Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Highlighted Activities

Congressional research reportFeb 23, 2012

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Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill:

Highlighted Activities

Jonathan L. Ramseur

Specialist in Environmental Policy

February 23, 2012

Congressional Research Service

7-5700

www.crs.gov

R42371

CRS Report for Congress

Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Highlighted Activities

Summary

In the wake of the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon offshore drilling rig in the Gulf of Mexico

on April 20, 2010, the federal government, state governments, and responsible parties faced an

unprecedented challenge. An oil discharge continued for 84 days, resulting in the largest oil spill

in U.S. waters—estimated at approximately 206 million gallons (4.9 million barrels). In recent

financial statements, BP estimated the combined oil spill costs—cleanup, natural resource and

economic damages, penalties, and other obligations—at approximately $41 billion.

Response activities, led by the U.S. Coast Guard, continue but have diminished substantially. The

natural resources damage assessment (NRDA) process, conducted by federal and state trustees, is

ongoing, now in its restoration planning phase. The Gulf Coast Claims Facility (GCCF), funded

by BP, continues to award claims to affected parties: it has awarded almost $6 billion in

compensation for economic losses resulting from the oil spill.

Members in the 112th Congress continue to express concerns regarding various oil spill-related

policy matters. However, oil spill-related legislative activity in the 112th Congress has diminished

compared to the 111th Congress.

The House passed H.R. 3408 (the PIONEERS Act) on February 15, 2012; the act would create a

Gulf Coast Restoration Trust Fund in the U.S. Treasury, financed by 80% of any Deepwater

Horizon-related penalties, settlements, and fines under Clean Water Act (CWA) Section 311. The

Trust Fund would be used to “restore the ecosystems and economy of the Gulf Coast region.”

Unlike similar legislative proposals (e.g., S. 1400, which the Senate Committee on Environment

and Public Works reported on December 11, 2011), the monies in the Trust Fund would not be

immediately available, but would require further congressional action to appropriate the funds.

Proposals that seek to encourage offshore oil exploration and development have seen more

legislative action than oil spill-related proposals. Congress enacted one bill with provisions that

arguably encourage OCS development. On December 23, 2011, Congress enacted P.L. 112-74

(the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012). Among other provisions, this act (§432) transfers air

emission regulatory authority in the OCS off Alaska’s north coast from the U.S. Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA) to the Department of the Interior (DOI). The primary difference

between the EPA and DOI programs is rooted in their different statutory authorities, which have

different objectives—air quality versus offshore energy development. The two regulatory

programs reflect these underlying differences.

In addition, the House has passed several bills intended to encourage oil and gas development on

the OCS. The Senate has not reported analogous legislation.

In 2011 the Secretary of the Department of the Interior (DOI) initiated a series of reforms aimed

at replacing the former regulatory agency, the Minerals Management Service (MMS). Secretary

Salazar redefined the responsibilities previously performed by MMS and reassigned the functions

of the offshore energy program among three separate organizations: the Bureau of Ocean Energy

Management (BOEM), the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), and the

Office of Natural Resources Revenue (ONRR). BOEM and BSEE are charged with managing

procedures for leases and operations, ONRR for revenue management.

Congressional Research Service

Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Highlighted Activities

Contents

Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1

Oil Spill Response ........................................................................................................................... 1

Compensation and Claims ............................................................................................................... 2

NRDA and Gulf Coast Restoration.................................................................................................. 3

Congressional Activity..................................................................................................................... 5

Executive Branch Activity............................................................................................................... 6

Independent Inquiries ...................................................................................................................... 7

CRS Reports for Further Reading.................................................................................................... 8

Contacts

Author Contact Information............................................................................................................. 9

Congressional Research Service

Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Highlighted Activities

Introduction

In the wake of the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon offshore drilling rig on April 20, 2010, the

federal government, state governments, and responsible parties faced an unprecedented challenge

in the Gulf of Mexico. Never before had a subsea drilling system discharge of this magnitude, or

an oil spill of this size—estimated at approximately 206 million gallons (4.9 million barrels)—

occurred in U.S. waters.1

In many respects, the incident was unprecedented, testing the response capabilities of the federal

government, state governments, and private industry; and the legal framework of liability and

compensation. Both the response (i.e., cleanup) and compensation process continue today.

