U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress
Congressional research reportAug 8, 2011
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the
112th Congress
(name redacted)
Specialist in Asian Affairs
(name redacted)
Analyst in European Affairs
August 8, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-....
www.crs.gov
R41971
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress
Summary
A robust discussion has arisen around U.S. policy towards Burma. Some Members of Congress,
senior officials in the Obama Administration, noted Burma scholars, and representatives of
various interest groups have weighed in on this discussion, offering their views on the merits of
current U.S. policy towards Burma and what policy changes ought to be made.
Among the commentators, there is general agreement that more than 20 years of political and
economic sanctions, and nearly two years of “pragmatic engagement,” have not led to the
achievement of the stated goals of U.S. policy towards Burma—the release of all political
prisoners from detention and the transfer power to a representative, democratically elected
civilian government that will respect the human rights of the people of Burma, including its
ethnic minorities. However, there is little agreement as to why U.S. policy has been unsuccessful
and what needs to be done to increase the likelihood of achieving the stated goals.
Some analysts see the holding of parliamentary elections, the release of opposition leader Aung
San Suu Kyi from house arrest in November 2010, the formal dissolution of Burma’s military
regime, and its replacement by a mostly civilian government as evidence of the advent of a new
era in Burma. Others view these events as thinly veiled ruses designed to hide the continuation of
repressive military rule behind the veneer of seemingly civilian institutions. Both groups of
commentators point to various recent events to support for their recommendations for the conduct
of U.S. policy towards Burma.
Other factors complicate the formulation of U.S. policy towards Burma. The Association of
Southeast Asian Nations, of which Burma is a member, has called for the end of all sanctions on
Burma. The European Union recently lifted its visa ban for several senior officials in the new
Burmese government. Neighboring China, India, and Thailand have recently increased their
investments in Burma, particularly in its energy sector. Inside Burma, the outbreak of fighting
between the Burmese military and several ethnic-based militias has reportedly led to serious
human rights abuses and another wave of Burmese refugees in the region.
The current discussions have generally focused on three related issues: (1) the effectiveness of the
U.S. sanctions regime; (2) the value of high-level meetings with Burmese officials; and (3) the
ability to coordinate policies towards Burma with other nations. To some, the basic premise of
U.S. policy is fundamentally flawed, and a completely new approach is needed. To others, the
main problem with U.S. policy has been in its lack of focus and inadequate implementation.
Some question whether or not any U.S. policy can have an appreciable impact on Burma’s
military leaders and foster progress towards U.S. objectives in Burma.
The installation of a new government in Burma and the appointment of Derek J. Mitchell to serve
as the first Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma are viewed as creating a
“honeymoon period” in which Congress and the Obama Administration can review and, if
desired, adjust U.S. policy towards Burma. The genesis of U.S. policy towards Burma was largely
driven by Congress passing legislation after particularly egregious actions by Burma’s ruling
military junta. The 112th Congress is currently considering legislation (H.J.Res. 66 and S.J.Res.
17) that would renew certain import restrictions contained in the Burmese Freedom and
Democracy Act of 2003. If the history of the development of U.S. policy towards Burma is
indicative, any dramatic new development in Burma—either good or bad—could prompt
Congress into action.
Congressional Research Service
U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress
Contents
Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1
Why Burma? .................................................................................................................................... 2
Current U.S. Policy .......................................................................................................................... 4
Conduct of Policy ...................................................................................................................... 4
The U.S. Sanctions Regime ....................................................................................................... 7
U.S. Aid to Burma ..................................................................................................................... 8
Perceived Problems with U.S. Policy ...................................................................................... 10
Major Developments in Burma in 2010 ........................................................................................ 11
The 2010 Elections .................................................................................................................. 11
The Release of Aung San Suu Kyi .......................................................................................... 13
Burma in 2011 ............................................................................................................................... 14
The New Parliaments .............................................................................................................. 14
The New Union Government .................................................................................................. 16
President Thein Sein.......................................................................................................... 16
The Vice Presidents ........................................................................................................... 17
The Ministers .................................................................................................................... 17
The National Defence and Security Council and the State Supreme Council................... 18
Changes in the Burmese Military ............................................................................................ 19
The Human Rights Situation.......................................................................................................... 21
Human Rights Under the SPDC .............................................................................................. 21
Human Rights Under the New Government............................................................................ 23
Political Prisoners .................................................................................................................... 25
Burma’s Militias and Refugee Problem ......................................................................................... 26
The Ethnic-Based Militias ....................................................................................................... 27
Burma’s Refugees.................................................................................................................... 28
The Economy ................................................................................................................................. 30
Burma’s Relations with North Korea............................................................................................. 33
Implications for U.S. Policy .......................................................................................................... 36
The Sanctions Debate .............................................................................................................. 36
The Effectiveness of Sanctions ......................................................................................... 37
The International Context.................................................................................................. 38
Enforcement of Sanctions ................................................................................................. 43
The Engagement Debate.......................................................................................................... 45
The Role of Congress .................................................................................................................... 45
Maintenance and Enforcement of Existing Policy .................................................................. 46
Modifying U.S. Policy ............................................................................................................. 46
Figures
Figure 1. Burmese Refugee Camps ............................................................................................... 29
Congressional Research Service
U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Burma by Fund, FY2006-FY2011 ....................................................... 9
Table 2. Mass Prison Reprieves ..................................................................................................... 26
Table 3. GDP Growth Rates........................................................................................................... 31
Table B-1. Reports Requires under U.S. Burma Sanction Laws ................................................... 50
Table D-1. Burma’s Ministers and Their Portfolios....................................................................... 53
Appendixes
Appendix A. Map of Burma .......................................................................................................... 49
Appendix B. Reports Required Under U.S. Burma Sanctions Laws ............................................. 50
Appendix C. Parliamentary Election Results by Political Party .................................................... 52
Appendix D. Burma’s Ministers and Their Portfolios ................................................................... 53
Appendix E. Burma’s Ethnic-Based Militias ................................................................................. 55
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 56
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 56
Congressional Research Service
U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress
Introduction
Current U.S. policy towards Burma (Myanmar)1 can be characterized as the balancing of bilateral
engagement and an assortment of political and economic sanctions—an approach sometimes
referred to as “pragmatic engagement.” In addition, the Obama Administration is attempting to
convince other nations to adopt a similar policy towards Burma. The stated intent of U.S. policy
is to persuade and/or pressure Burma’s military junta, the State Peace and Development Council
(SPDC), to release all political prisoners from detention and transfer power to a representative,
democratically elected civilian government that will respect the human rights of the people of
Burma, including its ethnic minorities.
Recent political developments in Burma may be harbingers of change with implications for U.S.
policy. The SPDC held national parliamentary elections on November 7, 2010, after a relatively
short and controversial campaign period in which opposition parties claimed they faced
harassment, intimidations, and limited access to the media.2 On the day of the election, media
outside of Burma reported allegations of vote-rigging and election fraud, including the lastminute appearance of large numbers of “advance votes.” Six days after the election, Aung San
Suu Kyi,3 the preeminent leader of Burma’s democracy movement, was released from house
arrest. Despite the controversies surrounding the campaign and the election, the official election
results released on December 7, 2010, announced that the SPDC-backed Union Solidarity and
Development Party (USDP) had won over three-quarters of the parliamentary seats.
The new bicameral parliament convened for the first time on January 31, 2011, in the new capital
city of Nay Pyi Taw.4 Its main tasks were the selection of a new President and two Vice
Presidents, and the confirmation of the new government ministers. Most of the new government
appointments went to former SPDC members or military officers. On March 30, 2011, Senior
General Than Shwe formally dissolved the SPDC and former General, Prime Minister, and SPDC
First Secretary Thein Sein became Burma’s new president.
The initial responses of the 112th Congress and the Obama Administration to the political
developments in Burma have been generally critical. In a press release issued the day of Burma’s
parliamentary election, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that the United States was
“deeply disappointed” by the elections, noting that “[t]he electoral process was severely flawed,
precluded an inclusive, level playing field, and repressed fundamental freedoms. As a result, the
elections were neither free nor fair.”5 On November 18, 2010, the House of Representatives
passed H.Res. 1677, denouncing “the one-sided, undemocratic, and illegitimate actions of the
1
In 1989, the ruling military junta changed the country’s official name from Burma to Myanmar. The United States—
along with several other nations—officially continue to refer to the nation as Burma. The United Nations and most
Asian nations have adopted the name Myanmar.
2
For more about the controversial election campaign in Burma, see CRS Report R41447, Burma's 2010 Election
Campaign: Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).
3
Burmese names do not have formal surnames and frequently include honorifics. For example, Aung San Suu Kyi will
sometimes be referred to as “Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.” In this case “Daw” is an honorific, used with older women. This
report will not use honorifics and will refer to Burmese people using their full name.
4
Burma’s 2008 constitution designates the city of Nay Pyi Taw, also known as Naypyidaw, as the capital. However,
the State Department continues to recognize Rangoon, also known as Yangon, as the capital.
5
Office of the Secretary of State, “Burma’s Elections,” press release, November 7, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
1
U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress
State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) that seek to legitimize military rule through a
flawed election process.”
The international response to the political developments in Burma has been mixed. Australia,
Canada, and the European Union were also critical of the conduct of the November election, and
have kept their own sanctions on Burma largely intact. The Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) and China, by contrast, welcomed the election results and the installment of a
new government, and subsequently called for the removal of all sanctions on Burma.
The convening of Burma’s new parliament and the official transfer of power to President Sein
and his ministers has precipitated a debate over the effectiveness of the current U.S. policy and
possible strategies to foster political change in Burma. One of the pivotal issues in this debate is
the degree to which recent political events represent either a shift of power from the military to a
largely civilian government, or an elaborate ruse by which the SPDC remains in control of the
country. A second major issue is whether or not U.S. policy can significantly impact political
developments in Burma, and if so, what should be the main components of that policy. A third
issue is which of the various U.S. goals should be given priority in the short run, and which goals
are better viewed as long-run objectives.
For the last 20 years, Congress has played a major role in formulating U.S. policy towards
Burma, particularly in the imposition of sanctions. The 112th Congress may decide to take
legislative action with respect to U.S policy towards Burma, as past Congresses did. The 110th
Congress, responding to the violent suppression of a popular protest in Burma in 2007, tightened
sanctions on Burma by passing the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta’s Anti-Democratic
Efforts) Act of 2008 (2008 JADE Act) (P.L. 110-286). The 108th Congress passed the Burmese
Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-61) following a crackdown on opposition parties,
which included the arrest and detention of Aung San Suu Kyi. The 101st, 103rd, and 104th
Congresses passed similar sanction-tightening measures, generally after anti-democratic and/or
repressive actions by the SPDC.
Why Burma?
A number of scholars have questioned why the United States has had such a sustained interest in
Burma.6 As described in another CRS report, U.S. relations with Burma remained comparatively
normal following the military coup in 1962; punitive sanctions were first imposed following the
brutal suppression of a peaceful and popular protest movement in 1988.7 Over the next 20 years,
the United States gradually adopted more sanctions and increased the pressure on Burma’s ruling
military in an effort to end the repression and promote democracy.
There is little question about the military junta’s legacy of human rights violations and its violent
suppression of the people of Burma. However, Burma is not the only nation in Asia where the
government has been accused of serious human rights violations. Yet, as one noted Burma scholar
6
Among the more noted commentators on U.S. policy in Burma are: Aung Din, Priscilla Clapp, Suzanne DiMaggio,
Michael Green, Fred Hiatt, Bertil Lintner, David I. Steinberg, Derek Tonkin, Sean Turnell, and Maung Zarni.
7
For details of the genesis of U.S. policy towards Burma see CRS Report R41336, U.S. Sanctions on Burma, by
(name redacted).
Congressional Research Service
2
U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress
recently pointed out, current U.S. sanctions on Burma are in some ways stricter than those
imposed on the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea (North Korea).8
Burma also appears to be of little geopolitical or global economic importance for the United
States. Its location between China and India may make Burma important to those two contending
regional powers, but the United States has no apparent strategic interest in Burma. Burma’s
known natural gas and oil fields are attractive to energy companies around the world, but are
neither sufficient or necessary for the United States to meet its foreseeable energy demand.
Despite Burma’s apparent lack of importance and uniqueness, the United States for over two
decades has diligently pursued a policy designed to end military repression and promote
democracy—with arguably little to show for the effort. As a result, a broad and wide-ranging
discussion on U.S. policy towards Burma has emerged, with possible implications for U.S.
policies towards other nations. Some observers have argued that the U.S. policy towards Burma
has proven that sanctions never work and that sanctions on Burma—and by extension, any other
nation—should be lifted. Other analysts maintain that the SPDC’s behavior over the last 20 years
demonstrates that Burma’s military leaders are not open to reason and that engagement in any
form is destined to fail. Some commentators also decry U.S. efforts to coordinate policies with
other countries toward Burma, noting that other nations have other priorities and readily realize
the limits on how far the United States is willing to press its case regarding Burma.
Some commentators see less grandiose lessons in the history of U.S. policy towards Burma,
suggesting the problems lie in the conduct of the policy and not that the policy is fundamentally
flawed. To these observers, the problems with U.S. sanctions on Burma are that the sanctions are
not strict enough, not properly targeted, and/or not adequately enforced. Similarly, these
observers argue the lack of results from direct dialogue stems from insufficient time, unclear
intent, and/or inappropriate priorities in the talks. Past efforts to coordinate Burma policies with
other nations have fallen short of their desired goals, according to some analysts, because the
United States was not flexible enough to allow other nations to adopt a different approach to
achieve the same overall objectives.
A final group of writers on U.S. policy focus more on analyzing how events of the past few
years—particularly the establishment of a new parliament and the installation of a new
president—may have changed the political dynamic inside Burma, and the implications for U.S.
policy. To some, the changes inside Burma are purely cosmetic, with the military still firmly in
control. According to these analysts, the United States should not reward the SPDC for its
charade, and in the opinion of some, should increase the pressure on Burma’s military leadership.
To others, the changes inside Burma are flawed, but real, and with the proper support and
encouragement, could gradually lead to an end of flagrant violations of human rights and the
eventual restoration of democracy. These commentators suggest that the United States consider
selectively removing sanctions and increasing channels of bilateral interaction in order to bolster
the elements of change inside Burma that will promote democracy.
To help understand the interplay of these distinct, but interrelated policy discussions, this report
reviews current U.S. policy towards Burma, as well as recent developments in the country. The
report then examines the implications for future U.S. policy and considers what actions, if any,
the 112th Congress may take with respect to U.S. policy towards Burma.
8
David I. Steinberg, “Disparate Sanctions: US Sanctions, North Korea and Burma,” East Asia Forum, June 23, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
3
U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress
Current U.S. Policy
In September 2009, the Obama Administration announced a change in U.S. policy towards Burma
after seven months of review, discussion, and consultation.9 The existing sanctions regime
remained in place, but new elements of U.S. policy were added—the willingness to engage in
direct dialogue with the SPDC on how to promote democracy and human rights in Burma, and to
cooperate to a greater extent with the SPDC on international security issues, such as nuclear
nonproliferation and counternarcotics efforts.
Outside of the new willingness to engage in direct dialogue, the Obama policy has continued the
policies of the two preceding administrations with the same goals—namely, to support “a unified,
peaceful, prosperous, and democratic Burma that respects the human rights of its citizens.”10 In
order to achieve these goals, the Obama Administration pressed Burma’s military leaders to
release all its political prisoners, end all its conflicts with ethnic minorities, cease its human rights
violations, and initiate “a credible internal political dialogue with the democratic opposition and
ethnic minority leaders on elements of reconciliation and reform.”11
Conduct of Policy
At present, the Obama Administration and Congress appear to generally agree on the goals of
U.S. policy in Burma. Disagreement tends to arise over the setting of priorities among the stated
goals and devising the proper strategy to increase the odds of achieving those goals. Given the
events of the past nine months in Burma, one of the more pressing questions is determining what
positive changes are more likely to occur in the short run, and which are probably better viewed
as longer term objectives. In addition, other questions concern the proper balance between the
various instruments of U.S. policy—sanctions, direct talks, coordination with other nations,
etc.—and what to realistically respect from the use of each of those instruments.
