Insourcing Functions Performed by Federal Contractors: Legal Issues
Congressional research reportFeb 22, 2013
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Insourcing Functions Performed by Federal
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CRS Report for Congress
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Insourcing Functions Performed by Federal Contractors: Legal Issues
Summary
Recent Congresses and the Obama Administration have taken numerous actions to promote
“insourcing,” or the use of government personnel to perform functions that contractors have
performed on behalf of federal agencies. Among other things, the 109th through the 111th
Congresses enacted statutes requiring the development of policies and guidelines to ensure that
agencies “consider” using government employees to perform functions previously performed by
contractors, as well as any new functions. The Obama Administration has similarly promoted
insourcing, with officials calling for consideration of insourcing in various workforce
management initiatives.
Certain insourcing initiatives of the Department of Defense (DOD), in particular, prompted legal
challenges alleging that DOD failed to comply with applicable guidelines when insourcing
specific functions. The only court to reach the issue assumed, without deciding, that certain
guidelines were legally binding. However, other courts have not addressed this issue because of
questions about jurisdiction and standing. The parties initially conceded that such suits were
cognizable under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which permits challenges to agency
actions that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
the law,” although the government has recently asserted that insourcing determinations are
committed to agency discretion by law and, thus, not reviewable by the courts.
At first, there was some uncertainty as to whether the U.S. Court of Federal Claims had
jurisdiction over such suits under the Administrative Disputes Resolution Act of 1996, or whether
the federal district courts had jurisdiction under the APA. However, most courts to address the
issue have found that the Court of Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to
insourcing determinations because such determinations are made in connection with “proposed
procurements” and at least some contractors are “interested parties.” Later, questions arose about
whether contractors who meet the statutory standing requirements (i.e., are “interested parties”)
must also meet prudential standing requirements. These judicially self-imposed limits on the
exercise of jurisdiction ensure that plaintiffs are within the “zone of interests” to be protected by
the statutes they seek to enforce. Initially, judges on the Court of Federal Claims reached differing
conclusions as to whether prudential standing requirements applied, although later decisions may
suggest that any prudential standing requirements that apply could potentially be easily met. Most
recently, the court has had to determine whether vendors whose contracts have expired have
standing to challenge insourcing determinations, or whether such challenges are moot.
Other provisions of law could also potentially constrain whether and how agencies may proceed
with insourcing in specific circumstances, or limit the activities that former contractor employees
may perform after being hired by the federal government. These include (1) contract law, under
which agencies could be found to have constructively terminated certain requirements contracts
by augmenting their in-house capacity to perform services provided for in the contract; (2) civil
service law, which would generally limit “direct hires” of contractor employees; and (3) ethics
law, which could limit the involvement of former contractor employees in certain agency actions.
Members of the 112th Congress enacted legislation (P.L. 112-239) that calls for the Office of
Management and Budget to establish “procedures and methodologies” for use by agencies in
deciding whether to insource functions performed by small businesses, including procedures for
identifying which contracts are considered for conversion and for comparing the costs of
performance by contractor personnel with the costs of performance by government personnel.
Congressional Research Service
Insourcing Functions Performed by Federal Contractors: Legal Issues
Contents
Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Legal Issues ..................................................................................................................................... 4
Administrative Procedure Act and Insourcing Guidelines ........................................................ 5
Jurisdiction of the Federal District Courts or the Court of Federal Claims......................... 6
Prudential Standing ........................................................................................................... 10
Expired Contracts and Mootness....................................................................................... 12
Whether Particular Guidelines Are Binding...................................................................... 14
Constructive Termination or Breach of Requirements Contracts ............................................ 15
Civil Service Laws and Limitations on “Direct Hires” ........................................................... 17
Ethics Laws and the Activities of Former Contractor Employees ........................................... 18
Small Business Law ................................................................................................................ 20
Congressional Actions ................................................................................................................... 21
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 23
Congressional Research Service
Insourcing Functions Performed by Federal Contractors: Legal Issues
Introduction
While agencies are prohibited by federal law and policy from contracting out functions that are
“inherently governmental,”1 other functions could potentially be contracted out.2 There has long
been debate over both general government policies promoting the use of the private sector to
perform “commercial functions,”3 and whether specific functions should be performed by
government personnel or contractors.4 However, since 2008, the insourcing initiatives of recent
Congresses and the Obama Administration have generated particular controversy.5 Several
lawsuits have been filed challenging agencies’ determinations to insource particular functions,
and broader questions have been raised as to whether agencies’ implementation of insourcing
runs afoul of civil service, ethics, or small business laws. This report provides a brief overview of
key legal issues related to recent insourcing initiatives. It will be updated as developments occur.
Background
Since January 1955, the federal government has consistently had policies promoting the use of
the private sector to produce commercial products and perform commercial services, although the
wording of such policies and, particularly, the degree to which they have been implemented by
the executive branch have varied over time.6 The George W. Bush Administration, for example,
1
In brief, an “inherently governmental function” is one that is “so intimately related to the public interest as to require
performance by Federal Government employees.” 31 U.S.C. §501 note, at §5(2)(A). There has recently been concern
about the definition of “inherently governmental functions” and, particularly, whether the existence of multiple and/or
contradictory definitions of this term has resulted in the contracting out of functions that must be performed by federal
employees. See CRS Report R42325, Definitions of “Inherently Governmental Functions” in Federal Procurement
Law and Guidance, by (name redacted) and (name redacted) (surveying existing definitions of inherently governmental
functions); CRS Report R42039, Performance of Inherently Governmental and Critical Functions: The Obama
Administration’s Final Policy Letter, by (name redacted), (name redacted), and (name redacted) (discussing Obama
Administration guidance regarding inherently governmental and related functions).
2
See, e.g., Gulf Group, Inc. v. United States, 61 Fed. Cl. 338, 341 n.7 (2004) (treating items on the Federal Acquisition
Regulation’s list of “functions approaching inherently governmental” as capable of being contracted out by agencies).
Congress can, however, remove agencies’ discretion to contract out particular functions by prohibiting them from
doing so (or from using appropriated funds to do so). See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, P.L. 110-161,
§730, 121 Stat. 1846 (2008) (“None of the funds made available in this Act may be used to study, complete a study of,
or enter into a contract with a private party to carry out, without specific authorization in a subsequent Act of Congress,
a competitive sourcing activity of the Secretary of Agriculture, including support personnel of the Department of
Agriculture, relating to rural development or farm loan programs.”).
3
See CRS Report R42325, Definitions of “Inherently Governmental Functions” in Federal Procurement Law and
Guidance, by (name redacted) and (name redacted), at pp. 3-8. For purposes of insourcing and outsourcing, a
“commercial function” is “[a] recurring service that could be performed by the private sector. This recurring service is
an agency requirement that is funded and controlled through a contract, fee-for-service agreement, or performance by
government personnel. Commercial activities may be found within, or throughout, organizations that perform
inherently governmental activities or classified work.” See U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Circular No. A-76
(Revised), May 29, 2003, at D-2, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
circulars_a076_a76_incl_tech_correction.
4
See, e.g., Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for FY2009, P.L. 110-417, §832, 122 Stat. 4535 (Oct.
14, 2008) (“It is the sense of Congress that ... the regulations issued by the Secretary of Defense pursuant to section
862(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 ... should ensure that private security
contractors are not authorized to perform inherently governmental functions in an area of combat operations.”).
5
See infra “Administrative Procedure Act and Insourcing Guidelines.”
6
Compare Bureau of the Budget Bulletin No. 55-4 (Jan. 15, 1955) (“[The] Federal Government will not start or carry
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promoted this policy vigorously under the name of “competitive sourcing” (later “commercial
services management”), which was a key component of the President’s Management Agenda.7 Its
doing so prompted concern among some commentators, who asserted that competitive sourcing
represented a concerted effort to shift work to the private sector and resulted in contractors
performing functions that should have been performed by government employees.8
Responding, in part, to such concerns, the 109th Congress enacted legislation directing the
Secretary of Defense to “prescribe guidelines and procedures for ensuring that consideration is
given to using Federal Government employees for work that is currently performed or would
otherwise be performed under Department of Defense [DOD] contracts.”9 These guidelines and
procedures are to ensure that “special consideration” is given to using government personnel to
perform functions that
•
had been performed by government employees at any time on or after October 1,
1980;
•
are closely associated with the performance of inherently governmental
functions;
•
are performed under contracts that were not competitively awarded; or
•
have been performed poorly by a contractor due to excessive costs or inferior
quality.10
Subsequent Congresses expanded upon these requirements. First, the 110th Congress required that
DOD guidelines and procedures also give consideration to using government employees to
perform new functions, as well as those that had been contracted out.11 Then, the 111th Congress
imposed similar requirements upon civilian agencies.12
(...continued)
on any commercial activity to provide a service or product for its own use if such product or service can be procured
from private enterprise through ordinary business channels.”) with Bureau of the Budget Circular A-76 (March 3, 1966)
(“The guidelines in this Circular are in furtherance of the Government’s general policy of relying on the private
enterprise system to supply its needs.”) and Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76, supra note 3 (“The
longstanding policy of the federal government has been to rely on the private sector for needed commercial services.
To ensure that the American people receive maximum value for their tax dollars, commercial activities should be
subject to the forces of competition.”). See also CRS Report R42341, Sourcing Policy: Selected Developments and
Issues, by (name redacted).
7
U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Performance of Commercial Activities, 67 Fed. Reg. 69772 (Nov. 19, 2002)
(“President [George W. Bush] has identified competitive sourcing—i.e., the process of opening the government’s
commercial activities to the discipline of competition—as one of the five main initiatives of his Management Agenda
for improving the performance of government.”).
