Hamas: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional research reportDec 2, 2010

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CRS Report for Congress

Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

Hamas: Background and Issues for Congress

Summary

This report and its appendixes provide background information on Hamas, or the Islamic

Resistance Movement, and U.S. policy towards it. It also includes information and analysis on (1)

the threats Hamas currently poses to U.S. interests, (2) how Hamas compares with other Middle

East terrorist groups, (3) Hamas’s ideology and policies (both generally and on discrete issues),

(4) its leadership and organization, and (5) its sources of assistance. Finally, the report raises and

discusses various legislative and oversight options related to foreign aid strategies, financial

sanctions, and regional and international political approaches. In evaluating these options,

Congress can assess how Hamas has emerged and adapted over time, and also scrutinize the track

record of U.S., Israeli, and international policy to counter Hamas.

Hamas is a Palestinian Islamist military and sociopolitical movement that grew out of the Muslim

Brotherhood. The United States, Israel, the European Union, and Canada consider Hamas a

terrorist organization because of (1) its violent resistance to what it deems Israeli occupation of

historic Palestine (constituting present-day Israel, West Bank, and Gaza Strip), and (2) its

rejection of the off-and-on peace process involving Israel and the Palestine Liberation

Organization (PLO) since the early 1990s. Since Hamas’s inception in 1987, it has maintained its

primary base of political support and its military command in the Gaza Strip—a territory it has

controlled since June 2007—while also having a significant presence in the West Bank. The

movement’s political leadership is currently headquartered in exile in Damascus, Syria. Hamas

receives assistance and training from Iran, Syria, and the Lebanese Shiite militant group

Hezbollah. Hamas is often discussed alongside other groups in the region that engage in militant

and terrorist activities to achieve their ends, yet Hamas has confined its militancy to Israel and the

Palestinian territories—distinguishing it from the broader aspirations expressed by Al Qaeda and

its affiliates.

The overarching U.S. goal regarding Hamas is to deter, transform, marginalize, or neutralize it so

that it no longer presents a threat to Israel’s security, to a peaceful and lasting resolution of the

Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or to other U.S. interests—either in its own right or as a proxy of Iran

or other actors. Various legislative and policy initiatives designed to accomplish this goal have at

most achieved temporary or partial success. It is possible to conclude that U.S. and other

international support for Israel and the Palestinian Authority/PLO dominated by Fatah (Hamas’s

main rival faction) has been counterproductive to some extent when comparing Hamas’s

domestic, regional, and international strength in the early 1990s—measured by factors such as

popularity, military force, and leverage with other actors (including Israel and Fatah)—to its

current strength. The Israeli-Egyptian closure regime in Gaza and various U.S. and international

initiatives constrain and isolate Hamas to a point and may exacerbate its internal organizational

tensions and tactical disagreements. Yet, the threats Hamas continues to pose to Israel, to

prospects for a two-state solution and to the future of Palestinian democracy present considerable

risks and difficult trade-offs for any U.S. policy decisions going forward.

The following CRS reports contain additional information on Hamas: CRS Report RL34074, The

Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by (name redacted); CRS Report R40101,

Israel and

Hamas: Conflict in Gaza (2008-2009), coordinated by (name redacted); CRS Report R40092,

Israel

and the Palestinians: Prospects for a Two-State Solution, by (name redacted); CRS Report R40664,

U.S. Security Assistance to the Palestinian Authority, by (name redacted); and CRS Report RS22967,

U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, by (name redacted).

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Hamas: Background and Issues for Congress

Contents

Introduction: Issues for Congress ................................................................................................1

Overview ....................................................................................................................................3

Threats Hamas Poses ............................................................................................................4

Rockets and Smuggling Tunnels......................................................................................5

Gaza Militias and Security Forces ...................................................................................8

Comparison with Other Middle East Terrorist Groups ...........................................................9

Ideology and Policies .......................................................................................................... 12

Overall Goals................................................................................................................ 13

On Israel’s Existence and the Jews ................................................................................ 13

On a Two-State Solution ............................................................................................... 14

On the Use of Violence ................................................................................................. 15

On Its Model for an Islamic State .................................................................................. 15

Use of Media ................................................................................................................ 16

Leadership and Organization............................................................................................... 17

In General..................................................................................................................... 17

Internal Tensions? ......................................................................................................... 18

In Gaza ......................................................................................................................... 19

Popular Support ............................................................................................................ 21

Sources of Assistance.......................................................................................................... 22

Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah ............................................................................................. 22

Charities and Individuals............................................................................................... 23

Possible Options for Congress................................................................................................... 26

U.S. Aid to Palestinians....................................................................................................... 27

Aid to Strengthen Non-Hamas Groups and Individuals.................................................. 27

U.S. Security Assistance in the West Bank..................................................................... 29

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

(UNRWA) in Gaza ..................................................................................................... 30

Restrictions on Aid to Hamas or PA Government Including Hamas................................ 30

U.S. Assistance to Israel to Counter Rocket Threat .............................................................. 31

Countering Financial and Smuggling Networks................................................................... 31

Terrorist Designations and Legal Action........................................................................ 31

Sanctions on Iran and Syria ........................................................................................... 32

Anti-Smuggling Efforts in Egypt and Elsewhere ........................................................... 32

Countering Hamas Media.................................................................................................... 34

Addressing Hamas in a Regional Context............................................................................ 34

Oversight ............................................................................................................................ 35

Inclusion of Hamas in Negotiations? ............................................................................. 35

International Dimensions .............................................................................................. 37

Conclusion................................................................................................................................ 38

Figures

Figure 1. Map of Key Hamas Leadership Nodes..........................................................................2

Figure 2. Map of Approximate Rocket Ranges from Gaza ...........................................................7

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Hamas: Background and Issues for Congress

Tables

Table 1. Hamas and Hezbollah: A Comparison .......................................................................... 10

Table 2. Public Budget Comparisons: Gaza and West Bank ....................................................... 20

Table 3. Major Hamas-commanded Security Forces in Gaza...................................................... 20

Table 4. U.S. Terrorist Designations and Financial Sanctions Against Hamas and

Affiliates................................................................................................................................ 23

Table D-1. Current Legislation Pertaining to Hamas .................................................................. 55

Table D-2. Selected Bills and Resolutions Pertaining to Hamas ................................................. 55

Appendixes

Appendix A. Historical Background and U.S. Policy ................................................................. 40

Appendix B. Key Dates in Hamas’s History .............................................................................. 48

Appendix C. Major Hamas Leaders........................................................................................... 51

Appendix D. Congressional Actions Pertaining to Hamas.......................................................... 55

Appendix E. Selected Bibliography on Hamas .......................................................................... 61

Contacts

Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 63

Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................... 63

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Hamas: Background and Issues for Congress

Introduction: Issues for Congress

Hamas,1 or the Islamic Resistance Movement, is a Palestinian Islamist military and sociopolitical

movement that grew out of the Muslim Brotherhood, a Sunni religious and political organization

founded in Egypt in 1928 that has branches throughout the world. The United States, Israel, the

European Union, and Canada consider Hamas a terrorist organization because of (1) its violent

resistance to what it deems Israeli occupation of historic Palestine (constituting present-day

Israel, West Bank, and Gaza Strip), and (2) its rejection of the off-and-on peace process involving

Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) since the early 1990s. Hamas seeks

assistance and training from other Arab, Islamic, and international actors and organizations, and

receives it from Iran, Syria, and the Lebanese Shiite militant group Hezbollah (see “Iran, Syria,

and Hezbollah” below).2

The overarching U.S. goal regarding Hamas is to deter, transform, marginalize, or neutralize it so

that it no longer presents a threat to Israel’s security, to a peaceful and lasting resolution of the

Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or to other U.S. interests—either in its own right or as a proxy of Iran

or other actors. Various legislative and policy initiatives designed to accomplish this goal have at

most achieved temporary or partial success. Hamas’s activities present challenges for U.S.

policymakers and members of Congress, including

•

countering Hamas’s military and terrorist threats to Israel, its financial and

smuggling networks, and its political influence;

•

determining under what circumstances and the manner in which the United States

might accept the participation of Hamas or Hamas representatives in a

Palestinian Authority (PA) government and/or in Israeli-Palestinian peace

negotiations;

•

de-linking Hamas from its connections with Iran and Syria; and

•

encouraging humanitarian relief efforts and economic development in Gaza

without bolstering Hamas.

U.S. efforts and policy debates on these issues, which include foreign aid strategies, financial

sanctions, and bilateral, regional, and international political approaches, are discussed further

below (see “Possible Options for Congress”).

Hamas is the transliterated acronym for the group’s Arabic name, “Harakat al Muqawama al Islamiyya,” or the

“Islamic Resistance Movement.” The acronym “Hamas” itself is an Arabic word meaning “zeal.”

See U.S. State Department, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2009,” Chapter 6. Terrorist Organizations, available at

http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2009/140900.htm: “HAMAS receives some funding, weapons, and training from Iran.

In addition, fundraising takes place in the Persian Gulf countries, but the group also receives donations from Palestinian

expatriates around the world. Some fundraising and propaganda activity takes place in Western Europe and North

America. Syria provides safe haven for its leadership.” See also Anna Fitfield, “Hizbollah Confirms Broad Aid for

Hamas,” Financial Times, May 12, 2009.

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Hamas: Background and Issues for Congress

Figure 1. Map of Key Hamas Leadership Nodes

Sources: Congressional Research Service; State of Israel, Ministry of Transport, Notice to Mariners, No. 1/2009

Blockade of Gaza Strip, January 2009; ESRI Community Data, 2008.

Notes: All boundaries and depictions are approximate. The designations employed and the presentation of

material on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of CRS concerning the

legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its

frontiers of boundaries.

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Hamas: Background and Issues for Congress

Overview

Since Hamas’s inception in 1987, it has maintained its primary base of political support and its

military command in the Gaza Strip—a territory it has controlled since June 2007—while also

having a significant presence in the West Bank. The movement’s political leadership is currently

headquartered in exile in Damascus, Syria.

Hamas’s military wing, the Izz al Din al Qassam Brigades, 3 has killed more than 400 Israelis,4

and at least 25 U.S. citizens (including some dual U.S.-Israeli citizens)5 in attacks since 1993. As

the Qassam Brigades developed from a small band of guerrillas into a more sophisticated

organization with access to greater resources and territorial control, its methods of attack evolved

from small-scale kidnappings and killings of Israeli military personnel to suicide bombings and

rocket attacks against Israeli civilians. Hamas also has frequently attacked or repressed

Palestinian political and factional opponents, particularly in its struggle with Fatah and other

groups for control in the Gaza Strip since Israel’s military disengagement in 2005. For further

information on these points, see “Threats Hamas Poses,” Appendix A, and Appendix B below.

Hamas emerged as the main domestic opposition force to Palestinian nationalist leader Yasser

Arafat and his secular nationalist Fatah movement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the 1980s

and 1990s—largely by using violence against Israeli civilian and military targets just as Arafat’s

PLO began negotiating with Israel. In 2006, a little more than a year after Arafat’s death and the

election of Fatah’s Mahmoud Abbas to replace him as PA president, Hamas became—by most

analysts’ reckoning—the first Islamist group in the Arab world to gain power democratically after

a stunning electoral upset of Fatah gave it control of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC)

and of Palestinian Authority government ministries.6

Subsequent efforts by Israel, the United States, and the international community to neutralize or

marginalize Hamas by military, political, and economic means may have changed the outward

nature of its influence, but have failed to squelch it. In 2007, Hamas seized control of the Gaza

Strip through decisive armed victories over PA and Fatah forces loyal to Abbas (causing Abbas to

dismiss Hamas’s PA government in the West Bank and appoint a “caretaker” non-Hamas

government in its stead). Hamas has since consolidated its power in Gaza despite considerable

damage visited on Gaza’s people and infrastructure by an Israeli invasion in December 20083

Izz al Din al Qassam was a Muslim Brotherhood member, preacher, and leader of an anti-Zionist and anti-colonialist

resistance movement in historic Palestine during the British Mandate period. He was killed by British forces on

November 19, 1935.

Figures culled from Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+before+2000/

Suicide%20and%20Other%20Bombing%20Attacks%20in%20Israel%20Since and

http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+since+2000/Victims+of+Palestinian+Violence+and+Terrorism+sinc.htm; and

from Jewish Virtual Library website at http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Terrorism/TerrorAttacks.html. In

the aggregate, other Palestinian militant groups (such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Fatah-affiliated Al Aqsa

Martyrs’ Brigades, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) also have killed scores, if not hundreds, of

Israelis since 1993.

Figures culled from Jewish Virtual Library website at

http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Terrorism/usvictims.html.

Detailed descriptions of Palestinian organizations, governance organs, and political factions are contained in CRS

Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by (name redacted).

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Hamas: Background and Issues for Congress

January 2009 (also known as Operation Cast Lead, which was launched by Israel in response to

repeated rocket attacks by Hamas and other Palestinian militants) and despite ongoing restrictions

(often termed the “blockade” or “closure regime”) by Israel and Egypt on the flow of people and

goods into and out of the territory.

By consolidating its control over Gaza and pursuing popular support through resistance to Israel,

Hamas seeks to establish its indispensability to any Arab-Israeli political arrangement. Many

analysts believe that Hamas hopes to leverage this indispensability into sole or shared leadership

of the PA in both the West Bank and Gaza—either through a power-sharing arrangement with

Abbas and his Fatah movement, or through presidential and legislative elections (which were

supposed to take place in January 2010 under PA law, but have been postponed pending factional

agreement on conditions for holding them)—and to gain membership in or somehow supplant the

Fatah-dominated PLO, which remains internationally recognized as the legitimate representative

of the Palestinian people. Fatah’s political hegemony inside the occupied territories has been

undermined by the inability of the Fatah-dominated PLO to co-opt or incorporate Hamas, which

has proved more resistant than secular Palestinian factions to the PLO’s inducements. Egyptianmediated efforts to forge a PA power-sharing arrangement in the West Bank and Gaza between

Hamas and its traditionally dominant rival faction, the secular nationalist Fatah movement, have

stalled repeatedly.7

Hamas also has gained popularity among many Palestinians at Fatah’s expense because of its

reputation as a less corrupt provider of social services (funded by donations from Palestinians,

other Arabs, and international charitable front groups) and because of the image it cultivates of

unflinching resistance to Israeli occupation. Some Palestinians perceive that Hamas is more

rooted in the experiences and attitudes of West Bankers and Gazans than Fatah. Most leaders

from Fatah’s historic core, including current PA President/PLO Chairman Mahmoud Abbas, spent

decades in exile with Yasser Arafat’s PLO in various Arab states. Although many from Hamas’s

top leadership, including political bureau chief Khaled Meshaal, also have lived in exile for 30plus years, Hamas has maintained a strong presence within the Palestinian territories since its

inception.

For additional information on Hamas’s historical background and on U.S. policy regarding

Hamas, see Appendix A.

Threats Hamas Poses

Many Israelis fear the potential long-term threat Hamas could pose to Israel’s physical and

psychological security if its rocket capabilities expand, if it gains an unchallenged foothold in the

West Bank, and/or if it otherwise finds a way to regularly target civilians inside Israel again.

Although damage from Palestinian suicide bombings in 1994-1997 and 2000-2008 is difficult to

measure qualitatively, the bombings constituted a fearsome means of attack. In the aggregate,

suicide bombing attacks by Palestinian militants killed approximately 700 Israelis (mostly

civilians within Israel proper),8 with Hamas directly responsible for more than 400 of these

The only previous power-sharing arrangement between Hamas and Fatah, the Saudi Arabia-brokered Mecca Accord

of February 2007, quickly deteriorated into factional fighting that led to Hamas’s takeover of Gaza in June 2007 (see

Appendix A and Appendix B).

Suicide bombing figures culled from Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/

Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+before+2000/

(continued...)