Several key Executive Branch officials are responsible for the development and implementation
of U.S. policy towards Burma. The relevant U.S. laws explicitly designate the President, the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and U.S. Trade Representative as having the
responsibility and authority to carry out the various components of the U.S. sanctions regime
against Burma. Using granted presidential powers, past Presidents have delegated their sanctionrelated authority to the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
the Treasury, and the U.S. Trade Representative—and in some cases, have allowed the stipulated
official to “redelegate” authority to other U.S. government officials or agencies.12 Among the
current government officials who play an active role in the implementation of U.S. policy towards
Burma are: Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and the Pacific Affairs Joseph Yun, and former Deputy
9
U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Policy Toward Burma,” press release, September 28, 2010.
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
12
This has been done via several Presidential Executive Orders, as well as Presidential Proclamation 8294 (“To
Implement Amendments to the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003,” Federal Register, Vol. 73, No. 191,
October 1, 2008, pp. 57223-57227) and Presidential Determination No. 2009–11 (“Limited Waiver of Certain
Sanctions Imposed by, and Delegation of Certain Authorities Pursuant to, the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE
(Junta’s Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008,” Federal Register, Vol. 74, No. 12, January 21, 2009, pp. 3957-3958).
10
Congressional Research Service
4
U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and the Pacific Affairs and current Ambassador to
Indonesia Scot Marciel.
Future U.S. policy towards Burma is to be coordinated by Derek Mitchell who was confirmed by
the Senate on August 2, 2011 as Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma.
Mitchell was nominated for the position on April 15, 2011. The position, which holds an
ambassadorial ranking, was created by the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta’s AntiDemocratic Efforts) Act of 2008 (JADE Act) (P.L. 110-286). According to the JADE Act, the
Special Representative is responsible for coordinating U.S. policy towards Burma, consulting
with foreign governments on relations with Burma, and consulting with Congress on U.S. policy
towards Burma. Mitchell co-authored an article published in Foreign Affairs in 2007 that
advocated a new U.S. policy towards Burma very similar to the approach adopted by the Obama
Administration in 2009.13
According to the Obama Administration, the existing U.S. sanctions on Burma will remain in
place “until we see concrete progress towards reform.”14 The Obama Administration has reserved
the right to implement or recommend additional, targeted sanctions if warranted by circumstances
inside Burma. Alternatively, the Obama Administration may relax sanctions or call for the
removal of sanctions if the political situation in Burma meets the specified criteria set in existing
U.S. law.
In addition to relaxing sanctions, the Obama Administration could alter other aspects of U.S.
policy that are known to irritate the SPDC and Burma’s military. For example, the SPDC
routinely complains about the continued use of the name, “Burma,” by the U.S. government,
despite the SPDC’s officially changing the country’s name to Myanmar in 1989. Another known
source of irritation for the SPDC is the restriction on travel within the United States placed on
official diplomatic representatives from Burma.15
Since its announcement of a new Burma policy, the Obama Administration has held several direct
discussions with SPDC officials, including at the first ASEAN-U.S. leaders meeting in Singapore
on November 15, 2009, which both President Obama and Burma’s Prime Minister General Thein
Sein attended.16 A few days prior to the ASEAN-U.S. leaders meeting, Assistant Secretary
Campbell and Deputy Assistant Secretary Marciel traveled to Burma to meet with Prime Minister
Thein Sein—the highest level U.S. delegation to visit Burma in 14 years.17 Campbell and Marciel
also met with Aung San Suu Kyi and leaders of other opposition parties and ethnic minorities.
Assistant Secretary of State Campbell also visited Burma from May 9-10, 2010, and had meetings
with SPDC officials, NLD leaders (including Aung San Suu Kyi), and leaders from various ethnic
minority groups. In December 2010, Deputy Assistant Secretary Yun traveled to Burma where he
met with SPDC officials, Aung San Suu Kyi and other NLD leaders, and representatives of
various ethnic minority groups.
13
Michael Green and Derek Mitchell, “Asia’s Forgotten Crisis: A New Approach to Burma,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 86,
no. 1 (January/February 2007), pp. 147-158.
14
U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Policy Toward Burma,” press release, September 28, 2010.
15
The United States places limits on the travel of Burmese diplomats in the United States. For example, members of
Burma’s delegation to the United Nations are not allowed to travel beyond 20 miles from the United Nations without
prior written approval. U.S. diplomats in Burma face similar restrictions on their travel in Burma.
16
While the two leaders attended the meeting, they did not have a separate bilateral meeting.
17
Tim Johnston, “Scant Details on Reaction to U.S. Envoys’ Burma Visit,” Washington Post, November 6, 2009.
Congressional Research Service
5
U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress
Deputy Assistant Secretary Yun traveled again to Burma from May 18-20, 2011—becoming the
first U.S. official to visit the country following the installation of the new government. During his
visit, Yun met with Deputy Speaker of Burma’s Lower House Nanda Kyaw Swar, Foreign
Minister Wunna Maung Lwin, Aung San Suu Kyi, and other opposition leaders. According to a
press release from the U.S. embassy in Burma, in his meetings with the Deputy Speaker and
Foreign Minister, Yun reiterated that progress in bilateral relations “would depend on the
Burmese government taking meaningful, concrete steps towards democratic governance, respect
for human rights, and the release of all political prisoners.…”18 Two days before Yun’s arrival,
Burma’s President Thein Sein announced a partial amnesty for selected prisoners in Burma (see
“The Release of Aung San Suu Kyi ” below). It would appear that the Obama Administration has
determined that the amnesty announcement was not sufficient to warrant the relaxation of
sanctions or other possible changes in relations.
The purposes of the bilateral talks have not always been clear. The initial meetings with Burmese
officials and various opposition groups seemed to focus on establishing relations and fostering a
willingness to engage in dialogue. More recent meetings appear to have involved more
substantive discussions of the current situation in Burma and future paths to progress. The talks
have not indicated that the SPDC and the Tatmadaw are willing to consider direct talks involving
representatives of the various opposition groups – which the United States and others consider a
necessary condition for national reconciliation. The perceived lack of progress on political reform
and national reconciliation may have shifted the U.S. focus for the bilateral talks onto the release
of political prisoners and the improvement of human rights situation. However, there are few
signs of improvement on either of those issues.
The Obama Administration has continued the past practice of consulting with the international
community to foster the desired changes inside Burma, including an intensified effort to engage
with ASEAN, China, and India. Prior to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Hanoi in July
2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton expressed U.S. support for ASEAN’s call for free and fair
elections in Burma. The United States has also raised the political situation in Burma with China
at various fora. During his November 2010 trip to India, President Obama called on the Indian
parliament to speak up for democracy and human rights in Burma.19
As with the bilateral talks with Burma, the intent of the Obama Administration’s effort to consult
with the international community on Burma policy has not been readily apparent to observers. It
seems unlikely – and unrealistic – for the Obama Administration to expect other nations to adopt
a similar policy of “pragmatic engagement” involving a combination of sanctions and direct
dialogue with Burmese officials and leaders given the recent statements by several of the key
nations. One plausible objective may be agreeing on what changes should occur in Burma, and
what role each nation and the United Nations may play in fostering those changes.
18
U.S. Embassy—Rangoon, “U.S. Department of State Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Travel to Burma,” press release, May 20, 2011.
19
The full text of the President’s speech is available online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/08/
remarks-president-joint-session-indian-parliament-new-delhi-india.
Congressional Research Service
6
U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress
The U.S. Sanctions Regime20
U.S. sanctions targeted solely at Burma are specified in five federal laws, a series of Presidential
Executive Orders, and certain Presidential Determinations. The five laws are:
•
Section 138 of the Customs and Trade Act of 1990 (Section 138)(P.L. 101382)—requires the President to impose “such economic sanctions upon Burma as
the President determines to be appropriate,” unless the President certifies certain
conditions pertaining to human rights and counternarcotics have been met;
•
Section 307 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (Section 307)(P.L. 87-195),
as amended by the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and
1995 (P.L. 103-236)—withholds U.S. contributions to selected international
organizations with programs in Burma;
•
Section 570 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1997 (Section 570)(P.L. 104-208)21—imposes
various specific sanctions on Burma, unless the President certifies that certain
human rights and democracy standards have been met;
•
The Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 (BFDA) (P.L. 108-61)—
requires the President to impose a ban on the import of products of Burma;22
freeze assets of certain Burmese officials; block U.S. support for loans to Burma
from international financial institutions; and ban visas for certain Burmese
officials; and
•
The Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta’s Anti-Democratic Efforts)
Act of 2008 (JADE Act) (P.L. 110-286)—bans the direct and indirect import of
products containing Burmese jadeite and rubies; expands the list of Burmese
officials subjected to visa bans and financial sanctions; and allows the placement
of restrictions on use of correspondent accounts to provide services to Burmese
officials.
The BFDA and JADE Act also require the President, the State Department and the Treasury
Department to provide selected congressional committees with reports on the implementation of
their sanctions provisions (see Appendix B).
Four Presidential Executive Orders (E.O.) currently in force impose sanctions on Burma. The
four E.O.s are:
•
E.O. 13047—Issued on May 20, 1997, by President Bill Clinton, it bans all new
investments in Burma, as required by Section 570;
•
E.O. 13310—Issued on July 28, 2003, by President George W. Bush, it brings
the sanction regime into compliance with certain provisions of the BFDA,
20
For more detailed information about U.S. sanctions on Burma, see CRS Report R41336, U.S. Sanctions on Burma,
by (name redacted)
21
The Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997 was merged into Title 1
of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997.
22
The general import ban is subject to renewal. The 112th Congress is considering H.J.Res. 66 and S.J.Res. 17 which
would renew the import ban for another year.
Congressional Research Service
7
U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress
including the freezing of assets of certain Burmese officials and the prohibition
of the provision of financial services to Burma;
•
E.O. 13448—Issued on October 18, 2007, by President Bush, it added to the list
of Burmese officials and entities subject to the freezing of assets; and
•
E.O. 13464—Issued on April 30, 2008, by President Bush, it added to the list of
Burmese officials and entities subject to the freezing of assets.
President Bush also issued Presidential Determination No. 2009-11 on January 15, 2009,
providing a limited waiver of some of the sanctions in the JADE Act stating that doing so was “in
the national interest of the United States.”23
The existing U.S. sanctions specifically targeted at Burma can be generally divided into several
broad categories. First, there are bans on issuing visas to certain Burmese government officials
(particularly the former and present leadership of the State Peace and Development Council
[SDPC] and the Union Solidarity Development Association [USDA]), members of their families,
and their business associates. Second, there are restrictions on the provision of financial services
to certain Burmese government officials, members of their families, and their business associates.
Third, certain assets of selected Burmese individuals held by U.S. entities have been “frozen.”
Fourth, there is a general prohibition on the import of goods of Burmese origin. Fifth, there is a
prohibition on the import of certain types of goods and goods from certain companies. Sixth,
there is a ban on new U.S. investments in Burma, including investments in third country
companies.24 Seventh, there are restrictions on the provision of bilateral and multilateral
assistance to Burma.
The enforcement of the sanctions is handled by multiple government agencies. The visa ban and
related provisions are administered by the State Department, as well as U.S. Customs and Border
Protection. The restrictions on the provision of financial services and the “freezing” of the assets
of certain Burmese officials is the responsibility of the U.S. Treasury and its Office of Foreign
Assets Control (OFAC). The restrictions on the importation of certain Burmese products is
managed by U.S. Customs and Border Protection of the Department of Homeland Security.
Enforcing restrictions on provision of bilateral or multilateral assistance is the responsibility of
the designated U.S. representative to the applicable agency or international body.
U.S. Aid to Burma
The existing sanctions laws contain provisions that do allow U.S. aid to Burma for humanitarian
assistance and in cases of natural disasters. Section 570 of the Foreign Operations, Export
Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997 (P.L. 104-208)25 prohibits bilateral
assistance to Burma except for humanitarian assistance; assistance promoting human rights and
democratic values; and counter-narcotics assistance (under specific conditions). The law does
23
Executive Determination 2009-11, “Limited Waiver of Certain Sanctions Imposed by, and Delegation of Certain
Authorities Pursuant to, the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta’s Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008,” 74
Federal Register 3957-3958, January 21, 2009.
24
Investments made prior to May 21, 1997—such as Unocal’s investment in the Yadana gas project—are not affected
by the new investment ban.
25
The Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997, was merged into Title 1
of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997.
Congressional Research Service
8
U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress
provide for a presidential waiver—either temporary or permanent—if the President “determines
and certifies to Congress that the application of such sanction would be contrary to the national
interest of the United States.” No such waiver is currently in effect.
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Burma by Fund, FY2006-FY2011
(US$ millions)
Fiscal Year
Total
Development
Assistance
Economic
Support Fund
Global Health
and Child
SurvivalUSAID
2006
10.890
10.890
2007
12.990
10.890
2.100
2008
43.758
12.895
2.083
2009
35.400
33.300
2.100
2010
38.600
36.500
2.100
2011b
38.527
36.427
2.100
0.717
P.L. 480a
28.063
Source: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, multiple years.
a.
P.L. 480 Title II Food Assistance Program.
b.
Figures provided to CRS by State Department.
Following the devastation caused by Cyclone Nargis in 2008, the United States provided over $85
million in assistance to help victims in Burma.26 The United States provided an additional $1.5
million in assistance after Cyclone Giri struck Burma in October 2010. When providing this
assistance, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) took measures to ensure that
aid money went directly to either U.N. agencies or international non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) and that none of the funds were paid to Burmese government officials or other
sanctioned entities.27 Besides support following natural disasters, U.S. aid to Burma has generally
been distributed in neighboring countries, with Thailand receiving much of the assistance to
support Burmese refugees in camps along the border (see “Burma’s Refugees”).
Much of U.S. assistance for Burma is administered through the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID). According to USAID’s webpage on Burma assistance, USAID “provides
humanitarian assistance to people in Burma, internally displaced persons (IDPs), as well as
migrants and refugees in 10 Thai provinces along the Thailand-Burma border.”28 Some of the
specific Burma programs supported by USAID include:
•
programs to combat avian influenza (AI), HIV/AIDS, and other infectious
diseases;
26
Burma was struck by a category 3 cyclone on May 2, 2007, resulting in the deaths of approximately 130,000 people.
For more information on the destruction caused by Cyclone Nargis and the international relief effort, see CRS Report
RL34481, Cyclone Nargis and Burma’s Constitutional Referendum, by (name redacted) and (name redacted).
27
This was confirmed by a recent Government Accountability Office report (U.S. Government Accountability Office,
Burma: UN and U.S. Agencies Assisted Cyclone Victims in Difficult Environment, but Improved U.S. Monitoring
Needed, GAO-11-700, July 2011).
28
http://www.usaid.gov/locations/asia/countries/burma/.
Congressional Research Service
9
U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress
•
education programs for Burmese IDPs, migrants, and refugees in Thailand;
•
training and assistance to strengthen community-based organizations in refugee
camps in Thailand; and
•
support for Burmese organizations seeking to protect human rights, civil liberties,
and press freedom in Burma and Thailand.
USAID typically allocates funds by providing grants to international and local NGOs. USAID has
used its Burma funds to provide grants to a number of different organizations, including the
American Refugee Committee, the National Endowment for Democracy, and the U.N. World
Food Program. In October 2010, USAID posted a solicitation for a Personal Services Contractor
(PSC) to serve as Burma Country Program Manager to be located in Burma, subject to visa
approval. If this position is successfully filled, it will be the first U.S. aid worker stationed in
Burma in many years.