8
See, e.g., Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees (AFGE), Privatization: Cleaning Up the Mess, February 9, 2009, available at
http://www.afge.org/index.cfm?page=2005LegislativeConferenceIssuePapers&fuse=Content&ContentID=1745
(“[Office of Management and Budget] officials illegally watered down the statutory definition when they overhauled
the A-76 Circular [in 2003].”).
9
National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006, P.L. 109-163, §343(a)(1), 119 Stat. 3200-01 (Jan. 6, 2006) (codified
at 10 U.S.C. §2461 note).
10
Id. at §343(a)(2)(A)-(D).
11
National Defense Authorization Act for FY2008, P.L. 110-181, §324, 122 Stat. 60-61 (Jan. 28, 2008) (codified at 10
U.S.C. §2463).
12
Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, P.L. 111-8, §736, 123 Stat. 689-91 (Mar. 11, 2009) (codified at 31 U.S.C. §501
note).
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When President Obama took office, these and related legislative actions13 were supplemented by
a number of executive branch initiatives that also promoted insourcing of at least certain
functions. President Obama himself paved the way for such initiatives with a March 4, 2009,
memorandum on government contracting, which suggested that “contractors may be performing
inherently governmental functions.”14 Although explicitly focused on impermissible and
inappropriate outsourcing of inherently governmental functions, this memorandum implied that at
least certain functions that have been outsourced should be returned to government performance
(i.e., insourced). DOD and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) both subsequently
issued additional guidance regarding insourcing. For example, in a May 28, 2009, memorandum,
the Deputy Secretary for Defense called for the development of insourcing plans and stated that
insourcing should be part of a “total force approach to workforce management and strategic
human capital planning.”15 OMB took a similar approach in its July 29, 2009, memorandum on
“Managing the Multi-sector Workforce,” directing agencies to conduct pilot human capital
analyses of programs where the agency has concerns about reliance on contractors.16
The President’s FY2011 budget submissions later reiterated the call for agencies to “be alert for
situations in which excessive reliance on contractors undermines the ability of the Federal
Government to control its own operations and accomplish its missions for the American
people.”17 DOD, in particular, heeded this call, with the Secretary of the Army testifying in
February 2010 that the Army intended to insource 7,162 positions in FY2010 and 11,084
positions in FY2011 through FY2015.18 Such announcements prompted some commentators to
object that DOD’s insourcing initiatives had become a “quota driven exercise.”19 These and
13
In addition to requiring the development of insourcing guidelines and procedures, the 109th through the 111th
Congresses enacted other legislation that could promote insourcing, or at least government performance of particular
functions. For example, the 111th Congress enacted legislation requiring agencies to complete inventories of their
service contracts before they “begin, plan for, or announce a study or public-private competition regarding the
conversion to contractor performance of any function performed by Federal employees pursuant to Office of
Management and Budget [OMB] Circular A–76 or any other administrative regulation or directive.” Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2010, P.L. 111-117, §743(g), 123 Stat. 3218 (Dec. 16, 2009). Previously, the 110th Congress had
enacted legislation requiring OMB to review existing definitions of inherently governmental functions, in part to ensure
that such functions are not contracted out. Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for FY2009, P.L. 110417, §321(a)(1)-(4), 122 Stat. 4411 (October 14, 2008).
14
President Barack Obama, Government Contracting, Mar. 4, 2009, at 2, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the_press_office/Memorandum-for-the-Heads-of-Executive-Departments-and-Agencies-Subject-Government.
15
Deputy Secretary of Defense, Insourcing Contracted Services: Implementation Guidance, May 28, 2009, Attachment
I, at 1, available at http://ebookbrowse.com/depsecdef-memo-insourcing-contracted-services-implementationguidance-28-may-09-osd-05339-09-pdf-d182859606.
16
Peter R. Orszag, Director, U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Managing the Multi-Sector Workforce, July 29,
2009, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/memoranda_fy2009/m-09-26.pdf.
17
ABA Public Contract Law Section, Legislative Coordinating Committee, Insourcing Initiatives, Mar. 6, 2010,
available at http://www.arnoldporter.net/resources/documents/InSourcing%20Presentation%20for%20ABA__VA_804440_1_%20_2_.pdf.
18
See, e.g., Matthew Weigelt, Army Vows to Cut 7,000 Contractor Jobs This Year, Wash. Tech., Feb. 23, 2010,
available at http://washingtontechnology.com/articles/2010/02/23/army-insourcing-core-governmental-functions.aspx.
19
Professional Services Council, Letter to the Honorable Robert Gates, May 3, 2010, available at
http://www.govexec.com/pdfs/050410rb1b.pdf (objecting that DOD had largely insourced routine commercial
functions, not critical positions). The Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for FY2011 responded, in part, to
such concerns by prohibiting DOD from establishing goals or quotas for insourcing functions. See P.L. 111-383, §323,
124 Stat. 4184 (Jan. 7, 2011) (codified at 10 U.S.C. §2463). See also National Defense Authorization Act for FY2012,
P.L. 112-81, §931(a), 125 Stat. 1543 (Dec. 31, 2011) (indicating that nothing in the revised 10 U.S.C. §129a shall be
construed to authorize the establishment of numerical goals or budgetary savings targets for the conversion of functions
to performance by DOD civilian personnel or for conversion to performance by contractor personnel).
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subsequent insourcing initiatives generated several lawsuits, discussed in more detail below,
alleging that DOD failed to comply with its own policies and procedures when determining to
insource specific functions.20
Legal Issues
Because federal agencies have broad discretion in determining their own requirements and how
they will meet these requirements, whether with their own employees or by contracting out,21
there do not appear to be any legal barriers to insourcing per se.22 However, various provisions of
federal law could constrain whether and how agencies may proceed with insourcing in particular
circumstances, as well as limit the activities that former contractor employees may perform after
being hired by the federal government. These provisions include (1) the Administrative Procedure
Act, which could potentially preclude agencies from implementing insourcing determinations that
were not made in accordance with any applicable statutes, regulations, or guidelines; (2) contract
law, under which agencies could be found to have constructively terminated for convenience, or
even breached, certain requirements contracts by augmenting their in-house capacity to perform
services provided for in the contract; (3) civil service law, which would generally limit “direct
hires” of contractor employees; and (4) ethics law, which could limit the involvement of former
contractor employees who are hired by the government in certain agency actions. No issues of
small business law would appear to be implicated, even though small businesses are generally
given special consideration under federal law,23 and some commentators have expressed concern
that insourcing, at least as implemented to date, has disproportionately affected small
businesses.24 However, the Obama Administration has provided that, as a matter of policy,
agencies should place a lower priority on reviewing certain functions performed by small
businesses when determining which functions should be insourced, as well as give small
20
One such suit also alleged that the contractor was denied due process of the law in violation of the Fifth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution because of the Air Force’s failure to comply with its insourcing guidelines. See Triad Logistics
Servs. Corp. v. United States, 2012 U.S. Claims LEXIS 393, at *16 (Apr. 16, 2012). However, this allegation was not
further developed in the litigation, and no other challenge to an insourcing determination appears to have raised the
issue.
21
See Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 127 (1940) (“Like private individuals and businesses, the
Government enjoys the unrestricted power to produce its own supplies, to determine those with whom it will deal, and
to fix the terms and conditions upon which it will make needed purchases.”) (emphasis added). The legislative branch
can, however, restrict the discretion of the executive branch to contract out, or perform in-house, specific functions.
See, e.g., Water Resources Development Act, P.L. 101-640, §314, 104 Stat. 4641 (Nov. 28, 1990) (codified at 33
U.S.C. §2321) (“Activities currently performed by personnel under the direction of the Secretary in connection with the
operation and maintenance of hydroelectric power generating facilities at Corps of Engineers water resources projects
are to be considered as inherently governmental functions and not commercial activities.”); National Defense
Authorization Act for FY1994, P.L. 103-160, §848(a)(1), 107 Stat. 1724-25 (Nov. 30, 1993) (codified at 10 U.S.C.
§2304e(a)) (prohibiting certain types of competition between DOD and small businesses).
22
Other aspects of sourcing policy may also raise legal issues, such as whether the agency properly conducted any
public-private competitions that resulted in outsourcing determinations. See, e.g., Patricia A. Thompson—Agency
Tender Official, B-310910.4 (Jan. 22, 2009). However, such issues are outside the scope of this report.
23
See, e.g., Small Business Act of 1958, P.L. 85-536, §2(a), 72 Stat. 384 (July 18, 1958) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§631(a)) (“[It is] the declared policy of the Congress that the Government should aid, counsel, assist, and protect,
insofar as is possible, the interests of small-business concerns.”).
24
See, e.g., Robert A. Burton & James Y. Boland, Concrete Steps Government Should Take to Alleviate Growing
Procurement Challenges for Small Businesses, 94 Fed. Cont. Rep. 190 (Aug. 17, 2010).
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Insourcing Functions Performed by Federal Contractors: Legal Issues
businesses preference when determining who performs work that remains in the private sector
after related functions are insourced.25
The report does not address any limits on insourcing that may be imposed by agency personnel
ceilings or caps, largely because such ceilings or caps pertain to agency personnel, not agency
functions. While personnel and functions are obviously related, and there could potentially be
instances where agencies experience difficulties in insourcing particular functions due to a lack of
personnel, agencies could return functions to in-house performance without hiring new
personnel.26 In addition, such caps or ceilings typically do not raise legal issues like those
discussed herein.
