American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat

Congressional research reportFeb 19, 2014

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American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a

Complex Threat

/name redacted/

Specialist in Organized Crime and Terrorism

February 19, 2014

Congressional Research Service

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www.crs.gov

R41416

CRS Report for Congress

Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat

Summary

This report describes homegrown violent jihadists and the plots and attacks that have occurred

since 9/11. For this report, “homegrown” describes terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within

the United States or abroad by American citizens, lawful permanent residents, or visitors

radicalized largely within the United States. The term “jihadist” describes radicalized individuals

using Islam as an ideological and/or religious justification for their belief in the establishment of a

global caliphate, or jurisdiction governed by a Muslim civil and religious leader known as a

caliph. The term “violent jihadist” characterizes jihadists who have made the jump to illegally

supporting, plotting, or directly engaging in violent terrorist activity.

The report also discusses the radicalization process and the forces driving violent extremist

activity. It analyzes post-9/11 domestic jihadist terrorism and describes law enforcement and

intelligence efforts to combat terrorism and the challenges associated with those efforts.

Appendix A provides details about each of the post-9/11 homegrown jihadist terrorist plots and

attacks.

There is an “executive summary” at the beginning that summarizes the report’s findings.

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Contents

Executive Summary ......................................................................................................................... 1

Homegrown Jihadist Terrorists: The Problem ........................................................................... 1

How Do People Become Violent Jihadists? ........................................................................ 2

Analysis of Homegrown Jihadist Plots ............................................................................... 2

Combating Homegrown Violent Jihadists ................................................................................. 3

Preventive Policing ............................................................................................................. 3

State and Local Authorities ................................................................................................. 4

Investigative Approaches .................................................................................................... 4

Trust and Partnership........................................................................................................... 4

Balancing Security and Liberty ........................................................................................... 4

Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 5

Homegrown Violent Jihadists .......................................................................................................... 7

Shortcomings and Strengths ...................................................................................................... 8

Radicalization and Violent Extremism .......................................................................................... 12

From Radicalization to Violent Extremism ............................................................................. 12

Forces and Factors in the Forging of Terrorists ....................................................................... 13

Intermediaries .................................................................................................................... 14

Social Networks ................................................................................................................ 20

The Internet ....................................................................................................................... 22

Jailhouse Jihadism ............................................................................................................. 25

Overview of Post-9/11 Homegrown Jihadist Terrorism Plots and Attacks .................................... 27

Overarching Themes................................................................................................................ 27

A Variety of Endgames ...................................................................................................... 28

Little Stomach for Suicide or Martyrdom ......................................................................... 37

The Success of Lone Wolves............................................................................................. 38

Varied Capabilities ............................................................................................................ 39

Combating Homegrown Terrorism: Enforcement Activities ......................................................... 41

Intelligence Approaches .......................................................................................................... 42

Preventive Policing ........................................................................................................... 43

The Role of State and Local Law Enforcement....................................................................... 49

Investigative Approaches......................................................................................................... 52

The Capone Approach ....................................................................................................... 52

Agent Provocateur Cases .................................................................................................. 53

Combating Homegrown Terrorism: Building Trust and Partnership ............................................. 59

Engagement and Community Policing .................................................................................... 59

The Tension between Enforcement and Engagement Activities.............................................. 60

Figures

Figure 1. Counterterrorism Context ............................................................................................... 42

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Tables

Table B-1. Homegrown Violent Jihadist Attacks and Plots since 9/11: Terrorist Profile

and Training .............................................................................................................................. 153

Table B-2. Homegrown Violent Jihadist Attacks and Plots since 9/11: Targets, Endgames,

and Investigative Tools ............................................................................................................. 155

Appendixes

Appendix A. Summary of Post-9/11 Homegrown Violent Jihadist Terrorist Plots........................ 66

Appendix B. Tables...................................................................................................................... 153

Contacts

Author Contact Information......................................................................................................... 157

Acknowledgments ....................................................................................................................... 157

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American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat

Executive Summary

This report analyzes homegrown violent jihadist plots and attacks that have occurred since 9/11.

It discusses the radicalization process and the forces driving violent extremist activity. It

examines post-9/11 law enforcement and intelligence efforts to combat terrorism and the

challenges associated with those efforts. It also briefly discusses the building of trust and

partnership between community groups and government agencies and the tensions that may occur

between law enforcement and engagement activities.

The report does not address terrorist activity against the United States conducted by foreigners

largely radicalized abroad such as Quazi Mohammad Rezwanul Ahsan Nafis’s attempt to blow up

the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2012), the Printer Cartridge plot (2010), the attempted

airline bombing by Farouk Abdulmutallab (Christmas Day 2009), the Transatlantic Airliners plot

(August 2006), or the “shoe bomber” Richard Reid (December 2001). Nor does the report address

domestic terrorism attributed to violent extremists inspired by non-jihadist causes such as radical

environmentalism, animal rights, or anti-abortion causes.

Specific plots and attacks are described throughout the report to support analytical findings. A full

description of each of the post-9/11 cases is provided in Appendix A of the report.

Homegrown Jihadist Terrorists: The Problem

“Homegrown” is the term that describes terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United

States or abroad by American citizens, lawful permanent residents, or visitors radicalized largely

within the United States. The term “violent jihadist” describes radicalized individuals using Islam

as an ideological and/or religious justification for their belief in the establishment of a global

caliphate—a jurisdiction governed by a Muslim civil and religious leader known as a caliph—via

violent means.

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates that there have been 74 homegrown violent

jihadist plots or attacks in the United States since September 11, 2001 (9/11).1 As part of a muchdiscussed apparent expansion of terrorist activity in the United States, from May 2009 through

January 2014, arrests were made for 53 “homegrown,” jihadist-inspired terrorist plots by

American citizens or lawful permanent residents of the United States. Three of these resulted in

attacks. Most of the 2009-January 2014 homegrown plots likely reflect a trend in jihadist terrorist

activity away from schemes directed by core members of significant terrorist groups such as Al

Qaeda. However, it may be too early to tell how sustained this uptick is. Regardless, the apparent

spike in such activity after April 2009 suggests that ideologies supporting violent jihad continue

to influence some Americans—even if a tiny minority.

Homegrown violent jihadists may exhibit a number of conventional shortcomings when

compared to international terrorist networks. Many homegrown violent jihadists possibly lack

deep understanding of specialized tradecraft such as bomb making. They may not have the

financing, training camps, support networks, and broad expertise housed in international

organizations. These apparent shortcomings may keep some homegrown violent jihadists from

Throughout this report, plots involving persons indicted at either the federal or state level are discussed. This report

does not presume the guilt of indicted individuals in pending cases.

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independently engaging in large-scale suicide strikes. Because of this, they may turn to violence

requiring less preparation, such as assaults using firearms. These shortcomings pose challenges

for law enforcement, intelligence, and security officials charged with detecting, preventing, or

disrupting terrorist plots. It is likely much harder to detect smaller conspiracies that can develop

quickly.

How Do People Become Violent Jihadists?

Individuals can become jihadist terrorists by radicalizing and then adopting violence as a tactic.

“Radicalization” describes the process of acquiring and holding extremist, or jihadist beliefs. This

activity is not necessarily illegal. For this report, “violent extremism” describes violent action

taken on the basis of radical or extremist beliefs. For many, “violent extremism” is synonymous

with “violent jihadist” and “jihadist terrorist.” In other words, when someone moves from simply

believing in jihad to illegally pursuing it via violent methods, he becomes a terrorist. Because the

move from belief to violence is so individualized, there is no single path that individuals follow to

become full-fledged terrorists.

Intermediaries, social networks, the Internet, and prisons have been cited as playing key roles in

the radicalization process. Intermediaries—charismatic individuals—often help persuade

previously law-abiding citizens to radicalize or even become violent jihadists. Social networks,

virtual or actual, support and reinforce the decisions individuals make as they embrace violent

jihad, as does perusal of online materials. While there has been much discussion regarding the

powerful influence online jihadist material may have on the formation of terrorists, no consensus

has emerged regarding the Web and terrorism. Prisons, seen by some as potential hotbeds of

radicalization, have not played a large role in producing homegrown jihadists.

Analysis of Homegrown Jihadist Plots

Homegrown violent jihadist activity since 9/11 defies easy categorization. No workable general

profile of domestic violent jihadists exists. According to CRS analysis, the 74 plots since 9/11

exhibit four broad themes: a variety of endgames, relatively little stomach for suicide or

martyrdom among plotters, successful attacks by lone wolves, and a wide range of capabilities

among the plots.

•

Endgames: In whole or in part, 33 plots involved individuals interested in

becoming foreign fighters in conflict zones involving violent jihad abroad.

Nineteen plots exclusively intended to use explosives or incendiary devices.

Three exclusively intended to use or did use firearms. Twenty-seven plots

incorporated multiple, unspecific, or unique tactics. Finally, outside of the 74

violent plots since 9/11, other schemes intended from the start only to fund or

materially support the activities of their jihadist colleagues.

•

Suicide or Martyrdom: According to publicly available information, 18 plots

included individuals who clearly professed interest in killing themselves while

engaged in violent jihad.

•

Success of Lone Wolves: Lone wolves conducted four of the five successful

homegrown attacks since 9/11.

•

Divergent Capabilities: Among the 74 homegrown plots since 9/11, the

operational capabilities of participants diverged greatly. Some evinced terrorist

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tradecraft such as bomb making skills. Others appeared to be far less

experienced.

Combating Homegrown Violent Jihadists

The spate of arrests in recent years should not obscure the challenges facing law enforcement in

disrupting homegrown terrorist plotting. Counterterrorism activity exists within two broad

contexts. The first of these involves addressing radicalization, much of which occurs in the open

marketplace of ideas. Please see CRS Report R42553, Countering Violent Extremism in the

United States, for more on this topic. The second context—the focus of this report—is more

“operational” and encompasses both violent jihadist plots (largely involving secretive illegal

activity) and the police work used to dismantle them. The latter context, by necessity, also occurs

outside of the public’s view. Government efforts to combat domestic violent jihad straddle both of

these arenas.

Preventive Policing

In the post-9/11 environment, the public has expected law enforcement to adopt a proactive

posture in order to disrupt terrorist plots before an attack occurs. Investigative leads about

terrorist plots in the homeland may originate from foreign intelligence sources. But, for the most

part, information about homegrown plots is available only through domestic intelligence

activities. In order to proactively gather intelligence, law enforcement has adopted a preventive

policing approach that focuses not just on crime that has occurred, but on the possibility that a

crime may be committed in the future.

In this context, a major challenge for law enforcement is gauging how quickly and at what point

individuals move from radicalized beliefs to violence so that a terrorist plot can be detected and

disrupted. At the federal level, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI, the Bureau) implemented a forward-leaning approach with a revision to the

Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations.2 The revision, meant to streamline

the FBI’s investigations and make them more proactive, has spurred the use of an investigative

tool dubbed “assessments.” These allow for the investigation of individuals or groups without

factual predication. The revised guidelines have, however, generated some controversy among

civil libertarians.

Also critical among the proactive approaches employed by law enforcement is the monitoring of

Internet and social networking sites. The USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56) authorizes the FBI to

use National Security Letters to obtain a range of information including data pertaining to email

and Internet use. It appears that U.S. law enforcement has effectively exploited the Internet—

which radicalizing individuals can mine for information and violent jihadists use while plotting—

in its pursuit of terrorists. A review of criminal complaints and indictments in terrorism cases

reveals that the FBI has exploited the Internet and/or email communications to build cases against

defendants in at least 36 of the post-9/11 cases studied in this report. Although much is said about

terrorist use of the Internet for recruitment, training, and communications, these cases suggest that

The FBI declined to speak with CRS about its counterterrorism programs, investigative activities, or engagement

efforts for this report.

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terrorists and aspiring terrorists will not find the Internet to be a uniformly permissive

environment.

State and Local Authorities

The role of state, local, and tribal law enforcement in detecting nascent terrorist plotting is

particularly important, especially considering the challenges involved in detecting lone wolves

and homegrown jihadist groups with few connections to larger terrorist organizations. More than

a decade after the 9/11 attacks, integrating state, local, and tribal law enforcement into the

national counterterrorism effort continues to be an abiding concern of policymakers. DOJ and the

FBI have established Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) to help coordinate federal, state, and

local investigative activities. States and major urban areas have also established intelligence

fusion centers with federal agencies, in part to share intelligence. The Nationwide Suspicious

Activity Report Initiative (NSI) is a program to push terrorism-related information generated

locally between and among federal, state, local, and tribal levels via fusion centers.

Investigative Approaches

To counter violent jihadist plots, U.S. law enforcement has employed two tactics that have been

described as the “Al Capone” approach and the use of “agent provocateurs.” These tactics have

long been used in a wide variety of cases but apparently have particular utility in counterterrorism

investigations. As the “Al Capone” moniker suggests, historically, these tactics have been

employed against many types of targets such as mafia bosses, white-collar criminals, and corrupt

public servants. The Capone approach involves apprehending individuals linked to terrorist plots

on lesser, non-terrorism-related offenses such as immigration violations. In agent provocateur

cases—often called sting operations—government undercover operatives befriend suspects and

offer to facilitate their activities. The use of these techniques has generated public controversy

and illustrates a bind that law enforcement faces. It has been charged with preventing homegrown

terrorism, but its use of preemptive techniques spawns concern among community members and

civil libertarians.

Trust and Partnership

Following the 9/11 attacks, law enforcement agencies came to realize that the prevention of

terrorist attacks would require the cooperation and assistance of American Muslim, Arab, and

Sikh communities. At the same time, Muslim, Arab, and Sikh Americans recognized the need to

define themselves as distinctly American communities who, like other Americans, desire to help

prevent another terrorist attack. The concept of building trust through engagement and

partnership is rooted in the community policing model developed by law enforcement

professionals in the 1990s. Currently, numerous U.S. government agencies conduct outreach,

engage, and partner with Muslim American communities.

Balancing Security and Liberty

Although many public officials support community engagement, significant challenges may exist

in the development of programs that foster substantive relationships rather than token discussions

or community relations events. Striking a balance between security and liberty—relying on local

communities to provide critical information to further proactive policing while simultaneously

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building trust and preserving the freedoms of community members—is seen as difficult. Law

enforcement investigative activities and tactics may pose particular complications in partnership

building. Especially challenging are law enforcement activities perceived by community

members to be unfairly targeting law-abiding citizens or infringing on speech, religion, assembly,

or due process rights.

The recruitment and management of informants—essential to many law enforcement

investigations—may, however, pose an obstacle to successful community engagement efforts.

Some Muslim community activists fear that law enforcement coerces immigrants into becoming

informants, especially those with legal problems or those applying for green cards. Others fear

that informants target and potentially entice impressionable youth into fictitious terrorist plots.

There has also been public discussion of the trustworthiness of informants with criminal

backgrounds. CRS analysis of open source reports indicates that confidential informants or

undercover operatives were used in at least 40 of the post-9/11 homegrown jihadist terrorism

cases. In some of those cases, the informants had criminal histories. In considering the tradeoff

between security and liberty, policy makers face a judgment in those cases where an investigative

tactic might inflame members of a particular community: Is the impact of that tactic

counterproductive in the long run, or is it necessary, short-term collateral damage?

Introduction

As part of a much-discussed apparent uptick in terrorist activity in the United States, from May

2009 through January 2014, arrests were made for 53 “homegrown,” jihadist-inspired terrorist

plots by American citizens or lawful permanent residents of the United States.3 Three of these

resulted in attacks.

•

In April 2013, two brothers—Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev—allegedly

detonated two homemade bombs near the finish line of the Boston Marathon,

killing 3 people and wounding more than 200. The duo also purportedly shot and

killed a police officer in events following the bombing.

•

In November 2009, U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan’s assault at Fort Hood in

Texas claimed 13 lives and wounded more than 30 others.

•

In June 2009, Abdulhakim Muhammad shot and killed one soldier and wounded

another at the U.S. Army-Navy Career Center in Little Rock, AR.

For this report, “homegrown” or “domestic” describe terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United States or

abroad by American citizens, lawful permanent residents, or visitors radicalized largely within the United States.

“Violent jihadist” describes radicalized individuals using Islam as an ideological and/or religious justification for their

belief in the establishment of a global caliphate—a jurisdiction governed by a Muslim civil and religious leader known

as a caliph—via violent means. Jihadists largely adhere to a variant of Salafi Islam—the fundamentalist belief that

society should be governed by Islamic law based on the Quran and adhere to the model of the immediate followers and

companions of the Prophet Muhammad. “Plots” include schemes by homegrown violent jihadists to commit violent

acts or their plans to join terrorist groups abroad. For more on Al Qaeda’s global network, see CRS Report R41070, Al

Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy, coordinated by (name

redacted).

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By comparison, in more than seven years from the September 11, 2001, terrorist strikes (9/11)

through April 2009, there were 21 such plots. Two resulted in attacks.4

•

In March 2006, Mohammed Reza Taheri-Azar, a naturalized American citizen

from Iran, drove his sport utility vehicle (SUV) into a crowd at the Pit, a popular

student gathering spot at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The

SUV struck and injured several people.