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Hamas: Background and Issues for Congress

deaths. 9 Israel also fears that Iran, Syria, and possibly other actors in the region might use

Hamas’s proximity to Israel either to facilitate a coordinated multi-front military attack or to

mobilize regional and international political pressure against Israel through the precipitation of

crises and causes célèbres.10

The ability of Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza to target civilians inside Israel (e.g.,

through suicide bombings) has been drastically reduced in the post-second intifada environment

through heightened Israeli security measures. A system of tightly patrolled barriers and crossings

limits access to Israel from both territories—in Gaza’s case, almost completely. The system also

includes the West Bank separation barrier11 that some Israelis envision as demarcating a border

between Israel and a future Palestinian state, even though it strays from the 1948-1967 armistice

line, known as the “Green Line,” in several places. Israeli military and intelligence operations

within the West Bank—including various obstacles to and restrictions on Palestinians’ freedom of

movement (some of which are designed to protect Israeli settlers and settlements)—buttress the

barrier system there.

Rockets and Smuggling Tunnels

In reaction to constraints on access to Israel, Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups in Gaza

have increased their strategic reliance on firing rockets and mortars indiscriminately at Israeli

targets.12 Rocket fire and the threat of future rocket fire with greater geographical range

precipitated Israel’s Operation Cast Lead against targets in Gaza in December 2008.13 The

approximately 8,350 rockets and mortars fired by Palestinians since 200114 have killed at least 28

Israelis and wounded dozens, 15 while the persistent threat of rocket fire has had a broader

negative psychological effect on Israelis living in targeted communities. 16

(...continued)

Suicide%20and%20Other%20Bombing%20Attacks%20in%20Israel%20Since.

See footnote 4.

Examples of international pressure on Israel are the various convoys and flotillas, including the so-called “Gaza

Freedom Flotilla” in May 2010, seeking to thwart the Israeli-Egyptian closure regime and to raise awareness of the

humanitarian and economic situation in Gaza. For more information, see CRS Report R41275, Israel’s Blockade of

Gaza, the Mavi Marmara Incident, and Its Aftermath, by (name redacted).

The barrier is referred to in different ways by different groups and individuals that are often reflective of various

political or national ideologies. Commonly used alternative names are the “security fence” (often used by Israeli

sources) and the “apartheid wall” (favored by Palestinians), although neither appellation describes the barrier’s physical

nature completely accurately. In some places, the barrier is mainly concrete; in others, mainly chain-link and/or wire.

Since 2001, Hamas and several other Palestinian terrorist groups based in the Gaza Strip have attacked communities

in southern and coastal areas of Israel with thousands of indiscriminately fired rockets and mortars. During the second

Palestinian intifada in 2001, Hamas militia members and others fired homemade mortars at Israeli settlements in the

Gaza Strip and launched the first locally produced “Qassam” rockets, named after the early-20th Century militant

leader Sheikh Izz al Din al Qassam. Teams of engineers, chemists, and machinists have improved the range and

payload of the Qassam series rockets over time, and Israeli military raids have targeted several individuals and facilities

associated with rocket research and production operations.

Over the years, rockets have expanded in range beyond relatively small Israeli communities near the Gaza border,

such as the town of Sderot (population est. 24,000), to the larger coastal cities of Ashqelon (population est.120,000)

and Ashdod (population est. 200,000) and to the Negev city of Beersheva (population est. 185,000). Mid-range Gradstyle rockets (thought to be smuggled into Gaza) that travel farther than Qassam rockets have been fired from Gaza by

Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (Al Quds series) and the Popular Resistance Committees (Nasser series).

Information provided by Israeli government to CRS, November 2010.

“Q&A: Gaza conflict,” BBC News, January 18, 2009, available at

(continued...)

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Hamas: Background and Issues for Congress

Since the end of Operation Cast Lead, Hamas has permitted far fewer rockets to be fired from

Gaza by its military wing and other Palestinian militant groups, perhaps because of a desire to

avoid another large-scale Israeli attack. Nevertheless, analysts and Israeli officials say that Hamas

continues to manufacture and stockpile hundreds, if not thousands, of “Qassam” rockets.17 These

rockets have limited ranges, and are generally made from household ingredients such as fertilizer,

sugar, alcohol, fuel oil, pipes, and scrap metal. The raw materials are generally smuggled into

Gaza—thus circumventing the Israeli-Egyptian closure regime—via tunnels under the Egyptian

border.

Since Israel’s disengagement from Gaza in 2005, Hamas has promoted a dramatic expansion of

the network of smuggling tunnels connecting Gaza with Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula. Under the

closure regime aimed at undermining Hamas’s control over the territory, the tunneling network

has become Gaza’s primary economic engine and mode of rearmament for militants. In addition

to raw materials for Qassam rockets and other explosive devices, press and trade reports and

Israeli officials allege that thousands of mortars and hundreds of longer-range rockets in Hamas’s

arsenal18 (some of which may have been manufactured in Iran or China) have been smuggled into

Gaza through the tunnels. As of the summer of 2010, one report said that these longer-range

rockets could include dozens of 122-mm Grad or Grad-style rockets (sometimes known as

Katyushas) and 230-mm Oghabs, and possibly some 50 modified 240-mm Fajr-3 rockets that

could conceivably reach Tel Aviv or Israel’s nuclear facilities in the Negev Desert near Dimona.19

Hamas and other Palestinian militants also have reportedly received small arms and anti-aircraft

and anti-tank weapons through the tunnels.20

(...continued)

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7818022.stm.

For a comprehensive treatment of this subject, see Human Rights Watch, Rockets from Gaza: Harm to Civilians from

Palestinian Armed Groups’ Rocket Attacks, August 6, 2009, available at

http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/08/06/rockets-gaza-0.

Information provided to CRS by Israeli government, November 2010.

Ibid.

Ian Siperco, “Shield of David: The Promise of Israeli National Missile Defense,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 17, Issue

2, Summer 2010.

See “Report: Egypt seizes anti-aircraft weapons bound for Gaza,” haaretz.com, September 7, 2010.

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Hamas: Background and Issues for Congress

Figure 2. Map of Approximate Rocket Ranges from Gaza

(for rockets possibly possessed by Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups)

Sources: Congressional Research Service; Jane’s Missiles and Rockets; Ian Siperco, “Shield of David: The Promise

of Israeli National Missile Defense,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 17, Issue 2, Summer 2010.

Notes: All boundaries, distances, and other depictions are approximate. The designations employed and the

presentation of material on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of CRS

concerning the presence in Gaza of the rockets described herein. There is no evidence that rockets with a range

farther than about 40 km have been fired at Israeli targets, though there have been reports that Hamas has

successfully tested longer-range rockets.

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Hamas: Background and Issues for Congress

Estimates say that approximately 7,000 people work on over 1,000 tunnels. The tunnels are

reportedly of a generally high quality of engineering and construction—with some including

electricity, ventilation, intercoms, and a rail system. The openings to many tunnels are found

within buildings in or around Gaza’s southernmost city of Rafah. Although Israeli airstrikes

rendered over 100 tunnels inoperative during Operation Cast Lead, many of them were restored

within a few weeks because the main damage was sustained at the openings, not in the middle

sections.21 Israel, Egypt, the United States, and other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

countries have pledged to stop or slow smuggling to Gaza by land and sea, and some measures

such as Egypt’s construction of an underground fence along its side of the Gaza-Egypt border

(see “Countering Financial and Smuggling Networks”) have been taken. Nevertheless, antismuggling capabilities remain limited and/or constrained.22

It also is possible that Hamas may have the capability to fire rockets from outside of Gaza. In

August 2010, rockets fired from Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula hit the neighboring cities of Eilat, Israel,

and Aqaba, Jordan, on the Red Sea coast. Israeli and Egyptian officials, along with Palestinian

Authority officials from the West Bank, claimed that Hamas was responsible. 23

Gaza Militias and Security Forces

The leadership and most of the manpower—estimated at about 2,500—of Hamas’s military wing,

the Qassam Brigades, are in Gaza.24 In addition, the Hamas-led government in Gaza maintains a

robust contingent of approximately 13,000-14,000 police, security, and intelligence personnel,

many of whom are drawn from the Executive Force that assisted the Qassam Brigades in

defeating Fatah-led forces in Gaza in June 2007 (see Table 3 and “In Gaza” below). 25

It seems unlikely that the Qassam Brigades and Hamas-commanded Gaza security forces, even

working in concert with other Gaza-based militants, could present a significant conventional

threat to an Israeli military superior in manpower, equipment, and technology. Perhaps the main

threat is the possibility that Hamas might kill or abduct additional Israeli soldiers to add to the

leverage it believes it has gained against Israel with current Hamas captive Sergeant Gilad

Shalit.26 The Qassam Brigades and other militant groups engage in periodic border skirmishes

Much of the information from this paragraph came from a CRS meeting with an Israeli official in August 2009. For a

description of past smuggling activities related to Gaza, see CRS Report R40849, Iran: Regional Perspectives and U.S.

Policy, coordinated by (name redacted).

See CRS Report RL33003, Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations, by (name redacted); and CRS Report RL34346,

The Egypt-Gaza Border and its Effect on Israeli-Egyptian Relations, by (name redacted).

“Netanyahu: Hamas responsible for rockets on Eilat; we will retaliate,” haaretz.com, August 4, 2010; Anshel Pfeffer

and Avi Issacharoff, “PA: Hamas military chief in Rafah ordered rocket attacks on Eilat, Aqaba,” haaretz.com, August

6, 2010.

Yezid Sayigh, “We serve the people”: Hamas policing in Gaza, Crown Paper, Crown Center for Middle East

Studies, Brandeis University, 2011 (forthcoming). This same source says that some of the security forces’ personnel

were holdovers from before the Hamas takeover. Some come from Fatah and other non-Hamas backgrounds.

Mohammed Najib, “Hamas creates external intelligence arm,” Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst, January 29, 2010.

Shalit, then a corporal, was taken captive in a June 2006 raid of an Israeli army post just outside Gaza. Two of

Shalit’s comrades were killed in the raid. The raid was organized jointly by the Popular Resistance Committees,

Hamas, and an extremist jihadist group calling itself the Army of Islam. Shalit has remained in Hamas’s custody since

then, and his status figures prominently in speculation about negotiations with Hamas associated with a possible

prisoner swap, cease-fire, or breakthrough in Palestinian power-sharing or Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. His wellbeing is a matter of major Israeli national concern.

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Hamas: Background and Issues for Congress

with Israeli forces involving small arms and improvised explosive devices, partly to continually

refresh their resistance credentials.

Hamas has portrayed its survival of Operation Cast Lead as a victory, but many analysts believe

that Israel established some level of deterrence. These analysts say that Hamas did not expect the

intensity of the Israeli operation and genuinely feared for the survival of its rule in Gaza. As a

result, they suggest the group is now more cautious about possible provocations of Israel. 27

Comparison with Other Middle East Terrorist Groups

Hamas is often discussed alongside other groups in the region that engage in militant and terrorist

activities to achieve their ends. Israeli officials routinely compare Hamas with Al Qaeda. Yet

Hamas has confined its militancy to Israel and the Palestinian territories—distinguishing it from

the broader violent jihadist28 aspirations expressed by Al Qaeda and its affiliates. This narrower

focus was reflected by the following statement from Hamas political bureau (or politburo) chief

Khaled Meshaal in a May 2010 interview with PBS’s Charlie Rose:

Hamas is a national resistance movement. Yet we adopt the Islamic intellectual approach

because we are part of the Muslim and Arab region. We have a battle only with the Israeli

occupation. We do not have any military act anywhere else in the world. We do not consider

any country in the world other than Israel as our enemy. We might say that the American

policies are wrong, but we do not have any conflict whatsoever except with the Israeli

politics. In other words, we do not practice resistance as an open choice anywhere else in the

world but in our occupied territories and against Israel. And we do not launch a religious

war. We are not against the Jews nor the Christians. And we do not pass any statements

about their religions. We only resist those who occupy our territories and attack us.29

Indeed, Al Qaeda voiced intense criticism of Hamas when it opted to engage in the Palestinian

political process in 2005-2007 because its leaders believed Hamas was fatally compromising Al

Qaeda’s ideal of pan-Islamic revolution. Al Qaeda’s number-two leader, Ayman al Zawahiri, said

in 2006 that “Those trying to liberate the land of Islam through elections based on secular

constitutions or on decisions to surrender Palestine to the Jews will not liberate a grain of sand of

Palestine.”30

Yoram Cohen and Jeffrey White, Hamas in Combat: The Military Performance of the Palestinian Islamic Resistance

Movement, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus #97, October 2009, available at

http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pubPDFs/PolicyFocus97.pdf.

Jihadism is a concept with many different levels of meaning in Islam, from internal striving to external conflict

between Muslims and non-Muslims (or sometimes between Muslims and other Muslims deemed to be insufficiently

faithful). For more information, see CRS Report RS21695, The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya, by

(name redacted).

Transcript of remarks by Khaled Meshaal, “Charlie Rose,” PBS, May 28, 2010, available at

http://www.charlierose.com/view/interview/11032#frame_top. For additional information both supporting and

countering Meshaal’s statement above on Hamas’s general stance toward Jews and Judaism, see “On Israel’s Existence

and the Jews” in the main body of the report.

Beverley Milton-Edwards and Stephen Farrell, Hamas: The Islamic Resistance Movement, Polity Press, Malden,

Massachusetts, 2010, p. 268. After Hamas agreed to a Saudi-brokered power-sharing arrangement with Fatah in

February 2007 known as the Mecca Accord, Zawahiri claimed that “The leadership of Hamas government has

committed an aggression against the rights of the Islamic nation by accepting what it called ... respecting international

agreements. I am sorry to have to offer the Islamic nation my condolences for the [virtual demise] of the Hamas

leadership as it has fallen in the quagmire of surrender.” “Hamas rejects al-Zawahiri’s claims,” aljazeera.net, March

(continued...)

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Furthermore, hundreds of disaffected Palestinians in Gaza who apparently share Al Qaeda’s

misgivings that Hamas engages in unacceptable compromise have joined violent jihadist groups

with Salafist31 leanings or postures in opposition to Hamas. Nevertheless, Hamas has been willing

to tolerate these smaller extremist groups to the extent they refrain from public challenges to

Hamas’s rule.32 Hamas also coordinates action with others that reject peace with Israel—both

Islamist and secular—under some circumstances.

Comparisons between Hamas and groups that blend political Islam with national or ethnic

loyalties and grievances may be more apt. Hezbollah shares many characteristics with Hamas. It

participates in electoral politics; it has a distinct geographical base of support; its main foreign

backing comes from Iran. Perhaps most importantly, opposition to Israeli occupation or alleged

occupation is a key animating factor for its supporters. Yet, significant differences exist between

the two organizations, many of them following from Hezbollah’s Shiite identity and greater

freedom to traverse national borders. Shiites (Hezbollah’s core demographic support base)

constitute a significantly lower percentage of the population in Lebanon than the percentage

Sunnis constitute in the Palestinian territories. Hezbollah’s ties with Shiite Iran also are closer and

more ideological than Hamas’s. Hezbollah operatives actively train other militants (including

from Hamas—see “Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah” below). Also, Hezbollah’s rockets, other weapons,

and militias are believed to present a significantly greater conventional military threat to Israel

than Hamas’s. 33

Table 1. Hamas and Hezbollah: A Comparison

Hamas

Hezbollah

1987

1982

National Identity

Palestinian

Lebanese

Sectarian Identity

Sunni Muslim

Shiite Muslim

Estimated Percentage of National

Population That Shares Sectarian

Identity

99%

28%-49%a

Named Foreign Terrorist

Organization by State Department

1997

Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, private

individuals and organizations

Iran, Syria, private individuals and

organizations

Established

Major Sources of Assistance

(...continued)

12, 2007.

Salafism refers to a broad subset of Sunni revivalist movements that seek to purify contemporary Islamic religious

practices and societies by encouraging the application of practices and views associated with the earliest days of the

Islamic faith. The world’s Salafist movements hold a range of positions on political, social, and theological questions

and include both politically quietist and violent extremist groups. Salafists generally eschew accommodation of “unIslamic” political mechanisms such as Western-style democracy. For more information, see CRS Report RS21695, The

Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya, by (name redacted).

Hamas took swift and brutal retributive action against the Army of Islam in September 2008 (in Gaza City) and Jund

Ansar Allah in August 2009 (in Rafah) when confronted with challenges to its authority. Nicolas Pelham and Max

Rodenbeck, “Which Way for Hamas?”, New York Review of Books, November 5, 2009, available at

http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2009/nov/05/which-way-for-hamas/.

