.osha.gov/

chemicalexecutiveorder/final_chemical_eo_status_report.pdf.

65

Congressional policy makers have debated chemical facility security issues since at least the 106th Congress.

66

See, for example, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Transportation Security and

Infrastructure Protection, Chemical Security: The Implementation of the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards

and the Road Ahead, 110th Congress, December 12, 2007; H.Rept. 112-492, accompanying H.R. 5855, Department of

Homeland Security Appropriations Bill, 2013, and S.Rept. 112-169, accompanying S. 3216, Department of Homeland

Security Appropriations Bill, 2013.

Congressional Research Service

16

Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress

some equipment that in hindsight appear to be unnecessary for chemical inspectors.

Additionally, we envisioned a greater number of field offices than we eventually decided to

employ.67

The degree to which funding meets agency infrastructural needs likely depends on factors both

external and internal to DHS. External factors include the number of regulated facilities and the

sufficiency of security plan implementation. Challenges experienced by DHS in overseeing

facility site security plan implementation will likely increase the workforce necessary to meet the

planned inspection cycle. In contrast, reduction in the number of regulated facilities will likely

decrease the number of needed inspectors. Internal factors include the ratio between headquarters

staff and field inspectors; the assigned risk tiers of the regulated facilities; and the timetable for

implementation of inspections. Once DHS has more fully engaged in inspection of regulated

facilities, it may be able to more comprehensively determine its long-term resource needs and

estimate both funding and staff requirements. A key factor for achieving program efficacy and

efficiency may be the success in training inspectors to perform CFATS inspections, given the

reported difficulties in developing inspector training combined with the requirements of a new

regulatory program.

Inspection Rate

As of December 2014, 1,366 chemical facilities had been approved in the CFATS process, which

starts with information submission by chemical facilities and finishes with approval of inspected

security measures by DHS.68 The DHS states that the first authorization inspection was conducted

in 2010; as of December 2014, DHS had conducted 1,851 authorization inspections.69 In 2013,

GAO projected that DHS may require between seven and nine years to complete review of site

security plans and that to inspect and approve all regulated facilities will require additional time.70

This estimate is premised on an approval rate of 30 to 40 facilities per month. As DHS has

increased its rate of inspection and approval, it is likely that it will take DHS less time to approve

all regulated facilities. Some policy makers have expressed surprise at the pace of inspection and

questioned whether DHS should continue at the current pace or accelerate the compliance

process.71 Several factors likely complicate and slow the inspection process. One factor appears to

be the internal operations of the DHS implementing office and the skills and capabilities of the

ISCD inspector cadre. Another factor appears to be that the information facilities submit in site

security plans may not provide what DHS views as sufficient detail to evaluate compliance.72

67

Testimony of Rand Beers, Under Secretary, National Protection and Programs Directorate, Department of Homeland

Security, before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy,

February 3, 2012.

68

Department of Homeland Security, Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, December 2014.

69

Department of Homeland Security, Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, December 2014.

70

Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Preliminary Observations on DHS Efforts to

Assess Chemical Security Risk and Gather Feedback on Facility Outreach, GAO-13-412T, March 14, 2013; and

Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Needs to Improve Its Risk Assessments and

Outreach for Chemical Facilities, GAO-13-801T, August 1, 2013.

71

Monica Hatcher, “Why Chemical Plants Are Vulnerable to Terrorism,” Houston Chronicle, April 5, 2010.

72

For example, see Department of Homeland Security, Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Site Security Plans

and Preliminary Inspections, NASTTPO Annual Meeting, May 12, 2010; and W. Koch, Air Products, Overview of DHS

CFATS Pre Authorization Visit, July 7, 2010.

Congressional Research Service

17

Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress

Rather than reject such site security plans, DHS attempts to gather iteratively the necessary

information from the facilities, including through compliance assistance visits.

Compliance assistance visits may lead to higher quality site security plan submissions, even

though the visits appear to be a significant drain on DHS resources. In principle, such visits may

lower the future authorization inspection burden, as CFATS inspectors will be familiar with

security measures at the chemical facility. Such familiarity may hasten the actual authorization

inspection.

The DHS has also suggested that higher risk-tier facilities benefit more from these types of

assistance visits due to the complexity of the facility, the potential presence of multiple chemicals

of interest, and the more stringent risk-based performance standards that apply. Lower risk-tier

facilities may not need such visits because these facilities may be less complex and inspectors

may develop best practices through the compliance assistance visits of higher-tiered facilities.

However, the converse might be true instead. Smaller facilities with less security experience may

benefit more from such visits.

Some policy makers have questioned whether the low inspection rate is due to constraints in the

number of chemical facility security inspectors hired by DHS or the availability of appropriated

funding. The CFATS regulations state that DHS will inspect the implementation of site security

plans at all facilities and require that facilities resubmit their Top-Screen and, if so directed by

DHS, their security vulnerability assessment and site security plan every two years for Tier 1 and

Tier 2 facilities or three years for Tier 3 and Tier 4 facilities.73 This would require DHS to perform

over 1,400 inspections annually to inspect every facility’s implementation of its site security plan.

The DHS has asserted that each inspection would require two or more inspectors and

approximately one week to perform.74

The DHS appears to have requested sufficient inspectors to manage the workload associated with

a reinspection cycle of every two years for top tier facilities and every three years for lower tier

facilities, but such a staffing level may be insufficient to address the large number of initial

regulatory submissions or a more frequent reinspection cycle or the use of inspectors to perform

compliance assistance visits.75 This level of staffing would appear to require at least several years

of inspections to reduce the backlog created from the initial site security plan submissions, even if

DHS performed only authorization inspections. A June 2012 DHS analysis estimated that DHS

might perform 813 inspections annually.76 At this rate, DHS would require approximately five

years to complete the initial inspections.77 If DHS were to hire additional inspectors, it might

73

Other DHS documents have provided different inspection timeframes. In 2011, DHS stated its expectation that, when

at full operational capability, it would inspect Tier 1 facilities annually, Tier 2 facilities every two years, and a

prioritized selection of 10% of Tier 3 and Tier 4 facilities each year (Department of Homeland Security, Annual

Performance Report Fiscal Years 2010–2012; Appendix A: Measure Descriptions and Data Collection Methodologies,

p. 8).

74

Department of Homeland Security, The Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards—Update for the Chemical

Sector Security Summit, June 29, 2009.

75

CRS calculation assuming two inspectors per inspection and one inspection per week.

76

This estimate uses three inspectors per inspection. Office of the Inspector General, Department of Homeland

Security, Effectiveness of the Infrastructure Security Compliance Division’s Management Practices to Implement the

Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Program, OIG-13-55, March 2013, p. 20.

77

For additional analysis of this issue, see CRS Report R43346, Implementation of Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism

Standards (CFATS): Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).

Congressional Research Service

18

Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress

reduce the backlog of site security plans but also run the risk of having additional unnecessary

staff in future years. The DHS might hire temporary or short-term staff to augment the inspector

cadre, but the need to train such employees for CFATS-specific inspections may pose challenges.

Finally, because DHS has focused on inspecting those facilities in the highest risk tier, it

potentially faces the most complicated inspection environments. Inspections of lower risk tier

facilities may pose fewer complications, take less time, and involve fewer inspectors. If so, DHS

might quickly and substantially increase the number of facilities inspected by focusing efforts on

lower tier facilities. Through this approach, DHS might gain insight and experience among the

inspector cadre while reducing some national risk.78

Federal Preemption of State Activities

The original statute did not expressly address the issue of federal preemption of state and local

chemical facility security statute or regulation. When DHS issued regulations establishing the

CFATS program, DHS asserted that the CFATS regulations would preempt state and local

chemical facility security statute or regulation that “conflicts with, hinders, poses an obstacle to or

frustrates the purposes of” the federal regulation.79 After the regulation’s release, Congress

amended DHS’s statutory authority to state that only in the case of an “actual conflict” would the

federal regulation preempt state authority.80 Few states have established independent chemical

facility security regulatory programs, and conflict between the federal and state activities has not

yet occurred.81 The DHS did not identify any state programs that conflict with the CFATS

regulations.82 The DHS has also not altered its regulatory language in response to the statutory

amendment.

Advocates for federal preemption call for a uniform security framework across the nation. They

assert that a “patchwork” of regulations might develop if states independently develop additional

chemical facility security regulations.83 Variation in security requirements might lead to differing

regulatory compliance costs, and companies might suffer competitive disadvantage based on their

geographic location.