•

In March 2003, two days after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, U.S. Army Sergeant

Hasan Akbar killed 2 U.S. Army officers and wounded 14 others at U.S. Army

Camp Pennsylvania in Kuwait, 25 miles from the Iraq border.

The apparent rise in such activity after April 2009 suggests that at least some Americans—even if

a tiny minority—are susceptible to ideologies supporting a violent form of jihad.

How serious is the threat of homegrown, violent jihadists in the United States? Experts differ in

their opinions.5 Moreover, the radicalization of violent jihadists may not be an especially new

phenomenon for the United States. Estimates suggest that between 1,000 and 2,000 American

Muslims engaged in violent jihad during the 1990s in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya.6 More

broadly, during the 1970s domestic terrorists “committed 60-70 terrorist incidents, most of them

bombings, on U.S. soil every year—a level of activity 15-20 times that seen in most years since

9/11.”7 Few of the attacks during the 1970s appear to have involved individuals motivated by

jihadist ideas.

But as the bombing of the Boston Marathon and the Fort Hood shootings may suggest, a single

successful attack can incur scores of casualties and cause considerable socioeconomic disruption.

Regardless of their novelty, frequency, or lethality, attacks fostered by violent jihadists radicalized

in the United States remain a security concern.

See Appendix A for a summary of publicly available information regarding these alleged plots and attacks. The

summary is presented in reverse chronological order.

In May 2010 congressional testimony, terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman emphasized that it is, “difficult to be

complacent when an average of one plot is now being uncovered per month over the past year or more—and perhaps

even more are being hatched that we don’t know about.” By contrast, an academic study of domestic Muslim

radicalization supported by the National Institute of Justice reveals that “the record over the past eight years contains

relatively few examples of Muslim-Americans that have radicalized and turned toward violent extremism” and

concludes that “homegrown terrorism is a serious but limited problem.” Another study has suggested that the

homegrown terrorist threat has been exaggerated by federal cases that “rely on the abusive use of informants.” U.S.

Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism

Risk Assessment, Written Testimony of Bruce Hoffman, Hearing: “Internet Terror Recruitment and Tradecraft: How

Can We Address an Evolving Tool While Protecting Free Speech,” 111th Cong., 2nd sess., May 26, 2010, p. 2; David

Schanzer, Charles Kurzman, and Ebrahim Moosa, Anti-Terror Lessons of Muslim Americans, January 6, 2010, p. 1.

Hereinafter: Schanzer, et.al, Anti-Terror Lessons of Muslim Americans. See also Charles Kurzman, Muslim American

Terrorism in the Decade Since 9/11, February 8, 2012; Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, Targeted and

Entrapped: Manufacturing the “Homegrown Threat” in the United States (New York: NYU School of Law, 2011), p.

38.

Quintan Wiktorowicz, Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield

Publishers, Inc., 2005), p. 3. See William Rosenau and Sara Daly, “American Journeys to Jihad: U.S. Extremists during

the 1980s and 1990s,” CTC Sentinel, vol. 3, no. 8 (August 2010) pp. 17-20.

Brian Michael Jenkins, Would Be Warriors: Incidents of Jihadist Terrorist Radicalization in the United States since

September 11, 2001 (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2010), p. viii. Hereinafter: Jenkins, Would-Be

Warriors.

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The bulk of the May 2009-January 2014 homegrown plots likely reflect a trend in jihadist

terrorist activity away from schemes directed by the core leaders of Al Qaeda or other significant

terrorist groups. A global shift in terrorism toward decentralized, autonomously radicalized,

violent jihadist individuals or groups who strike in their home countries appears to have

occurred.8 Global counterterrorism efforts have made it harder for international terrorist networks

to formulate plots, place their recruits in targeted countries, and carry out violent strikes in

locations far from their bases of operation.9

Homegrown Violent Jihadists

This report focuses on geography and citizenship in its characterization of homegrown terrorism

by defining the phenomenon as jihadist terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United

States or abroad by American citizens, lawful permanent residents, or visitors radicalized largely

within the United States.10 These homegrown groups or individuals can focus their plots on

foreign targets. They can have operational ties to foreign terrorist groups, but most of the plots

after April 2009 have not. Homegrown violent jihadists potentially either come from Muslim

immigrant communities or are converts to Islam. A review of the numerous arrests of homegrown

violent jihadists on terrorism-related charges since 9/11 suggests a wide array of incidents. There

have been those who have plotted or attempted terrorist attacks. Others have provided material

support to terrorist groups. Some have recruited individuals to travel abroad—or have gone

themselves—to acquire terrorist training, conduct terrorism, or join in other forms of jihadist

conflict, such as fighting in Somalia, Syria, or Afghanistan.

Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: University of

Pennsylvania Press, 2008), pp. 71, 133-146. Hereinafter: Sageman, Leaderless Jihad.

Philip Mudd, “Evaluating the Al-Qa!ida Threat to the U.S. Homeland,” CTC Sentinel, vol. 3, no. 8 (August 2010) p.

2, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol3Iss8.pdf; Dennis C. Blair, Senate Select Committee on

Intelligence: U.S. Intelligence Community Annual Threat Assessment: Statement for the Record, Office of the Director

of National Intelligence, February 2, 2010, pp. 7-8, http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20100202_testimony.pdf.

Hereinafter: Blair, Annual Threat Assessment, February 2, 2010.

Others have used similar definitions. Rick “Ozzie” Nelson and Ben Bodurian define homegrown as “extremist

violence perpetrated by U.S. legal residents and citizens. See Rick “Ozzie” Nelson and Ben Bodurian, A Growing

Terrorist Threat? Assessing “Homegrown” Extremism in the United States, Center for Strategic and International

Studies, Washington, DC, March 8, 2010, p. v, http://csis.org/publication/growing-terrorist-threat. Hereinafter: Nelson

and Bodurian, A Growing Terrorist Threat? For further discussion of definitions of homegrown terrorism, see Sam

Mullins, “Home-grown Terrorism: Issues and Implications,” Perspectives on Terrorism, vol. 1, no. 3 (2007),

http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php?option=com_rokzine&view=article&id=12&Itemid=54. The FBI and

the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) use the term “homegrown violent extremist” instead of homegrown

violent jihadist. They define “homegrown violent extremist” as “a person of any citizenship who has lived and/or

operated primarily in the United States or its territories who advocates, is engaged in, or is preparing to engage in

ideologically-motivated terrorist activities (including providing support to terrorism) in furtherance of political or social

objectives promoted by a foreign terrorist organization, but is acting independently of direction by a foreign terrorist

organization.” This definition appears to differ from the one used in this report by 1. largely focusing on whether or not

an individual was directed by a foreign organization and by 2. including all sorts of terrorists, not just violent jihadists.

See DHS and FBI, Joint Intelligence Bulletin, “Use of Small Arms: Examining Lone Shooters and Small-Unit Tactics,”

August 16, 2011, p. 3.

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Shortcomings and Strengths

Homegrown violent jihadists may exhibit a number of conventional shortcomings when

compared to international terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda. Because some homegrown

terrorists are not tied to international groups, some say they possibly lack deep, hands-on

understanding of specialized tradecraft such as bomb making and may not have the financing,

training camps, support networks, and broad expertise housed in international organizations with

extensive rosters and greater resources.11 Also, homegrown groups tend to be much less formally

structured than international organizations.12 A former CIA case officer has commented that the

threat posed by self-radicalized “lone” bombers lacking support networks, “even those who have

been in contact with either Al Qaeda or the Taliban, will be hit or miss at best.”13

These apparent shortcomings may keep some homegrown violent jihadists from independently

planning, coordinating, and implementing large-scale strikes such as 9/11 or the Mumbai attacks

of November 2008.14 Because of this, they may turn to violence involving less planning and

preparation, such as assaults using firearms.15 However, the possibility that homegrown violent

jihadists can commit large strikes that kill or wound numerous victims and disrupt everyday life

for thousands of Americans is not out of the question. The bombing of the 2013 Boston Marathon

by the Tsarnaev brothers suggests as much.16

Al Qaeda appears to have embraced such homegrown terrorist plots. In March 2010, As Sahab, Al

Qaeda’s media wing, released an English language video titled “A Call to Arms” featuring

American-born spokesperson Adam Gadahn. In the video directed toward jihadists in the United

States, Israel, and the United Kingdom, Gadahn extols alleged Fort Hood shooter Nidal Hasan as

a “trailblazer” who did not attract law enforcement attention by training abroad or relying on

conspirators.17 Gadahn encourages would-be terrorists to select realistically hittable targets that

Dina Temple-Raston, “Would-Be Bombers in U.S. Hampered by Logistics,” National Public Radio, June 21, 2010,

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=127909962.

Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, pp. 71, 133-146; Scott Stewart, Jihadism: The Grassroots Paradox, STRATFOR, March

18, 2010, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100317_jihadism_grassroots_paradox?ip_auth_redirect=1. Hereinafter:

Stewart, Jihadism.

Art Keller, “Why Was Faisal Shahzad a Bad Bombmaker?” AfPak Channel, a special project of Foreign Policy and

the New America Foundation, May 14, 2010, http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/05/14/bad_bombmakers.

Hereinafter: Keller, “Why Was Faisal Shahzad a Bad Bombmaker?”

On November 26, 2008, ten militants came ashore from the Arabian Sea on small boats and attacked numerous highprofile targets in Mumbai, India, with automatic weapons and explosives. Among the sites attacked were two luxury

hotels—the Taj Mahal Palace and the Oberoi-Trident—along with the main railway terminal, a Jewish cultural center, a

café frequented by foreigners, a cinema house, and two hospitals. By the time the episode ended some 62 hours later,

about 165 people, along with nine terrorists had been killed (one terrorist was captured), and hundreds more injured.

Six American citizens were among the 26 foreigners reported dead. For more information, see CRS Report R40087,

Terrorist Attacks in Mumbai, India, and Implications for U.S. Interests, by K. A. Kronstadt.

For more on the deterioration of tradecraft among homegrown violent jihadists, see Keller, “Why Was Faisal

Shahzad a Bad Bombmaker?” Exclusive Analysis, “North American Quarterly Terrorism Update,” December 2009, p.

5; Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, p. 140.

Sari Horwitz, “Investigators Sharpen Focus on Boston Bombing Suspect’s Widow,” Washington Post, May 3, 2013,

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/investigators-sharpen-focus-on-boston-bombing-suspectswidow/2013/05/03/a2cd9d28-b413-11e2-baf7-5bc2a9dc6f44_story.html?hpid=z1. Hereinafter: Horowitz,

“Investigators Sharpen Focus.”

Stewart, Jihadism.

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are familiar to them and have some broadly symbolic—especially economic—resonance.18 In an

early June 2011 English language video message titled “Do Not Rely on Others, Take the Task

upon Yourself,” Gadahn even more clearly emphasized lone wolf operations. In the video he

suggests possible weapons,

Let’s take America as an example. America is absolutely awash with easily obtainable

firearms. You can go down to a gun show at the local convention center and come away with

a fully automatic assault rifle, without a background check, and most likely without having

to show an identification card. So what are you waiting for?19

Gadahn stresses “targeting major institutions—after a clip showing the logos of such firms as

Exxon, Merrill Lynch and Bank of America—and ‘influential public figures.’”20 At about the

same time as this video was released, users of jihadist websites apparently began posting potential

targets and developing hit lists.21

In the same vein as Gadahn’s video, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (an Al Qaeda affiliate) has

issued an English language propaganda magazine titled Inspire. The magazine has encouraged

homegrown violent jihadist activity in the West, focusing on smaller scale strategies such as using

a vehicle to run over victims.22 The magazine has featured articles attributed to three prominent

violent jihadist propagandists with strong American ties: Gadahn, radical U.S.-born imam Anwar

al-Awlaki, and Saudi-born American citizen Samir Khan.23 In September 2011, the latter two died

in a widely reported U.S. strike in Yemen.24

This does not mean that homegrown terrorists are incapable of sophisticated, coordinated action

or linking up with international groups. For example, in 2008 foiled New York City subway

bomber Najibullah Zazi received explosives instruction from Al Qaeda in Pakistan. He and coconspirators then tried to implement this training in the United States.25 U.S. authorities assert

Ibid; Exclusive Analysis, “Global Jihad Quarterly Update,” May 2010, pp. 6-7.

Matthew Cole, “New Al Qaeda Video: American Muslims Should Buy Guns, Start Shooting People,” ABC News,

June 3, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/al-qaeda-video-buy-automatic-weapons-start-shooting/story?id=13704264.

Ibid.

John Hudson, “A Very Odd Al Qaeda ‘Hit List,’” The Atlantic Wire, June 17, 2011, http://www.theatlanticwire.com/

global/2011/06/very-odd-al-qaeda-hit-list/38967/; Judson Berger, Al Qaeda-Linked Site Posts “‘Hit List’ of U.S.

Targets, Prompting Feds to Send Alert,” Fox News, June 16, 2011, http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011/06/16/feds-sendalert-after-al-qaeda-linked-site-posts-hit-list-us-targets/#ixzz1QbS44Tc6.

Kimberly Dozier, “Yemeni al Qaeda Publishes Second Edition of English Magazine,” Washington Times, Associated

Press, October 12, 2010, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/oct/12/yemeni-al-qaeda-publishes-secondedition-english-m/print/.

Ibid; Judith Miller and David Samuels, “A Glossy Approach to Inciting Terrorism,” Wall Street Journal, November

27, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703572404575635053157718986.html?mod=

googlenews_wsj. None of the three reside in the United States.

Mark Mazzetti, Eric Schmitt, and Robert F. Worth, “Two-Year Manhunt Led to Killing of Awlaki in Yemen,” New

York Times, September 30, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/world/middleeast/anwar-al-awlaki-is-killed-inyemen.html?pagewanted=all.

For 10 years prior to the plot, Zazi, an Afghan immigrant legally present in the United States, lived in the New York

City Borough of Queens. Zazi pled guilty to conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction against U.S. persons or

property, conspiracy to commit murder in a foreign country, and providing material support to a terrorist organization.

See Department of Justice (DOJ), Press Release, “Najibullah Zazi Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Use Explosives

Against Persons or Property in U.S., Conspiracy to Murder Abroad, and Providing Material Support to al Qaeda,”

February 22, 2010, http://newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/nyfo022210.html. Hereinafter: DOJ Press Release,

“Najibullah Zazi Pleads Guilty.” For more on Zazi’s childhood, see Michael Wilson, “From Smiling Coffee Vendor to

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that senior Al Qaeda official Adnan el-Shukrijumah possibly recruited Zazi and his fellow

plotters.26 Shukrijumah—a Saudi-born, naturalized American citizen who spent part of his youth

in Brooklyn—and others involved in Al Qaeda’s “external operations” program allegedly planned

the attack.27 The relative sophistication of Zazi’s plot, involving both individuals in the United

States and abroad, may have actually exposed it to greater law enforcement and intelligence

agency scrutiny.28

The conventionally perceived shortcomings of homegrown terrorists may, in fact, pose some

challenges for law enforcement, intelligence, and security officials charged with detecting,

preventing, or disrupting terrorist plots. According to one terrorism analyst, “The smaller cells

tend to be less powerful than a central terrorist organization like Al Qaeda, but they are harder to

detect…. When the group of conspirators are [sic] small it’s much more difficult for the FBI….

The larger the group, the greater the chances the FBI can infiltrate.”29 Former Director of

National Intelligence Dennis C. Blair noted that many of the terrorist schemes disrupted in

2009—including homegrown activity—relied on short-term planning. These quickly generated

schemes are harder to identify and disrupt than more traditional and more highly organized

international terrorist conspiracies, which can gestate for years.30

According to at least one study, homegrown terrorists can be nimble adversaries, because as U.S.

citizens or lawful permanent residents, they can travel easily between the United States and

foreign countries.31 While abroad, they could receive training from foreign terrorist organizations,

conduct surveillance operations against foreign targets, and plan attacks. In the case of recent

immigrants to the United States, they are particularly comfortable moving between American and

foreign cultural contexts.32 English language skills, the ability to navigate Western culture,

society, and context are likely key ingredients for successful strikes.33 Three cases involving

homegrown terrorists illustrate how these factors possibly facilitate terrorist plotting:

•

In February 2011, Colleen LaRose (aka “Jihad Jane”) pled guilty “to all counts of

a superseding indictment charging her with conspiracy to provide material

(...continued)

Terror Suspect,” New York Times, September 26, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/26/nyregion/26profile.html?

_r=1&pagewanted=print. Hereinafter: Wilson, “From Smiling Coffee Vendor.”

William K. Rashbaum, “Al Qaeda Figure to Be Indicted in Subway Plot,” New York Times, July 7, 2010,

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/08/nyregion/08terror.html. Hereinafter: Rashbaum, July 7, 2010. He is also alleged

to have “encouraged” the plotters. See DOJ Press Release, “Al-Qaeda Operative Sentenced to Life in Prison in One of

the Most Serious Terrorist Plots against the United States since 9/11,” November, 16, 2012, http://www.justice.gov/

opa/pr/2012/November/12-nsd-1380.html.

Ibid. Al Qaeda’s external operations program focuses on targeting the United States and the West.