Perceived Problems with U.S. Policy
The Obama Administration has readily admitted some frustration with the results of its Burma
policy. When asked during the State Department’s daily press briefing on March 10, 2010, for
signs of progress in Burma resulting from the new policy, Assistant Secretary Philip J. Crowley
stated that “so far, those results are lacking.”29 Following his May 2010 trip to Burma, Assistant
Secretary Campbell stated that the Obama Administration was “profoundly disappointed by the
response of the Burmese leadership.”30 In his testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee
on June 2, 2011, Deputy Assistant Secretary Yun stated “We are disappointed by the lack of any
results from our repeated efforts at dialogue.”31
There appear to be several sources of frustration within the Obama Administration with respect to
Burma. First, the SPDC has reportedly been relatively unresponsive in the high-level meetings,
preferring to confine discussion to the exchange of formal statements that avoid or evade the
issues raised by U.S. officials. Second, the current U.S. sanction regime may not be effectively
targeted so as to be able to apply pressure for change. Third, other nations are seemingly reluctant
or unwilling to discuss ways to coordinate Burma policies, thereby creating opportunities for the
SPDC to circumvent efforts by the United States and other countries to apply political and
economic pressure.
There are indications that the Obama Administration is examining a possible rebalancing of its
Burma policy. In part, this rebalancing may reflect its disappointment with the apparent
ineffectiveness of the current approach. The rebalancing may also be in response to the formation
of a new government and its possible implications for the future of Burma. Finally, Special
Representative Mitchell may wish to pursue a restructuring of the strategic approach of U.S.
policy towards Burma.
29
U.S. Department of State, “Daily Press Briefing,” press release, March 10, 2010.
U.S. Embassy in Rangoon, Burma, “Assistant Secretary Campbell’s Remarks on Visit to Burma,” press release, May
10, 2010.
31
Department of State, “Block Burmese JADE Act and Recent Policy Developments,” press release, June 2, 2011.
30
Congressional Research Service
10
U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress
Major Developments in Burma in 2010
The year 2010 proved to be an eventful year for Burma, with the country struck by another major
cyclone32 and racked by periodic conflicts between the Burmese military, known as the Tatmadaw
(“Royal Force”), and various insurgent groups in eastern Burma (see “The Ethnic-Based Militias”
below). However, what may prove to be the most politically significant events for the year both
took place in November—the national elections to select the nation’s first civilian parliament in
20 years, and the release of Aung San Suu Kyi. The elections, held on November 7, were
portrayed by the SPDC as the completion of the fifth step in its seven-step process for the
creation of a “disciplined democracy” in Burma.33 However, to the United States and many other
nations the elections were neither free nor fair, and denoted little progress in the return to civilian
rule Burma. By contrast, the release of Aung San Suu Kyi was greeted by the international
community as a possibly pivotal event that might lead to the resumption of talks between the
SPDC and the various opposition groups in Burma about possible national reconciliation.
The 2010 Elections
Burma’s first parliamentary elections in 20 years were held on November 7, 2010. At stake were
168 seats in the Upper House (Amyotha Hluttaw, or National Assembly) and 325 seats in the
Lower House (Pyithu Hluttaw, or People’s Assembly) of the Union Parliament (Pyidaungsu
Hluttaw), as well as 661 seats in the 14 Regional and State Hluttaws.34 Candidates from 37
different political parties ran in the election, including the SPDC-backed Union Solidarity and
Development Party (USDP) and a splinter group from the NLD, the National Democratic Force
(NDF). The NLD was prohibited from participating in the election after it refused to re-register as
a political party.35 Voting was held after a relatively short and controversial campaign period, in
which opposition parties maintained they faced harassment, intimidation and limited access to the
media.36 Opposition leaders and international observers also complained about the SPDCimposed election laws.37
32
Cyclone Giri, a category 4 cyclone, struck the coast of Burma on October 22, 2010, killing over 150 people and
leaving tens of thousands of people homeless. The United States initially provided $300,000 in emergency relief
supplies. On January 11, 2011, the United States announced it would provide an addition $1.5 million in food
assistance.
33
For more information on the SPDC’s seven-step roadmap to democracy, see CRS Report R41218, Burma’s 2010
Elections: Implications of the New Constitution and Election Laws, by (name redacted).
34
Elections were not held for five seats in the Lower House and for 12 seats in the Regional and State Hluttaws
because of the ongoing military conflicts in those areas of Burma. No date has been announced for elections for those
seats.
35
The NLD decided against reregistering because certain provisions in the election laws may have prohibited some
NLD leaders, including Aung San Suu Kyi, from running in the election, as well as required the NLD accept that the
1990 election results were invalid. The laws also severely constrained the use of funds to conduct a campaign.
36
For more about the controversial election campaign in Burma, see CRS Report R41447, Burma's 2010 Election
Campaign: Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).
37
For more about the various provisions of the elections laws, see CRS Report R41218, Burma’s 2010 Elections:
Implications of the New Constitution and Election Laws, by (name redacted).
Congressional Research Service
11
U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress
News accounts of the conduct of the election
vary widely in their assessments. The SPDCrun media in Burma reported a high turnout
and few voting irregularities. The opposition
press in exile (such as Irrawaddy and
Mizzima) and some international observers
reported a light turnout and serious voting
irregularities. Among the more serious claims
of voting fraud were reports of ballot box
stuffing and the delivery of large numbers of
unexplained “advance votes” to many polling
places. In some cases, the “advance votes”
were delivered after preliminary results
indicated that an opposition candidate had
won the election.
The Controversial Creation of the USDP
The creation of the Union Solidarity and Development
Party (USDP) was the source of some political
controversies in Burma. The USDP officially applied for
recognition as a political party on April 29, 2010, when
then-Prime Minister Thein Sein and 26 other government
officials submitted the necessary documents to the Union
Election Commission (UEC). However, a provision in the
Political Party Registration Law appears to prohibit civil
services personnel from forming a political party. On
June 8, 2010, the UEC recognized the USDP as a political
party, ruling that the Prime Minister and other officials
were not civil servants.
On July 16, 2010, the assets of the Union Solidarity and
Development Association (USDA), a SPDC-run
“grassroots organization” claiming over 24 million
members, were transferred to the USDP, providing the
new political party with both the money and a network
of contacts to use in the upcoming campaign. The asset
transfer became controversial because another provision
in the Political Party Registration Law prohibits a party
from obtaining or using directly or indirectly money,
buildings, vehicles, or property owned by the State.
Several opposition parties maintained that the USDA
asset transfer violated this law, and the USDP should
therefore either be barred from the election or required
to relinquish the assets. The UEC decided otherwise,
allowing the USDP to keep the USDA’s assets.
In a press release issued the day of the
parliamentary election, Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton stated that the United States
was “deeply disappointed” by the elections,
noting that “[t]he electoral process was
severely flawed, precluded an inclusive, level
playing field, and repressed fundamental
freedoms. As a result, the elections were
neither free nor fair.”38 Secretary Clinton also
indicated that allegations of intentional
Internet slowdowns, voter intimidation, and fraudulent “advance voting” schemes were “very
troubling.”
On December 7, 2010, the Union Election Commission (UEC), which was responsible for
conducting the parliamentary elections, announced the official results. According to the UEC,
77% of Burma’s eligible voters voted, with 93% of the votes cast deemed valid. The USDP won
in a landslide, picking up 129 seats (77%) in the Upper House, 259 seats (80%) in the Lower
House, and 495 seats (75%) in the Regional and State Hluttaws (see 0). When coupled with the
25% of the seats in the Upper and Lower House reserved for military personnel (to be appointed
by the Tatamadaw’s Commander in Chief), the USDP/military bloc holds a supermajority in both
houses, which would allow them to amend Burma’s constitution. The main opposition party, the
NDF, won a total of 16 seats—eight in the Lower House, four in the Upper House, and four in
Regional and State Hluttaws. Several ethnic minority parties—the All Mon Region Democracy
Party, the Chin Progressive Party, the PaO National Organization, the Rakhine Nationals
Progressive Party, and the Shan Nationals Democratic Party—won 10 or more seats, but were
unable to win enough seats to control any of the 14 Regional or State Hluttaws.
The international response to Burma’s 2010 elections was mixed. The House of Representatives
passed H. Res. 1677 on November 18, 2010, denouncing “the one-sided, undemocratic, and
illegitimate actions of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) that seek to legitimize
military rule through a flawed election process.” President Obama, who was traveling in India at
38
Office of the Secretary of State, “Burma’s Elections,” press release, November 7, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
12
U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress
the time, released a statement saying the “elections in Burma were neither free nor fair, and failed
to meet any of the internationally accepted standards associated with legitimate elections.”39
Despite pressure from President Obama, India’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh made no
official statement regarding Burma’s elections. The ASEAN Chairman, Vietnam’s Foreign
Minister Pham Gia Khiem, issued a statement on November 11, 2010, welcoming the election as
“a significant step forward in the implementation of the 7-point Roadmap for Democracy.”40
China also welcomed the election, referring to is as “a critical step for Myanmar in implementing
the seven-step road map in the transition to an elected government.”41 A senior official with the
Indonesian government stated, “While we are welcoming the results of the [Burmese] elections,
we are urging reconciliation.”42
The Release of Aung San Suu Kyi
Aung San Suu Kyi was released from house arrest on November 13, 2010. She had been under
detention since her conviction in August 2009 for allowing an uninvited U.S. visitor, John Yettaw,
to stay overnight in her home without notifying Burmese authorities. The court-ordered sentence
of three years in prison was commuted to house arrest for up to 18 months by SPDC leader,
Senior General Than Shwe. At the time of her conviction in 2009, she was already under house
arrest that had been imposed “for her own safety” on May 30, 2003, after clashes between her
supporters and pro-SPDC demonstrators.
Many international observers viewed her trial and conviction as a way for the SPDC to minimize
her influence in the November 2010 parliamentary elections. The length of her commuted house
arrest meant she was eligible for release only after the election was held.
Since her release, Aung San Suu Kyi’s movements have been closely monitored by Burmese
authorities, who have also placed restrictions on who she is allowed to see. Her younger son, Kim
Aris, was granted permission to visit her soon after her release from house arrest. She has also
been allowed to meet with several U.N. and U.S. officials, including Vijay Nambiar, chief of staff
for U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, and Deputy Assistant Secretary Yun. In early July, she
traveled outside of Rangoon for the first time to Pagan (Bagan) despite veiled threats against her
in the government-run press (see “Human Rights Under the New Government”). While she
reportedly has permission to travel out of the country, Aung San Suu Kyi has so far refrained
from international travel perhaps because she fears she may not be allowed reentry into Burma.
Aung San Suu Kyi has focused her energies since her release on several activities. First, she has
been educating herself on the situation in Burma and the international attitudes towards the
country.43 Second, she has been holding frequent meetings with the NLD’s aging leadership
(frequently referred to as the “Uncles”) as well as with NLD members. Third, she has helped
39
The White House, “Statement by President Obama on Burma’s November 7 Elections,” press release, November 7,
2010.
40
ASEAN Secretariat, “ASEAN Chair Issues Statement on Myanmar Elections,” press release, November 11, 2010.
41
“China Welcomes Myanmar’s Smooth General Election,” Xinhua, November 9, 2010.
42
Mustaqim Adamrah, “Indonesia ‘Welcomes’ Myanmar Election Results,” Jakarta Post, November 16, 2010.
43
During her house arrest, Aung San Suu Kyi had very limited contact with the outside world. She was allowed to
listen to the radio and read newspapers, but was forbidden to use the Internet, watch television, or use the telephone.
Outside contact was generally limited to her doctor and two residential maids, although she was permitted to meet
twice with Kurt Campbell in 2009 and 2010, and once with Joseph Yun.
Congressional Research Service
13
U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress
direct the reformation of the NLD as a political force in Burma by submitting appeals for the
NLD’s reinstatement as a political party (rejected by Burma’s courts) and organizing public
awareness events. Fourth, Aung San Suu Kyi has reached out to the international community to
express her views and those of the NLD on the situation in Burma and what she thinks is the
appropriate international response. In June 2011, she testified by video at a hearing of the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific.
The SPDC’s decision to end Aung San Suu Kyi’s house arrest was greeted with guarded approval
by the Obama Administration. The White House issued a statement “welcoming her long overdue
release,” but then pointed out that her release “does not change the fact that she, and the political
opposition she represents, has been systematically silenced, incarcerated, and deprived of any
opportunity to engage in political processes that could change Burma.”44 The statement went on
to call for the release of all political prisoners in Burma (see “Political Prisoners”).
Burma in 2011
The transition to the new government began early in 2011, with the new Union Parliament
meeting for the first time on January 31, 2011. Prior to the parliament’s first session, the SPDC
established relatively restrictive rules and procedures for the Union Parliament. The main tasks
for the Union Parliament’s first session was the selection of Burma’s President and two Vice
Presidents, the selection of speakers for both houses of parliament, and the confirmation of
ministerial nominations—undertakings that the parliament successfully completed before
adjourning on March 30, 2011. Also on March 30, Senior General Than Shwe formally dissolved
the SPDC, officially transferred power to the new government, and appointed General Min Aung
Hlaing as his successor as Commander-in-Chief of the Burmese military.45
The New Parliaments
Burma’s various parliaments—the Upper House and the Lower House of the Union Parliament,
and the 14 Regional and State Hluttaws—met for the first time on January 31, 2011, in their
specially constructed buildings in Nay Pyi Taw. Access to the parliament buildings was limited to
members of the parliaments, their staff and other government officials. No media were allowed.
The second session of the Union Parliament is scheduled to begin on August 22, 2011.46
The parliamentary meetings proceeded under rules released by the SPDC on January 11, 2011,
but created on October 21, 2010—16 days before the parliamentary elections.47 The rules
reportedly include strict limitations on the clothes to be worn by the members of the parliament,
contact with the media, and the length and content of comments that can be made on the floor of
the parliament. Under the SPDC-imposed rules, all questions must be submitted in advance and
44
White House, “Statement by the President on the release of Aung San Suu Kyi,” press release, November 12, 2010.
Wai Moe, “Than Shwe Officially Dissolves Junta,” Irrawaddy, March 30, 2011.
46
The official summons to the Union Parliament and its two houses were published in the New Light of Myanmar on
August 1, 2011.
47
Article 443 of Burma’s new constitution grants the SPDC the authority to promulgate laws that remain in force after
the new government is established. For more information, see Htet Aung, “Burma’s Disciplined Democracy,”
Irrrawaddy, January 20, 2011.
45
Congressional Research Service
14
U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress
the Speaker has the authority to edit or block the submitted questions. The SPDC rules also
prohibit outside discussion or distribution of parliamentary documents; violators, including the
members of the parliaments, are to be sentenced to at least two years in prison, a fine of
approximately $250, or both.
The Union Parliament chose Former General,
Prime Minister, and SPDC member Thein
Sein as President. The two Vice Presidents
selected were former General and SPDC
Secretary Tin Aung Myint Oo and Dr. Sai
Mauk Kham, an ethnic Shan member of the
Upper House from the USDP. The Speakers
for the Lower and Upper Houses are former
SPDC members Thura Shwe Man and Khin
Aung Myint, respectively. The Speakers for all
14 Regional and State Hluttaws are USDP
members; 10 were previously generals in the
Tatmadaw.