Supporters of a state’s right to regulate chemical facility security claim that the federal regulation

should be a minimum standard with which all regulated entities must comply. They assert that

DHS should allow states to develop more stringent regulations than the federal regulations. They

claim such regulations would increase security. Some supporters of state regulation suggest that

more stringent, conflicting state regulations should preempt the federal regulations. Such a case

might occur if a state regulation mandated the use of a particular security approach at chemical

facilities, conflicting with the federal regulation that adopts a performance-based, rather than

prescriptive, approach. The desire to retain industries that might relocate if faced with increased

78

The DHS defines all facilities regulated under CFATS as high-risk chemical facilities. A lower or higher risk tier is

relative to other high-risk chemical facilities.

79

6 C.F.R. 27.405(a).

80

Section 534, P.L. 110-161, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008.

81

Some states, including New Jersey, Maryland, and New York, have implemented laws addressing security at

chemical facilities.

82

72 Federal Register 17688–17745 (April 9, 2007) at 17727.

83

See, for example, National Association of Chemical Distributors, “NACD Key Issue: Chemical Facility Security,”

Key Issues 2009 Washington Fly-In 111th Congress.

Congressional Research Service

19

Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress

regulation arguably would temper state inclinations to require overly stringent or incompatible

regulations.

Some policy makers may assert that chemical facility security should be left to the states rather

than be implemented by the federal government. If Congress allows the statutory authority to

expire and does not appropriate funds for the further implementation of CFATS, the federal

authority would lapse, and state and local jurisdictions would be solely responsible for regulating

chemical facility security.

Transparency

The CFATS process involves determining chemical facility vulnerabilities and developing

security plans to address them. Information developed in this process is not openly disseminated.

The CFATS program categorizes this information as Chemical-terrorism Vulnerability

Information (CVI) and provides penalties for its disclosure. Some advocates have argued for

greater transparency in the CFATS process, even if the program does not provide detailed

information regarding potential vulnerabilities and specific security measures. They assert that

those individuals living in surrounding communities require such information to effectively plan

and make choices in an emergency.84

The current statute and regulation prohibit public disclosure of CVI. Only specific “covered

persons” may access CVI. While acknowledging a legitimate homeland security need to limit

dissemination of security information, some policy makers have questioned whether such

limitations hinder other efforts. For example, first responders and community representatives

have highlighted how such information protection regimes may impede emergency response and

the ability of those in the surrounding community to react to emergency situations at the chemical

facility.85 Additionally, worker representatives have raised concerns that these limitations and the

lack of mandated inclusion of worker representatives may impede worker input into security

plans.86

The current information protection regimes for chemical facility security information, CVI under

CFATS and Sensitive Security Information (SSI) under the Maritime Transportation Security Act

(MTSA), do not contain penalties for incorrectly marking information as protected. Only

disclosure of correctly marked information is penalized. Additionally, the chemical facility is

responsible for identifying and appropriately marking protected information. These information

markings only would be assessed in the case of dispute. As was asserted during congressional

oversight, this disparity may lead to a tendency by regulated entities, in order to protect

themselves against potential liability or scrutiny, to erroneously limit dissemination of

information that should be made available to the public.87

84

OMB Watch and Public Citizen, “Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, Department of Homeland Security,

DHS-2006-0073,” Letter, February 7, 2007.

85

Testimony of Joseph Crawford, Chief of Police, City of Saint Albans, WV, before the House Committee on Energy

and Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, April 21, 2009; and testimony of Kent Carper,

President, Kanawha County Commission, Kanawha County, WV, before the House Committee on Energy and

Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, April 21, 2009.

86

See, for example, testimony of Glenn Erwin, United Steelworkers International Union, before the Senate Committee

on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, July 13, 2005.

87

House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Secrecy in the

(continued...)

Congressional Research Service

20

Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress

Additionally, the existing statute contains no provisions explicitly protecting or allowing for

concerned covered persons to divulge CVI or to challenge the categorization of information as

protected in an attempt to inform authorities about security vulnerabilities or other weaknesses.

Depending on the circumstances, those individuals might be penalized for their disclosure of

protected information. The CFATS regulations, reflecting this inherent tension, provide for a DHS

point of contact to which such information might be revealed, but also state “Section 550 did not

give DHS authority to provide whistleblower protection, and so DHS has not incorporated

specific whistleblower protections into this regulation.”88

Definition of Chemical Facility

The DHS regulates an assortment of entities that possess and manufacture chemicals of interest.

Thus, the term chemical facility encompasses many types of facilities, including agricultural

facilities, universities, and others.89 With DHS defining chemical facilities according to

possession of a chemical of interest, it regulates facilities not part of the chemical manufacturing

and distributing chain. Stakeholders have expressed concern that the number of entities so

regulated might be unwieldy and that the regulatory program might focus on many chemical

facilities that pose little risk rather than on those facilities that pose more substantial risk. For

example, during the rulemaking process, DHS received commentary and revised its regulatory

threshold for possession of propane, stating:

DHS, however, set the [screening threshold quantities] for propane in this final rule at 60,000

pounds. Sixty thousand pounds is the estimated maximum amount of propane that nonindustrial propane customers, such as restaurants and farmers, typically use. The Department

believes that non-industrial users, especially those in rural areas, do not have the potential to

create a significant risk to human life or health as would industrial users. The Department

has elected, at this time, to focus efforts on large commercial propane establishments but

may, after providing the public with an opportunity for notice and comment, extend its

[CFATS] screening efforts to smaller facilities in the future. This higher [screening threshold

quantity] will focus DHS’s security screening effort on industrial and major consumers,

regional suppliers, bulk retail, and storage sites and away from non-industrial propane

customers.90

In 2007, when developing its interim final rule, DHS estimated the expected number of regulated

facilities and identified them by primary risk category: release due to loss of containment or

potential for theft and diversion.91 In 2012, DHS analyzed the number of facilities with final tier

assignments and identified their primary risk category. As seen in Table 4, initial expectations of

the distribution of facilities by primary risk did not match the risk types of the actual regulated

facilities.92

(...continued)

Response to Bayer’s Chemical Plant Explosion, Serial No. 111-28, April 21, 2009.

88

72 Federal Register 17688–17745 (April 9, 2007) at 17718.

89

For example, facilities distributing agricultural chemicals may be regulated under CFATS. See CRS Report R43070,

Regulation of Fertilizers: Ammonium Nitrate and Anhydrous Ammonia, by (name redacted), (name redacted), and (name

redacted).

90

72 Federal Register 65396–65435 (November 20, 2007) at 65406.

91

Note that a facility might be primarily regulated for one category but also qualify under the other.

92

In contrast, initial expectations of the number of facilities per tier were more in line with actual enrollment.

Congressional Research Service

21

Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress

Table 4. Facilities Regulated Under CFATS by Primary Risk Category

(percentage of facilities)

Risk Type

2007 Estimate

2012 Actual

Release

62%

13%

Theft/Diversion

38%

87%

Source: CRS analysis of data in Department of Homeland Security, Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards

Interim Final Rule Regulatory Assessment, DHS-2006-0073, April 1, 2007; and 79 Federal Register 6418-6452

(February 3, 2014) at 6438.

Notes: The 2007 estimate is based on 5,000 facilities (3,117 release facilities: 1,883 theft/diversion facilities). The

2012 analysis of facilities actually reporting is based on 3,566 facilities (455 release facilities: 3,111 theft/diversion

facilities).

Academic institutions have asserted that DHS should not apply CFATS regulations to them

because of the dispersed nature of chemical holdings at colleges and universities. These

institutions claim that regulatory compliance costs would not be commensurate with the risk

reduction.93 The DHS has identified that a college or university with a high-risk facility on

campus might choose to implement security measures at the specific location rather than across

the entire campus.94 The DHS has already implemented select regulatory extensions for

agricultural chemical users, though not distributors.95 While the regulatory compliance costs

likely decrease at lower risk tiers compared to higher risk tiers, all regulated entities bear

compliance costs as continued annual expenses.

As mentioned above, the statutory authority underlying CFATS exempts several types of

facilities, including water and wastewater treatment facilities. The federal government does not

regulate water and wastewater treatment facilities for chemical security purposes. Instead, current

chemical security efforts at water and wastewater treatment facilities are voluntary in nature.96

Some advocacy groups have called for inclusion of currently exempt facilities, such as water and

wastewater treatment facilities.97 Some drinking water and wastewater treatment facilities possess

amounts of chemicals of interest and would lead to regulation if located at a different type of

facility.98 Advocates for their inclusion in security regulations cite the presence of such potentially

hazardous chemicals and their relative proximity to population centers as reasons to mandate

security measures for such facilities. In contrast, representatives of the water sector point to the

critical role that water and wastewater treatment facilities have in daily life. They caution against

93

72 Federal Register 65396–65435 (November 20, 2007) at 65412.

Department of Homeland Security, Colleges and Universities and the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards

(CFATS), July 2010.