This report provides a summary update of selected issues related to the 2010 Deepwater Horizon

oil spill:

•

Oil Spill Response

•

Compensations and Claims

•

NRDA and Gulf Coast Restoration

•

Congressional Activity

•

Executive Branch Activities

•

Independent Inquiries

More detailed analysis of these issues, as well as other issues (e.g., OCS moratoria), is addressed

in other CRS products. The final section includes a list of CRS reports that discuss various

aspects of the Deepwater Horizon incident as well as related background information.

Oil Spill Response

The uncontrolled discharge from the Deepwater Horizon continued for approximately 84 days

until, following several attempts, responders gained control of the release on July 15, 2010.

Response activities continue to date but have diminished substantially compared to the height of

operations:

•

During the summer of 2010, response personnel levels rose to 47,000; response

vessel numbers approached 7,000.

•

As of December 2011, approximately 1,000 response personnel remain in the

Gulf region.2

An estimated 17% of this oil did not enter the Gulf environment, but was directly recovered from the wellhead by BP.

See the Federal Interagency Solutions Group, Oil Budget Calculator Science and Engineering Team, Oil Budget

Calculator: Deepwater Horizon-Technical Documentation, November 2010. See also CRS Report R41531, Deepwater

Horizon Oil Spill: The Fate of the Oil, by Jonathan L. Ramseur.

Unified Command, Shoreline Clean-up Completion Plan (SCCP) FAQs, December 15, 2011, at

http://www.restorethegulf.gov/sites/default/files/u306/SCCP%20FAQ%20FINAL%20VERSION1.pdf. See also the

Unified Command website at http://www.restorethegulf.gov.

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Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Highlighted Activities

According to NOAA shoreline survey data, the maximum extent of shoreline oiling involved

almost 1,100 miles of shoreline. As of October 2011, that figure has decreased to 481 miles.3

On November 23, 2010, the federal government released a peer-reviewed publication that

provided an oil budget estimate (i.e., an estimate of what happened to the oil). At the time of these

calculations, a portion of the oil had been effectively removed from the Gulf environment through

human interaction. However, a greater portion remained, in some form, in the Gulf.4

It is debatable whether the fate of the remaining oil will ever be established conclusively.

Multiple challenges hinder this objective, and as time progresses, determining the fate of the oil

will likely become more difficult. Researchers are continuing to study and publish results

addressing various aspects of the spill.5

Compensation and Claims

As an identified responsible party (others may also be legally responsible),6 BP is liable for

cleanup costs, natural resource damages, and various economic damages.7 The total costs of the

2010 Gulf spill are projected to dwarf those of the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill.8 In its recent

financial statements, BP estimated the combined oil spill costs—cleanup, natural resource and

economic damages, potential Clean Water Act (CWA) penalties, and other obligations—to be

approximately $41 billion. This estimate includes payments made to date as well as projected

future payments, such as claims. However, BP acknowledges the difficulty in estimating some

costs and does not include these costs in its projection. Therefore, this estimate is subject to

considerable uncertainty.9

Data from personal communication (October 3, 2011) with NOAA Office of Response and Restoration officials.

For more information, see CRS Report R41531, Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: The Fate of the Oil, by Jonathan L.

Ramseur.

For example, some recent results suggest that microbial organisms played a substantial role through biodegradation.

See, e.g., David Valentine et al, “Dynamic autoinoculation and the microbial ecology of a deep water hydrocarbon

irruption,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, January 2012; Bethanie Edwards et al., “Rapid Microbial

Respiration of Oil from the Deepwater Horizon Spill in Offshore Surface Waters of the Gulf of Mexico,”

Environmental Research Letters, Vol. 6, August 2011.

For the purpose of this report, BP is discussed as if it is the sole responsible party—a key term in the existing liability

and compensation framework. However, other parties are involved. The Department of Justice named 9 defendants in a

civil suit filed December 15, 2010. See Press Release at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/December/10-ag1442.html.

Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. 2702 (discussed below).

The Exxon Valdez was a U.S.-flagged tanker that grounded in Prince William Sound, AK, in March 1989 spilling

approximately 11 million gallons of oil. The oil spill sparked regional and nation-wide interest in oil spill prevention,

response, clean-up, and liability. In association with the 1989 oil spill, Exxon paid approximately $4.9 billion.

Payments were made voluntarily and pursuant to several different legal proceedings at different times over

approximately 20 years.

