Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities
Congressional research reportSep 28, 2012
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Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s
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September 28, 2012
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CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities
Summary
Several published reports indicate that top Israeli decisionmakers are seriously considering
whether to order a military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, and if so, when. Twice in Israel’s
history, it has conducted air strikes aimed at halting or delaying what Israeli policymakers
believed to be efforts to acquire nuclear weapons by a Middle Eastern state—destroying Iraq’s
Osirak reactor in 1981 and a facility the Israelis identified as a reactor under construction in Syria
in 2007. Today, Israeli officials generally view the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran as an
unacceptable threat to Israeli security—with some describing it as an existential threat. This
report analyzes key factors that may influence Israeli political decisions relating to a possible
strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. These include, but are not limited to, the views of and
relationships among Israeli leaders; the views of the Israeli public; U.S., regional, and
international stances and responses as perceived and anticipated by Israel; Israeli estimates of the
potential effectiveness and risks of a possible strike; and responses Israeli leaders anticipate from
Iran and Iranian-allied actors—including Hezbollah and Hamas—regionally and internationally.
For Congress, the potential impact—short- and long-term—of an Israeli decision regarding Iran
and its implementation is a critical issue of concern. By all accounts, such an attack could have
considerable regional and global security, political, and economic repercussions, not least for the
United States, Israel, and their bilateral relationship. It is unclear what the ultimate effect of a
strike would be on the likelihood of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. The current Israeli
government, President Barack Obama, and many Members of Congress have similar concerns
about Iran’s nuclear program. They appear to have a range of views on how best to address those
shared concerns. Iran maintains that its nuclear program is solely for peaceful, civilian energy and
research purposes, and U.S. intelligence assessments say that Iran has not made a decision to
build nuclear weapons. However, Iran continues to enrich uranium in militarily hardened sites
and questions remain about its nuclear weapons capabilities and intentions.
Short- and long-term questions for Members of Congress to consider regarding a possible Israeli
decision to strike Iranian nuclear facilities militarily might include, but are not limited to, the
following:
•
How might an Israeli strike affect options and debate regarding short-term and
long-term U.S. relations and security cooperation with, and foreign assistance to,
Israel and other regional countries?
•
Would an Israeli strike be considered self-defense? Why or why not? What would
be the legal and policy implications either way?
•
How might a strike affect the implementation of existing sanctions legislation on
Iran or options and debate over new legislation on the subject?
•
How might Congress consult with the Obama Administration on and provide
oversight with respect to various political and military options?
This report has many aspects that are the subject of vigorous debate and remain fully or partially
outside public knowledge. CRS does not claim to independently confirm any sources cited within
this report that attribute specific positions or views to various Israeli, U.S., or other officials.
This is an update of a report dated March 28, 2012. However, the only updated material is the
initial section entitled “Developments from Late March to September 2012.”
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Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities
Contents
Developments From Late March to September 2012 ...................................................................... 1
Issue Status: Possible Israeli Decision and Public Debate ........................................................ 1
Possible Operational and Cost-Benefit Considerations for Israel ............................................. 4
U.S. Concerns and Possible Responses: Possible Impact on Israeli Decisionmaking .............. 5
Potential Iranian Responses: Possible Impact on Israeli Decisionmaking ................................ 7
Congressional Action................................................................................................................. 8
Introduction, Issue Overview, and Questions for Congress............................................................. 9
Preliminary Considerations Regarding an Israeli Decision ........................................................... 17
Nature of the Threat—Differing Stated Perceptions ............................................................... 17
Possible “Zone of Immunity” and Israel’s Ability to Act Independently ................................ 20
Military Action Versus Alternative Courses of Action ............................................................ 21
The Israeli Decisionmaking Process.............................................................................................. 24
Decisionmakers: Views and Interactions................................................................................. 24
Public Opinion and Debate in Israel........................................................................................ 28
Potential Factors in an Israeli Decision: Stances and Anticipated Responses Outside Israel ........ 30
The United States..................................................................................................................... 30
Regionally and Internationally ................................................................................................ 34
Potential Factors in an Israeli Decision: Possible Operational Aspects of an Israeli Strike .......... 35
Access...................................................................................................................................... 36
Aircraft .................................................................................................................................... 38
Weapons .................................................................................................................................. 38
Potential Factors in an Israeli Decision: Estimated Effects of a Possible Strike ........................... 41
Effect on Iran’s Nuclear Program ............................................................................................ 41
Effect on Iran’s Regime........................................................................................................... 44
Potential Factors in an Israeli Decision: Possible Iranian Responses to a Strike........................... 45
Diplomatic Responses ............................................................................................................. 45
Hostile but Non-Military Responses ....................................................................................... 46
Military Responses .................................................................................................................. 46
Attacks on Israeli Territory................................................................................................ 47
Attacks Against Israeli Interests Abroad ........................................................................... 52
Expanded Military Responses ................................................................................................. 53
Attempted Closure of the Strait of Hormuz ...................................................................... 53
Attacks on U.S. Allies in the Persian Gulf ........................................................................ 54
Attacks on U.S. Installations and Interests in the Region or Elsewhere Abroad............... 54
Possible Attacks on the U.S. Homeland ............................................................................ 55
Conclusion: Possible Implications for Congress ........................................................................... 56
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Major Iranian Facilities in Regional Context..................................................... 15
Figure 2. Timeline of Relevant Events Involving Iran’s Nuclear Program and Israel................... 16
Figure 3. Underground Nuclear Facilities and Penetrating Munitions .......................................... 40
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Figure 4. Potential Ranges of Iranian Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles...................................... 49
Figure 5. Possible Ranges of Rockets and Missiles from Iranian-Allied Groups.......................... 51
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 57
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 57
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Developments From Late March to September 2012
Many media reports in Israel, the United States, and elsewhere since late March 2012—and
especially since August—have focused closely on apparent differences between the Netanyahu
government in Israel and the Obama Administration on potential “red lines” for possible military
action. After seemingly unsuccessful attempts by Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to
persuade President Barack Obama to present Iran with a time-specific ultimatum (see “U.S.
Concerns and Possible Responses: Possible Impact on Israeli Decisionmaking” below), prospects
for future Israeli military action remain unclear. The complex array of information and views set
forth in this section may help U.S. policymakers address relevant questions on this issue within
the context of various regional and global economic, political, and security concerns.
As with other parts of the report, this section has many elements that are the subject of vigorous
debate and remain fully or partially outside public knowledge. CRS does not claim that it has
confirmed independently any sources cited within this report that attribute specific positions or
views to Israeli, U.S., or other officials.
Issue Status: Possible Israeli Decision and Public Debate
Israeli and international media reports have continued speculating that Israeli Prime Minister
Binyamin Netanyahu may order an Israeli military attack on Iranian nuclear facilities in the
coming months. The rationale for a possible strike is set forth in detail below (see “Possible
“Zone of Immunity” and Israel’s Ability to Act Independently”). This has enlivened an already
vigorous public debate in Israel (as discussed below). A wide array of current and former leaders
in Israel’s political, military, and security establishments have either publicly expressed
opposition or are reportedly opposed, not to an attack in principle, but to an attack without U.S.
support given possible operational and political fallout.1 Seemingly heated private and public
exchanges between the Obama Administration and Netanyahu government (discussed below)
have occurred within the context of frequent consultations—including summer 2012 visits to
Israel by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, and National
Security Advisor Tom Donilon.
In a September 27 speech before the United Nations General Assembly in which he stressed that
the hour was getting “very late,” Netanyahu said, “I believe that faced with a clear red line, Iran
will back down. This will give more time for sanctions and diplomacy to convince Iran to
dismantle its nuclear weapons program altogether.” He asserted that otherwise, at current rates of
uranium enrichment, Iran could reach the final stage of enrichment by the spring or summer of
2013.2 Netanyahu’s remarks appear to have convinced several former Israeli officials and other
international commentators that the timeline for a possible Israeli attack has been pushed back at
least to early 2013.3 However, one Israeli journalist reportedly wrote, “If one takes his statements
1
See, for example, David Remnick, “The Vegetarian,” New Yorker, September 3, 2012.
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/netanyahu-faced-with-clear-red-line-iran-will-back-down-onnuclear-program.premium-1.466987
3
Dan Margalit, “A sigh of relief at the White House,” Israel Hayom, September 28, 2012; Dan Williams, “Israelis see
no Iran war this year after Netanyahu’s speech,” Reuters, September 28, 2012; Jay Solomon, “Netanyahu Demands
‘Red Line’ on Iran,” Wall Street Journal, September 28, 2012.
2
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seriously, within a short time, months at most, if Iran is not deterred and if the US does not attack,
Israel will launch an attack on its own.”4
Speculation persists regarding a possible Israeli strike, even though—as discussed below (see
“Effect on Iran’s Nuclear Program”)—most Israeli officials and analysts agree that military action
might only delay, not destroy, Iran’s nuclear program. Other efforts—diplomacy, sanctions,
reported covert action, even implied threats of military action by Israel or the United States—
have not led Iran’s regime either to stop expanding its uranium enrichment activities or to take
steps toward assuring the international community that its nuclear program is confined to purely
peaceful purposes. Israel is not a direct party to the P5+1 (see “Military Action Versus Alternative
Courses of Action” below for a definition of this term) negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program,
where technical discussions that continued in the spring and summer of 2012 made no apparent
progress.5
In August 2012, Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon called upon the international
community to acknowledge that diplomacy had failed.6 In August 2012, Congress and the
President enacted the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-158),
an additional sanctions law aimed at Iran’s oil exports.7 Most analysts agree that these sanctions,
combined with preexisting U.S. and international sanctions (see “Military Action Versus
Alternative Courses of Action” below), are significantly affecting Iran’s economy, and reports
indicate that Israeli officials may seek additional sanctions.8 The August 2012 International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report on Iran’s nuclear program reiterated concern over
continued enrichment and evidence of possible military dimensions to the program.9 For more
information on U.S. and international sanctions, diplomatic efforts, and their collective impact, as
well as the August IAEA report, see CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy
Responses, by (name redacted); CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by (name redacted);
and CRS Report R40094, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International
Obligations, by (name redacted).
Israeli concerns regarding a potential Iranian nuclear weapons capability may be exacerbated by
reports that Iran has deliberately provided faulty information about its nuclear program to
international monitors.10 This may further heighten Israeli and international concerns about the
reliability and comprehensiveness of current information regarding the program and its progress.
Media attention to deliberations among Netanyahu and the other members of the 14-member
Israeli security cabinet (see “Decisionmakers: Views and Interactions” below) has intensified. A
vote of approval from the security cabinet is necessary before ordering military action. A late
August New York Times report indicated that of those within the security cabinet whose views are
4
Nahum Barnea, quoted in Harriet Sherwood, “Binyamin Netanyahu's UN bomb triggers derision and admiration,”
guardian.co.uk, September 28, 2012.
5
For a discussion of Israel’s reported positions regarding negotiations, see Gareth Porter, “U.S.-Israel Deal to Demand
Qom Closure Threatens Nuclear Talks,” InterPress Service, April 12, 2012.
6
Jodi Rudoren, “Israeli Minister Asks Nations to Say Iran Talks Have Failed,” New York Times, August 12, 2012.
7
CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by (name redacted).
8
Isabel Kershner, “Israeli Foreign Ministry Calls for More Sanctions on Iran,” nytimes.com, September 27, 2012.
9
IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in
the Islamic Republic of Iran, August 2012.
10
Stuart Winer, “Iran admits it deceived the West over nuclear program,” Times of Israel, September 20, 2012.
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thought to be known, approximately six members are in favor of a strike, with three or four
opposed.11
The implications for Israeli decisionmaking of press articles pointing to Israeli emphasis on home
front safety12 and streamlined cabinet procedures reportedly giving Netanyahu greater control
over the decisionmaking process13 are unclear. In August 2012, Netanyahu appointed Avi Dichter,
a former head of the Israel Security Agency (also known as the Shin Bet), as Home Front Defense
Minister after his predecessor was named ambassador to China. Reports indicate that Dichter—
though not a member of the security cabinet—has joined the group of eight other ministers
(previously known as the “octet,” now known as the “group of nine”) that has particularly
significant influence over the national security decisionmaking process.14 Netanyahu disbanded
security cabinet meetings earlier than planned during the first week of September, reportedly due
to leaks of disagreements over when Iran would reach a “zone of immunity” (the term is
described below—see “Possible “Zone of Immunity” and Israel’s Ability to Act
Independently”).15 If, when, and how Netanyahu might call a vote in the security cabinet and/or
the full 29-member cabinet remains unclear.16
Another possible consideration for Netanyahu is that he will face national elections sometime in
2013; he has faced a drop in approval ratings in 2012—from over 50% in March to 31% in
August.17 This drop may not fundamentally undermine Netanyahu’s chances for another prime
ministerial term in Israel’s coalition-based parliamentary system. However, changing electoral
prospects might affect his and other actors’ decisionmaking on Iran.18 Polls continue to indicate
that a majority of Israelis opposes a unilateral Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear facilities at this
time, but that a slight majority would support a joint U.S.-Israel strike.19 Ehud Olmert, Israel’s
previous prime minister, who reportedly ordered Israel’s 2007 strike on a presumed Syrian
11
Rudoren and Sanger, op. cit. A September bulletin from a Washington, DC-based consulting firm asserted a slight
numerical edge within the security cabinet for those opposing a strike, with four (including Defense Minister Ehud
Barak) listed as “unknown” or “uncertain.” Nathaniel Kern and Matthew M. Reed, “Netanyahu’s Divided Cabinet,”
Foreign Reports Bulletin, September 19, 2012. Reports have focused on possible changes in the position of Barak, one
of the primary public exponents of a possible Israeli strike, as well as the views of Vice Prime Minister and Minister for
Strategic Affairs Moshe Ya’alon. See Yossi Verter, “Reshuffling the deck: Barak now opposes Israeli strike on Iran,
sources say,” Ha’aretz, September 7, 2012; Hagai Golan and Stella Korin-Lieber, “Barak: I see eye-to-eye with
Netanyahu on Iran,” Globes, September 13, 2012; Ari Shavit, “IDF chief of staff-turned-vice premier: ‘We are not
bluffing,’” Ha’aretz Magazine, June 14, 2012; Remnick, op. cit.
12
Calev Ben-David and Gwen Ackerman, “Israel to Hold Home Front Drill Amid Rise in Iran Tensions,” Bloomberg,
August 12, 2012.
13
Attila Somfalvi, “Revised gov't protocol gives PM unprecedented powers,” ynetnews.com, August 12, 2012.
14
Herb Keinon, “Security cabinet remains key in deciding on war,” jpost.com, September 6, 2012.
15
“Citing leak, Netanyahu disbands security cabinet meeting,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency, September 5, 2012.
16
Keinon, op. cit. A September 2012 New Yorker article on Israel’s 2007 strike on the presumed Al Kibar reactor in
Syria discusses how security cabinet deliberations proceeded in that case. David Makovsky, “The Silent Strike,” New
Yorker, September 17, 2012.
17
“Netanyahu Approval,” jewishjournal.com/rosnersdomain.
18
See, for example, Yossi Verter, “In UN speech, Netanyahu pitches Iran as key selling point for early Israeli
elections,” haaretz.com, September 28, 2012.
19
http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2012/p45ejoint.html. This poll was taken on September 9-14, 2012, and has a
margin of error of 4.5%. It was conducted jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of
Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah.
The poll was supported by the Ford Foundation Cairo office and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Ramallah and
Jerusalem. See Remnick, op. cit., for a discussion of the possible impact of polls on Netanyahu’s decisionmaking.