95

73 Federal Register 1640 (January 9, 2008).

96

Congress required certain drinking water facilities to perform vulnerability assessments and develop emergency

response plans through Section 401 of P.L. 107-188, the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and

Response Act of 2002. For more information on drinking water security activities, see CRS Report RL31294,

Safeguarding the Nation’s Drinking Water: EPA and Congressional Actions, by (name redacted).

97

See, for example, Paul Orum and Reece Rushing, Center for American Progress, Chemical Security 101: What You

Don’t Have Can’t Leak, or Be Blown Up by Terrorists, November 2008; and testimony of Philip J. Crowley, Senior

Fellow and Director of Homeland Security, Center for American Progress, before the House Committee on Energy and

Commerce, Subcommittee on Environment and Hazardous Materials, June 12, 2008.

98

See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Factoids: Drinking Water and Ground Water Statistics for 2008, EPA

816-K-08-004, November 2008; and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Clean Watersheds Needs Survey 2004:

Report to Congress, January 2008.

94

Congressional Research Service

22

Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress

including these facilities in the existing regulatory framework because of the potential for undue

public impacts. They cite, for example, loss of basic fire protection and sanitation services if the

federal government were to order a water or wastewater utility to cease operations for security

reasons or failure to comply with regulation.99

If Congress were to remove the drinking water and wastewater treatment facility exemption, the

number of regulated facilities might substantially increase, placing additional burdens on the

CFATS program. The United States contains approximately 52,000 community water systems and

16,500 wastewater treatment facilities.100 These facilities vary substantially in size and service.

The number of regulated facilities would depend on the criteria used to determine inclusion, such

as chemical possession or number of individuals served. It is likely that only a subset of these

facilities would meet a regulatory threshold.101 In 2011, a DHS official testified that

approximately 6,000 such facilities would likely meet the CFATS threshold.102

Identification of Non-Responsive Facilities

Although facilities with greater than screening threshold quantities of chemicals of interest must

submit information to DHS under the Top-Screen process, an unknown number of facilities do

not provide such information. One limited survey of community hospitals reported that 56% of

respondents were aware of CFATS reporting requirements.103 Another example appears to be the

West Fertilizer Company, which reported more than a threshold amount of chemical of interest to

the EPA under the Risk Management Plan (RMP) program but did not file with DHS under

CFATS. The DHS refers to these non-compliant facilities as “outliers.” Congressional policy

makers have raised the concern that many facilities may still not have properly reported to

DHS.104

99

American Water Works Association, “Chemical Facility Security,” Fact Sheet, 2009. For more information on

security issues in the water infrastructure sector, see CRS Report RL32189, Terrorism and Security Issues Facing the

Water Infrastructure Sector, by (name redacted).

100

See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Factoids: Drinking Water and Ground Water Statistics for 2008, EPA

816-K-08-004, November 2008; and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Clean Watersheds Needs Survey 2004:

Report to Congress, January 2008. For comparison, more than 36,000 chemical facilities filed a Top-Screen under

CFATS.

101

For example, the number of individuals served by the drinking water facility might be used as a regulatory criterion.

Section 401 of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-188)

mandated drinking water facilities serving more than 3,300 individuals develop an emergency response plan and

perform a vulnerability assessment. Approximately 8,400 community water systems met this requirement in 2002. For

more information on drinking water security activities, see CRS Report RL31294, Safeguarding the Nation’s Drinking

Water: EPA and Congressional Actions, by (name redacted).

102

Oral testimony of Rand Beers, Under Secretary, National Protection and Programs Directorate, Department of

Homeland Security, before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity,

Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies, February 11, 2011.

103

Morgan M. Bliss, Kiril D. Hristovski, and Jon W. Ulrich. “Compliance of Community Hospitals with the Chemical

Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) in the Western United States” Journal of Homeland Security and

Emergency Management, 10(2), 2013, pp. 433-445.

104

Representative Michael T. McCaul, Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security; Representative Fred Upton,

Chairman, Committee on Energy and Commerce; and Representative John Carter, Chairman, Homeland Security

Appropriations Subcommittee, Letter to Janet Napolitano, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, July 22,

2013; Senator Tom Carper, Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Letter to Janet

Napolitano, Secretary, and Suzanne Spaulding, Acting Under Secretary, National Protection and Programs, U.S.

Department of Homeland Security, June 28, 2013; and Representative Henry A. Waxman, ranking Member, Committee

(continued...)

Congressional Research Service

23

Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress

The number of facilities not complying with CFATS reporting requirements is unknown. If DHS

lacks information about a facility’s chemical holdings, it is unlikely to be able to identify it as an

outlier. As noted above, DHS has regulatory authority to direct specific facilities to comply with

CFATS, but DHS might not issue such orders without information indicating that a facility is out

of compliance.

In 2009, DHS listed some identification mechanisms in use at that time. These mechanisms

included receiving information from the public through the DHS CFATS Tip Line;105 crossreferencing with information from other federal regulatory programs, such as the Environmental

Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) Risk Management Planning (RMP) program (see text box below);106

and a pilot program with the state of New York and the state of New Jersey to identify nonresponsive facilities in those states.107 Since then, DHS has also created the CFATS Share tool

through which state Homeland Security Advisors, appropriate DHS components, and other

stakeholders have access to data on the CFATS-regulated facilities within their jurisdictions. In

addition, DHS participates “in engagements with various State Homeland Security Advisors

(HSA) and other state and local security partners. The Department also has participated in

numerous meetings with Local Emergency Planning Committees, Area Maritime Security

Committees, Sector Coordinating Councils, and Fusion Centers.”108 The DHS terminated some of

these activities but continues others.

Integration of this information with the CFATS program may pose challenges due to different

data formats, resource availability, and limited utility. The DHS has requested $3 million in

funding for FY2015 to develop an automated process to collect and analyze data provided by

other federal, state, and local partners. As part of this process, DHS plans to compare information

from EPA Risk Management Program and the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act

Title III data from all 50 states annually to identify potentially non-compliant facilities.109

(...continued)

on Energy and Commerce, and Representative Bennie G. Thompson, ranking Member, Committee on Homeland

Security, Letter to President Barack Obama, May 2, 2013.

105

The DHS has established a CFATS Tip Line for reporting a possible CFATS security concern. The telephone

number is 877-394-4347. Tips may be made anonymously or not.

106

The EPA RMP program, established under Section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act, requires chemical facilities to report

to EPA possession of certain chemicals above threshold quantities. The RMP chemical list has substantive overlap with

the CFATS list of chemicals of interest, and, in many cases, the RMP threshold quantity is equal to or less than the

CFATS screening threshold quantity. Therefore, many chemical facilities reporting under the RMP program also would

file a Top-Screen under CFATS.

107

Testimony of Philip Reitinger, Deputy Under Secretary, National Protection and Programs Directorate, Department

of Homeland Security, before the House Committee on Homeland Security, June 16, 2009; and testimony of Rand

Beers, Under Secretary, National Protection and Programs Directorate, Department of Homeland Security, before the

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, March 3, 2010.

108

Department of Homeland Security, DHS Responses to Rep. McCaul and Rep. Meehan’s May 2, 2013 Letter

Regarding the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) Program, June 2013.

109

Department of Homeland Security, National Protection and Programs Directorate, Infrastructure Protection and

Information Security Fiscal Year 2015 Congressional Justification, p. 90.

Congressional Research Service

24

Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress

Comparison of DHS CFATS and EPA RMP Facilities

Comparing federally held information on regulated facilities may be effective in identifying outliers. In order to identify

such facilities, DHS has reengaged with EPA regarding RMP data and has identified some outlier facilities.110 According

to the EPA Office of Inspector General, 12,774 facilities reported to EPA under the RMP program.111 According to

DHS, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) identified approximately 3,724 facilities reporting to the EPA that they

possessed more than a threshold quantity of a chemical of interest.112 The DHS identified 3,362 of these facilities as

potential outliers. These facilities, in addition to 106 facilities identified by DHS through consultation with the Texas

State Chemist, were sent letters regarding their potential responsibilities under CFATS. The DHS has received a

response from 2,946 facilities, approximately 1,500 of which indicated they had previously filed a Top-Screen. Of the

remaining facilities 857 have submitted or intend to submit a Top-Screen. The DHS has not received a response from

522 facilities.113 The DHS is in the process of verifying the information submitted by the facilities and determining why

facilities have not yet replied to the DHS letter.