For more information on Hezbollah and the threats it potentially poses, see CRS Report R41446, Hezbollah:

Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted) and (name redacted).

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Hamas

Hezbollah

Members of National Legislature

74 of 132b

10 of 128

Ministers in National Government

All ministers in de facto Gaza

government; no ministers in PA

government in West Bank

2 of 30 (Agriculture and

Administrative Reform); part of

“March 8” coalition that has 10

ministers total

Estimated Troop Strength

2,500 in Qassam Brigades

(military wing)

13,000-14,000 (some non-Hamas) in

Gaza security forces

A few hundred terrorist operatives

and potentially thousands more

volunteers for defensive operations

Approximate Maximum

Rocket/Missile Range

80 km

Over 100 km (and possibly over 200

km)

Territorial Control

Gaza Strip (using de facto control of

national institutions and mechanisms)

Areas of southern and eastern

Lebanon

Probable Main Weapon Supply

Route

Tunnels under patrolled and fenced

Gaza-Egypt border (14 km)

Loosely patrolled and unfenced

Lebanon-Syria border (260 km)

No evidence

Yes

Says noc

Yes

Trains Militants of Other

Nationalities

Has Intentionally Struck at U.S.

Targets in Middle East

Sources: CRS Report R41446, Hezbollah: Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted) and (name redact

ed); Central Intelligence Agency; State Department; Council on Foreign Relations; Yezid Sayigh;

International Foundation for Electoral Systems.

Notes: This comparison is not meant to be exhaustive.

U.S. State Department, International Religious Freedom Report 2009, available at

http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2009/127352.htm; Pew Forum for Religion & Public Life, Mapping the Global

Muslim Population, October 2009, available at

http://pewforum.org/uploadedfiles/Orphan_Migrated_Content/Muslimpopulation.pdf. Because parity among

confessional groups in Lebanon remains a sensitive issue, a national census has not been conducted since

1932.

Hamas won this legislative majority in 2006, but the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) has not been

functional since Hamas’s takeover of Gaza in June 2007 due to a lack of a quorum caused by the territorial

political divide between Gaza and the West Bank. Furthermore, the PLC’s four-year term expired in January

2010 under PA law, although the PLO Central Council extended its term in December 2009 (along with the

PA presidential term of Mahmoud Abbas, which also expired in January 2010 under PA law) until new

elections can be held. The legality of this extension has been questioned. For further information, see CRS

Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by (name redacted).

Hamas has not claimed responsibility for any attacks targeting Americans, and insists that it targets only

Israelis, but has killed at least 25 U.S. citizens (some of whom were dual U.S.-Israeli citizens) in attacks

aimed at Israelis.

Hamas retains its claim to an electoral mandate because the majority it won in the Palestinian

Legislative Council (PLC) in 2006 elections has not been displaced through subsequent elections

(some say mainly due to reluctance by both Hamas and Fatah to risk their respective spheres of

control in Gaza and the West Bank because of uncertainty regarding Palestinians’ political

preferences and factional advantages). As a result, many Hamas leaders, followers, and

sympathizers identify the movement with other Sunni-led, Islamist-influenced groups and parties

in the region that participate non-violently in their respective political arenas. These include

Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and non-militant branches and affiliates of

the Muslim Brotherhood. Hamas’s model of having a foot in both political and military realms

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serves as inspiration for other regional Islamist groups. This leads to concerns among regional

states and the broader international community that Islamist groups elsewhere that participate or

seek to participate non-violently in the political arena could turn to violence.

Ideology and Policies

Hamas combines Palestinian nationalism with Islamic fundamentalism, although opinions differ

about how these two driving forces interact in Hamas’s ideology and policies.34 Its leaders strive

to connect Hamas to the longer narrative of Palestinian national struggle—dating to the time of

the British Mandate—and to past leaders such as the anti-colonialist Izz al Din al Qassam (see

footnote 3), Mohammed Amin al Husseini (the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem during the British

Mandate), and Abd al Qader al Husseini (a political and military leader who died in the 1948 war

with Israel).

Some analysts insist that Hamas’s actions show that it remains best defined by reference to its

1988 founding charter or “covenant,” which sets forth a particularly militant, uncompromising,

and anti-Semitic agenda.35 These observers maintain this view despite and perhaps because of

statements and documents issued over subsequent years by Hamas leaders purporting to redefine

the movement’s agenda or distance it from the charter, but failing formally to disavow it. 36

Other analysts see Hamas as a pragmatic, evolving movement.37 They argue that Hamas has

already moderated its positions by participating in 2006 elections for the Palestinian Legislative

Council, agreeing to short-term cease-fires with Israel through indirect negotiation, and

expressing willingness to enter into a long-term cease-fire (or hudna) with Israel. Also, these

observers say, Hamas signed the Mecca Accord in February 2007, pursuant to which it agreed to

share power with Fatah, “respect” previous agreements signed by the PLO, and allow the PLO to

negotiate with Israel and submit any agreement reached to the Palestinian people for their

approval. Finally, these observers liken Hamas to the PLO from earlier times. The PLO, also once

a terrorist group, altered some of its tenets in the late 1980s and early 1990s—agreeing to eschew

violence, enter into negotiations with Israel (under the “land-for-peace” rubric of U.N. Security

Council Resolutions 242 and 338), and recognize its right to exist.38

Still other analysts do not assume that Hamas remains committed to every word of its charter, but

maintain that a decisive majority of Hamas members are unwilling to deviate from core principles

See Matthew Levitt, “Political Hardball Within Hamas: Hardline Militants Calling Shots in Gaza,” Washington

Institute for Near East Policy, PolicyWatch #1450, January 6, 2009, available at

http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2982. This article contends that debate is most contentious

within Hamas over which of these two driving forces to prioritize.

See, e.g., Michael Herzog, “Can Hamas Be Tamed?”, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2006; Charles Krauthammer,

“Moral Clarity in Gaza,” Washington Post, January 2, 2009.

Many of these documents written subsequent to the Hamas charter can be found in Azzam Tamimi, Hamas: A

History from Within, Olive Branch Press, Northampton, Massachusetts, 2007, Appendices. However, Fatah, whose

leaders populate the main leadership positions of the PA and the PLO (which have dealings with Israel and the West),

has not purged its 1960s charter of its clauses calling for the destruction of the Zionist state and its economic, political,

military, and cultural supports (even though the PLO has recognized Israel’s right to exist).

See Henry Siegman, “US Hamas policy blocks Middle East peace,” Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre, September

2010, available at http://www.usmep.us/usmep/wp-content/uploads/NorefReport_Siegman_Hamas-Israel_Sep10.pdf;

Michael Bröning, “Hamas 2.0,” foreignaffairs.com, August 5, 2009.

See footnote 131.

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of the movement—namely, its ability to resort to violence and its unwillingness to agree to a

permanent peace or territorial compromise with Israel. 39 These analysts readily say that Hamas is

not monolithic. Yet, they assert that in the instances in which Hamas conveys an impression of its

pragmatism or potential moderation, consensus exists among its various political and military

leadership bodies and councils that such actions are tactical, confined within the limits its core

principles allow, and only bind Hamas as long as circumstances favor a diplomatic approach over

a more confrontational one. Under this interpretation, statements from Hamas leaders hinting at

permanent compromise of its core principles would either be deceptive or represent a

marginalized view. For example, these analysts claim, Hamas’s stated willingness to contemplate

a long-term cease-fire in the event of the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank

(including East Jerusalem) and Gaza would allow Hamas to consolidate its position and await a

more propitious moment to assault Israeli targets.40

Overall Goals

Hamas’s primary goal is to achieve the “liberation” of all of historic Palestine (comprising

present-day Israel, West Bank, and Gaza Strip) for Palestinian Arabs in the name of Islam. There

is vigorous debate among analysts and perhaps within Hamas regarding the essential aspects of

this goal. Hamas’s charter is explicit about the struggle for Palestine being a religious obligation.

It describes the land as a waqf, or religious endowment, saying that no one can “abandon it or part

of it.”

Those who believe that Hamas is pragmatic are less likely to believe that it considers itself bound

by its charter or by rhetoric intended to rally domestic support. On the other hand, those who

contend that consensus exists within Hamas not to compromise on core principles believe that

Hamas sees events from a different perspective than U.S. and other international analysts. They

assert that Hamas has a much different concept of time, borne out by a gradual but consistent rise

in the movement’s fortunes over the course of generations (within its greater Muslim Brotherhood

context) in the face of significant internal challenges and external opposition.

On Israel’s Existence and the Jews

The 1988 charter commits Hamas to the destruction of Israel and the establishment of an Islamic

state in all of historic Palestine. 41 It calls for the elimination of Israel and Jews from Islamic holy

land and portrays Jews in decidedly negative terms, citing anti-Semitic texts and conspiracies.

Many observers claim that subsequent statements from Hamas have refrained from or

deemphasized blanket negative references to Jews and supposed global Zionist conspiracies.

Some might say, however, that this is belied by numerous anti-Semitic statements and references

CRS interview in September 2010 with U.S. analyst covering Middle East terrorism at major Washington, DC think

tank.

See Matthew Levitt, “Score One for ‘Hamaswood,’” Middle East Strategy at Harvard, August 11, 2009, available at

http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2009/08/score-one-for-hamaswood/.

For a translation of the 1988 Hamas charter (from the original Arabic), see

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hamas.asp.

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to pejorative stereotypes in media controlled by Hamas, including programming for both children

and adults on Hamas’s Al Aqsa satellite television channel.42

On a Two-State Solution

Although Hamas’s charter is uncompromising in its call for the liberation of all of historic

Palestine, those observers who contend that Hamas is essentially pragmatic point to past

statements in which leaders pledged hypothetically to respect actions taken through a potential

Palestinian referendum or PA power-sharing government (that includes Hamas) to accept a twostate solution. 43 Hamas politburo chief Khaled Meshaal, however, in an August 2010 interview,

said:

Hamas does accept a Palestinian state on the lines of 1967—and does not accept the twostate solution. There is [a] big difference between these two. I am a Palestinian. I am a

Palestinian leader. I am concerned with accomplishing what the Palestinian people are

looking for—which is to get rid of the occupation, attain liberation and freedom, and

establish the Palestinian state on the lines of 1967. Talking about Israel is not relevant to

me—I am not concerned about it. It is an occupying state, and I am the victim. I am the

victim of the occupation; I am not concerned with giving legitimacy to this occupying

country. The international community can deal with this (Israeli) state; I am concerned with

the Palestinian people. I am as a Palestinian concerned with establishing the Palestinian state

only.44

In a May 2010 interview with PBS’s Charlie Rose, Meshaal clarified the circumstances under

which Hamas would respect the outcome of a Palestinian referendum on the relationship with

Israel held after, not before or concurrently with, the establishment of a Palestinian state:

If Israel withdraws to the borders of 1967, and from East Jerusalem, that will become the

capital of the Palestinian state with the right of self—with the right of return for the refugees

and with a Palestinian state with real sovereignty on the land and on the borders and on the

checkpoints. Then we—the Palestinian state will decide the future of the relationship with

Israel. And we will respect the decision that will reflect the viewpoint of the majority of the

Palestinian people…. Don’t request the Palestinian people to have a certain stance from

Israel while living under the Israeli occupation. Give the Palestinian people the opportunity

to live in a normal situation in a Palestinian state, and then the Palestinian people with

complete freedom will decide.45

Matthew Levitt, “Hamas’s Ideological Crisis,” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology Vol. 9, Hudson Institute Center of

Islam, Democracy, and the Future of the Muslim World, November 6, 2009, available at

http://www.currenttrends.org/research/detail/hamass-ideological-crisis.

Steven Erlanger, “Academics View Differences Within Hamas,” New York Times, January 29, 2006.

Sharmine Narwani, “Khaled Meshaal Interview: Hamas Chief Weighs In on Eve of Peace Talks,” The Huffington

Post, August 31, 2010.

Transcript of remarks by Khaled Meshaal, “Charlie Rose,” op. cit.

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On the Use of Violence

Hamas’s 1988 charter says, “There is no solution for the Palestinian question except through

Jihad. Initiatives, proposals and international conferences are all a waste of time and vain

endeavors.”46

In the years since, the movement’s willingness to halt violence and emphasize political over

military methods in some circumstances, most notably the decision to participate in the 2006 PLC

elections, has prompted some analysts to express hope that it might contemplate demilitarizing.

Nevertheless, Hamas’s leadership and many other analysts insist that no matter what other means

Hamas may tactically employ from time to time, armed resistance remains its ultimate trump

card.

In a July 2010 interview with the Jordanian newspaper Al Sabeel, Meshaal discussed how having

the option to use violence enhances Hamas’s ability to negotiate, in contrast to the lack of

leverage he said the PLO has had since renouncing violence:

The [PLO] negotiators say: “Negotiation is the option, the course and the only plan.” They

coordinate security with the enemy and implement the “Road Map” and its security

requirements freely, with Israel offering nothing in return. What is there to force Olmert or

Netanyahu to grant the Palestinians anything?

Negotiation in the [PLO] case is out of its objective context; it is, merely from the

perspective of political logic, lacking resistance and not based on the necessary power

balance. The Vietnamese—for instance—negotiated with the Americans as the latter were

retreating; thus negotiations were useful for turning the last page on American occupation

and aggression. You are successful in negotiation and in imposing your conditions on the

enemy depending on the number of power cards you have on the ground.47

On Its Model for an Islamic State

Hamas’s charter envisions that Palestine will become an Islamic society that allows for

coexistence of all religions “under its wing”:

The Islamic Resistance Movement is a distinguished Palestinian movement, whose

allegiance is to Allah, and whose way of life is Islam. It strives to raise the banner of Allah

over every inch of Palestine, for under the wing of Islam followers of all religions can

coexist in security and safety where their lives, possessions and rights are concerned. In the

absence of Islam, strife will be rife, oppression spreads, evil prevails and schisms and wars

will break out.48

However, by reshaping PA institutions, laws, and norms to fit its ends—instead of fully

overhauling them—and by allowing the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in

the Near East (UNRWA) and other international and non-governmental organizations to operate

1988 Hamas charter, op. cit.

Translation (from the original Arabic) of Al Sabeel (Jordan) newspaper interview with Khaled Meshaal, available at

http://www.middleeastmonitor.org.uk/articles/middle-east/1491-khaled-meshal-lays-out-new-hamas-policy-direction.

1988 Hamas charter, op. cit.

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in Gaza, Hamas has opted—for the time being at least—for stability over a comprehensive

societal transformation. Hamas interior minister Fathi Hamad has insisted:

Claims that we are trying to establish an Islamic state are false. Hamas is not the Taliban. It

is not al-Qaeda. It is an enlightened, moderate Islamic movement.49

Some ideologues who believed that Hamas would or should have implemented sharia law and

formally and fully Islamized public and private life soon after taking power have been

disappointed. This disappointment has resulted in some Islamists joining more extremist groups,

though it does not appear to present a near-term challenge to Hamas’s rule and it is unclear how

pronounced or significant this trend will be long term.

Yet, there has been some movement toward a greater Islamization of society through the broader

Hamas community network of mosques, reconciliation committees, government ministries and

courts, security forces, religious scholars, and schools. Islamic fatwas (legal opinions) have been

offered as an alternative to secular justice for some police detainees. “Morality police,” judges,

and school principals advocate for and enforce Islamic dress codes—especially for women—in

publicly conspicuous places, although resistance to these measures has slowed or reversed their

implementation in some instances.50 How this has affected the minority of Palestinian Christians

in Gaza is unclear. In February 2010, interior minister Fathi Hamad (in a statement that some

could interpret as contradicting his above-quoted statement regarding Hamas’s supposed

moderation) “called for ‘Da’wa efforts to reach all institutions, not just mosques,’ signaling an

intent to systematically Islamize government agencies, starting with his own.”51

Use of Media

Hamas has used its control over Gaza’s media and a robust Internet presence52 to cast Islamist,

anti-Israel, and anti-Semitic teachings within a narrative portraying “martyrdom” and violence

against Israel and Jews as heroic. Public dissent is suppressed, and Hamas uses its Al Aqsa

television and radio channels and summer camps53 to indoctrinate children and youth with its

hybrid Islamist/Palestinian nationalist views. In 2009, Hamas even produced its first featurelength film celebrating the life and death of a Qassam Brigades militant from the first intifada.54 It

Pelham and Rodenbeck, op. cit..