“U.S. Officials Link Al Qaeda Operative to New York Plot,” Daily Times (Pakistan), July 2, 2010,

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\07\02\story_2-7-...._pg7_39. The Zazi case has been

mentioned as an instance in which National Security Agency collection programs had been used to help thwart a

terrorist attack. See CRS Report R43134, NSA Surveillance Leaks: Background and Issues for Congress, by (name re

dacted) and (name redacted).

Rashbaum, July 7, 2010.

Blair, Annual Threat Assessment, February 2, 2010, p. 7.

Nelson and Bodurian, A Growing Terrorist Threat? p. v.

Ibid.

Michael Kenney, “Organizational Learning and Islamic Militancy,” National Institute of Justice Journal, no. 265

(April 2010), p. 19.

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support to terrorists, conspiracy to kill in a foreign country, making false

statements, and attempted identity theft.”34 She allegedly discussed with her coconspirators how her mainstream American physical appearance would allow her

to “blend in with many people.”35

•

On March 18, 2010, David Headley, born Daood Sayed Gilani to an American

mother and Pakistani father, pled guilty to helping plan the 2008 terrorist attacks

in Mumbai, India, and for plotting to attack the offices of a newspaper in

Copenhagen, Denmark. Headley was able to use his American citizenship and

Pakistani heritage to move between the United States and abroad for seven years

during which time he received terrorist training in Pakistan and scouted locations

in India and Denmark for terrorist attacks.36

•

For 10 years prior to his involvement in a September 2009 plot to trigger

explosive devices in New York City’s subways, Najibullah Zazi, an Afghan

immigrant legally present in the United States, lived in the New York City

borough of Queens and had family in Pakistan.37

In 2010, the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) Office of Intelligence and Analysis

warned, “probable terrorist perception of success in challenging the U.S. even through failed

attacks, suggest[s] Al Qaeda and associated groups will try to conduct operations in the United

States with increased frequency.”38 It appears that for the foreseeable future, American citizens

and lawful permanent residents of the United States radicalized within the nation’s borders will

continue to pose a violent jihadist threat.39

DOJ Press Release, “Pennsylvania Woman Pleads Guilty in Plot to Recruit Violent Jihadist Fighters and to Commit

Murder Overseas,” February 1, 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/philadelphia/press-releases/2011/ph020111.htm; Derrick

Nunnally et al., “’Jihad Jane’ Said to Have Confessed, Philly.com, March 18, 2010, http://www.philly.com/philly/news/

breaking/88307227.html

United States vs. Colleen R. LaRose, Grand Jury Indictment in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of

Pennsylvania, filed March 4, 2010, http://intelfiles.egoplex.com/2010-03-04-LaRose-Indictment.pdf.

Jane Perlez, “American Terror Suspect Traveled Unimpeded,” New York Times, March 25, 2010,

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/26/world/asia/26pstan.html?scp=1&sq=

American%20Terror%20Suspect%20Traveled%20Unimpeded&st=cse; DOJ Press Release, “Chicago Resident David

Coleman Headley Pleads Guilty to Role in India and Denmark Terrorism Conspiracies,” March 18, 2010,

http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/March/10-ag-277.html. Hereinafter: DOJ Press Release, March 18, 2010. The

Headley case has been mentioned as an instance in which National Security Agency collection programs had been used

to help thwart a terrorist attack. See CRS Report R43134, NSA Surveillance Leaks: Background and Issues for

Congress, by (name redacted) and (name redacted).

On February 22, 2010, Zazi pled guilty to conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction, conspiracy to commit

murder overseas, and providing material support for a terrorist organization. John Marzulli, “Zazi, Al Qaeda Pals

Planned Rush-Hour Attack on Grand Central, Times Square Subway Stations,” New York Daily News, April 12, 2010,

http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ny_crime/2010/04/12/2010-0412_zazi_pals_planned_rushhour_attack_on_2_busiest_subway_stations.html; Stephanie Simon, “FBI Again Questions

Immigrant in Terror Probe,” Wall Street Journal, September 18, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/

SB125323086773921349.html.

DHS, Office of Intelligence and Analysis Note, IA-0291-10, “Evolution of the Terrorist Threat to the United States,”

May 21, 2010, p.1.

Eileen Sullivan and Devlin Barrett, “Recent Cases Show Challenge of U.S. Terrorists,” Associated Press, March 18,

2010, http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hvogWD5bjFT7x-mkAwUu2tpIN_cgD9EGKHJ80.

Hereinafter: Sullivan and Barrett, March 18, 2010.

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Radicalization and Violent Extremism

Radicalization and violent extremism are terms that are sometimes used interchangeably but do

not necessarily mean the same thing. Radicalization has been described as the exposure of

individuals to ideological messages and the movement of those individuals from mainstream

beliefs to extremist viewpoints.40 Others say radicalization consists of changes in belief and

behavior to justify intergroup violence and personal or group sacrifice to forward specific, closely

held ideas.41 Still others use the term to more closely link extremist beliefs to violent action, as in

this definition by DHS, which states that radicalization “entails the process of adopting an

extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence, as a

method to effect societal change.”42

But there is an important distinction between the terms “radicalization” and “violent extremism”

as it relates to the threshold of U.S. law enforcement interest and action. This is because

Americans have the right under the First Amendment to adopt, express, or disseminate ideas,

even hateful and extremist ones. But when radicalized individuals mobilize their views (i.e., they

move from a radicalized viewpoint to membership in a terrorist group, or to planning, materially

supporting, or executing terrorist activity) then the nation’s public safety and security interests are

activated. Thus, the terms may be differentiated as follows:

•

“Radicalization” describes the process of acquiring and holding radical,

extremist, or jihadist beliefs.

•

“Violent extremism,” for this report, describes violent action taken on the basis of

radical or extremist beliefs. For many, this term is synonymous with “violent

jihadist” and “jihadist terrorist.”

From Radicalization to Violent Extremism

Combating homegrown violent jihadists requires an understanding of how radicalization works

and formulating ways to prevent the radicalization from morphing into violent extremism.43 In

2007, the New York City Police Department’s (NYPD’s) Intelligence Division released a study of

domestic jihadist radicalization that has been widely circulated within the law enforcement

community.

The study describes a general four-step process of radicalization leading to violent extremism.

First, individuals exist in a pre-radicalization phase in which they lead lives unaware of or

uninterested in either violent jihad or fundamentalist Salafi Islam. Next, they go through selfidentification in which some sort of crisis or trigger (job loss, social alienation, death of a family

Royal Canadian Mounted Police, National Security Criminal Investigations, Radicalization: A Guide for the

Perplexed, Canada, June 2009, p. 1. Hereinafter: Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Radicalization.

Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways toward Terrorism,”

Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 20, no. 3 (July 2008), p. 416.

U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Written Testimony of Charles

E. Allen, Assistant Secretary of Intelligence and Analysis and Chief Intelligence Officer, Department of Homeland

Security, “Threat of Islamic Radicalization to the Homeland,” 110th Cong., 1st sess., March 14, 2007, p. 4. Hereinafter:

Allen Testimony, March 14, 2007.

See Sageman, Leaderless Jihad.

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American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat

member, international conflict) urges them to explore Salafism. Third, individuals undergo

indoctrination or adoption of jihadist ideals combined with Salafi views. The study indicates that,

typically, a “spiritual sanctioner” or charismatic figure plays a central role in the indoctrination

process. Finally, radicalizing individuals go through “jihadization,” where they identify

themselves as violent jihadists, and are drawn into the planning of a terrorist attack.44 At this

point, according to the NYPD, they can be considered violent extremists. The FBI’s own fourstage model of radicalization closely follows that of the NYPD.45

However, this model and the process it describes—though useful—should be read with caution,

according to some observers. The radicalization process is best depicted in broad brush strokes.

One expert has suggested that

There is no easily identifiable terrorist-prone personality, no single path to radicalization and

terrorism. Many people may share the same views, and only a handful of the radicals will go

further to become terrorists. The transition from radical to terrorist is often a matter of

happenstance. It depends on whom one meets and probably on when that meeting occurs in

the arc of one’s life.46

Some experts have warned against viewing the radicalization process as a “conveyer belt,”

somehow starting with grievances and inevitably ending in violence.47 The NYPD report itself

acknowledges that individuals who begin this process do not necessarily pass through all the

stages nor do they necessarily follow all the steps in order, and not all individuals or groups who

begin this progression become terrorists.48 Studies by the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis

indicate that the radicalization dynamic varies across ideological and ethno-religious spectrums,

different geographic regions, and socio-economic conditions. Moreover, there are many diverse

“pathways” to radicalization and individuals and groups can radicalize or “de-radicalize” because

of a variety of factors.49

Forces and Factors in the Forging of Terrorists

What drives radicalization and spurs the creation of terrorists remains open to debate. Poverty,

alienation, brainwashing, or personal humiliation—commonly seen as factors driving

radicalization and terrorism—may not play particularly significant roles. Likewise, failed

multiculturalism or failed integration into the larger society does not predict radicalization or

terrorist activity.50 The radicalization process and jihadist violence may offer participants

powerful but intangible spiritual incentives such as salvation and paradise in the afterlife.

Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat, City of New York Police

Department, Intelligence Division, New York, 2007, pp. 6-8, http://sethgodin.typepad.com/seths_blog/files/

NYPD_Report-Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf.

Carol Dyer, Ryan E. McCoy, Joel Rodriguez, et al., “Countering Violent Islamic Extremism: A Community

Responsibility,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, December 2007, p. 6.

Jenkins, Would-Be Warriors, p. 7.

Sophia Moskalenko and Clark McCauley, “Measuring Political Mobilization: The Distinction Between Activism and

Radicalism,” Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 21, no. 2 (April 2009), pp. 239-40.

Silber and Bhatt, Radicalization in the West, pp. 10, 19.

Allen Testimony, March 14, 2007, p. 5.

Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Radicalization, pp. 1-9; Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, p. 48, 50-51, 73-88; Aidan

Kirby, “The London Bombers as ‘Self-Starters’: A Case Study in Indigenous Radicalization and the Emergence of

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Other forces are key in radicalization and the evolution of jihadist terrorists. Family ties and

socialization are critical. Moral outrage or perceptions that the West is harming the global

community of Muslims (the Ummah),51 or even waging war against it may also spur

radicalization and violence. And travel to regions featuring terrorist activity can foster

radicalization. Religious conversion plays a key role in the radicalization of some individuals.52

CRS analysis of the 74 plots since 9/11 suggests that 31 of them included converts to Islam.

As all of this may suggest, in fact, “pre-radicalization” indicators are subtle and may not be

detectable and the forces driving jihadists can be described in only the most general of terms.

Certainly, radicalizing individuals and terrorists connect larger grievances about the world to their

own direct experiences. A study of 2,032 foreign fighters who joined Al Qaeda and its affiliated

organizations broadly suggests that these individuals can be categorized as revenge seekers, status

seekers, identity seekers, or thrill seekers who possessed “an unfulfilled need to define

themselves.”53 Even more broadly and fundamentally, one author has suggested that

psychologically, individual terrorists “see the world in Manichean, black-and-white terms; they

identify with others; and they desire revenge.”54

Overall, many scholars and counterterrorism analysts who have studied post-9/11 jihadist terrorist

attacks have noted the prominence of a number of forces impacting radicalization and extremism.

These include intermediaries (the “spiritual sanctioners” identified by the NYPD report on

radicalization), social networks, the Internet, and prisons.

Intermediaries

Intermediaries are critical in the development of terrorist plots and radicalization. They quicken

the formulation of individual or group beliefs regarding violent jihad. Terrorist recruiters from Al

Qaeda or extremist clerics tied to such organizations can play this role in the radicalization

process. They can interact with individuals interested in terrorism either directly (face-to-face

discussion groups) or in online forums. Some post 9/11 terrorist plots have included an

intermediary.55 In certain cases a key intermediary may be a government informant or undercover

agent. Four charismatic U.S. citizens have played especially prominent roles in international

jihadist propaganda, but determining the impact—if any—of these and other intermediaries can

be difficult.

(...continued)

Autonomous Cliques,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 30, no. 5 (May 2007), p. 422. Hereinafter: Kirby “The

London Bombers.” For more on the spiritual incentives involved in joining radical Islamic groups see Quintan

Wiktorowicz and Karl Kaltenthaler, “The Rationality of Radical Islam,” Political Science Quarterly, vol. 121, no. 2

(Summer 2006) pp. 295-300.

The Quran uses the term Ummah to refer to the community of believers. The term is used to describe both individual

communities, great and small, of faithful Muslims and to refer to the world-wide community of believers. See Richard

Hooker, World Civilizations, Glossary, 1996, http://www.wsu.edu/~dee/GLOSSARY/UMMAH.HTM.

Ibid.

John M. Venhaus, Why Youth Join al-Qaeda, United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 236, Washington, DC,

May 2010, p. 1, http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR236Venhaus.pdf.

Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat (New York: Random

House, 2006), p. 41.

Rick “Ozzie” Nelson, Countering Terrorism and Radicalization in 2010 and Beyond: A New Terrorist Threat?

Assessing ‘Homegrown Extremism,’ Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, January 22, 2010,

http://csis.org/publication/homegrown-terrorism-fact-sheet.

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Anwar al-Awlaki was a radical imam and key international charismatic figure in jihadist circles

prior to being killed in a U.S. counterterrorism operation in Yemen in September 2011.56 Awlaki

allegedly served as a leader in the terrorist group known as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

(AQAP).57 He was a U.S. citizen born in New Mexico in 1971 and had been linked to a number

of domestic jihadist plots.58 U.S. officials have said that he directed foreign terrorist Umar Farouk

Abdulmutallab’s failed Christmas Day 2009 bombing attempt.59 However, according to publicly

available sources, his exact connections to homegrown violent jihadists are largely unclear.

Before his November 5, 2009, gun rampage at Fort Hood, Texas, U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan

exchanged emails with Awlaki. It remains publicly unknown how the contact influenced Hasan.

After the Fort Hood shootings, Awlaki issued a statement dubbing Hasan a hero.60

The imam and his teachings have influenced people involved in other homegrown violent jihadist

plots. Jose Pimentel was building explosive devices when he was arrested after two years of

surveillance by the NYPD.61 He sympathized with Al Qaeda and drew inspiration from Awlaki.

The would-be bomber is reputed to have tried but failed to correspond with Awlaki via email, and

the cleric’s death may have sped up his plotting.62 In December 2010, federal officials charged

Antonio Martinez, a Muslim convert, in a plot to bomb an Armed Forces recruiting station. A

sting operation by the FBI ensnared Martinez. He allegedly planned to attack an Armed Forces

recruiting station in Maryland, using a sport utility vehicle loaded with what he believed was a

bomb. During the course of his plot, he also allegedly praised Awlaki.63 Naturalized U.S. citizen

Farooque Ahmed was arrested in October 2010 for attempting to assist people he believed to be

terrorists in planning the bombing of Washington, DC, Metrorail stations.64 Ahmed allegedly

Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General, to Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, United

States Senate, May 22, 2013.

For context regarding Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, see CRS Report RL34170, Yemen: Background and U.S.

Relations, by (name redacted); CRS Report R41070, Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global

Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy, coordinated by (name redacted).

According to media reporting from January 2012, the FBI and DHS warned that after Awlaki’s death, his legacy may

still help influence Americans to become homegrown jihadists. See Catherine Herridge, “Al Qaeda in Yemen Targets

More American Recruits,” Fox News, January 10, 2012, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/01/10/al-qaeda-inyemen-targets-more-american-recruits/.

Jeremy Pelofsky, “U.S. Says Al Qaeda Leader Awlaki Directed Underwear Bomber,” Reuters, February 10, 2012,

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/10/usa-security-abdulmutallab-idUSL2E8DAFMV20120210; Greg Miller and

Spencer S. Hsu, “Muslim Cleric Tied to Bomb Attempt,” The Washington Post, July 1, 2010,

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/30/AR2010063005343.html.

“Profile: Anwar al-Awlaki,” BBC News, January 3, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8438635.stm.

In February 2014, Pimentel pled guilty to a “single count of attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the first

degree as a crime of terrorism,” a New York state-level charge. James C. McKinley, Jr., “Man Pleads Guilty to

Reduced Charge in Terrorism Case,” New York Times, February 19, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/20/

nyregion/manhattan-man-pleads-guilty-to-reduced-charges-in-terror-case.html?_r=0; Joseph Goldstein, William K.

Rashbaum, “City Bomb Plot Suspect Is Called Fan of Qaeda Cleric,” New York Times, November 20, 2011,

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/21/nyregion/jose-pimentel-is-charged-in-new-york-city-bomb-plot.html. Hereinafter:

Goldstein and Rashbaum, “City Bomb Plot.” See also Tom McElroy, “‘Al-Qaida Sympathizer’ Accused of NYC Bomb

Plots,” Associated Press, November 21, 2011. Hereinafter: McElroy, “‘Al-Qaida Sympathizer.’”

Ibid.

Dina Temple-Raston, “Officials Worry About Some Latino Converts To Islam,” National Public Radio, August 24,

2011, http://www.npr.org/2010/12/09/131916271/officials-worry-about-some-latino-converts-to-islam; DOJ Press

Release, “Maryland Man Charged in Plot to Attack Armed Forces Recruiting Center,” December 8, 2010,

http://www.fbi.gov/baltimore/press-releases/2010/ba120810.htm.