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nuclear reactor, and whose political comeback prospects have been the subject of Israeli domestic
speculation,20 was quoted as saying in September:
Worse comes to worst, and all options have been tried, then, naturally it may force Israel to
act to defend its existence. But it must be clear that we tried with the international
community, and particularly with the United States, to act together before we resort to the
last option of an Israeli military operation.21
Public debate in Israel continues to reflect disagreement over both the likelihood and the
advisability of an attack. At least one analyst has asserted that Israeli leaders appear to be
preparing the “Israeli home front, and international public opinion, for the inevitably messy
aftermath of any such action.”22 Other commentators—who note that Israeli leaders did not
provide prior warning before military attacks in 1981 and 2007, respectively, against presumed
Iraqi and Syrian nuclear reactors—have said that “all the loose talk of a brewing strike is a signal
the warnings are little more than posturing.”23 One journalist argued that Israel might strike Iran
“just to prove that they’re serious” to a largely skeptical world.24 Another journalist wrote that the
key question “is whether Netanyahu sees the threat of Iran building a nuclear bomb as so severe
that he is willing to risk severe friction with the United States, a severe blow to the Israeli
economy, the possibility of a bloody regional war, and a hail of missiles from Iran, Hezbollah,
Hamas, and perhaps Syria hitting Israel.”25
Possible Operational and Cost-Benefit Considerations for Israel
Israeli censorship rules reportedly limit public discussion of operational details of a possible
Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. Nevertheless, sources that discuss potential military
capabilities, options, and outcomes, such as a 2012 book by an Israeli military correspondent and
an Israeli military historian,26 could shed some light on Israeli decisionmakers’ calculations. U.S.
and international sources have provided some additional information on this subject since late
March 2012.27 A September report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
concluded that although an Israeli strike was possible, “it would be complex and high risk in the
operational level and would lack any assurances of a high mission success rate.” Furthermore, the
report stated that Iranian retaliation will have “devastating regional consequences.”28 Some other
20
Isabel Kershner, “Former Israeli Premier Gets Suspended Sentence,” New York Times, September 24, 2012.
Makovsky, op. cit.
22
Oren Kessler, “The Decider,” foreignpolicy.com, August 23, 2012, citing views attributed to Uzi Rabi, director of the
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Tel Aviv University.
23
Ibid., citing Israeli journalists Motti Kirshenbaum and Ben Caspit.
24
Ben Caspit, quoted in Rudoren, op. cit.
25
Yossi Melman, “Israel May Have Time Limit in Iran Attack Decision” (translated from Hebrew), israelspy.com,
August 10, 2012.
26
Yaakov Katz and Yoaz Hendel, Israel vs. Iran: The Shadow War, Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2012, pp. 167193.
27
For general background information, see “Potential Factors in an Israeli Decision: Possible Operational Aspects of an
Israeli Strike” and “Potential Factors in an Israeli Decision: Estimated Effects of a Possible Strike” below.
28
Anthony H. Cordesman and Abdullah Toukan, Analyzing the Impact of Preventive Strikes Against Iran’s Nuclear
Facilities, Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 10, 2012.
21
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commentators have presented what they claim to be leaked information from U.S. or Israeli
sources pertaining to possible operational details of potential Israeli military action.29
In response to a question in an August Ha’aretz interview about whether the potential domestic,
regional, and international costs of Israeli military action would be worth “a two-year delay in
Iran’s inevitable nuclearization,” an Israeli “decisionmaker” widely assumed to be Defense
Minister Barak30 said:
Our objective is not to wipe out the Iranian nuclear program. But it must be understood that
the real story is the contest between Iran’s nuclearization and the fall of the current regime of
the ayatollahs in Iran. If we succeed in pushing off the nuclear program by six or eight or 10
years, there’s a good chance that the regime will not survive until the critical moment. So the
objective is delay.31
Meir Dagan, who ended his eight-year tenure as head of Israel’s Mossad in early 2011, is one of
the most outspoken opponents of an Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear facilities in the near
future. When interviewed for a September New Yorker article, Dagan said:
An Israeli bombing would lead to a regional war and solve the internal problems of the
Islamic Republic of Iran. It would galvanize Iranian society behind the leadership and create
unity around the nuclear issue. And it would justify Iran in rebuilding its nuclear project and
saying, “Look, see, we were attacked by the Zionist enemy and we clearly need to have it.”32
U.S. Concerns and Possible Responses: Possible Impact on Israeli
Decisionmaking
As mentioned above and discussed further below (see “The United States”), U.S. concerns and
potential responses regarding the consequences of a possible Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear
facilities could significantly affect Israeli decisionmaking. Israeli differences with the Obama
Administration over the Iranian nuclear issue have reportedly been the subject of intense private
discussions.33 Additionally, U.S. concerns about regional and international perceptions of U.S.
involvement in a potential Israeli attack and the durability of the international sanctions regime
29
For example, in August, a U.S. blogger posted what he claimed was an Israeli briefing document outlining Israel’s
war plans against Iran. He claimed that the document was passed to him “by a high-level Israeli source who received it
from an IDF officer.” Richard Silverstein, “Bibi’s Secret War Plan,” Tikun Olam, August 15, 2012. Passages posted
from the alleged document anticipate massive Israeli cyberattacks, followed by land- and naval-based missile attacks
and attacks by the Israel Air Force against a wide range of Iranian nuclear facilities, military targets, and key individual
professionals and commanders. Ibid. A late September report cited unnamed U.S. military and intelligence officials
discussing various Israeli attack options, including a possible special forces raid on the deep-underground uranium
enrichment facility at Fordow. Mark Perry, “The Entebbe Option,” foreignpolicy.com, September 27, 2012. A late
March report by the same author also cited unnamed U.S. government officials in speculating that Israel could possibly
use airfields in Azerbaijan to land planes or conduct search-and-rescue missions following an attack in Iran. Mark
Perry, “Israel’s Secret Staging Ground,” foreignpolicy.com, March 28, 2012. Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor
Lieberman subsequently dismissed reports of possible Israeli use of Azeri airfields as “science fiction.” Lada
Evgrashina and Margarita Antidze, “Israel denies it has access to Azerbaijan air bases,” Reuters, April 23, 2012.
30
Harriet Sherwood, “Israeli speculation over Iran strike reaches fever pitch,” guardian.co.uk, August 14, 2012.
31
Ari Shavit, “A grave warning on Iran from ‘the decision maker,’” Ha’aretz, August 11, 2012.
32
Remnick, op. cit.
33
Anne Gearan, “Rep. Mike Rogers tells of heated exchange between Netanyahu, U.S. envoy over Iran nuclear
program,” washingtonpost.com, September 6, 2012.
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against Iran may have at least partly motivated the following August 2012 comments by General
Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: “I don’t want to be accused of trying to
influence—nor do I want—nor do I want to be complicit if [the Israelis] choose to do it.”34
President Obama, in his September 25 address at the annual opening session of the U.N. General
Assembly in New York, said that time remains for diplomacy with Iran, but is “not unlimited.”35
He also said that the United States “will do what we must to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear
weapon.”36 Earlier in September, the Administration apparently rejected Israeli requests both for
setting firm deadlines for U.S. military action, and for an Obama-Netanyahu meeting later in the
month on the sidelines of the annual opening sessions of the U.N. General Assembly.37 In
declining to set deadlines, Secretary of State Clinton set forth her view of U.S.-Israel differences
on the issue in a September 2012 interview:
They’re more anxious about a quick response because they feel that they’re right in the
bull’s-eye, so to speak. But we’re convinced that we have more time to focus on these
sanctions, to do everything we can to bring Iran to a good-faith negotiation.38
Responding at a news conference, Netanyahu was quoted as saying:
If Iran knows that there’s no deadline, what will it do? Exactly what it’s doing: It’s
continuing without any interference toward obtaining nuclear weapons capability and from
there nuclear bombs. The world tells Israel: Wait. There’s still time. And I say: Wait for
what? Wait until when? Those in the international community who refuse to put red lines
before Iran don't have a moral right to place a red light before Israel.39
U.S. responses to Netanyahu’s statement, including by Members of Congress, have varied.40
34
Transcript of remarks by General Martin E. Dempsey, U.S. Embassy in London, England, August 30, 2012, available
at http://www.jcs.mil/speech.aspx?id=1727.
35
Matt Spetalnick and Mark Felsenthal, “U.S. will ‘do what we must’ on Iran, Ban Ki-moon opposes threats,” Reuters,
September 25, 2012.
36
Ibid.
37
Netanyahu has subsequently consulted with President Obama via telephone, and ultimately met in New York on
September 27 with Secretary of State Clinton.
38
Indira A.R. Lakshmanan, “U.S. ‘Not Setting Deadlines’ for Iran, Clinton Says,” Bloomberg, September 10, 2012.
39
Joshua Mitnick and Jay Solomon, “Israel Blasts U.S. Over Iran—Netanyahu Says Obama Administration Has No
‘Moral Right’ to Restrain Jewish State,” Wall Street Journal, September 12, 2012. An Israeli “decisionmaker” widely
believed to be Defense Minister Barak was quoted as saying in August, “But let me remind you that Ronald Reagan did
not want to see a nuclear Pakistan but Pakistan did go nuclear. Bill Clinton did not want to see a nuclear North Korea,
but North Korea went nuclear.” Shavit, “A grave warning on Iran from ‘the decision maker,’” op. cit. In September,
however, Barak acknowledged “impressive preparations by the Americans to counter Iran on all fronts” and asserted
that some U.S. red lines for military action already existed. Barak Ravid, “Barak hints U.S. military preparations may
eliminate Israel's need for Iran strike,” haaretz.com, September 7, 2012; Golan and Korin-Lieber, op. cit.
40
Senator Barbara Boxer, the sponsor of the U.S.-Israel Enhanced Security Cooperation Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-150),
wrote a letter dated September 12 to Netanyahu urging Netanyahu to “step back and clarify your remarks so that the
world sees that there is no daylight between the United States and Israel.” Text available at
http://boxer.senate.gov/en/press/releases/091212b.cfm. A group of 128 Republican Members of Congress sent a
September 13 letter to President Obama calling on him to meet with Netanyahu during his planned U.S. visit later in
the month. Text available at http://kingston.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=308403. In September
20 testimony before the Middle East and South Asia Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, former
deputy national security advisor (during the George W. Bush Administration) Elliott Abrams said that no president of
the United States would give Israel a pledge to attack another country “by a date certain.”
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Regarding levels of U.S.-Israel security cooperation focused on this issue, former Obama White
House national security official Dennis Ross suggested in August that “senior American officials
should ask Israeli leaders if there are military capabilities we could provide them with—like
additional bunker-busting bombs, tankers for refueling aircraft and targeting information—that
would extend the clock for them.”41 A U.S. source has reported that the United States has
drastically reduced the scope of its planned involvement in a late October joint missile defense
exercise with Israel known as Austere Challenge 12.42 The United States and more than 30 other
countries reportedly conducted joint military maneuvers in the Persian Gulf in late September,
possibly in preparation for potential Iranian responses to an Israeli attack.43
Potential Iranian Responses: Possible Impact on Israeli
Decisionmaking
As discussed below (see “Potential Factors in an Israeli Decision: Possible Iranian Responses to a
Strike”), Israeli leaders’ calculations regarding Iran’s potential response to an attack on its nuclear
facilities may affect their decisionmaking. Leading Iranian military commanders and advisors, as
well as Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah, have indicated that Iran and Hezbollah would
retaliate robustly against Israel, and that Iran would possibly also target U.S. positions in the
Gulf.44 Reports indicate that Iran test-fired four surface-to-sea missiles near the Strait of Hormuz
in late September, and that it is planning to hold major military preparedness maneuvers in the
near future.45 One senior Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander reportedly said
in September that Iran could launch a preemptive strike against Israel if it were sure Israel was
preparing to attack it.46 Reports from September that Iran bears responsibility for recent
cyberattacks against various U.S. banks and companies47 could presage similar attacks in
retaliation for a possible Israeli military strike.
Iranian or Iranian-allied terrorist plots against Israeli targets (see “Attacks Against Israeli Interests
Abroad” below) also appear to remain a threat. Several reports alleged Hezbollah involvement48
in the July 2012 bus suicide bombing in Burgas, Bulgaria, that targeted an Israeli tourist group—
41
Dennis B. Ross, “How America Can Slow Israel’s March to War,” New York Times, August 17, 2012.
Karl Vick and Aaron J. Klein, “Exclusive: U.S. Scales Back Military Exercise with Israel, Affecting Potential Iran
Strike,” time.com, August 31, 2012.
43
Peter Kenyon, “U.S. Naval Exercises Send Message in the Tense Gulf,” National Public Radio, September 24, 2012.
Known as the International Mine Countermeasures Exercise (IMCMEX), the maneuvers reportedly included, among
other countries, the United Kingdom, France, Japan, Yemen, and Jordan. Laura Sukhtian, “Massive Anti-Mine Naval
Exercise Underway in Gulf,” Defense News, September 17, 2012.
44
“IRGC Commander Warns of Iran's Devastating Response to Israeli Attack,” Fars News Agency, September 17,
2012; Laila Bassam, “Iran could strike US bases if Israel attacks: Hezbollah,” Reuters, September 3, 2012; Zahra
Hosseinian, “Iran: Hezbollah will defend us ‘easily’ against Israeli attack – Iran,” Reuters, September 14, 2012.
45
Nick Schifrin and Matthew McGarry, “Iran, US Flex Military Muscles in Persian Gulf,” ABC News, September 25,
2012; Robert Tait, “Iran plans military exercises in preparation for Israeli strike on nuclear facilities,” telegraph.co.uk,
September 16, 2012.
46
Zahra Hosseinian and Rania El Gamal, “Iran could launch pre-emptive Israel strike-commander,” Reuters,
September 23, 2012.
47
Ellen Nakashima, “Iran blamed for cyberattacks on U.S. banks and companies,” Washington Post, September 21,
2012.
48
Nicholas Kulish and Eric Schmitt, “Hezbollah Is Blamed for Attack on Israeli Tourists in Bulgaria,” New York
Times, July 19, 2012.
42
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Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities
killing 6 (including the Bulgarian driver) and injuring at least 32. The broader strategic purpose of
such plots—that is, whether they seek to deter or provoke possible Israeli or international action
of a specific nature—is difficult to discern.
Congressional Action
In addition to enacting additional sanctions (as discussed above) against Iran in August 2012,
Congress has taken other actions in 2012 with possible relevance to the Iranian nuclear issue.
Congress and the President may have at least partly focused on bolstering Israeli capabilities visà-vis Iran in enacting the U.S.-Israel Enhanced Security Cooperation Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-150)
on July 27. The act contains non-binding “sense of Congress” language focusing largely on
possible avenues of cooperation outside of direct bilateral aid, including expediting specific types
of arms sales (such as F-35 fighter aircraft, refueling tankers, and bunker buster munitions);
providing excess defense articles; boosting operational, intelligence, and political-military
coordination; and providing additional aid for Israel’s Iron Dome short-range missile defense
system and U.S.-Israel cooperative missile defense programs. The act also extended deadlines for
Israel to access U.S. war reserves stockpiles and to draw upon existing loan guarantees.
Furthermore, the House passed a measure on May 27, 2012—the National Defense Authorization
Act for FY2013 (H.R. 4310)—that would, if ultimately enacted, authorize up to $680 million in
additional funding for Iron Dome from FY2012 to FY2015.49 Congress and the President made an
initial $205 million appropriation for the program in FY2011. An additional $70 million in U.S.
funding was reprogrammed for Iron Dome in FY2012 from prior-year Missile Defense Agency
funding for various programs, and will presumably count toward the $680 million figure if H.R.
4310 is enacted. Israel has reportedly spent more than $200 million on initial stages of Iron
Dome’s development, procurement, and deployment.50 One report indicates that the House Armed
Services Committee may seek to condition additional U.S. funding for Iron Dome on coproduction or technology sharing because of the system’s possible application for forwarddeployed U.S. military units.51
On September 22, the Senate passed S.J.Res. 41 by a vote of 90-1. If subsequently passed by the
House, this joint resolution would express the non-binding “sense of Congress” rejecting “any
United States policy that would rely on efforts to contain a nuclear weapons-capable Iran”, and
joining “the President in ruling out any policy that would rely on containment as an option in
response to the Iranian nuclear threat.” S.J.Res. 41 explicitly states, however, that it shall not be
construed as “an authorization for the use of force or a declaration of war.”
The remainder of this report is unchanged from the version published on March 28, 2012.
49
The version of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2013 (H.R. 5856) reported by the Senate
Appropriations Committee would, if enacted, provide $211 million to Israel for Iron Dome in FY2013, subject to
possible budget sequestration. For information on sequestration, see CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel ,
by (name redacted)
50
Jamie Levin, “Israel’s economy will pay heavy price for Iron Dome,” Ha’aretz, March 23, 2012.
51
Spencer Ackerman, “U.S. Funds Israel’s ‘Iron Dome,’ But Doesn’t (Quite) Know How It Works,” wired.com,
August 21, 2012.