The fact that approximately 40% of the facilities had previously submitted a Top-Screen is, according to DHS,

demonstrative of the difficulties in comparing data across multiple regulatory programs.114 In addition, DHS asserts

that, based on prior data, it identifies only a small fraction of facilities filing a Top-Screen as high risk.

Inherently Safer Technologies

Previous debate on chemical facility security has included whether to mandate the adoption or

consideration of changes in chemical processes to reduce the potential consequences following a

successful attack on a chemical facility. Suggestions for such changes have included reducing the

amount of chemical stored onsite and changing the chemicals used. In previous congressional

debate, these approaches have been referred to as inherently safer technologies or methods to

reduce the consequences of a terrorist attack.

A fundamental challenge for inherently safer technologies is how to compare one technology with

its potential replacement. It is challenging to unequivocally state that one technology is inherently

safer than the other without adequate metrics. Risk factors may exist outside of the comparison

framework.115 Some experts have asserted that the metrics for comparing industrial processes are

not yet fully established and need additional research and study.116 A committee of the National

Research Council of the National Academies has recommended that DHS support research and

development to foster cost-effective, inherently safer chemistries and chemical processes.117 The

110

Testimony of David Wulf, Director, Infrastructure Security Compliance Division, National Programs and Protection

Directorate, Department of Homeland Security, before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on

Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies, on August 1, 2013.

111

Office of Inspector General, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Improvements Needed in EPA Training and

Oversight for Risk Management Program Inspections, Report No. 13-P-0178, March 21, 2013, p. 1.

112

Personal communication between CRS and DHS staff, October 28, 2013.

113

Personal communication between CRS and DHS staff, May 8, 2014.

114

Personal communication between CRS and DHS staff, October 28, 2013.

115

For example, the replacement of hydrogen fluoride with sulfuric acid for refinery processing would replace a more

toxic chemical with a less toxic one. In this case, experts estimate that equivalent processing capacity would require 25

times more sulfuric acid. Thus, more chemical storage facilities and transportation would be required, potentially

posing different dangers than atmospheric release to the surrounding community. Determining which chemical process

had less overall risk might require considering factors both internal and external to the chemical facility and the

surrounding community. See testimony of M. Sam Mannan, Director, Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center,

Texas A&M University, before the House Committee on Homeland Security, December 12, 2007.

116

Testimony of M. Sam Mannan, Director, Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center, Texas A&M University,

before the House Committee on Homeland Security, December 12, 2007.

117

Committee on Assessing Vulnerabilities Related to the Nation’s Chemical Infrastructure, National Research

(continued...)

Congressional Research Service

25

Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress

National Academies has identified as a potential concern that inherently safer process analyses

may become narrowly focused and its outcomes inappropriately weighted.118 A facility might

consider many additional factors beyond homeland security implications when weighing the

applicability and benefit of switching from one process to another. These factors include cost,

technical challenges regarding implementation in specific situations, supply chain impacts,

quality and availability of end products, and indirect effects on workers.119

Supporters of adopting these approaches as a way to improve chemical facility security argue that

reducing or removing these chemicals from a facility will reduce the incentive to attack the

facility. They suggest that reducing the consequences of a release also lowers the threat from

terrorist attack and mitigates the risk to the surrounding populace. They point to facilities that

have voluntarily changed amounts of chemicals on hand or chemical processes in use as examples

that facilities can implement such an approach in a cost-effective, practical fashion.120

Opponents of mandating what proponents call inherently safer technologies question the validity

of the approach as a security tool and the government’s ability to effectively oversee its

implementation. Industrial entities assert that process safety engineers within the regulated

industry already employ such approaches and that these are safety, not security, methods. They

assert that process safety experts and business executives should determine the applicability and

financial practicality of changing existing processes at specific chemical facilities.121 A 2011

industry survey stated that, of those respondents that assessed using alternative chemicals or

processes, 66.4% determined such alternatives were not technically feasible.122 Opponents of an

inherently safer technology mandate also question whether the federal government contains the

required technical expertise to adjudicate the practicality and benefit of alternative technological

approaches.123A third opposing view states concern that few existing alternative approaches are

well understood with regard to their unanticipated side effects. They claim that researchers should

(...continued)

Council, Terrorism and the Chemical Infrastructure: Protecting People and Reducing Vulnerabilities, 2006.

118

Committee on Inherently Safer Chemical Processes, National Research Council, The Use of Methyl Isocyanate

(MIC) at Bayer CropScience, 2012.

119

For further discussion on this issue, see Center for Chemical Process Safety, American Institute of Chemical

Engineers, Final Report: Definition for Inherently Safer Technology in Production, Transportation, Storage, and Use,

July 2010.

120

See, for example, Paul Orum and Reece Rushing, Center for American Progress, Preventing Toxic Terrorism: How

Some Chemical Facilities Are Removing Danger to American Communities, April 2006; and Paul Orum and Reece

Rushing, Center for American Progress, Chemical Security 101: What You Don’t Have Can’t Leak, or Be Blown Up by

Terrorists, November 2008.

121

See, for example, testimony of Timothy J. Scott, Dow Chemical Company, before the House Committee on

Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies, February

11, 2011; and testimony of Marty Durbin, Managing Director, Federal Affairs, American Chemistry Council, before

the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Environment and Hazardous Materials, June 12,

2008.

122

AcuTech Consulting Group, A Survey of CFATS Progress in Securing the Chemical Sector, September 6, 2011,

p. 41.

123

See, for example, testimony of M. Sam Mannan, Director, Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center, Texas A&M

University, before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure

Protection, and Security Technologies, February 11, 2011; testimony of Dennis C. Hendershot, Staff Consultant, Center

for Chemical Process Safety, American Institute of Chemical Engineers, before the Senate Committee on Environment

and Public Works, June 21, 2006, S.Hrg. 109-1044; and testimony of Matthew Barmasse, Synthetic Organic Chemical

Manufacturers Association, before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, July 13,

2005.

Congressional Research Service

26

Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress

continue to study these alternative approaches rather than immediately apply them, since

unanticipated side effects could injure business and other interests.124

The DHS has engaged in research and development activities within its Science and Technology

(S&T) Directorate to develop a better understanding of inherently safer technology, including

efforts to define inherently safer technology.125 The NPPD has not adopted the results from these

research and development efforts within its regulatory context. Congress has directed DHS to

detail and report to Congress the Department’s definition of inherently safer technology as it

relates to chemical facilities under the purview of CFATS.126

Some industry representatives have asserted that an inherently safer technology mandate might

have a potentially significant negative financial impact.127 Regulated entities incur a cost when

meeting existing CFATS requirements, and small businesses may be challenged to make

additional necessary capital investments. In its interim final rule, DHS estimated that even

without an inherently safer technology requirement CFATS “may have a significant economic

impact on a substantial number of small entities.”128 Because of the performance-based nature of

the regulatory requirement, it is difficult to detail the exact impact on small businesses.129 Adding

an inherently safer technology requirement might increase the cost of CFATS compliance and

might disproportionately affect small entities not already incorporating such activities in their

business processes. Policy makers in previous Congresses highlighted the issue of small business

impact, especially in the context of requiring additional measures that might hurt productivity.

Personnel Surety

A recurring issue in chemical facility security is ensuring that individuals with known terrorist

affiliations do not gain access to high-risk facilities. The CFATS program addresses this concern

by establishing a personnel surety risk-based performance standard in regulation. This

performance standard requires facilities to conduct background checks on employees and

unescorted visitors and provide identifying information to DHS for use in screening employees

against the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB).130

124

For example, EPA experts have pointed to the change by drinking water treatment facilities between two approved

disinfectants—chlorine and chloramine—as correlated with an unexpected increase in levels of lead in drinking water

due to increased corrosion. Government Accountability Office, Lead in D.C. Drinking Water, GAO-05-344, March

2005.

125

The Chemical Security Analysis Center of the DHS S&T Directorate contracted with the Center for Chemical

Process Safety of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers to develop a technically based definition for inherently

safer technology. See Center for Chemical Process Safety, American Institute of Chemical Engineers, Final Report:

Definition for Inherently Safer Technology in Production, Transportation, Storage, and Use, July 2010.