After his selection as Lower House Speaker
Thura Shwe Man reportedly told chamber
members to refrain from spending too much
time in debate.48 Upper House Speaker Khin
Aung Myint reportedly made a similar
statement to his chamber’s members. In an
article in the government-run newspaper, The
Mirror, he was quoted as saying, “The
Parliament representatives are to serve the
interests of the people unanimously, no matter
which party they are from [sic].… The
precious time will be lost if they argue with
each other. The Parliament should not be in a
debate-like situation.”49
State and Regional Power: A Path for
Political Change?
The Schedules One and Two of the 2008 constitution
distinguishes between the types of laws that the Union
Parliament and the State and Regional Parliaments have
the right to enact. In addition, the constitution provides
for 14 separate State and Regional Governments, each
headed by a Chief Minister, who is appointed by Burma’s
President, subject to the approval of the State or
Regional Parliament. The Chief Ministers report directly
to the President.
Some observers have speculated that the separate,
protected powers of the State and Regional Parliaments
may provide a mechanism for the gradual transformation
of Burma into a more democratic government. This is
seen as being most likely in States where ethnic
minorities constitute a larger portion of the population.
Other observers, however, note that the constitution
contains additional provisions that can be used by the
President and the Commander-in-Chief to maintain
control over troublesome States or Regions. The
President has the power to dismiss Chief Ministers and
require the reorganization of state and regional
ministries. In the case of an emergency in a State or
Region, the President can assume both legislative and
executive power in that State or Region. If the
emergency should threaten to cause the dissolution of
the Union, a loss of national sovereignty, or involve an
insurgency or violence, the Commander-in-Chief may
assume power over the State or Region.
On June 29, 2011, President Thein Sein reorganized the
ministries in the Kachin State and the Saigaing Region.
On June 30, he reorganized the ministries in the Bago
Region, the Chin State, the Kayan State, and the Yangon
Region. In all six cases, the reorganization also involved
the appointment of new ministers. It waits to be seen if
this reflects a Union Government policy of asserting tight
control over the States and Regions.
Early assessments of the function of Burma’s
new Union Parliament have been mixed.
Richard Horsey, a former International Labor
Organization (ILO) officer in Burma, notes
that the Upper House and Lower House met
separately on 14 days and jointly for 18 days
while in session, with meetings often lasting only a few minutes, “earning it the epithet, ‘the
fifteen-minute parliament’ among some activists.”50 However, Burmese commentator Kyaw
Kyaw maintains that members of parliament have used their limited ability to submit questions to
48
Myo Thant, “A Parliament without Debate?,” Mizzima, February 2, 2011.
As cited in Myo Thant, “A Parliament without Debate?,” Mizzima, February 2, 2011.
50
Richard Horsey, The Initial Functioning of the Myanmar Legislatures, SSRC, May 17, 2011.
49
Congressional Research Service
15
U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress
good use, forcing government ministers to publicly address issues “that are not normally
discussed in domestic media.”51
Another key factor that may limit the power of Burma’s new Union Parliament is the new
constitution. Under the constitution, the President and his cabinet have fairly broad powers, and
the Union Parliament has limited oversight and review of the actions and decisions of the
executive branch, but the constitution does provide the Union Parliament with the ability to
appoint and impeach the President, Vice Presidents, and government ministers. The constitution
also grants the Burmese military virtual autonomy from the Union Parliament, beyond possible
budgetary control.52
The New Union Government
Burma’s new President, Vice Presidents and Ministers are collectively referred to in Burma’s
constitution as the “Union Government.” As the country’s executive branch, the Union
Government assumed responsibility for the administration and operation of Burma’s domestic
and foreign policies after the formal dissolution of the SPDC. The Union Government has the
constitutional power to set policies, propose the national budget, and conduct foreign affairs,
subject to the approval of the Union Parliament. The constitution also provides some additional
powers to the President not often found in other countries, making Burma’s President potentially
the most powerful political figure in the country. However, if the President attempts to overreach
in exerting his power, he can be impeached by the Union Parliament, and replaced by one of the
two Vice Presidents.
President Thein Sein
Thein Sein was born on April 20, 1945. He is a graduate of Burma’s elite military school, the
Defence Services Academy. His military career included posting in various parts of Burma,
including the Shan State, the home of several ethnic-based militias (see “The Ethnic-Based
Militias”). After the downfall of the former intelligence chief General Khin Nyunt in 2004 based
on allegations of corruption, Thein Sein was made the SPDC’s First Secretary and promoted to
Lieutenant General. In 2007, he was appointed Prime Minister when his predecessor, Soe Win,
became ill with leukemia. He oversaw the drafting of Burma’s new constitution and played an
important role in the transformation of the USDA, the SPDC’s civilian organization, into the
USDP, the SPDC-backed political party. He is viewed as one of the more moderate SPDC leaders,
and disinclined to take unnecessary risks.
If President Thein Sein can effectively administer the operation of the new ministries, manage
relations with the Tatmadaw, and avoid conflict and controversy with the Union Parliament, he
could guide the nation’s transition away from military rule. Under the constitution, he is limited
to two five-year terms, providing him with up to 10 years to make a clear break with Burma’s
past. However, his military background and his past position as SPDC Prime Minister—as well as
his presumed loyalty to Than Shwe—raises doubts about his willingness to dramatically depart
51
Kyaw Kyaw, “Burma’s Parliamentary System Explained,” New Mandala, April 1, 2011.
The Parliament’s ability to use the budget to control either the President or the Tatmadaw is mitigated by a
constitutional provision that allows the continuation of expenditures based on the previous year’s budget if the
Parliament fails to approve the current year’s proposed budget.
52
Congressional Research Service
16
U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress
from Burma’s oppressive, paternalistic governance system. Thein Sein also suffers from heart
problems (he reportedly has a pacemaker) and may have been reluctant to accept the Presidency.53
The Vice Presidents
The Union Government’s two Vice Presidents are former General and SPDC Secretary Tin Aung
Myint Oo and Dr. Sai Mauk Kham, a Shan member of the Union Parliament from the USDP.
Under Burma’s constitution, the three nominees for President and Vice President are selected
separately by the Upper House, the Lower House, and the military’s members of the Union
Parliament. The Lower House nominated Thein Sein, who was selected as President. The Upper
House nominated Sai Mauk Kham and the military members nominated Tin Aung Myint Oo.
Tin Aung Myint Oo was born on May 29, 1950. Like Thein Sein, he is a graduate of the Defence
Services Academy. He served in the Army, and rose to the rank of Lieutenant General. Prior to his
appointment as Vice President, he was First Secretary for the SPDC. His nickname while in the
Army was Thiha Thura, “Courageous as a Lion.” On November 12, 2009, he unexpectedly
resigned from his position with the SPDC and the Army.54 At one time, he was chairman of the
Trade Policy Council, which has the authority to grant export and import licenses and grant
foreign companies permission to invest in the country. Tin Aung Myint Oo is considered a
“hardliner.” The media has also reported that Tin Aung Myint Oo may be trying to undermine the
authority of President Thein Sein to set the stage for a possible military coup.55 Another source
claims that a power struggle has emerged between Vice President Tin Aung Myint Oo and Lower
House Speaker Shwe Mann for de facto control over the military and the government.56
Sai Mauk Kham, born in 1950, graduated from Mandalay Medical Institute and became a
physician. He is from the Shan ethnic minority, and is known as a strong advocate of Shan
culture. He reportedly developed close ties with Tin Aung Myint Oo, when the latter was
commander of the North-East Regional Command (which includes the Shan State). Many
observers maintain that Sai Mauk Kham was chosen as Vice President so that one of the three top
positions was filled by an ethnic minority. He is expected to wield little power in the government.
The Ministers
President Thein Sein’s cabinet consists of 30 Ministers holding 34 separate portfolios (see
Appendix D). The three Ministers for Defense, Home Affairs, and Border Affairs were appointed
by the Commander-in-Chief of the Tatmadaw (as stipulated in the constitution) and are active
military officers. Among the rest of the Ministers, 4 are recently retired military officers and 15
were Ministers or Deputy Ministers in the SPDC government.
The cabinet reflects strong continuity from the SPDC government, as well as a significant
presence of current or past military officers. As one commentator observes, however, the presence
of military officers in the cabinet is not surprising given that “the military has been the pre53
“Profile: Burmese leader Thein Sein,” BBC, February 4, 2011.
Speculation at the time of his resignation attributed his departure to a dispute between his son and the grandson of
SPDC leader Than Shwe.
55
Larry Jagan, “Burma’s Octopus Strangles Reform,” Irrawaddy, July 7, 2011.
56
Aung Zaw, “The Rut and Roar Begins in Burma,” Irrawaddy, July 8, 2011.
54
Congressional Research Service
17
U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress
eminent institution for more than half a century,” and a military education and career have offered
better prospects than a civilian education and civil service.57 It is unclear if the continuity of
Ministers represents an effort by the SPDC to retain control over the Union Government or
reflects a lack of other sufficiently skilled people to carry out the ministerial duties.
The National Defence and Security Council and the State Supreme Council
Burma’s constitution establishes a National Defence and Security Council (NDSC) with
significant powers over the government, particularly in times of national or regional emergencies.
The NDSC has 11 members—the President; the two Vice Presidents; the Speakers of the two
chambers of the Union Parliament; the Commander-in-Chief and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of
the Tatmadaw; and the Ministers of Border Affairs, Defence, Foreign Affairs, and Home Affairs.
In the current government, all of the NDSC members are active or retired military officers, except
for Vice President Sai Mauk Kham.
Under the constitution, the President can declare a regional or national emergency after
consulting with the NDSC. In the case of a national emergency that could result in disintegration
of the country or loss of sovereignty, the President’s declaration can transfer all legislative,
judicial, and executive power to the Commander-in-Chief for up to one year, and the Union
Parliament, Union Government, and judiciary are dissolved. The President can extend the
national emergency declaration twice for up to six months each time after consultation with the
NDSC. Once the emergency is over, the NDSC assumes legislative, executive and judicial power
until a new Union Parliament is chosen, a new President is selected, and new judges appointed.
To some observers, the powers of the NDSC and the prominent role of the military among the
NDSC members provide the SPDC and the Tatmadaw with the ability to topple a Union
Parliament or Union Government that attempts to undermine or challenge the role of the military
in Burma’s governance. Similarly, the constitution’s provisions for the President and the NDSC to
declare regional emergencies could be used to corral Regional or State Hluttaws that stray too far
from the military’s chosen path for the nation’s political or economic development.
In February 2011, the Irrawaddy, a leading opposition news agency operating out of Thailand,
reported that an unnamed source close to the military said that Than Shwe and the SPDC were
going to create a “State Supreme Council” to be the top governmental body in Burma.58
According to the source, the State Supreme Council would consist of Senior General Than Shwe,
Vice Senior General Maung Aye, Lower House Speaker Thura Shwe Mann, President Thein Sein,
Vice President Tin Aung Myint Oo, retired Lieutenant General Tin Aye, and two other senior
military generals. In April 2011, the Asia Sentinel reported on rumors circulating in Burma that
the State Supreme Council was still to be formed, and that while it was to supposed to have only
advisory power, it would actually be the ultimate power in Burma.59
Burma’s constitution has no provision for a State Supreme Council in either an advisory role or as
the ultimate power in the country. Political observers in Burma differ on the veracity of the
unconfirmed reports of the creation of the State Supreme Council. While such an entity would be
57
Richard Horsey, Who’s Who in the New Myanmar Government, SSRC, April 14, 2011.
“Than Shwe to Head Extra-Constitutional ‘State Supreme Council,’” Irrawaddy, February 10, 2011.
59
Larry Jagan, “The Look of Burma’s New Government,” Asia Sentinel, April 1, 2011.
58
Congressional Research Service
18
U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress
technically unconstitutional, the combined votes of the USDP and the military in the Union
Parliament would be sufficient to amend the constitution to legalize the State Supreme Council.
Changes in the Burmese Military
Burma’s political changes have also had potentially important consequences for the Tatmadaw
and its future. The creation of the USDP involved several senior military officers stepping down
from their military posts to participate in the parliamentary elections. The formation of the Union
Government also took some senior officers out of their military uniforms and moved them into
civilian clothes.60 As a result, there has been a significant change in the top positions in the
military.
The new Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services (as of March 30, 2011) is General Min Aung
Hlaing. Another graduate of the Defence Services Academy, he is 54 years old, younger than
President Thein Sein and two Vice Presidents. Prior to his appointment as Commander-in-Chief,
he was acting Joint Chief of Staff (after current Upper House Speaker Thura Shwe Mann stepped
down to run in the parliamentary elections). Troops under his command have staged attacks on
armed ethnic groups in various parts of Burma, including the assault on the Myanmar National
Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) in 2009 that led to the flight of an estimated 37,000 ethnic
Kokang into China.61 One of his first major actions after being promoted to Commander-in-Chief
was to form a new national intelligence unit under his direct control. The national intelligence
unit reportedly will be responsible for domestic political and security affairs.62 Min Aung Hlaing
is generally regarded as a hardliner, with strong loyalty to Than Shwe.
Under Burma’s constitution, the Commander-in-Chief is a powerful figure in the Burmese
government. The constitution grants the Tatmadaw complete autonomy and gives the
Commander-in-Chief authority over military affairs. The Commander-in-Chief appoints 25% of
the members of the Union Parliament and 25% of the seats in the regional and state hluttaws. He
also nominates the Ministers of Border Affairs, Home Affairs, and Defence. The Commander-inChief—along with the Deputy Commander-in-Chief and the three Ministers nominated by the
Commander-in-Chief—are members of the National Defense and Security Council. In the case
the President declares a national emergency, the Commander-in-Chief assumes all executive,
legislative, and judicial power.
Besides a new Commander-in-Chief, the Tatmadaw also has new officers in almost every senior
military posting. The new Deputy Commander-in-Chief is Lieutenant General Soe Win, who
served with Min Aung Hliang along Burma’s border with China. He replaced Vice Senior General
Maung Aye.63 Virtually all of the senior positions in the military are filled with officers appointed
since the November elections, including all 14 of the regional commanders.
60
Two of the overseas opposition new agencies, the Irrawaddy and Mizzima, both published political cartoons
featuring officers removing their military uniforms and putting on the traditional Burmese clothes required for
Members of Parliament, satirizing the “change in government.”
61
Min Aung Hlaing reportedly ordered the arrest of Brigadier General Win Maung following the assault on the
Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army for his failure to detain Peng Jiasheng, the leader of the MNDAA.
62
“Burma Forms New Intelligence Unit,” Irrawaddy, May 3, 2011.
63
The current status of Maung Aye is unknown. There were unconfirmed reports that he was arrested in August 2010
after he refused to “retire” from the military and accept a senior position in the government.
Congressional Research Service
19
U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress
The political status of the Tatmadaw may be changing in important ways. Whereas in the past the
regional commanders also were effectively in charge of the administration of the region or state
(and allegedly were able to extort substantial kickbacks from local businesses), the new
constitution assigns administrative responsibilities to Chief Ministers for each state or region.64
Six of the 14 Chief Ministers are ex-military commanders and three are ex-SPDC Ministers, often
of higher rank than the newly appointed regional commanders. It is too early to tell if the newly
appointed military officers will accept their change in status (and loss of economic power) and if
the Chief Ministers will be able to exert control over their state or region. According to one
report, the power struggle between the regional commanders and the Chief Ministers has already
begun.65
The new Commander-in-Chief may have given a sign in July 2011 on how he will react to power
struggles between regional commanders and the new local governments. On July 1, 2011, at least
six regional commanders were reassigned, with some sources claiming 12 of the 14 commanders
were replaced.66 On July 5, Brigadier General Tun Than was dismissed as Commander of
Rangoon Command because of allegations of corruption.67 Since then, two more regional
commanders have been placed under investigation for allegations of corruption.68
In addition, the SPDC potentially altered the nature of Burma’s military when it issued the People
Military Service Law on November 4, 2010.69 The new law mandates that every Burmese citizen
is required to undergo military training and to serve in the armed forces. All Burmese citizens—
men and women—may be required to serve between 24 and 36 months in the military if called
into duty by a newly created drafting committee. Exemptions are provided for members of
religious orders, the disabled, and housewives with children. Previously, Burma officially had a
volunteer military, and many people willingly joined the military because it provided their
families with special benefits, such as better housing and greater access to scarce foods and
consumer goods. The special privileges afforded to Tatmadaw families have reportedly been
reduced since the parliamentary elections.