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Introduction, Issue Overview, and Questions for
Congress52
In February 2012, a U.S. newspaper columnist reported that Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta
“believes there is a strong likelihood that Israel will strike Iran in April, May or June.”53 Less than
two weeks later in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 14,
Secretary Panetta declined when questioned to take a position on the likelihood of a spring 2012
Israeli attack against nuclear facilities in Iran.54
Secretary Panetta’s comments were only part of the stream of statements from U.S. and Israeli
officials and media reports that drew attention to a question that has periodically recurred in the
national security discourse of both countries (and more broadly): Might Israel choose to attack
Iran’s nuclear facilities, possibly counter to U.S. advice?
For decades, successive regimes in Iran have engaged in nuclear-related activities. The ultimate
goal of these activities, however, has remained stubbornly ambiguous. Despite extensive
examination of these activities by both government and non-government experts around the
world, including on-site investigation by representatives of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), no definitive proof has been offered to conclude with certainty the validity of
•
Iran’s claims that its nuclear work is entirely for peaceful purposes as allowed
under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to which it is a party;
•
concerns of some government officials and non-government experts in the United
States and elsewhere that Iran is seeking a “nuclear capability” below the
threshold of nuclear weapons (which entails the combination of fissile material
with a nuclear warhead and an appropriate delivery vehicle) that nevertheless
may allow it to rapidly cross the nuclear threshold at some time in the future; or
•
allegations that the Iranian regime is committed to acquiring nuclear weapons.
Ongoing disagreements among analysts as to how far away Iran is from achieving a “nuclear
capability” or nuclear weapons if it is committed to doing so only exacerbate this ambiguity and
uncertainty regarding Iran’s nuclear-related efforts. This ambiguity and uncertainty is a major
feature of the environment in which international actors decide their policies and actions vis-à-vis
52
Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in Middle Eastern irs,
Affawith contributions from (name redacted), Specialist
in Middle Eastern Affairs and (name redacted), Analyst in Nonproliferation. See also CRS Report RL32048,
Iran: U.S.
Concerns and Policy Responses, by (name redacted); CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations,
by (name redacted); and CRS Report R40094,
Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International
Obligations, by (name redacted). Outside reports on the issue include Anthony H. Cordesman and Alexander Wilner
, Iran
and the Gulf Military Balance – II: The Missile and Nuclear Dimensions: Working Draft, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, February 22, 2012. Ronen Bergman, “Will Israel Attack Iran?”, New York Times Magazine,
January 25, 2012; Dalia Dassa Kaye, et al., Israel and Iran: A Dangerous Rivalry, RAND Corporation, 2011; Dana H.
Allin and Steven Simon, The Sixth Crisis: Iran, Israel, America and the Rumors of War, New York: Oxford University
Press, 2010.
53
David Ignatius, “Of a mind to attack Iran,” Washington Post, February 3, 2012.
54
At the same hearing, Secretary Panetta acknowledged having talked with the columnist who wrote the February 2012
report “about a lot of things.”
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Iran. The view a state holds of the ultimate goal of Iran’s nuclear-related activities informs the
approach it takes in dealing with the Iranian regime.
For various reasons—including geopolitical, historical, and ideological—the prospect of an Iran
with nuclear weapons arguably affects the threat perceptions of Israel more than those of the
United States55 or other nations. Twice in its history, Israel has conducted air strikes aimed at
preventing a regional actor from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability—destroying Iraq’s
Tammuz-Osirak reactor in 1981 and a presumed reactor under construction at Al Kibar near Deir
al Zur in Syria in 2007. For some period of time, Israeli leaders have conveyed their view that
Israel may similarly be compelled to act to prevent a potentially nuclear-armed Iran. Analysts
generally agree that Israeli military action against multiple Iranian nuclear facilities would be
significantly more complex operationally than these previous attacks, both of which targeted
single facilities that were closer in range to Israel (see Figure 1 below). What lessons the
previous strikes—particularly the one on Osirak in 1981—impart for an Israeli decision on
whether to strike Iran is a subject of debate.56
For Congress, the potential impact—short- and long-term—of an Israeli decision regarding Iran
and its implementation is a critical issue of concern.
Since Iran’s nuclear program became a major international issue a decade ago, Israel has deferred
to the United States and other actors in coordinating diplomacy and implementing economic and
other sanctions aimed at convincing Iran to abandon activities that could allow it to develop
nuclear weapons. In recent years, however, reports suggest that Israel has pursued covert
means—including sabotage, cyberwarfare, and assassination—to intimidate Iran and delay the
nuclear program, with some reported success.57 Without confirming or denying involvement,
Israeli officials also generally have welcomed reports of events that might set back Iran’s nuclear
program.58
Even before the reports in recent months of possible Israeli military action, at various stages of
the international effort to persuade Iran to relinquish any possible nuclear weapons ambitions
some Israeli officials have hinted that Israel might be compelled to take unilateral action to
counter what they see as an Iranian nuclear weapons program.59 It was in the first three months of
55
Leslie Susser, “Spy vs. Spy,” Jerusalem Report, March 26, 2012, stating, “Although he too is committed to stopping
the Iranians, US President Barack Obama does not see the prospect of a nuclear Iran in the same apocalyptic terms as
Netanyahu does. True, a nuclear Iran would hurt vital American interests in the Middle East, but Iran is a long way
from American shores.”
56
Allin and Simon, p. 53. Some analysts cite Osirak to emphasize the potential perils of an attack on Iran, pointing to
Saddam Hussein’s subsequent clandestine pursuit of nuclear weapons on an accelerated timetable. Some use it to
emphasize the potential benefits of an attack, pointing to the U.S.-led international action from 1991-2003 that
eventually squelched Hussein’s nuclear ambitions, even though the international coalition was not initially assembled
in response to Iraq’s nuclear program, but its 1990 invasion of Kuwait. According to a 2010 book, many Israelis
believe that buying time through a strike on Iran “might prove worthwhile in [unanticipated] ways…” Ibid.
57
See Yossi Melman, “The war against Iran’s nuclear program has already begun,” Ha’aretz, December 2, 2011. Some
reports state that U.S. and British intelligence agencies have aided Israel with some non-lethal covert operations. Daniel
Klaidman, Eli Lake, and Dan Ephron, “Obama’s Dangerous Game with Iran,” Newsweek, February 13, 2012.
58
For example, after the January 2012 assassination of an Iranian nuclear scientist, Brig. Gen. Yoav Mordechai, an
Israeli military spokesman, reportedly wrote on his Facebook page, “I don’t know who took revenge on the Iranian
scientist, but I am definitely not shedding a tear.” Alan Cowell and Rick Gladstone, “Iran Reports Killing of Nuclear
Scientist in ‘Terrorist’ Blast,” New York Times, January 11, 2012.
59
See, for example, Jeffrey Goldberg, “Point of No Return,” The Atlantic, September 2010.
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2012, however, that the issue came into sharper relief for U.S. policymakers, including in
Congress. This was in part a result of comments by senior Israeli government officials and former
officials that intensified the debate within their country as to the wisdom and potential
effectiveness of military action against nuclear-related targets in Iran, linked to a similar
discussion in the United States and worldwide.
This report assesses this issue, focusing primarily on the decision that might be made by the
government of Israel. In particular, it examines the range of factors that could influence such an
Israeli decision.
Implementation of an Israeli decision to strike Iran’s nuclear-related facilities could have
significant implications for U.S. interests and goals related both to the nuclear issue itself and to
broader regional and international concerns, including U.S. relations with Israel.60 In assessing
those implications and considering possible action either before or after a possible Israeli strike
(see “Conclusion: Possible Implications for Congress” below), Congress and the Obama
Administration might consider the following questions:
Israeli Debate and Decision Regarding a Potential Attack:
•
What is the nature of the public and official debate in Israel over the Iranian
nuclear issue and possible Israeli, U.S., and international approaches to it,
including military and non-military options? How might that debate evolve?
•
What are the factors in Israeli thinking and who are the main actors involved in
the decision?
•
Under what conditions is a final political decision regarding military action
likely?
•
How does Israel assess the operational requirements of a potential strike?
Effect on Iran’s Nuclear Program and Regime:
•
Ultimately, is an attack more likely to prevent an Iran with nuclear weapons or help bring
it about? If an attack only delayed a potential nuclear weapons program in Iran, would
Israel feel compelled to take additional military action later?
•
What effect might an attack have on a potential Iranian decision to weaponize its nuclear
program?
•
Would an attack help or hinder the ongoing international effort to use diplomacy,
monitoring, sanctions, and possible threats of further military action to persuade Iran not
to pursue nuclear weapons? To what extent might the large coalition that is now working
with the United States to enforce sanctions against Iran fracture in the event of a strike?
•
Would an attack strengthen or weaken the Iranian regime, particularly given that current
trends indicate that the regime faces significant economic challenges and political
divisions?
60
For more information on U.S.-Israel relations, including the level of U.S. commitment to Israel’s security, see CRS
Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by (name redacted); and CRS Report RL33222,
U.S. Foreign Aid
to Israel, by (name redacted).
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Effect on Other U.S. Interests:
•
What retaliation from Iran and its regional allies (including Lebanese Hezbollah and
Hamas or other Palestinian militants) is likely against Israeli targets?
•
If Iran retaliated, would it limit the targeted area to Israel, or would it also target U.S.
interests and allies in the region and elsewhere? If Iran expands its response to U.S. or
U.S.-allied targets, what forms might that take?
•
What is the likelihood and potential scope of a crisis in the Strait of Hormuz and Persian
Gulf regarding global energy prices and potential region-wide conflict? What are other
possible regional consequences of an Israeli attack?
This report has many elements that are the subject of vigorous debate and remain fully or partially
outside public knowledge. CRS does not claim that it has confirmed independently any sources
cited within this report that attribute specific positions or views to Israeli, U.S., or other officials.
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Iran’s Nuclear Program and Facilities of Main Concern: A Primer61
Iran’s leaders claim that Iran’s nuclear program is solely for peaceful, civilian energy and research purposes. Since the 1979 Islamic
Revolution, Iran’s leaders (including current Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i) have regularly spoken in public against the
development and use of nuclear weapons.62 Iran is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and conducts its
declared nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring and safeguards. For a discussion of Iran’s
compliance or non-compliance with international obligations regarding its nuclear program, see Figure 2 below and CRS Report
R40094, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations, by (name redacted).
Iran’s gas centrifuge-based uranium enrichment program is currently the main source of proliferation concern for the
international community. Gas centrifuges enrich uranium by spinning uranium hexafluoride gas at high speeds to increase the
concentration of the uranium-235 isotope. Such centrifuges can produce both low-enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in
nuclear power reactors, and highly enriched uranium (HEU).63 HEU and plutonium are the two types of fissile material used in
nuclear weapons.
Iran’s construction of a nuclear reactor moderated by heavy water has also been a source of proliferation concern. The reactor is
a proliferation concern because the reactor’s spent fuel will contain plutonium well-suited for use in nuclear weapons. To be used
in nuclear weapons, however, plutonium must be separated from the spent fuel—a procedure called “reprocessing.” Iran has said
that it will not engage in reprocessing, and there is no public evidence that Tehran either has constructed or is constructing a
reprocessing facility.
A 2007 National Intelligence Estimate said that Iran “probably would use covert facilities—rather than its declared nuclear sites—
for the production of highly enriched uranium for a weapon,”64 at least in part because of the difficulty of diverting significant
amounts of nuclear material from safeguarded facilities without detection. According to Colin Kahl, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Middle East Policy from 2009 until the end of 2011, “there is no evidence that Iran has built additional covert
enrichment plants.”65
For a January 31, 2012, Senate Select Intelligence Committee hearing, James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, submitted
written testimony stating that Iran has the “capacity to eventually produce nuclear weapons” and “is keeping open the option to
develop” such weapons, but added that “[w]e do not know... if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons.”
Some high-ranking U.S. and Israeli political decisionmakers reportedly differ on the question of how long action might remain
possible to prevent a potentially nuclear-armed Iran. This relates to the question of a possible “zone of immunity” discussed
below. Differences on this question reportedly persist even though U.S. and Israeli assessments are similar on the timetables for
Iran to
•
achieve the capability to develop and produce the components for a nuclear weapon; and
•
if it chooses, to weaponize successfully.
In a January 2012 60 Minutes interview, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta said, “The consensus is that, if [Iran] decided to do it,
it would probably take them about a year to be able to produce a bomb and then possibly another one to two years in order to
put it on a deliverable vehicle of some sort in order to deliver that weapon.”66
According a February 2012 report from IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano, Iran has produced 5,451 kilograms of LEU in the
61
Prepared by (name redacted), Analyst in Nonproliferation,
with contributions from (name redacted), Specialist in Middle
Eastern Affairs.
62
President Obama was quoted in a late February 2012 interview as saying that Iranian leaders in early 2012 have been
saying that “nuclear weapons are sinful and un-Islamic.” President Barack Obama, quoted in Jeffrey Goldberg, “Obama
to Iran and Israel: ‘As President of the United States, I Don’t Bluff,’” theatlantic.com, March 2, 2012.
63
LEU typically contains less than 5% uranium-235. Weapons-grade HEU typically contains approximately 90%
uranium-235.
64
Similarly, a CIA report for 2004 concluded that “inspections and safeguards will most likely prevent Tehran from
using facilities declared to the IAEA directly for its weapons program as long as Iran remains a party to the NPT.”
Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and
Advanced Conventional Munitions, January 1-December 31, 2004.
65
Colin H. Kahl, “Not Time to Attack Iran: Why War Should Be a Last Resort,” Foreign Affairs, January 17, 2012.
66
Transcript of remarks by Secretary Panetta from CBS’s 60 Minutes interview, January 29, 2012, available at
http://www.votesmart.org/public-statement/664274/cbs-60-minutes-transcript.
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Natanz commercial facility. This quantity of LEU, if further enriched, could produce enough HEU for four nuclear weapons,
according to the Institute for Science and International Security.67 According to Amano’s report, Iran has enriched approximately
95 kilograms of uranium up to 20% uranium-235 at the Natanz pilot facility and approximately 14 kilograms of similarly enriched
uranium at the Fordow facility.
The four facilities described below are under IAEA safeguards and monitoring:
Natanz
Iran has both a pilot centrifuge facility and a larger commercial facility located at this site. The commercial facility is reportedly
hardened by steel-reinforced concrete, buried underground, and covered by a mound of earth.68 This facility is capable of
eventually holding more than 47,000 centrifuges. Iran is currently using first-generation centrifuges in the commercial facility to
produce uranium enriched up to 5% uranium-235. Iran is using the pilot facility both to produce uranium enriched up to 20%
uranium-235 and also to test more-advanced centrifuges. According to the IAEA Director-General’s February 2012 report, Iran
has installed approximately 9,100 centrifuges in the commercial facility and is feeding uranium hexafluoride into as many as 8,808
of those centrifuges.
Fordow
Iran has a centrifuge facility located at this site—reportedly built into the side of a small mountain69 and specially hardened.70 The
facility is eventually supposed to contain approximately 3,000 centrifuges. Tehran has told the IAEA that the facility will be
configured to produce both uranium enriched to 5% uranium-235 and 20% uranium-235. Iran has installed approximately 700
first-generation centrifuges in the facility, and it is now reportedly producing 20%-enriched uranium.
Esfahan
Among several nuclear facilities located at this site, Iran’s above-ground uranium conversion facility converts uranium oxide into
several compounds, including gaseous uranium hexafluoride that can be enriched in centrifuges.
Arak
Iran is constructing a nuclear reactor moderated by heavy water at this above-ground site. Tehran also has a plant at this site for
producing heavy water. According to a February 2012 IAEA report, the plant appears to be operating.
Iran also has other nuclear-related facilities, including a light-water nuclear power reactor at Bushehr and a research reactor in
Tehran, as well as research, centrifuge production, and mining facilities. See “Effect on Iran’s Nuclear Program” below for a
textbox describing other facilities related to Iran’s nuclear program.
Figure 1 below provides a map showing facilities related or possibly related to Iran’s nuclear program, the site of the two
previous Israeli strikes in Iraq and Syria, and the surrounding region. Figure 2 below provides a timeline of selected events
relevant to the Iranian nuclear issue and Israel’s involvement.