126

H.Rept. 112-331, p. 986.

127

Testimony of Stephen Poorman, International EHS Manager, FUJIFILM Imaging Colorants Ltd., on behalf of the

Society of Chemical Manufacturers and Affiliates before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and

Governmental Affairs, March 3, 2010.

128

72 Federal Register 17688–17745 (April 9, 2007) at 17772.

129

Department of Homeland Security, Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Interim Final Rule Regulatory

Assessment, DHS-2006-0073, April 1, 2007.

130

The Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) is a centralized federal database of information about known or suspected

terrorists. For more information, see http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/nsb/tsc/tsc_faqs.

Congressional Research Service

27

Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress

The DHS has not fully established the process by which CFATS-regulated facilities can meet this

standard.131 The DHS issued a series of information collection requests from 2009 to 2011 that

described how DHS would gather and use information on employees at CFATS-regulated

facilities and requested public comment.132 Stakeholders and policy makers raised concerns that

the DHS approach seemed to duplicate existing requirements underpinning the Transportation

Worker Identification Credential (TWIC). In addition, DHS did not plan to accept existing TWIC

cards as meeting the CFATS screening requirement. In July 2012, DHS withdrew this proposed

personnel surety program from Office of Management and Budget review.

The DHS asserts that its position on how to comply with the personnel surety standard has

“evolved” in response to industry-provided information.133 The DHS engaged in industry

outreach activities through conference calls with industry associations and meetings with

Chemical Sector Coordinating Council leadership and members.134

In March 2013 and February 2014, DHS released notices of a new information collection request

for compliance with the CFATS personnel surety program.135 The proposed personnel surety

program contains provisions similar to those in the earlier information collection requests. The

DHS proposes that regulated entities would provide certain identifying information to DHS

before giving individuals access to restricted areas within a chemical facility. The DHS would use

that information to screen employees and unescorted visitors against the TSDB. As with the prior

personnel surety proposals, DHS would still require facilities to provide identifying information

even for employees or visitors who have a TWIC card or another credential that is issued only

following screening against the TSDB. The DHS asserts the purpose of this requirement is to

allow DHS to verify that the credential is still valid, not to perform an additional background

check. The DHS would alternatively allow facilities to use approved electronic reader devices to

verify the validity of TWIC cards, but not other credentials. While DHS plans eventually to

require implementation of the personnel surety program at facilities in each risk tier, it would

limit the initial program to only Tier 1 and Tier 2 facilities.

The DHS has indicated that this new information collection request clarifies that DHS will

implement the personnel surety program in phases; that DHS will accept third-party submission

of information on behalf of regulated entities; that facilities will not need to submit information

each time an affected individual seeks access; and that entities with multiple regulated facilities

may submit information on a company-wide basis, rather than separately for each facility.

Additionally, the DHS requests comment on mechanisms to use electronic verification and

validation of TWIC cards rather than requiring submission of information to DHS.136

131

The DHS approves facility site security plans on a conditional basis, reflecting the future need to comply with the

personnel surety performance standard.

132

See 74 Federal Register 27555-27557 (June 10, 2009); 75 Federal Register 18850-18857 (April 13, 2010); and 76

Federal Register 34720-24732 (June 14, 2011).

133

Office of Infrastructure Protection, National Protection and Programs Directorate, Department of Homeland

Security, CFATS Personnel Surety Program Update-Chemical Sector Security Summit, August 1, 2012.

134

Testimony of Rand Beers, Under Secretary, and David Wulf, Director, Infrastructure Security Compliance Division,

National Protection and Programs Directorate, Department of Homeland Security, before the House Committee on

Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy, March 14, 2013.

135

78 Federal Register 17680-17701 (March 22, 2013) and 79 Federal Register 6418-6452 (February 3, 2014).

136

Office of Infrastructure Protection, National Protection and Programs Directorate, Department of Homeland

Security, CFATS Personnel Surety Program Update-Chemical Sector Security Summit, August 1, 2012.

Congressional Research Service

28

Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress

The extent to which this new information collection request addresses industry concerns is not yet

resolved. Industry stakeholders, in comments on the information collection requests, highlight the

importance of recognizing other credentials, question whether the information regarding visitors

could be obtained in the requisite time, and suggest that the number of individuals who would

require screening may be larger than DHS estimates.

Policy Options

The existing statutory authority for CFATS expires on December 13, 2014. The 113th Congress

has passed H.R. 4007, which authorizes DHS to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes

through the Homeland Security Act. This bill will repeal the existing statutory authority on the

effective date of the act (30 days after enactment). Many of the existing authorities are present in

H.R. 4007, but it also provides DHS with new authorities, such as the ability for certain covered

chemical facilities to self-certify the sufficiency of their security plans. The DHS may use the

existing regulations and issue new regulations as necessary to implement the new authority.

The 113th Congress may address chemical facility security through several options. Congress may

continue its oversight of DHS’s efforts to implement this program. Congress might also take

legislative action to extend further the existing statutory authority by revising or repealing its

sunset provision; codifying the existing regulations; amending the existing statutory authority;

addressing existing programmatic activities; or restricting or expanding the scope of chemical

facility security regulation.

If Congress does not act and allows the statutory authority to expire, regulated entities may

question the application and enforcement of the CFATS regulations. In the case where Congress

allows the statutory authority to expire, but Congress appropriates funds for enforcing the CFATS

program, DHS will likely be able to enforce the CFATS regulations. The GAO has found that in

the case where a program’s statutory authority expires, but Congress explicitly appropriates

funding for it, the program may continue to operate without interruption.137 If Congress allows

the statutory authority to expire and also does not appropriate funding for implementing the

CFATS program, the CFATS regulations will likely also lapse. In this case, the states would likely

become the primary source of any chemical facility security regulation.

Continue Congressional Oversight

Under one possible policy option, interested Members of Congress or congressional committees

might continue their oversight of the CFATS program. Historically, much of the congressional

debate has considered legislative options to reauthorize the existing statute or authorize the

CFATS program through a different statutory vehicle. Congressional committees have accepted

the assurances of DHS officials regarding CFATS activities even as DHS failed to meet its selfestablished deadlines. The program’s critical self-assessment and DHS’s lack of identifying the

West Fertilizer Company as a CFATS-regulated facility may lead congressional oversight to

increase focus on program performance, use of appropriations, and internal oversight.

137

Office of the General Counsel, General Accounting Office, Principles of Federal Appropriations Law, Third

Edition, GAO-04-261SP, January 2004, pp. 2-70–2-71.

Congressional Research Service

29

Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress

Congressional oversight of the program’s implementation, enforcement, and efficacy may play a

key role in determining the sufficiency of the existing authority and regulations.

Maintain the Existing Regulatory Framework

The existing statutory authority places much of the CFATS regulatory framework at the discretion

of the Secretary of Homeland Security. The DHS is still in the process of implementing these

regulations and has not yet determined their effectiveness. Congress might choose to maintain the

existing regulations by extending the statutory authority’s sunset date or codifying the existing

regulations. Also, as noted above, allowing the statutory authority to expire could maintain, in

effect, the existing regulatory framework if Congress continues to fund implementation, although

this might lead to legal challenge.

Extend the Sunset Date

Congressional policy makers might choose to extend the current statutory authority for a fixed or

indefinite time. Congress has enacted a series of limited extensions of the statutory authority

since its inception. H.J.Res. 130 extends the existing statutory authority through December 13,

2014. Extending the existing statutory authority may provide regulated entities continuity, protect

them from losing those resources already expended in regulatory compliance, and avoid

providing a competitive advantage to those regulated entities that remained out of regulatory

compliance. An extension may allow assessment of the efficacy of the existing regulations and

inclusion of this information in any future attempts to revise or extend DHS’s statutory authority.

Moreover, since DHS is in the process of implementing current regulations, some policy makers

argue for a simple extension without changing statutory requirements.

The Obama Administration FY2015 budget requests an extension of the statutory authority until

October 4, 2015, but the Obama Administration also supports enacting a longer duration or

permanent statutory authority.138 The Administration’s Chemical Facility Safety and Security

Working Group’s report to the President called for action from Congress to provide permanent

statutory authorization for the CFATS program.139 Congress might make the existing program

permanent by removing the statutory authority’s sunset date. Some regulated entities support

converting the existing program into a program with permanent or long-term authorization.140 The

removal of the sunset date would make the statutory authority permanent, maintain the current

discretion granted to the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop regulations, and might allow

long-term assessment of the efficacy of the existing regulations. Making the existing statute

permanent would provide consistency in authority and remove the statutory pressure to

reauthorize the program. In contrast, the presence of a sunset date for the statutory authority

arguably increases the likelihood of congressional attention to chemical facility security as a

138

Oral testimony of Rand Beers, Under Secretary, National Protection and Programs Directorate, Department of

Homeland Security, before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity,

Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies, February 11, 2011.