Administrative Procedure Act and Insourcing Guidelines
Assuming that the decision to insource particular functions is not “committed to agency
discretion by law,”27 as the government has recently asserted,28 the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) could potentially constrain such decisions by allowing challenges to agency actions that
are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.”29
Where insourcing is concerned, applicable laws could include various statutes requiring DOD to
“use the least costly form of personnel consistent with military requirements and other needs of
the Department,”30 or to ensure that the difference in the cost of performing functions with DOD
civilian employees, instead of contractors, exceeds certain thresholds when determining whether
a function should be insourced.31 It could also potentially include various guidelines, such as
DOD’s directive on “Estimating and Comparing the Full Costs of Civilian and Military
Manpower and Contract Support.”32 Guidelines not based in statutes or regulations are not
necessarily enforceable in the same way that statutes and regulations are. However, they could
potentially be found to be legally binding if the agency intended to be bound, or has employed the
guidelines in such a way that they are binding as a practical matter.33
25
Office of Management and Budget, Office of Federal Procurement Policy, Publication of the Office of Federal
Procurement Policy (OFPP) Policy Letter 11-01, Performance of Inherently Governmental and Critical Functions, 76
Fed. Reg. 56227, 56239-40 (Sept. 12, 2011).
26
Id. at 56239 (noting that agencies could reassert control over any functions which they determine should not have
been contracted out by strengthening oversight of contractor performance, as well as by insourcing the function).
27
5 U.S.C. §701(a)(2).
28
See Triad Logistics, 2012 U.S. Claims LEXIS 393, at *77. The court did not directly reach the merits of this
argument, but expressed concern that, were this argument to prevail, agencies’ insourcing determinations could be
“unreviewable.” See id., at *83 (“Unreviewable decision-making authority by Executive Branch agencies, as proposed
by the government, requires close attention.”).
29
5 U.S.C. §706(a)(2)(A).
30
10 U.S.C. §129a (2010). This language was deleted in December 2011, as part of amendments made to Section 129a
by the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2012. See P.L. 112-81, §931(a), 125 Stat. 1543.
31
10 U.S.C. §2463(e)(1)(c).
32
See Office of the Sec. of Defense, Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 09-007, incorporating Change 4, Oct. 2,
2012, available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/DTM-09-007.pdf.
33
See, e.g., Pacific Molasses Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 356 F.2d 386, 389-90 (5th Cir. 1996) (“When an
administrative agency promulgates rules to govern its proceedings, these rules must be scrupulously observed. This is
so even when the defined procedures are ‘… generous beyond the requirements that bind such agency …’ For once an
agency exercises its discretion and creates the procedural rules under which it desires to have its actions judged, it
denies itself the right to violate these rules.”). But see Farrell v. Dep't of the Interior, 314 F.3d 584, 590 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(“The general consensus is that an agency statement, not issued as a formal regulation, binds the agency only if the
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To date, no court appears to have directly addressed whether the non-statutory guidelines utilized
in the Obama Administration’s insourcing initiatives are legally binding, although one court
seems to have assumed, without deciding, that certain guidelines were binding.34 Rather, the
litigation has focused, first, upon whether the U.S. Court of Federal Claims or the federal district
courts have jurisdiction over challenges to insourcing determinations and, more recently, upon
whether contractors who meet certain statutory standing requirements (i.e., are “interested
parties”) must also meet prudential standing requirements, as well as whether challenges to
insourcing determinations are moot after the vendor’s contract expires.
Jurisdiction of the Federal District Courts or the Court of Federal Claims
In the earliest cases challenging DOD’s insourcing initiatives, the parties generally agreed that
insourcing determinations were reviewable under the APA,35 but contested whether the Court of
Federal Claims or the federal district courts had jurisdiction over such challenges. This question
arose because the APA’s waiver of the government’s sovereign immunity as to suits brought
against it in the federal district courts is limited, and does not apply if “any other statute that
grants consent to suit expressly or impliedly forbids the relief which is sought.”36 Among the
other statutes waiving the government’s sovereign immunity is the Tucker Act, as amended by the
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act (ADRA) of 1996, which provides that, effective January
1, 2001, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims has exclusive trial-level jurisdiction over any
action by an interested party objecting to a solicitation by a Federal agency for bids or
proposals for a proposed contract or to a proposed award or the award of a contract or any
alleged violation of statute or regulation in connection with a procurement or a proposed
procurement.37
The key questions in the initial cases were, thus, (1) whether plaintiffs challenging insourcing
determinations are “interested parties,” and (2) whether insourcing determinations are made “in
connection with a procurement or a proposed procurement.” If the plaintiffs were interested
parties and insourcing determinations were made in connection with procurements or proposed
procurements, then the Court of Federal Claims would have exclusive jurisdiction over such
challenges pursuant to the Tucker Act, as amended by ADRA. However, if insourcing
(...continued)
agency intended the statement to be binding.”).
34
See Santa Barbara Applied Research, Inc. v. United States, 98 Fed. Cl. 536, 546-49 (2011) (Firestone, J.) (finding
that certain actions by the Air Force (e.g., allocating fewer civilian employees to perform particular functions than had
been requested by the program offices, using DTM-COMPARE to account for overtime risk) were not arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law).
35
See Vero Tech. Support, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1340 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (“There appears
to be no dispute that the APA governs the Plaintiff’s claim. Rather the dispute concerns which court has jurisdiction to
hear the APA claim.”). Although the government has also argued that contractor challenges to insourcing
determinations constitute contract disputes, which are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims
under the Contract Disputes Act, this argument has generally been rejected. See, e.g., K-Mar Industries v. U.S. Dep’t of
Defense, 752 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (W.D. Okla. 2010); Rothe Development, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 116934 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 3, 2010), motion to amend denied, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5236 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 19,
2011).
36
5 U.S.C. §702. Because it is a sovereign, the United States is immune to suits without its consent. See, e.g., United
States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941).
37
Ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (Mar. 3, 1887) (codified, as amended, at 28 U.S.C. §1491(b)(1)).
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determinations were not made in connection with procurements or proposed procurements, then
the federal district courts would have jurisdiction under the APA.38
Majority View That the Court of Federal Claims Has Exclusive Jurisdiction
Most federal appellate and district courts that have considered the question have found that
contractors’ challenges to insourcing determinations fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Court of Federal Claims because at least some contractors are interested parties, and insourcing
determinations are made in connection with proposed procurements. For example, in Rothe
Development, Inc. v. Department of Defense, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
(“Fifth Circuit”) upheld a decision by the district court finding that a contractor was an interested
party because it had a “direct economic interest as a prospective bidder” in any contracts that
would be awarded to perform the functions if the functions were not insourced.39 In reaching this
conclusion, the Fifth Circuit relied upon the definition of “interested party” given in the
Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) of 1984, which has generally been found to apply for
purposes of the Tucker Act.40 CICA defines an “interested party” as an “actual or prospective
bidder or offeror whose direct economic interest would be affected by the award of the contract or
by failure to award the contract.”41 The Fifth Circuit similarly affirmed the district court’s finding
that an insourcing determination is made in “connection with” a procurement or proposed
procurement for purposes of the Tucker Act because federal law defines “procurement” as
including:
all stages of the process of acquiring property or services, beginning with the process for
determining a need for property or services and ending with contract completion and
closeout,
and the process of determining a need for property or services “necessarily includes the choice to
refrain from obtaining outside services.”42 The court further emphasized the incongruity between
the district court’s having jurisdiction when an agency determines to insource, but not when it
38
It is unclear whether the federal district courts would exercise jurisdiction over challenges to insourcing
determinations if such determinations were found to be made in connection with a procurement, but contractors were
found not to be “interested parties” for purposes of ADRA. See Vero Tech. Support, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1341-42
(suggesting that standing to bring suit in the Court of Federal Claims under ADRA is “narrower” than standing to bring
suit in district court under the APA). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (“Eleventh Circuit”) affirmed
the district court’s decision in this case in an unpublished opinion without addressing the issue. See 437 Fed. App'x 966
(11th Cir. 2011).
39
666 F.3d 336, 338 (5th Cir. 2011), aff’g 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116934. In fact, the Fifth Circuit noted that, “if Rothe
had no such interest, it is difficult to imagine how it might demonstrate a particularized injury necessary for Article III
standing.” Id.
40
See, e.g., Vero Tech. Support, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 16598, at *11 (citing American Federation of Government
Employees, AFL-CIO v. United States, 258 F.3d 1294, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). However, it should be noted that, while
the Eleventh Circuit relied upon the Federal Circuit’s decision in AFGE in concluding that ADRA relies on CICA’s
definition of “interested party,” the district court questioned the relevance of this case to determinations of who is an
interested party for purposes of ADRA because the case involved a challenge by government employees—not a
contractor—to agency sourcing determinations. See 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1343.
41
P.L. 98-369, §2713, 98 Stat. 1183 (July 18, 1984) (codified, as amended, at 31 U.S.C. §3551(2)).
42
Rothe Dev., 666 F.3d at 339 (quoting 41 U.S.C. §111). As the Fifth Circuit noted, the Tucker Act does not define
“procurement.” However, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (OFPPA) does, and its definition has generally
been found to apply for purposes of the Tucker Act. See, e.g., Vero Tech. Support, 437 Fed. App’x at 769 (citing
Distributed Solutions, Inc. v. United States, 539 F.3d 1340, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2008), as holding that the meaning of
“procurement,” for purposes of ADRA, comes from the OFPPA).