(...continued)
67
ISIS Analysis of IAEA Iran Safeguards Report: Production of 20% Enriched Uranium Triples; Iran Increases
Number of Enriching Centrifuges at Natanz FEP by Nearly 50% and Signals an Intention to Greatly Expand the
Number of Centrifuges at Both Natanz and Fordow; Advanced Centrifuge Program Appears Troubled, Institute for
Science and International Security, February 24, 2012.
68
Todd Lindeman and Bill Webster, “Hardened targets,” Washington Post, March 1, 2012.
69
Ibid.
70
Joby Warrick, “Iran: Underground sites vulnerable, experts say,” Washington Post, March 1, 2012.
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Figure 1. Map of Major Iranian Facilities in Regional Context
Sources: Economist, adapted by CRS.
Notes: All locations are approximate. Parchin is an Iranian military testing facility that, according to the Washington Post, “U.S. officials believe was used a decade ago to test
explosive triggers of the kind used to detonate nuclear warheads.” Thomas Erdbrink and Joby Warrick, “Iran urged to grant access to inspectors,” Washington Post, March
9, 2012. According to the IAEA Director-General’s November 2011 report, the IAEA was “permitted by Iran to visit the site twice in 2005. From satellite imagery available
at that time, the Agency identified a number of areas of interest, none of which, however, included the location now believed to contain the building which houses the
explosives chamber mentioned above; consequently, the Agency’s visits did not uncover anything of relevance.” In early March 2012, the “P5+1” countries (United States,
United Kingdom, France, Germany, China, Russia) that manage international diplomacy with Iran on the nuclear issue urged Iran to grant IAEA monitors renewed access to
Parchin. See Figure 3 for additional reported details on the underground facilities at Natanz and Fordow.
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Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities
Figure 2. Timeline of Relevant Events Involving Iran’s Nuclear Program and Israel
2002-2012
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Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities
Sources: Various, compiled by CRS.
Preliminary Considerations Regarding an Israeli
Decision71
Nature of the Threat—Differing Stated Perceptions
The question of whether a nuclear-weapons-capable Iran will or will not pose an existential threat
to Israel has become an important debate among Israeli leaders. Some Israeli officials express
concerns, based on Iranian leaders’ long-standing pronouncements against the existence of
Israel,72 that Iran might seek to use a nuclear weapon against Israel even if faced with the
prospect of near-certain retaliation73 from Israel’s presumed but officially undeclared nuclear
arsenal.74 In a 2010 interview, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu was quoted as saying:
Iran has threatened to annihilate a state. In historical terms, this is an astounding thing. It’s a
monumental outrage that goes effectively unchallenged in the court of public opinion….
71
Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in Middle Eastern irs,
Affawith contributions from (name redacted), Specialist
in Middle Eastern Affairs and (name redacted), Analyst in Nonproliferation.
72
Israeli official and public discourse regularly refers to many of these actual and alleged pronouncements. Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini, leader of Iran’s Islamic Revolution, decreed that the elimination of a Zionist regime in Israel was a
religious duty. His successor as supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i, has repeatedly referred to Israel as a
“cancerous tumor” since his accession in 1989, including in a rare Friday sermon at a Tehran mosque in February 2012.
Elected President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad quoted Khomeini when he made a remark in October 2005 that was widely
translated in Israel and Western countries as expressing the hope that Israel would eventually be “wiped off the map,”
though some analysts have claimed that a more accurate translation was “this regime occupying Jerusalem must vanish
from the page of time.” Juan Cole, “Hitchens the Hacker; And, Hitchens the Orientalist; And, ‘We don’t Want Your
Stinking War!’”, Informed Comment, May 3, 2006. Ahmadinejad also has reportedly described the Holocaust as a
“myth” used as a pretext to create an “artificial Zionist regime.” In a March 2012 CNN interview, an advisor to
Khamene’i said that Ahmadinejad’s comments were “definitely not” meant in a military sense and that such an
approach was not “a policy of Iran.” “Top Iran official calls for cooperation from West in return for ‘transparency,’”
CNN, March 15, 2012.
73
Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a former Iranian president (1989-1997), said in a December 2001 speech, “If one
day, the Islamic world is also equipped with weapons like those that Israel possesses now, then the imperialists’
strategy will reach a standstill because the use of even one nuclear bomb inside Israel will destroy everything.
However, it will only harm the Islamic world. It is not irrational to contemplate such an eventuality.” Translation by
BBC Global Monitoring of Rafsanjani’s Jerusalem Day speech (from Farsi) in Tehran, December 14, 2001, as carried
by Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, available at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iran/2001/011214-text.html. However, Iranian officials, including
Ahmadinejad, have made the case that Iran does not have a history of aggression. For example, in 2006, Javad Zarif,
then Iran’s permanent representative to the United Nations, said, “Our history, in the past 250 years, we have not
attacked any other country. We have been the subject of invasion; we have been the subject of aggression; we have
been the subject of use of chemical weapons. But we have defended ourselves, but we never resorted to use of chemical
weapons, even in retaliation. So our record is very clear. On the other hand, unfortunately, Israel has a record of
aggression against its neighbors, has a known nuclear stockpile, is not a member of any international instrument.”
Transcript of PBS Newshour, April 28, 2006.
74
Israel is not a party to the NPT and maintains a policy of “nuclear opacity” or amimut. A consensus among media
and analysts’ reports is that Israel possesses an arsenal of 80 to 200 nuclear weapons, although some suggest a higher
figure. See, for example, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Nuclear programmes in the Middle East: In the
shadow of Iran, May 2008, p. 133.
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Iranian leaders talk about Israel’s destruction or disappearance while simultaneously creating
weapons to ensure its disappearance.75
Other leading Israeli officials and analysts—including Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Tamir
Pardo, director of Israel’s Mossad intelligence agency—generally avoid characterizing the threat
from Iran as existential at least partly because they claim that Israel “is a strong state and it could
protect itself under any circumstances.”76 According to three Israeli analysts, including a former
deputy national security advisor, whether or not Iran will behave as a “rational actor” has
“become an important dimension of the Israeli debate about a nuclear Iran.”77
Yet, even some Israeli officials who generally avoid characterizing the threat of a nuclearweapons-capable Iran as existential describe it as still presenting unacceptably high risks. They
express concern that a nuclear Iran would compromise traditional Israeli security doctrine and
practices—based on principles of self-reliance and maintaining overwhelming military
superiority—and lead to an unacceptable level of national security uncertainty. This in turn would
fundamentally damage the quality of life and psychological sense of safety that Israelis deem
critically important to their country’s continued viability as a Jewish national home.78 According
to a March 2012 article in Israel’s Jerusalem Report, “Even if the Iranians don’t use the bomb,
[Netanyahu] fears the very fact that they have it could lead to a mass exodus of Jews from an
Israel under nuclear threat, weakening the state and compromising the Zionist dream.”79
Some Israelis worry that even if Iran did not attack Israel with a nuclear weapon, mere possession
of a weapon or the capability to assemble one quickly would make it more difficult to deter Iran
from pursuing greater regional influence and amplifying threats to Israeli security through proxies
and allies—the Lebanese Shiite group Hezbollah, Hamas and other Palestinian militants in Gaza,
and possibly even the beleaguered Asad regime in Syria. Some in Israel, however, argue that Iran
might be limited in its ability to use a potential nuclear weapons capability to thwart conventional
Israeli military action against regional threats.80 Analysts discuss a range of other possible
regional reactions that would undermine Israeli security, including less willingness of Gulf Arab
states to oppose Iranian ambitions; the possibility of proliferation in countries such as Egypt,
Turkey, and Saudi Arabia; and perhaps international pressure on Israel either to declare its nuclear
weapons status or consider giving it up if Iran would do the same.81
75
Goldberg, “Point of No Return,” op. cit.
Avner Cohen, “Israel ponders a nuclear Iran,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Web edition), August 17, 2010. See
also Barak Ravid, “Mossad chief: Nuclear Iran not necessarily existential threat to Israel,” Ha’aretz, December 29,
2011. A February 2012 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report stated, “In actual practice, Israel
can already deliver an ‘existential’ nuclear strike on Iran, and will have far more capability to damage Iran than Iran is
likely to have against Israel for the next decade.” Cordesman and Wilner, op. cit. The Washington Post has written that
President Obama “has declined to call on Israeli leaders to declare [its nuclear] program, a source of frustration and fear
in the Middle East.” Scott Wilson, “Obama to urge Israel’s patience,” Washington Post, March 3, 2012.
77
Shai Feldman, Shlomo Brom, and Shimon Stein, “What to Do About Nuclearizing Iran? The Israeli Debate,”
Brandeis University, Crown Center for Middle East Studies Brief No. 59, February 2012.
78
Haim Malka, Crossroads: The Future of the U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership, Center for Strategic and International
Studies, 2011, pp. 58-59; Kaye, et al., op. cit., pp. 37, 52-53.
79
Susser, op. cit.
80
Stein, et al., “The Public Discussion of Israel’s Strategy Regarding a Nuclear Iran,” op. cit.
81
Kaye, et al., op. cit., pp. 27-28; Cohen, op. cit.; Shimon Stein, Shai Feldman, and Shlomo Brom, “The Public
Discussion of Israel’s Strategy Regarding a Nuclear Iran,” Institute for National Security Studies Insight No. 310,
January 31, 2012. Israel has expressed support for a WMD-free zone in the Middle East, but has asserted that other
regional countries should reconcile themselves to Israel’s existence before negotiating such a zone. Sha’ul Horev,
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Israelis continue to debate whether the risks of a nuclear-weapons-capable Iran outweigh the risks
of a strike that most assessments doubt would definitively end Iran’s nuclear program (see “Effect
on Iran’s Nuclear Program” below). According to one Israeli report, “Netanyahu faces one of the
most difficult choices any Israeli prime minister has had to contemplate. A strike against Iran’s
nuclear facilities could lead to regional conflagration, tens of thousands of missiles and rockets
raining down on Israeli population centers and war on several fronts. But with no attack, Iran
could go nuclear on his watch.”82 Unlike the wide range of views expressed among U.S. and
international analysts about whether a nuclear-weapons-capable Iran might or might not be
contained, based on concepts and experiences dating from the Cold War, Israeli officials—
according to a 2011 RAND Corporation report—appear to be “reluctant to address futures
involving a nuclear-armed Iran, as they [want] to maintain the focus on preventing such an
outcome.”83 Some Israeli analysts have, however, contemplated the prospects for mutual
deterrence between Israel and Iran, including some who collaborated on the subject in a 2008
memorandum published by Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), under the
assumption that Iran might not be prevented from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. One
article from this memorandum questioned whether Cold War-era containment would be
applicable:
The fact that since Hiroshima and Nagasaki no nuclear device has been used in the course of
hostilities might lead to the tentative conclusion that a third use of a nuclear weapon in war is
of very low probability. This conclusion is based on the superpowers relationship during the
Cold War—the only historical example of a relatively stable and long nuclear deterrence
balance. But would this pattern recur in various regional nuclear conflicts?84
Despite Israelis’ general reluctance to discuss containment scenarios, some Israeli public figures
are less expansive in their characterization of the inherent risks of a potentially nuclear-armed
Iran. In the words of one analyst:
If and when there was a clear Iranian threat to attack Israel, then Israel could launch a
preemptive assault. And if no such threat ever materializes, Israel need never attack. Any
(...continued)
Director General of Israel’s Atomic Energy Commission, explained the government’s position in September 2009, “It
is our vision and policy, to establish the Middle East as a mutually verifiable zone free of weapons of mass destruction
and their delivery systems. We have always emphasized, that such a process, through direct negotiations, should begin
with confidence building measures. They should be followed by mutual recognition, reconciliation, and peaceful
relations. Consequently conventional and non-conventional arms control measures will emerge ... In our view, progress
towards realizing this vision cannot be made without a fundamental change in regional circumstances, including a
significant transformation in the attitude of states in the region towards Israel.” Statement by Dr. Sha’ul Horev,
Director General, Israel Atomic Energy Commission, to the 53rd General Conference of the International Atomic
Energy Agency, September 2009, Israel Atomic Energy Commission, September 15, 2009.
82
Susser, op. cit.
83
Kaye, et al., op. cit., p. 47.
84
Yair Evron, “An Israel-Iran Balance of Nuclear Deterrence: Seeds of Instability,” Israel and a Nuclear Iran:
Implications for Arms Control, Deterrence, and Defense, INSS Memorandum No. 94, July 2008. For an Israeli
perspective on whether missile defense systems could effectively deter a “rational” Iran, see Uzi Rubin, “Missile
Defense and Israel’s Deterrence against a Nuclear Iran,” from the same memorandum. In February 2012, Louis René
Beres, a Purdue University professor with significant past involvement in assisting Israel formulate national security
strategy, co-authored an essay that said, “Perhaps a nuclear Iran can still be prevented by preemption. But in the more
likely absence of any remaining options for ‘anticipatory self-defense,’ Israel’s best available stance will be to
effectively deter an already-nuclear Iran.” Louis René Beres and General (USAF ret.) John T. Chain, “Israel and Iran at
the eleventh hour,” Oxford University Press Blog, February 23, 2012.
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future Iran-Israel war will happen if Iran’s regime makes it unavoidable, not in theory but in
actual practice.85
Possible “Zone of Immunity” and Israel’s Ability to Act
Independently
Long-standing Israeli national security doctrine emphasizes Israel’s prerogative to “defend itself,
by itself.” In a January 24, 2012, speech in the Knesset, Prime Minister Netanyahu said, in
reference to the Iranian nuclear issue, “In the end, with regard to threats to our very existence, we
cannot abandon our future to the hands of others. With regard to our fate, our duty is to rely on
ourselves alone.”86
In a November 2011 CNN interview, Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak appeared to set forth
parameters for Israel’s ability to act independently when he said that the window of opportunity
for a preventive strike to stop or slow Iran’s progress toward nuclear weapons capability could
close within nine months. He explained that the Iranians could enter a “zone of immunity” from
military action “by widening [the] redundancy of their plan, making it spread over many more
[sites], with many more elements.”87 As evidence of his claim that Iran is progressing toward a
zone of immunity, Barak has cited Iran’s ongoing movement of enriched uranium and/or uranium
enrichment centrifuges into the supposedly difficult-to-attack Fordow facility.88
It is unclear whether Israeli leaders’ willingness to make policy decisions in line with the zone of
immunity concept explained by Barak might be affected by the views of U.S. military planners
who reportedly question the imminence of Iran achieving such a zone.89 According to a February
2012 New York Times article, a senior Obama Administration official who has discussed the
concept with Israelis says that “‘there are many other options’ to slow Iran's march to a completed
weapon, like shutting off Iran’s oil revenues, taking out facilities that supply centrifuge parts or
singling out installations where the Iranians would turn the fuel into a weapon.”90
The concept Barak has articulated may anticipate that Iran would consider using IAEA-monitored
and -safeguarded enrichment facilities at Fordow to produce weapons-grade enriched uranium.
Although it is unclear how Iran may act, there is no precedent for an NPT party to use declared
facilities to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons.91 If weapons-grade enrichment were to
85
Barry Rubin, “Israel Isn’t Going to Attack Iran and Neither Will the United States,” PJ Media, January 26, 2012.
Transcript of English translation (from Hebrew) available on Israeli Prime Minister’s Office website.
87
Transcript of remarks by Ehud Barak on CNN’s Fareed Zakaria GPS, November 20, 2011. According to one report,
“Iran has announced plans for 10 new enrichment sites—further dispersing later-generation centrifuges in places
smaller, harder to locate and easier to harden.” Karl Vick, “Can Israel Stop Iran’s Nuke Effort?”, Time, February 6,
2012.
88
“Israel and Iran: Closer to take-off,” Economist, February 11, 2012. A report dated February 24, 2012, from IAEA
Director-General Yukiya Amano said that Iran began using the site in December 2011 to enrich uranium up to 20%
uranium-235. Iranian officials have stated that this uranium will be used as fuel in nuclear reactors to produce medical
isotopes. “Iran Plans Several New Nuclear Reactors,” PressTV, April 12, 2011.
89
Joby Warrick, “Iran’s underground nuclear sites not immune to U.S. bunker-busters, experts say,” Washington Post,
March 1, 2012.
90
Mark Landler and David E. Sanger, “U.S. and Israel Split on Speed of Iran Threat,” New York Times, February 8,
2012.