Ibid.

Yezid Sayigh, “Hamas Rule in Gaza: Three Years On,” Crown Center of Middle East Studies, Brandeis University,

March 2010, available at http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB41.pdf.

Sayigh, “We serve the people”…, op. cit. For example, the Qassam Brigades (www.qassam.ps) and Al Aqsa TV

(www.aqsatv.ps/ar/) maintain their own websites, and most (if not all) of the Hamas-run Gaza ministries, including the

Ministry of Interior (http://www.moi.gov.ps), also maintain websites. Some of these websites have English and other

foreign-language versions as well as Arabic.

In May and June 2010, two separate incidents of arson were reported against Gaza summer camps run by UNRWA

(that served approximately 250,000 Gaza youth in Summer 2010). Some analysts in Israel and the West believe that the

incidents may have taken place with the tacit or express approval of Hamas in an attempt to promote its model for

influencing youth over UNRWA’s (Hamas’s camps reportedly served approximately 100,000 Gaza youth in Summer

2010), given the criticism Hamas has reportedly leveled at the UNRWA camps for their focus on entertainment and

potentially “corrupting” influences. See “This year Hamas’ summer camps in the Gaza Strip…,” Meir Amit

Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, September 14, 2010, available at http://www.terrorisminfo.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/hamas_e128.htm; Sarah A. Topol, “Hamas’s Summer Camp War,”

Slate.com, July 27, 2010.

Levitt, “Hamas’s Ideological Crisis,” op. cit.

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encourages support and often recruits from “mosque youth” who assist neighborhood imams and

sometimes act as informants for Hamas-controlled Gaza intelligence organizations. 55

Hamas leaders also skillfully use regional and international media outlets to craft messages to its

various audiences, including Arabs and Muslims, Americans, Europeans, and Israelis. Israeli

officials insist that Hamas delivers the same message to Arab and Western audiences with a

different tone and emphasis for each, 56 creating what some might call purposeful and convenient

ambiguity over questions such as Hamas’s possible pragmatism.

Leadership and Organization

In General

Hamas has a variety of movement-wide and regional leadership organs, along with branches that

conduct its political, military, and social welfare activities with varying levels of formal

association to the group. In addition, the de facto Hamas government in Gaza has its own

leadership structures and public stature. Who controls overall strategy, policy, and financial

decisions, and how control is exercised, remain open questions with opaque answers. The State

Department and some analysts believe that Hamas generally follows a hierarchical model in

which ultimate control resides with the 15-member political bureau (or politburo) and the

movement-wide consultative council (known as the shura council) headquartered in Damascus.57

According to Matthew Levitt of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, “Under this Shura

council are committees responsible for supervising a wide array of activities, from media

relations to military operations. At the grassroots level in the West Bank and Gaza, local Shura

committees answer to the overarching Shura council and carry out its decisions on the ground.”58

One reason to believe that substantial authority resides with the movement-wide and regional

shura councils is that Hamas closely guards the secrecy of these councils’ membership. Hamas

also maintains branch offices in areas where it enjoys support, such as Lebanon, Sudan, the Gulf,

and possibly Iran.59

Some analysts, however, believe that Hamas’s formal hierarchical structures remain subject to a

dispersion of control given that the geographical division of the organization’s core activities

among Damascus and Gaza—maintained out of necessity for the organization’s security and

survival—creates a system of mutual leverage. This system is based on how the actions and

funding streams of Hamas’s political, military, and social welfare branches affect their

interactions, as these interactions both shape and are shaped by events.

Hamas seeks to mitigate the tension inherent between its activities as (1) a militant organization

uncompromisingly opposed to Israel in defiance of international opprobrium and

countermeasures; and (2) the de facto government in Gaza accountable to its people for managing

Sayigh, “We serve the people”…, op. cit.

Israel Defense Forces Intelligence, “The forked tongue of Hamas: How it speaks differently to Western and Arab

media,” April 11, 2006, available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism+Obstacle+to+Peace/Terror+Groups/The%20forked%20tongue%20of%20Hamas%2011-Apr-2006

See U.S. State Department, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2009,” Chapter 6, op. cit.

Levitt, “Political Hardball Within Hamas…,” op. cit.

See Cohen and White, op. cit.

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security, economic, and other basic societal issues that largely depend upon Israeli and

international actions. Some might express this as Hamas’s desire to maximize its power while

minimizing its accountability. Hamas claims it draws a bright line bifurcating the organization’s

leadership from its members in the Gaza government, which, if true, helps it deflect

accountability. This could discourage the United States and other international actors from

including Hamas in political discussions tied to Palestinian governance or negotiations with

Israel.

Internal Tensions?

Various U.S. and international policymakers, including Secretary of State Hillary Rodham

Clinton, have said or implied that organizational fissures may exist within Hamas.60 These

possible fissures are somewhat overlapping. One supposedly runs between Gaza-based leaders

accountable to local public opinion and Damascus-based leaders seen as closer to Iran. Another

supposedly runs between so-called pragmatists and more hardline elements in the Gaza leadership

(often Qassam Brigades militants and their sympathizers). Yet another is said to exist between

two groups of Damascus exiles: (1) native Gazans with personal links to Hamas’s Gaza founders

(such as Musa Abu Marzouk), and (2) displaced West Bankers used to operating outside of the

Palestinian territories who forged links with the Gaza founders mostly through Islamist

organizations in Kuwait (known as Kuwaitiyya, this group includes Khaled Meshaal).

Within the Qassam Brigades, some analysts speculate that internal struggles may partly explain

the rise of Jaljalat (an Arabic word for “thunder”), an “amorphous network of armed militants

numbering some 2,500-3,000” that reportedly includes many disaffected Brigades members.

Yezid Sayigh of King’s College London, a longtime analyst of Palestinian security and politics

and a former PLO advisor, claimed in a March 2010 report that Jaljalat fears that, “by taking on

the mundane tasks of government and public service delivery, Hamas has jeopardized its

nationalist and Islamic purity and its commitment to armed resistance against Israel.” Sayigh’s

report also said that Jaljalat is suspected of several attacks on Hamas vehicles and security

offices, as well as on Internet cafés. Additionally, the report said that Qassam Brigades

commander Ahmed al Jaabari may be concerned that some Hamas leaders in Gaza may be

building alternative power bases that could threaten the internal unity of Hamas and the

Brigades.61

Hamas could be more united than it seems, although it benefits from the portrayal of its

leadership as divided because this perception provides Hamas with greater flexibility in dealing

with both Western actors who hold out hope of its moderation and its Syrian and Iranian

benefactors who are reminded not to take its rejectionist stance for granted. Presenting a divided

front also may serve Hamas by providing it with a rationale to explain policy inconsistencies or

changes of direction to the Palestinian people.

In testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs,

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said, “In fact, we think there is [sic] some divisions between the Hamas

leadership in Gaza and in Damascus. There’s no doubt that those in Damascus take orders directly from Tehran.”

Transcript of Subcommittee hearing: “Supplemental Request,” April 23, 2009.

The source for this paragraph is Sayigh, “Hamas Rule in Gaza: Three Years On,” op. cit.

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In Gaza

Hamas directs the Gaza government and security forces through a self-appointed cabinet of

Hamas ministers led by Ismail Haniyeh, who served as PA prime minister prior to Hamas’s

dismissal from government after the June 2007 Gaza takeover. The process by which decisions

are taken is opaque, but analysts believe that it involves the movement-wide and Gaza regional

shura councils, the Damascus politburo, and Qassam Brigades leadership. 62 Along with an

unknown amount it may receive from Hamas’s organization and external benefactors, the Hamasled government may receive revenue from Gaza’s zakat committees (which collect Muslims’

obligatory donations of 2.5% of their surplus wealth) and from licensing fees and taxes. Although

Hamas is believed to make tens of millions of dollars annually from operating Gaza’s smuggling

tunnels (the estimate for 2009, according to Yezid Sayigh, was $150 million-$200 million), most

of its profit reportedly goes to the organization (the Qassam Brigades, in particular), and not the

Gaza regime. 63 The people of Gaza still rely on Israel, Egypt, the PA in the West Bank, UNRWA,

and other international and non-governmental organizations for access to and resources from the

outside world (including banking, water, and fuel for electricity).

Reference to the government in Gaza as the “Hamas regime” does not mean that all or even most

of the people employed in ministries, civil service positions, and even security forces are

necessarily members of Hamas or even Hamas sympathizers. Hamas partisans are, however,

intermingled throughout. The Jerusalem Report, an Israeli weekly, states that since the June 2007

takeover, the PA in the West Bank has continued paying salaries to tens of thousands of public

sector employees in Gaza—mostly in education- and health-related positions—while paying

salaries to thousands more (including from the security forces) on the condition that they not

perform their duties.64 Although this policy might allow the PA to maintain the loyalties of its

workers, it also has relieved the regime of the economic burden of supporting those paid by the

PA. It also has given the regime the opportunity to create a critical mass of Hamas loyalists within

the government by filling vacated positions in the security forces and other key public

institutions. Additionally, the Hamas-led regime has created its own ad hoc judicial framework

and hired its own judges,65 many of them from sharia courts.66

In a conversation with CRS in August 2009, an Israeli official claimed that the Damascus politburo, headed by

Khaled Meshaal, exercises more strategic control over Hamas’s activities than Hamas’s other leadership organs

because (the Israeli official claimed) the politburo is responsible for arranging the transport of cash, weapons, and other

supplies to the Gaza Strip.

CRS correspondence with Yezid Sayigh, October 2010.

Danny Rubenstein, “Planet Gaza,” The Jerusalem Report, June 7, 2010. U.S. appropriations legislation (including the

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-117)) prohibits U.S. aid to be “obligated for salaries of personnel of

the Palestinian Authority located in Gaza.” The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) says that direct

U.S. budgetary assistance to the PA is used “to service debt to commercial suppliers and commercial banks.” USAID

FY2011 Congressional Notification #1, October 7, 2010.

Nathan J. Brown, “Palestine: The Schism Deepens,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 20, 2009,

available at http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23668

Sayigh, “Hamas Rule in Gaza: Three Years On,” op. cit. Sharia courts seek the direct application of Islamic legal

principles to society without reference to secular legal principles as possible supplements or alternatives.

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Hamas: Background and Issues for Congress

Table 2. Public Budget Comparisons: Gaza and West Bank

Gaza

Hamas-led Regime

West Bank

Palestinian Authority

1.55 million

2.51 million

32,000

145,000

Overall Annual Budget Estimates

(2010)

$320 million-$540 milliona

$2.78 billion

Annual Internal Revenue (2010)

$60 million

$1.54 billion

External Support Requirements

(2010)

$260 million-$480 million

$1.24 billion

Palestinian Population in Territory

Public Employees

Sources: Central Intelligence Agency, State Department, Yezid Sayigh.

Notes: All figures are as of March 2010 and are approximate.

The Hamas-led regime in Gaza states that its 2010 budget is $540 million, but it is possible that the actual

budget is closer to the actual budget for 2009, which was $320 million. CRS correspondence with Yezid

Sayigh, October 2010.

Although much international attention has focused on the improved professionalization of PA

security forces in the West Bank, analysts say that Hamas-led security forces in Gaza also exhibit

impressive levels of discipline and efficiency that have succeeded in keeping order. There are,

however, widespread reports of mistreatment and torture of Hamas political opponents

(particularly Fatah members) and other prisoners; at the same time, similar reports circulate about

PA treatment of Hamas members and sympathizers in the West Bank. 67

Table 3. Major Hamas-commanded Security Forces in Gaza

Branch

Role

Estimated Manpower

Internal Security Service

Counterintelligence and infiltration of

rivals (possibly including external

intelligence arm)

500

VIP Protection Force

Bodyguards for Hamas leadership and

key facilities

2,000

National Security Force

Border guard with early warning

function

930

Police

Routine civil and criminal policing

functions (largely derived from former

“Executive Force”)

10,000

Source: Mohammed Najib, “Hamas creates external intelligence arm,” Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst, January 29,

2010.

Many analysts believe that Hamas rule remains stable and effective in some areas despite the

miserable post-Operation Cast Lead situation and Gaza’s dilapidated infrastructure.68 Some see

the beginnings of a patronage system, citing, among other evidence, the $60 million in handouts

See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Internal Fight: Palestinian Abuses in Gaza and the West Bank, July 29, 2008,

available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2008/07/29/internal-fight-0.

See, e.g., Daniel Byman, “How to Handle Hamas,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2010; Thanassis Cambanis,

“Letter from Gaza,” foreignaffairs.com, June 18, 2010.

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Hamas: Background and Issues for Congress

Hamas is reported to have distributed in $1,500-$6,000 increments to families whose homes were

lost or damaged in the conflict.69 According to Yezid Sayigh, Hamas benefits from “unbroken

territorial control over the entirety of the Gaza Strip.” This stands in contrast to the difficulties

faced by the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, whose jurisdiction and operations are

“fundamentally circumscribed by the ‘Swiss cheese’ model of intermeshed Palestinian autonomy

areas and Israeli-controlled settlements and military zones.”70

Popular Support

Although Hamas’s rule in Gaza is authoritarian, it did win PLC elections in 2006, and some

believe that the future possibility of elections makes it responsive to public opinion. Polls taken in

the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip from August-October 2010 indicated

that Palestinians favored Fatah over Hamas by nearly two-to-one to over three-to-one margins in

each territory.71 Large groupings of Palestinians (ranging in the various polls from 15% to nearly

40%), however, did not identify a factional preference,72 possibly indicating popular malaise or

cynicism regarding political developments and processes, or potential for volatility.

However, according to a September-October 2010 poll by the Palestinian Center for Policy and

Survey Research, over 60% of Gazans (contrasted with just over 40% of West Bankers) supported

both Hamas’s August-September 2010 shooting attacks on Israeli settlers in the West Bank73 and

the idea of attacking civilians inside Israel.74 Might the possible resumption by Hamas of regular

attacks or other active opposition to Israeli-PLO negotiations gain it support from this

demographic? In the same poll, Palestinians were almost evenly divided (those agreeing came out

slightly ahead, by a 49%-48% margin) on the following question related to a possible two-state

solution:

There is a proposal that after the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and the

settlement of all issues in dispute, including the refugees and Jerusalem issues, there will be

a mutual recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of

the Palestinians people. Do you agree or disagree to this proposal?75

“Country Report: Palestinian Territories,” Economist Intelligence Unit, October 2009. Yet, some observers note that

Hamas leaders have mostly avoided the type of conspicuous consumption in which many Fatah leaders have engaged

since the 1990s, and which feeds widespread perceptions of corruption.

Sayigh, “Hamas Rule in Gaza: Three Years On,” op. cit.

Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No. 37 (September 30-October 2,

2010), available at http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2010/p37e.html#table; Arab World for Research and

Development, “Middle East Peace Process: Silver Linings Remain,” August 8-14, 2010, available at

http://www.awrad.org/pdfs/Oversample%20Results%20-%20Analysis%20%28final%29.pdf; Jerusalem Media and

Communications Centre, Poll No. 71 (September 11-15, 2010), available at

http://www.jmcc.org/documentsandmaps.aspx?id=808.

Ibid.

The shooting attacks, which coincided with the relaunch of Israel-PLO negotiations, killed four Israelis (including a

pregnant mother) and injured two more.

Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No. 37 (September 30-October 2,

2010), op. cit.

Ibid.

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Hamas: Background and Issues for Congress

Some reports indicate that Hamas is building its support base among Palestinian refugees outside

of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, particularly in Lebanon.76 Gaining the loyalty of refugee camp

populations could give Hamas additional leverage with Fatah, Israel, and other regional actors.