To some observers, the diminution of the powers of the regional commanders and the creation of
a military draft are part of an effort to professionalize Burma’s military, and reduce the
Tatmadaw’s political powers. Other analysts are unconvinced that there is a plan to transform the
Tatmadaw, or if there is such a plan, that it will prove effective. These analysts assert that the
culture of Burma’s military, with its high reliance on loyalty, will prevent a major change in its
traditions of privilege and entitlement, or in the military’s historical disregard for the common
Burmese citizen.
64
The 14 Chief Ministers for regions and states are appointed by Burma’s President, subject to the approval of the
Regional or State Hluttaw.
65
Yan Pai, “Military, Regional Govts at Odds over Business Concessions,” Irrawaddy, May 27, 2011.
66
Wai Moe, “Regional Commanders Reshuffled,” Irrawaddy, July 4, 2011.
67
“Brigadier General Tun Than, Commander of Rangoon Command, is Dismissed,” Mizzima, July 7, 2011.
68
“Five Military Generals Under Investigation in Naypyidaw,” Irrawaddy, July 28, 2011.
69
“People Military Service Law,” State Peace and Development Council Law No. 27/2010, November 4, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
20
U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress
The Human Rights Situation
For decades, Burma’s military leaders used political and economic oppression to maintain control
over the country. On several occasions, the SPDC or its predecessors violently put down popular
protests in order to remain in power.70 During most of its reign in Burma, the SPDC used tight
control over the political and economic activities of Burmese citizens to suppress opposition and
extract a privileged socio-economic status for the Tatmadaw. According to several Burma
analysts, the SPDC and the Tatmadaw treat the country as if they are an army of occupation.
With the arrival of the new Union Government and the official departure of the SPDC, it is
uncertain if there will be a significant change in the human rights situation in Burma. The early
indications are mixed, with some signs of a loosening of government control and other signs of a
tightening of authoritarian rule. The actions of the Tatamadaw, in particular, since the first
meeting of the Union Parliament have been especially troubling, suggesting that the military
intends to continue its past disregard for human rights.
Burma’s history of serious human rights violations has led to calls for the creation of a U.N.
Commission of Inquiry (COI). In his September 2010 report to the U.N. Secretary General, U.N.
Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar Tomás Ojea Quintana
repeatedly indicated his support for the establishment of a COI under the auspices of the U.N.
General Assembly, the U.N. Security Council, or the U.N. Human Rights Council (UNHRC).71
On June 17, 2011, U.S. Ambassador to the UNHRC Eileen Chamberlain Donahoe reiterated that
the United States supports the creation of a COI.72 In addition to the United States, 15 other
nations have publicly endorsed the creation of a COI.73 The COI has not been endorsed by the
other ASEAN member nations, China, India, or Japan.
Human Rights Under the SPDC
The most recent reports of the U.N. Human Rights Council (UNHRC), the U.S. Department of
State, and the major international human rights organizations all describe pervasive and severe
human rights abuses under SPDC rule. On March 18, 2011, the UNHRC stated that it “strongly
condemns the ongoing systematic violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms of the
people of Myanmar.”74 In its assessment of events in Burma in 2010, Human Rights Watch wrote,
“The ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) continued to systematically deny all
basic freedoms to citizens and sharply constrained political participation. The rights of freedom of
70
The violent suppression of protest movements include the crackdowns of the “8888 Uprising” of 1988, in which an
estimated 3,000 civilians were killed, and the “Saffron Revolution” of 2007, in which an unknown number of civilians
were killed. According to the SPDC, the official number of dead was 13 (including Japanese reporter Kenji Nagai).
Western media and opposition groups estimate several hundred people were killed during the protests.
71
Tomás Ojea Quintana, Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, United Nations General Assembly, A/65/368, New
York, NY, September 15, 2010.
72
Htet Aung, “US Vows to Continue Pressing for Burma COI,” Human Rights Education Institute of Burma, June 17,
2011.
73
Nations that have publicly endorsed the creation of a Commission of Inquiry are Australia, Belgium, Canada, the
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Slovakia, and the United Kingdom.
74
United Nations Human Rights Council, Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, A/HRC/16/L. 11, March 18, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
21
U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress
expression, association, assembly, and media remained severely curtailed.”75 Freedom House
described the human rights situation under SPDC rule in starker language: “The military junta has
long ruled by decree and controlled all executive, legislative, and judicial power; suppressed
nearly all basic rights; and committed human rights abuses with impunity.”76 The depth and
breadth of human rights violations by the SPDC, the Tatamadaw, and their associates in Burma
have been extensive. Human rights abuse in Burma has been both political and economic in
nature. Among the more common and egregious human rights violations reportedly committed by
the SPDC and its supporters are:
•
Abritrary and unlawful detention, disappearance, torture, and murder of Burmese
citizens by the Tatmadaw and other security forces;
•
Systematic restriction of freedom of speech and the press;
•
Limitations on freedom of association (including a de facto ban on labor unions)
and assembly;
•
Restrictions on the religious practices of religious groups not legally recognized;
•
Denial of citizenship and other legal rights to selected ethnic minorities;
•
Discrimination against certain ethnic minorities in education, employment, and
cultural activities;
•
Restrictions on the ability of citizens to participate in elections and the political
process (including the dissolution or non-recognition of political parties);
•
The falsification and fabrication of election results;
•
The illegal displacement of people (particularly certain ethnic minorities) and
seizure of property;
•
Official condoning of violence against women, particularly by Tatmadaw soldiers
(including rape in conflict areas);
•
Child labor, including the recruitment of children as soldiers;
•
Involuntary servitude and forced labor, especially in conflict areas;
•
Trafficking in persons, especially women and girls from ethnic minorities;
•
Denial of workers’ rights (including the prohibition on the right to strike,
organize, and bargain collectively; forced mandatory overtime; and unsafe
working conditions);
•
Widespread corruption and extortion by military officers and civil servants; and
•
Indifference to and/or disregard of reports of human rights violations.
The legal devices by which the SPDC has systemically violated the human rights of Burma’s
citizens are also extensive. The SPDC-written and -approved constitution appears to guarantee
many of the civil and economic liberties for the Burmese people, but usually subject to
conditions, such as the “prevalence of law and order, community peace and tranquility or public
75
76
Human Rights Watch, Burma: Country Report, January 2011.
Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2011 - Burma (Myanmar), January 2011.
Congressional Research Service
22
U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress
order and morality.” The constitution also preserves the continuity of all existing laws and
directives issued by the SPDC and its predecessors, unless they are superseded by new laws
passed by the Union Parliament. These include some of Burma’s more notorious laws, which the
SPDC used to detain and imprison opposition political leaders, union organizers, and other
dissidents:
•
The Law Protecting the Peaceful and Systematic Transfer of State Responsibility
and the Successful Performance of the Functions of the National Convention
against Disturbances and Oppositions—a 1996 law prohibiting “inciting,
demonstrating, delivering speeches, making oral or written statements and
disseminating” in order to: undermine the stability of the State, community peace
and tranquility, the prevalence of law and order, and/or undermine national
reconciliation;
•
The Unlawful Associations Act—originally a British law adopted in 1908 and
amended in 1954, this law prohibits membership or participation in any
association declared unlawful by the President; and
•
The Law Relating to the Formation of Organizations—promulgated in 1998, the
law requires virtually all organizations in Burma to register with the government,
and anyone supporting an unregistered organization may be imprisoned for up to
five years.
In addition, the SPDC created multiple security forces with the legal authority to monitor, harass,
detain, and imprison individuals engaged in undesirable activities. Under the new constitution,
the Tatamadaw have full autonomy and are not subject to civilian oversight, which allows the
military to abuse human rights with virtual impunity. Burma’s police force, which is under the
administrative control of the Ministry of Home Affairs, was frequently used by the SPDC to
monitor and detain political activists and human rights organizers, particularly in urban areas.
Inside the Ministry of Defense, Military Security Affairs was an another vehicle to repress civil
and economic freedoms in Burma. Prior to its transformation into a political party, the USDA
operated as a “neighborhood watch” arm for the SPDC to uncover local leaders of dissent.
Security personnel in these agencies routinely screened mail, monitored telephone calls and
email, and conducted illegal raids—generally with little fear of reprisal from the SPDC.
Human Rights Under the New Government
It may be too soon to determine if the Union Government will support the military’s tradition of
widespread human rights abuse in Burma or use this time of transition to develop a new policy of
greater respect for political and economic liberties. The widespread presence of ex-military
officers in the high echelons of the Union Government—including several ex-SPDC leaders in
key positions—does not seem to set the stage for dramatic shifts in policies and practices with
respect to human rights.
During the first few months of its existence, the Union Government has shown some signs of
maintaining strict and tight control over Burma. The Network for Human Rights Documentation–
Burma (ND-Burma) claims that its field workers found evidence of 167 cases of human rights
violations in Burma during the first three months of 2011.77 According to the organization, the
77
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Burma: January (continued...)
Congressional Research Service
23
U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress
most common human rights violations during this time period were forced labor (mostly the
military’s use of civilians as porters), the confiscation or destruction of property (principally
undercompensated land seizures for commercial use), and the military’s conscription of child
soldiers.
Since the end of March, there continue to be reports of human rights violations by the Burmese
government. Reporters without Borders obtained copies of a directive of the Ministry of
Communications, Posts, and Telegraphs tightening the regulation of Internet cafes, “including a
requirement to keep the personal data of all their clients along with a record of all the websites
they visit, and make it available to the authorities.”78 They also reported that the Rangoon-based
weekly, True News, had been shut down for alleged inaccuracies in a story on mobile phones. The
opposition news agency Mizzima reported on June 8, 2011, that government troops in the Mon
State were using civilians as “human shields” in order to avoid attacks by a local ethnic-based
militia, the Karen National Union (KNU).79 Other human rights abuses that have allegedly
occurred since the beginning of the year include the continued arbitrary detention of political and
labor organizers, the rape of minority women by Burmese soldiers in conflict areas, and the
financial harassment of non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
Signs are also emerging of a possible growing impatience within Burma’s leadership with the
actions of Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD. On June 28, 2011, the Ministry of Home Affairs,
which is responsible for domestic security, reportedly sent a letter to NLD Chairman Aung Shwe
and Aung San Suu Kyi informing the organization that it must act in accordance with the law.80
The letter stated that certain activities of the NLD—erecting signboards and flags, issuing
statements, holding meetings, publishing periodicals and videos—were considered violations of
the law. The Ministry indicated that if the NLD wishes to continue these activities it should either
register as a political party or as a social organization. The NLD is unlikely to register either as a
political party or a social organization, as that would require it to renounce the results of the 1990
elections and accept the legitimacy of the 2008 constitution and the new Union Government.
The following day, the government-run newspaper, New Light of Myanmar ran an opinion article
that was highly critical of Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD, and contained seemingly veiled
threats against the Nobel Laureate and her political party.81 Following a defense of the legitimacy
of the 2008 constitution, the November 2010 elections, and the Union Government, the author
states, “Yet, there are certain persons who are attempting to get the nation in a terrible mess.…”
Later in the article, the author accuses the NLD of “making unreasonable demands” and being
reliant on “external elements [that] are contrary to the people’s desires and interests.” Noting her
pending national tour, the author writes, “We are deeply concerned that if Daw Aung San Suu Kyi
makes trips to countryside regions, there may be chaos and riots, as evidenced by previous
incidents.” This last phrase appears to be a reference to her aborted 2003 national tour, which
(...continued)
March 2011, May 18, 2011.
78
Reporters without Borders, Surveillance of Media and Internet Stepped Up under New Civilian President, May 17,
2011.
79
Kun Chan, “Villagers Forced to Serve as Human Shields and Porters by Burmese Soldiers,” Mizzima, June 8, 2011.
80
“Home Affairs Ministry Sends Letter to U Aung Shwe, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi Informing They Are to Act in
Accord with Law,” New Light of Myanmar, June 29, 2011.
81
Pyae Sone Aung, “Right to Make Choice Still in Hand,” New Light of Myanmar, June 29, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
24
U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress
ended following an attempt on her life and resulted in her being placed under house arrest.82 A
subsequent paragraph asserts that the NLD is “trying to politically test the patience of the
government,” and suggests the NLD “should stop doing so to avert unnecessary consequences.”
Despite the letter from the Ministry and the article in New Light of Myanmar, Aung San Suu Kyi
traveled to the city of Pagan (Bagan) during the first week of July without incident. On July 18,
2011, she attended ceremonies honoring her father, late General Aung San, for the first time in
nine years. Then, on July 25, 2011, Social Welfare, Relief, and Resettlement Minister Aung Kyi,
who had previously served as the SPDC’s official liaison to Aung San Suu Kyi, met with her for
over an hour. No details of the content of the meeting were released.
The new government has taken some actions that may indicate potential improvements in some
areas. The New Light of Myanmar reported on June 3, 2011, that the Vice President Tin Aung
Myint Oo and Senator John McCain had discussed allowing the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) to resume its visits to Burmese prisoners. The SPDC halted ICRC visits in
2006. The Ministry of Information announced that as of June 10, 2011, five categories of
publications—sports, entertainment, technology, health, and children’s literature—would no
longer be subject to pre-publication censorship, but would still be subjected to post-publication
censorship.83 Nevertheless, all other weekly journals, monthly magazines, and books will
continue to be required to submit their proposed drafts to the Burmese censorship board ahead of
publication.
Regardless of the future policies of the new Burmese government, at this juncture, the human
rights situation in Burma remains poor. On June 1, 2011, Freedom House released a special
report, The Worst of the Worst, 2011: The World’s Most Repressive Societies, which designated
Burma among the nine most repressive countries in the world.84 On June 15, 2011, U.S.
Ambassador to the U.N. Human Rights Council Eileen Chamberlain Donahoe included Burma
among a list of 13 countries that continue to abuse human rights, stating, “Burma continued to
hold over 2,000 political prisoners and routinely violated the rights of its citizens, including
ethnic minority populations.”85
Political Prisoners
As of March 2011, 2,073 political prisoners reportedly remained in detention in Burma, according
to the Thailand-based advocacy group, Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP).86
Burma’s political prisoners include members of the NLD and other opposition parties,
82
On May 30, 2003, Aung San Suu Kyi’s motorcade and her supporters were attacked by counter protesters near the
town of Depayin, resulting in the killing of an unknown number of people. The NLD maintains that counter-protesters
were actually SPDC security officials sent to assassinate Aung San Suu Kyi and that 70 or more people were killed. An
unpublished police investigation of the incident claims only four people died during the incident, and that NLD
supporters were carrying weapons with the intention of attacking the counter protesters.
83
“Burmese Censors Ease Conditions,” Irrawaddy, June 8, 2011.
84
Freedom House, The Worst of the Worst, 2011: The World’s Most Repressive Societies, June 1, 2011. The other eight
most repressive countries were Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Sudan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan.
85
United Nations Hurman Rights Council, Council Hears Reports on Côte d'Ivoire and Syria, Holds General Debate
on Human Rights Situations That Require Its Attention, June 15, 2011.
86
Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma), “Monthly Chronology March, 2011,” press release, March
2011, http://www.aappb.org/.