As stated by BP,

The total amounts that will ultimately be paid by BP in relation to all obligations relating to the

incident are subject to significant uncertainty and the ultimate exposure and cost to BP will be

dependent on many factors. Furthermore, the amount of claims that become payable by BP, the

amount of fines ultimately levied on BP (including any determination of BP’s negligence), the

outcome of litigation, and any costs arising from any longer-term environmental consequences of

the oil spill, will also impact upon the ultimate cost for BP.

(continued...)

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Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Highlighted Activities

In the early months of the spill, the issue of liability limits received considerable attention. As a

responsible party of an offshore facility, BP is liable for “all removal costs plus $75 million” for

natural resource damages and specified economic damages.10 However, liability limits are not

guaranteed but are conditional.11 Regardless, BP has awarded claims to individuals and

businesses far exceeding its (conditional) liability limit of $75 million. The Obama

Administration and BP jointly announced on June 16, 2010, the creation of the Gulf Coast Claims

Facility (GCCF), an independent claims facility administered by Kenneth Feinberg, to process

claims for individuals and businesses.12 Although the GCCF has awarded approximately $6

billion (as of February 17, 2012), it has received considerable attention, with some raising

questions about its effectiveness in compensating injured parties.13 The GCCF will continue to

accept claims until it closes its operations on August 22, 2013.

Some parties have sought compensation through litigation. Many of these lawsuits have been

consolidated into a case before the United States District Court in New Orleans. According to

court documents, over 100,000 private claims of “non-governmental economic loss and property

damages” comprise one part of this case;14 other parts include government claims.15

NRDA and Gulf Coast Restoration

When a spill occurs, natural resource trustees conduct a natural resource damage assessment

(NRDA) to determine the extent of the harm. Trustees may include officials from federal agencies

designated by the President, state agencies designated by the relevant governor, and

representatives from tribal and foreign governments. The trustees’ work occurs in three steps: a

Pre-assessment Phase, the Restoration Planning Phase, and the Restoration Implementation

Phase. Natural resource damages are compensatory, not punitive. Collected damages cannot be

placed into the general treasury revenues of the federal or state government, but must be used to

restore or replace lost resources.

The Deepwater Horizon NRDA process is progressing as trustees have moved from a preassessment phase to a restoration planning phase.16

(...continued)

BP, Fourth quarter and full year 2010 financial statement, February 1, 2011, at http://www.bp.com/.

OPA §1004 (33 U.S.C. §2704).

First, the liability limits do not apply to situations involving acts of gross negligence or willful misconduct. Second,

liability limits do not apply if the violation of a federal safety, construction, or operating requirement proximately

caused the spill. Third, parties must report the incident and cooperate with response officials to maintain their liability

caps. See OPA Section 1004 (33 U.S.C. §2704).

See http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/.

For more information, see CRS Report R41679, Liability and Compensation Issues Raised by the 2010 Gulf Oil

Spill, by Jonathan L. Ramseur.

See United States District Court Eastern District of Louisiana, Order issued August 26, 2011, at

http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/OilSpill/OilSpill.htm.

For further information, the Court’s website provides documents related to the case, http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/

OilSpill/OilSpill.htm.

For more information, see CRS Report R41972, The 2010 Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Natural Resource Damage

Assessment Under the Oil Pollution Act, by James V. DeBergh.

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Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Highlighted Activities

On April 21, 2011, the trustees for the Deepwater Horizon oil spill announced that BP has agreed

to provide $1 billion toward early restoration projects in the Gulf of Mexico to address injuries to

natural resources caused by the spill. “Early Restoration” projects may be developed prior to the

completion of the injury assessment to achieve restoration faster. NOAA published a draft plan

(seeking public comments) of early restoration projects in December 2011.17

The Deepwater Horizon oil spill raised issues regarding restoration of natural resources in the

spill’s path and the region at large. On June 15, 2010, the Administration committed to

developing a long-term Gulf of Mexico restoration plan for post-spill recovery needs as well as

long-term restoration. In contrast to the environmental damages addressed by NRDA, the

Administration’s plan would address a broader array of restoration needs,18 many of which

predate the oil spill.19

To fund restoration efforts, and, in some cases, economic projects, in the Gulf region, several bills

would redirect20 potential CWA Deepwater Horizon penalties into a newly created trust fund.