91
North Korea used plutonium instead of uranium-enriching centrifuges to provide fissile material for its nuclear
weapons program and announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003, “two years before announcing that it had the
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occur at Fordow or Natanz under IAEA safeguards (assuming that Iran was cooperating with the
IAEA), the international community would probably learn of it because of the difficulty in
diverting significant amounts of nuclear material from safeguarded centrifuge facilities without
detection.92
To put the current Israeli debate into context, one report has claimed that Barak’s “zone of
immunity” warning did not mark “the first time that the Israelis have invented a phrase that
suggests a hard deadline before an attack. At the end of the Bush administration, they said they
could not allow Iran to go past ‘the point of no return.’ That phrase was also ill-defined, but
seemed to suggest that once Iran had the know-how and the basic materials to make a bomb, it
would be inevitable.”93 In that case, and in the current case as well, some observers have
expressed opinions that the timetables are mainly intended to intimidate Iran and to prod the
United States and other international actors into taking tougher and more urgent action.94
The issue of Israeli independent action is linked to U.S. attitudes and decisions. According to
multiple sources, including the following excerpt from a February 2012 article, Israeli leaders
have not been satisfied with U.S. responses to their attempts to obtain assurances that the United
States would use force against Iran if non-military measures are deemed insufficient:
One former Israeli official tells Newsweek he heard this explanation directly from Defense
Minister Ehud Barak. “If Israel will miss its last opportunity [to attack], then we will have to
lean only on the United States, and if the United States decides not to attack, then we will
face an Iran with a bomb,” says the former Israeli official. This source says that Israel has
asked Obama for assurances that if sanctions fail, he will use force against Iran. Obama’s
refusal to provide that assurance has helped shape Israel’s posture: a refusal to promise
restraint, or even to give the United States advance notice.95
It is unclear whether the Israelis might be willing to reconsider this posture in the wake of
Netanyahu’s meeting with President Obama and other U.S. officials in March 2012. Amos Yadlin,
a former head of Israeli military intelligence and one of the Israel Air Force pilots who carried out
the 1981 Osirak strike, has been quoted as saying, “The US has promised not to allow Iran to
have the bomb, but can Israel rely on this promise? That is the key to what Israel may decide to
do.”96
Military Action Versus Alternative Courses of Action
It is unclear how Israeli officials might react to Obama Administration efforts to convince them to
give more time for sanctions with increasingly broad multilateral support to take fuller effect
before elevating military options to the fore.97 An Israeli investigative reporter quoted a “very
(...continued)
bomb and three years before testing one.” “Attacking Iran: Up in the air,” Economist, February 25, 2012.
92
Colin H. Kahl, “An Israeli strike on Iran would backfire,” Washington Post, March 4, 2012.
93
Landler and Sanger, op. cit.
94
Tobias Buck, “Israel debate on Iran strike gains urgency,” Financial Times, February 3, 2012.
95
Klaidman, et al., op. cit. See also “Israel wouldn't warn U.S. before Iran strike, says intelligence source,” Associated
Press, February 28, 2012; Bergman, “Will Israel Attack Iran?”, op. cit.
96
Susser, op. cit.
97
Klaidman, et al., op. cit.
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senior Israeli security source” as saying that “Americans tell us there is time, and we tell them
that they only have about six to nine months more than we do and that therefore the sanctions
have to be brought to a culmination now, in order to exhaust that track.”98
In late 2011 and early 2012, the United States and the European Union (EU) imposed sanctions—
due to take effect in June and July, respectively—aimed directly at Iran’s export of crude oil,
which accounts for around 70% of its hard currency revenue.99 Many Israeli officials
acknowledge that sanctions have begun to significantly affect Iran’s economy.100 That effect could
be compounded following the March 2012 expulsion by the Brussels-based SWIFT (Society for
Worldwide International Financial Transfers) of all Iranian banks blacklisted by the EU from its
electronic transfer system. It is not clear, however, how a sustained, intensifying economic impact
on the Iranian regime and its people could affect the regime’s behavior or policy, including with
regard to a possible return to international diplomacy.101 In early March, the “P5+1” (United
States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, China, and Russia) accepted Iran’s proposal to restart
negotiations in the spring of 2012 on its nuclear program. Israeli Vice Prime Minister and
Strategic Affairs Minister Moshe Ya’alon was quoted as saying in March that the spring 2012
talks between Iran and the P5+1 would show “if there is a chance that the sanctions are working
or that the Iranians are continuing to manoeuvre and advance toward a military nuclear
capability.”102
It is also unclear to what extent Israelis believe that their alleged ongoing covert action or “secret
war” against Iran’s nuclear program103 might mitigate the need for an air strike. The two most
recently retired heads of the Mossad, Meir Dagan and Ephraim Halevy, have both publicly stated
that an Israeli military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities would be counterproductive, partly
because they both reportedly “believe sabotage and diplomacy have done much to set back Iran’s
nuclear ambitions and can do more yet.”104 Dagan has been quoted as saying, “The Iranian
problem must be shaped as an international problem, and efforts to delay Iran's nuclear program
should continue.”105 In March 2012, Vice Prime Minister Ya’alon was quoted as saying, when
asked if Israel might be just weeks away from a strike on Iran, “No. Look, we have to see. The
[Iranian nuclear] project is not static…. Sometimes there are explosions, sometimes there are
98
Bergman, “Will Israel Attack Iran?”, op. cit.
For more information on Iran sanctions and their effects, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by (name re
dacted).
100
Buck, op. cit.
101
For two U.S. perspectives on this question, see Dennis B. Ross, “Iran is Ready to Talk,” New York Times, February
14, 2012; Gerald F. Seib, “Iran Is Becoming Election Wild Card,” Wall Street Journal, February 28, 2012.
102
Dan Williams, “Israel says sabotage may stretch Iran atom timeline,” Reuters, March 27, 2012.
103
Melman, “The war against Iran’s nuclear program has already begun,” op. cit.
104
Bruce Riedel, “The Israeli Anti-Attack-Iran Brigade,” The Daily Beast, November 7, 2011.
105
Quote from Israeli newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth translated in “Former Mossad chief against Iran strike,” United
Press International, May 8, 2011. An Israeli analyst has suggested a wider array of options short of a preemptive strike:
“As the Iranian regime works hard to get nuclear weapons and missiles capable of carrying them, Israel uses the time to
build a multi-level defensive and offensive capability. These layers include: U.S. early warning stations and antimissile missile installations in the Gulf; Israeli missile-launching submarines; Israeli long-range planes whose crews
have rehearsed and planned for strikes at Iranian facilities; different types of anti-missile missiles capable of knocking
down the small number of missiles Iran could fire simultaneously; covert operations, possibly including computer
viruses and assassinations, to slow down Iran’s development of nuclear weapons; improved intelligence; help to the
Iranian opposition (though the idea of “regime change” in the near future is a fantasy); and other measures.” Rubin, op.
cit.
99
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worms there, viruses, all kinds of things like that.”106 However, according to one report from an
Israeli investigative journalist, some senior Israeli military intelligence officials believe that—as
was the case with Iraq’s nuclear program in the late 1970s/early 1980s—possible Mossad actions
have not stopped Iran’s progress toward nuclear weapons capability.107
106
107
Ya’alon quoted and translated from Israel’s Army Radio in Williams, op. cit.
Bergman, “Will Israel Attack Iran?”, op. cit.
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The Israeli Decisionmaking Process108
Several factors may influence any Israeli political decision relating to a possible strike on Iranian
nuclear facilities. These include, but are not limited to, the views and interactions of Israeli
decisionmakers; the public debate in Israel,
the stances and anticipated responses of U.S.,
The Security Cabinet and “Octet”
regional, and international actors; estimates of
Israel’s security cabinet is the group of government
the effects of a possible strike; and the
ministers convened by the prime minister to make
decisions on matters related to national security.109 The
anticipated Iranian response regionally and
prime minister can have outside security and military
internationally.
Discussion below regarding the Israeli
decisionmaking process and the factors that
may influence it is largely dependent on
secondary sources that CRS does not claim to
confirm independently.
Decisionmakers: Views and
Interactions
According to one report, the issue of a
possible Israeli strike on Iran has “sparked
fierce public debate in Israel among political
and military leaders, past and present, dividing
cabinet ministers, generals and Mossad chiefs.
Most see military action as a last resort to be
contemplated only if sanctions and diplomacy
fail; others insist that bombing Iran could
actually stabilize the Middle East by setting
back the radical cause indefinitely.”111
officials brief the group. Prime ministers also rely upon
security cabinet majorities to confirm broad-based
support within Israel’s coalition-based parliamentary
democracy for important courses of action.
During the tenure of this government, Prime Minister
Netanyahu has tended to convene and rely upon the
opinions of a smaller group of eight ministers within the
security cabinet, known as the “octet,” perhaps partly
due to concerns that larger groups are more prone to
leaking information publicly.110
Current security cabinet (first eight comprise octet)
Binyamin Netanyahu (Prime Minister)
Ehud Barak (Defense Minister/Deputy PM)
Avigdor Lieberman (Foreign Minister/Deputy PM)
Moshe Ya’alon (Vice PM/Strategic Affairs Minister)
Yuval Steinitz (Finance Minister)
Eli Yishai (Interior Minister/Deputy PM)
Dan Meridor (Intel. & Atomic Ener. Min./Dep. PM)
Benny Begin (Minister without Portfolio)
Silvan Shalom (Vice PM/Regional Dev. Minister)
Yitzhak Aharonovitch (Internal Security Minister)
Yaakov Ne’eman (Justice Minister)
Gideon Sa’ar (Education Minister)
Uzi Landau (National Infrastructure Minister)
Ariel Atias (Housing & Construction Minister)
A 2011 RAND Corporation report cited a
former Israeli official as saying that “the majority of ministers currently in power (including
Prime Minister Netanyahu) would support military action to avoid Iran’s acquiring a bomb under
108
Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs.
A February 2012 report quoted Israeli Vice Prime Minister and Strategic Affairs Minister Moshe Ya’alon as saying,
“In the State of Israel, any process of a military operation, and any military move, undergoes the approval of the
security cabinet and in certain cases, the full cabinet.” Jeffrey Heller and Dan Williams, “Prime Minister Netanyahu
can’t fly solo in Israel to attack Iran,” Reuters, February 7, 2012. The security cabinet of Menachem Begin reportedly
elected to carry out the 1981 strike on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor over the objections of the then Mossad director, and
the security cabinet of Ehud Olmert reportedly supported the 2007 strike against Syria’s presumed nuclear reactor
under construction at Al Kibar (near Deir al Zur) by a vote of 13-1. For additional information on how the
decisionmaking process on Iran might proceed under Prime Minister Netanyahu, see a transcript of an interview with
the former director-general of Netanyahu’s office in Dovid Efune, “On Iran and Obama, How Bibi will Decide –
Exclusive Interview with Eyal Gabbai, Part 1” The Algemeiner, March 5, 2012.
110
Eli Lake, “Meet the Israeli ‘Octet’ That Would Decide an Iran Attack,” Daily Beast, March 9, 2012.
111
Susser, op. cit.
109
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their watch.”112 However, an Israeli journalist known for covering intelligence issues wrote in
February 2012 that “as [former Mossad chief Meir] Dagan, the majority of Israeli Cabinet
ministers, the CIA, and others have made clear, there is no need to strike in the near future since
there is still time before Iran produces its first bomb.”113
In a January 2012 interview, Defense Minister Barak indicated that there were “three categories
of questions, which he characterized as ‘Israel’s ability to act,’ ‘international legitimacy’ and
‘necessity,’ all of which require affirmative responses before a decision is made to attack:”
1. Does Israel have the ability to cause severe damage to Iran’s nuclear sites and bring about
a major delay in the Iranian nuclear project? And can the military and the Israeli people
withstand the inevitable counterattack?
2. Does Israel have overt or tacit support, particularly from America, for carrying out an
attack?
3. Have all other possibilities for the containment of Iran’s nuclear threat been exhausted,
bringing Israel to the point of last resort? If so, is this the last opportunity for an attack?114
Whether Israel’s leaders believe the answer is “yes” or “no” to each of these three questions is a
subject of debate among U.S. and Israeli analysts. A January 2012 New York Times article stated
that
conversations with eight current and recent top Israeli security officials suggested several
things: since Israel has been demanding the new sanctions, including an oil embargo and
seizure of Iran’s Central Bank assets, it will give the sanctions some months to work; the
sanctions are viewed here as probably insufficient; a military attack remains a very real
option; and [post-attack] situations are considered less perilous than one in which Iran has
nuclear weapons.115
In Israeli policymakers’ evaluation of post-attack situations, however, one Israeli analyst asserted
in February 2012 that they are so focused on the “immediate military implications” that they
are ignoring several of the potential longer-term aspects of a strike: the preparedness of
Israel’s home front; the contours of an Israeli exit strategy; the impact on U.S.-Israel
relations; the global diplomatic fallout; the stability of world energy markets; and the
outcome within Iran itself. Should Israel fail to openly debate and account for these factors in
advance of an attack, it may end up with a strategic debacle, even if it achieves its narrow
military goals.116
Israeli sources indicate that top leaders are divided on the issue. One journalist asserted in
February that Netanyahu’s and Barak’s apparent support for an attack in the near future is
countered by many cabinet ministers and security establishment officials who supposedly share
former Mossad chief Dagan’s perspective “against a strike and in favor of sanctions and covert
operations.” That view is based at least partly on doubts about Israel’s military capability to set
112
Kaye et al., op. cit., p. 40.
Yossi Melman, “Face Off,” Tablet, February 9, 2012.
114
Bergman, “Will Israel Attack Iran?”, op. cit.
115
Ethan Bronner, “Israel Senses Bluffing in Iran’s Threats of Retaliation,” New York Times, January 26, 2012.
116
Ehud Eiran, “What Happens After Israel Attacks Iran,” foreignaffairs.com, February 23, 2012.
113
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back Iran’s nuclear program three to five years.117 According to a November 2011 article by
another Israeli journalist:
Benny Begin and Moshe Yaalon, two of the most hardline right-wing ministers in the “Octet
Forum,” the Israeli Cabinet’s main decision-making body, are currently opposed to an attack
because they believe a military strike will cause a massive backlash from Iran and its proxies
and should only be a very last resort.118
According to the same article, “Netanyahu’s decision to replace Dagan [in early 2011]—coupled
with Barak’s insistence on removing popular army chief [Gabi] Ashkenazi in February [2011]—
was seen by many as an intentional strategy to remove opponents of a military strike on Iran from
positions of influence.”119 In June 2011, the New York Times quoted Dagan as saying, “I decided
to speak out because when I was in office, [former Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) director
Yuval] Diskin, Ashkenazi and I could block any dangerous adventure. Now I am afraid that there
is no one to stop Bibi [Netanyahu] and Barak.”120 Despite changeovers in top Israeli security
positions, an Israeli military correspondent was quoted as claiming in February 2012 that the
current Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Benny Gantz, is considered a
leader of a school of thought within the security establishment that reportedly has not concluded
that the time has come for military action.121 One report cited a former senior Israeli official as
saying that the defense establishment “was not enthusiastic about an attack. It hoped that
sanctions and diplomacy would work and that if military action were needed it would come from
the United States.”122
It is unclear how influential security officials’ views would be in a decision on a strike. When an
interviewer told Barak in January 2012 about top-ranking military personnel who argue that a
military strike is either unnecessary or would be ineffective, Barak said, “It’s good to have
diversity in thinking and for people to voice their opinions. But at the end of the day, when the
military command looks up, it sees us—the minister of defense and the prime minister. When we
look up, we see nothing but the sky above us.”123 In mid March 2012, one report quoted an Israeli
journalist as writing that a slight majority of Israel’s security cabinet supports a strike:
According to the most recent assessments, at this point eight ministers tend to support
Netanyahu and Barak’s position, while six object to it. It should be noted that the security
117
Melman, “Face Off,” op. cit.
Anshel Pfeffer, “Will They?”, Tablet, November 18, 2011. Israeli reports in early November 2011 about other
“octet” members said that Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman had been convinced to support a strike on Iran, while
Intelligence and Atomic Energy Minister Dan Meridor objected to an “immediate attack” and Interior Minister Eli
Yishai had not made up his mind. Barak Ravid, et al., “Netanyahu trying to persuade cabinet to support attack on Iran,”
Ha’aretz, November 2, 2011; Ari Shavit, “Decision to attack Iran must be made with a clear mind,” Ha’aretz,
November 3, 2011.