Congressional Research Service
25
U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress
representatives of various ethnic groups in Burma, Buddhist monks and nuns, student and youth
organizers, and other dissidents. Conditions for the political prisoners are reportedly harsh.87
On May 16, 2011, President Thein Sein issued Order No. 28/2011 commuting all death sentences
to life in prison and reducing the duration of all prison sentences by one year (exclusive of
remission days).88 The amnesty resulted in the release of 14,578 prisoners, of which 55 were
considered political prisoners.89 The SPDC has made several mass releases of prisoners in the
past, also with few political prisoners included among those reprieved (see Table 2).
Approximately 20 political prisoners in Insein
Prison in Rangoon reportedly began a hunger
strike following the amnesty’s announcement
to express their disapproval of the continued
detention of over 2,000 political prisoners, and
to demand better conditions and treatment for
political prisoners.90 According to the AAPP,
seven of the hunger strikers were placed in
special “punishment cells” for demanding
better conditions.91
Table 2. Mass Prison Reprieves
Total
Prisoners
Political
Prisoners
5,588
26
334
253
January 3, 2007
2,831
50
September 23, 2008
9,002
10
Date
January 3, 2005
July 6, 2005
February 20, 2009
6,313
24
The SPDC and the new government have
generally denied that there are political
September 17, 2009
7,114
128
prisoners in Burma and have asserted that the
May 16, 2011
14,578
55
status of prisoners is an internal matter. New
Light of Myanmar has not run any stories on
Source: Burma Bulletin, May 2010
the hunger strike in Insein Prison. However,
the June 3 edition of the paper, in two separate stories covering Senator John McCain’s visit, did
report that Senator McCain asked about the status of political prisoners and was told by Foreign
Minister Wunna Maung Lwin and Vice President Aung Myint Oo that there are no political
prisoners in Burma.92 One of the stories included Senator McCain’s statement that the according
to the statistics of the International Human Rights Council, there are 2,000 political prisoners in
Myanmar.
Burma’s Militias and Refugee Problem
The predominately ethnic Burman SPDC has long discriminated against many of the nation’s
over 100 ethnic minorities. In some of the more serious cases, the SPDC and the Tatmadaw have
been accused of committing grievous human rights abuses against certain Burmese ethnic
87
According to a story in the Los Angeles Times, some prisoners are tortured and placed in solitary confinement for
years. Others are forbidden to speak. Medical care is limited, and the provided food is “barely edible.” ("Political
Prisoners in Burma Face Bleak Conditions,” Los Angeles Times, December 3, 2010)
88
“Government Grants Amnesty for Prisoners,” New Light of Myanmar, May 17, 2011.
89
“Bogus Amnesty Keep Political Prisoners Behind Bars,” Burma Bulletin, May 2011.
90
Ba Kaung, “Prisoners Go on Hunger Strike Following Amnesty,” Irrawaddy, May 23, 2011.
91
Saw Yan Naing, “Seven Hunger Strikers Sent to ‘Dog Cells,’” Irrawaddy, May 25, 2011.
92
The New Light of Myanmar, June 3, 2011, pp. 1, 8. This appears to be the first direct denial by a Burmese official of
the existence of political prisoners in Burma to appear in the New Light of Myanmar.
Congressional Research Service
26
U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress
minorities. The reasons for the discrimination and maltreatment are complex and varied. Some
ethnic minorities claim that a major cause of the discrimination is religious persecution. In other
cases, the maltreatment appears to be primarily based on ethnicity.
An important source of tension between the Burmese military and some of the ethnic minorities
of eastern and northern Burma is the continued presence of ethnic-based militias. Over the last 60
years, the Burmese military and these militias have fought, frequently resulting in the internal
displacement of the local civilian population and/or the flight of civilians across international
borders. As a consequence, hundreds of thousands of Burmese refugees are scattered across
Southeast Asia, many in camps located in Bangladesh and Thailand. A flare-up of fighting
between the Tatmadaw and the militias occurred in the first half of 2011, causing another round
of refugees to flee the conflict areas.
The Ethnic-Based Militias
During the campaign period for the November 2010 elections, the Burmese military launched a
series of attacks against ethnic-based militias in eastern and northern Burma. The Tatmadaw
assaults were reportedly in retaliation for the militias’ rejection of a SPDC proposal to transform
the militias into Border Guard Forces (BGF) or pyithusit (government-run local militias) under
the authority of the Tatmadaw. The Burmese military specifically targeted the Kachin
Independence Army, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army, the Karen National Liberation Army,
the Shan State Army, and the United Wa State Army. The conflicts between the Tatmadaw and the
militias continued unabated during the first session of the Union Parliament and the establishment
of the Union Government, indicating that either the new government supports the military
campaign or lacks the power to control the military.
Since its independence from British colonial rule in 1948, Burma has struggled to maintain its
national unity due to tensions between the majority Burmans and the country’s over 100 ethnic
minorities. The Panglong Agreement of 1947 between the Burmese colonial government
(represented by Aung San, the father of Aung San Suu Kyi) and representatives of several ethnic
minorities provided for “full autonomy in the internal administration for the Frontier Areas,”
which was understood to mean the traditional homelands for the ethnic minorities. The Kachin, in
particular, maintain that the Panglong Agreement included provisions for a “separate Kachin State
within a Unified Burma,” with the demarcation to be determined by “the Constituent Assembly,”
or Burma’s parliament. Soon after Burma’s independence, the Panglong Agreement collapsed,
and several ethnic-based militias arose, primarily in northern and eastern Burma.93 The Burmese
military and the various militias fought off-and-on throughout much of the new republic’s early
years. Following the coup in 1962, Burma’s military junta adopted a more aggressive stance
towards the ethnic-based militias, launching a series of campaigns that led to hundreds of
thousands of refugees fleeing across Southeast Asia. Many of the refugees ended up in camps in
neighboring Thailand.
In the 1990s, the Burmese military changed its tactics towards the ethnic-based militias, offering
a cease-fire and relative autonomy if the militias and their associated political parties agreed to
remain part of Burma and accept the legitimacy of the military junta. This new policy was
generally attributed to Prime Minister and Chief of Intelligence General Khin Nyunt, the creator
93
A list of the various ethnic-based militias is provided in Appendix E of this report.
Congressional Research Service
27
U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress
of Burma’s “Seven Step Roadmap to Democracy.” Several of the militias accepted the agreement,
but some refused. For about a decade, conflict between the Tatmadaw and the militias was
comparatively infrequent. The ceasefire agreements generally held, and the Burmese military and
the non-ceasefire militias seemed willing to accept a military standoff.
On October 18, 2004, SPDC leader Than Shwe announced that General Khin Nyunt had resigned
for health reasons. Khin Nyunt was almost immediately arrested, and subsequently tried on
corruption charges and sentenced on July 21, 2005, to 44 years in jail. Many of Burma’s senior
intelligence officers were also arrested and Burma’s intelligence bureau was disbanded.
The removal of Khin Nyunt corresponded with a change in the SPDC approach to the militias to a
more hardline stance. A number of the leaders of the ethnic opposition groups were detained and
given long jail sentences. For example, General Hso Ten of the ceasefire Shan State Army-North
was sentenced to 106 years in prison.
Various efforts have been made to end the fighting or establish a ceasefire. Representatives of the
Tatmadaw and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) are engaged in ongoing talks. On July 28,
2011, Aung San Suu Kyi released an open letter to President Thein Sein and the ethnic-based
militias calling for an immediate ceasefire and offering her assistance in ending the hostilities.94
The Ethnic Nationalities Council (ENC), a coalition of representatives of ethnic groups from the
Arakan, Chin, Kachin, Karen, Karenni (Kayah), Mon and Shan States, released a statement on
August 1, 2011, welcoming Aung San Suu Kyi’s open letter and offer of assistance.95 The Union
Government has not officially responded to the offer.
The possibility of convening a second Panglong Conference with participants from the ethnic
minorities, the NLD, and the new Union Government has been raised by some of the ethnic
minorities in Burma. Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD have expressed their tentative support for
the concept. However, the SPDC, the Union Government, and the Tatmadaw have rejected the
proposal.
Burma’s Refugees
The renewed fighting between the Tatmadaw and the militias has precipitated a new wave of
refugees fleeing the conflicts in eastern and northern Burma. In the northern Kachin State, over
10,000 people have reportedly moved near or across the border with China to avoid the
skirmishes between the Tatmadaw and the KIA. In southeastern Burma, more than 15,000 Karen
have reportedly crossed into Thailand to escape fighting between Democratic Karen Buddhist
Army and the Burmese military.
The renewed fighting and flight of refugees may be creating some tension between the new
Union Government and the governments in China and Thailand. China, whose major
hydroelectric projects may have contributed to the conflict in Kachin State, is reportedly applying
pressure on Burma to stop the assaults on the KIA.96 Similarly, Thailand is reportedly pressuring
the Union Government to rein in the Tatmadaw to staunch the flow of refugees from southeastern
94
Tun Tun, “Suu Kyi’s ‘Open Letter’ Calls for Immediate Cease-fire in Ethnic Areas,” Mizzima, July 28, 2011.
“ENC Statement on the ‘Open Letter’ of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi,” August 1, 2011.
96
China’s hydroelectric investments in the Kachin State supposedly upset the Kachin leadership, who felt that they
were not adequately consulted or compensated (for expropriated land) before work on the project began.
95
Congressional Research Service
28
U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress
Burma. Thailand has also held talks with Burma about ways of repatriating more of the Burmese
refugees living in camps
along their mutual border.
Figure 1. Burmese Refugee Camps
The U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) report, Global
Trends 2010, states that
Burma is the world’s fifth
largest source of refugees,
after (in order) Afghanistan,
Iraq, Somalia, and the
Democratic Republic of
Congo.97 According to the
UNHCR, Burmese refugees
currently number over
415,000. UNHCR also
estimates that there are over
62,000 internally displaced
people in Burma, plus over
797,000 “stateless persons.”98
Many of Burma’s refugees
live in camps located along
the borders with Bangladesh
and Thailand (see Figure 1).
According to the ThailandBurma Border Consortium
(TBBC), the camps in
Thailand contained over
141,000 Burmese refugees as
of the end of 2010—42,000
more than were registered
with the UNHCR. Roughly
80% of the refugees in the Thai camps are ethnic Karen, with another 10% Karenni. Other ethnic
minorities in the camps include Chin, Kachin, Mon, Rakhine, and Shan. The camps in
Bangladesh are home to over 28,000 Burmese refugees, mostly Rohingyas from western Burma.
In addition to the refugees located in the camps in Bangladesh and Thailand, tens of thousands of
Burmese have reportedly settled in other countries in South and Southeast Asia. Malaysia has
over 15,000 registered Burmese (mostly Rohingyas) who have entered illegally (under Malaysian
law) but have obtained UNHCR registrations.99 Refugees International estimates that over
200,000 unregistered Rohingya refugees are living in Bangladesh, in addition to the 28,000 living
97
United Nation High Commission for Refugees, Global Trends: 2010, June 2011.
The “stateless persons” consist primarily of ethnic Rohingyas, whom the Burmese government does not recognize as
Burmese citizens.
99
Malaysia does not recognize the legal status of refugees and is not a party to the 1951 Convention relating to the
Status of Refugees.
98
Congressional Research Service
29
U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress
in camps. Representatives of Burmese refugees in India claim that over 80,000 Burmese refugees
are living in India, consisting mostly of Chin, who are escaping religious discrimination and
persecution for their Christian beliefs. Burmese refugees are also located in smaller numbers in
Cambodia, Indonesia, and Singapore.
While ongoing efforts are made to resettle Burmese refugees to other nations, the continual
outflow of Burmese people often exceeds the annual number of resettlements. Refugees not
registered with the UNHCR or residing in camps often risk arrest, detention, and deportation back
to Burma. The situation for Burmese refugees in Malaysia has received particular attention, with
allegations that Malaysia and Thailand officials were involved in human trafficking and extortion
of Rohingyas.100
The Economy
The available economic statistics for Burma are widely regarded as unreliable and inaccurate (see
text box). The Central Statistical Organization (CSO) in the Ministry of National Planning and
Economic Development lacks the technical expertise and resources to obtain accurate economic
data. In addition, Burma has an extensive “underground economy,” in which many Burmese
citizens augment their standard of living through unrecorded and unreported work and commerce.
Also, the SPDC has intentionally kept portions of the state-run economy secret—most notably,
the real value of the proceeds from natural gas and oil—to evade international sanctions and
domestic and international scrutiny.
Despite the lack of reliable data, economists who monitor Burma generally agree that it is among
the poorest countries in the world and is the poorest country in Southeast Asia. The United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) ranks Burma 132nd on its human development
index.101 Its people suffer from widespread poverty, particularly its rural population. According to
the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 19% of the population is undernourished and 32%
of its children are malnourished. The most recent UNDP household survey revealed a reduction in
the percentage of households living in poverty from 32% in FY2005 to 26% in FY2010.102
However, some Burma observers are reportedly skeptical about the UNDP survey results,
pointing to the lack of reliable census data upon which to base the sample survey.103
The general consensus on the main reason why Burma’s economic situation is so bad is gross
mismanagement by the SPDC. Burma’s economic system has been described as a “kleptocracy”
in which the country’s most profitable and valuable industries and businesses are owned or
controlled by SPDC members, their families, or their supporters.104 In 2010, the SPDC proceeded
with the “privatization” of many government-owned assets that some critics claim mostly
involved the transfer of property to the SPDC leaders, their families, and their most loyal
100
For more details, see U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Trafficking and Extortion of Burmese
Migrants in Malaysia and Southern Thailand, committee print, 111th Cong., 1 sess., April 3, 2009, S. Prt. 111-18.
101
Burma was ranked just below Cameroon and just above Yemen. The only Asian nations with lower rankings are
Nepal (138th) and Afghanistan (155th).
102
Burma’s fiscal year runs from April to March.
103
Thea Forbes, “UNDP Survey Cites Significant Reduction in Poverty in Burma,” Mizzima, June 10, 2011.
104
For example, see Mary Callahan, “Myanmar’s Perpetual Junta,” New Left Review, November-December 2009, pp.
27-63.
Congressional Research Service
30
U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress
supporters.105 Just prior to its formal dissolution, the SPDC transferred ownership of rubber
plantations, jade mines, and gold mines to junta leader Than Shwe and members of his family.106
Burma is considered one of the world’s most
corrupt countries. In its 2010 Corruption
Perception Index (CPI), Transparency
International ranked Burma 176th in the
world—tied with Afghanistan and just above
the most corrupt country in the world,
Somalia.107 Corruption reportedly is common
at all levels of society. In particular, some
regional military commanders allegedly
receive payments from the legal (e.g., timber,
jade, and ruby mining) and illegal (e.g., opium
and methamphetamines) businesses operating
in the territories under their command.
According to one report, President Thein
Sein’s priority agricultural development
program has already been sidetracked into a
bribery and extortion racket by local
authorities and bankers.108
Burma’s Inaccurate Economic Data:
The Case of GDP Growth Rate
One example of the general inaccuracy of Burma’s official
economic statistics is its reported gross domestic
product (GDP) growth rates. In its staff report for the
2007 Article IV consultation with Myanmar, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) included a text box
comparing Burma’s official GDP growth rates for 1995 to
2006 to other economies making the transition from
central planning to a more market-oriented economy.
The staff report concludes, “This comparison seems to
indicate that the high growth profile show by Myanmar’s
official statistics is overestimated.”
Table 1 of the same report lists Burma’s official GDP
growth rates, as well as the IMF’s estimates (see below).
The IMF estimates are significantly lower than the official
figures.