139

Chemical Facility Safety and Security Working Group, Executive Order 13650: Actions to Improve Chemical

Facility Safety and Security-A Shared Commitment, Report to the President, May 2014, p. 46, https://www.osha.gov/

chemicalexecutiveorder/final_chemical_eo_status_report.pdf.

140

For example, see letters from various entities entered into the Congressional Record at Congressional Record, July

8, 2014, pp. H5848-H5851.

Congressional Research Service

30

Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress

legislative topic. Some advocates who wish for more regular congressional review of the statutory

authority might oppose removing its sunset date.

Codify the Existing Regulations

Congressional policy makers might choose to affirm the existing regulations by codifying them or

their principles in statute. Such codification could reduce the discretion of the Secretary of

Homeland Security to alter the CFATS regulations in the future. The existing statutory authority

grants broad discretion to the Secretary to develop many elements of the CFATS regulations.

Future Secretaries may choose to alter its structure or approach and still comply with the existing

statute. Policy makers might identify specific components of the existing regulation that they

wish any future regulation to retain and codify those portions. Specifying these components might

limit the ability of the Secretary to react to changing circumstance, gained experience, and new

knowledge. On the other hand, the codified portions might enhance the regulated community’s

ability to plan for future expenses and requirements.

Alter the Existing Statutory Authority

Congressional policy makers might choose to alter the existing statutory authority to modify the

existing regulations, address stakeholder concerns, or broadly change the regulatory program.

Accelerate or Decelerate Compliance Activities

The DHS bases its schedule for facility CFATS compliance on the chemical facility’s assigned

risk tier. Those chemical facilities assigned to higher risk tiers have a more accelerated

compliance and resubmission schedule than those assigned to lower risk tiers. Congressional

policy makers might attempt to accelerate the compliance schedule by increasing funding

available to DHS for CFATS, thereby increasing the ability of DHS to provide feedback to

regulated entities, review submissions, and inspect facilities filing site security plans. Additional

funding might reduce or mitigate inefficiencies or delays related to DHS processing of

submissions.

Alternatively, policy makers might provide DHS with the authority to use third parties as CFATS

inspectors. The DHS could then augment the number of CFATS inspectors to meet increased

demand or delegate inspection authority to state and local governments. Third-party inspectors

might allow DHS to draw on expertise outside of the federal government in assessing the efficacy

of the implemented site security activities. The DHS may need to define the roles and

responsibilities of these inspectors and how DHS will assess and accredit their qualifications. The

DHS has stated its intent to issue a rulemaking regarding the use of third-party inspectors but has

not yet done so.141 The use of third-party inspectors might lead to concerns about equal treatment

of chemical facilities by different third-party inspectors, and questions about whether homeland

security inspections of this type are an inherently governmental responsibility that only federal

employees should perform.

141

72 Federal Register 17688–17745 (April 9, 2007) at 17712.

Congressional Research Service

31

Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress

Congress might direct DHS to increase its activities on identifying noncompliant facilities.

Following an explosion in West, TX, DHS identified that the facility had not complied with

CFATS, though it reportedly possessed more than a screening threshold quantity of chemicals of

interest. Congressional policy makers may prioritize identifying those facilities that have not yet

reported over other parts of the CFATS process, depending on their view of the relative risk

reduction of these activities.

Finally, Congress might determine that DHS has sufficient resources to accelerate compliance

activities but is restrained by some other procedural factor. Some congressional policy makers

assert that the internal and external reviews of the CFATS program indicate internal challenges

and claim “the basic programmatic building blocks of CFATS are missing.”142 Congressional

policy makers might direct DHS to refine its internal procedures, streamline its review process,

reduce the timeframe for response and interaction with regulated entities, or otherwise enact

process improvements.

Conversely, congressional policy makers might choose to slow the implementation schedule of

the chemical facility security regulations. Concern about the impact of the regulation on small

businesses or other entities might lead to a decelerated compliance schedule. The DHS has

already implemented select regulatory extensions for certain agricultural operations.143

Congressional policy makers might direct DHS to provide longer submission, implementation,

and resubmission timelines for those regulated entities that might suffer disproportionate

economic burdens from compliance.

Incorporate Excluded Facilities

Policy makers might remove some or all of the statutory exclusions from the CFATS program.

The Administration has supported revising the existing exclusions to provide a more

comprehensive chemical facility security approach. The DHS supports modifying the existing

exemption for (1) facilities regulated under the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) to

increase security at these facilities to the CFATS standard and (2) facilities regulated by the

Nuclear Regulatory Commission to clarify the scope of the exemption.144

In addition, DHS and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have called for additional

authorities to regulate water and wastewater treatment facilities:

The Department of Homeland Security and the Environmental Protection Agency believe

that there is an important gap in the framework for regulating the security of chemicals at

water and wastewater treatment facilities in the United States. The authority for regulating

the chemical industry purposefully excludes from its coverage water and wastewater

142

Representative Michael T. McCaul, Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security; Representative Fred Upton,

Chairman, Committee on Energy and Commerce; and Representative John Carter, Chairman, Homeland Security

Appropriations Subcommittee, Letter to Janet Napolitano, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, July 22,

2013.

143

73 Federal Register 1640 (January 9, 2008).

144

Testimony of Rand Beers, Under Secretary, National Protection and Programs Directorate, Department of

Homeland Security, before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, March 3, 2010.

The DHS and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission have developed a memorandum of understanding regarding security

at chemical facilities regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Memorandum of Understanding between the

U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 31, 2011).

Congressional Research Service

32

Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress

treatment facilities. We need to work with the Congress to close this gap in the chemical

security authorities in order to secure chemicals of interest at these facilities and protect the

communities they serve. Water and wastewater treatment facilities that are determined to be

high-risk due to the presence of chemicals of interest should be regulated for security in a

manner that is consistent with the CFATS risk and performance-based framework while also

recognizing the unique public health and environmental requirements and responsibilities of

such facilities.145

The EPA has testified that the Obama Administration believes that EPA should be the lead agency

for chemical security for both drinking water and wastewater systems, with DHS supporting

EPA’s efforts. The EPA also supports providing states with an important role in regulating

chemical security at water systems, including determinations, auditing, and inspecting.146

In contrast, the Administration’s Chemical Facility Safety and Security Working Group’s report to

the President called for action from Congress to remove the exemption for water and wastewater

treatment facilities. According to the report, DHS could then regulate security at these facilities in

collaboration with the EPA.147

If Congress provides the executive branch with statutory authority to regulate water and

wastewater treatment facilities for chemical security purposes, it may weigh several policy

decisions. Among these choices are which facilities should be regulated; how stringent such

security measures should be; what federal agency should oversee them; and whether compliance

with these security measures is practicable given the public nature of many water and wastewater

treatment facilities.

One option for congressional policy makers might be to include water and wastewater treatment

facilities under the existing CFATS regulations, effectively removing the exemption currently in

statute. This would place water and wastewater treatment facilities on par with other possessors

of chemicals of interest. The DHS would provide oversight of all regulated chemical facilities.148

Opponents might claim that activities under CFATS, such as vulnerability assessment, duplicate

existing requirements under the Safe Drinking Water Act.149 Also, opponents of such an approach

cite the essential role that water and wastewater treatment facilities play in daily life and assert

145

Testimony of Benjamin H. Grumbles, Assistant Administrator for Water, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Environment and Hazardous Materials, June

12, 2008. See also testimony of Rand Beers, Under Secretary, National Protection and Programs Directorate,

Department of Homeland Security, before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,

March 3, 2010.

146

Testimony of Peter S. Silva, Assistant Administrator for Water, Environmental Protection Agency, before the

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, March 3, 2010.

147

Chemical Facility Safety and Security Working Group, Executive Order 13650: Actions to Improve Chemical

Facility Safety and Security-A Shared Commitment, Report to the President, May 2014, pp. 46-47,

https://www.osha.gov/chemicalexecutiveorder/final_chemical_eo_status_report.pdf.