DOJ Press Release, “Virginia Man Arrested for Plotting Attacks on D.C.-Area Metro Stations with People He

Believed to Be al Qaeda Members,” October 27, 2010, http://washingtondc.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/

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possessed a biography of Awlaki and listened to his online sermons.65 Also apprehended in

October 2010, U.S. citizen Abdel Hameed Shehadeh, who allegedly tried to join overseas

extremist groups such as the Taliban, modeled one of the jihadist websites he managed after

Awlaki’s teachings. The website offered hyperlinks to Awlaki’s online lectures. According to

DOJ, Shehadeh also discussed Awlaki’s ideas with an individual he tried (and failed) to recruit for

violent jihad.66 Zachary Chesser, who allegedly tried to join the Somali terrorist group al-Shabaab

as late as July 2010 and propagandized online, emailed Awlaki. The cleric responded twice,

according to court documents.67 In July 2010, Paul Rockwood Jr. pled guilty to making false

statements in a domestic terrorism investigation. He closely followed Awlaki’s online

pronouncements and developed an “execution” hit list that included 15 people Rockwood

believed had desecrated Islam.68 According to court documents, Shaker Masri encouraged an FBI

cooperating source to “review speeches” by Awlaki.69 Arrested in June 2010 while allegedly

trying to join al-Shabaab, Mohamed Alessa and Carlos Almonte, watched videos of and listened

to sermons by Awlaki.70

According to media sources, Faisal Shahzad, a Pakistani immigrant who admitted that he

attempted to detonate an explosives-filled vehicle in New York City’s Times Square on May 1,

2010, cited Awlaki and another cleric, Abdullah Faisal from Jamaica, as key influences on him.71

Also, a surveillance recording from 2007 captured one of six individuals eventually convicted of

plotting to attack Fort Dix in New Jersey talking about an Awlaki lecture.72

U.S. officials believe Awlaki also had contact with Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the young

Nigerian who concealed an explosive device in his underwear and attempted to detonate it on a

Northwest Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Detroit on Christmas Day 2009.73 In October 2011,

(...continued)

wfo102710.htm.

Carol Cratty, “Accused Would-Be DC Metro Bomber Pleads Not Guilty in Federal Court,” CNN.com, November 9,

2010, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-11-09/justice/virginia.bomb.plot_1_qaeda-al-awlaki-speedy-trial?_s=PM:CRIME;

Matt Apuzzo and Adam Goldman, “Officials: Muslim Source Turned in Terror Suspect,” Associated Press, October

28, 2010, http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20101028/ap_on_go_ca_st_pe/us_terror_arrest.

United States. v. Abdel Hameed Shehadeh, Criminal Complaint, U.S. District for the Eastern District of New York,

October 21, 2010, http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1400.pdf .

United States. v. Zachary Adam Chesser, Affidavit, 1:10-MJ-504, U.S. District for the Eastern District of Virginia,

July 21, 2010, http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1343.pdf. In 2012, al-Shabaab allied itself

with Al-Qaeda. See “Somalia Militants Officially Join with Al Qaeda,” CBS News, February 9, 2012,

http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57373985/somalia-militants-officially-join-with-al-qaeda/?tag=

contentMain;contentBody.

DOJ Press Release, “Alaska Man Pleads Guilty to Making False Statements in Domestic Terrorism Investigation,

Spouse Pleads Guilty to Making False Statements,” July 21, 2010, http://anchorage.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/

ak072110.htm.

United States v. Shaker Masri, Criminal Complaint, U.S. District Court Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division,

August 9, 2010, http://jnslp.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/masri-complaint1.pdf.

Anti-Defamation League, “New Jersey Residents Arrested for Attempting To Join Somali-Based Terrorist Group,”

June 7, 2010, updated July 22, 2010, http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/new_jersey_al_shabaab.htm.

Dina Temple-Raston, “Jamaican Imam Said to Inspire Times Square Suspect,” National Public Radio, May 19,

2010, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126962091. For more on Shahzad’s suspected ties to

Awlaki, see Scott Shane and Mark Mazzetti, “Times Sq. Bomb Suspect Is Linked to Militant Cleric,” New York Times,

May 6, 2010.

Scott Shane, “Born in U.S., a Radical Cleric Inspires Terror,” New York Times, November 18, 2009,

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/19/us/19awlaki.html.

Jeanne Meserve, “Anti-Terrorism Chief, U.S.-Born Cleric had Major Role in Airline Bombing Try,” CNN.com, June

(continued...)

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when he pled guilty to his involvement in the plot, Abdulmutallab stated, “I was greatly inspired

to participate in jihad by the lectures of the great and rightly guided mujahedeen who is alive,

Sheikh Anwar al-Awlaki, may Allah preserve him and his family and give them victory, Amin,

and Allah knows best.”74 A U.S. official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the

topic’s sensitivity, told The Washington Post that Awlaki was the first U.S. citizen added to a list

of suspected terrorists the CIA was authorized to kill.75

Even after Awlaki’s death, his teachings have influenced would-be plotters. Dzhokhar Tsarnaev

has reportedly indicated to authorities that he and his brother, Tamerlan, watched videos of Anwar

Al-Awlaki in the period before the siblings allegedly bombed the 2013 Boston Marathon.76 In

January 2013, Erwin Antonio Rios, an individual who allegedly desired to travel abroad to wage

violent jihad, purportedly discussed the writing of the deceased radical cleric with a law

enforcement informant.77

Samir Khan—before he was killed in the same strike as Awlaki—served as the editor of Inspire

magazine, launched in 2010 by AQAP.78 Inspire has been described as “a slick magazine for

jihadists ... that featured political and how-to articles written in a comfortable American

vernacular.”79 The magazine is intended to attract would-be jihadists in the West.

The Saudi-born Khan lived in Queens, New York, and Charlotte, North Carolina. He radicalized

after the Al Qaeda attacks on September 11, 2001, and moved with his parents to Charlotte in

2004. He left Charlotte in 2009 and joined AQAP in Yemen.80 Prior to leaving the United States,

Khan had gained some notoriety as a jihadist blogger and as creator of the online magazine, Jihad

Recollections—Inspire’s forerunner.81

(...continued)

30, 2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/06/30/leiter.al.awlaki/index.html.

See “Transcript: Read Abdulmutallab’s Statement on Guilty Plea,” Detroit Free Press, October 12, 2011,

http://www.freep.com/article/20111012/NEWS01/111012038/Transcript-Read-Abdulmutallab-s-statement-guilty-plea.;

Monica Davey, “Would-Be Plane Bomber Pleads Guilty, Ending Trial,” October 12, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/

2011/10/13/us/umar-farouk-abdulmutallab-pleads-guilty-in-plane-bomb-attempt.html.

Greg Miller, “Muslim Cleric Awlaki is 1st U.S. citizen on List of Those CIA is Allowed to Kill,” The Washington

Post, April 7, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/06/AR2010040604121.html.

Margaret Coker, “Cleric Cited by Tsarnaev Lives On—Online,” Wall Street Journal, May 5, 2013,

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323687604578465023366949366.html; Eric Schmitt, et al., “Boston

Plotters Said to Initially Target July 4 for Attack,” New York Times, May 2, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/

03/us/Boston-bombing-suspects-planned-july-fourth-attack.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.

United States v. Erwin Antonio Rios, Criminal Complaint, United States District Court for the Eastern District of

North Carolina, February 7, 2013.

Kimberly Dozier, “Yemeni al Qaeda Publishes Second Edition of English Magazine,” Washington Times, Associated

Press, October 12, 2010, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/oct/12/yemeni-al-qaeda-publishes-secondedition-english-m/print/.

Robbie Brown and Kim Severson, “2nd American in Strike Waged Qaeda Media War,” New York Times, September

30, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/world/middleeast/samir-khan-killed-by-drone-spun-out-of-theamerican-middle-class.html. Hereinafter: Brown and Severson, “2nd American.” Mark Schone and Matthew Cole,

“American Jihadi Samir Khan Killed with Awlaki,” ABC News, September 30, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/

american-jihadi-samir-khan-killed-awlaki/story?id=14640013. Hereinafter: Schone and Cole, “American Jihadi.”

Brown and Severson, “2nd American.”

Schone and Cole, “American Jihadi”; Aaron Y, Zelin, “American Jihadi,” Foreign Policy, September 30, 2011,

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/09/30/samir_khan_dead_inspire_magazine?page=full.

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Reportedly, Khan and his online publications may have influenced homegrown jihadists.

•

In November 2012, Miguel Alejandro Santana Vidriales was arrested for

allegedly plotting with three others to join either Al Qaeda or the Taliban in

Afghanistan. According to DOJ, he had read articles from Inspire about bomb

making and weapons training.82

•

In July 2011, U.S. Army private Naser Abdo was arrested near Fort Hood in

Texas for allegedly plotting a shooting spree and bombing in the area. Abdo

intended to kill soldiers near the same place where Army Major Nidal Hasan

killed 13 individuals in 2009. Federal officials noted that Abdo also possessed an

article on how to construct an explosive device, among other items. The article

was from Inspire.83

•

In November 2010, Mohamed Osman Mohamud, a Somali-born naturalized U.S.

citizen, was arrested as part of an FBI sting operation, moments after he tried to

detonate a van he believed was packed with explosives in Portland’s Pioneer

Courthouse Square.84 According to DOJ, Mohamud wrote articles for Khan’s first

magazine, Jihad Recollections.85

Aside from editing Inspire, Khan also contributed to it. Additionally, the magazine included

commentary from Awlaki and another American Al Qaeda propagandist, Adam Gadahn.86

Adam Gadahn has served as a translator and English-language propagandist for Al Qaeda and

has been charged with treason by the United States. He has appeared in a number of the

organization’s videos widely circulated on the Web. Born in 1978 and raised in California,

Gadahn converted to Islam as a teenager and moved to Pakistan by 1999. As a young convert in

California, Gadahn was influenced by two jihadists involved with a discussion group he attended.

One of these men also likely introduced him into Al Qaeda circles in Pakistan and Afghanistan. In

2004, he first appeared in a widely released video threatening attacks on the United States, and in

another dispatch he urged Americans to convert to Islam. In a video posted on June 20, 2010,

Gadahn rails against President Barack Obama, describing him as “treacherous, bloodthirsty, and

narrow-minded.”87

He had a copy of the seventh edition (fall 2011) of the magazine which included a column by Khan. United States v.

Sohiel Omar Kabir, et al., Criminal Complaint, United States District Court for the Central District of California,

November 16, 2012 (unsealed November 19, 2012).

DOJ Press Release, “Naser Jason Abdo Charged Federally in Bomb Plot,” July 29, 2011, http://www.justice.gov/

usao/txw/press_releases/2011/Abdo.pdf; David Goodman, “Soldier Held amid Claim of Terror Plot at Fort Hood,” New

York Times, July 28, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/29/us/29awol.html?_r=1. Pierre Thomas, et al., “Fort

Hood Suspect Yells Nidal Hasan’s Name in Court,” ABC News, July 29, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/forthood-suspect-naser-jason-abdo-yells-nidal-hasan/story?id=14187568#.UKzj4dVrq1g. Abdo and Santana (from the

previous example) apparently read the same bomb making article from Inspire, “How to Build a Bomb in the Kitchen

of Your Mom,” from the magazine’s first edition.

Jerry Markon, “FBI Foils Elaborate Bomb Plot in Oregon,” Washington Post, November 28, 2010,

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/27/AR2010112700546.html.

United States v. Mohamed Osman Mohamud, Affidavit, U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon, November 26,

2010.

Ibid; Judith Miller and David Samuels, “A Glossy Approach to Inciting Terrorism,” Wall Street Journal, November

27, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703572404575635053157718986.html?mod=

googlenews_wsj. None of the three reside in the United States.

“American-Born al Qaeda Spokesman Appears in New Video,” CNN.com, June 20, 2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/

(continued...)

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American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat

Omar Hammami, also known as “Abu Mansour al-Amriki,” is originally from Daphne,

Alabama. In 2007, he emerged as a key international intermediary for the Somali terrorist group

al-Shabaab but has since broken with the group.88 In September 2013, he publicly renounced his

ties to al-Shabaab and Al Qaeda, and news reports indicated that he was killed by assassins from

the terrorist group.89 Before that, he spent years trying to influence would-be violent jihadists to

join with the Somali terrorist group. The son of a Syrian-born father and an American mother, he

has been featured in propagandist videos distributed by the group. In one, he instructs recruits in

urban warfare. Zachary Chesser saw Hammami as a role model. He even imitated Hammami’s

adoption of “al-Amriki” (the American) as part of his own jihadist name—“Abu Talhah AlAmrikee.” Somali officials tie Hammami to al-Shabaab recruitment and financial management.

He may also have led battlefield skirmishes. In August 2010, DOJ unsealed a 2009 superseding

indictment against him.90 In October 2011, Hammami released a video calling Western Muslims

to violent jihad.91

As a child, Hammami lived between the Christian world of his mother and the Muslim beliefs of

his father. He converted to Islam in high school, and while a student at the University of South

Alabama, he led the Muslim Student Association and began adhering to Salafi doctrine. His

Salafism allegedly sprang in part from a desire to rebel against his father. In 2002, he dropped out

of school, and by 2004 he had found his way to Toronto, Canada, where American combat in Iraq

and Afghanistan encouraged him to reconsider his nonviolent Salafi views. One of his friends

alleges that Hammami began surfing the Web for information on jihad at this time. While in

Canada, he married a Somali woman. In 2005, they moved to Cairo, and by late 2006 he was in

Somalia pursuing violent jihad.92

(...continued)

US/06/20/al.qaeda.video/index.html; Raffi Khatchadourian, “Azzam the American: The Making of an Al Qaeda

Homegrown,” The New Yorker, January 22, 2007, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/01/22/

070122fa_fact_khatchadourian; “Al Qaeda’s ‘American Voice of Islam,” STRATFOR, September 5, 2006,

http://www.stratfor.com/al_qaedas_american_voice_islam?fn=8415719516; Evan Kohlmann, “American Greases alQaida Media Machine,” MSNBC, July 14, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/13842265/. See also Brian Dodwell,

“The Abbottabad Documents: The Quiet Ascent of Adam Gadahn,” CTC Sentinel, vol. 5, no. 5 (May 2012), pp. 19-22,

http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/CTCSentinel-Vol5Iss5.pdf.

Christopher Anzalone, “The Evolution of an American Jihadi: The Case of Omar Hammami,” CTC Sentinel, vol. 5,

no. 6 (June 2012), p. 10, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/CTCSentinel-Vol5Iss64.pdf.

Abdi Guled and Jason Straziuso, “Somalia: Reports indicate American jihadi killed,” Associated Press, September

12, 2013; “‘American al-Shabab’ Disavows Militant Group, al-Qaida,” Voice of America News, September 5, 2013,

http://www.voanews.com/content/american-alshabab-disavows-militant-group-alqaida/1743983.html.

Spencer S. Hsu, “Arrest of Va. Man Spotlights al-Qaeda’s New American Recruiter,” The Washington Post, August

1, 2010; DOJ Press Release, “Fourteen Charged with Providing Material Support to Somalia-Based Terrorist

Organization al Shabaab,” August 5, 2010, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/August/10-ag-898.html; Andrea Elliott,

“The Jihadist Next Door,” New York Times Magazine, January 31, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/31/

magazine/31Jihadist-t.htm; John Goddard, “Terrorist Leader Lived in Toronto,” The Hamilton Spectator, Ontario,

Canada, January 4, 2010; Brendan Kirby, “Report: Former Daphne High and USA Student Has Been Charged in a

Secret Indictment in Mobile with Providing Material to Terrorists,” Mobile Register, September 5, 2009,

http://blog.al.com/live/2009/09/report_former_daphne_high_and.html; The Nine Eleven Finding Answers (NEFA)

Foundation, “Shabaab al-Mujahideen Releases Footage of ‘Abu Suleim Training Camp,’” September 2009,

http://www.nefafoundation.org/multimedia-prop.html.

Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, “Al-Shabab’s Western Recruitment Strategy,” CTC Sentinel, vol. 5, no. 1 (January

2012), pp. 19-21, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Vol5-Iss1.pdf.

Ibid.

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American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat

Social Networks

Social networks appear to be central to the radicalization process and to terrorist plots as well.

Networks can be actual groups—encompassing intimate kinship ties, bonds of friendship, links

forged in student associations, or cliques tied to radical mosques. They may also be virtual and

fostered by the Internet. Group loyalties can form around jihadist messages entailing moral

outrage over the perceived suffering of fellow Muslims and a sense that the West is at war with

Islam. Networks help place these messages into the context of an individual’s personal

experiences.93

Beyond the radicalization experience, the development and strengthening of affective ties with

like-minded individuals may play a prominent role in the formation of terrorist groups and plots.94

For example, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev may have been heavily influenced by his elder brother as they

allegedly planned the bombing of the 2013 Boston Marathon.95

According to The New York Times, Faisal Shahzad befriended Shahid Hussain, a fellow Pakistani,

while the two were enrolled at the University of Bridgeport in Connecticut in the early 2000s.

Shahzad appears to have started to radicalize in the United States by 2004. During trips to

Pakistan prior to his attempted Times Square bombing, Shahzad reestablished ties with Hussain.