Sources of Assistance

Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah

According to the State Department, Iran provides financial and military assistance to Hamas and

other Palestinian militant groups.77 During a December 2009 visit to Tehran, Hamas politburo

chief Khaled Meshaal said, “Other Arab and Islamic states also support us ... but the Iranian

backing is in the lead, and therefore we highly appreciate and thank Iran for this.”78 Meshaal and

his politburo colleagues, along with Hamas’s movement-wide shura council, have safe haven in

Damascus, Syria. From Damascus, Hamas’s leadership-in-exile can direct the group’s operations

through financial transactions and unrestrained access to travel and communications. The Iranbacked Hezbollah movement in Lebanon provides military training as well as financial and moral

support and has acted in some ways as a mentor or role model for Hamas,79 which has sought to

emulate the Lebanese group’s political and media success. Some Palestinians who are skeptical of

the Arab-Israeli peace process believe that Iranian support for Palestinian militants and Hezbollah

provides needed leverage with Israel that the United States and Europe are unlikely to deliver to

PA President/PLO Chairman Mahmoud Abbas.

Some reports say that contributions to Hamas’s political and military wings from Iran range from

$20 million-$30 million annually.80 Yet, even though Hamas welcomes direct and indirect Iranian

assistance and Iran’s reputation among Arab populations has arguably been bolstered in recent

years by its anti-Western and anti-Israel positions and rhetoric, Hamas and Iran may intentionally

maintain a measure of distance from one another. An alternate interpretation is that they merely

understate the extent of their ties.81 They appear to understand the importance of Hamas

maintaining an image among its domestic constituents as an authentic Palestinian offshoot of the

Muslim Brotherhood, instead of as an Iranian proxy—owing to the ethnic, sectarian, and

See U.S. State Department, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2009,” Chapter 6, op. cit.; International Crisis Group,

Nurturing Instability: Lebanon’s Palestinian Refugee Camps, Middle East Report No. 84, February 19, 2009, available

http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Israel%20Palestine/84%20nurturing%2

0instability%20lebanons%20palestinian%20refugee%20camps.ashx.

See U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2009,” Chapter 3. State Sponsors of Terrorism,

available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2009/140889.htm.

Transcript of remarks by Khaled Meshaal, Al Jazeera TV, December 15, 2009, Open Source Document

GMP20091215648001 (translated from Arabic).

Fitfield, op. cit; Thanassis Cambanis, A Privilege to Die: Inside Hezbollah’s Legions and Their Endless War Against

Israel, Free Press, New York, 2010, pp. 17, 267-272.

See Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, “Hamas,” updated August 27, 2009, available at

http://www.cfr.org/publication/8968/#p8; Matthew Levitt, “The Real Connection Between Iran and Hamas,”

Counterterrorism Blog, January 12, 2009, available at

http://counterterrorismblog.org/2009/01/the_real_connection_between_ir.php.

See, e.g., Ehud Yaari, “Sunni Hamas and Shiite Iran Share a Common Political Theology,” Washington Institute of

Near East Policy, PolicyWatch #1716, November 9, 2010.

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Hamas: Background and Issues for Congress

linguistic differences between Palestinians (who are predominantly Arab, Sunni, and Arabicspeaking) and Iranians (who are mostly non-Arab, Shiite, and Persian-speaking).

Iran’s future influence over the Palestinian political scene seems tied to Hamas’s fortunes, which

have been on the rise since Hamas’s political emergence in the late-1980s, and bolstered by its

victory in Palestinian Legislative Council elections in 2006 and takeover of Gaza in 2007.

Possible Iranian-supported smuggling of weapons, cash, and other contraband into the Gaza

Strip,82 along with Iranian training for Gaza-based Hamas militants (who are able to travel to and

from Iran and Lebanon after using the Gaza-Sinai tunnels), 83 is believed to reinforce both

Hamas’s ability to maintain order and control over Gaza and its population, and Palestinian

militants’ ability to fire mortars and rockets into Israel.84

Charities and Individuals

U.S. officials and many analysts have concluded that, drawing upon its historical roots in and

continuing ties to the Palestinian dawa (social welfare) community, Hamas receives much of its

support from private individuals and organizations in the Palestinian diaspora and greater Arab

and Muslim worlds (particularly in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states).85 Since 1995, the United

States has taken active measures—in concert with Israel, the PA, and other international actors—

to disrupt Hamas’s use of charities as front organizations (see Table 4 below and Appendix A for

additional details).

Table 4. U.S.Terrorist Designations and Financial Sanctions Against Hamas and

Affiliates

Hamas Designation

Statutory Basis

Specially Designated

Terrorist (SDT)

International Emergency

Economic Powers Act

January 1995

Executive Order 12947

(P.L. 95-223, 50 U.S.C.

§1701, et seq.)

Financial Sanctions

Subject to Civil and/or

Criminal Liabilitya

Blocks all U.S. property of

SDT (or of party controlled

by SDT or acting on its

behalf)

Any transaction or dealing

by a U.S. person or within

the United States with SDT

or SDT property

Uzi Mahnaimi, “US navy seeks arms bound for Hamas,” The Sunday Times (UK), January 25, 2009.

Byman, op. cit.

According to the State Department, in 2009, “Iran remained the principal supporter of groups that are implacably

opposed to the Middle East Peace Process. The Qods Force, the external operations branch of the Islamic

Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), is the regime’s primary mechanism for cultivating and supporting terrorists

abroad. Iran provided weapons, training, and funding to HAMAS and other Palestinian terrorist groups, including

Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC).”

U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2009,” Chapter 3, op. cit. See also Marie Colvin, “Hamas

Wages Iran’s Proxy War on Israel,” The Sunday Times (UK), March 9, 2008.

See U.S. Treasury Department press release: “U.S. Designates Five Charities Funding Hamas and Six Senior Hamas

Leaders as Terrorist Entities,” August 22, 2003, available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js672.htm; U.S.

Treasury Department press release: “Treasury Designates Al-Salah Society Key Support Node for Hamas,” August 7,

2007, available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp531.htm. See also Don Van Natta, Jr., with Timothy L.

O’Brien, “Flow of Saudi Cash to Hamas Is Under Scrutiny by U.S.,” New York Times, September 17, 2003.

Congressional Research Service

Hamas: Background and Issues for Congress

Hamas Designation

Foreign Terrorist

Organization (FTO)

October 1997

State Department

Specially Designated

Global Terrorist (SDGT)

October 2001

Treasury Department

(Under Executive Order

13224)

Statutory Basis

Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act of 1996

(P.L. 104-132, 110 Stat.

1214-1319)

International Emergency

Economic Powers Act

(P.L. 95-223, 50 U.S.C.

§1701, et seq.)

Financial Sanctions

Subject to Civil and/or

Criminal Liabilitya

Requires financial

institutions to block all

funds in which FTOs or

their agents have an

interest

U.S. persons providing

material support or

resources to FTOs; failure

of financial institutions to

block funds

Blocks all U.S. property of

SDGT (or of party

controlled by SDGT or

acting on its behalf) and of

those who provide material

support to SDGT

Any transaction or dealing

by a U.S. person or within

the United States with

SDGT or SDGT property

Directs executive branch

to work with other

countries to prevent acts of

terrorism, deny financing to

terrorists, and share

intelligence about terrorist

funding activities

Source: U.S. Treasury Department, Office of Foreign Assets Control, “What You Need to Know About U.S.

Sanctions,” available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/terror/terror.pdf.

See footnote 87 and footnote 88, respectively, for discussion of the statutory bases for U.S. criminal and

civil liability for material support of terrorism (18 U.S.C. §2333, §2339A, §2339B).

Yet, it appears that, either through the international banking system or the Gaza-Sinai smuggling

tunnels (or both), Hamas’s political and military wings both still receive funding from their own

networks of affiliated Islamic charities,86 including some that have operated and may still operate

in the United States, Canada, and Europe. The most illustrative case was that of the Texas-based

Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF), once the largest Islamic charity in the

United States. After U.S. investigators determined that HLF was funneling money to Hamas and

had close ties with Hamas leader Musa Abu Marzouk when he lived in the United States in the

early 1990s, the Treasury Department named HLF a specially designated global terrorist (SDGT)

in 2001 and froze its assets. In 2008, five HLF leaders (four of whom are U.S. citizens) were

found guilty on criminal charges of providing more than $12 million in material support to

Hamas (through contributions to Hamas-linked charities) after President Bill Clinton had named

Hamas a specially designated terrorist (SDT) by executive order in 1995.87 For providing

financing, HLF and two affiliated organizations also were found liable in 2004 in federal civil

court for the 1996 Hamas shooting death of an Israeli-American dual citizen in Jerusalem,

although the verdict against HLF was reversed on appeal in 2007 on procedural grounds.88

Matthew Levitt and Michael Jacobson, The Money Trail: Finding, Following, and Freezing Terrorist Finances,

Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus #89, November 2008, available at

http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pubPDFs/PolicyFocus89.pdf.

See U.S. Department of Justice press release, Holy Land Foundation, Leaders, Accused of Providing Material

Support to Hamas Terrorist Organization, July 27, 2004, available at

http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2004/July/04_crm_514.htm. Criminal liability for material support of terrorism is

authorized under 18 U.S.C. §2339A and §2339B. For further information, see CRS Report R41333, Terrorist Material

Support: An Overview of 18 U.S.C. 2339A and 2339B, by (name redacted).

Laura B. Rowe, “Ending Terrorism with Civil Remedies: Boim v. Holy Land Foundation and the Proper Framework

of Liability,” 4 Seventh Circuit Review 372 (2009), available at http://www.kentlaw.edu/7cr/v4-2/rowe.pdf. In addition

(continued...)

Congressional Research Service

Hamas: Background and Issues for Congress

The December 2004 findings of the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (an Israeli

non-governmental organization), as paraphrased in a November 2008 Washington Institute for

Near East Policy report, claimed that there were two separate categories of Hamas-linked

charitable fronts:

The first category includes those fronts directly tied to Hamas. These typically employ

Hamas activists, are established with the assistance of the Hamas political leadership, and see

the vast majority of their funds dispensed to Hamas charities in the West Bank and Gaza.

Such charities bring in an estimated $15–$20 million a year and include the Palestinian

Relief and Development Fund (Interpal) and the al-Aqsa International Foundation, among

others. The second category includes fronts that support radical Islamist elements generally

but are not Hamas specific. A majority of these fronts are based in Persian Gulf states and

most of the funds they send to the West Bank and Gaza are also channeled through Hamas

organizations there.89

In November 2008, the Treasury Department identified one of these alleged front organizations, a

Saudi Arabia-based charity known as the Union of Good, as an SDGT, claiming that the

organization had been responsible for the transfer of tens of millions of dollars to Hamasmanaged associations in the Palestinian territories. The Union of Good is reportedly chaired by

Yusuf al Qaradawi,90 a renowned Egyptian scholar of Islam and Hamas supporter based in Qatar

whose popular religious program on the Al Jazeera satellite television channel attracts

approximately 40 million viewers. At the time of the Union’s SDGT designation, the Treasury

Department stated:

The leadership of Hamas created the Union of Good in late-2000, shortly after the start of the

second Intifada, in order to facilitate the transfer of funds to Hamas. The Union of Good acts

as a broker for Hamas by facilitating financial transfers between a web of charitable

organizations—including several organizations previously designated under E.O. 13224 for

providing support to Hamas—and Hamas-controlled organizations in the West Bank and

Gaza. The primary purpose of this activity is to strengthen Hamas' political and military

position in the West Bank and Gaza, including by: (i) diverting charitable donations to

support Hamas members and the families of terrorist operatives; and (ii) dispensing social

welfare and other charitable services on behalf of Hamas…. [S]ome of the funds transferred

by the Union of Good have compensated Hamas terrorists by providing payments to the

families of suicide bombers.91

According to the Israel Security Agency (also known as the Shin Bet), several Islamic charitable

organizations withdrew their funding from the Union of Good shortly after its SDGT

designation. 92

(...continued)

to other civil penalties that may accrue, civil liability for damages caused by a party’s support of terrorism is authorized

under 18 U.S.C. §2333, which states: “Any national of the United States injured in his or her person, property, or

business by reason of an act of international terrorism … may sue therefor … and shall recover threefold the damages

he or she sustains…”

Levitt and Jacobson, op. cit., citing the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center.

Israel Security Agency (also known as the Shin Bet), “The Union of Good – Analysis and Mapping of Terror Funds

Network,” available at http://www.shabak.gov.il/SiteCollectionImages/english/TerrorInfo/coalition_en.pdf.

U.S. Treasury Department press release HP-1267, “Treasury Designates the Union of Good,” November 12, 2008,

available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1267.htm.

Israel Security Agency, op. cit.

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Hamas: Background and Issues for Congress

Some analysts believe that Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups may benefit from tradebased money laundering.93 Charities, companies, and individuals purchase high-demand

commodities like sugar, tea, coffee, and cooking oil to be sold in Palestinian areas because of the

scarcity of these items under the Israeli-Egyptian closure regime. Orders can be worth hundreds

of thousands of dollars.94 Some groups, such as the Anti-Defamation League, have raised

concerns over the participation of U.S. citizens and use of private U.S. funds in protest convoys

(including the May 2010 Mavi Marmara flotilla discussed below—see “International

Dimensions”) directed at the Israeli-Egyptian closure regime that have raised money and donated

supplies to Palestinians in Gaza, partly because of the difficulty in confirming that the recipients

are not linked with Hamas. In July 2009, approximately 200 U.S. activists participated in a

convoy organized by the British organization Viva Palestina (led by then British parliamentarian

George Galloway) that entered Gaza from Egypt and donated approximately $500,000 worth of

medical supplies (purchased from funds raised in the United States earlier in 2009) to Palestinian

groups.95

Possible Options for Congress

In considering legislative and oversight options, Congress can assess how Hamas has emerged

and adapted over time, and also scrutinize the track record of U.S., Israeli, and international

policy to counter Hamas. There have been multiple attempts to marginalize Hamas through a

variety of measures—political and foreign aid strategies, financial sanctions, arrests and

deportations, physical blockades and border closures, and Israeli military operations and

assassinations. Some of these measures have achieved temporary or partial success, but none has

yet prevented Hamas from playing a major role in Israeli-Palestinian politics or prevented

assistance to Hamas from states and other non-state actors in its region. Some might contend that

U.S. policy with respect to Hamas since its initial U.S. terrorist designation in 1995 has

strengthened instead of weakened the organization given its increased regional and international

profile. Perhaps U.S. policy also has increased Hamas’s reliance on the type of grassroots support

that is not easily countered by governmental means. Others might say that the proper goal is to

further strengthen the measures that have achieved temporary or partial success.

The following questions could be useful in evaluating legislative or oversight options:

•

Is Hamas stronger than it was five years ago? 15 years ago? Why or why not?

Have its rivals become stronger or weaker over that same period of time?

(Strength could be measured by one of more of the following factors: popularity,

military force, leverage with Israel, regional and global influence.)

Glenn R. Simpson and Benoit Faucon, “A Trail of Sugar to Gaza,” Wall Street Journal, July 2, 2007.

For example, an allegedly suspicious 2005 food shipment to Gaza by the Comité de Bienfaisance et de Secours aux

Palestiniens, a French organization the United States considers to be a Specially Designated Terrorist Organization due

to its ties to Hamas, was worth $521,130. Simpson and Faucon, op. cit.

Anti-Defamation League, “Viva Palestina: Supporting Hamas Under the Guise of Humanitarianism,” July 22, 2009,

available at http://www.adl.org/main_Anti_Israel/galloway_us_tour_09.htm?Multi_page_sections=sHeading_4.

Concerns about possible links to Hamas may have been fueled by Galloway’s actions during a previous European

convoy’s trip to Gaza in March 2009, when he gave approximately $1.5 million in cash and 110 vehicles directly to the

Hamas-led regime.

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Hamas: Background and Issues for Congress

•

What are the United States’ ultimate goals for Israel, the Palestinians, and the

broader region? How do particular options regarding Hamas fit into these goals?

•

What are Hamas’s ultimate goals and how might Hamas act proactively to

achieve these goals? How might it react to particular U.S. options that it

perceives could serve or frustrate these goals?

•

Once implemented, when are various options likely to produce results? What are

U.S. capacities and political will for implementing and monitoring various

options over time? What are intervening variables (i.e., other relevant actors,

other issues that might distract from those addressed by various options, political

timelines) and how might their potential negative impact on different options be

minimized?