119
Pfeffer, “Will They?”, op. cit. However, Dagan was one of the longest-serving Mossad directors (2002-2011),
having had his term extended multiple times following his initial appointment, including once by Netanyahu.
120
Ethan Bronner, “A Former Spy Chief Questions the Judgment of Israeli Leaders,” New York Times, June 3, 2011.
121
Ha’aretz journalist Amir Oren, quoted in Vita Bekker, “US worries grow over Israeli strike on Iran,” The National
(United Arab Emirates), February 20, 2012.
122
Bronner, “Israel Senses Bluffing in Iran’s Threats of Retaliation,” op. cit.
123
Bergman, “Will Israel Attack Iran?”, op. cit.
118
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cabinet has yet to hold a decisive meeting on the issue and the assessments are based on
secret talks being held between the prime minister and his ministers, one at a time.124
Another mid March Israeli report claimed that “if Netanyahu and Minister of Defense, Ehud
Barak, decide to attack, they'll be able to pass a decision through the cabinet without significant
difficulty. With the exception of ministers Benny Begin and Dan Meridor, a tenacious objection
against an Israeli strike on Iran is not expected.”125
Some Israeli analysts question whether Netanyahu is likely to launch a strike against Iran. He has
not ordered a major military offensive during either of his stints as Israel’s prime minister (19961999 and 2009-present), possibly owing in part to what some analysts have observed to be a
generally cautious approach to decisionmaking.126 In his meeting with President Obama at the
White House on March 5, 2012, Netanyahu reportedly confirmed that no decision had been made
to that point.127
Yet, speaking at the annual American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) conference in
Washington, DC, on March 5, 2012, Netanyahu said:
We’ve waited for diplomacy to work. We’ve waited for sanctions to work. None of us can
afford to wait much longer. As Prime Minister of Israel, I will never let my people live under
the shadow of annihilation. Some commentators would have you believe that stopping Iran
from getting the bomb is more dangerous than letting Iran have the bomb. They say that a
military confrontation with Iran would undermine the efforts already underway, that it would
be ineffective, and that it would provoke even more vindictive action by Iran.
Netanyahu then referred to correspondence in 1944 between the World Jewish Congress and the
U.S. government that apparently indicated U.S. unwillingness to bomb Auschwitz because of the
“doubtful efficacy” of the operation and the possibility of “even more vindictive action by the
Germans.” In response to Netanyahu’s speech, the editor-in-chief of Israel’s Ha’aretz newspaper
wrote:
The Holocaust talk has but one meaning—forcing Israel to go to war and strike the
Iranians…. No amount of missiles falling on Tel Aviv, rising oil prices and economic crises
matter when compared to genocide…. Enough loopholes can be detected that would allow
Netanyahu to escape an imminent decision to go to war…. Nevertheless, Netanyahu took on
a public obligation on Monday that would make it very hard for him to back away from the
path of war with Iran.128
124
Excerpt from article by Ben Caspit in Israel’s Hebrew-language Ma’ariv newspaper, translated and quoted in “Most
of Israel security cabinet backs Iran strike,” Agence France Presse, March 15, 2012.
125
Amir Rapaport, “Who Opposes Attacking Iran,” Israel Defense, March 16, 2012. For a report detailing the
relationship between Netanyahu and Barak and their interaction on this issue, see Ethan Bronner, “2 Israeli Leaders
Make Iran Issue Their Own,” New York Times, March 27, 2012.
126
CRS telephone interview with former Israeli deputy national security advisor and military planning director Brig.
Gen. (ret.) Shlomo Brom, February 21, 2012. Daniel Levy, “Netanyahu Won’t Attack Iran (Probably),”
foreignpolicy.com, March 2, 2012.
127
Barak Ravid, “Netanyahu tells Obama: I have yet to decide whether to attack Iran,” Ha’aretz, March 6, 2012.
128
Aluf Benn, “By conjuring the Holocaust, Netanyahu brought Israel closer to war with Iran,” haaretz.com, March 6,
2012.
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In early March 2012 interviews on Israeli television following his Washington, DC, trip,
Netanyahu reportedly said:
This is not a matter of days or weeks. It is also not a matter of years. The result has to be that
the threat of a nuclear weapon in Iran’s hands is removed…. If you don’t make the decision,
and you don’t succeed in preventing it, who will you explain that [to]? To historians? To the
generations that were here before us? To the generations that won’t come after us? It is
forbidden to let the Iranians get nuclear arms. And I intend not to allow that to happen.129
Public Opinion and Debate in Israel
A U.S.-based Israeli analyst has noted that domestic Israeli political factors might militate against
Netanyahu undertaking the risks a strike would entail—including his coalition’s apparently strong
prospects for reelection in 2012 or 2013, and a reported lack of pressure for military action on
Iran from the public or from coalition partners seen as having generally hawkish views.130 Public
opinion polls conducted in February and March 2012 indicated reluctance by a majority of
Israelis to support an attack on Iranian nuclear facilities in the absence of U.S. cooperation.
Assuming an Israeli attack without U.S. cooperation, a mid March poll conducted jointly by
Israeli and Palestinian organizations indicated that Israelis would oppose a strike by a 51%-42%
margin. A sizeable majority, however, would apparently support an attack with U.S. cooperation
by a 69%-26% margin.131 An Israeli political science professor involved with a late February poll
on the same questions reportedly explained the Israeli views as follows: “They are not
challenging the right to [attack], [they are] challenging the ability to do it effectively and with
international support. People don’t want Israel to become the troublemaker of the world.”132
A public debate in which Israeli officials and non-government analysts might engage appears to
be a controversial subject in its own right. According to one report, “No issue in Israel is more
fraught than the debate over the wisdom and feasibility of a strike on Iran…. Security officials are
increasingly kept from journalists or barred from discussing Iran. Much of the public talk is as
much message delivery as actual policy.”133 In a November 2011 poll taken by Israel’s Dialog
polling institute, Israelis indicated by a 51%-39% margin that they oppose public discussion of a
possible attack because it could “cause damage.”134
129
Prime Minister Netanyahu quoted in Herb Keinon, “Netanyahu: Attack on Iran not immediately in offing,”
jpost.com, March 8, 2012.
130
Levy, op. cit. See also Paul Pillar, “Why Israeli Public Opinion Opposes a Strike on Iran,” theatlantic.com, March 1,
2012.
131
Poll of 600 adult Israelis during the period of March 11-15, 2012, conducted by the Harry S. Truman Research
Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and
Survey Research in Ramallah, West Bank. Details of the poll, which has a margin of error of 4.5%, are available at
http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2012/p43ejoint.html. A late February poll conducted by Israel’s Dahaf Institute
indicated that Israelis would oppose a strike without U.S. cooperation by a 63%-31% margin, and support a strike with
U.S. cooperation by a 62%-34% margin. See http://www.peaceindex.org/indexMonthEng.aspx?num=240#anchor269.
A poll taken by Israel’s Dialog polling institute in early March indicated only 26% support for an independent Israeli
strike. See http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=55988.
132
Tel Aviv University professor Tamar Herrmann, quoted in Joshua Mitnick, “Majority of Israelis oppose a unilateral
strike on Iran nuclear program,” Christian Science Monitor, March 8, 2012.
133
Bronner, “Israel Senses Bluffing in Iran’s Threats of Retaliation,” op. cit.
134
Details of the poll, which has a margin of error of 4.6%, are available at
http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=54362.
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Some Israeli commentators have voiced concern that the public is resigned to the possibility of
war with Iran, based on a tradition of deference to national leaders.135 According to one
commentator, “The impression is that the majority of Israelis are not afraid…. The decision is left
up to a handful of people who have decided that the public, as usual, trusts them blindly,
obediently.”136 An early March 2012 Dialog poll indicated that by a 50%-38% margin Israelis
trust Netanyahu and Barak on the Iran issue.137
Two January 2012 articles co-authored by three Israeli analysts (including two former officials)
argued that “a public discussion will assist those officials who are authorized to make informed
decisions on this issue.”138 Both articles acknowledged the limitations of such a discussion given
the apparent centrality to decisionmakers’ considerations of classified information on Iran’s
nuclear program and on the operational capacity of Israel’s air force. Yet, they still argued for a
debate to proceed:
Instead, the public debate must focus on the strategic dimensions of the issue—a realm in
which civilian strategists have much to contribute. Indeed, airing these dimensions is an
absolute imperative. Without it we are condemned to repeat the mistakes of the past or to
commit worse ones. More important, without such airing we are doomed to step mindlessly
closer and closer to a military confrontation with Iran or, possibly just as dangerous, to
accept and accommodate its nuclear ambitions and designs.139
135
Joel Greenberg, “Sense of inevitable war grips Israel,” Washington Post, February 23, 2012; Larry Derfner, “Israel’s
Silent March to War with Iran,” Jewish Daily Forward, February 10, 2012.
136
Gideon Levy, “Israelis should be afraid of their leaders, not Iran,” Ha’aretz, February 5, 2012.
137
Details of the poll, which has a margin of error of 4.5%, are available at
http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=55988.
138
Stein, et al., “The Public Discussion of Israel’s Strategy Regarding a Nuclear Iran,” op. cit. See also Shlomo Brom,
Shai Feldman, Shimon Stein, “A real debate about Iran,” mideast.foreignpolicy.com, January 30, 2012.
139
Brom, et al., “A real debate about Iran,” op. cit.
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Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities
Potential Factors in an Israeli Decision: Stances and
Anticipated Responses Outside Israel140
The United States
Despite the reference by Defense Minister Barak to the possible need for “overt or tacit support,
particularly from America” before approving an Israel strike, it is unclear to what extent Israeli
decisionmakers might be influenced by the stated positions and anticipated responses of U.S.
policymakers in the Obama
Administration and Congress
Selected Polls of U.S.Views on
regarding an attack. Not
Potential Israeli Strike
surprisingly, Israeli leaders are
These poll results are included to provide information regarding U.S.
extremely sensitive to U.S. views
public opinion on the issue, which could impact U.S. policymakers’
for a variety of reasons, including
views and positions and ultimately influence Israeli decisionmaking.
but not limited to:
Reuters/Ipsos Public Affairs (March 8-11, 2012)
•
Strong U.S.-Israel
relations dating back to
when the United States
was the first country to
recognize the provisional
Jewish government as the
de facto government of
Israel upon its declaration
of statehood in May 1948;
•
Robust ongoing military
and security cooperation,
including significant U.S.
arms sales and other forms
of support; and
•
Trade ties and important
bilateral economic and
scientific cooperation.141
Israeli leaders’ perspectives about
the possible effects of a strike on
U.S. political and material
assistance to Israel, possible
negative security consequences for
the United States from a potential
Iranian retaliation, and the
probability of future U.S. military
Do you support or oppose Israel taking military action against Iran if
there is evidence that Iran is building nuclear weapons?
Strongly support: 40%, Somewhat support: 22%, Somewhat oppose:
11%, Strongly oppose: 19%, Neither: 4%, Unsure: 4%
(Poll of 1,084 adults with 3.1% margin of error)
CBS News/New York Times (March 7-11, 2012)
If Israel were to attack Iran in order to prevent it from developing a
nuclear weapons program, should the U.S. support Israel's military
action, or should the U.S. not get involved?
Support: 47%, Not get involved: 42%, Oppose (volunteered response):
1%, Unsure: 10%
(Poll of 1,009 adults with 3% margin of error)
ABC News/Washington Post (March 7-10, 2012)
Would you support or oppose Israel bombing Iran's nuclear
development sites?
Support: 42%, Oppose: 51%, No opinion: 7%
(Poll of 1,003 adults with 4% margin of error)
Program on International Policy Attitudes/University of
Maryland (March 3-7, 2012)
Do you think the U.S. should…
Discourage Israel from attacking Iran’s nuclear program: 34%
Take a neutral stance: 46%
Encourage Israel to attack Iran’s nuclear program: 14%
Don’t know/Refused: 6%
(Poll of 727 Americans with 4.5% margin of error)
The Hill/Pulse Opinion Research (March 1, 2012)
Support or oppose Israel attack on Iran to destroy nuclear program?
Very supportive: 28%, Somewhat supportive: 24%, Somewhat opposed:
22%, Very opposed: 19%, Not sure: 8%
(Poll of 1,000 likely voters with 3% margin of error)
140
Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs.
For more details on these interactions, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by (nam
e redacted); and CRS Report RL33222,
U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel , by (name redacted).
141
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Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities
action to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran may, among other considerations, influence the Israeli
decisionmaking process
An Israeli journalist wrote in March 2012 that Israel did not ask permission when it acted to
prevent Saddam Hussein and Bashar al Asad from obtaining nuclear weapons, but that “the
[Obama] administration can credibly counter that in neither case did Israeli unilateralism threaten
to draw America into an armed conflict, as it does now.”142 According to three Israeli analysts
(including two former officials) mentioned above:
Even after the withdrawal of its troops from Iraq, the U.S. remains extremely exposed to
Iranian retaliation—either directly against its forces in the area or by Iran’s attempting to
ignite a broader conflict in the region—so an Israeli strike would harm U.S. interests in the
region and would place many U.S. lives at risk. And while in an election year America’s
political reaction to such a strike may be mitigated by domestic political considerations, the
reaction of the U.S. defense community to an Israeli military strike might be extremely
negative, as such an action might be seen as representing Israeli insensitivity to and disregard
of U.S. priorities and concerns.143
Some reports have speculated that an Israeli decision to attack, if it occurs, could come before the
U.S. presidential election in November 2012, with one Israeli report stating, “A second-term
president, not constrained by electoral necessities, will be able to apply a lot more pressure on the
Israeli government not to attack.”144
Separate from the question of whether the United States might support an Israeli strike on Iran,
Israeli decisionmakers might be influenced by how they anticipate the United States would
respond after an attack, including in the event of retaliation by Iran and its allies. Although the
United States does not have a formal treaty obligation to defend Israel in the event it is attacked,
successive Administrations have either stated or implied that the United States would act to
protect Israel’s security if it were endangered—including by Iran—and have worked with
Congress to ensure and bolster Israel’s “qualitative military edge” over regional security
threats.145
142
Yossi Klein Halevi, “Can Israel Trust the United States When It Comes to Iran?”, The New Republic, March 2,
2012.
143
Feldman, et al., “What to Do About Nuclearizing Iran? The Israeli Debate,” op. cit.
144
Anshel Pfeffer, “US election hands Netanyahu giant dilemma on Iran,” Jewish Chronicle Online, February 9, 2012.
See also Bret Stephens, “(How) Should Israel Bomb Iran,” Wall Street Journal, February 7, 2012, stating, “Jerusalem
knows that Mr. Obama will be hard-pressed to oppose an Israeli strike—the way Dwight Eisenhower did during the
Suez crisis—before election day. A re-elected President Obama is a different story.”
145
For more information on the level of U.S. commitment to Israel’s security, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel:
Background and U.S. Relations, by (name redacted); and CRS Report RL33222,
U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel , by (name reda
cted). In addition to a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (TIAS 2675) dated July 23, 1952, the United States and
Israel have entered into a range of stand-alone agreements, memoranda of understanding, and other arrangements
varying in their formality. In remarks at the White House on March 5, 2012, with Prime Minister Netanyahu, the
President said, “As I’ve said repeatedly, the bond between our two countries is unbreakable. My personal
commitment—a commitment that is consistent with the history of other occupants of this Oval Office—our
commitment to the security of Israel is rock solid. And as I've said to the Prime Minister in every single one of our
meetings, the United States will always have Israel’s back when it comes to Israel’s security.” In a March 2006 speech
against the backdrop of Iran’s hostile rhetoric toward Israel and pursuit of a nuclear program, President George W.
Bush said, “I made it clear, I’ll make it clear again, that we will use military might to protect our ally Israel.” Seymour
M. Hersh, “The Iran Plans,” The New Yorker, April 17, 2006.
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It is unclear to what extent U.S. expressions of willingness to act forcefully on Iran might
encourage Israeli restraint. Since the second term of the George W. Bush Administration, U.S.
officials have sought to maintain that a credible strike option exists while simultaneously
communicating the possible risks for U.S. interests, regional security, and global energy markets
if Israel were to act alone.146 Addressing the AIPAC conference on March 4, 2012, President
Obama said,
Iran’s leaders should have no doubt about the resolve of the United States—just as they
should not doubt Israel’s sovereign right to make its own decisions about what is required to
meet its security needs…. Iran's leaders should know that I do not have a policy of
containment; I have a policy to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.