The latter had also returned to Pakistan. Together, the two grew more militant, especially when in

2007 Pakistani forces stormed Lal Masjid, the “Red Mosque,” a center of Islamic

fundamentalism. The two friends socialized with a third individual, Muhammad Shouaib Mughal.

The three were keenly interested in global jihad. Mughal eventually trained with the Pakistani

Taliban, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. He brought Shahzad and Hussain into the group’s camps

for training in 2009.96

Intermediaries within Networks

Social networks often feature their own internal intermediaries or charismatic leaders. DOJ

alleges that in 2010, Sohiel Omar Kabir “influenced [Miguel Alejandro Santana Vidriales and

Ralph Deleon] to convert to Islam and introduced [them] to radical and violent Islamic doctrine....

” This purportedly included posting items online and perusing violent jihadist material on the

web.97 DOJ asserts that Kabir listed content related to Al Qaeda on his Facebook page and that, in

turn, Santana and Deleon used the Facebook “like” function to highlight some of these links via

their own accounts. According to a criminal complaint unsealed in November 2012, the trio and

another individual, Arifeen David Gojali, allegedly plotted to travel from Southern California to

join either Al Qaeda or the Taliban.98

Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, pp. 71-85.

Max Abrahms, “What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy,” International

Security, vol. 32, no. 4 (Spring 2008), p. 96.

Miranda Leitsinger, “Classmates of Suspected Bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Suggest ‘Brainwashing’ by Older

Brother,” NBC News, April 21, 2013, http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/04/21/17851546-classmates-ofsuspected-bomber-dzhokar-tsarnaev-suggest-brainwashing-by-older-brother?lite.

Andrea Elliott, “Militant’s Path from Pakistan to Times Square,” New York Times, June 22, 2010,

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/23/world/23terror.html. Hereinafter: Andrea Elliott, June 22, 2010.

United States v. Sohiel Omar Kabir, et al., Criminal Complaint, United States District Court for the Central District

of California, November 16, 2012 (unsealed November 19, 2012).

Ibid. Facebook describes its “like” function as a “social plugin” that allows users to share content from each other’s

(continued...)

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American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat

In 2009 and 2010, Daniel Boyd and several others were indicted on terrorism charges.99 From

November 2006 to 2009, Boyd, a charismatic leader, led a conspiracy involving a network of

associates that included his sons Dylan and Zakariya to radicalize, recruit, and assist young men

interested in terrorism. The conspiracy also purportedly included fundraising for and provision of

material support to terrorist groups. Using stories of his past violent jihadist exploits in Pakistan

and Afghanistan, Boyd recruited and trained individuals for violent terrorist activity, according to

FBI courtroom testimony. From 1989-1992, Boyd supposedly trained at terrorist camps in

Afghanistan and Pakistan and may have been a fighter in Afghanistan.100 In 2011, the Boyds pled

guilty to charges related to the case.101

Jihadi Cool

Several post-9/11 plots have suggested that intermediaries and social networks can emphasize

persuasive messages featuring elements outside of jihadist religious rhetoric. Adventurism and

romanticized notions of revolution seem to have some prominence in the radicalization process. A

desire to protect the Ummah against what he perceived as Western incursion may have been more

important to Faisal Shahzad than more overtly religious rhetoric.102 Terrorist recruiters also

promote “jihadi cool” by producing rap videos advocating terrorism and releasing them on the

Web. In 2007, Cabdulaahi Ahmed Faarax, a charismatic recruiter for al-Shabaab, enticed young

Somali men in Minnesota with a jihadi cool message replete with war stories. According to

federal court documents, he emphasized jihad but also stressed the sense of brotherhood he had

experienced while fighting. He detailed his own experiences in guerilla combat and reassured his

listeners that it was fun and not to be afraid. He further underscored that recruits would get the

chance to use firearms.103

“Jihadi cool” may have also played a role in pushing five young Northern Virginia Muslim men

to travel in 2009 to Pakistan, where they were arrested for allegedly attempting to join jihadist

organizations in the region. On June 24, 2010, the five were convicted on terrorism charges and

sentenced to 10 years in prison in Pakistan.104 Muslim leaders from Alexandria, Virginia,

(...continued)

Facebook profiles. See http://developers.facebook.com/docs/plugins/.

DOJ Press Release, “Kosovar National Charged with Terrorism Violations,” June 17, 2010, http://www.justice.gov/

opa/pr/2010/June/10-nsd-706.html.

100

Mike Baker, “Feds Play Audio Tapes at Tense NC Terror Hearing,” Associated Press, in SCnow.com, August 5,

2009, http://www2.scnow.com/news/2009/aug/05/feds_play_audio_tapes_at_tense_nc_terror_hearing-ar-350281/; DOJ

Press Release, “Seven Charged with Terrorism Violations in North Carolina,” July 27, 2009, http://www.justice.gov/

opa/pr/2009/July/09-nsd-725.html (Hereinafter: DOJ Press Release, July 27, 2009)

101

DOJ Press Release, “North Carolina Man Pleads Guilty to Terrorism Charge,” September 14, 2011,

http://www.fbi.gov/charlotte/press-releases/2011/north-carolina-man-pleads-guilty-to-terrorism-charge-1; DOJ Press

Release, “North Carolina Man Pleads Guilty to Terrorism Charge,” June 7, 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/charlotte/pressreleases/2011/north-carolina-man-pleads-guilty-to-terrorism-charge; DOJ Press Release, “Raleigh-Area Man Pleads

Guilty to Terrorism Charges,” February 9, 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/charlotte/press-releases/2011/ce020911.htm.

102

Andrea Elliott, June 22, 2010.

103

United States v. Cabdulaahi Ahmed Faarax and Abdiweli Yassin Isse, Criminal Complaint, U.S. District Court State

and District of Minnesota, October 8, 2009, http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/us/

20091124_TERROR_DOCS/faarax.pdf; Dina Temple-Raston, “Jihadi Cool: Terrorist Recruiters’ Latest Weapon,”

National Public Radio, March 26, 2010, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125186382&ft=1&f=

1001.

104

Shaiq Hussain and Brigid Schulte, “5 N.Va. Men Convicted on Terrorism Charges in Pakistan, Given 10 Years in

Prison,” The Washington Post, June 25, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2009/12/10/

(continued...)

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indicated that they had no inkling of radicalization among the five.105 Abroad, as early as 2006,

Dutch officials noted an “intensification of radicalization tendencies” among young Muslims in

the Netherlands and a perception that jihad was “cool.”106

The Internet

The Web plays a role in the experiences of many would-be and actual terrorists, just as it does in

the lives of so many people. The interactivity of chat rooms, blogs, social networking sites,

message boards, video hosting sites, and email blurs the lines between readership and authorship

that previous generations of terrorists and sympathizers encountered with pamphlets, newspapers,

and newsletters.107 This blurring possibly encourages people who interact in such forums to more

easily see themselves as part of broader jihadist movements and not just casual readers or online

spectators. They may eventually engage in more substantive activity—actual propagandizing,

financial support, or joining a terrorist network.108

The Web’s impact on individual would-be jihadists likely varies. In some cases accessing and

engaging in online jihadist rhetoric possibly prods an individual toward violence. A study of

18,130 entries in 2,112 online discussions from more than 15 Arabic-language jihadist forums

revealed that “[o]ne fifth of all discussions included an explicit call for more terrorist attacks....

Overall, two thirds of all discussions contain[ed] some form of call for or encouragement of

terrorist attacks.”109 One author asserts that Internet activity has been central in the development

of a “self-starter” phenomenon110 and offers would-be violent jihadists what has been described

as a “de-formalized” radicalization experience.111 For this report, “self-starters” are groups that

lack ties to major international terrorist networks and do not receive orders from such

organizations.112 However, instances of solely virtual radicalization without face-to-face

(...continued)

ST2009121002234.html?sid=ST2009121002234.

105

Mary Beth Sheridan and Spencer S. Hsu, “Arrests Suggest U.S. Muslims, Like Those in Europe, Can Be

Radicalized Abroad,” The Washington Post, December 12, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/

article/2009/12/11/AR2009121104404.html

106

Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, The Netherlands, Violent Jihad in the Netherlands: Current Trends

in the Islamist Terrorist Threat, The Hague, March 2006, p. 8, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/netherlands/violent.pdf.

107

Maura Conway, “Terrorism and Mass Communication: Nitro to the Net,” The World Today, vol. 60, no. 8/9

(Aug/Sep 2004), pp. 19-22, http://doras.dcu.ie/513/1/nitro_to_net_2004.pdf.

108

Gilbert Ramsay, “Relocating the Virtual War,” Defence Against Terrorism Review, vol. 2, no. 1 (Spring 2009), p.

34, http://www.tmmm.tsk.tr/publications/datr3/03_Gilbert%20Ramsay.pdf.

109

Edna Erez, Gabriel Weimann, and A. Aaron Weisburd, “Jihad, Crime, and the Internet: Content Analysis of Jihadist

Forum Discussions,” October 31, 2011, Report submitted to the National Institute of Justice in fulfillment of

requirements for Award Number 2006-IJ-CX-0038, pp. i, vii, x.

110

Kirby “The London Bombers,” p. 416.

111

Ibid, p. 425.

112

Ibid, p. 415.

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interaction seem to be rare.113 Most radicalization apparently requires experience with real-world

social networks.114

In other instances, terrorist “wannabes” may see online activity as a suitable substitute for direct

violence and face-to-face contact with hardcore terrorists.115 Simply, individuals interested in

violent jihad no longer have to physically travel to formal terrorist camps for indoctrination and

rudimentary training. One author has also indicated that activity in the virtual realm may even

play a much more profound, “cathartic” role, “allow[ing] aspiring jihadists to be part of the

broader global jihad but crucially without engaging in direct violence.”116 In essence, online

activity may channel individuals away from the violent expression of their radical beliefs by

allowing them to air their grievances. While such activity may be seen in terrorist circles as an

increasingly legitimate option—instead of violent jihad—it does not come without repercussions

for online supporters of terrorism. Individuals absorbed in such activities may run afoul of law

enforcement for materially aiding terrorist organizations.117

Regardless of whether jihadist online activity drives individuals to violence, the Internet arguably

serves to spur radicalization in three ways. First, it allows jihadists to augment their messages

with suggestive audio and video. Second, it makes it easier for would-be jihadists to find and

interact with like-minded people around the world. Finally, the Internet “normal[izes] behaviors

considered unacceptable or inappropriate in real-world environments.”118 Terrorists publish

rhetoric online that displaces culpability for their violent actions, which they commonly describe

as inevitable responses when faced with overpowering enemies such as the West.119

Radicalizing material is readily accessible online, as are virtual communities in which one can

discuss violent jihad. Since 2005, video sharing websites have broadened the availability of jihadi

video material. All sorts of other texts and graphic images supporting violent jihad exist on the

Web, as does a great volume of tradecraft, such as bomb-making guides.

113

One terrorism expert has written: “Although the Internet clearly contributes to radicalization, and possibly to

recruitment to jihadist terrorism, it has not yet produced the army of action-oriented acolytes sought by al Qaeda’s

leaders.” Brian Michael Jenkins, Stray Dogs and Virtual Armies Radicalization and Recruitment to Jihadist Terrorism

in the United States since 9/11 (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2011), p. 17.

114

Tim Stevens, “Regulating the ‘Dark Web:’ How a Two-Fold Approach Can Tackle Peer-to-Peer Radicalisation,”

The RUSI Journal, vol. 154, no. 2 (April 2009), p. 29. For an example of one terrorist’s extensive online radicalization

experiences, see Majority and Minority Staff Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,

Zachary Chesser: A Case Study in Online Islamist Radicalization and Its Meaning for the Threat of Homegrown

Terrorism, February 2012. For an extensive discussion of the role of the Internet in radicalization, see Ines von Behr, et

al., Radicalisation in the Digital Era: The Use of the Internet in 15 Cases of Terrorism and Extremism, (Santa Monica,

CA: The RAND Corporation, 2013).

115

In December 2011, Congressional testimony, Brian Michael Jenkins stated that online activity offers would-be

jihadists “the means of vicariously participating in the jihadist struggle without incurring personal risks.” He described

such activity as akin to “a kind of psychologically satisfying video game.” See Chris Lefkow, “Al-Qaeda Minting Few

Militants Online: US Experts,” AFP December 7, 2011, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/

ALeqM5gC5qYifcavSLq1Jhl3dyxnGAdmgw?docId=CNG.afdd07c7dff397072b27a36860c352ca.531.

116

Akil N. Awan, “The Virtual Jihad: An Increasingly Legitimate Form of Warfare,” CTC Sentinel, vol. 3, no. 5 (May

2010), p. 11, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol3Iss5.pdf. Hereinafter: Awan, “The Virtual Jihad.”

117

Awan, “The Virtual Jihad,” p. 12.

118

Gabriel Weimann, Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenge (Washington, DC: United States

Institute of Peace Press, 2006), p. 116. Hereinafter: Weimann, Terror on the Internet; Awan, “The Virtual Jihad,” p.

12.

119

Ibid.

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Social networking, now inherently part of the Internet, is likely a tool that is used in the

development of contacts among radicalized individuals and recruitment into violent jihadist

groups. Before he died, Anwar al-Awlaki circulated jihadist lectures online and managed his own

popular Facebook page and blog.120 The five Virginia men convicted on June 24, 2010, in

Pakistan on terrorism charges allegedly contacted an Al Qaeda operative via social networking

websites, according to press coverage of their trial in the city of Sarghoda.121

Another case that highlights Internet-related issues involves Tarek Mehanna. Mehanna, a

pharmacist living with his parents in Sudbury, a wealthy Boston suburb, was arrested on terrorism

charges in October 2009.122 Among other alleged activities, Mehanna and co-conspirators

translated from Arabic to English documents advocating terrorism and posted them on jihadist

websites.123 They viewed themselves as the “media wing” for Al Qaeda in Iraq. In the eyes of

some terrorism experts, the Mehanna case highlights the shift away from core members of Al

Qaeda toward Internet-inspired, homegrown radicalization and self-starting terrorists. The

Mehanna case emphasizes how recruiters from foreign terrorist organizations no longer seem

necessary to shepherd radicalized individuals into terrorist training abroad. (Mehanna, himself,

allegedly tried but failed to get into such camps.) One terrorism specialist has noted that “there is

a sense that these guys are radicalizing on their own.”124 Another has commented that the Web has

supplanted mosques as a recruitment venue, especially as terrorists try to draw Westerners into

their organizations.125 In December 2011, Mehanna was convicted of “conspiracy to provide

material support to al-Qaeda; providing material support to terrorists (and conspiracy to do so);

conspiracy to commit murder in a foreign country; conspiracy to make false statements to the FBI

and two counts of making false statements.”126

Aside from its possible impact on the radicalization process, the Internet potentially offers

terrorists operational capabilities.127 Its decentralized form mirrors the flattened, cellular

structures of most terrorist organizations. Among other things, it could help them to collect

intelligence about their targets, communicate with one another, propagandize, recruit foot

soldiers, raise funds, convey operational direction, and provide training or instruction.128 For

120

NEFA Foundation, “Anwar al Awlaki: Pro Al-Qaida Ideologue with Influence in the West,” February 5, 2009,

http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/nefabackgrounder_alawlaki.pdf.

121

Brigid Schulte, “5 Va. Men Facing Terrorism Charges in Pakistan Write of ‘Noble’ Motivation,” The Washington

Post, May 16, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/15/AR2010051503548.html

122

Denise Lavoie, “Mass. Terror Suspect Taught Kids at Muslim School,” Guardian.co.uk, Associated Press, foreign,

October 21, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/8766970.

123

Shelley Murphy, “Taking Refuge Where His Woes Began: Sudbury Terror Suspect Presses Case on Internet,” The

Boston Globe, February 1, 2010, http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2010/02/01/

web_is_now_refuge_for_man_caught_online/?page=1 (Hereinafter: Murphy, Feb 1, 2010); Denise Lavoie, Abby

Goodnough, and Liz Robbins, “Mass. Man Arrested in Terrorism Case,” New York Times, October 21, 2009,

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/22/us/22terror.html; Superseding Indictment, U.S. v. Tarek Mehanna and Ahmad

Abousamra, U.S. District Court District of Massachusetts, 2009, http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/

case_docs/1121.pdf.

124

Dina Temple-Raston, “Mass. Arrest Spurs Fear of Homegrown Terrorism,” National Public Radio, October 22,

2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=114020731.

125

Murphy, February 1, 2010.

126

DOJ Press Release, “Massachusetts Man Convicted on Terrorism-Related Charges,” December 20, 2011,

http://www.fbi.gov/boston/press-releases/2011/massachusetts-man-convicted-on-terrorism-related-charges.

127

Weimann, Terror on the Internet, pp. 56.

128

Weimann, Terror on the Internet, pp. 111-140.