Table 3. GDP Growth Rates
Official versus IMF Estimate
To a certain extent, the high level of poverty
Burma’s
IMF
and corruption in Burma helped the SPDC
Official
Figure
Estimate
Fiscal
Year
maintain power. With few economic
opportunities available to them, young men in
2002-2003
12.0
5.5
rural areas often sought to enlist in the
2003-2004
13.8
0.0
Tatmadaw, whose members and their families
2004-2005
13.6
5.0
were provided better housing, food allowance,
medical care, and other forms of support. The
2005-2006
13.6
4.5
additional income that military officers and
2006-2007
12.7
7.0
senior civil servants obtained by graft and
Source: IMF, Myanmar—Staff Report for the 2007 Article
extortion helped maintain loyalty to the
IV Consultation, SM/07/347, November 5, 2007.
SPDC. However, the “privatization” of
government-assets and the appointment of
state and regional Chief Ministers may have reduced these incentives to support Burma’s military.
This may partially explain the SPDC’s decision to promulgate in November 2010 a new law
mandating compulsory military service (see “Changes in the Burmese Military”).
105
For one news account of Burma’s “privatization” program, see Jerry Guo, “Corporate Junta,” Newsweek, November
15, 2010.
106
Yan Pai, “Tha Shwe Acquires State Properties,” Irrawaddy, April 4, 2011.
107
Transparency International’s CPI for 2010 is available online at http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/
surveys_indices/cpi/2010.
108
Khin Oo Thar, “Farmers’ Loan Scheme Rife with Bribery,” Irrawaddy, June 29, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
31
U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress
In addition to the long-term problem of widespread poverty, the Union Government faces two
major short-term economic challenges—increasing economic growth and decreasing inflation.
Unofficial estimates of Burma’s economic growth—such as the ones done by the IMF—indicate
that the economy is expanding, but at a rate slower than other Southeast Asian nations, and
inadequate to significantly improve the economic situation of the Burmese people. Their meager
standard of living has been eroded by comparatively high inflation (over 20%), and particularly
by rising food prices.
Burma’s economy grew modestly in fiscal
years 2009 and 2010, according to the Asian
Development Bank (ADB), because of
agriculture’s recovery from the effects of
Cyclone Nargis109 and the government’s heavy
construction investment in the new capital,
Nay Pyi Taw, and the nation’s roads.110
Another significant factor in Burma’s stronger
growth performance was Southeast Asia’s
recovery from the effects of the global
financial crisis of 2007-2008. Greater
economic growth also helped reduce
inflationary pressures in the economy. The
ADB estimated inflation in fiscal years 2009
and 2010 at 8.2% and 7.3%, respectively.
China’s Hydroelectric Projects in Burma
Among China’s major investments in Burma are a series
of hydroelectric projects in Kachin State. China
reportedly has plans to build up to nine dams in the
region to provide electricity for western China; none of
the electricity is to be transmitted into Burma. The
largest of the nine dams is the Myitsone hydroelectric
project, that is projected to produce 6,000 megawatts
per year and scheduled for completion in 2019.
The Myitsone project is reportedly unpopular in the
Kachin State. Construction has displaced an estimated
10,000 people and caused environmental damage. It has
also brought a large number of Chinese construction
workers into the region, creating resentment among the
local population who may have expected to work on the
project. In addition, the local ethnic-based militia, the
Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), which controls
the area where the dam is being built, is apparently
dissatisfied with the compensation being offered for
allowing the project to be built.
Burma’s economy benefitted from
exceptionally high inward foreign direct
investment (FDI) in FY2011. Burma’s CSO
Some analysts speculate that the Chinese investments in
reported total inward FDI of nearly $20 billion the Kachin State are a major contributing factor in the
breakdown of the ceasefire agreement between the
for FY2011, compared to $302 million the
Tatmadaw and the KIO.
year before. According to CSO, China was the
main source of investment ($8.2 billion),
followed by Hong Kong ($5.4 billion) and Thailand ($2.9 billion). Most of the reported FDI went
to oil, natural gas, electrical power, or mining projects; smaller amounts went to agricultural or
manufacturing investments. Foreign observers caution that the CSO’s inward FDI figure probably
reflects pledged—not actual—investments, and that the actual annual figure is probably
significantly lower than $20 billion. Some analysts assert that the recent rise in inward FDI has
muted the effectiveness of U.S. economic sanctions. Other analysts suspect that certain
investment projects in Burma have contributed to the recent conflict between the Tatamadaw and
the ethnic-based militias (see “China’s Hydroelectric Projects in Burma”). In addition, the recent
military conflicts in Burma reportedly have led to a stoppage of construction work on some
investment projects, and may be discouraging new investments.111
A future source of possible economic growth for Burma is the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement
(AFTA), which will complete its final stage of implementation in 2015. Tariffs on most goods
109
For more about Cyclone Nargis, see CRS Report RL34481, Cyclone Nargis and Burma’s Constitutional
Referendum, by (name redacted) and (name redacted).
110
Asian Development Bank, Asia Development Outlook 2011: Myanmar, April 2011.
111
Simon Roughneen, “War Trumps Investment in Myanmar,” Asia Times, July 25, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
32
U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress
were eliminated in 2010 for the six original ASEAN member nations (Brunei, Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) and are to be eliminated for the final four
ASEAN member nations (Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam) in 2015. While there is some
concern that Burma is unprepared to adjust to tariff removal in 2015, its economy may benefit
from increased trade and greater inward FDI.
In his inaugural address to the Union Parliament on March 30, 2011, President Thein Sein
advocated his vision for the future development of Burma’s economy.112 After acknowledging
that Burma remains a predominantly agricultural country, he said, “[W]e must turn to national
industrialization to transform [the country] into a developed, rich one with a lot of employment
opportunities and high per capita income.” To achieve this goal, President Thein Sein pledged to
“practice the market economy as the economic policy.…” However, his interpretation of a market
economy is one “in which the government takes control over the market to a certain degree.”
President Thein Sein’s economic priorities are agriculture, industrialization, infrastructure, and
education. The new government is to ensure “reasonable prices for agricultural produce” and
provide microfinancing to Burma’s rural population. President Thein Sein hopes to promote
industrialization by attracting inward FDI, in part by establishing special economic zones (SEZs).
The SEZ in Dawei Township (near the border with Thailand) has received a high level of
international attention, partly because of its large size (estimated investment of $14 billion) and
the involvement of China and Thailand in its construction. President Thein Sein also intends to
continue to invest heavily in infrastructure. The SPDC-promulgated national budget for FY2012
includes massive increases in government expenditures on industry, energy, construction,
transportation, and telecommunications.113
Critics of the President’s economic proposals have questioned his priorities and his policies.
Some Burmese economists (such as U Myint) would like to see a greater focus on poverty
reduction and more attention to good governance, greater government accountability, and the
elimination of government corruption. Others would like Burma to adjust its artificially
overvalued official exchange rate, which is seen as a major barrier to inward FDI. Still other
analysts suggest the new government needs to do more to protect workers’ rights, citing studies
by EarthRights International and others that SPDC, the Tatmadaw, and foreign investors have
conspired to evade U.S. sanctions and violate the rights of Burmese workers.114
Burma’s Relations with North Korea
Burma’s relations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) have become a
growing source of apprehension for the United States and the global community. Much of the
rising anxiety has focused on North Korea’s export of military equipment, supplies, and
112
A translation of his speech is available online at http://www.encburma.net/index.php/archives/burma-government/
133-new-president-thein-sein-speech-on-30-march-2011.html.
113
A summary of the FY2012 budget was published in the Myanmar Gazette on February 11, 2011, and reprinted by
Network Myanmar (http://www.networkmyanmar.org/).
114
In March 2011, EarthRights International published the report, The Burma-China Pipelines: Human Rights
Violations, Applicable Law, and Revenue Secrecy recounting how the pipeline projects have led to land confiscations,
forced labor, and arbitrary arrest and detention. In December 2010, the Swiss-American drilling company, Transocean,
was subpeonaed for a second time by the Securities and Exchange Commission among allegations that the company
had violated U.S. sanctions by conducting business with Burmese nationals on OFAC’s SDN list.
Congressional Research Service
33
U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress
technology to Burma, including reports of trade in technology and equipment for the construction
of nuclear weapons. Possibly equally disconcerting has been evidence of North Korea supplying
Burma’s military with missiles and missile technology that would pose a threat to much of
Southeast Asia. Allegations that the Tatmadaw have used chemical weapons in their assaults on
the various ethnic-based militias in Burma have evoked the specter of a Burmese military that
possesses chemical weapons and missiles with which to deliver them across the region. The
continued bilateral trade in military equipment and technology would appear to violate U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1874.115 The military ties between Burma and North Korea are
viewed by some analysts as a mounting threat to regional security.
Relations between Burma and North Korea have a rocky history. Following Burma’s
independence from British colonial rule, the democratically elected government of U Nu
supported the U.N. Security Council resolution declaring North Korea the aggressor in the
Korean War. However, the U Nu government refrained from recognizing either North Korea or
South Korea as the de jure government in Korea, viewing the ongoing conflict as an unresolved
civil war.116 In practice, Burma continued to have economic and cultural exchanges with both
North and South Korea.
Following the military coup that overthrew Burma’s civilian government, the ruling junta led by
General Ne Win continued to maintain relations with both North and South Korea, but showed a
bias in support of North Korea. During this period, trade between Burma and North Korea
apparently had minimal military content; most of the bilateral trade consisted of industrial goods
from North Korea being exchanged for food and raw materials from Burma.
Relations between Burma and North Korea were effectively severed on October 9, 1983, when
North Korean agents detonated a large bomb in Rangoon, killing 21 people in an apparent
assassination attempt on South Korea’s President Chun Doo Hwan. On November 4, 1983,
Burma ordered the closure of North Korea’s embassy in Rangoon and expelled North Korea’s
diplomatic corps from the country.
Official contact between the two countries was gradually reestablished starting in 1996, possibly
driven by the Tatmadaw’s interest in acquiring North Korean military equipment.117 Burma’s
military had been relying heavily on military supplies from China, but was interested in the North
Korean equipment, which was similar in design and cheaper than from China. In addition, North
Korea was willing to conduct barter trade, which was attractive to the hard currency strapped
Burmese junta. Over the ensuing decade, the flow of military equipment from North Korea to
Burma allegedly expanded to include ammunition, field guns, surface-to-surface and surface-toair missiles, and short-range ballistic missiles and related technology.
Indications that Burma may be pursuing a nuclear weapons program, possibly with the assistance
of North Korea, began to emerge around 2001. In February 2001, the military junta revitalized
115
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874, adopted unanimously on June 12, 2009, following North Korea’s
underground nuclear weapons test on May 25, 2009. It imposed economic sanctions on North Korea and allows any
member nation to search North Korean cargo for evidence of goods related to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.
For more about this resolution, and the relationship between North Korea and Burma, see CRS Report R40684, North
Korea’s Second Nuclear Test: Implications of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874, coordinated by Mary Beth
Nikitin and (name redacted).
116
The U Nu government maintained a similar policy with respect to Vietnam.
117
The Burmese military expanded rapidly following the suppression of the national protests of 1988.
Congressional Research Service
34
U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress
Burma’s long dormant nuclear energy program and began discussions with Russia for the
construction of a 10 megawatt nuclear reactor in Burma for medical and research use. The deal
also included plans for nuclear training for Burmese engineers and military personnel in Russia.
After the reactor deal with Russia fell apart, Burma apparently began discussions with North
Korea, which had obtained nuclear reactors and technology from Pakistan and Russia. The
possibility of a deal with Russia resurfaced in 2007, but soon collapsed again. By that time, an
estimated 1,000-2,000 Burmese nationals had received some nuclear training in Russia.
Following the second failed deal with Russia, reports of Burma holding talks with North Korea
reemerged. Some of the nuclear-trained Burmese military officers left Burma and reported to
foreign governments and the international media that they had been working on various aspects of
a fledgling nuclear program in Burma that was being provided with technical assistance from
North Korea. Since then, reports of secret shipments from North Korea and other allegations by
ex-Burmese military personnel of a clandestine nuclear weapons program in Burma have
appeared in the press.
In May 2010, the Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB) released the report “Nuclear Related
Activities in Burma,” by Robert E. Kelley (an ex-International Atomic Energy Agency inspector)
and Ali Fowle (an editor for DVB), providing evidence about Burma’s nuclear program, its
cooperation with North Korea and other nations, and the potential risk of Burma developing
nuclear weapons.118 The authors concluded that Burma currently has an undisclosed nuclear
program, operating under military control, possibly with the intent to enrich uranium to construct
a nuclear weapon. However, in public presentations about the report, Kelley has indicated that
given the program’s current level of technology and administration, the risk that Burma will
construct a nuclear weapon in the near future is very small. Other sources—such as Professor
Desmond Ball and journalist Bertil Lintner—also reported extensively in 2010 about the evidence
that Burma had a nuclear weapons program and was receiving assistance from North Korea.119
Many experts in nuclear weaponry remain skeptical of the reported evidence of Burma’s nuclear
weapons program and the involvement of North Korea. Kelley wrote in an article in Foreign
Affairs in May 2011:
Based on extensive work on this issue, I believe Burma-North Korea cooperation in the
nuclear field remains a hypothesis, not an established fact. Cooperation between the two in
conventional arms production has been widely reported by reliable researchers for years.
There is some evidence to suggest Burmese interest in ballistic missiles, but none to suggest
they have mastered the production of all the components for such weapons or that they have
acquired them from North Korea.… A Burmese nuclear program in general, whether for
weapons or for other activities, while still only conjecture, is a cause for concern given
regular defector reporting.120
During a television interview in July 2009, Secretary Clinton stated that the Obama
Administration is concerned about the possible transfer of nuclear technology from North Korea
118
Robert E. Kelley and Ali Fowle, Nuclear Related Activities in Burma, Democratic Voice of Burma, May 2010.
For example, see Desmond Ball, “Burma’s Nuclear Program: Towards a Weapons Capacity,” paper prepared for the
1st IFANS Conference on Global Affairs: Nuclear Challenges and Responses in the 21st Century, Seoul, Republic of
Korea, October 5, 2010.
120
Robert E. Kelley, “Burma-DPRK Cooperation in Military Affairs,” Foreign Affairs, May 5, 2011.
119
Congressional Research Service
35
U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress
to Burma.121 The U.S. concern apparently extends to other forms of weapons technology. On May
26, 2011, the destroyer USS McCampbell intercepted a Belize cargo ship allegedly in transit from
North Korea to Burma under suspicion that the ship was carrying weapons technology in
violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874.122 Repeated requests from the USS
McCampbell to board and inspect the ship were denied, and the ship eventually returned to North
Korea.
Implications for U.S. Policy
Political events in Burma in 2010 and 2011 have renewed discussions about the nature and
effectiveness of U.S. policy towards the country. Both the U.S. sanctions regime and U.S.
engagement policy have been subjected to scrutiny and criticism by Congress, officials with the
Obama Administration, and Burma experts. In part, the discussion has focused on the suitability
of continuing the existing sanctions given the installation of a new government in Burma. The
debate has also focused on the effectiveness of the existing sanctions and engagement in fostering
the desired changes in Burma. What have not been generally challenged are the stated goals and
objectives of U.S. policy—the establishment of a representative, democratically elected civilian
government that will respect the human rights of the people of Burma, including its ethnic
minorities, and the release of all political prisoners.
The Sanctions Debate
The discussions about U.S. sanctions on Burma have examined several aspects of the policy.
Some commentators have focused on the impact of the sanctions on Burma’s economy, the
targeted Burmese leaders, and the behavior of the SPDC and the Tatmadaw, questioning whether
the sanctions have had the intended effects. Other writers have focused on the effectiveness of
U.S. sanctions given an international context where only a few other nations are following the
U.S. approach, and other key nations are using a “constructive engagement” approach. In
addition, some people have expressed concern about the diligence and rigor with which the
sanctions have been and are being enforced.