An Israeli in Netanyahu’s “inner circle” reportedly said in February that, compared with a year
ago, President Obama’s recent rhetoric indicates greater credibility that the United States would
be “ready to attack if worse comes to worst,”147 though it is not clear whether this provides
reassurance at a level that might significantly affect Israeli leaders’ calculations regarding the
advisability of and need for independent action. In 2007, according to former President George
W. Bush, Netanyahu’s predecessor Ehud Olmert unsuccessfully sought U.S. action to destroy the
secret Syrian reactor before he ordered the Israeli strike. President Bush said that he declined to
order military action owing to the low confidence of the U.S. intelligence community that Syria
had a nuclear weapons program, proposing—to Olmert’s dismay—that they instead publicly
expose the reactor’s existence and pursue internationally backed coercive diplomacy.148
U.S. views have potential salience for Israeli decisionmakers because top Israeli officials do not
necessarily agree with the Obama Administration on every aspect of how to address Iran’s nuclear
program. It is unclear, for example, to what extent views conveyed by President Obama and other
U.S. officials in early 2012 that appear to appeal for more time to judge the effectiveness of
international sanctions and diplomacy might affect Israeli positions on a possible strike. There are
indications that Israeli officials continue to differ with the Obama Administration on points
possibly relating to timeframes for action.149 U.S. officials reportedly said in early March that the
President “is not ready to accept a central part of Israel’s strategic calculation: that an attack on
Iran’s nuclear facilities would be warranted to stop it from gaining the capability to build a
nuclear weapon, rather than later, to stop it from actually manufacturing one.”150 The President
and Netanyahu “did not close the gap on this issue” during their March 5 meeting, according to a
U.S. official cited in one report who claimed that the issue was not addressed.151
146
Eli Lake, “U.S., Israel Discuss Triggers for Bombing Iran’s Nuclear Infrastructure,” Daily Beast, December 28,
2011.
147
Klaidman, et al., op. cit.
148
George W. Bush, Decision Points, New York: Crown Publishers, 2010, pp. 421-422.
149
Some Members of Congress have explicitly supported the concept of possible Israeli military action against Iran
without setting forth a specific timeframe. In May 2011, Congressman Louie Gohmert introduced H.Res. 271, entitled:
“Expressing support for the State of Israel’s right to defend Israeli sovereignty, to protect the lives and safety of the
Israeli people, and to use all means necessary to confront and eliminate nuclear threats posed by the Islamic Republic
of Iran, including the use of military force if no other peaceful solution can be found within reasonable time to protect
against such an immediate and existential threat to the State of Israel.” To date, H.Res. 271 has 69 Republican cosponsors and was referred to the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia.
150
Mark Landler, “Israel’s Backers Pressure Obama on Iran Position,” New York Times, March 4, 2012.
151
Mark Landler, “Obama Presses Israel to Resist Strikes on Iran,” New York Times, March 6, 2012.
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Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities
In a February 19, 2012, CNN interview, General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, revealed apparent differences in Israeli and U.S. positions, saying:
we think that it’s not prudent at this point to decide to attack Iran. I mean, that’s been our
counsel to our allies, the Israelis, well-known, well-documented.... I wouldn’t suggest, sitting
here today, that we’ve persuaded them that our view is the correct view and that they are
acting in an ill-advised fashion, but we’ve had a very candid, collaborative conversation.152
In testimony before the Senate Budget Committee on February 28, General Dempsey explained
his CNN remarks by saying, “I didn't counsel Israel not to attack. We’ve had a conversation with
them about time, the issue of time.” Further to the question of timing, President Obama said in an
interview less than a week before the March 5 meeting with Netanyahu that “at a time when there
is not a lot of sympathy for Iran and its only real ally [Syria] is on the ropes, do we want a
distraction in which suddenly Iran can portray itself as a victim, and deflect attention from what
has to be the core issue, which is their potential pursuit of nuclear weapons?”153 A U.S. European
Command-Israel joint missile defense exercise planned for April 2012—known as Austere
Challenge 12—was postponed and has been rescheduled for later in 2012. Some reports claim
that the postponement is at least partly intended to discourage perceptions of joint U.S.-Israel
planning with respect to a possible early 2012 Israeli attack on Iran.154
During his March 2012 Washington, DC, trip, Prime Minister Netanyahu explicitly insisted on
Israel’s prerogative to act independently. In his March 5 AIPAC speech, Netanyahu said:
Israel must always have the ability to defend itself, by itself, against any threat. We deeply
appreciate the great alliance between our two countries. But when it comes to Israel’s
survival, we must always remain the masters of our fate.
After Netanyahu reportedly met in private with various congressional leaders during his trip to
Washington, DC, on March 6, 2012, Senator Carl Levin, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, was quoted as saying that if Iran does not follow international demands that it stop
uranium enrichment, “an attack on them by Israel is very likely.”155 Referring to Netanyahu’s U.S.
meetings following his return to Israel, his spokesman reportedly said, “A red light was not given.
And if we’re already talking about colors, then a green light was not given either.”156 In a March
14 speech in the Knesset addressing the issue, Netanyahu cited past decisions by Israeli leaders—
the 1948 declaration of statehood, the initiation of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, and the 1981 strike
on Osirak—that were supposedly undertaken either without U.S. knowledge or despite prior
counsel from U.S. officials to delay action.157
152
Transcript of interview with General Martin Dempsey on CNN’s Fareed Zakaria GPS, February 19, 2012.
Goldberg, “Obama to Iran and Israel…,” op. cit.
154
Yaakov Katz, “Joint drill with US to be held after delay,” Jerusalem Post, February 6, 2012.
155
Donna Cassata, “Sen. Levin says Israeli attack on Iran likely,” Associated Press, March 6, 2012.
156
Netanyahu spokesman Liran Dan quoted in “Israel cautiously welcomes Western nuclear talks with Iran,” Reuters,
March 7, 2012.
157
Transcript of English translation of speech (from Hebrew) available on Israeli Prime Minister’s Office website.
153
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Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities
Regionally and Internationally
It is unclear to what degree Israeli decisionmakers might take into account the anticipated
reactions of other regional and international actors. Some Israeli analysts voice concern—given
the possibility that a possible Israeli attack would not be sanctioned in advance by an
international legal or political mandate158—about possible damage to Israel’s growing political
and economic relations with key countries such as China and Russia and potential acceleration of
its international isolation or “delegitimization.”159 In 1981, the United Nations Security Council—
including the United States under the Reagan Administration—voted unanimously in favor of
Resolution 487, which condemned Israel’s strike on Iraq’s Osirak reactor as a violation of the
U.N. Charter and the “norms of international conduct.” Nevertheless, some of these same analysts
suggest that if an Israeli attack successfully delays Iran’s nuclear program without resulting in
significant costs to other countries, “there might be quite a few regional and international players
who in retrospect would be pleased that Israel took on itself the risks to solve the problem of
Iranian nuclearization.”160
It is not clear how other Middle Eastern actors’ potential reactions might be affected by ongoing
political change that may lead Arab governments to become more responsive to popular
sentiment that includes anti-Israel strains. Israeli decisionmakers might be weighing the possible
consequences of further alienating neighboring Arab states with which Israel has always had
problematic relations. Doing so could possibly increase prospects for greater regional conflict,
decrease chances for diplomatic progress on the Palestinian issue, and harm the U.S. regional
profile.
158
In one view, Yale law and political science professor Bruce Ackerman has argued that if “President Obama supports
Netanyahu’s preemptive strike, he will transform Bush’s Iraq aberration into the founding precedent of a new era of
international law. He should instead reaffirm Reagan’s position in 1981 [joining the unanimous U.N. Security Council
vote on Resolution 487, which found Israel’s Osirak strike to be in violation of the U.N. Charter] and return the
presidency to its traditional commitments to international law abroad and constitutional fidelity at home.” Bruce
Ackerman, “The legal case against attacking Iran,” Los Angeles Times, March 5, 2012. In another view, Peter
Berkowitz, a fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, has argued, partly in light of what he characterizes as
changing views on the imminence of national security threats in a post-9/11 world, that many considerations
“separately, and certainly taken together, furnish legal justification, grounded in the right of anticipatory self-defense,
for Israel or the United States to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. However, not everything that is lawful is prudent and
wise.” Peter Berkowitz, “Would a Military Strike Against Iran Be Legal?”, RealClearPolitics, March 4, 2012. The
IAEA General Conference adopted a resolution in 1985 (GC(29)/RES/444) considering that an “armed attack on and
threat against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes constitutes a violation of the principles of the United
Nations Charter, international law and the Statute of the Agency,” and adopted a resolution in 1990 (GC(34)/RES/533)
encouraging all IAEA member states to be ready to provide immediate peaceful assistance—if requested—to countries
whose safeguarded facilities have been attacked.
159
Stein, et al., “The Public Discussion of Israel’s Strategy Regarding a Nuclear Iran,” op. cit. Israel claims that its
detractors—some of whom it claims are motivated by anti-Israel or anti-Semitic convictions—seek to delegitimize its
international standing, often by exaggerating alleged human rights and international law violations regarding its actions
vis-à-vis Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
160
Ibid.
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Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities
Potential Factors in an Israeli Decision: Possible
Operational Aspects of an Israeli Strike161
Another factor in Israel’s deliberations is the question of operational capability: Can Israeli forces
conduct a successful strike, however they define “success”? One Israeli journalist has written:
While a large-scale operation against Iran … would stretch the [Israel Air Force’s] resources,
it is still within its capabilities. This is exactly what the lion’s share of the defense budget has
been spent on for over more than a decade. On fighter jets, airborne tankers, long-range
reconnaissance drones and electronic warfare aircraft.162
According to another Israeli report, “military thinkers acknowledge the objective difficulties but
argue that, with the out-of-the-box improvisation and planning the Israel Air Force is renowned
for, they can be surmounted.”163 Not all Israeli assessments agree, however. One Israeli analyst
has written:
Would such an attack by Israel be likely to succeed even in doing maximum damage to
Iranian facilities? No, a great deal could go wrong, especially against multiple hardened
targets at the planes’ maximum range. Planes could get lost or crash or have to turn back.
Planes arriving over the targets could miss, or accidentally drop their bombs on civilians, or
simply not do much damage. Many targets would remain unscathed.164
A senior Israeli official was cited in one report as quoting a senior commander who reportedly
told the Israeli cabinet in September 2011 that “we have no ability to hit the Iranian nuclear
program in a meaningful way.”165 A March 2012 poll indicated that 65% of Jewish Israelis believe
that the Israeli military has the “ability to damage Iran's nuclear program substantially,”166 while a
late February 2012 poll indicated by a 53%-39% margin that Jewish Israelis do not believe that an
Israeli attack conducted without U.S. cooperation would stop “Iran’s nuclearization for a
substantial period of time.”167
In open source assessments mainly in non-Israeli media, analysts assert that although the Israel
Air Force (IAF) is formidable, an attempt to destroy Iran’s nuclear capability would be a
challenge due to both the IAF’s technical capabilities and the limited numbers of aircraft in its
fleet that are equipped to simultaneously operate over long ranges, carry the necessary ordnance,
and thwart foreign air defenses. Former Central Intelligence Agency and National Security
Agency Director Michael Hayden said, for example, “that airstrikes capable of seriously setting
161
Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in Military Aviation.
Anshel Pfeffer, “Israel could strike Iran’s nuclear facilities, but it won’t be easy,” haaretz.com, February 20, 2012.
163
Susser, op. cit.
164
Rubin, op. cit.
165
Vick, op. cit. Following this quote, the article states, “The key word is meaningful [emphasis original]. The working
assumption behind Israel’s military preparations has been that a strike, to be worth mounting, must delay Tehran’s
nuclear capabilities by at least two years.” Ibid.
166
Poll of 505 Jewish Israelis conducted by Professor Camil Fuchs of Tel Aviv University for the Jerusalem Center for
Public Affairs. Details of the poll, whose margin of error is unspecified, available at
http://jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=254&PID=0&IID=13295.
167
Dahaf Institute poll, February 28-29, 2012, with a 4.5% margin of error, details available at
http://www.peaceindex.org/indexMonthEng.aspx?num=240#anchor269.
162
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Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities
back Iran’s nuclear program were ‘beyond the capacity’ of Israel.”168 Multiple reports have
asserted that military analysts believe that reaching all critical Iranian nuclear facilities “would
require an air campaign of hundreds of sorties and would have to last for weeks.”169 However, a
U.S. defense analyst has said that any Israeli attack would probably be a one-time event: “Given
the unfriendly airspace Israeli strike aircraft would have to traverse to reach Iran’s facilities as
well as Israel’s geographic distance from Iran, the likelihood of Israel being able to carry out
repeated strikes is low. Israeli strike aircraft would only have one opportunity to strike at Iran’s
nuclear facilities.”170 Nevertheless, the same defense analyst has said, “One wave can do a lot,
depending on the quality of the penetrating munitions and the targeting abilities.”171
Access
The distance from Israeli bases to Iranian nuclear facilities imposes two significant difficulties.
The first involves airspace. Depending on the route selected, Israeli aircraft would have to cross
the sovereign airspace of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, and/or Turkey both en route and on
the return trip. According to one report, “The route over Iraq would be the most direct and likely,
defense analysts say, because Iraq effectively has no air defenses and the United States, after its
December withdrawal, no longer has the obligation to defend Iraqi skies.”172
Each route involves different diplomatic considerations, but Israel has shown a willingness and
ability to operate in foreign airspace for limited periods with little or no detection and without
targeting air defense sites, as in the 2007 raid on the suspected Syrian nuclear site near Deir al
Zur.173 However, although Israel may be able to hide comparatively small combat aircraft from
foreign air defense systems through electronic and other means, large tankers and other support
aircraft required for a long-range strike on Iran may be another matter. According to a 2010 book
by two U.S. analysts, “It seems likely that Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait would be able to
detect the overflight of Israeli aircraft. Syria might not see ingressing aircraft, but the ability to
blind the Syrians again, after doing so in 2007, is not something Israel can take for granted.”174
Although there have been past reports—officially denied—that Saudi Arabia has granted or
would grant advance permission for Israel to overfly its territory,175 Israel may rely on
168
Elisabeth Bumiller, “Iran Raid Seen as a Huge Task for Israeli Jets,” New York Times, February 19, 2012.
Vick, op. cit. See also General (USAF ret.) Charles Wald, in Jim Michaels, “Israeli Attack On Iran Would Be
Complex," USA Today, February 14, 2012.
170
Anthony H. Cordesman, The New IAEA Report And Iran’s Evolving Nuclear And Missile Forces, Center for
Strategic and International Studies, November 8, 2011.
171
Vick, op. cit.
172
Bumiller, “Iran Raid Seen as a Huge Task for Israeli Jets,” op. cit.
173
An article by former German Defense Ministry director of planning (1982-1988) Hans Rühle for Switzerland’s
Neuer Zürcher Zeitung on the 2007 Syria raid claimed that seven Israeli F-15s “flew along the Mediterranean coast,
brushed past Turkey and pressed on into Syria. Fifty kilometers (30 miles) from their target they fired 22 rockets at the
three identified objects inside the Kibar complex.” Article translated and quoted in “Iranian defector tipped Syrian nuke
plans,” Associated Press, March 19, 2009. In the 1981 strike on Iraq’s Osirak reactor, the eight Israeli F-16s that
carried out the bombing and six supporting F-15s transited Jordanian and Saudi airspace en route and on the return trip.
An overflight of present-day Jordan might have more complicated political ramifications, given that Israel and Jordan
signed a peace treaty in 1994.
174
Allin and Simon, op. cit., p. 99.
175
Hugh Tomlinson, “Saudi Arabia gives Israel clear skies to attack Iranian nuclear sites,” The Times (UK), June 12,
2010.
169
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technological and logistical advantages mentioned in the above paragraph to elude interception
during its overflight of third-party countries. Additionally, according to a book by two U.S.
analysts, “For all these countries except Syria, the balance of incentives might well lie on the side
of silence … a humbled Iran would be the overriding interest, especially if intercepting aircraft
were likely to be shot to pieces by Israeli fighters.”176 Active resistance to Israeli overflight using
surface-to-air missiles or intercepting aircraft could, at a minimum, derail Israel’s “intricate attack
plan”177—for example, by lengthening Israeli flight routes and complicating refueling plans.