148

The U.S. Coast Guard oversees those chemical facilities exempted from CFATS because they are regulated under

MTSA. In 2013, DHS stated that only 32 facilities claimed a partial exemption from CFATS regulations due to being

partially regulated under MTSA (78 Federal Register 17680-17701 (March 22, 2013) at 17698). In 2009, DHS testified

that 365 facilities were fully exempt from the CFATS regulations due to compliance with MTSA, while 135 were

partially exempt (“House Committee on Homeland Security Holds Hearing on the Chemical Facility Antiterrorism Act

of 2009,” CQ Congressional Transcripts, June 16, 2009).

149

Section 1433 of the Safe Drinking Water Act as amended by Section 401 of P.L. 107-188, the Public Health

Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, required water systems to perform a vulnerability

assessment.

Congressional Research Service

33

Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress

that several authorities available to DHS under CFATS, such as the ability to require a facility to

cease operations, are inappropriate if applied to a municipal utility.150 Congressional policy

makers might mitigate some of these concerns by requiring DHS to consult with EPA regarding

its regulation of water and wastewater treatment facilities and harmonizing existing vulnerability

assessment requirements.

Another option might be to grant statutory authority to regulate water and wastewater treatment

facilities for security purposes to EPA. Some water-sector stakeholders suggest that EPA retaining

the lead for water and wastewater treatment facilities would be more efficient. Providing EPA the

authority to oversee security as well as public health and safety operations may reduce the

potential for redundancy and other inefficiencies.151

If policy makers assign responsibility for chemical facility security at different facilities to

different agencies, each agency will promulgate separate rules. These rules may be similar or

different depending on the agencies’ statutory authority, interpretation of that authority, and

ability of the regulated entities to comply as well as any interagency coordination that might

occur. Some industry representatives have expressed concern regarding the effects of multiple

agencies regulating security at drinking water and wastewater treatment facilities.152 They assert

that municipalities that operate both types of facilities might face conflicting regulations and

guidance if different agencies regulate drinking water and wastewater treatment facilities.

Congress may wish to assess the areas where such facilities are similar and different in order to

provide authorities that meet any unique characteristics.

Any new regulation of drinking water and wastewater treatment facilities is likely to cause the

regulated entities, and potentially the federal government, to incur some costs. Representatives of

the water and wastewater sectors argue that local ratepayers will eventually bear the capital and

ongoing costs incurred due to increased security measures.153 Congressional policy makers may

wish to consider whether the regulated entities and the customers they serve should bear these

costs, as is done for other regulated chemical facilities, or whether they should be borne by the

taxpayers in general through federal financial assistance to the regulated entities. Additionally, if

inclusion of other facility types significantly increases the number of regulated entities, the

regulating agency may require additional funds to process regulatory submissions and perform

required inspections.

Harmonize Regulations

Other security statutes, such as MTSA, apply to some facilities exempt from the existing

chemical facility security regulations. The DHS supports modifying the existing exemption for

MTSA-regulated facilities to increase security at these facilities to the CFATS standard and

150

Testimony of Brad Coffey, Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies, before the House Committee on Energy

and Commerce, Subcommittee on Environment and Hazardous Materials, June 12, 2008.

151

Some agencies oversee both safety and security issues. For example, the U.S. Coast Guard has both safety and

security responsibilities for ports.

152

See, for example, American Water Works Association, “AWWA Members Urged to Contact Congress on Chemical

Security Bill,” and Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies, “Drinking Water Security and Treatment Mandates,”

Policy Resolution, October 2008.

153

Testimony of Brad Coffey, Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies, before the House Committee on Energy

and Commerce, Subcommittee on Environment and Hazardous Materials, June 12, 2008.

Congressional Research Service

34

Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress

modifying the existing exemption for facilities regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

to clarify the scope of the exemption for NRC-regulated facilities.154 The EPA has testified that

the Obama Administration believes that DHS should be responsible for ensuring consistency of

high-risk chemical facility security across all critical infrastructure sectors.155

If Congress modifies these exemptions, conflicts might arise between requirements under

chemical facility security regulations and these other provisions. One approach to resolving these

conflicts is to identify which statute would supersede the others. Critics of such an approach

might assert that the superseding statute does not contain all of the protections present in the other

statutes. Another approach might be to require agencies to generally harmonize the regulations

implementing each statute. Regulatory agencies might identify and determine the best ways to

meet statutory requirements while also limiting regulatory duplication or contradiction.

Such harmonization might reduce the regulatory burden on companies possessing facilities

regulated under two frameworks, such as MTSA and CFATS, by allowing a single security

approach to the regulations. For example, equivalent credentialing of workers under both

regulatory frameworks might limit the regulatory cost of compliance, in contrast to requiring two

distinct security credentials. The DHS has established a joint NPPD/U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)

working group to evaluate and, where appropriate, implement methods to harmonize the CFATS

and MTSA regulations.156 In contrast, if the process of harmonization leads to a significant

increase in security requirements, the regulatory burden faced by industry might also increase.

The USCG and NPPD have signed a memorandum of agreement regarding collaborative use of

security risk management information developed by each entity.157 Congress previously expressed

its expectation that DHS would execute a memorandum of agreement between NPPD and USCG

regarding harmonization of chemical security responsibilities under CFATS and MTSA no later

than March 30, 2012.158 The DHS did not meet this expectation, and Congress reaffirmed this

direction in March 2013.159

Increase Interagency Coordination

Congress may also focus on the interaction between different federal agencies, or between federal

and state agencies, regulating facilities possessing chemicals of interest. States and the EPA, for

example, receive information on certain chemical facilities through compliance with

environmental regulations. The extent to which these agencies coordinate and exchange

information with each other may affect overall regulatory compliance. The White House is

154

Testimony of Rand Beers, Under Secretary, National Protection and Programs Directorate, Department of

Homeland Security, before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, March 3, 2010.

155

Testimony of Peter S. Silva, Assistant Administrator for Water, Environmental Protection Agency, before the

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, March 3, 2010.

156

Testimony of Rand Beers, Under Secretary, National Protection and Programs Directorate, Department of

Homeland Security, before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Environment and the

Economy, March 31, 2011.

157

United States Coast Guard and National Protection and Programs Directorate, Department of Homeland Security,

Memorandum of Agreement Between United States Coast Guard and National Protection and Programs Directorate

Regarding Collaborative Use of Security Risk Management Information, December 14, 2012.

158

H.Rept. 112-331, p. 947.

159

See explanatory statement for P.L. 113-6, FY2013 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, printed

in the March 11, 2013, Congressional Record, pp. S1287-S1587 at p. S1554.

Congressional Research Service

35

Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress

coordinating a review of chemical safety and security regulations across departments and

agencies for potential gaps in coverage and explore ways to mitigate those gaps through existing

authorities.160

As early as 2009, DHS identified reconciling CFATS submissions with EPA RMP facility

information as a way to reveal outliers.161 The West Fertilizer Company, for example, was

compliant with the EPA RMP program and had provided a five-year update in 2011, but it was not

identified by DHS as noncompliant under CFATS.162 Comparing federally held information on

regulated facilities may be effective in identifying outliers. Such a process likely would occur

through data analysis rather than through outreach activities, a potentially less costly procedure.

The success of this approach would depend on the quality of self-reporting by regulated entities.

In the case of the West Fertilizer Company, its report to EPA might have indicated to DHS that it

should also have reported to DHS, but this approach would not allow DHS to identify a facility

that fails to self-report to any agency. In order to identify such facilities, DHS has reengaged with

EPA regarding RMP data and has identified some outlier facilities.163

Similarly, DHS might attempt to collect chemical holdings data from other governmental entities,

including state and local regulatory agencies. State and local regulatory agencies may possess

more diverse information about chemical holdings at particular facilities than federal agencies.

For example, under Title III of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA; P.L.

99-499), the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) requires certain

facilities to submit chemical inventories to state and local planning authorities and the local fire

department, so-called “Tier II” reporting. Reporting to states under EPCRA results in chemical

inventories while reporting to EPA under the RMP program is required only for select chemicals.

For example, EPCRA-based reporting to the state of Texas showed the presence of ammonium

nitrate at the West Fertilizer Company. Ammonium nitrate does not require reporting under the

RMP program but is a CFATS chemical of interest.164 The DHS might request such information

from state or local authorities and use it to verify facility compliance with CFATS reporting

requirements. The DHS is in the process of contacting certain state officials regarding facilities

containing chemicals within their jurisdictions.165 The DHS requests specific funding for FY2015

to establish a capacity for such analysis on an annual basis.166

160

Department of Homeland Security, DHS Responses to Rep. McCaul and Rep. Meehan’s May 2, 2013 Letter

Regarding the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) Program, June 2013.