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determines to outsource.43 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in an unpublished
decision, and various federal district courts have relied upon similar reasoning in finding that the
Court of Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to insourcing determinations.44
The Court of Federal Claims has also consistently found that at least certain challenges to
insourcing determinations are within its jurisdiction. For example, in its most recent decision
regarding insourcing, Dellew Corporation v. United States, the court relied upon the same logic
and precedents used by the Fifth Circuit in Rothe when finding that contractors are interested
parties, and insourcing determinations are made in connection with procurements.45 Specifically,
the Dellew court found that the incumbent contractor was an “interested party,” as that term is
defined in the Competition in Contracting Act, because it “likely would continue to provide ...
services for the Air Force in the future” if the functions were not insourced and, thus, had a
“direct economic interest” in the proposed procurement.46 The Dellew court similarly found that
the insourcing determination was made in connection with a “procurement,” as that term is
defined in the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act.47 In reaching this conclusion, the court
noted that the decision to insource involved the “process for determining a need for property or
services” because it involved a determination that the Air Force needed certain services, and that
these services could be provided more cheaply by agency personnel than contractor employees.48
Minority View That the Federal District Courts Have Jurisdiction
In contrast to the majority view, one federal district court has found that the district courts have
jurisdiction over challenges to insourcing determinations because such challenges are not within
the Court of Federal Claim’s jurisdiction under the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act
(ADRA). In K-Mar Industries, Inc. v. Department of Defense, the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Oklahoma found that a contractor challenging an insourcing determination is
not an “interested party,” within the meaning of the Competition in Contracting Act because no
contract or prospective contract is at issue.49 The K-Mar court similarly found that an insourcing
determination is not made “in connection with a procurement or a proposed procurement,” given
43
Rothe Dev., 666 F.3d at 339 (“Rothe’s construction of procurement would require us to believe Congress intended
concurrent jurisdiction over bid protests where the [DOD] determined it could execute functions more cost-effectively
with federal employees, but exclusive jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims where the [DOD] concluded an
outside contract was more efficient. We refuse to adopt so narrow a meaning of procurement.”).
44
See, e.g., Vero Tech. Support, 437 Fed. App'x at 771; Fisher-Cal Indus., Inc. v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
36508 (D.D.C., Mar. 19, 2012); Harris Enterprises, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Defense, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143574
(W.D. Tex., Oct. 12, 2010). Another case challenging an agency insourcing determination was settled by the parties
without a decision on the merits. See Rohmann Servs., Inc. v. Dep’t of Defense, Case No. 10-CV-0061 (W.D. Texas).
This appears to have been the earliest of the cases challenging the Obama Administration’s insourcing initiatives, and
the terms of the settlement were widely characterized as a “win” for the contractor because the agency continued the
contract. See, e.g., Matthew Weigelt, Small Business Fights Insourcing … and Wins, Wash. Tech., May 5, 2010,
available at http://washingtontechnology.com/articles/2010/05/03/procurement-insourcing-boone-v-air-force.aspx.
45
No. 12-627C, 2012 U.S. Claims LEXIS 1638 (Dec. 20, 2012).
46
Id. at *41.
47
Id. at *36-*37.
48
Id. at *37-*38.
49
752 F. Supp. 2d at 1211. In a separate decision, the court denied K-Mar’s motion for a preliminary injunction.
However, in so doing, it made clear that “[n]othing stated in this order is intended to pre-judge in any way the merits of
the procedures-based claims. At this stage the court has no view regarding the merits of any permanent relief based on
these claims.” K-Mar Industries v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126955 (W.D. Okla., Nov. 4, 2010).
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the definition of “procurement” in the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (OFPPA), which
has been adopted for purposes of ARDA.50 In finding that an insourcing determination did not
involve a procurement, the court relied on the plain meaning of the OFPPA, which, it found,
provides that procurement begins with determining “a need for property or services,” not with
determining “whether there is a need” for property or services.51 The court also noted that the
term “acquisition,” which it characterized as “the critical concept” within the definition of
“procurement,” denotes only purchasing or leasing by contract,52 and that even if ADRA’s grant
of jurisdiction arguably applied through a broad reading of the definition of “procurement,” this
would not constitute a clear jurisdictional grant and waiver of sovereign immunity, only an
implied one, and waivers of sovereign immunity are construed narrowly.53
The K-Mar court also cited an earlier decision by the Court of Federal Claims wherein the Court
of Federal Claims appeared at least somewhat sympathetic to the argument that challenges to
agency insourcing determinations are within the jurisdiction of the district courts.54 There, in
finding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear a challenge to an insourcing determination because the
plaintiff’s claim was still pending in federal district court, the Court of Federal Claims stated that:
plaintiff’s deliberate choice of forum in the District Court and chosen basis for jurisdiction,
traditional APA jurisdiction, resonates with this court. Without a contract or solicitation at
issue, even as amended by the ADRA, Tucker Act jurisdiction to challenge insourcing policy
55
decisions is not immediately apparent.
However, the court also noted that it “had not fully explored the issue at this time,”56 and a
subsequent decision by the same judge adopted the majority view that the Court of Federal
Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to insourcing determinations.57
50
752 F. Supp. 2d at 1212. The OFPPA defines “procurement” as including “all stages of the process of acquiring
property or services, beginning with the process for determining a need for property or services and ending with
contract completion and closeout.” P.L. 93-400, §4, 88 Stat. 796 (Aug. 30, 1974) (codified, as amended, at 41 U.S.C.
§111). See supra note 42.
51
K-Mar Indus., 752 F. Supp. 2d at 1212. The government had attempted to argue that, for purposes of ADRA and the
OFPPA, the “process for determining a need for property or services” begins with a decision by the agency as to
whether there is a need to acquire property or services and, thus, encompasses any insourcing determination.
52
Id. This definition also comes from the OFPPA. See 41 U.S.C. §131 (“[T]he term ‘acquisition’—(1) means the
process of acquiring, with appropriated amounts, by contract for purchase or lease, property or services (including
construction) that support the missions and goals of an executive agency, from the point at which the requirements of
the executive agency are established in consultation with the chief acquisition officer of the executive agency; and (2)
includes—(A) the process of acquiring property or services that are already in existence, or that must be created,
developed, demonstrated, and evaluated; (B) the description of requirements to satisfy agency needs; (C) solicitation
and selection of sources; (D) award of contracts; (E) contract performance; (F) contract financing; (G) management and
measurement of contract performance through final delivery and payment; and (H) technical and management
functions directly related to the process of fulfilling agency requirements by contract.”).
53
752 F. Supp. 2d at 1212.
54
Id. at 1213 n.4
55
Vero Technical Support, Inc. v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 784, 792 (2010).
56
Id.
57
Triad Logistics Servs. Corp., 2012 U.S. Claims LEXIS 393, at *46-*47 n.14 (“The court notes that Triad’s case
raises different issues from an earlier in-sourcing case brought before this Judge. … In [Vero], although the court
offered a preliminary view on the broader issue of jurisdiction to review in-sourcing challenges under the Tucker Act,
further and more in-depth review has led the court to the different conclusion than suggested in [Vero].”).
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Prudential Standing
While the Court of Federal Claims has consistently found that it has jurisdiction over challenges
to insourcing determinations, judges on the court have reached differing conclusions as to
whether contractors who meet the statutory standing requirements (i.e., are “interested parties”)
must also meet prudential standing requirements and, if so, whether they are within the zone of
interests protected by various statutes pertaining to insourcing.58 The concept of prudential
standing is a “judicially self-imposed limit[] on the exercise of federal jurisdiction,”59 “founded in
concern about the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic society.”60 In
determining whether prudential standing exists, the court focuses upon “whether the interest
sought to be protected by the [plaintiff] is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected by
the statute … in question,” or whether the plaintiffs are “merely incidental beneficiaries” of the
statutory provisions at issue.61
Initially, in Santa Barbara Applied Research, Inc. v. United States, the Court of Federal Claims
expressly rejected the government’s argument that the case should be dismissed on prudential
standing grounds because the plaintiff contractor was not “within the zone of interests to be
protected” by the statutes governing insourcing.62 In making this argument, the government had
asserted that provisions in the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for
FY2011 prohibiting DOD from imposing any quotas or goals on insourcing without a considered
cost analysis “do not provide any benefits to contractors,” and cannot form the basis for a
challenge to an insourcing determination.63 The court disagreed, in part, because it construed the
decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in American Federation of
Government Employees, AFL-CIO v. United States to mean that prudential standing is not
required in bid protests under the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act (ADRA) because
ADRA’s standing requirements are “more stringent” than those of the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA).64 However, the court also suggested that, if prudential standing were required,
contractors challenging insourcing determinations would possess such standing because the Ike
Skelton NDAA “was enacted, at least in part, for the benefit of the contracting community.”65
Later, however, in Hallmark-Phoenix 3, LLC v. United States, the Court of Federal Claims
dismissed on prudential standing grounds a contractor’s challenge to the Air Force’s
determination to insource certain supply services that the contractor had provided.66 The
Hallmark-Phoenix court did so because it found that prudential standing requirements were
applicable to bid protests given Supreme Court precedents, which applied prudential standing
analysis in non-APA cases. It also noted that earlier bid protest decisions had imposed prudential
58
Tamerlane, Ltd. v. United States, 81 Fed. Cl. 752, 759 (2008) (“[The] decisions of one judge … on the Court of
Federal Claims do not serve to bind another judge of the court.”).
59
Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004) (internal quotations omitted).
60
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
61
Nat’l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 494 n.7 (1998); Ass’n of Data Processing
Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-53 (1970).
62
98 Fed. Cl. at 544.
63
Id. See supra note 19 for further discussion of this provision of the Ike Skelton NDAA.