Unless specifically directed otherwise, the Miscellaneous Receipts Act (31 U.S.C. §3302(b))

provides that all court or administratively imposed penalties are paid to the general fund of the

U.S. Department of the Treasury. The underlying statutory provisions of the Oil Spill Liability

Trust Fund (OSLTF) override this general provision by transferring civil judicial penalties under

CWA Section 311 (among others)21 into the OSLTF.22

The potential CWA civil penalties could be substantial: the National Commission report included

a range of $4.5 billion to $21.5 billion for possible penalty revenue.23 However, the civil penalties

could be below this range, because the “EPA Administrator, the Secretary [of Homeland

Security], or the court, as the case may” must consider several factors when assessing the penalty

amounts.24 On December 15, 2010, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) initiated a civil

proceeding against BP and other defendants related to the Deepwater Horizon incident. One of

the issues in this case relates to the CWA civil penalties.

For more up-to-date information, see http://www.gulfspillrestoration.noaa.gov/.

See the Obama Administration’s America’s Gulf Coast: A Long Term Recovery Plan after the Deepwater Horizon

Oil Spill (sometimes referred to as the “Mabus Report”), September 2010.

See CRS Report R41640, The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and the Gulf of Mexico Fishing Industry, by Harold F.

Upton.

Existing law directs these penalties to the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund. See CRS Report R41679, Liability and

Compensation Issues Raised by the 2010 Gulf Oil Spill, by Jonathan L. Ramseur.

26 U.S.C. §9509(b)(8) states “any penalty paid pursuant to section 311 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,

section 309(c) of such Act (as a result of violations of such section 311), the Deepwater Port Act of 1974, or section

207 of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act.”

The relationship between trust funds, such as the OSLTF, and the general treasury is complex. For more information,

see GAO, Federal Trust and Other Earmarked Funds: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions, January 2001.

The low end of this range is achieved by multiplying 4.1 million barrels (amount of discharge after removing the

17% directly captured by BP) by $1,100/ barrel. The upper end of range is achieved by multiplying 4.9 million barrels

(total discharge amount) by the maximum penalty of $4,300/barrel, which presumes a determination of either gross

negligence or willful misconduct.

As listed in CWA §311(b)(8), these include

the seriousness of the violation or violations, the economic benefit to the violator, if any, resulting

from the violation, the degree of culpability involved, any other penalty for the same incident, any

history of prior violations, the nature, extent, and degree of success of any efforts of the violator to

minimize or mitigate the effects of the discharge, the economic impact of the penalty on the

violator, and any other matters as justice may require.

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Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Highlighted Activities

Congressional Activity

Although interest has arguably diminished in the 112th Congress (relative to interest in the 111th

Congress—see text box below), some Members continue to express concerns regarding various

oil spill-related policy matters.

The House passed H.R. 3408 (the PIONEERS Act) on February 15, 2012; the act would create a

Gulf Coast Restoration Trust Fund in the U.S. Treasury, financed by 80% of any Deepwater

Horizon-related penalties, settlements, and fines under Clean Water Act (CWA) Section 311.

Compared to similar bills, the text is relatively brief, stating that the Trust Fund would be used to

“restore the ecosystems and economy of the Gulf Coast region.” Unlike similar legislative

proposals (e.g., S. 1400, discussed below), the monies in the Trust Fund would not be

immediately available, but would require further congressional action to appropriate the funds.

The Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works reported S. 1400 (the RESTORE Act)

on December 11, 2011. This bill would distribute (without further appropriation) potential CWA

penalties from the incident to Gulf states and a restoration council to support various objectives,

including restoration projects and economic development in the Gulf states.

At least four committees in both the House and the Senate have held hearings on issues associated

with the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the 112th Congress. Several of these hearings dealt with

recommendations made by the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and

Offshore Drilling, which issued its final report in January 2011.25 At least 30 proposals have been

introduced that would address various oil spill-related issues.26 Some of the bills are similar (if

not identical) to proposals from the 111th Congress. Other bills reflect recommendations by the

Commission in its January 2011 final report.27

Activity in the 111th Congress28

During the immediate aftermath of the oil spill, Senate and House committees in the 111th Congress held more than

60 hearings on a variety of issues. Members introduced more than 150 legislative proposals related to oil spill matters.

The 111th Congress enacted three of these proposals into law (P.L. 111-191, P.L. 111-212, and P.L. 111-281).