•

How would the success of various options be measured?

U.S. Aid to Palestinians

Aid to Strengthen Non-Hamas Groups and Individuals

The current U.S. aid program for the West Bank-based PA led by President Mahmoud Abbas and

Prime Minister Salam Fayyad dates back to June 2007. Since that time, U.S. bilateral assistance

to the West Bank and Gaza Strip has amounted to approximately $2 billion, and assistance to

UNRWA for Palestinian refugees (including in Gaza) has totaled over $700 million. 96

This assistance includes $395.4 million (including $100 million in FY2010 funding) that have

been appropriated or reprogrammed for use in the West Bank since 2007 to train, reform, advise,

house, and provide non-lethal equipment for PA civil security forces in the West Bank loyal to

President Abbas. A small amount of training assistance also has been provided to strengthen and

reform the PA criminal justice sector. The Obama Administration has requested an additional

$150 million in FY2011 funding for the security assistance program, which U.S. officials insist is

only designed for West Bank security, and not for a prospective PA invasion of Hamas’s

stronghold in Gaza.

The current U.S. aid program appears to reflect a threefold strategy with respect to Hamas:

•

First, humanitarian aid is provided to Gaza to provide the people with basic needs

and to prevent destabilization.

•

Second, assistance (budgetary, development, security) provided for the West

Bank is intended to create a virtuous cycle of prosperity for Palestinians under

Abbas’s rule to contrast with the relative indigence of Gaza under Hamas, with

the idea that Palestinians will reject the Hamas model and embrace the West

Bank model.

•

Third, the West Bank security assistance is largely intended to combat, neutralize,

and prevent terrorism from Hamas and other militant organizations.

For further information, see CRS Report RS22967, U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, by (name redacted).

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Hamas: Background and Issues for Congress

Reevaluations might focus on the prospects for these three strategies to achieve their purposes.

Some analysts argue that improvements in Palestinians’ material well-being brought about by the

current aid program might be necessary, but are unlikely to be sufficient in achieving lasting

support for non-Hamas political elements without more direct progress on (1) Hamas-Fatah

power-sharing, (2) Palestinian political reform (including presidential and legislative elections),

and/or (3) Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.97 Nathan Brown of the Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace, a longtime U.S. analyst of Palestinian politics, warned in June 2010 that the

problem with “soldiering on” with the current strategy is that U.S. and Israeli policy inertia cedes

the initiative to other actors:

As has been shown time and again in recent years (most recently with the Gaza blockade),

both Israel and the United States have unfortunately but unmistakably (and quite

consistently) maintained policies until a crisis forces them to reevaluate….

…. A political misstep by the West Bank government, an eruption of violence against Israeli

targets originating either in the West Bank or Gaza, an upsurge in the conflict in Jerusalem,

an extensive Israeli military campaign in Gaza, or the loss of one of the two indispensible

men of the moment (Fayyad and Abbas) would likely leave both countries once more

desperately rather than deliberately adjusting their policies toward internal Palestinian

politics, and doing so most likely on unfavorable terms.98

Some analysts present U.S. involvement with Palestinian politics and institutions over the past 15

years as a cautionary tale,99 stating or implying that the continuation of U.S. policies intended to

present the West Bank as a model for Gazans to emulate might backfire—due either to negative

outcomes or negative perceptions (or both).100

Some members of Congress advocate expanding the level and type of humanitarian and

development assistance to Gaza—often at the same time they advocate easing, ending, or even

challenging the Israeli-Egyptian closure regime—because Gazans are seen as needing more

support to improve their economic, physical, and psychological situations.101 Senator John Kerry,

chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Representatives Brian Baird and Keith

Ellison visited U.N. officials in Gaza in February 2009 (in the first official U.S. government visits

to Gaza since 2003) to highlight Gazans’ needs immediately following Operation Cast Lead.

Representative Baird has since returned to Gaza twice, once in May 2009 with Representatives

Donna Edwards and Peter Welch, and once in February 2010. In January 2010, 54

Representatives signed a letter to President Obama that requested a substantive lifting of the

closure regime. 102

See, e.g., Nathan J. Brown, “Fayyad Is Not the Problem, but Fayyadism Is Not the Solution to Palestine’s Political

Crisis,” op. cit.; Michele Dunne, “A Two-State Solution Requires Palestinian Politics,” Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace, June 2010, available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/palestine_politics.pdf.

Nathan J. Brown, “Are Palestinians Building a State?”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Commentary,

June 2010, available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/palestinian_state1.pdf.

See Dunne, op. cit.

100

See, e.g., Mohammed Najib, “Struggling on – Khaled Mashal, political chief of Hamas,” Jane’s Intelligence Weekly,

August 20, 2010.

101

For further information on conditions in Gaza, see, e.g., Amnesty International UK, et al., “Dashed Hopes:

Continuation of the Gaza Blockade,” November 30, 2010, available at

http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/dashed-hopes-continuation-gaza-blockade-301110-en.pdf; Sarah A.

Topol, “‘Gaza Is Not Darfur!’”, Slate.com, August 5, 2010.

102

Text of Letter to the President, January 20, 2010, available at

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Hamas: Background and Issues for Congress

U.S. Security Assistance in the West Bank103

As mentioned above, the Bush and Obama Administrations have given non-lethal aid for PA civil

security forces in the West Bank loyal to President Abbas in an effort both to counter militants

from Hamas and other militants, and to establish the rule of law for an expected Palestinian state.

This U.S. assistance program exists alongside other assistance and training programs reportedly

provided to Palestinian security forces and intelligence organizations by the European Union and

various countries, including probable covert U.S. assistance programs.104 By most accounts, the

PA forces receiving training have shown increased professionalism and have helped substantially

improve law and order and lower the profile of terrorist organizations in West Bank cities.

However, the aspiration to coordinate international security assistance efforts and to consolidate

the various PA security forces under unified civilian control that is accountable to rule of law and

to human rights norms remains largely unfulfilled. PA forces have come under criticism for the

political targeting of Hamas—in collaboration with Israel and the United States—through

massive shutdowns and forced leadership changes to West Bank charities with alleged ties to

Hamas members and through reportedly arbitrary detentions of Hamas members and

supporters.105 A September-October 2010 Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research poll

indicated that 76% of Palestinians (with opinions nearly uniform between Gazans and West

Bankers) opposed or strongly opposed the PA’s mass arrests of Hamas members and sympathizers

following Hamas’s August-September 2010 shooting attacks against Israeli settlers in the West

Bank.106 Some Palestinians and outside observers also assert that the effectiveness and credibility

of PA operations are undermined by Israeli restrictions—including curfews, checkpoints, no-go

zones, and limitations on international arms and equipment transfers—as well as by Israel’s own

security operations in the West Bank107 and the Gaza closure regime.

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http://docs.google.com/viewer?url=http%3A%2F%2Fellison.house.gov%2Fimages%2Fstories%2FDocuments%2F201

0%2FGaza_letter_to_Obama.pdf.

103

For more information on this subject, see CRS Report R40664, U.S. Security Assistance to the Palestinian

Authority, by (name redacted); Government Accountability Office, Palestinian Authority: U.S. Assistance Is Training and

Equipping Security Forces, but the Program Needs to Measure Progress and Is Facing Logistical Constraints, May

2010, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10505.pdf.

104

See, e.g., Ian Cobain, “CIA working with Palestinian security agents,” guardian.co.uk, December 17, 2009; Yezid

Sayigh, “‘Fixing Broken Windows’: Security Sector Reform in Palestine, Lebanon and Yemen,” Carnegie Endowment

for International Peace, October 2009, available at

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/security_sector_reform.pdf.

105

See, e.g., Nathan Thrall, “Our Man in Palestine,” New York Review of Books, October 14, 2010, available at

http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/oct/14/our-man-palestine/. For further discussion of human rights

concerns surrounding PA security forces in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza, see CRS Report R40664, U.S. Security

Assistance to the Palestinian Authority, by (name redacted); Human Rights Watch,

Internal Fight: Palestinian Abuses in

Gaza and the West Bank, op. cit.

106

Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No. 37 (September 30-October

2, 2010), available at http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2010/p37e.html#table.

107

See International Crisis Group, Squaring the Circle: Palestinian Security Reform Under Occupation, Middle East

Report No. 98, September 7, 2010, available at

http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Israel%20Palestine/98%20Squaring%2

0the%20Circle%20--%20Palestinian%20Security%20Reform%20under%20Occupation.ashx; International Crisis

Group, Ruling Palestine II: The West Bank Model? Middle East Report No. 79, July 17, 2008, available at

http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle_east___north_africa/arab_israeli_conflict/79_ruling_palestine_ii

___the_west_bank_model.pdf. These operations underscore the fact that the Israeli-Palestinian agreements that

authorized the creation of Palestinian security forces in the 1990s in areas of limited Palestinian self-rule contained

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United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near

East (UNRWA) in Gaza

The United States is the largest single-state donor to UNRWA, which provides food, shelter,

medical care, and education for many of the original refugees from the 1948 Arab-Israeli war and

their descendants—now comprising approximately 4.8 million Palestinians in Jordan, Syria,

Lebanon, the West Bank, and Gaza.108 Most observers acknowledge that the role of UNRWA in

providing basic services (i.e., food, health care, education) in Gaza takes much of the governing

burden off Hamas. As a result, some complain that this amounts to UNRWA’s enabling of Hamas

and is an argument militating for discontinuing or scaling back UNRWA’s activities. However,

many others, U.S. and Israeli officials included, believe that UNRWA plays a valuable role by

providing stability and serving as the eyes and ears of the international community in Gaza. They

generally prefer UNRWA to the uncertain alternative that might emerge if UNRWA were removed

from the picture. 109

Restrictions on Aid to Hamas or PA Government Including Hamas

Under current appropriations legislation, the United States cannot provide financial assistance to

Hamas under any conditions. This law also prohibits U.S. assistance to a PA government with

Hamas ministers unless all the government’s ministers accept the “Section 620K principles”: (1)

recognition of “the Jewish state of Israel’s right to exist” and (2) acceptance of previous IsraeliPalestinian agreements—named after the section in the Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act of 2006

(P.L. 109-446) that sets them forth. These principles have some similarity to the principles the socalled international Quartet (United States, European Union, United Nations, and Russia) has

required Hamas to meet before accepting dealings with it: (1) recognizing Israel’s right to exist,

(2) renouncing violence, and (3) accepting previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements. Hamas has

alleged that the United States has used its leverage with Abbas to “veto” any serious attempt to

broker a power-sharing compromise (by threatening an aid cutoff if Hamas rejoins the PA without

accepting the Section 620K principles and/or Quartet principles), and some analysts understand

the situation similarly.110

Future debates might focus on the following issues:

•

Whether to relax or tighten U.S. restrictions on which Palestinian party/ies

should be answerable for accepting and complying with the Section 620K

principles.

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clauses that preserved Israel’s prerogative to conduct operations in those areas for purposes of its own security.

108

For further information on UNRWA, see CRS Report RS22967, U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, by (nam

e redacted); and CRS Report RS21668,

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

(UNRWA), by (name redacted).

109

See FY2011 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Department of State (Volume 2), p. 86,

available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/137936.pdf: “U.S. government support for UNRWA directly

contributes to the U.S. strategic interest of meeting the humanitarian needs of Palestinians, while promoting their selfsufficiency. UNRWA plays a stabilizing role in the Middle East through its assistance programs, serving as an

important counterweight to extremist elements.”

110

See Dunne, op. cit.

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Hamas: Background and Issues for Congress

•

Whether to grant the U.S. President discretion—under certain conditions and/or

for specific purposes—to waive aid restrictions relating to a power-sharing

government that includes Hamas and does not meet the Section 620K principles.

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton gave testimony at an April 2009 congressional hearing

regarding the possibility of Hamas members serving in a PA government that would accept the

Quartet principles and/or the Section 620K principles. She stated that “we are currently funding

the Lebanese government, which has Hezbollah in it” because of a U.S. interest in supporting a

government working to prevent the “further incursion of extremism.”111

U.S. Assistance to Israel to Counter Rocket Threat

The Obama Administration and both houses of Congress have proposed funding to support

Israel’s development of a short-range missile defense system known as Iron Dome that is

designed to counter the rocket threat from Hamas. The United States and Israel also are codeveloping a missile defense system known as David’s Sling that could potentially be deployed

against Hamas’s longer-range rockets.112 For fuller detail on this subject, see CRS Report

RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by (name redacted); and CRS Report RL33476, Israel:

Background and Relations with the United States, by (name redacted).

Countering Financial and Smuggling Networks

Terrorist Designations and Legal Action

As discussed elsewhere in this report (see “Charities and Individuals” and Appendix A), U.S.

executive orders and designations dating from 1995 that identify Hamas, affiliated organizations,

and some of its leaders as terrorists (see Table 4) have authorized efforts, including those in

concert with other international actors, to target Hamas funding sources. As also discussed

elsewhere, existing anti-terrorism legislation has been used by U.S. courts to find U.S. citizens

and/or organizations civilly and criminally liable for their material support of Hamas. Congress

could evaluate how it might

•

support the Administration’s anti-terrorism financial and legal actions;

•

mandate or advocate complementary or alternative actions; and

•

provide greater oversight.

Some analysts believe that the effectiveness of U.S. cooperation with Israel, the PA, and other

international actors in freezing Hamas’s assets and global financial transfers has hindered

Hamas’s capacity to carry out terrorist attacks and significantly influenced its political decisions

over the past decade—including its attempt to seek popular legitimacy in 2005-2006 Palestinian

elections and its allegedly increased reliance on Iranian support.113 Even though Hamas

111

Transcript of House Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs hearing:

“Supplemental Request,” April 23, 2009.

112

U.S.-Israel cooperation also takes place on a missile defense system known as “Arrow” that targets rockets of a

longer range that what Hamas may currently possess.

113

See, e.g., Milton-Edwards and Farrell, op. cit.

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Hamas: Background and Issues for Congress

physically controls Gaza, the legal banking system there remains answerable to the PA in the

West Bank and still applies controls in deference to U.S. policy. 114 Most analysts believe,

therefore, that smuggling cash and valuable goods (trade-based money laundering) through the

Gaza-Sinai tunnels remains a preferred option for Hamas.115 Increasing scrutiny of charities and

perhaps the specter of legal liability have reduced the effectiveness of Hamas financing networks

in North America and Europe. Yet, political sensitivity to Hamas’s popularity among Arab

populations and an inclination to hedge bets on the outcome of the Fatah-Hamas rivalry may

make Arab governments less likely to crack down on their own charities, even under U.S.

pressure.

Sanctions on Iran and Syria

U.S. and international sanctions against Iran and Syria appear not to have had a significant effect

on the two regimes’ support for Hamas.116 However, supporters of the sanctions may believe that

even if the sanctions do not compel Iran and Syria to curtail or cease support for Hamas, they

might make the two regimes’ future support for Hamas less robust and effective. If sanctions

weaken Iran and Syria in general terms, one could argue, resources and efforts allocated to

helping Hamas and other potential proxies could be redirected to core internal matters related to

regime survival. One, however, also might argue the reverse—that weaker Iranian and Syrian

regimes could be more rather than less likely to sponsor potential proxies in order to draw

domestic attention away from internal problems and focus it on common external adversaries and

issues of regional or international concern.

Anti-Smuggling Efforts in Egypt and Elsewhere

The ongoing Israeli-Egyptian closure regime—consisting of an Israeli naval blockade plus heavy

restrictions on the passage of people and goods through land crossings—places most of the focus

of other anti-smuggling efforts on the Gaza-Sinai tunnels. Targeting these tunnels, however,

remains problematic. The State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism 2009 said that

“Israeli officials asserted that Egypt took steps to prevent arms smuggling from the Sinai into

Gaza, but can do much more in terms of arresting, prosecuting, and incarcerating smugglers,

destroying tunnel infrastructure, and providing socio-economic alternatives for Bedouin involved

in smuggling activities.”117

Egypt, with U.S. support, is nearing completion of an underground fence at its border with Gaza:

United States army engineers are helping Egypt build the 6-8 km long steel wall, which is

scheduled for completion in 2011. It was designed in the US and reportedly fits together like

a jigsaw. The border is approximately 14 km long in total, but it is impossible to tunnel

under the 5 km stretch approaching the sea, meaning that the wall is designed to cover all

potential areas of tunnel construction. It has been bomb proofed and the 40 cm thick steel is

114

Sayigh, “We serve the people”…, op. cit.