64
98 Fed. Cl. at 544. For more on the AFGE decision, see supra note 40.
65
98 Fed. Cl. at 544.
66
99 Fed. Cl. 65 (2011) (Allegra, J.).
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standing requirements.67 The Hallmark-Phoenix court further found that the contractor was not
within the “zone of interests” protected by the various statutes governing insourcing because
these statutes were intended to be enforced by Congress, not the courts.68 In particular, the court
noted that one of the key provisions relied upon by the plaintiff—10 U.S.C. Section 2363(b),
which requires that DOD give “special consideration” to using civilian employees to perform
certain functions—arose in a “limited budgetary context,” and does not “remotely suggest[] an
intent to confer a right to judicial review” upon contractors.69
In its next decision, Triad Logistics Services Corporation v. United States, the Court of Federal
Claims did not reach the question of prudential standing because it dismissed the contractor’s
complaint on mootness grounds, as discussed below.70 However, in its opinion, the court
nonetheless expressed both (1) disagreement with the Hallmark-Phoenix decision and (2)
reservations about whether the plaintiff contractor could be found to be within the zone of
interests of one of the statutes that the court relied upon in Santa Barbara. Specifically, the Triad
Logistics court noted that, in its view, the “concept of ‘prudential standing’ does not apply to bid
protests,” but that, if it did, the plaintiff contractor could not be found to be within the zone of
interests protected by the Ike Skelton NDAA for FY2011 unless that provision were construed to
apply retroactively.71
More recently, in Elmendorf Support Services Joint Venture v. United States, the Court of Federal
Claims apparently viewed the prudential standing requirements as applicable, but saw the
plaintiffs as satisfying these requirements in light of a recent Supreme Court decision finding that
prudential standing requirements are “not meant to be especially demanding,” and “foreclose[]
suit only when a plaintiff’s ‘interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes
implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the
suit.’”72 According to the Elmendorf court, the contractor met this standard because a proposed
procurement was involved, and the contractor alleged that “the procurement (read in-sourcing
67
Id. at 69-71 (citing, among other things, Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 163 (1997), which noted that courts will
apply the prudential standing requirements unless Congress has “expressly negated” them).
68
Id. at 72-76.
69
Id. at 73-74. The court reached this conclusion, in part, because both the text and legislative history of Section 2463
evidenced an intent that DOD would be accountable to Congress, not the courts, for its performance in insourcing,
including its compliance with insourcing guidelines. Id. at 74-75. The court also reached a similar conclusion regarding
Section 129a of Title 10 of the United States Code, which, prior to being amended in December 2011, required the
Secretary of Defense to “use the least costly form of personnel consistent with military requirements and other needs of
the Department.” According to the court, the fact that Section 129a’s direction to “use the least costly form of
personnel” is “buried” among reporting provisions, and its origin as a “sense of Congress” provision, indicate that it
was not intended to benefit contractors. Id. at 72-73.
70
2012 U.S. Claims LEXIS 393, at *76 (Horn, J.). In Triad Logistic’s case, the Government Accountability Office
(GAO), which shares jurisdiction over contractor bid protests with the Court of Federal Claims, had found that it could
not hear challenges to insourcing determinations that allege an agency failed to comply with its internal guidelines. See
Triad Logistics Servs. Corp., B-403726 (Nov. 24, 2010) (finding that the former 10 U.S.C. §129a (1) did not actually
require a cost comparison and (2) did not constitute a procurement statute). Instead, GAO viewed this statute as one
governing DOD personnel policy and, thus, outside its jurisdiction to hear protests “concerning an alleged violation of
a procurement statute or regulation.”
71
2012 U.S. Claims LEXIS 393, at *71, *81. A fundamental canon of statutory interpretation is that laws will not be
given retroactive effect unless there is clear congressional intent to the contrary. See Gozlon-Peretz v. United States,
498 U.S. 395, 404 (1991) (“[A]bsent a clear direction by Congress to the contrary, a law takes effect on the date of its
enactment.”).
72
105 Fed. Cl. 203, 209 (2012) (quoting Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak,—
U.S.—-, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 2210 (2012)).
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process) was flawed.”73 While the court acknowledged that “Congress no doubt was motivated by
fiscal concerns” when it enacted 10 U.S.C. Section 2463 and related provisions requiring
comparisons of the costs of performing work with government personnel and contractor
employees, it noted that:
the procedures and standards required by these statutes [nevertheless] circumscribe the
government’s ability to bring services in-house. At a minimum, incumbent contractors have
an interest in ensuring that the calculus is done properly. This competitive impulse creates an
incentive to expose ways in which the government may have acted improperly. Refereeing
such debates is routine work for the courts.74
Expired Contracts and Mootness
Later decisions of the Court of Federal Claims have raised related questions about whether
vendors whose contracts have expired have standing to challenge insourcing determinations, or
whether such challenges are moot. Initially, this question was framed as one of statutory standing
(i.e., are such vendors “interested parties”).75 However, the most recent decision from the Court
of Federal Claims explicitly characterizes this question as one of mootness.76 The mootness
doctrine originates from the “case or controversy” requirement of Article III of the U.S.
Constitution,77 which permits federal courts to entertain only matters in which there is an ongoing
justiciable issue.78 When the “issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally
cognizable interest in the outcome,”79 the case is moot, and no longer presents a justiciable
controversy over which a federal court may exercise jurisdiction.80
In Triad Logistics, the court first distinguished between vendors currently holding contracts, and
vendors whose contracts have expired, in finding that the plaintiff contractor was not an
interested party and, thus, lacked standing.81 In so doing, the court asserted that the situation in
Santa Barbara was different than the situation in Triad Logistics because the vendor in Santa
Barbara had an “ongoing contract” that was “in-sourced after the enactment of the Ike Skelton
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011,” while the contract in Triad Logistics
had expired before the function was insourced (and before the Ike Skelton National Defense
Authorization Act was enacted). A later decision in Elmendorf Support Services similarly found
that “incumbency is necessary to support standing,”82 and elaborated upon the Triad Logistics
court’s concerns about fashioning a “workable remedy” for an improper insourcing determination
after the contract has expired. In particular, the Elmendorf court noted that vendors who had
performed work that was improperly insourced cannot claim monetary damages, and that a
declaration that the agency had acted in a way that was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
73
Id.
Id.
75
See, e.g., 2012 U.S. Claims LEXIS 393, at *65.
76
Dellew Corp., 2012 U.S. Claims LEXIS 1638, at *46-*52.
77
See, e.g., Gerdau Ameristeel Corp. v. United States, 519 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Allen v. Wright,
468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) and North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971)).
78
See, e.g., NEC Corp. v. United States, 151 F.3d 1361, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
79
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969) (internal citation omitted).
80
NEC Corp., 151 F.3d at 1369.
81
2012 U.S. Claims LEXIS 393, at *84-85.
82
2012 U.S. Claims LEXIS 1082, at *7 (Sept. 10, 2012).
74
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discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law” when insourcing particular functions would
do nothing for the vendor in the absence of an injunction ordering the agency to cease performing
the work.83 The court further indicated that it was not inclined to enter such an injunction “now
that the Air Force has completely absorbed the work,” because an injunction “would inevitably be
more disruptive of services, more disruptive to the lives of individuals, and cause more waste,”
than would be caused by preserving the status quo.84
Between them, these two decisions could potentially have been construed as granting agencies
broad discretion to insource so long as the contract had “ended”—something which an agency
can generally cause to occur at any time by exercising its inherent and contractual rights to
terminate contracts for convenience.85 However, the most recent decision from the Court of
Federal Claims, Dellew Corporation, appears to limit agencies’ ability to moot challenges by
terminating contracts, as well as suggests potential remedies for contractors with unexpired
contracts who prevail in their challenges to insourcing determinations.86 The case arose, like other
challenges to insourcing determinations, from the Air Force’s decision to insource certain services
that the plaintiff had provided. While the case was pending, the Air Force terminated the contract
for convenience (apparently based solely upon the insourcing determination) and, then, asserted
that the plaintiff lacked standing because it did not have a current contract.87 The court disagreed.
It found that the plaintiff had standing, despite the contract termination, because the contract was
terminated in the middle of an option period and, but for the termination, the plaintiff could still
have been performing the contract months after the court’s decision.88 The court also indicated
that, in the appropriate circumstances, it could “order a return to the pre-termination status quo
for the remaining months” of the contract period (including options).89 However, the court found
that the contractor was not entitled to such an order here because key statutory provisions—
requiring cost savings of $10 million or 10% of personnel-related costs to support an insourcing
determination—were not in effect when this particular insourcing determination was made.90
Rather, at the time the functions were insourced, the applicable guidelines required only that
DOD employees “be the most cost effective provider.” In the court’s view, this requirement was
because of the “considerable cost savings” evidenced here even after “the errors [that the
government made in calculating the costs of performance in-house and by contractor personnel]
are taken into account.”91
83
Id. at *8-*9.
Id. at *9-*10.
85
See, e.g., Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 512 (1923); United States v. Corliss Steam Engine Co.,
91 U.S. 321 (1875); G.L. Christian & Assocs. v. United States, 312 F.2d 418 (Ct. Cl. 1963). See also Dietrich Knauth,
Contractor’s Insourcing Protest Loss Carries Silver Lining, Law360, Jan. 4, 2013 (noting that the Dellew decision
“could essentially prevent agencies from using premature contract terminations to pull the rug out from under
contractors after they have protested”).
86
2012 U.S. Claims LEXIS 1638.
87
Id. at *25, *28.
88
Id. at *51-*52.
89
Id.
90
Id. at *63.
91
Id. at *66-*67.
84
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Whether Particular Guidelines Are Binding
If and when these jurisdictional questions are resolved, courts may have to determine which, if
any, of the current insourcing guidelines constrain an agency’s actions when bringing work inhouse.92 There are a number of such guidelines,93 some of which are clearly binding upon the
agency (e.g., statutes, regulations promulgated by a notice and comment process) and others of
which may not be (e.g., statements, policies). Where guidelines not based in statutes or
regulations are concerned, courts may need to determine, among other things, whether the agency
intended to be bound or has employed the guidelines in such a way that they are binding as a
practical matter, because this is key to determining which agency statements and policies are
enforceable under the APA.94
To date, the only court to address the issue has apparently assumed, without deciding, that DOD’s
guidance on “Estimating and Comparing the Full Costs of Civilian and Military Manpower and
Contract Support,” among other things, was legally binding.95 However, as other courts consider
the various guidelines that might apply, they could potentially find that certain guidelines are not
legally binding, or that any binding guidelines do not require the specific procedures that the
agency failed to implement when making its allegedly improper insourcing determination. The
latter proved to be the case in Labat-Anderson, Inc. v. United States, where the contractor claimed
that DOD improperly insourced functions the contractor had performed while DOD prepared to
award a new contract.96 In particular, the contractor claimed that DOD did not follow the
procedures for comparing the costs of performing the function in question with government and
92
But see Santa Barbara Applied Research, 2011 U.S. Claims LEXIS 732, at *28-*57 (apparently assuming, without
deciding, that all of the guidelines in question were legally binding). Nonetheless, the court in Santa Barbara upheld
the agency’s insourcing determination because it found that various actions taken in making this determination were
not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.