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example, the Tsarnaevs allegedly followed bomb making instructions from Inspire magazine—

available online—while constructing the homemade explosive devices they detonated at the 2013

Boston Marathon.129

Jailhouse Jihadism

In the last several years, terrorism experts and some Members of Congress have shown interest in

jihadist prison radicalization.130 But the research is decidedly unclear regarding the threat posed

by radicalization behind bars. A scholar of the prison phenomenon in the United Kingdom notes

that jail time potentially accelerates the radicalization process for many individuals. Prison brings

together disaffected people who may be receptive to anti-social messages offering “clear, albeit

intolerant, solutions to complex problems of identity and belonging.”131 Experts have sounded

warnings about the unknown level of threat posed by radicalization and terrorist recruitment in

U.S. jails.132

Others are quick to point out, however, that while conversion to Islam and radicalization occur

among incarcerated populations, the jump to terrorist plotting in the United States is rare.133 This

is at least partly due to prison officials’ efforts to counter jailhouse jihadism, according to a study

involving interviews with 210 prison officials and 270 inmates mostly from state correctional

systems.134 The Federal Bureau of Prisons has acknowledged the possibility of inmate

radicalization but “do[es] not believe that there is widespread terrorist-inspired radicalization or

recruiting in federal prisons,” where between 5% and 6% of prisoners identify as Muslims.135

Based on CRS analysis of the 74 violent jihadist plots since 9/11, only one clearly involved

radicalization in prison. A study of 117 homegrown jihadist terrorists from the United States and

United Kingdom found seven cases in which prison had a significant impact on an individual’s

radicalization process.136

129

Horowitz, “Investigators Sharpen Focus.”

U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Threat of Muslim-American Radicalization in U.S.

Prisons, 112th Cong., 1st sess., June 15, 2011; U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and

Governmental Affairs, Prison Radicalization: Are Terrorist Cells Forming in U.S. Cell Blocks? 109th Cong., 2nd sess.

September 19, 2006, S. Hrg. 109–954 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2007), pp. 1-6, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/

getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_senate_hearings&docid=f:30597.pdf.

131

James Brandon, “The Danger of Prison Radicalization in the West,” Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel, vol. 2,

no. 12 (December 2009), pp. 1-3, http://ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol2Iss12.pdf. Hereinafter: Brandon, “The

Danger of Prison.”

132

George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute (HSPI) and The University of Virginia Critical

Incident Analysis Group (CIAG), “Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prisoner Radicalization,” HSPI and CIAG,

Washington, DC, September 2006, http://www.healthsystem.virginia.edu/internet/ciag/publications/

out_of_the_shadows.pdf.

133

Brandon, “The Danger of Prison,” p. 4; Mark S. Hamm, “Prisoner Radicalization: Assessing the Threat in U.S.

Correctional Institutions,” National Institute of Justice Journal, no. 261 (October 2008), p. 18, http://www.ncjrs.gov/

pdffiles1/nij/224085.pdf.

134

Bert Useem and Obie Clayton, “Radicalization of U.S. Prisoners,” Criminology & Public Policy, vol. 8, no. 3

(August 2009), pp. 586-587, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1745-9133.2009.00574.x/pdf. Hereinafter:

Useem and Clayton, “Radicalization of U.S. Prisoners.”

135

Gary Fields and Suzanne Sataline, “Bomb Case Raises Issue of Islam in Jails,” Wall Street Journal, May 23, 2009;

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124303841574048865.html.

136

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Laura Grossman, Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K.: An Empirical

Examination of the Radicalization Process, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Center for Terrorism Research,

Washington, DC, April 2009, pp. 14-15, http://www.defenddemocracy.org/downloads/

(continued...)

130

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The lack of conclusive prison-based radicalization among the jihadist terrorism plots and foiled

attacks since 9/11 suggests that the threat emanating from prisons does not seem as substantial as

some experts may fear. One case, commonly known as the Newburgh Four plot, included at least

two individuals who converted to Islam while in state prison, but it remains unclear whether they

radicalized behind bars.137

The most prominent post-9/11 example of domestic violent jihadist activity inspired in prison

implicated the group, Jamiyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh (JIS or the “Authentic Assembly of God”).

Kevin James, Levar Washington, Gregory Patterson, and Hammad Samana were arrested and

charged in August 2005 for their participation in a plot to attack Jewish institutions and other

targets in the Los Angeles area, including synagogues, the Israeli Consulate, Los Angeles

International Airport (LAX), U.S. military recruiting offices, and military bases.

According to DOJ, the incarcerated James founded JIS in 1997 based on his interpretation of

Islam. His views are apparent in several of his prison writings, including a 104-page document

titled the “JIS Protocol.” In this document, James supports the establishment of an Islamic

Caliphate in the United States and describes “Jihad [as] the only true ‘anti-terrorist action[,]’ a

defensive battle against the aggression of theological imposters led by Zionism.” The document

also advocated the killing of “lawful targets,” including non-Muslims. Reportedly, James met

Washington in prison in 2004 and introduced him to JIS and its beliefs. After his release,

Washington, who converted to Islam while he was in prison, recruited Patterson, an employee at

LAX, and Samana at the Jamaat-E-Masijudal mosque in Inglewood, California, where they all

worshipped. Both Patterson and Samana swore allegiance to Washington and pledged to serve as

“mujahideen,” according to court documents.138 One study has pointed out that James’

radicalization manifested itself in prison but may not have been heavily influenced by his

experiences behind bars. Two points suggest that factors outside of prison may have at least partly

driven his radicalization: his “JIS Protocol” does not focus on jailhouse conditions, and his father

had been a member of the Black Panther Party.139

(...continued)

HomegrownTerrorists_USandUK.pdf. Hereinafter: Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman, Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S.

and U.K.

137

Eric Gorski and Rachel Zoll, “Plot Renews Fears of Radical Islam in Prison,” Associated Press, in msnbc.com, May

22, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30891721/; Daniel J. Wakin, “Imams Reject Talk That Islam Radicalizes

Inmates,” New York Times, May 24, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/24/nyregion/24convert.html.

138

DOJ Press Release, “Man Who Formed Terrorist Group that Plotted Attacks on Military and Jewish Facilities

Sentenced to 16 Years in Federal Prison,” March 6, 2009, http://losangeles.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel09/

la030609ausa.htm (Hereinafter: DOJ Press Release, March 6, 2009); Anti-Defamation League, “Two Sentenced in Los

Angeles Terror Plot against Jewish Institutions,” adl.com, August 24, 2008, updated 2009, http://www.adl.org/

main_Terrorism/los_angeles_sentenced.htm; DOJ Press Release, “Man Involved in Domestic Terrorism Plot Targeting

Military and Jewish Facilities Sentenced to 22 Years,” July 23, 2008, http://losangeles.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel08/

la062308usa.htm; DOJ Press Release, “Second Man Involved in Domestic Terrorism Plot Targeting Military, Jewish

Facilities Sentenced to Prison,” July 21, 2008, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/July/08-nsd-634.html; DOJ Press

Release, “Four Men Indicted on Terrorism Charges,” August 31, 2005, http://www.dodig.mil/IGInformation/

IGInformationReleases/fourmen_090105.pdf. Hereinafter: DOJ Press Release, August 31, 2005.

139

Useem and Clayton, “Radicalization of U.S. Prisoners,” pp. 581-582.

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Overview of Post-9/11 Homegrown Jihadist

Terrorism Plots and Attacks

Scholars and law enforcement officials have noted that no workable general profile of domestic

violent jihadists exists. According to the NYPD’s Intelligence Division, there is no effective

profile to predict exactly who will radicalize.140 Another study found only broad trends among

domestic jihadist terrorists, specifically that they are overwhelmingly male and about two-thirds

of them are younger than 30 years old.141 As the above discussion may suggest, generalizing

about the individuals involved is problematic.

Indeed, there does not appear to be a common thread connecting the U.S. Army psychiatrist

Major Nidal Hasan with the Caucasian convert, Daniel Patrick Boyd; the Afghan immigrant

Najibullah Zazi with Carlos Bledsoe, an African American of a happy childhood who converted

to Islam and renamed himself Abdulhakim Muhammad; David Headley, who was born Daood

Gilani to a successful Pakistani immigrant father and American mother, with Talib Islam, who

was born Michael Finton and raised in multiple foster homes; or the educated pharmacist Tarek

Mehanna, with the Somali American from Minneapolis Shirwa Ahmed, who traveled to the land

of his birth and became the first U.S. citizen suicide bomber. The plots and attacks drew in firstand second-generation Muslim American immigrants and native-born Americans who converted

to the faith. Some included individuals acting alone, while others had multiple co-conspirators.

Some plots were aspirational. Many believe others appear to have been pushed along by

government informants or undercover agents, and still others were serious and calculating until

uncovered by intelligence and/or law enforcement officials (see Appendix A for details on the

cases).

Table B-1 provides information about the profile and training of individuals involved in domestic

jihadist terrorist plots and attacks. Table B-2 documents the specific plots and attacks, including

the target (within/outside the United States), intended endgame (use of firearms, explosives, or

fight abroad), and tools used by investigators to disrupt the plotting.

Overarching Themes

Homegrown violent jihadist activity since 9/11 defies easy categorization. For example,

conventional notions of “homegrown” may suggest plots that are hatched and executed solely

within the United States. But in a globalized environment, many domestic jihadist terrorist plots

have some sort of international dimension. For example, some plotters train abroad. Some receive

cues from terrorist Internet propagandists operating in foreign lands. And as suggested above,

homegrown terrorists can focus their violent plans on domestic or international entities. Since

9/11, 42 homegrown plots featured domestic targets, 29 focused on foreign ones, and three

conspiracies had both domestic and foreign targeting elements. From another perspective, 44

involved intent to or actual travel abroad for training or to plan for terrorist attacks. The 74

homegrown jihadist attacks and plots since 9/11 do exhibit four broad themes: a variety of

140

141

Silber and Bhatt, Radicalization in the West, p. 8.

Schanzer, et.al, Anti-Terror Lessons of Muslim Americans, p. 10.

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endgames, relatively little stomach for suicide or martyrdom among plotters, successful attacks

by lone wolves, and varied capabilities among the plots.

A Variety of Endgames

Homegrown violent jihadists pursue a number of endgames. Some seek involvement in foreign

conflicts or insurgencies. Others plan and attempt to execute either bombings or assaults with

firearms. Finally, some jihadists apparently intended from the start only to fund or materially

support the activities of their brethren.

Foreign Fighters

Thirty-three of the post-9/11 homegrown plots have featured individuals seeking (at least in part)

to become foreign fighters with terrorist groups. Al-Shabaab-related cases concerning young men

leaving the United States to fight in Somalia form the paramount example. Other cases involve

different destinations, such as Syria and the warring factions involved in its civil war.

•

According to DOJ, Abdella Ahmad Tounisi, 18 years old at the time of his arrest

in April 2013, was apprehended at Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport while

he tried to board a flight for Istanbul, Turkey. Tounisi, a U.S. citizen, allegedly

intended to travel to Syria to join the Nusra Front, a terrorist organization

commonly referred to as “al Qaeda in Iraq.”142

•

In March 2013, Eric Harroun—of Phoenix, Arizona—was arrested for

“conspiring to use a rocket propelled grenade (RPG) [a weapon of mass

destruction] while fighting with the al Nusrah Front” in Syria.143

•

Five men from Northern Virginia (Northern Virginia Five) were arrested in

Sarghoda, Pakistan, in December 2009. They purportedly traveled there hoping

to join jihadist groups and battle U.S. troops in Afghanistan. On June 24, 2010,

they were convicted of terrorism charges in a special Pakistani anti-terror court.

Prosecutors say the five men also began planning attacks against a Pakistani

nuclear plant and an air base and other targets in Afghanistan and “territories of

the United States.”144

•

In February 2006, three residents of Toledo, Ohio—Mohammad Zaki Amawi, a

dual U.S. and Jordanian citizen; Marwan Othman El-Hindi, a naturalized U.S.

citizen from Jordan; and Wassim Mazloum, a lawful permanent resident from

Lebanon (Toledo, Ohio Plotters)—were charged with conspiracy to kill or maim

142

DOJ Press Release, “FBI Arrests Suburban Chicago Man on Charge of Supporting Terrorism Overseas,” April 20,

2013, http://www.fbi.gov/chicago/press-releases/2013/fbi-arrests-suburban-chicago-man-on-charge-of-supportingterrorism-overseas.

143

DOJ Press Release, “Former U.S. Soldier Charged with Conspiring to Use Destructive Device While Fighting with

al Qaeda-Affiliated Group in Syria,” March 28, 2013, http://www.fbi.gov/washingtondc/press-releases/2013/formeru.s.-soldier-charged-with-conspiring-to-use-destructive-device-while-fighting-with-al-qaeda-affiliated-group-in-syria?

utm_campaign=email-Immediate&utm_medium=email&utm_source=washington-press-releases&utm_content=

191247. For more context on the Nusra front, see CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S.

Response, coordinated by (name redacted).

144

Jerry Markon, et al., “Pakistan Charges 5 Northern Virginia Men in Alleged Terrorism Plot,” Washington Post,

March 18, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/17/AR2010031700430_pf.html.

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persons in locations outside the United States, to include U.S. Armed Forces

personnel serving in Iraq.145 On June 13, 2008, a federal jury convicted all three

of conspiring to commit terrorist acts against Americans overseas and material

support to terrorists.146

Explosives and Firearms

Nineteen of the 74 homegrown jihadist plots targeting the United States since 9/11 exclusively

involved explosives or incendiary devices. Suspects at least discussed the use of bombs, hand

grenades, or missiles in these cases.147 From a broader perspective, 38 cases in whole or in part

included schemes revolving around explosives or incendiary devices.148 Historically, most

terrorist incidents in the United States have involved bombs or fires. According to research drawn

from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism’s Global

Terrorism Database, about 83% of all terrorist incidents on U.S. soil between 1970 and 2007—

including violent jihadists as well as non-jihadists—have included explosives or incendiary

devices. Roughly 9% involved firearms.149

The deadly bombing of the Boston Marathon, the attempt by Faisal Shahzad to detonate an

explosives-filled 1993 Nissan Pathfinder in New York City’s Times Square, and Najibullah Zazi’s

plot to detonate bombs in the New York City subway system stand out as examples of plots

incorporating explosive or incendiary devices.

•

DOJ claims that Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev assembled two bombs using

components including pressure cookers, low explosive powder, shrapnel, and

adhesive. They concealed the explosive devices inside backpacks and planted

them among crowds near the finish line of the Boston Marathon on April 15,

2013. The brothers then triggered the bombs to devastating effect.150 The FBI and

DHS have noted that such devices “contain[ing] the initiator, switch, and

explosive charge frequently have been used in Afghanistan, India, Nepal, and

Pakistan.”151

145

United States v. Mohammad Zaki Amawi, et al., Indictment, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio

Western Division, 2006, http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/indictment_22006.pdf.

146

Anti-Defamation League, “Three Men Face Terrorism Charges in Ohio,” adl.org, October 21, 2009,

http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/Ohio_men_trial.htm.

147

This includes one case involving a surface-to-air missile (to be supplied by an undercover agent).

148

“In part” means that bomb related plotting was coupled with another endgame—either the use of firearms or plans

to become foreign fighters. For this report, the endgame dubbed “foreign fighter” involves individuals who plotted to

go abroad to join a terrorist group. If these individuals also discussed using explosives or firearms while acting as

foreign fighters abroad, the endgame of the plot remained “foreign fighter.” However, plots that involved individuals

scheming to engage in foreign fighting and/or commit terrorist acts within the United States could have multiple

endgames. Such a case might involve a person who at one point plotted to blow up a domestic target (explosives

endgame) and subsequently also plotted to travel abroad to join Al Qaeda (foreign fighter endgame).

149

Gary LaFree, “Terrorist Attacks Against the United States Homeland from 1970 to 2007,” p. 57, in Appendix B,

“Community-Level Indicators of Radicalization: A Data and Methods Task Force,” Report to Human

Factors/Behavioral Sciences Division, Science and Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security,”

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, College Park, MD, February16, 2010,

http://www.start.umd.edu/start/publications/START_HFD_CommRadReport.pdf.

150

United States v. Dzhokhar A. Tsarnaev, Indictment, United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts,

June 27, 2013.

151

FBI and Department of Homeland Security, Roll Call Release, “Update: Pressure Cookers as IED Components,”

(continued...)

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•

On May 1, 2010, investigators discovered fireworks, clocks, wiring, filled

propane tanks, gasoline canisters, and fertilizer that Shahzad had rigged for

explosion in his vehicle.152 The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan helped facilitate the

failed attack by training Shahzad and sending him $12,000 in funding.153

•

Zazi has admitted that he plotted to bomb New York City subway trains in

September 2009. Zazi told investigators that he and two friends planned to strap

explosives to their bodies, board trains at the Grand Central and Times Square

stations—two of the busiest in New York City—and explode their bombs during

the crowded rush hour.154

Three plots intended to use firearms exclusively, while 22 plots involved in whole or in part the

use of firearms. The three plots that exclusively focused on firearms include two of the successful

post-9/11 attacks.

•

The deadlier of the two attacks was the November 5, 2009, shooting at Fort

Hood, Texas. In it, U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan killed 13 and injured more than

30 others.155

•

Abdulhakim Muhammad was arrested on June 1, 2009, in connection with a

shooting at the U.S. Army-Navy Career Center in Little Rock, Arkansas, that

killed one soldier and wounded another.156 He was charged with capital murder,

attempted capital murder, and 10 counts of unlawful discharge of a firearm.157 In

Arkansas state court, in July 2011, Muhammad pled guilty to these charges.158

The third case that centered on firearms involved six men. They were arrested in May 2007 in a

plot against Fort Dix, a U.S. Army base in New Jersey. The plan focused on firearms and included

(...continued)

April 16, 2013.