161

Department of Homeland Security, The Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards—Update, August 30, 2009,

p. 9.

162

Right-to-Know Net, West Fertilizer Co. Risk Management Plan, June 30, 2011, http://data.rtknet.org/rmp/rmp.php?

facility_id=100000135597&database=rmp&detail=3&datype=T.

163

Testimony of David Wulf, Director, Infrastructure Security Compliance Division, National Programs and Protection

Directorate, Department of Homeland Security, before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on

Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies, on August 1, 2013.

164

CRS Report R43070, Regulation of Fertilizers: Ammonium Nitrate and Anhydrous Ammonia, by (name redacted),

(name redacted), and (name redacted).

165

Oral testimony of David Wulf, Director, Infrastructure Security Compliance Division, National Programs and

Protection Directorate, Department of Homeland Security, before the House Committee on Homeland Security,

Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies, on August 1, 2013.

166

Department of Homeland Security, National Protection and Programs Directorate, Infrastructure Protection and

Information Security Fiscal Year 2015 Congressional Justification, p. 90.

Congressional Research Service

36

Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress

Because of the range of information possessed by various federal, state, and local regulatory

agencies, this approach may provide a greater insight into the identities of non-compliant

facilities but also be resource intensive, as different state and local agencies store such data in

various, potentially incompatible formats. In addition, industry stakeholders may have concerns

about the identification and subsequent protection of proprietary or competitive information

arising from the aggregation of different regulatory filings.

Consider Inherently Safer Technologies

Congressional policy makers may choose to address the issue of inherently safer technologies,

sometimes called methods to reduce the consequences of terrorist attack. The current statute bars

DHS from mandating the presence or absence of a particular security measure. Therefore, DHS

cannot require a regulated facility to adopt or consider inherently safer technologies.167 Congress

could choose to continue the current policy or provide DHS with statutory authority regarding

inherently safer technologies at regulated chemical facilities or require efforts regarding

inherently safer technologies.

One policy approach might be to mandate the implementation of inherently safer technologies for

a set of processes. Another policy approach might be to mandate the consideration of

implementation of inherently safer technologies with certain criteria controlling whether

implementation is required. A third policy approach might be to mandate the development of a

federal repository of inherently safer technology approaches and consideration of chemical

processes against those options listed in the repository. Stakeholders might assess and review the

viability of applying these inherently safer approaches at lower cost if such information were

centralized and freely available. Alternatively, policy makers might establish an incentive-based

structure outside of the chemical facility security mandate to encourage the adoption of inherently

safer technologies by regulated entities.

The Obama Administration supports use of inherently safer technologies to enhance security at

high-risk chemical facilities in some circumstances. It has established a series of principles

directing its policy:

•

The Administration supports consistency of inherently safer technology

approaches for facilities regardless of sector.

•

The Administration believes that all high-risk chemical facilities, Tiers 1-4,

should assess [inherently safer technology] methods and report the assessment in

the facilities’ site security plans. Further, the appropriate regulatory entity should

have the authority to require facilities posing the highest degree of risk (Tiers 1

and 2) to implement inherently safer technology methods if such methods

demonstrably enhance overall security, are determined to be feasible, and, in the

167

The National Environmental Justice Advisory Council, an EPA advisory committee, has recommended to the EPA

an alternative approach. It recommends that the EPA Administrator use authorities under the Clean Air Act to require

chemical facilities to implement inherently safer technology approaches (National Environmental Justice Advisory

Council, Letter to Administrator Jackson, March 14, 2012). Several congressional policy makers have expressed their

opposition to this approach. See, for example, Senator James M. Inhofe, Senator Susan M. Collins, Senator David

Vitter, and Senator Mary Landrieu, Letter to Administrator Jackson, July 16, 2012; and Representative Fred Upton,

Representative Ed Whitfield, and Representative John Shimkus, Letter to Administrator Jackson, May 8, 2012.

Congressional Research Service

37

Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress

case of water sector facilities, consider public health and environmental

requirements.

•

The Administration believes that the appropriate regulatory entity should review

the inherently safer technology assessment contained in the site security plan for

all Tier 3 and Tier 4 facilities. The entity should be authorized to provide

recommendations on implementing inherently safer technologies, but it would

not have the authority to require facilities to implement the inherently safer

technology methods.

•

The Administration believes that flexibility and staggered implementation would

be required in implementing this new inherently safer technology policy.168

A congressional mandate for regulated entities to adopt or consider adopting inherently safer

technologies may have benefits and drawbacks. It may lead regulated entities to consider factors

such as homeland security impact in their chemical process assessments. Some experts assert that

existing chemical process safety activities consider and assess inherently safer technology

approaches though not necessarily in a homeland security context.169 These assessments may lead

to changes in chemical process when deemed safer, more reliable, and cost-effective. The extent

to which homeland security impact has factored into these industry decisions is unknown, but

DHS has identified cases where chemical facilities have voluntarily modified chemical processes

to lower their CFATS tier. An additional complication to assessing inherently safer technology is

the varying amounts and quality of information available regarding industrial implementation of

inherently safer technologies. While some facilities have converted to processes generally

deemed as inherently safer, other facilities may not have sufficient information available to

effectively assess the impacts from changing existing processes to ones considered inherently

safer.170 The differences that exist among chemical facilities, in terms of chemical process, facility

layout, and ability to finance implementation, may challenge mandatory implementation of

inherently safer technologies at regulated entities. Finally, the National Academies have identified

that the chemical industry lacks a common understanding and set of practice protocols for

identifying safer processes.171 Therefore, it seems likely that any such mandate will also require

accompanying outreach and educational activities for regulated entities. Even the mandatory

consideration of inherently safer technologies may place a financial burden on some small

168

Testimony of Rand Beers, Under Secretary, National Protection and Programs Directorate, Department of

Homeland Security, before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, March 3, 2010.

See also Personal Communication between CRS and Office of Legislative Affairs, Department of Homeland Security,

January 16, 2014.

169

See, for example, testimony of Dennis C. Hendershot, Staff Consultant, Center for Chemical Process Safety,

American Institute of Chemical Engineers, before the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, June 21,

2006, S.Hrg. 109-1044.

170

The Chemical Security Analysis Center of the DHS S&T Directorate contracted with the Center for Chemical

Process Safety of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers to develop a technically based definition for inherently

safer technology. See Center for Chemical Process Safety, American Institute of Chemical Engineers, Final Report:

Definition for Inherently Safer Technology in Production, Transportation, Storage, and Use, July 2010. The DHS has

not adopted the S&T Directorate work as a regulatory definition. Congress has directed DHS to detail and report to

Congress the Department’s definition of inherently safer technology as it relates to chemical facilities under the

purview of CFATS. See H.Rept. 112-331, p. 986.

171

Committee on Inherently Safer Chemical Processes, National Research Council, The Use of Methyl Isocyanate

(MIC) at Bayer CropScience, 2012.

Congressional Research Service

38

Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress

regulated entities. Congress might limit mandatory measures to those facilities considered by

DHS to pose the most risk or might provide such financial assistance to regulated facilities.172

Policy makers might choose to try to further incentivize regulated entities to adopt inherently

safer technologies. Under the CFATS regulations, facilities that adopt inherently safer

technologies might change their assigned risk tier by reducing the amount of chemicals of interest

they store. As of December 2014, more than 3,000 facilities had removed or reduced the amount

of chemicals of interest stored onsite and no longer qualify as a high-risk facility.173 Policy

makers might provide regulated entities that adopt inherently safer technologies with additional

financial or regulatory incentives. Alternatively, policy makers might direct DHS or another

agency to perform inherently safer technology assessments for regulated entities, transferring the

cost of such assessment from the facility to the federal government.174 The regulated entity or the

overseeing agency might use the results of these assessments to guide adoption of inherently safer

technologies.

Modify Information Security Provisions

Congressional policy makers might choose to increase transparency in the CFATS process by

altering the information security provisions of the program. Such an approach might include

increasing the number and type of individuals granted access to CVI, improving information

exchange with first responders, and adjusting the manner by which courts and administrative

proceedings handle CVI. The Obama Administration has testified that CVI is a distinct

information protection r

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.

Chemical Facility Security: Issues and Options for the 113th Congress · R42918 | Frix