See, e.g., Omar Karmi, “Going underground – Egypt’s new wall may destabilize Gaza,” Jane’s Intelligence Review,

March 12, 2010.

116

For general information on sanctions against Iran and Syria, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by (name re

dacted); and CRS Report RL33487, Syria: Background and U.S. Relations, by (name redacted).

117

U.S. State Department, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2009,” Chapter 2. Country Reports: Middle East and North

Africa Overview, available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2009/140886.htm.

115

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super-strength, although these factors, if Abu Murrad [a Qassam Brigades commander] is to

be believed, have not proved impervious. The wall is designed to run as deep as 25 m,

representing a major construction project.118

Many observers, however, remain skeptical because of the ineffectiveness of past anti-smuggling

efforts. According to some, smugglers have already penetrated the Egyptian underground border

fence and Hamas remains able to count on tunnels for money and weapons. 119 Egypt’s inability or

unwillingness to fully shut down tunnel traffic shows that external influence on its actions may

have distinct limits. Egypt’s motivations with regard to the Gaza-Sinai border are unique and

complex—influenced by factors such as Hamas’s potential to fan Islamist sentiment in Egyptian

politics, fear that Israel might seek to transfer responsibility for Gaza to Egypt, Egypt’s historical

relationship to Gaza, a desire to accommodate traditional economic and cultural practices in

Sinai, and comfort with the status quo. 120

For additional information on U.S. support for Egyptian anti-smuggling measures, see CRS

Report RL33003, Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations, by (name redacted); and CRS Report

RL34346, The Egypt-Gaza Border and its Effect on Israeli-Egyptian Relations, by (name reda

cted).

Some analysts argue that easing or ending the Israeli-Egyptian closure regime, and hence

facilitating normalized trade in everyday goods, would facilitate a narrower and potentially more

effective military, intelligence, and law enforcement focus on keeping money and weapons out.121

Although restrictions on non-dual-use goods entering Gaza from Israel were loosened in June

2010, the continued Israeli restriction on exports largely limits the goods legally entering Gaza to

those provided through humanitarian aid.

Near the end of Operation Cast Lead in January 2009, the Bush Administration signed a

memorandum of understanding with the Israeli government pledging additional U.S. support to

counter weapons smuggling through a “multi-dimensional, results-oriented effort with a regional

focus and international components working in parallel,” including efforts to counter societal

incentives for smuggling.122 In March 2009, eight NATO member states agreed with the United

States on a Gaza anti-smuggling program that “provides a comprehensive platform for enhanced

cooperation and coordination in the areas of information and intelligence sharing; diplomatic

engagement; and military and law enforcement activities.”123 Actions ascribed by most reports to

Israel have occasionally occurred, including the January 2009 bombing of an apparent armssmuggling convoy in Sudan moving in the direction of the Egypt-Gaza border124 and the February

118

Karmi, op. cit.

See Ben Knight, “New Israeli-Egyptian border barrier has more than one purpose,” Deutsche Welle, November 14,

2010. This article claimed that a new Israeli project to build a fence along the Israel-Egypt border might also target the

Gaza-Egypt smuggling tunnels, although Egyptian officials have denied this. Ibid.

120

See Karmi, op. cit.

121

Colloquium attended by CRS at major U.S. think tank, October 2010.

119

122

“Text of U.S.-Israel Agreement to End Gaza Arms Smuggling,” Ha'aretz, January 17, 2009. Shortly afterward, the

United States interdicted the Cypriot-flagged ship Monchegorsk in the Red Sea after it reportedly left Iran with

weapons-related equipment.

123

U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Welcomes Agreement on Gaza Weapons Smuggling,” March 16, 2009, available at

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/03/120436.htm. The eight NATO member-states are Canada, Denmark, France,

Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom.

124

“How Israel Foiled an Arms Convoy Bound for Hamas,” Time, March 30, 2009.

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Hamas: Background and Issues for Congress

2010 assassination of Qassam Brigades leader Mahmoud al Mahbouh during his trip to allegedly

purchase weapons from Iranian sources in Dubai.125 It is not known whether those or similar

actions involved intelligence sharing.

Countering Hamas Media

In March 2010, the Treasury Department named Hamas’s Al Aqsa Television as a specially

designated global terrorist (SDGT), thus allowing the United States to target Al Aqsa’s finances.

Three months later, in June 2010, France’s official broadcast regulator ordered the French satellite

operator Eutelsat to cease broadcast of Al Aqsa (which was carried through one of its satellites by

Bahrain-based Noorsat).126 This occurred following repeated urgings from the European

Commission that Al Aqsa’s programming violated European anti-incitement laws. It is unclear

whether the U.S. designation of Al Aqsa also might have influenced the regulator’s decision.

The 111th Congress considered legislation to counter Hamas incitement. H.R. 2278, which passed

the House of Representatives on December 8, 2009 (by a vote of 395-3), and was referred to the

Senate Foreign Relations Committee, would seek to make it U.S. policy to urge all parties with

influence over satellite transmissions to halt broadcasts of Hamas-run Al Aqsa TV and similar

channels (including Hezbollah’s Al Manar TV) and to consider implementing punitive measures

against satellite providers that do not halt such broadcasts. H.R. 2278 also would require an

annual presidential report to Congress on “anti-American incitement to violence” that would

include a country-by-country breakdown of (1) all media outlets that engage in such incitement

and (2) all satellite providers that carry programming classified as such incitement.127

Addressing Hamas in a Regional Context

Another possible way to approach Hamas is by seeking to persuade other regional actors to cease

support for Hamas or to influence Hamas to act more in accordance with U.S. interests. Although

the United States and much of the Western world regards Hamas as a terrorist organization, it is

regarded differently in many Middle Eastern states. As discussed above, Hamas is actively

supported by Iran and Syria. Most others, including not only Qatar and Turkey, but also those

considered to be the United States’ closest Arab allies (such as Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia)

acknowledge that Hamas is an integral part of Palestinian society and needs to be involved in

both an internal Palestinian political solution and an Israeli-Palestinian peace. They maintain

125

The Mahbouh killing, ascribed by most reports to the Israeli Mossad, caused a diplomatic backlash against Israel

because the purported assassins used falsified or fraudulently obtained European and Australian passports to gain entry

to Dubai. For a detailed account, see Alon Ben-David, “Spy games – Mossad returns to form,” Jane’s Intelligence

Review, June 23, 2010.

126

An Israeli organization has reported, however, that Hamas later agreed to a new Al Aqsa broadcast deal with

Kuwait-based Gulfsat, which also broadcasts using a Eutelsat satellite. Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center,

“Hamas’ Al-Aqsa TV has circumvented the French media regulator’s ban,” July 12, 2010, available at

http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/hamas_e120.htm. Al Aqsa is also broadcast

through Arab League-owned, Saudi Arabia-based Arabsat.

127

It is unclear whether the executive branch would consider such legislation binding on its formulation of U.S. policy.

On September 9, 2008 (during the 110th Congress), the House of Representatives passed H.Res. 1069 (by a 409-1 vote),

which condemned Hamas’s Al Aqsa TV (among other Middle East TV channels, including Al Manar) for anti-Israel,

anti-Semitic, and anti-U.S. incitement and called upon satellite TV providers Arabsat (Arab League-owned, Saudibased) and Eutelsat (privately owned, France-based) to cease transmitting Al Aqsa programming.

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Hamas: Background and Issues for Congress

contact with Hamas to varying degrees and are sensitive to the strong support for Hamas believed

to exist among their populations.

Oversight

Inclusion of Hamas in Negotiations?128

A major open question regarding congressional oversight of Administration policy is whether

Hamas, with which U.S. government representatives are currently prohibited from having

contact, could be included (either directly or indirectly) in U.S.-facilitated final-status

negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians—in the event it wanted to be included.

Acquiescing to the inclusion of Hamas in the peace process in some manner could involve its

integration or reintegration into existing Palestinian leadership structures such as the PA and the

PLO.

The Obama Administration has not departed from the Bush Administration’s stance on Hamas. It

has conditioned Hamas’s participation in the peace process on its meeting the Quartet principles.

The U.S. Special Envoy for Middle East Peace, former Senator George Mitchell, routinely cites

distinguishing factors between the inclusion of the Irish Republican Army-affiliated Sinn Fein in

the talks he brokered over Northern Ireland in the 1990s and the exclusion of Hamas in IsraeliPalestinian negotiations—the main one being Hamas’s unwillingness to renounce violence as a

means to redress its grievances. A number of meetings by former U.S. officials with senior Hamas

leaders since 2009, however, has led some to wonder if the Administration might be open to

indirect or secret talks with Hamas even in the absence of its acceptance of the Quartet

principles.129 In an October 2010 Newsweek interview, Khaled Meshaal said that one day U.S.

officials “will not have any other alternative except to hear from Hamas and listen to Hamas.”130

Any possibility of U.S. policy shifts regarding Hamas’s role, however, could trigger heated

debate. Those opposing policy shifts say dealing with Hamas would likely strengthen its political

hand at the expense of Abbas and other more moderate Palestinians, allowing the movement to

argue that its hardline tactics with Israel are more effective than Abbas’s approach. They also

might say that any move toward legitimizing Hamas and integrating it into Palestinian organs of

governance such as the PLO or the PA could embolden it and other Palestinian militants to use

these organs of governance to mount attacks on Israel—either before or after the establishment of

a Palestinian state.131 Those favoring policy shifts might say that Hamas is less likely to attack

128

For more on this subject, see “The Role of Hamas” in CRS Report R40092, Israel and the Palestinians: Prospects

for a Two-State Solution, by (name redacted).

129

Charles Levinson, “U.S. Ex-Officials Engage with Hamas,” Wall Street Journal, April 2, 2010. Several former U.S.

officials signed the 2009 U.S./Middle East Project report submitted to the Obama Administration that advocated taking

a more “pragmatic approach” toward Hamas. The report acknowledged that direct U.S. engagement with Hamas might

not now be practical, but recommended that the United States “offer [Hamas] inducements that will enable its more

moderate elements to prevail, and cease discouraging third parties from engaging with Hamas in ways that might help

clarify the movement’s views and test its behavior.” Zbigniew Brzezinksi, Chuck Hagel, et al., “A Last Chance for a

Two-State Israel-Palestine Agreement: A Bipartisan Statement on U.S. Middle East Peacemaking,” 2009 U.S./Middle

East Project, available at http://www.usmep.us/bipartisan_recommendations/A_Last_Chance_for_a_Two-State_IsraelPalestine_Agreement.pdf.

130

Babak Dehghanpisheh and Ranya Kadri, “Hamas Sticks to the Hard Line,” Newsweek, October 14, 2010.

131

These opponents might assert that Hamas should be dealt with only after it is marginalized. Israel did not agree to

formal negotiations with Yasser Arafat of the PLO or with other historical Arab adversaries of Israel—such as former

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Israel if it is made a stakeholder that is accountable to revived Palestinian hopes of a Palestinian

state.132

The U.S. military perceives the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a growing threat to other

U.S. interests in the region. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in March

2010, then U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) commander (and current commander of the

International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan) General David Petraeus stated:

The enduring hostilities between Israel and some of its neighbors present distinct challenges

to our ability to advance our interests in the AOR [CENTCOM’s area of responsibility].

Israeli-Palestinian tensions often flare into violence and large-scale armed confrontations.

The conflict foments anti-American sentiment, due to a perception of U.S. favoritism for

Israel. Arab anger over the Palestinian question limits the strength and depth of U.S.

partnerships with governments and peoples in the AOR and weakens the legitimacy of

moderate regimes in the Arab world. Meanwhile, al-Qaeda and other militant groups exploit

that anger to mobilize support. The conflict also gives Iran influence in the Arab world

through its clients, Lebanese Hizballah and Hamas.133

If the military’s perception of Israeli-Palestinian tensions as a challenge to its objectives holds or

expands, pressure could build for greater efforts to counteract these tensions. Such pressure may

in turn lead to more urgent discussion of alternatives to prevent the expansion of Hamas’s

influence. 134 Some analysts who remain skeptical of Hamas’s ultimate capacity for moderation

nevertheless believe that the United States could gain some marginal or temporary advantages

through some form of direct or indirect engagement of Hamas leaders (or some of them). Such

efforts could be part of either a broad “carrots and sticks” strategy or a narrower focus on issues

such as improving the economic and humanitarian situation in Gaza.135 This is partly because

these analysts do not see better alternatives for addressing the reality of Hamas and the leverage it

holds. They sometimes cite U.S. willingness to engage or to consider engaging Sunni insurgents

in Iraq and Taliban elements in Afghanistan as possible precedents.136 Some high-ranking former

(...continued)

Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and King Hussein of Jordan—until it had established a position of strength relative to

each of them. Some might say that doing this helped lead to diplomatic breakthroughs in each case. However, at a

February 2009 hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace analyst Michele Dunne provided an explanation for why the analogy may not apply

to Hamas: “Regarding Hamas, I think that our problem as the United States is we want Hamas to walk the road that the

PLO walked 20 years ago. And Hamas sees very well that the PLO walked that road, and it failed.” See Transcript of

Hearing, “Gaza After the War: What Can Be Built on the Wreckage,” House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the

Middle East and South Asia, February 12, 2009, available at http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/111/47420.pdf.

132

See Joshua Mitnick, “As Peace Talks Sputter, Israelis and Palestinians Eye Plan B,” Christian Science Monitor,

September 15, 2008.

133

Prepared statement of General David Petraeus, Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, March 16, 2010,

available at http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2010/03%20March/Petraeus%2003-16-10.pdf.

134

See Mark Perry, “Red Team,” foreignpolicy.com, June 30, 2010; Bilal Y. Saab, “What Do Red Teams Really Do?”,

foreignpolicy.com, September 3, 2010.

135

See, e.g., Byman, op. cit.; Cambanis, “Letter from Gaza,” op. cit.; Peter Beinart, “Hamas: U.S. Diplomacy’s Final

Frontier,” Time, May 1, 2009; Muriel Asseburg, “Ending the Gaza Blockade – But How?”, German Institute for

International and Security Affairs (SWP), July 2010, available at http://www.swpberlin.org/common/get_document.php?asset_id=7274.

136

Beinart, op. cit.

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Israeli officials, such as Ephraim Halevy (former Mossad director) and Giora Eiland (former head

of Israel’s National Security Council) also have advocated negotiating with Hamas.137

International Dimensions

Future debates might take place over whether the United States should actively dissuade others in

the international community—particularly European actors—from engagement with and

contributions to Hamas.138 Although the other Quartet members formally espouse the Quartet

principles, Russia has regular dealings with Hamas, legislators from various EU countries have

met publicly with Khaled Meshaal and other Hamas leaders, and Hamas representatives claim

that high-ranking European officials—including ambassadors—are talking to them regularly.139

Some analysts believe that Khaled Meshaal’s media overtures following President Obama’s 2009

Cairo speech were largely aimed at gaining EU (if not U.S.) acceptance of a Hamas role in

Palestinian affairs and/or the peace process without having to commit to the Quartet principles.

Some might argue that European governments could be useful as go-betweens for Hamas and the

United States, while others might counter that the go-between role may have limited utility—

using Bush Administration-era European diplomacy with Iran as a case in point.

Activism and discourse on the international stage present additional challenges for U.S. policy

regarding Hamas. The Mavi Marmara Gaza flotilla incident in May 2010 drew international

attention—encouraged by Turkey—to the Gaza closure regime, leading the Obama

Administration to persuade Israel to loosen restrictions on the importation of non-dual-use items

such as food and medical supplies, and to greater relaxations by Egypt of the Rafah border

crossing. This highlighted that even though the United States might be wary of pressing hard to

change the status quo in Gaza, lest Hamas is boosted as a result, outside actors and events could

in some cases force a response. Additional attempts to break the naval blockade are expected. For

further details, see CRS Report R41275, Israel’s Blockade of Gaza, the Mavi Marmara Incident,

and Its Aftermath, by (name redacted). The example established by the Turkey-based Islamist

non-governmental organization IHH (Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and

Humanitarian Relief), the lead sponsor of the flotilla, could inspire organizations that sympathize

with Hamas, but seek to avoid sanctions for materially supporting it, to find creative ways to

provide moral and political support.