A second challenge is that the distance to targets and the size of a possible strike package would
require all of Israel’s aerial refueling capability, with little or no margin for equipment or
operational failures. A February 2012 Economist article anticipated the facilities that an Israeli
strike might target:
Israel would probably pay particular attention to the enrichment plants at Natanz and
Fordow; after them would come the facility at Isfahan that turns uranium into a gas that the
centrifuges can work with and the heavy-water reactor under construction at Arak, both of
which are above the ground. The larger Russian-built reactor at Bushehr would probably
escape unscathed; it is less relevant to weapons work and damage to it could spread
contamination across the Gulf.178
See Figure 1 for a map of major Iranian facilities in regional context. Israel has five KC-130s and
four 707-based tankers similar to American KC-135s.179 A 2009 study estimated a need for 12
tanker equivalents per mission simply to attack Iranian nuclear facilities at Esfahan, Natanz, and
Arak (the Fordow facility had not yet been revealed).180 Without additional tankers, the fighters
would have to refuel twice over the duration of the mission. This need may be somewhat reduced
by the fact that Israel is also believed to have “mastered the operation of ‘buddy refueling,’”
using the F-15s’ drop tanks to refuel the shorter-range F-16s en route.181 Additionally, one Israeli
report states, “For the last few years, Israeli representatives have been snapping up every old
Boeing 707 airliner in good condition … and converting them into airborne tankers. According to
various sources, the IAF has by now eight or nine such tankers.”182
Analysts differ in assessing the effectiveness of Iranian air defenses. Iran’s defensive missile
systems are among the least modern in the Middle East, relying on Hawk systems supplied by the
United States before the Iranian Revolution and Vietnam-era Russian SA-2s, along with a few
more modern SA-5s. But they are controlled, some argue, by a modern, coordinated network.
One analyst has said, “They're not using wax pencils on glass…. [t]hey have updated
176
Allin and Simon, op. cit., pp. 99-100.
Ibid., p. 49.
178
“Attacking Iran: Up in the air,” op. cit. Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Colin Kahl has said that an
Israeli attack might also target “multiple centrifuge production facilities in and around populated areas of Tehran and
Natanz.” Kahl, “An Israeli strike on Iran would backfire,” op. cit.
179
The Military Balance 2011, Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa, International Institute for Strategic
Studies, March, 2011. Israel has supported distant deployments before, most notably a 2,600-kilometer deployment to
Poland, albeit only three fighters were involved.
180
Abdullah Toukan and Anthony H. Cordesman, Study on a Possible Israeli Strike on Iran’s Nuclear Development
Facilities, Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington, DC, March 8, 2009.
181
Hans Rühle, “Wie Israel Irans Atomprogramm zerstören könnte (How Israel could destroy Iran's nuclear program),”
Die Welt (Germany), February 16, 2012 (CRS translation).
182
Pfeffer, “Israel could strike Iran's nuclear facilities, but it won't be easy,” op. cit.
177
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computerized modern air defenses.”183 Another has raised the possibility, however slight, that
Russia might have “in recent years secretly supplied [Iran] with the SA-12 Giant or the latest
variants of the S-300 series” air defense systems.184 If that is the case, analysts estimate that the
attrition rate of Israeli aircraft in an air strike could be significantly higher than otherwise.185
Aircraft
Although an attack on Esfahan, Natanz, and Arak might require deploying only 20% of Israel’s
top-line fighters purchased from the United States, it would probably require 100% of the most
capable—the IAF’s 25 F-15Is.186 Undertaking additional strikes on Fordow and possibly other
facilities—such as those related to research, centrifuge production, uranium mining and
processing, or even possible weapons production—would probably require diverting some of
these aircraft from the first three targets and possibly addressing some targets through alternative
means (see below). According to a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report,
“Israeli aircraft would probably need to carry close to their maximum payloads to achieve the
necessary level of damage against most targets suspected of WMD activity, although any given
[above-ground] structure could be destroyed with 1-3 weapons.”187 Striking Natanz, Esfahan, and
Arak simultaneously would probably require 90 tactical fighters, including a 10% margin for
reliability.188 With support, this yields an Israeli strike “involving at least 100 aircraft.”189 Most
sources indicate that Israel has a total of “around 350 fighter jets, a larger aerial combat force than
countries of the likes of Britain and Germany.”190
Weapons
The facilities at Esfahan and Arak are above ground, meaning they can be attacked with a variety
of weaponry. Those that are underground, such as the commercial enrichment facility at Natanz,
or above-ground structures that have been hardened, can be struck with precision-guided “bunkerbuster” weapons, two types of which the United States has sold to Israel. The Guided Bomb Unit
(GBU)-27 2000-lb class weapon carries 550 lbs of high explosives, and can penetrate more than
six feet of reinforced concrete. The GBU-28 5000-lb class weapon penetrates at least 20 feet of
concrete and 100 feet of earth.191 According to CSIS, “The key weapon to be used against hard
targets and underground sites like Natanz might be the GBU-28, although the US may have
quietly given Israel much more sophisticated systems or Israel may have developed its own.”192
183
Scott Johnson, an analyst at IHS Jane’s, in Jim Michaels, “Israeli Attack On Iran Would Be Complex,” USA Today,
February 14, 2012.
184
Rühle, op. cit.
185
Toukan and Cordesman, op. cit.
186
Ibid. The IAF also has 101 F-16Is (per Military Balance, op. cit.).
187
Cordesman, op. cit.
188
Toukan and Cordesman, op. cit.
189
Joseph Cirincione, quoted in “Expert: Attack on Iran may mean $200/barrel oil,” CBSNews.com, February 20, 2012.
190
Pfeffer, “Israel could strike Iran's nuclear facilities, but it won't be easy,” op. cit.
191
Toukan and Cordesman, op. cit.
192
Cordesman, op. cit. Although small nuclear warheads, in the event Israel has them, could be effective against targets
too hardened for Israel’s conventional weapons to address, their use would, in the words of CSIS, “generate severe
diplomatic and military consequences for Israel.” Ibid.
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Because the GBU-27 and -28 can be laser-guided, other aircraft or special operations forces
inserted on the ground may be used to designate the target.193
Israel possesses Jericho II medium-range ballistic missiles with ranges capable of striking Iran.194
They could be used against above-ground targets and free up aircraft to focus on hardened targets
or those less amenable to missile attack. However, whether these ballistic missiles have the
accuracy and capacity to destroy such targets in Iran is unclear.
From a weaponeering perspective, Fordow offers a unique challenge. Because the facility is
reportedly built inside a mountain an estimated 295 feet deep,195 Israel’s current earth-penetrating
munitions may be ineffective.196 Observers suggest strikes against the reinforced entrance doors
may be necessary, which would require a great degree of precision. Such an attack would not be
possible with missiles, as the angle of approach required would not be possible from a ballistic
trajectory. According to CSIS, “The hard target bombs [Israel] has acquired from the US are
bunker-busters, however, not systems designed to kill underground facilities. They could damage
entrances but not the facilities. What is not known is whether Israel has its own ordnance or has
secretly acquired more sophisticated systems.”197
However, it may not be necessary to damage a facility directly in order to disrupt its functionality.
Centrifuges, for example, require an enormous degree of precision to work, and even a relatively
minor shock or other event can destroy a centrifuge’s utility. In the case of Natanz, even if the
reinforced building is not breached, an explosion strong enough to significantly damage the walls
could still ruin centrifuges—and the consensus of planners is that one to two GBU-28s would be
sufficient to shatter the reinforced dome.198 At Fordow, assuming that munitions would not be
able to penetrate the mountainous terrain over the facility, the question would be how well the
centrifuges have been isolated from shock and the possible blast effects of an attack on the
facility’s entrances.199 In a Washington Post interview apparently contemplating a hypothetical
U.S. strike on Fordow, a U.S. defense analyst was cited as a source for the following statement:
“‘There are good outcomes short of destroying’ the centrifuge hall. Strikes against more
accessible targets—from tunnel entrances and air shafts to power and water systems—can
effectively knock the plant out of action.”200
See Figure 3 below for a graphic with reported details on the underground facilities at Natanz
and Fordow and on penetrating munitions that could be used to target the facilities.
193
Rühle, op. cit., states that Israel used special operations forces to designate targets in the strike on Syria’s nuclear
facility in 2007.
194
Toukan and Cordesman, op. cit.
195
Lindeman and Webster, op. cit.
196
A former RAND Corporation analyst has argued, however, that a highly coordinated and precise attack using GBU27s and GBU-28s could conceivably incapacitate Fordow’s centrifuges. Austin Long, “Can They?”, Tablet, November
8, 2011.
197
Cordesman, op. cit.
198
Rühle and Toukan/Cordesman evaluate the use of GBU-28s against Natanz; Long dedicates all GBU-28 strikes to
Fordow, but finds GBU-27s sufficient for Natanz.
199
Long, op. cit.
200
Anthony Cordesman of CSIS cited in Warrick, “Underground sites vulnerable, experts say,” op. cit.
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Figure 3. Underground Nuclear Facilities and Penetrating Munitions
Sources: Washington Post (from DigitalGlobe via Google Earth Pro, GlobalSecurity.org), adapted by CRS
Note: CRS does not claim to confirm this information independently.
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In a February 2012 Bipartisan Policy Center report, former Senator Charles S. Robb and retired
Air Force General Charles Wald suggested that the United States provide Israel with 200 GBU-31
bunker-busting munitions and additional aerial refueling assets.201 GBU-31s have the same
warhead as Israel’s existing GBU-28s (the BLU-122), but with a more precise guidance kit.
Although its warhead would cause little to no more damage than a GBU-28’s, the report asserts
that “The GBU-31 would augment the IAF’s existing capabilities, in this case by increasing the
likelihood that any given sortie would score a direct hit on its target.”202 Reports indicate that
Prime Minister Netanyahu might have requested additional GBU-28s and tanker aircraft from
U.S. officials during his early March 2012 Washington, DC, trip, though White House Press
Secretary Jay Carney claimed that the topic was not discussed in Netanyahu’s meeting with the
President.203
Potential Factors in an Israeli Decision: Estimated
Effects of a Possible Strike
Effect on Iran’s Nuclear Program204
Another major consideration for Israeli decisionmakers is the ultimate impact of an Israeli
military strike on Iran’s existing nuclear program. Israeli officials and analysts generally agree
that a strike would not completely destroy the program. One journalist has said, “According to the
Israeli assessment, a successful strike, a strike that would be conducted according to planning,
would … inflict a significant damage that would end with a delay of three to five years.”205 In
February 2012, a senior Israeli official was cited in Time magazine as saying that “given the wide
geographic dispersion of Iran’s atomic facilities, combined with the limits of Israel’s air armada,
the Jewish state can expect to push back the Iranian program by only a matter of months—a year
at most, according to the official. He attributes that estimate to the Israel Atomic Energy
Commission, which is charged with assessing the likely effect of a strike.”206 In March 2012,
however, another source cited optimism among some Israeli national security officials that a
strike in “the next six months—conducted before Iran can further harden its nuclear sites, or make
them redundant—will set back the ayatollahs’ atomic ambitions at least five years.”207 Aside from
201
Senator Charles S. Robb and General (USAF ret.) Charles Wald, Co-Chairs, Meeting the Challenge: Stopping the
Clock, Bipartisan Policy Center, Washington, DC, February 2012. They make these suggestions under the following
rationale: “While we do not advocate an Israeli military strike, we believe a more credible Israeli threat can only
increase the pressure on Iran to negotiate.” Ibid.
202
Robb and Wald, op. cit.
203
Kent Klein, “White House Denies Report of Deal With Israel Over Iran,” Voice of America, March 8, 2012.
According to Reuters, a report in Israel’s Ma’ariv newspaper that President Obama agreed to provide the equipment on
the condition that Israel not attack in 2012 was dismissed in Israeli government circles as “unrealistic.” “Iran-Konflikt Israel fordert in USA bunkerbrechende Bomben an (Israel requests bunker-buster bombs in USA),” Reuters
Deutschland, March 8, 2012 (CRS translation).
204
Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, with contributions from (name redacted), Analyst in
Nonproliferation.
205
Ronen Bergman, quoted in Lourdes Garcia-Navarro, “In Israel, A Nonstop Debate on Possible Iran Strike,” NPR,
January 31, 2012.
206
Vick, op. cit.
207
Jeffrey Goldberg, “Israelis Grow Confident Strike on Iran’s Nukes Can Work,” Bloomberg, March 19, 2012.
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estimates of how much time the Iranian program might be set back as a result of a strike, Israeli
officials and analysts have generally not focused in open sources on technical details that might
provide hints about potential Israeli attack plans and how they might factor into Israeli
decisionmaking. According to one Israeli analysis from January 2012:
the censor’s office is charged with preventing publication of secrets that may harm state
security…. A public discussion ought not to deal with the operational issues connected to a
military action, lest operational plans, Iranian vulnerabilities, and limitations of Israeli
capabilities are exposed. In addition, the public does not have the necessary information for a
discussion of this sort, such as detailed intelligence on the Iranian nuclear program and
information on the IDF’s operational capabilities that are relevant to such an action.208
Public discussion of this issue in the United States may give some hint as to the considerations
Israeli leaders are addressing. Many officials and analysts in the United States have argued that,
following a military attack that destroyed most of Iran’s major nuclear facilities, Iran would be
able to reconstitute the program.209 General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, in his February 19 CNN interview, said:
I think that Israel has the capability to strike Iran and to delay the production or the capability
of Iran to achieve a nuclear weapons status, probably for a couple of years. But some of the
targets are probably beyond their reach and, of course, that’s what—that’s what concerns
them. That’s this notion of a zone of immunity that they discuss.210
According to a February 13, 2012, CRS telephone interview with a U.S. executive branch
official, an attack that left Iran’s conversion and centrifuge production facilities intact would
considerably reduce the timeline for reconstitution. This timeline would possibly also be affected
by variables such as the number of centrifuges and quantity of LEU and 20%-enriched uranium
remaining usable after an attack. Director of National Intelligence Clapper, in February 16, 2012,
testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, said that the intelligence community
does not have a “single number” for the amount of time necessary for Iran to reconstitute its
program, explaining that the number of relevant variables precludes formulating such an
assessment. Reconstitution of a program aimed at developing a full nuclear weapons capability
would depend not only on Iran’s ability to produce fissile nuclear material for a weapon, but also
research, development, and production relating to the creation of both functional warheads and
delivery systems such as missiles.
208
Stein, et al., “The Public Discussion of Israel’s Strategy Regarding a Nuclear Iran,” op. cit.
Kahl, “Not Time to Attack Iran…,” op. cit. See also Vick, op. cit.
210
General Dempsey transcript, op. cit.
209
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Other Facilities Related to Iran’s Nuclear Program211
Iran’s facilities for producing centrifuges and components would probably be important to Tehran’s ability to
reconstitute its nuclear program after a military attack. Iran might have facilities that are unknown to Israel. IAEA
inspectors had access to Iranian centrifuge workshops in order to verify an October 2003 agreement under which
Iran suspended its enrichment program. However, the agency’s knowledge of Iran’s workshops has deteriorated since
Iran ended this access in early 2006. Several months later, Wayne White, a former top Middle East intelligence analyst
at the Department of State, expressed concern that Tehran could be moving some components related to its nuclear
program.212
More recently, a U.S. official told CRS in an April 2011 in-person interview that there “could be lots of workshops” in
Iran. A former U.S. government official with direct experience on the issue told CRS via telephone on February 27,
2012, that Iran’s centrifuge production is widely distributed and that the number of workshops has probably
multiplied “many times” since 2005 because of an increase in Iranian contractors and subcontractors working on the
program. Perhaps referring to Iranian centrifuge workshops, former Central Intelligence Agency and National Security
Agency Director Michael Hayden stated in January 2012 that neither the United States nor Israel knows the location
of all key Iranian nuclear-related facilities.213
An executive branch official said in a February 27, 2012, CRS telephone interview that Iran does not have sufficient
spare centrifuges or components that would enable it to install new centrifuges immediately after an attack. However,
the former official interviewed on February 27 added that most centrifuge workshops could probably be rebuilt or
replicated within six months.
Perhaps anticipating that a military strike might not permanently set back Iran’s nuclear prog
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