152

DOJ Press Release, “Faisal Shahzad Pleads Guilty in Manhattan Federal Court to 10 Federal Crimes Arising from

Attempted Car Bombing in Times Square,” June 21, 2010, http://newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/

nyfo062110.htm. Hereinafter: DOJ Press Release, June 21, 2010; DOJ Press Release, “Manhattan U.S. Attorney

Charges Faisal Shahzad with Attempted Car Bombing in Times Square,” May 4, 2010, http://newyork.fbi.gov/

dojpressrel/pressrel10/nyfo050410a.htm; United States v. Faisal Shahzad, Criminal Complaint, U.S. District Court for

the Southern District of New York, June 17, 2010, http://cryptome.org/shahzad/usa-v-shahzad.htm.

153

DOJ Press Release, June 21, 2010; Anne Flaherty, “White House Says Pakistan Taliban Behind N.Y. Bomb,”

Associated Press in abcnews.com, May 9, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=10596709.

154

John Marzulli, “Zazi, Al Qaeda Pals Planned Rush-Hour Attack on Grand Central, Times Square Subway Stations,”

New York Daily News, April 12, 2010. http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ny_crime/2010/04/12/2010-0412_zazi_pals_planned_rushhour_attack_on_2_busiest_subway_stations.html.

155

“Fort Hood Shooting Suspect to Remain Confined,” Associated Press State and Local Wire, in msnbc.com,

November 21, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34084622; “Fort Hood Shooting Suspect Out of Intensive Care,”

CNN.com, December16, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/12/16/texas.fort.hood.hasan/index.html?iref=

allsearch.

156

NEFA, “Target America Series #18: The Little Rock Arkansas Recruiting Station Shooting,” June 2009,

http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/NEFA_littlerockrecruitingshooting.pdf; James Dao, “Man

Claims Terror Ties in Little Rock Shooting,” New York Times, January 22, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/

us/22littlerock.html.

157

James Dao, “Man Claims Terror Ties in Little Rock Shooting,” New York Times, January 22, 2010,

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/us/22littlerock.html. Hereinafter: Dao, January 22, 2010.

158

“Man Pleads Guilty to Recruiting Center Killing, Gets Life,” CNN.com, July 25, 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/201107-25/justice/arkansas.recruiter.shooting_1_capital-murder-quinton-ezeagwula-carlos-bledsoe?_s=PM:CRIME.

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attacking and killing soldiers. In December 2008, a jury found five of the six guilty of conspiring

to kill military personnel but cleared them of attempted murder.159

Multiple, Unclear, or Unique Tactics

In total, 27 attacks and plots incorporated multiple or unique tactics or the tactics were not clear

from the public record. One attack involving multiple tactics happened abroad but targeted

members of the U.S. Armed Forces at a base. In that attack, which occurred on March 23, 2003,

U.S. Army Sergeant Hasan Akbar used hand grenades (explosives) and his military-issued M-4

rifle to kill two fellow U.S. servicemen and wound 14 others at Camp Pennsylvania in Kuwait.160

Other examples of multiple, unique, or unspecified tactics include the following:

•

Members of the plot involving Daniel Boyd allegedly attempted to travel abroad

to engage in jihad as foreign fighters and also likely prepared to attack a domestic

site—the U.S. Marine Corps Base in Quantico, Virginia, using firearms.161

•

Bryant Vinas, who plotted to blow up (explosives) the Long Island railroad in

New York, admitted to U.S. officials that he met with Al Qaeda leaders in

Pakistan and, between March and July 2008, attended three Al Qaeda training

courses.162 In September 2008, as a foreign fighter he took part in a rocket attack

targeting a U.S. military base in Afghanistan.163

•

Even though the plotters discussed using explosives, the four individuals tied to

JIS and arrested in 2005 used firearms in robberies to generate funding for their

scheme.164

•

In a case involving unspecified tactics, Ehsanul Islam Sadequee, a U.S. citizen

born in Virginia, and Syed Haris Ahmed, a naturalized U.S. citizen from

Pakistan, scouted targets in Washington, DC, in 2005.165

•

In an attack that did not feature guns or bombs, on March 3, 2006, Mohammed

Reza Taheri-Azar, a naturalized U.S. citizen, crashed his SUV into a crowd near

159

Christopher Dela Cruz, “Three convicted in Fort Dix terror plot are sentenced to life in prison,” NJ.com, April 28,

2009, http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2009/04/judge_sentences_fort_dix_defen.html. Hereinafter: Dela Cruz,

NJ.com April 28, 2009.

160

Convicted and sentenced to death in military court, Akbar was at least in part motivated by extremist Islamic beliefs.

He had converted to Islam as an adult. Madeline Gruen, “Backgrounder: Sgt. Hasan Akbar,” PowerPoint presentation,

NEFA, Jan 2010, http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/nefa_akbarbackgrounder.pdf; Manuel Roig-Franzia,

“Army Soldier Is Convicted in Attack on Fellow Troops,” The Washington Post, April 22, 2005,

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A7210-2005Apr21.html.

161

DOJ Press Release, “Superseding Indictment in Boyd Matter,” September 24, 2009, http://charlotte.fbi.gov/

dojpressrel/2009/ce092409.htm; DOJ Press Release, July 27, 2009.

162

Paul Cruickshank, Nic Robertson, and Ken Shiffman, “From Long Island to Lahore: The Plot to Bomb New York,”

cnn.com, May 21, 2010, http://edition.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/05/14/bryant.neal.vinas.part2/index.html; Hereinafter:

Cruickshank, Robertson, and Shiffman, “From Long Island to Lahore;” Sebastian Rotella and Josh Meyer, “U.S.-born

Militant Who Fought for Al Qaeda Is In Custody,” Los Angeles Times, July 23, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/

jul/23/nation/na-american-jihad23.

163

Cruickshank, Robertson, and Shiffman, “From Long Island to Lahore.”

164

DOJ Press Release, March 6, 2009; DOJ Press Release, August 31, 2005.

165

DOJ Press Release, “Terrorism Defendants Sentenced,” December 14, 2009, http://atlanta.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/

pressrel09/at121409a.htm.

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American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat

the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. No one was seriously injured in

the attack, and he pled guilty to two counts of attempted murder. The assailant

allegedly hoped to avenge the deaths of Muslims abroad that he believed were

caused by the United States.166

Material Support

Although this report largely focuses on radicalization and violent jihadist plotting, there is at least

one other illegal method for individuals to assist terrorists. Radicalization may lead people to help

terrorist organizations by illegally providing them material support unrelated to specific violent

jihadist plots. How frequently this has occurred since 9/11 is difficult to discern, because material

support167 charges are often part of the illegal activity in violent plots. DOJ has publicly released

information on unsealed terrorism convictions between September 11, 2001, and March 18,

2010.168 CRS analysis of this information indicates that homegrown jihadists unconnected to any

specific violent plots were prosecuted for materially supporting terrorists in at least six

schemes.169 The six schemes supported violent jihadist or jihadist-linked groups such as Al

166

“Iranian Ex-UNC Student Gets 33 Years in Prison for Plowing SUV into Crowd to Avenge Muslim Deaths,”

Associated Press, in FoxNews.com, August 26, 2008, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,410904,00.html; “Driver

Charged for Plowing Through Crowd,” msnbc.com, March 5, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11660817/.

167

As described in U.S. Code, Title 18, Part I, Chapter 113B, 2339A and 2339B. For more information, see CRS

Report R41333, Terrorist Material Support: An Overview of 18 U.S.C. 2339A and 2339B, by (name redacted).

168

DOJ, “National Security Division Statistics on Unsealed International Terrorism-Related Convictions 9/11/013/18/10,” http://theplumline.whorunsgov.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/March-26-2010-NSD-Final-Statistics.pdf.

169

For this measure, (1) Homegrown jihadists were convicted under either section 2339A or 2339B of U.S. Code, Title

18, Part I, Chapter 113B, and no other “Category I”*(see definition below) conviction charges were tied to their cases.

(2) The scheme or the radicalization of the individuals involved had to have largely occurred after 9/11. (3) The scheme

was jihadist in nature, eliminating material support cases involving non-jihadist terrorist groups. (4) The scheme did not

include a violent plot as reported publicly. So, for example, the August 2004 Albany, New York, plot implicating

Yassin M. Aref and Mohammed Mosharref Hossain in an FBI sting involving material support to a Pakistani terrorist

group is not included among the six material support cases. This is because the case involved a scheme to launder

through Hossain’s pizza shop and real estate holdings the proceeds of the sale of a shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile

which was purportedly to be used in a fictitious plot to assassinate Pakistan’s United Nations envoy.

*The introduction included with DOJ’s “National Security Division Statistics,” enumerates two categories of offenses

involved in the 403 terrorism and terrorism-related prosecutions listed between 9/11/01 and 3/18/10. According to the

Department of Justice document, “Category I Offenses” are “violations of federal statutes that are directly related to

international terrorism and that are utilized regularly in international terrorism matters.” The statistical portion of the

document includes 105 individuals who had material support charges under 18 U.S.C. §2339A or 18 U.S.C. §2339B

among their conviction charges. Appendix A in the Department of Justice, “National Security Division Statistics,”

describes the following as Category I Offenses: Aircraft Sabotage (18 U.S.C. §32); Animal Enterprise Terrorism (18

U.S.C. §43); Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons (18 U.S.C. §§112, 878, 1116, l201(a)(4)); Use of

Biological, Nuclear, Chemical or Other Weapons of Mass Destruction (18 U.S.C. §§175, 175b, 229, 831, 2332a);

Production, Transfer, or Possession of Variola Virus (Smallpox) (18 U.S.C. §175c); Participation in Nuclear and WMD

Threats to the United States (18 U.S.C. §832); Conspiracy Within the United States to Murder, Kidnap, or Maim

Persons or to Damage Certain Property Overseas (18 U.S.C. §956); Hostage Taking (18 U.S.C. §1203); Terrorist

Attacks Against Mass Transportation Systems (18 U.S.C. §1993); Terrorist Acts Abroad Against United States

Nationals (18 U.S.C. §2332); Terrorism Transcending National Boundaries (18 U.S.C. §2332b) Bombings of places of

public use, Government facilities, public transportation systems and infrastructure facilities (18 U.S.C. §2332f); Missile

Systems designed to Destroy Aircraft (18 U.S.C. §2332g); Production, Transfer, or Possession of Radiological

Dispersal Devices (18 U.S.C. §2332h); Harboring Terrorists (18 U.S.C. §2339); Providing Material Support to

Terrorists (18 U.S.C. §2339A); Providing Material Support to Designated Terrorist Organizations (18 U.S.C. §2339B);

Prohibition Against Financing of Terrorism (18 U.S.C. §2339C); Receiving Military-Type Training from an FTO (18

U.S.C. §2339D); Narco-Terrorism (21 U.S.C. §1010A); Sabotage of Nuclear Facilities or Fuel (42 U.S.C. §2284);

Aircraft Piracy (49 U.S.C. §46502); Violations of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. §1705(b)) involving E.O. 12947 (Terrorists Who

Threaten to Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process); E.O. 13224 (Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With

(continued...)

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American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat

Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Sayyaf, and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT). They included the

following:

•

Rahmat Abdhir: A U.S. citizen living in San Jose, California, Abdhir was

indicted in 2007 for providing material support to his brother, Zulkifli Abdhir, a

member of Jemaah Islamiyah based in the Philippines. The U.S. government

accused Rahmat of sending to his brother more than $10,000 in supplies,

including chocolates, underwear, knives, guns, and radios.170

•

Ahmed Abdellatif Sherif Mohamed: According to DOJ, during a routine traffic

stop in Goose Creek, South Carolina on August 4, 2007, law enforcement

officials found explosive materials (PVC pipe containing potassium nitrate and

kitty litter as well as about 20 feet of fuse) during a consensual search of the

trunk of the Toyota Camry Mohamed was driving. A laptop retrieved from the car

yielded a video produced by Mohamed depicting how components from a remote

controlled toy car could be used to fashion a detonator for an explosive device.

Mohamed had uploaded the recording to YouTube. Although no specific terrorist

group was linked to Mohamed, he did admit that he intended the recording as

instruction to “suiciders” on how to spare themselves in attacks. An Egyptian

resident of Tampa, Florida, Mohamed entered the United States on an F-1 student

visa.171

•

Tarik Shah, Rafiq Abdus Sabir, Mahmud Faruq Brent: In an investigation

stretching back at least to December 2001, the FBI infiltrated a group of

acquaintances interested in supporting international jihadist terrorist

organizations. Shah and Brent pled guilty to material support in 2007 and Sabir

was convicted of the charge the same year. In 2005, Shah, a Bronx, New York

City, jazz musician and martial arts instructor, had sworn allegiance to Al Qaeda

in the presence of an FBI agent who posed as a recruiter for the group. He had

also allegedly offered to train Al Qaeda fighters in hand-to-hand combat. Shah

purported to have been interested in traveling to Afghanistan in 1998 to attend

terrorist training camps.172 Sabir, a doctor from Florida, swore allegiance to Al

Qaeda in the same ceremony as his friend, Shah. Sabir also offered his medical

skills to treat injured Al Qaeda fighters.173 Brent, a Washington, DC, cab driver,

(...continued)

Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism or Global Terrorism List); and E.O. 13129 (Blocking

Property and Prohibiting Transactions With the Taliban).

170

Bob Egelko, “Bail Denied for Man Accused of Aiding Brother Tied to Terror,” February 16, 2008; DOJ Press

Release, “Specially Designated Global Terrorist and His Brother Indicted for Providing Material Support to Terrorists,”

August 3, 2007, http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_Abdhir_DOJPRIndictment.pdf.

171

DOJ Press Release, “Ahmed Abdellatif Sherif Mohamed Pleads Guilty to Providing Material Support to Terrorists,”

June 18, 2008, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/June/08-nsd-544.html; United States v. Ahmed Abdellatif Sherif

Mohamed, Sentencing Memorandum, U.S. District Court Middle District of Florida, 2008,

http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/718.pdf.

172

Joseph Goldstein, “Bronx Man Pleads Guilty to Pledging Fealty to Qaeda,” New York Sun, April 5, 2007,

http://www.nysun.com/new-york/bronx-man-pleads-guilty-to-pledging-fealty/51890/; DOJ Press Release, “Bronx

Martial Arts Instructor Pleads Guilty to Conspiring to Support Al Qaeda,” April 4, 2007, http://www.justice.gov/usao/

nys/pressreleases/April07/shahpleAprilpdf.

173

DOJ Press Release, “Florida Doctor Sentenced to 25 Years for Conspiring and Attempting to Support Al Qaeda,”

November 28, 2007, http://media-newswire.com/release_1058218.html; Stephen W. Smith, “Fla. Doctor Convicted in

NY Terror Case,” CBSNews.com, May 21, 2007, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/05/21/terror/

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American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat

traveled to Pakistan in 2002 to attend a LeT training camp.174 A fourth individual

was arrested in the investigation but did not get convicted of material support.175

•

Ronald Grecula: In an FBI sting operation, Grecula negotiated to build and sell

an explosive device with individuals he believed were tied to Al Qaeda.176

•

Ilyas Ali: In a drugs-for-arms case, Ali, a naturalized U.S. citizen born in India,

admitted to conspiring in 2002 with two Pakistanis to supply Al Qaeda with antiaircraft missiles bought using proceeds from the sale of heroin and hashish.177

•

Cedric Carpenter and Lamont Ranson: In February 2005, the duo from New

Orleans pled guilty to conspiring to sell false Mississippi Driver’s licenses,

Social Security cards, and birth certificates to undercover informants they

believed were members of the Abu Sayyaf terrorist organization.178

Aside from the convictions derived from the DOJ’s list covering the period between 9/11 and

March 18, 2010, several other material support cases have come to light. Some of the cases

include the following:

•

In September 2012, Joseph J. Brice, a resident of Clarkston, Washington, pled

guilty to “the crimes of attempting to provide material support to terrorists and

manufacturing an unregistered explosive device.”179 Brice came to law

enforcement attention in April 2010, when an explosive device he had

constructed exploded, seriously injuring him. According to DOJ, a subsequent

terrorism investigation uncovered (among other things) evidence that Brice had

“posted instructions on the manufacturing of chemical improvised destructive

devices ... and other anti-law enforcement literature” on a “foreign-based jihadi

internet site.”180 He was arrested in May 2011.181

(...continued)

main2833349.shtml.

174

DOJ Press Release, “Maryland Man Sentenced to 15 Years for Providing Material Support to Terrorist

Organization,” July 25, 2007, http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/July07/brentsentencingpr.pdf.

175

Larry Neumeister, “Moroccan-Born Bookseller Sentenced to 13 Years in Terror Case by Federal Judge in New

York,” Associated Press in Worldstream, April 16, 2007.