These different threads of discussions have led to differing views on the correct future path for
U.S. sanctions on Burma. Some analysts support a full or partial lifting of the sanctions, based on
sometimes conflicting conclusions about their effectiveness. Other people suggest that the
establishment of the new Burmese government is a prime time to tighten the sanction regime.
Still others advocate a “wait and see” approach, allowing the Union Parliament and the Union
Government time to demonstrate their intentions, and the newly confirmed U.S. Special
Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma to formulate his recommendations for U.S.
policy.
121
122
“Clinton Warns of Nuclear Ties Between Burma, North Korea,” VOA News, July 22, 2009.
“US Blocks Ship Suspected of Carrying North Korea Arms,” VOA News, June 13, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
36
U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress
The Effectiveness of Sanctions
The objectives of U.S. sanctions on Burma are to promote the transition to a representative
democracy, to protect human rights and civil liberties, and to secure the release of all political
prisoners. An additional explicit objective of the U.S. sanctions is—as stated in the JADE Act—to
“identify individuals responsible for the repression of peaceful political activity in Burma and
hold them accountable for their actions.” An implicit objective of the sanctions is to avoid
unnecessary and/or excessive harm to Burma’s general population, while maximizing the adverse
effects on the targeted individuals. The policy discussion over the impact of the sanctions has
raised questions on the degree to which U.S. policy has met these objectives.
Burmese opposition groups have debated the effectiveness of sanctions for many years. The
release of Aung San Suu Kyi, the parliamentary elections, and the installation of the Union
Government reinvigorated the debate, with a wide range of opinions being expressed. Not long
after the Union Parliament held its first meeting, a group of five ethnic-based parties that had won
seats in the election reportedly released a declaration supporting the end of all sanctions, stating
that the sanctions “are causing many difficulties in the important areas of trade, investment, and
modern technologies for the development of ethnic areas.”123 The Democratic Party (Myanmar)
reportedly sent a letter to the foreign embassies in Burma suggesting the lifting of all sanctions,
supposedly based on the notion that the removal of the sanctions would increase the chances that
all political prisoners would be released.124 The National Democratic Force (NDF) has called for
the removal of all “non-targeted” sanctions (i.e., sanctions not targeted at specific individuals or
organizations) because they reduce economic growth and harm ordinary Burmese citizens.125
On February 8, 2011, the NLD released a review of sanctions on Burma, noting the growing
discussion of the subject.126 The NLD review generally dismissed claims that sanctions have been
responsible for “the economic hardships of the people of Burma.” They point to an International
Monetary Fund (IMF) study that “did not see sanctions as a significant factor” in Burma’s
economic problems, but instead pinpointed the problems on the economic mismanagement of the
SPDC.127 The NLD also contended that, “given the average Burmese citizen does not have a bank
account,” the financial sanctions have only affected “members of the military junta and their
associates.” In the end, the NLD concluded that sanctions have proven to be an effective means of
fostering political change in Burma, and called for a discussion with the leading sanction
nations—Australia, Canada, the European Union, and the United States—to reach an agreement
on “when, how, and under what circumstances” sanctions might be modified. For over a week
following the release of the NLD review of sanctions, the New Light of Myanmar ran a series of
articles criticizing the review, the NLD, Aung San Suu Kyi, and the United States, culminating in
an article on February 17, 2011, referring to economic sanctions as “a tactic of colonialists to
create [a] neo-colony of neo-colonialism.”128
123
Nivell Rayda, “ASEAN Calls for Lifting of Sanctions on Burma,” Jakarta Globe, January 17, 2011.
Te Te, “Movement Builds to End All Non-targeted Sanctions,” Mizzima, January 20, 2011.
125
“Opposition Backs End to Sanctions,” AFP, January 20, 2011.
126
National League for Democracy, Sanctions on Burma, Rangoon, Burma, February 8, 2011.
127
The NLD review does not identify the specific IMF study cited.
128
Kyaw Myint Naing, “Economic Sanctions Only a Tactic of Colonialists to Create Neo-Colony of Neo-colonialism,”
New Light of Myanmar, February 17, 2011.
124
Congressional Research Service
37
U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress
There has been a parallel international discussion of the effectiveness of sanctions on Burma.
Soon after the elections were held, ASEAN called for the removal of all sanctions given the
“significant developments” in Burma.129 ASEAN also implied that the lifting of sanctions would
encourage the evolution of political reconciliation in Burma. The International Crisis Group
(ICG)130 released a report in March 2011 backing the removal of sanctions, claiming that the
sanctions have harmed the people of Burma, “undermine vital economic reforms,” polarize the
political situation in Burma, and “reinforce dangerous imbalances in Myanmar’s external
economic and diplomatic relations.”131 A recent op-ed published in the Washington Post,
however, cautions that the removal of sanctions could place the United States on “the wrong side
of history.”132 Pointing to the recent events in Middle East, the author suggests that it may be time
to “fully” try sanctions by targeting the personal finances of Burma’s rulers and their families
with “focus and intensity,” plus applying more pressure on Burma’s neighbors to help Burma’s
democrats and not its generals. The Economist recently took a slightly different stance,
recognizing that sanctions may not have been effective, but their removal at this time would be
seen as rewarding “cosmetic” political reforms. Instead, it recommends “a calibrated approach to
lifting sanctions.”133
The International Context
The United States is one of several countries to have imposed limited sanctions on Burma.
Australia, Canada, and the European Union (EU) have also imposed sanctions. Australia is the
only Asian nation to impose sanctions on Burma, with others choosing to adopt a policy of
political and economic engagement. At present, the U.S. sanctions regime is more extensive than
those of other nations. Both the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act and the JADE Act require
that efforts be taken to coordinate U.S. sanctions with those of other nations. However, it is
unclear what steps have been made to coordinate sanction regimes with other nations. Given the
2010 elections and the new Union Government in Burma, it seems unlikely that any other
countries will be willing to adopt a U.S-style sanctions regime, barring a significant act of
repression occurring in Burma.
EU Sanctions134
According to the EU’s webpage on Burma, “The prime goal of the EU is to see a legitimate,
democratically elected civilian government established in Myanmar (Burma) - a government
which pursues social and economic development and respects human rights while rebuilding
relations with the international community.”135
129
Nivell Rayda, “ASEAN Calls for Lifting of Sanctions on Burma,” Jakarta Globe, January 17, 2011.
International Crisis Group (ICG) is an independent non-governmental organization committed to preventing and
resolving deadly conflict. ICG is funded by donations from over 30 countries (including the United States), more than a
dozen international foundations, and a number of corporations and individuals.
131
International Crisis Group, Myanmar’s Post-Election Landscape, Brussels, March 7, 2011.
132
Fred Hiatt, “The U.S. Could Get on the Right Side of History in Burma,” Washington Post, May 30, 2011.
133
“A Double Bind,” Economist, May 26, 2011.
134
This section written by Derek Mix, Analyst in European Affairs.
135
European Union External Action Service, Myanmar (Burma) country page, http://www.eeas.eu/myanmar/
index_en.htm.
130
Congressional Research Service
38
U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress
In 1996, the member states of the EU formally adopted a Common Position on Burma that
imposed sanctions on the country.136 The rationale cited by the EU at the time has remained
relatively unchanged for nearly 15 years: the junta’s failure to respect the results of the 1990
election, a lack of progress toward democratization, widespread violations of human rights and
the detention of political prisoners, and the regime’s unwillingness to enter into a “meaningful
dialogue.” The Common Position of 1996 imposed an arms embargo; suspended cooperation not
related to aid or development; imposed a visa ban on Burmese political and military leaders;
suspended high-level official visits; expelled Burmese military personnel from embassies in the
EU; and withdrew European military personnel from embassies in Burma.
Over the past decade and a half, EU sanctions against Burma have grown progressively stricter
and more extensive. Changes to the Common Position on Burma have extended and updated the
lists of Burmese officials subject to visa bans, imposed asset freezes and financial restrictions for
Burmese officials and related enterprises, and banned imports and investment with regard to
economic sectors controlled by the Burmese government (timber, minerals, and precious
stones).137 EU sanctions, however, do not entail a blanket ban on trade and business in Burma.
In mid-April 2011, EU foreign ministers reviewed the measures in place against Burma in the
context of recent developments and decided to renew the majority of sanctions for an additional
12 months.138 At the same time, however, they decided to suspend the visa ban and asset freeze
for 22 civilian officials in the Burmese government, including Foreign Minister Wunna Maung
Lwin, and to lift the suspension of high-level official visits to Burma.
Although some observers reiterate that the bulk of EU sanctions were renewed intact, some
advocates who believe strict sanctions must be maintained to pressure Burma’s leaders on
democratization have expressed concerns that suspending the visa ban and unfreezing the assets
of top Burmese officials may lead to further easing of sanctions down the road. Critics also assert
that the measures appear to open a gap between U.S. and EU sanctions policies.
The EU recognized and criticized the flaws in Burma’s 2010 election, but the decision to relax its
Burma sanctions for the first time since 1996 is in some part a response to that vote and the
ensuing installation of a nominally civilian government (critics of the EU’s move stress that the
new Burmese government is civilian in name only). By signaling a more flexible approach, the
EU “reiterates its willingness to encourage and respond to improvements in governance and
progress, in the hope that a greater civilian character of the Government will help in developing
much needed new policies.”139
136
The EU’s Common Position on Burma has been through several iterations. The Common Position currently in force
is 2006/318/CFSP (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
CONSLEG:2006E0318:20090813:EN:HTML). It was preceded by 2004/423/CFSP and 2003/297/CFSP, which
replaced the 1996 original, 96/635/CFSP. Common Positions are also regularly amended, including adjustments to the
annexes of individuals and entities subject to sanctions.
Common Positions are the EU’s legal instrument for authorizing sanctions and require the unanimous agreement of all
27 member states.
137
For more detailed information on EU sanctions in force against Burma, see the relevant section, included linked
documents, of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions) in Force, May 26, 2011.
138
Since 2003, the EU’s Common Position on Burma expires every 12 months. At the expiration date, the position
comes up for renewal, amendment, or replacement, and is accordingly reviewed by EU foreign ministers at the Council
of the European Union. Prior to 2003, the EU re-visited its position on Burma every six months.
139
“Press Release on the Results of the 3082nd Council Meeting,” Foreign Affairs, April 12, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
39
U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress
More broadly, however, EU debates about Burma rest on some wider themes: engagement versus
isolation, and pragmatism versus morality. These themes are a common feature of many debates
about the EU’s role in the world, and sanctions are often a central part of these discussions.
The adoption of EU-wide sanctions requires the unanimous agreement of all 27 member states.
Although the EU has sanctions against 25 countries, there is a considerable current of skepticism
among many European policymakers about the about the effectiveness of sanctions in achieving
desired results. Some critics charge that European firms doing business in Burma violate the spirit
of EU sanctions, and frequently flirt with the sectors that do explicitly fall under the sanctions. In
addition, the critics note, the enforcement of EU sanctions is difficult and uneven, as it is up to
each member state individually to enforce them with regard to its own citizens and businesses.140
Such doubts about the merits of sanctions are amplified in the case of Burma because the
commercial activities of countries such as China, India and Thailand limit the effectiveness of
U.S. and EU sanctions.
In addition, sanctions skeptics argue that the measures, no matter how targeted, end up hurting the
general population. As a matter of principle in international policy, therefore, many European
policymakers argue that the development of extensive economic, business, and cultural ties, is a
more effective way to gain influence and effect change.
While viewpoints within Europe vary from case to case, the EU tends to demonstrate a general
preference for engagement in its approach to international relations. Many European
policymakers are uncomfortable with the idea that the isolation of problematic regimes represents
an effective policy approach. Seizing on last year’s Burmese election as a small opening, the
changes to the EU’s sanctions measures appear to be an attempt to build some momentum for
greater engagement and dialogue. The EU has resumed high-level official visits in anticipation of
“access to senior levels of the Government, and to key opposition figures,” and it has deemed
Foreign Minister Wunna Maung Lwin, who is Burma’s former ambassador to the European
Commission, “an essential interlocutor.”141
Some observers of EU sanctions debates, however, caution that naked economic interests may at
times masquerade as pragmatic engagement. A number of advocates for the relaxation of EU
sanctions on Burma reportedly have potentially lucrative corporate interests in the country—in
timber, energy, and mining, among other areas. Some Europeans argue that EU sanctions on
Burma have benefitted countries such as China, India, South Korea, and Thailand at Europe’s
expense, with Austria, Germany, and Italy reportedly among those most in favor of easing
sanctions for economic reasons.142
In the end, arguments about pragmatism and engagement are a part of EU debates about
sanctions, but the policy outcomes of these debates hinge on a complex mix of factors that also
has much to do with collective values and a community sense of right and wrong. The set of
principles laid out in the 1992 Treaty on European Union to guide the EU’s external action call
for a values-based foreign policy with the support of democracy and human rights at its core.
140
ibid.
ibid.
142
Andrew Buncombe and Joseph Allchin, “European Firms Seize on Suu Kyi Release to Hunt Profit in Burma,” The
Independent, April 25, 2011.
141
Congressional Research Service
40
U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress
There are legitimate debates about the best way to fulfill this mandate, but in the end the moral
component to EU decisions about sanctions continues to carry a great deal of weight.
Additionally, on these types of issues the EU has a strong preference for consultation with
partners and for multilateral action to the greatest extent possible. Prior to making the April 2011
decision, the EU asserted that it “listened carefully to a broad range of stakeholders, including
civil society, opposition groups, ASEAN members, and regional and international partners.”143
The EU and the United States do not always agree on every aspect of international sanctions. In
the case of Burma, as with numerous other instances, U.S. and EU sanctions may not be identical,
but on the whole their approaches appear to remain compatible and complementary.
The significance of the EU’s April 2011 adjustments to its Burma sanctions regime should not
therefore be overstated. All 27 member states continue to unanimously support extensive
sanctions on Burma, albeit now with a greater measure of flexibility in the hope of encouraging
more constructive engagement. The rescinded sanctions have been suspended for 12 months and
can be restored if developments warrant: ultimately, the EU maintains that it “will assess the new
Government by its deeds, and will review the set of restrictive measures accordingly.”144
Other Key Nations
Australia and Canada also have substantial sanctions on Burma, but more limited in scope when
compared to those of the United States. On October 24, 2007, Australia imposed targeted
sanctions on Burma’s military regime and its supporters. Australia’s sanctions include an arms
embargo, travel restrictions on selected Burmese officials and their supporters, and restrictions on
the provision of financial services to selected Burmese officials and their supporters. Canada’s
sanctions went into effect on December 13, 2007, following the passage of the Special Economic
Measures (Burma) Regulations (SOR/2007-285). Canada’s sanctions, which provide exemptions
for certain types of humanitarian assistance, include:
143
144
•
a ban on all goods exported from Canada to Burma, excepting only the export of
humanitarian goods;
•
a ban on all goods imported from Burma into Canada;
•
a freeze on assets in Canada of any designated Burmese nationals connected with
the Burmese State;
•
a ban on new investment in Burma by Canadian persons and companies;
•
a prohibition on the provision of Canadian financial services to and from Burma;
•
a prohibition on the export of any technical data to Burma;
•
a prohibition on Canadian-registered ships or aircraft from docking or landing in
Burma;
•
a prohibition on Burmese-registered ships or aircraft from docking or landing in
Canada and passing through Canada.
“Press Release on the Results of the 3082nd Council Meeting,” op. cit.
ibid.
Congressional Research Service
41
U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress
Equally important in the sanctions discussion are the nations that do not impose sanctions on
Burma, particularly China, India, Japan, and the other ASEAN member countries. China, which
has officially adopted policy of “non-interference” in the internal affairs of other nations, has in
the past rejected calls for sanctioning Burma’s military regime. In 2007, China and Russia
blocked a U.N. Security Council resolution (introduced by the United Kingdom and the United
States) demanding an end to politica
This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.