93
The recent statutes directing agencies to “consider” insourcing certain functions have, among other things, required
agencies to develop and implement guidelines for determining which functions should be insourced, a requirement that
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and individual federal agencies have met by developing several policies
that ensure functions are “performed in the most fiscally advantageous way possible,” and by establishing procedures
for conducting cost comparisons. See, e.g., Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, P.L. 111-8, §736, 123 Stat. 689-90
(Mar. 11, 2009) (requiring civilian agencies to develop guidelines); National Defense Authorization Act for FY2008,
P.L. 110-181, §324(a)(1), 122 Stat. 60 (Jan. 28, 2008) (requiring defense agencies to develop guidelines); Dep't of
Defense, Personnel & Readiness, OSD Costing Information, available at http://prhome.defense.gov/RSI/
REQUIREMENTS/INSOURCE/INSOURCE_COSTING.ASPX; OMB Civilian Fringe Benefit Cost Factor, quoted in
Rohmann Servs., Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Defense, No. SA-10-CA-0061-XR, Application for Preliminary Injunction (W.D.
Tex., filed Feb. 9, 2010) (requiring agencies to assume certain “fringe costs,” as well as loss of manpower productivity,
when conducting cost comparisons). Other sources cited by Rohmann include (1) 10 U.S.C. §129a, which previously
stated that “[t]he Secretary of Defense shall use the least costly form of personnel consistent with military requirements
and other needs of the Department;” (2) Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness)’s Guidelines and
Procedures for Implementation of 10 U.S.C. §2463, which reads, “[r]equests for manpower shall be fiscally informed
and closely managed to ensure responsible stewardship of Defense resources. When a [DOD] Component … is
considering whether to convert from contractor to government performance, manpower managers shall follow standard
… procedures to determine and validate the manpower requirements.… Also, the effectiveness, efficiency, and
economy of the activity shall be assessed;” and (3) Insouring Implementation Guidance, which authorizes the
insourcing of “contracted services that [DOD] civilian employees can perform … if a cost analysis shows that [DOD]
civilian employees would perform the work more effectively than the private sector.” See Rohmann Servs., Inc. v. U.S.
Dep't of Defense, No. SA-10-CA-0061-XR, Original Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, at ¶¶ 34-36
(W.D. Tex., filed Jan. 26, 2010).
94
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
95
See, e.g., Santa Barbara Applied Research, 98 Fed. Cl. at 549.
96
65 Fed. Cl. 570, 572 (2005).
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contractor employees that were set forth in OMB Circular A-76, 10 U.S.C. Section 2462, and
Executive Order 12615.97 However, the Court of Federal Claims ultimately found that
1. the cost-comparison and other requirements of OMB Circular A-76 were binding
only insofar as they had been incorporated into agency regulations, and the
relevant DOD regulations either did not specify procedures for conducting cost
comparisons or did not apply;98
2. the agency had complied with the requirements in 10 U.S.C. Section 2462,
although not with the allegedly related requirements in OMB Circular A-76 that
had not been incorporated into regulations;99 and
3. Executive Order 12615 did not bind the executive branch because it explicitly
stated that it did not create a private right of action, and it did not provide the
court with a meaningful standard of review.100
Similar findings could result as courts consider the particular insourcing guidelines currently at
issue. Additionally, different courts (or different judges on the same court) could potentially reach
differing conclusions as to whether particular guidelines are binding.101
Constructive Termination or Breach of Requirements Contracts
Because certain contracts provide for the contractor to supply all of the contracting activity’s
requirements for goods or services, there could also be situations where the government must
either delay insourcing so as to allow current contracts to expire, or face the prospect of liability
to the contractor for constructive termination for convenience102 or even breach of contract.103
This issue is most likely to arise with so-called “requirements contracts,” or contracts
97
Id. at 573-74.
Id. at 577-79.
99
Id. at 579-80.
100
Id. at 580-81.
101
For example, some, but not all, federal circuits have found that the 1983 and 2003 versions of OMB Circular A-76
were issued pursuant to statutory authority, which is one of the conditions for guidelines being reviewable by the
federal courts. See Labat-Anderson, 65 Fed. Cl. at 578 (2003 version); Diebold v. United States, 947 F.2d 787, 800 (6th
Cir. 1991) (1983 version).
102
The government always has the right to terminate a contract for convenience, even if the “standard” termination-forconvenience clause was not included in the contract. See, e.g., G.L.A. Christian & Assocs. v. United States, 375 U.S.
954 (1963) (court reading the standard termination-for-convenience clause into a contract from which it was lacking).
Depending upon the type of contract involved, agencies that no longer need certain services for which they had
contracted could also be obligated to pay the contractor, at a minimum, termination costs. For example, unless it
terminates the contractor for convenience, the government generally cannot avoid paying the contractor for goods or
services contracted for under a firm-fixed-price contract—the preferred type of government contract—if it no longer
needs those goods or services. See, e.g., North Chicago Disposal Co., ASBCA 25535, 82-1 BCA ¶ 15,488 (1981)
(government could not recover when it contracted for removal of “wet garbage” from galleys at the Great Lakes Naval
Base and then did not use the service because the galley personnel were unaware of it and disposed of the garbage inhouse); Rolligon Corp., ASBCA 8812, 65-2 BCA ¶ 15,488 (1965) (government liable for the full contract price when it
leased two experimental vehicles from the contractor for a one-year testing-and-evaluation period and then
discontinued testing after one month).
103
Courts often treat governmental failures to comply with the terms of procurement contracts as constructive
terminations of the contract. See, e.g., Nesbitt v. United States, 543 F.2d 583 (Ct. Cl. 1965); Integrity Mgmt. Int'l, Inc.,
ASBCA 18289, 75-1 BCA ¶ 11,235 (1975). However, they will generally not convert failure to order under a
requirements contract into a termination for convenience when the failure was in bad faith or based on circumstances
(continued...)
98
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by which one party, the seller, agrees to satisfy all of the agency’s requirements for services
and/or items for a specified period of time. That contract is violated if either the buyer does
not purchase all of its requirements from the seller, or, if the seller fails to satisfy all of the
buyer’s needs. The consideration that makes such a contract binding is the buyer’s promise
to purchase all of its requirements from the seller and the seller’s promise to satisfy those
requirements.104
Because a requirements contract obligates the procuring activity to obtain “all” its requirements
from the contractor,105 not just a certain quantity specified in the contract,106 developing
additional in-house capacity to perform the function—as would be expected to occur with
insourcing—could raise legal issues, depending upon the terms of the contract.
If the contract provides for the contractor to supply those goods or services “required to be
purchased by the government,” it will generally be construed to allow the procuring activity to
develop additional in-house capacity during the term of the contract.107 However, if the contract
provides that the contractor is entitled to supply those goods or services “in excess of the
quantities which the activity may itself furnish with its own capabilities,” it will generally be read
to refer to the procuring activity’s capabilities at the time of contracting and preclude the
development of additional in-house capacity during the term of the contract. For example, in
Maya Transit Company, the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals found that the contractor
was entitled to an equitable adjustment (i.e., additional payment) under its contract because the
procuring activity developed additional in-house capacity to provide busing services and began
relying upon this capacity, instead of using the contractor’s busing services, to meet its
requirements, which had not changed.108 Similarly, in Henry Angelo & Sons, Inc., the Board
granted the contractor recovery under a contract for painting and related work after the procuring
activity began using its own personnel to paint military housing because it was less expensive.109
(...continued)
known to the government at the time of contracting. See, e.g., Torncello v. United States, 681 F.2d 756 (Fed. Cl. 1982)
(termination based on the contractor’s prices, which were known to the government at the time of contracting); Kalvar
Corp. v. United States, 543 F.2d 1298 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (termination in bad faith).
104
Aviation Specialists , Inc., DOTBCA 1967, 91-1 BCA ¶ 23,534 (Dec. 30, 1990). If the government legitimately has
no requirements for the goods or services in question, it has no obligation to purchase anything from the contractor. See
G.T. Folge & Co. v. United States, 135 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1943). Any estimates of quantity contained in the solicitation
or the contract are nonbinding. See, e.g., Franklin Co. v. United States, 381 F.2d 416 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (government not
obligated to furnish work orders up to the estimated amount); Kasehagen Sec. Servs., Inc., ASBCA 25629, 86-2 BCA ¶
18,797 (1986) (contractor must fill orders above the estimate). However, the government could potentially be liable to
the contractor if the estimate was negligently prepared. See, e.g., Alert Care Ambulance Serv., VACAB 2844, 90-3
BCA ¶ 22,945 (1990) (government failed to exercise due care in preparing the estimates because it did not consider
historical data regarding prior years’ requirements); Pied Piper Ice Cream, Inc., ASBCA 20605, 76-2 BCA ¶ 12,148
(1976) (same).
105
Requirements contracts can contain maximum quantities, requirements in excess of which the contractor is not
obligated to meet. See 48 C.F.R. §16.503(a)(2). They can also be limited to the procuring activity’s needs in a
particular geographic area. See, e.g., Metcom, Inc., B-153450 (May 6, 1964) (finding that a requirements contract
limited to a particular geographical area is no impediment to the issuance of a new invitation for bids for the same
items to be supplied to a different area).