176

DOJ Press Release, “Ronald Grecula Pleads Guilty to Attempting to Provide Material Support to Al-Qaeda,”

September 22, 2006. http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/

US_v_Grecula_DOJPRGuiltyPlea.pdf.

177

Kelly Thornton, “Man Sentenced in Drugs-for-Missiles Plot,” San Diego Union-Tribune, April 14, 2006; Thornton,

“Drugs-for-Arms Plot Nets Prison,” San Diego Union-Tribune, April 5, 2006, http://legacy.signonsandiego.com/

uniontrib/20060405/news_2m5missile.html; ‘“Al-Qaeda Dealers’ Face US Trial,” BBC News, January 6, 2003,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2630849.stm.

178

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Press Release, “Two New Orleans Men Admit Offering to Sell False

Identities to Assist Members of Terrorist Organization,” February 28, 2005.

179

DOJ Press Release, “Clarkston Man Sentenced to Federal Prison for Attempting to Provide Material Support to

Terrorists,” June 12, 2013, http://www.fbi.gov/seattle/press-releases/2013/clarkston-man-sentenced-to-federal-prisonfor-attempting-to-provide-material-support-to-terrorists; Eric M. Johnson, “Washington State Man Gets 12 Years for

Trying to Aid Militants,” Reuters, June 12, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/12/us-usa-explosivewashingtonstate-idUSBRE95B19L20130612.

180

Ibid., and United States v. Joseph Jefferey Brice, Plea Agreement, United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Washington, September 25, 2012.

181

Ibid.

Congressional Research Service

American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat

•

In May 2011, FBI agents arrested Hafiz Khan (a naturalized U.S. citizen and

resident of Miami) and two of his sons Izhar Khan and Irfan Khan (both

naturalized U.S. citizens). They were allegedly involved in efforts to provide

financing and other material support to the Pakistani Taliban. The trio was

purportedly assisted by three other indicted individuals at large in Pakistan. This

second group included Amina Khan—Izhar Khan’s daughter—and her son,

Alam Zeb, as well as an individual named Ali Rehman. Hafiz and Izhar Khan

are imams in South Florida mosques.182 The federal government dropped its

charges against Irfan Khan in June 2012 and Izhar Khan in January 2013.183

Hafiz Khan was found guilty of material support in March 2013.184

•

Nima Ali Yusuf: A lawful permanent resident of the United States living in San

Diego, Yusuf was arrested on November 12, 2010, on charges of conspiracy to

provide material support to al-Shabaab and for making false statements to a

government agency regarding an international terrorism matter.185 In December

2011, Yusuf pled guilty to conspiring to provide material support to alShabaab.186

•

Mohamud Abdi Yusuf, Abdi Mahdi Hussein, and Duwayne Mohamed Diriye

participated in a scheme to provide material support to al-Shabaab, according to

an indictment unsealed November 3, 2010. Yusuf, a resident of St. Louis,

Missouri, is accused of sending funds to people tied to the terrorist organization

in Somalia, including Diriye. Yusuf purportedly worked with Hussein to structure

financial transactions while the latter was an employee of a licensed moneyremitting business.187 In November 2011, Yusuf “pled guilty to providing

material support to a foreign terrorist organization.”188

182

Jay Weaver, “No Decision from Judge on Bail for Accused South Florida Muslim Clerics,” Miami Herald, July 1,

2011, http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/07/01/2294392/accused-south-florida-muslim-clerics.html; Julie K. Brown,

“Imam’s Arrest Stuns Mosque Members,” Miami Herald, May 14, 2011, http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/05/14/

2217517/mosque-members-imam-doesnt-have.html; DOJ Press Release, “Six Individuals Charged for Providing

Material Support to the Pakistani Taliban,” May 14, 2011, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/May/11-nsd-621.html.

183

Rafael Olmeda and Robert Nolin, “Judge Declares Broward Muslim Cleric Not Guilty in Terror-Support Case,”

South Florida Sun Sentinel, January 18, 2013, http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2013-01-18/news/fl-imam-not-guilty20130117_1_izhar-khan-defense-lawyers-pakistani-taliban; Jay Weaver, “Feds Drop Terrorism Charges Against

Miami Cab Driver Accused of Aiding Taliban,” Miami Herald, June 13, 2012, http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/06/

13/2848241/feds-drop-terrorism-charges-against.html.

184

DOJ Press Release, “Defendant Convicted of Providing Material Support to Terrorism,” March 4, 2013,

http://www.fbi.gov/miami/press-releases/2013/defendant-convicted-of-providing-material-support-to-terrorism/view.

185

DOJ Press Release, “San Diego Woman Charged with Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to al Shabaab,”

November 15, 2010, http://sandiego.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/sd111510.htm; United States v. Nima Ali Yusuf,

Indictment, U.S. District Court, Southern District of California, November 12, 2010.

186

DOJ Press Release, “San Diego Woman Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to al Shabaab,”

December 1, 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/sandiego/press-releases/2011/san-diego-woman-pleads-guilty-to-conspiracy-toprovide-material-support-to-al-shabaab?utm_campaign=email-Immediate&utm_medium=email&utm_source=sandiego-press-releases&utm_content=52852.

187

DOJ Press Release, “Two Indicted in Missouri on Charges of Providing Material Support to a Terrorist

Organization,” November 3, 2010, http://stlouis.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/sl110310.htm.

188

DOJ Press Release, “Local Man Pleads Guilty to Providing Material Support to Terrorist Organization,” November

3, 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/stlouis/press-releases/2011/local-man-pleads-guilty-to-providing-material-support-toterrorist-organization?utm_campaign=email-Immediate&utm_medium=email&utm_source=st-louis-press-releases&

utm_content=44103.

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American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat

•

According to an indictment unsealed on November 2, 2010, San Diego residents

Basaaly Saeed Moalin, Mohamed Mohamed Mohamud, and Issa Doreh

conspired to provide material support to al-Shabaab. The indictment states that

Moalin received a request for financial support from one of al-Shabaab’s military

leaders in December 2007 and subsequently worked with Mohamud and Doreh

to fill the request.189 In a separate indictment unsealed on December 3, 2010,

Anaheim resident Ahmed Nasir Taalil Mohamud was tied to the scheme.190 The

quartet was convicted of material support in February 2013.191

•

Barry Bujol: According to DOJ, Bujol, a U.S. citizen living in Texas, allegedly

attempted to provide money, pre-paid telephone calling cards, and global

positioning system receivers (among other items), to Al Qaeda in the Arabian

Peninsula after he had communicated with radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki.192 He

was arrested on May 30, 2010.193 In November 2011, he was convicted of

attempting to provide material support or resources to a designated foreign

terrorist organization as well as aggravated identity theft.194

•

Khalid Quazzani: On May 19, 2010, Quazzani, a naturalized U.S. citizen

originally from Morocco and living in Kansas City, Missouri, pled guilty to

participating in a material support scheme that provided more than $23,000 to Al

Qaeda.195

•

Syed Hashmi: A Pakistan-born U.S. citizen, Hashmi pled guilty to material

support charges on April 27, 2010. He admitted that while he was a graduate

student in London, he allowed a roommate to store in his apartment ponchos,

189

DOJ Press Release, “Three California Men Charged with Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to al Shabaab,”

November 2, 2010, http://sandiego.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/sd110210.htm; United States v. Basaaly Saeed

Moalin, et al., Indictment, U.S. District Court, Southern District of California, November 2, 2010,

http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1409.pdf.

190

DOJ Press Release, “California Man Charged with Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to al Shabaab,”

December 3, 2010, http://sandiego.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/sd120310a.htm.

191

Ben Brumfield, “Four Somalis in U.S. Found Guilty of Supporting Terrorists Back Home,” CNN, February 23,

2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/23/us/somalia-al-shabaab/index.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=

feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+rss%2Fcnn_us+%28RSS%3A+U.S.%29. The Moalin case has been mentioned as an

instance in which National Security Agency collection programs had been used to help thwart a terrorist attack. See

CRS Report R43134, NSA Surveillance Leaks: Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted) and (name r

edacted).

192

Evan Perez, “U.S. Terror Suspect Arrested,” Wall Street Journal, June 3, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/

SB10001424052748703340904575285310199323440.html; DOJ Press Release, “Texas Man Indicted for Attempting

to Provide Material Support to Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,” June 3, 2010, http://houston.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/

pressrel10/ho060310.htm.

193

Ibid.

194

DOJ Press Release, “Texas Man Convicted for Attempting to Provide Material Support to Al Qaeda,” November 14,

2011, http://www.justice.gov/usao/txs/1News/Releases/2011%20November/111114%20Bujol.htm; DOJ Press Release,

“Texas Man Gets Max for Attempting to Provide Material Support to Al Qaeda,” May 24, 2012,

http://www.justice.gov/usao/txs/1News/Releases/2012%20May/120524%20Bujol.html.

195

DOJ Press Release, “Al Qaeda Supporter Pleads Guilty to Supporting Terrorist Organization,” May 19, 2010,

http://kansascity.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/kc051910.htm. Terry Frieden, “U.S. Citizen Pleads Guilty to Sending

Funds to al Qaeda,” CNN.com, May 19, 2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/05/19/

missouri.al.qaeda.funding.plea/index.html.

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American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat

sleeping bags, and waterproof socks destined for Al Qaeda. Hashmi also loaned

the individual $300 to travel to Waziristan, Pakistan, to deliver the goods.196

•

Raja Lahrasib Khan: On March 25, 2010, Khan, a naturalized U.S. citizen born

in Pakistan, was charged with providing material support (in the form of money)

to Al Qaeda. The criminal complaint alleges that Khan accepted $1,000 from an

undercover agent and assured him that the money would be used to purchase

weapons and possibly other supplies. In February of 2012, he pled guilty to

material support charges.197

•

Between November 2007 and March 2010, U.S. citizens Wesam El-Hanafi and

Sabirhan Hasanoff allegedly engaged in a scheme to, among other things,

provide computer expertise to and purchase seven Casio digital watches for Al

Qaeda.198 In June 2012, El-Hanafi and Hasanoff pled guilty to providing material

support Al Qaeda associates in Yemen and elsewhere and to conspiring to

provide material support to al Qaeda.199

Little Stomach for Suicide or Martyrdom

Relatively few of the terrorist conspiracies examined in this report clearly contained suicidal or

martyrdom overtones. Two terrorist plots clearly had suicide missions as core elements.

Najibullah Zazi and his associates planned their attack on New York’s subways as suicide

missions.

Additionally, some Americans from Minneapolis, Minnesota, who were recruited into al-Shabaab

reportedly committed suicide attacks. On October 29, 2008, al-Shabaab recruit Shirwa Ahmed

became the first known American suicide bomber when he drove an explosives-laden truck into a

government building in Somalia, one of five simultaneous assaults that killed 22 U.N. aid

workers and others.200 The FBI also identified Farah Mohamed Beledi as a suicide bomber who

196

DOJ Press Release, “U.S. Citizen Sentenced in Manhattan Federal Court to 15 Years in Prison for Conspiring to

Provide Material Support to Al Qaeda,” June 9, 2010, http://newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/nyfo060910.htm;

Benjamin Weiser, “Former Brooklyn College Student Admits He Conspired to Help Al Qaeda,” New York Times, April

28, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/28/nyregion/28hashmi.html; Allison Gendar, “Plea Gets Terror Thug 15

Years,” New York Daily News, April 28, 2010.

197

DOJ Press Release, “Chicago Man Pleads Guilty to Attempting to Provide Funds to Support al Qaeda in Pakistan,”

February 6, 2012, http://www.fbi.gov/chicago/press-releases/2012/chicago-man-pleads-guilty-to-attempting-toprovide-funds-to-support-al-qaeda-in-pakistan?utm_campaign=email-Immediate&utm_medium=email&utm_source=

chicago-press-releases&utm_content=69007; Mike Robinson, “Chicago Terrorism Suspect Pleads Not Guilty,”

Associated Press, April 5, 2010, http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/

ALeqM5i8cDBcu_QALQpoeOTNk3X03l3L9AD9ET4U6O0; DOJ Press Release, “Chicago Man Charged with

Providing Material Support to Al Qaeda by Attempting to Send Funds Overseas,” March 26, 2010,

http://www.justice.gov/usao/iln/pr/chicago/2010/pr0326_01.pdf.

198

DOJ Press Release, “Manhattan U.S. Attorney Charges Two Brooklyn Men with Conspiring to Provide Material

Support to al Qaeda,” April 30, 2010, http://newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/nyfo043010.htm; Benjamin

Weisser, “2 Ex-Brooklyn Men Charged in Terror Plot,” New York Times, April 30, 2010; http://www.nytimes.com/

2010/05/01/nyregion/01terror.html.

199

DOJ Press Release, “Two Brooklyn Men Plead Guilty in Manhattan Federal Court to Providing Material Support to

Al Qaeda,” June 18, 2012, http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/june12/hasanoffandelhenafipleas.html. See

also Benjamin Weiser, “Statements by Detained Terror Suspect Are Focus of Sentencing, and of Debate,” New York

Times, June 3, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/04/nyregion/statements-by-detained-egyptian-terrorismsuspect-are-focus-of-sentencing.html.

200

DOJ Press Release, “Terror Charges Unsealed in Minnesota against Eight Defendants,” November 23, 2009,

(continued...)

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American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat

died as he tried to detonate his suicide vest in a May 2011 attack in Mogadishu, Somalia.201

According to media reports, al-Shabaab has claimed that Abdisalan Hussein Ali purportedly blew

himself up while attacking African Union troops in Mogadishu in October 2011.202

Individuals in 16 other plots clearly expressed some level of willingness to engage in suicide

missions. For example, Daniel Maldonado told authorities that he would be willing to become a

suicide bomber if he were wounded and could not otherwise fight.203 Al Qaeda member and U.S.

citizen Bryant Neal Vinas wanted to become a suicide bomber but was rebuffed by the group.204

In emails intercepted by law enforcement authorities, Colleen LaRose (“Jihad Jane”) wrote that

she was prepared to be a martyr. And, in recordings of his conversations with an informant,

Shaker Masri stated that he would be willing to walk up to a group of U.S. Army soldiers and

blow himself up as a martyr.205

The Success of Lone Wolves

Lone wolves (Nidal Hasan, Abdulhakim Muhammad, Hasan Akbar, and Mohammed TaheriAzar) have conducted four of the five successful homegrown attacks since 9/11. Three other

plotters acted alone. The remaining plots have involved two or more participants in a group or

network of one type or another.206 Three of the four lone wolf attacks involved firearms, and they

targeted U.S. military personnel.

It is difficult to generalize from such a small pool of cases. However, the success of four solo

actors may highlight two contrasting points. First, law enforcement may face significant

challenges in identifying and stopping lone wolf terrorists involved in technically uncomplicated

plots unconnected to terrorist groups. Second, U.S. Law enforcement has been successful in

disrupting and dismantling homegrown terrorist groups or networks since 9/11. Bolstering this

point, undercover agents or cooperating witnesses infiltrated and monitored 37 of the plots.

(...continued)

http://minneapolis.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel09/mp112309.htm.

201

FBI Press Release, “FBI Announces Identity of Transitional Federal Government Checkpoint Suicide Bomber,”

June 9, 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/minneapolis/press-releases/2011/fbi-announces-identity-of-transitional-federalgovernment-checkpoint-suicide-bomber.

202

Josh Kron, “American Identified as Bomber in Attack on African Union in Somalia,” New York Times, October 30,

2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/31/world/africa/shabab-identify-american-as-bomber-in-somalia-attack.html.

See Mike Carter, “Somali Bomb Suspect Tied to Seattle,” The Seattle Times, September 24, 2009.

http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2009930567_somalia24m.html.

203

United States v. Daniel Joseph Maldonado, Superseding Criminal Complaint, U.S. District Court, Southern District

of Texas, February 13, 2007, http://www.foxnews.com/projects/pdf/Maldonado_Complaint.pdf.

204

Michael Powell, “U.S. Recruit Reveals How Qaeda Trains Foreigners,” New York Times, July 23, 2009,

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/24/nyregion/24terror.html.

205

United States v. Shaker Masri, Affidavit in support of Criminal Complaint, U.S. District Court Northern District of

Illinois Eastern Division, August 9, 2010, http://jnslp.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/masri-complaint1.pdf.

206

People who plotted with undercover government investigators and no one else are not counted as lone wolves for

this report, because the individuals in such cases believed that they were acting in concert with actual allies and not

alone.

Congressional Research Service

American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat

Varied Capabilities

Among the 74 homegrown plots since 9/11, the operational capabilities of participants diverge

greatly. Some evinced terrorist tradecraft such as bomb making skills. Others did not. As

mentioned elsewhere in this report, while it appears that the Tsarnaev brothers did not receive

formal bomb-making training, they were allegedly able to assemble working explosive devices

from instructions available on the Internet.

Two additional homegrown jihadist terrorist plots appear to stand out for the capability their

plotters. Both came to public attention in 2009. Both involved homegrown jihadists who had

strong ties to foreign terrorist organizations. Attorney General Eric Holder characterized one of

those plots—Najibullah Zazi’s plan to blow up explosives on the New York City subway—as

one of the most serious terrorist threats to our nation since September 11th, 2001, and were it

not for the combined efforts of the law enforcement and intelligence communities,

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