Provisions in these laws generally concerned short-term matters that will not have a lasting impact on oil spill

governance. However, H.R. 3619, the Coast Guard Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011, which the

President signed October 15, 2010 (P.L. 111-281), includes more substantial changes. In addition to the enacted

legislation, the House in the 111th Congress passed several bills, including H.R. 3534 (the Consolidated Land, Energy,

and Aquatic Resources Act, or CLEAR Act), that included multiple oil spill provisions. The Senate had comparable

bills on its legislative calendar, but did not vote on their passage.

The final report and other publications are available at http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/.

Primarily in response to oil pipeline spills, Congress enacted (January 3, 2012) one oil spill-related bill—H.R. 2845

(the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011). See CRS Report R41684, Oil Spill

Legislation in the 112th Congress, by Jonathan L. Ramseur.

See CRS Report R41684, Oil Spill Legislation in the 112th Congress, by Jonathan L. Ramseur; and Commission’s

final report at http://www.oilspillcommission.gov.

CRS Report R41453, Oil Spill Legislation in the 111th Congress, by Jonathan L. Ramseur (archived).

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Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Highlighted Activities

In contrast, proposals that seek to encourage offshore oil exploration and development have seen

more legislative action. Congress enacted one bill with provisions that arguably encourage OCS

development. On December 23, 2011, Congress enacted P.L. 112-74 (Consolidated

Appropriations Act, 2012). Among other provisions, this act (§432) transfers air emission

regulatory authority in the OCS off Alaska’s north coast from the U.S. Environmental Protection

Agency (EPA) to the Department of the Interior (DOI). The primary difference between the EPA

and DOI programs is rooted in their different statutory authorities, which have different

objectives—air quality versus offshore energy development. The two regulatory programs reflect

these underlying differences.

In addition, the House passed several bills that encourage oil and gas development on the OCS:

for example, H.R. 1230, H.R. 1229, H.R. 1231, and H.R. 2021. The Senate has not reported

analogous legislation.

Executive Branch Activity

The Administration’s response involves multiple agencies. As this spill occurred in the coastal

zone, an on-scene coordinator (OSC) from the U.S. Coast Guard directed and coordinated the onsite activities of federal, state, local, and private entities (e.g., BP). The OSC continues to

coordinate activities in the region. This framework of multiple parties working together under the

leadership of the federal government is referred to as the Unified Command. Upon classifying the

event as a spill of national significance, Secretary of Homeland Security Napolitano appointed

retired Coast Guard Admiral Thad Allen as National Incident Commander, a role that dissolved in

October 2010.

Prior to the oil spill, the Department of the Interior (DOI) and congressional investigations had

identified a number of management shortcomings, ethical lapses among personnel, and conflicts

of interest in the former Minerals Management Service (MMS). Such concerns had been raised in

oversight hearings and in reports, including one from the DOI inspector general.29 On May 19,

2010, the Secretary of the Department of the Interior (DOI) replaced the Minerals Management

Service (MMS) with the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement

(BOEMRE). On October 1, 2011, DOI divided BOEMRE into three separate entities: the Bureau

of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement

(BSEE), and the Office of Natural Resources Revenue (ONRR).

The DOI agencies have issued several regulatory and policy changes related to offshore activities,

including an interim final rule on drilling procedures, and notices to lessees (NTLs) on worst-case

discharges and spill containment measures.30

After observing the Deepwater Horizon response operations in the Gulf, many questioned the

ability of industry and the federal government to prevent or respond to a significant blowout at

substantial water depths. DOI agencies issued two notices to lessees (NTLs) to address some of

these issues through policy guidance.31 In addition, two industry groups—the Marine Well

For more information, see CRS Report R41485, Reorganization of the Minerals Management Service in the

Aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, by Henry B. Hogue.

For more details, see http://www.boem.gov/reforms.htm.

The NTLs are available at http://www.boem.gov/reforms.htm.

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Containment Company (MWCC)32 and Helix Well Containment Group (HWGC)33—pooled

resources to develop subsea containment technology that could be used by operators on the OCS.