106
Even in an “indefinite quantity contract,” there is some minimum quantity specified in the contract. The government
is only liable to the contractor for orders up to this amount. See, e.g., 48 C.F.R. §16.504(a)(1); Peter J. Brandon,
AGBCA 91-186-1, 92-1 BCA ¶ 24,648 (1991).
107
See, e.g., Export Packing & Crating Co., Inc., ASBCA 16133, 73-2 BCA ¶ 10,066 (1973); Applied Painting &
Decorating Co., ASBCA 15919, 73-2 BCA ¶ 10,358 (1973).
108
ASBCA 20186, 75-2 BCA ¶ 11,552 (1975).
109
ASBCA 15082, 72-1 BCA ¶ 9,356 (1972).
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In so doing, the Board explicitly noted that “[t]he Government does not have an arbitrary right to
develop and use potential capabilities at the expense of a contractor.”110
Civil Service Laws and Limitations on “Direct Hires”
Civil service laws could also impose certain limitations upon agencies’ implementation of
insourcing by requiring that government positions generally be filled through a competitive
process with selections based on merit.111 Because of this requirement, it is typically not possible
for an agency insourcing a function to hire, on the spot, the person currently performing that
function under a contract.112 Only when an agency has “direct hire” authority, or other similar
authority, may it hire “any qualified person” without engaging in the appropriate competitive
process.113 Currently, agencies have direct hire authority on a temporary basis under the National
Defense Authorization Act for FY2004, as amended by National Defense Authorization Act for
FY2008, for “Federal Acquisition positions.”114 These include positions in the General Schedule
(GS) contracting and purchasing series, as well as other positions in the GS series “in which
significant acquisition-related functions are performed.”115 However, agencies generally lack such
authority for other positions, which means that they cannot directly hire contractor employees,
although a person who performed a particular function on behalf of a contractor would probably
be well qualified when competing for any government position that would perform that function.
It should also be noted that civil service laws are intended to protect the integrity of the
government hiring process and applicants for government positions, not employers concerned
about the possibility of the government hiring “their” employees.116 Regardless of how sizable or
destructive to a firm,117 such loss of employees would not appear to give rise to any cause of
action against the government, particularly in the absence of “no-solicitation” clauses in federal
contracts.118 Depending upon their terms, such clauses could potentially preclude one party to a
contract from attempting to hire the employees of its vendors. However, such clauses are not
110
Id.
See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§3309-3318; 5 C.F.R. Parts 211 & 337.
112
“Targeting” contractors’ employees by informing them of government positions and encouraging them to apply is
generally permissible, even if some commentators have characterized it as inconsistent with the intent of the “Merit
System’s hiring and other procedures.” See David Hubler, Is the Government Trying to Steal Your Best Employees?,
Wash. Tech., Aug. 26, 2009, available at http://washingtontechnology.com/articles/2009/08/26/contractors-worriesfeds-fish-for-their-employees.aspx. For example, in Labat-Anderson, the court noted, without expressing any
disapproval, that the agency emailed employees of the incumbent contractor encouraging them to apply for positions
with the agency after determining to insource functions performed by the contractor. Labat-Anderson, 65 Fed. Cl. at
573.
113
See U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Direct-Hire Authority (DHA) Fact Sheet, available at
http://www.opm.gov/DirectHire/factsheet.asp (discussing the possible ways in which agencies can be authorized to
make direct hires).
114
P.L. 108-136, §1413(a), 117 Stat. 1665-66 (Nov. 24, 2003) (codified at 41 U.S.C. §1703) (authority through
September 30, 2007); P.L. 110-181, §853, 122 Stat. 250 (Jan. 28, 2008) (authority through September 30, 2012); P.L.
112-239, §1103,—Stat.—(Jan. 2, 2013) (authority through September 30, 2017).
115
41 U.S.C. §1703(g)(1)(A).
116
See, e.g., Matthew Weigelt, Defense Officials Hone Their Insourcing Strategy, Wash. Tech., Feb. 3, 2010, available
at http://ebookbrowse.com/army-secretary-directs-strategic-insourcing-federal-computer-week-feb-3-2011-pdfd92004136 (quoting some contractors as objecting to the government’s “aggressiveness” in hiring their employees).
117
Id. (describing one small business that lost 20% of its workforce to the government).
118
See, e.g., Hubler, supra note 112.
111
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standard terms of government contracts. Similarly, even if employers were to draft covenants not
to compete that could be construed to prevent their employees from working for the government
in the future, such clauses are generally enforceable only against the employee, not against any
party who subsequently hires them.119
Ethics Laws and the Activities of Former Contractor Employees
The federal ethics and conflict of interest laws and regulations would not prohibit or necessarily
prevent the employment by a federal agency of an individual from the private sector who has
experience, expertise, or knowledge about or concerning a particular project, contract, or other
such matter. Once employed, however, there may exist certain narrow limitations on the official
duties or conduct of that government employee in relation to matters in which that employee may
have a continuing or current personal financial interest, or concerning which a former employer
of that individual is a direct party to a governmental transaction or other such matter.
Unlike employees in the private sector, federal employees and officials are subject to several
layers of ethics and conflict of interest laws and regulations which seek to limit or restrict
personal “conflicts of interest,” and to assure fealty to the overall, public interest, as opposed to
private financial or economic interests of persons or companies. The principal statutory method
of dealing with potential conflicts of interest in the executive branch is through disqualification or
“recusal” requirements which prohibit a federal official from participating in any particular
governmental matter in which that official, or those close to the official, has any financial
interest.120 This conflict of interest provision, which is a criminal statute, is directed only at
current and existing financial interests and connections, and does not reach past affiliations,
employments, or previous representations of private clients.121
While the statutory disqualification provision is a criminal law covering only current financial
interests of the official, there are also “regulatory” recusal requirements that might apply in
narrow circumstances to certain past affiliations and previous economic interests. Such recusals
are generally required in relation to a “particular matter involving specific parties,” when entities
or organizations previously affiliated with the federal official are now parties to or represent
parties in those matters. The regulations provide that a federal official should recuse or disqualify
himself or herself from working on a particular governmental matter involving specific parties if
a “person for whom the employee has, within the last year, served as an officer, director, trustee,
general partner, agent, attorney, consultant, contractor or employee” is a party or represents a
119
For example, when Oracle hired the former chief executive officer of Hewlett-Packard, Hewlett-Packard filed suit
against this individual to enforce a confidentiality agreement, not against Oracle. See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Hurd, No.
110CV181699, Civil Complaint for Breach of Contract and Threatened Misappropriation of Trade Secrets (Cal. Sup.
Ct., filed Aug. 26, 2010). Because they are restraints of trade, covenants not to compete and similar agreements are
looked upon with disfavor by the courts and will generally be enforced only when they are reasonable in terms of the
times, places, and activities which they encompass. See, e.g., Kolani v. Hluska, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 257 (Cal. App. 1998);
Rector-Phillips-Morse v. Vroman, 489 S.W.2d 1 (Ark. 1973).
120
18 U.S.C. §208. Interests “imputed” to the employee are the financial interests of that employee’s spouse or
dependents, or the financial interests of an organization in which the employee is affiliated as an officer, director,
trustee, general partner or employee, or one “with whom he is negotiating or has any arrangement concerning
prospective employment.”
121
CACI, Inc.-Federal v. United States, 719 F.2d 1567,1578 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Center for Auto Safety v. F.T.C., 586 F.
Supp. 1245, 1246 (D.D.C. 1984).
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party in such matter.122 This one-year recusal requirement, as to matters involving an official’s
former employers, businesses, clients, or partners, applies to any officer or employee of the
executive branch, but applies narrowly only to “a particular matter involving specific parties”
when such former employer or business associate is or represents a party to the matter. Matters
“involving specific parties” may apply to such things as contracts, investigations, or prosecutions
involving specifically identified individuals or parties, as opposed to broader “particular matters”
which may involve a number of persons or entities (such as most rule making). Notwithstanding
the fact that a past employer, client, or business associate with whom the employee has a
“covered relationship” may be a party or represent a party to such a matter, an employee may, as
with the regulatory restriction on current interests, receive authorization by his or her agency to
participate in the matter.123
There are also recusal requirements in regulations concerning such matters when a party (or one
representing a party) had made an “extraordinary payment” to the official prior to the official’s
entry into government. The regulations of the Office of Government Ethics provide for a two-year
recusal requirement which bars an official in the executive branch from participating in a
particular matter in which a “former employer” is or represents a party when that former
employer had made an “extraordinary payment” to the official prior to entering government. An
“extraordinary payment” is one in excess of $10,000 in value made by an employer after the
employer has learned that the employee is to enter government service, and one which is not an
ordinary payment (that is, a payment other than in conformance with the employer’s “established
compensation, benefits or partnership program”).124 This disqualification provision may also be
waived in writing by an agency head, or if the individual involved is the head of an agency, by the
President or his designee.125
Finally, there are now additional restrictions on certain presidential appointees issued by way of
executive order. On January 21, 2009, President Obama issued an executive order requiring the
signing of an “ethics pledge” by all presidential and vice presidential appointees to full-time, noncareer positions in the executive branch, including all non-career SES appointees, and appointees
to positions excepted from competitive service because they are of a confidential or policy
making nature (such as Schedule C appointments).126 The “ethics pledge” places two additional
restrictions on such appointees entering the executive branch, with respect to their former
employers or clients. Initially, such “appointees” may not participate in, and must recuse
themselves for two years after entering federal service from any particular governmental matter
involving specific parties when a former client or former employer of the appointee is a party to
or represents a party in that particular matter.127 This extends the similar regulatory recusal
requirement applicable to all executive branch officials from one year to two years for such
“appointees.”128 Secondly, any such “appointees” who were registered “lobbyists”129 prior to
122
5 C.F.R. §2635.502(a), (b)(1)(iv).
5 C.F.R. §2635.502(c), (d).
124
5 C.F.R. §2635.503(b)(1).
125
5 C.F.R. §2635.503(c).
126
Executive Order 13490, 74 Fed. Reg. 4673 (Jan. 26, 2009).