Additionally, international investigations of both the May 2010 flotilla incident and Operation

Cast Lead, as well as the publicity surrounding these investigations, have demonstrated that the

United States has limited capacity to influence the direction of the debate. Attempts by the United

States, Israel, and several European states to draw attention to Hamas’s alleged culpability for

recklessly endangering civilians during Operation Cast Lead, unjust and inhumane treatment of

political opponents, and the difficult conditions faced by Gaza’s population have generally been

137

Byman, op. cit.

138

On the previous occasions in which Hamas participated in the PA government from 2006-2007, the European Union

joined the United States in refusing to provide direct assistance to the PA. There are indications, however, that

Europeans might be less willing to follow the U.S. lead in the event that another PA government including Hamas is

formed. See Muriel Asseburg and Paul Salem, “No Euro-Mediterranean Community without peace,” EU Institute for

Security Studies and European Institute of the Mediterranean, September 2009, available at

http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/10Papers-01.pdf.

139

Andrew Rettman, “EU Countries Practice ‘Secret’ Diplomacy, Hamas Says,” euobserver.com, September 14, 2009.

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countered by representatives of other governments at various U.N. bodies who focus their

criticism on Israel for alleged violations of international law.

For example, the Report of the U.N. Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (commonly

known as the “Goldstone Report,” after South African judge Richard Goldstone, the mission’s

leader), which was endorsed by the U.N. Human Rights Council and the U.N. General Assembly

in the fall of 2009, has generated controversy because of what many U.S. officials and analysts

have deemed its disproportionate and hyperbolic condemnation of Israeli strategy and actions

during the conflict.140 Most critics of the report believe that it did not sufficiently investigate or

criticize Hamas for endangering Gaza’s civilian population (including its allegedly intentional use

of hospitals, schools, mosques, and residential neighborhoods as command and operations centers

or as weapons caches, and of its civilians as “human shields”141). On November 3, 2009, the

House of Representatives passed H.Res. 867 (“Calling on the President and the Secretary of State

to oppose unequivocally any endorsement or further consideration of the ‘Report of the United

Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict’ in multilateral fora”) by a vote of 344-36

(with 22 voting “present”).

Conclusion

Hamas’s integral role in Palestinian society and politics is seen by many as problematic because it

is devoted to violent opposition to Israel. U.S. efforts to deter, transform, marginalize, or

neutralize Hamas have at most achieved temporary or partial success. It is possible to conclude

that U.S. and other international support for Israel and the PA/PLO/Fatah has been

counterproductive to some extent when comparing Hamas’s domestic, regional, and international

strength in the early 1990s—measured by factors such as popularity, military force, and leverage

with other actors (including Israel and Fatah)—to its current strength. Hamas routinely portrays

U.S. efforts to counter its influence as part of an agenda to weaken Palestinians at the expense of

Israel, hoping to convince Palestinians of Israel’s implacability and of the futility of peace

negotiations aimed at Palestinian statehood. Factional and geographical divisions—reflected in

Hamas’s control of Gaza and the Abbas-led PA’s control of the West Bank—present fundamental

dilemmas both for prospects for a two-state solution and for the future of Palestinian democracy.

U.S. policy and law reject dealings with and aid to Hamas or any PA government that includes

Hamas without the acceptance of conditions that appear antithetical to Hamas’s core principles.

This could limit the Administration’s ability to offer incentives even if regional conditions present

possible advantages to doing so for U.S., Israeli, and/or Palestinian interests.

The Israeli-Egyptian closure regime in Gaza and various U.S. and international initiatives

constrain and isolate Hamas to a point and may exacerbate internal organizational tensions and

tactical disagreements. Overall, however, Hamas maintains a unified public stance on its core

principle of violent opposition to Israel. It continues to threaten Israel through its rockets and the

140

The Goldstone Report, dated September 25, 2009, is available at

http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/specialsession/9/FactFindingMission.htm.

141

The Goldstone Report found that Israel used Palestinian civilians as human shields during Operation Cast Lead,

while stating that Israel had not provided sufficient evidence for a finding that Hamas had done the same. Ibid. In

October 2010, an Israeli military court convicted two IDF soldiers of reckless endangerment and conduct unbecoming

for using a nine-year-old Gaza boy to check suspected booby-traps. “Two Israeli soldiers guilty of using human shield

in Gaza,” BBC News, October 3, 2010, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11462635.

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possibility of other attacks and to receive assistance from Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and private

individuals and organizations. Additionally, Gaza’s poor humanitarian conditions and morale

contribute to an image of Hamas-as-victim and to local and international hostility toward Israel.

In this context, any U.S. policy decision going forward will likely present considerable risks and

difficult trade-offs.

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Appendix A. Historical Background and U.S. Policy

Pre-1987: Hamas’s Emergence

Hamas’s politicization and militarization can be traced to the first Palestinian intifada (“uprising”)

that began in the Gaza Strip in 1987 in resistance to the Israeli occupation. Its precursor, Al

Mujamma al Islami (known simply as Mujamma, or “The Islamic Center”), was established in

Israeli-occupied Gaza in the 1970s under the auspices of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood,

which had links to Muslim Brotherhood chapters in Egypt and Jordan and later developed links to

branches elsewhere—most notably among Palestinian refugees and expatriates living in Kuwait.

Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the group’s leader, concentrated the Mujamma’s activities on religious

and social services, following some models provided by the Egyptian and Jordanian Muslim

Brotherhood branches, whose open political activism was repressed by state authorities. Yassin’s

and his associates’ activities—which led to Hamas’s founding—were countenanced and

sometimes supported by Israel, which believed the Islamists to be a convenient foil for the secular

nationalist factions such as Fatah that Israel then perceived to be greater threats.142

Motivation to become more politically active grew within Mujamma and the Palestinian Muslim

Brotherhood after the 1979 Iranian Revolution led many in the Middle East to imagine the

possibilities of political Islam, and in light of increased Palestinian concern for the status of the

West Bank, Gaza, and Palestinian refugees following the deferral of the Palestinian question by

the Israel-Egypt peace treaty of 1979 and Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon that forced the

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) into exile in Tunisia. The formation in Gaza of other

armed resistance groups such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) created pressure for the

Palestinian Brotherhood to arm. Yassin’s efforts to help the organization stockpile weapons led to

his arrest by Israel in 1984, but the Brotherhood’s gradual transformation into a militant

organization regained momentum following Yassin’s release in a 1985 prisoner swap. Yassin and

his associates, who proceeded with outside support from their colleagues in Kuwait and

elsewhere, officially established Hamas in 1987 when the first Palestinian intifada (or uprising)

provided widespread Palestinian support for resistance against Israel.

1987-1995: Gaining Attention

In Hamas’s early years during the first intifada, international political attention remained focused

on Yasser Arafat’s Fatah movement and the PLO, under the rationale that other Palestinian groups

had marginal political legitimacy or would take cues from Arafat. When Israel deported several

top Hamas leaders to southern Lebanon in December 1992 (along with several other Palestinian

Islamists—more than 400 total) in response to a number of Hamas kidnappings and killings of

Israeli soldiers, the United States joined human rights organizations in pressuring Israel to

repatriate the leaders to the West Bank and Gaza, which it did in late 1993.143

142

Andrew Higgins, “How Israel Helped to Spawn Hamas,” Wall Street Journal, January 25, 2009.

Some believe this Israeli measure strengthened, rather than weakened, Hamas. Not only did its deported leaders

persevere and bond through the hardships of a year in exile, but they also cultivated relations with and received

mentorship from the Iran-backed Hezbollah movement before being repatriated to the West Bank and Gaza in 1993 as

a result of pressure on Israel from human rights organizations and the United States. See Paul McGeough, Kill Khalid:

The Failed Mossad Assassination and the Rise of Hamas, The New Press, New York, 2009, p. 68.

143

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Following the signing of the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles (or Oslo Accord) in September

1993, Hamas joined with other Islamist and some leftist Palestinian factions in rejecting Oslo

framework limiting Palestinian national aspirations to the West Bank and Gaza (and thus giving

up the national dream for all of “Palestine” as it existed under the British Mandate) and creating

multi-tiered zones of Palestinian self-rule circumscribed by a continuing Israeli occupation whose

future remained subject to negotiation. Hamas also refused to participate in elections for the new

Palestinian Authority (until subsequent developments led to a change of strategy in 2005-2006).

Hamas and other rejectionist groups engaged in sporadic attacks on Israeli targets inside the

Palestinian territories. However, following a February 1994 shooting and grenade attack by an

Israeli settler that killed 29 and injured several more Palestinians worshiping at the historic

Mosque of Abraham in the West Bank city of Hebron, Hamas significantly shifted its strategy. It

began a spate of attacks aimed at civilians in Israel, including its first use of suicide bombings in

crowded public places.

Meanwhile U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation investigations, Israeli investigations, and media

reporting revealed that Hamas had apparently been recruiting and fundraising on U.S. soil since

its inception. As mentioned in the main body of the report (see “Charities and Individuals”), an

alleged hub of Hamas financing was the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development

headquartered near Dallas, TX, and which had offices in California, New Jersey, and Illinois. As

this information became public and Hamas and other Palestinian groups continued attacks on

Israeli targets (sometimes killing or injuring U.S. citizens), pressure mounted for the Clinton

Administration to act.

1995-2004: Violence and International Opposition

In January 1995, then President Bill Clinton signed Executive Order 12947, which blocked the

assets of and prohibited U.S. transactions with Hamas and 11 other specially designated terrorist

organizations (SDTs) deemed threats to the Middle East peace process, including the Israeli

extremist groups Kach and Kahane Chai.144

Meanwhile, Israel was vigorously pursuing operatives from Hamas and pressuring the newly

formed Palestinian Authority (PA) led by Yasser Arafat to crack down as well. Israel had allowed

the PA to establish internal security forces in Gaza and the West Bank from former PLO and

Fatah militias. Arafat encouraged the formation of additional paramilitary and intelligence

organizations populated with many close Arafat associates that Israel tolerated (despite their not

being sanctioned under the Oslo agreements) with the hope that they would help neutralize

Hamas and other terrorist organizations. In addition to targeting Hamas militants, the PA forces

periodically suppressed the activities of Hamas-affiliated charities and social organizations.

In early 1996, following another round of Hamas suicide bombings, the United States became

actively involved in fostering Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation in combating terrorism.

Likely determining that the paramilitary and intelligence organizations with personal ties to

Arafat and patronage networks were more relevant than the official police, the Clinton

Administration reportedly began providing these organizations with tens of millions of dollars in

covert assistance through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), according to the New York

144

Executive Order 12947 of January 23, 1995, “Prohibiting Transactions with Terrorists Who Threaten to Disrupt the

Middle East Peace Process,” available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/legal/eo/12947.pdf.

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Times.145 The European Union also reportedly began a counterterrorism program.146 Additionally,

in October 1997, the State Department listed Hamas as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO),

shortly after a major September suicide bombing in a Jerusalem pedestrian shopping area that left

one U.S. citizen among the dead and several others among the injured.

The fruits of U.S. counterterrorism assistance to the PA continue to be debated. Although Hamas

suicide and other attacks did not immediately cease, they abated from the end of 1998 until the

second Palestinian intifada (also known as the Al Aqsa intifada) began in September 2000. The

effects of U.S. assistance are unclear partly because of its covert nature, and because of several

other intervening factors—including Israeli counterterrorism actions and ongoing IsraeliPalestinian negotiations. Some observers point to the drop-off in attacks as evidence that U.S.

assistance helped the PA prevent and deter terrorist attacks until the collapse of peace process

negotiations in 2000. Others believe that although PA capacities were enhanced, Arafat’s onagain, off-again crackdowns on Hamas and other militants were of little lasting value. Suspects

detained to placate U.S. and Israeli pressure were often released shortly thereafter due to internal

political pressure on Arafat and the PA not to appear to be “collaborating” with the Israelis or

because of insufficient evidence owing to the political nature of the arrests.

Upon the outbreak of the second intifada in September 2000, Hamas demonstrated that it still had

the capacity to carry out attacks inside Israel. Following Al Qaeda’s attacks against multiple U.S.

targets on September 11, 2001, then President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13224

authorizing his Administration to take action domestically and in concert with international actors

to suppress the activities and block the financing of a list of specially designated global terrorist

individuals and organizations (SDGTs). Hamas was added to the list in October 2001, and the

Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development was added in December 2001. Six Hamas

leaders (including Khaled Meshaal, Musa Abu Marzouk, and Osama Hamdan—see Appendix

C), along with five Hamas-affiliated charities (four based in Europe, one based in Lebanon) were

later added in August 2003.147 Al Aqsa Television and Hamas’s Islamic National Bank were

added in March 2010.148 As discussed in the main body of the report (see “Charities and

Individuals”), a Hamas-related, Saudi Arabia-based organization known as the Union of Good

was added to the list in November 2008.

Although some U.S. counterterrorism assistance to the Arafat-led PA continued during the second

intifada, such assistance was complicated by the fact that offshoots (known as Tanzim and the Al

Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades) from Arafat’s own Fatah faction that included former PA security force

commanders were participating in attacks on Israeli military and civilian targets—possibly with

Arafat’s tacit approval. Following the deadliest attack of the intifada in March 2002, a Hamas

suicide bombing of the Park Hotel in Netanya during a Passover seder that killed 22 Israelis and

injured over 100 more, Israel mounted Operation Defensive Shield. During March and April of

2002, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) moved into major West Bank cities, established martial

law, destroyed much of the PA’s security and civilian infrastructure, and besieged Arafat’s

145

Elaine Sciolino, “Violence Thwarts C.I.A. Director’s Unusual Diplomatic Role in Middle Eastern Peacemaking,”

New York Times, November 13, 2000. See also Vernon Loeb, “CIA Emerges to Resolve Mideast Disputes; Out of

Shadows, Agency Is Directly Involved in Israeli-Palestinian Security Talks,” Washington Post, September 30, 1998.

146

See Brynjar Lia, Building Arafat’s Police, Ithaca Press, Reading, UK, 2007, p. 300, et seq.

147

U.S. Treasury Department, Office of Foreign Assets Control, “What You Need to Know About U.S. Sanctions,”

available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/terror/terror.pdf

148

U.S. Treasury Department press release TG-594, “Treasury Designates Gaza-Based Business, Television Station for

Hamas Ties,” March 18, 2010, available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg594.htm.

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compound in Ramallah. In the post-September 11 environment, the Bush Administration

acquiesced to Israel’s characterization of Operation Defensive Shield as a necessary

counterterrorism operation. In June 2002, President Bush indicated that Arafat was no longer a

trusted part of the peace process, and that future U.S. support for the PA would need to come

through another leader. 149

Hamas did not escape Israeli countermeasures. Israel embarked on a targeted assassination

campaign, killing many top Hamas leaders in Gaza between 2002-2004, including co-founders

Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and Abdel Aziz al Rantissi. As a natural consequence, the geographical

locus of Hamas’s leadership shifted to Khaled Meshaal and the political bureau in Damascus,

where it is less vulnerable to Israeli assassination operations than in Gaza. Even though Hamas

had to absorb the shock of losing much of its founding core, its reputation and institutions were

strengthened relative to Fatah and the PA owing to the damage done to PA infrastructure and

security institutions and to public confidence in Palestinian leadership. Additionally, Hamas was

able to elevate its cause in the eyes of many Palestinians by portraying its assassinated leaders as

lionized martyrs.

2005-2006: Israel’s Gaza Disengagement and the Palestinian

Legislative Council Election Campaign

During the second intifada, the popularity of Hamas began to increase as Fatah’s fell. At the same

time, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) effectively dismantled the security organizations and

infrastructure of the Fatah-dominated PA, which had the unintende

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