Independent Inquiries

Several investigations and commissions—both federal and private—were initiated to examine

issues surrounding the Deepwater Horizon incident. These include the following (listed in order

of report publication date):

•

National Incident Commander’s Report: final report released October 2010.34

•

U.S. Coast Guard’s Incident Specific Preparedness Review: final report released

January 2011.35

•

The National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore

Drilling: final report—The Gulf Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling—

submitted to the President on January 12, 2011.36

•

Joint Investigation of Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and

Enforcement and U.S. Coast Guard: volume I of the final report—Report of

Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Explosion, Fire, Sinking

and Loss of Eleven Crew Members Aboard the Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit

Deepwater Horizon—issued in April 2011;37 and Volume II—Report Regarding

the Causes of the April 20, 2010 Macondo Well Blowout—issued in September

2011.38

•

On Scene Coordinator Report: released September 2011.39

•

National Academy of Engineering: final report—Macondo Well–Deepwater

Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety—issued

December 2011.40

•

U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board: report forthcoming.41

Several committee hearings have considered the findings of some of these reports, particularly the

National Commission’s final report.

See http://marinewellcontainment.com/about.php.

See http://www.helixesg.com/HFRS/.

See http://www.nrt.org

See http://www.uscg.mil/foia/docs/DWH/BPDWH.pdf.

See http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/.

For cover letter, see http://www.boemre.gov/pdfs/maps/JointMemo092011.pdf; Volume I available at

https://homeport.uscg.mil.

See http://www.boemre.gov/pdfs/maps/DWHFINAL.pdf.

See https://homeport.uscg.mil.

See http://www.nae.edu/default.aspx?id=19649.

See http://www.csb.gov/investigations.

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CRS Reports for Further Reading

Legislation

CRS Report R41684, Oil Spill Legislation in the 112th Congress, by Jonathan L. Ramseur.

CRS Report R41453, Oil Spill Legislation in the 111th Congress, by Jonathan L. Ramseur.

2010 Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill

CRS Report R41679, Liability and Compensation Issues Raised by the 2010 Gulf Oil Spill, by

Jonathan L. Ramseur.

CRS Report R41531, Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: The Fate of the Oil, by Jonathan L. Ramseur.

CRS Report R41972, The 2010 Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Natural Resource Damage

Assessment Under the Oil Pollution Act, by James V. DeBergh.

CRS Report R41311, The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Coastal Wetland and Wildlife Impacts

and Response, by M. Lynne Corn and Claudia Copeland.

CRS Report R41320, Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Disaster: Risk, Recovery, and Insurance

Implications, by Rawle O. King.

CRS Report R41323, Tax Issues and the Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill: Legal Analysis of Payments

and Tax Relief Policy Options, by Molly F. Sherlock, Erika K. Lunder, and Edward C. Liu.

CRS Report R41265, The 2010 Oil Spill: MMS/BOEMRE and NEPA, by Kristina Alexander.

CRS Report R41234, Potential Stafford Act Declarations for the Gulf Coast Oil Spill: Issues for

Congress, by Francis X. McCarthy.

CRS Report R41365, Tax Deductible Expenses: The BP Case, by Molly F. Sherlock.

Background

CRS Report RL33705, Oil Spills in U.S. Coastal Waters: Background and Governance, by

Jonathan L. Ramseur.

CRS Report RS22145, Environmental Activities of the U.S. Coast Guard, by Jonathan L.

Ramseur.

CRS Report R41266, Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA): Liability of Responsible Parties, by

Robert Meltz.

CRS Report R41370, Federal Civil and Criminal Penalties Possibly Applicable to Parties

Responsible for the Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill, by Robert Meltz.

CRS Report RL34209, Commercial Fishery Disaster Assistance, by Harold F. Upton.

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Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Highlighted Activities

CRS Report R41308, The 2010 Oil Spill: Criminal Liability Under Wildlife Laws, by Kristina

Alexander.

CRS Report RL33404, Offshore Oil and Gas Development: Legal Framework, by Adam Vann.

CRS Report R41485, Reorganization of the Minerals Management Service in the Aftermath of the

Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, by Henry B. Hogue.

CRS Report RS22022, Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA), by Julie M. Whittaker.

CRS Report R40645, U.S. Offshore Oil and Gas Resources: Prospects and Processes, by Marc

Humphries and Robert Pirog.

CRS Report R41522, Cuba’s Offshore Oil Development: Background and U.S. Policy

Considerations, by Neelesh Nerurkar and Mark P. Sullivan.

CRS Report RS22990, Gas Hydrates: Resource and Hazard, by Peter Folger.

CRS Report R41132, Outer Continental Shelf Moratoria on Oil and Gas Development, by Curry

L. Hagerty.

Author Contact Information

Jonathan L. Ramseur

Specialist in Environmental Policy

jramseur@crs.loc.gov, 7-7919

Congressional Research Service

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.