127
E.O. 13490, Section 1, para. 2.
128
See 5 C.F.R. §2635.502(a), (b)(1)(iv).
129
“Lobbyists” are those required to register and file under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, as amended,
including employees listed as lobbyists of organizations registering under the law. See 2 U.S.C. §§1602 et seq. The
restriction applies if one had been a “lobbyist” within two years of his or her appointment.
123
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entering the executive branch are under additional and further restrictions. Such
appointees/former lobbyists may not, for two years after entering the government, (1) participate
in any particular matter on which the appointee had lobbied within the two years prior to his or
her appointment, (2) participate in the specific issue area in which that particular matter falls, or
(3) seek or accept employment with any agency that the appointee had lobbied within the two
years prior to entering government service.130
Small Business Law
Small businesses generally receive special consideration under federal law and policy.131 For
example, it is the “declared policy of Congress that the Government should … insure that a fair
proportion of the total purchases and contracts or subcontracts for property and services for the
Government … be placed with small-business enterprises,”132 and there are a number of
contracting preferences for various types of small businesses, including set-asides, sole-source
awards, and price evaluation preferences.133 However, such protections do not appear to furnish
grounds for challenging an insourcing determination even if, as some commentators allege,
insourcing disproportionately affects small businesses.134 Under most provisions of federal law,
preferences for small business apply only in the case of “acquisitions” or “contract
opportunities,”135 which could be construed to mean that they exist only when an agency has
determined to contract out a function, not when it is determining whether to contract out a
function.136 While the regulations implementing Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act are
somewhat broader in that they refer to agency “requirements,”137 there does not appear to be any
precedent for construing the regulatory prohibition upon removing a requirement from the 8(a)
130
E.O. 13490, Section 1, para. 3.
See supra note 23.
132
15 U.S.C. §631(a).
133
See 15 U.S.C. §637(a) (set-asides and sole-source awards for small businesses owned and controlled by socially and
economically disadvantaged individuals); 15 U.S.C. §637(m) (set-asides for women-owned small businesses); 15
U.S.C. §644(g) (set-asides for small businesses generally); 15 U.S.C. §657a (set-asides, sole-source awards and price
evaluation preferences for Historically Underutilized Business Zone (HUBZone) small businesses); 15 U.S.C. §657f
(set-asides and sole-source awards for service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses).
134
See Burton & Boland, supra note 24. Such commentators are concerned that the functions currently performed by
small businesses are more likely to be insourced than those performed by larger firms, and several small business
associations have called upon the Obama Administration to abandon its insourcing initiatives. See, e.g., U.S. Chamber
of Commerce et al., Letter to the President, Aug. 19, 2010, available at http://www.techamerica.org/content/wpcontent/uploads/2010/08/Coalition_Letter_President_Obama-Insourcing_Moratorium_8-19-2010.pdf (“Given
Secretary Gates’ recent acknowledgement that insourcing does not save money, Senator Menendez’s concerns that
insourcing is ‘counter-intuitive’ to your Administration’s goal of creating Federal contracting opportunities,
particularly for small and minority owned businesses, and the current state of the nation’s economy, we respectfully
urge your Administration to issue a revision to the insourcing agenda calling for an immediate moratorium on
all insourcing efforts throughout the Federal government.”) (emphases in original).
135
By definition, an “acquisition” is “the acquiring by contract with appropriated funds of supplies or services
(including construction) by and for the use of the Federal Government through purchase or lease, whether the supplies
or services are already in existence or must be created, developed, demonstrated, and evaluated.” 48 C.F.R. §2.101
(emphasis added).
136
Cf. supra note 52 and accompanying text (noting that “acquisition” has a narrower meaning than “procurement”
under the OFPPA).
137
See, e.g., 13 C.F.R. §126.606 (“A [contracting officer] may request that SBA release an 8(a) requirement ...
However, SBA will grant its consent only where neither the incumbent nor any other 8(a) participant can perform the
requirement.”).
131
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Program without the consent of the Small Business Administration (SBA) to mean that agencies
need the SBA’s permission to insource functions formerly contracted out through the 8(a)
Program.138 However, the Obama Administration’s Interagency Taskforce on Federal Contracting
Opportunities for Small Business has recommended that the “relationship between policies that
address the rebalancing of agencies’ relationship with contractors and small business contracting
policies” be clarified,139 and its policy letter on the performance of inherently governmental and
critical functions explicitly addressed insourcing of functions performed by small business
contractors. Among other things, the policy letter directs agencies, when reviewing outsourced
work for potential insourcing, to place a lower priority on reviewing work performed by small
businesses that is not inherently governmental, particularly if the agency has not met its small
business goals.140 The policy letter also directs agencies to give small businesses preference when
determining who performs the private-sector work that remains after related activities are
insourced.141
Congressional Actions
While most of the legal issues related to insourcing discussed herein arise from agencies’
implementation of insourcing initiatives, there is considerable scope for Congress to influence
whether and how insourcing is implemented. The 112th Congress enacted legislation that calls for
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to establish “procedures and methodologies” for
use by agencies in deciding whether to insource functions performed by small businesses,
including procedures for (1) identifying which contracts are considered for conversion; (2)
determining whether particular functions are inherently governmental or critical functions; and
(3) comparing the costs of performance by contractor personnel with the costs of performance by
government personnel.142 This legislation also requires agency Offices of Small and
Disadvantaged Business Utilization (OSDBUs) to review and to advise on insourcing
determinations, and SBA procurement center representatives (PCRs) to consult with OSDBUs
and other agency personnel on insourcing determinations.143
Other legislative options are possible if concerns related to insourcing persist. Broadly, Congress
could restrict the scope of any insourcing by, for example, requiring that agencies complete a
“public-private competitive sourcing analysis” and determine that the “provision of such goods or
services by Federal employees provides the best value to the taxpayer” before using government
personnel to provide goods or services previously performed by a “private sector entity.”144
138
In fact, a recent decision by the Court of Federal Claims upheld an agency’s determination to remove a requirement
from the 8(a) Program without the SBA’s consent. See K-LAK Corp. v. United States, 98 Fed. Cl. 1 (2011).
139
Report of the Interagency Task Force on Federal Contracting Opportunities for Small Business, 7 (Sept. 23, 2010),
available at http://www.sba.gov/idc/groups/public/documents/sba_homepage/contracting_task_force_report.pdf.
140
76 Fed. Reg. at 56239.
141
Id. at 56239-40. Specifically, the letter instructs agencies to use the “rule of two”—which generally requires that a
contract be “set aside” for small businesses if at least two small businesses are capable of performing it at a fair market
price—when deciding whether small or “large” businesses should perform the remaining private-sector work.
142
National Defense Authorization Act for FY2013, P.L. 112-239, §1655,—Stat.—.
143
Id. at §1621.
144
Freedom from Government Competition Act, H.R. 1474, S. 785, at §4(e). A provision in the House-passed National
Defense Authorization Act for FY2012 (H.R. 1540, §939) would also have limited agencies’ ability to insource by
requiring the consideration of certain information when estimating and comparing the costs of performing functions
with DOD civilian employees and contractor personnel. However, this provision was not included in the bill as enacted.
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Alternatively, Congress could broaden the scope of insourcing with legislation, like that
introduced in the 109th through 111th Congresses, which encourages agencies to insource
particular functions.145
More narrowly, Congress could also expand or limit the jurisdiction of particular courts over
contractors’ challenges to insourcing determinations; require that agency insourcing guidelines be
promulgated in ways that are more or less likely to be found to be legally binding; expand or limit
direct hire authority; impose or remove restrictions upon the activities of former contractor
employees who enter government service; or otherwise seek to protect small businesses from the
effects of insourcing determinations. For example, some Members of the 112th Congress
introduced legislation that would have amended 31 U.S.C. Section 3551(1) to provide that the
term “protest” includes a written objection to the “conversion of a function that is being
performed by a private sector entity to performance by a Federal employee,” and that “any small
business whose economic interest would be affected by the conversation” is an “interested
party.”146 This legislation would also have amended the Small Business Act to prohibit an agency
from converting functions performed by small businesses to performance by federal employees
unless it has “made publicly available, after providing notice and an opportunity for public
comment,” its procedures for making insourcing determinations.147 The requirement that agency
procedures be made publicly available after a notice-and-comment period, in particular, could
help remove questions as to whether agencies are bound by their insourcing guidelines that could
arise when these guidelines are promulgated as policy or guidance documents.148 However,
questions about prudential standing could potentially remain, notwithstanding the enactment of
this legislation, because prudential standing is a “judicially self-imposed limit[] on the exercise of
federal jurisdiction.”149
145
See, e.g., Correction of Long-Standing Errors in Agencies’ Unsustainable Procurements (CLEAN-UP) Act, S. 991,
§4 (requiring agencies to report on how “wrongly contracted out work will be insourced,” among other things).
146
Subcontracting Transparency and Reliability Act of 2012, H.R. 3893, §301.
147
Id., at §302.
148
See supra notes 92-101 and accompanying text. The House-passed National Defense Authorization Act for FY2013
would similarly prohibit civilian agencies from insourcing a function performed by a small business unless the agency
“makes publicly available the procedures and methodologies” it used in making the determination to insource,
including those for (1) determining which contracts were considered for potential conversion, (2) evaluating whether a
function is inherently governmental or critical, and (3) estimating and comparing costs. H.R. 4310, as passed by the
House, at §1658. However, agencies subject to these requirements would not necessarily have to promulgate their
procedures and methodologies through a notice-and-comment process.
149
But see Bennett, 520 U.S. at 163 (noting that Congress can “expressly negate” prudential standing requirements).
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