Geoengineering: Governance and Technology Policy
Congressional research reportNov 26, 2013
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
Geoengineering:
Governance and Technology Policy
(name redacted)
Specialist in Agricultural Conservation and Natural Resources Policy
(name redacted)
Analyst in Environmental Policy
November 26, 2013
Congressional Research Service
7-....
www.crs.gov
R41371
Geoengineering: Governance and Technology Policy
Summary
Climate change policies at both the national and international levels have traditionally focused on
measures to mitigate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and to adapt to the actual or anticipated
impacts of changes in the climate. As a participant in several international agreements on climate
change, the United States has joined with other nations to express concern about climate change.
Some recent technological advances and hypotheses, generally referred to as “geoengineering”
technologies, have created alternatives to traditional approaches to mitigating climate change. If
deployed, these new technologies could modify the Earth’s climate on a large scale. Moreover,
these new technologies may become available to foreign governments and entities in the private
sector to use unilaterally—without authorization from the United States government or an
international treaty—as was done in the summer of 2012 when an American citizen conducted an
ocean fertilization experiment off the coast of Canada.
The term “geoengineering” describes an array of technologies that aim, through large-scale and
deliberate modifications of the Earth’s energy balance, to reduce temperatures and counteract
anthropogenic climate change. Most of these technologies are at the conceptual and research
stages, and their effectiveness at reducing global temperatures has yet to be proven. Moreover,
very few studies have been published that document the cost, environmental effects, sociopolitical impacts, and legal implications of geoengineering. If geoengineering technologies were
to be deployed, they are expected to have the potential to cause significant transboundary effects.
In general, geoengineering technologies are categorized as either a carbon dioxide removal
(CDR) method or a solar radiation management (SRM) method. CDR methods address the
warming effects of greenhouse gases by removing carbon dioxide (CO2) from the atmosphere.
CDR methods include ocean fertilization, and carbon capture and sequestration. SRM methods
address climate change by increasing the reflectivity of the Earth’s atmosphere or surface.
Aerosol injection and space-based reflectors are examples of SRM methods. SRM methods do
not remove greenhouse gases from the atmosphere, but can be deployed faster with relatively
immediate global cooling results compared to CDR methods.
To date, there is limited federal involvement in, or oversight of, geoengineering. However, some
states as well as some federal agencies, notably the Environmental Protection Agency,
Department of Energy, Department of Agriculture, and the Department of Defense, have taken
actions related to geoengineering research or projects. At the international level, there is no
international agreement or organization governing the full spectrum of possible geoengineering
activities. Nevertheless, provisions of many international agreements, including those relating to
climate change, maritime pollution, and air pollution, would likely inform the types of
geoengineering activities that state parties to these agreements might choose to pursue. In 2010,
the Convention on Biological Diversity adopted provisions calling for member parties to abstain
from geoengineering unless the parties have fully considered the risks and impacts of those
activities on biodiversity.
With the possibility that geoengineering technologies may be developed and that climate change
will remain an issue of global concern, policymakers may determine whether geoengineering
warrants attention at either the federal or international level. If so, policymakers will also need to
consider whether geoengineering can be effectively addressed by amendments to existing laws
and international agreements or, alternatively, whether new laws and international treaties would
need to be developed.
Congressional Research Service
Geoengineering: Governance and Technology Policy
Contents
Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1
Geoengineering Governance............................................................................................................ 3
Risk Factors ............................................................................................................................... 4
Policy Considerations ................................................................................................................ 6
Geoengineering Technologies .......................................................................................................... 9
Carbon Dioxide Removal ........................................................................................................ 10
Carbon Capture and Sequestration .................................................................................... 10
Ocean Fertilization ............................................................................................................ 12
Afforestation...................................................................................................................... 13
Enhanced Weathering ........................................................................................................ 14
Solar Radiation Management .................................................................................................. 15
Enhanced Albedo (Surface and Cloud) ............................................................................. 16
Aerosol Injection ............................................................................................................... 18
Space-Based Reflectors ..................................................................................................... 19
The Debate over the Methods of Oversight ................................................................................... 20
The Status Quo ........................................................................................................................ 20
Threshold for Oversight .......................................................................................................... 20
Methods for Oversight ............................................................................................................. 21
Moratoriums or Bans ............................................................................................................... 23
The Debate over Oversight and Governmental Involvement ........................................................ 23
State Policies Addressing Geoengineering .............................................................................. 23
National Policies Addressing Geoengineering ........................................................................ 24
Current U.S. Policies Addressing Geoengineering ........................................................... 24
Potential Roles for Federal Agencies and Other Federally Funded Entities ..................... 26
International Cooperation on Geoengineering......................................................................... 29
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 38
Figures
Figure 1. Geoengineering Technology Options ............................................................................... 9
Figure 2. Cloud Whitening Schematic ........................................................................................... 18
Tables
Table 1. Scientific Underpinnings for Different Perspectives on Geoengineering .......................... 7
Table 2. Six Types of Functions Federal Entities Can Perform and Selected Federal
Entities Authorized to Perform Them ......................................................................................... 27
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 39
Congressional Research Service
Geoengineering: Governance and Technology Policy
Introduction
Climate change has received considerable policy attention in the past several years both
internationally and within the United States.1 A major report released by the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change in 2013 found widespread evidence of climate warming, and many are
concerned that climate change may be severe and rapid with potentially catastrophic
consequences for humans and the functioning of ecosystems.2 The National Academies maintains
that the climate change challenge is unlikely to be solved with any single strategy or by the
people of any single country.3
Policy efforts to address climate change use a variety of methods, frequently including mitigation
and adaptation.4 Mitigation activities aim to reduce greenhouse gases (GHGs) from the Earth’s
atmosphere. Carbon dioxide is the dominant greenhouse gas emitted naturally through the carbon
cycle and through human activities like the burning of fossil fuels. Other commonly discussed
GHGs include methane, nitrous oxide, hydroflourocarbons, perflourocarbons, and sulfur
hexaflouride. Adaptation activities seek to improve an individual’s or institution’s ability to cope
with or avoid harmful impacts of climate change, and to take advantage of potential beneficial
ones.
Some observers are concerned that current mitigation and adaptation strategies may not prevent
change quickly enough to avoid extreme climate disruptions. Geoengineering has been suggested
by some as a timely additional method to mitigation and adaptation that could be included in
climate change policy efforts. Geoengineering technologies, applied to climate, aim to achieve
large-scale and deliberate modifications of the Earth’s energy balance in order to reduce
temperatures and counteract anthropogenic (i.e., human-made) climate change; these climate
modifications would not be limited by country boundaries. As an unproven concept,
geoengineering raises substantial environmental and ethical concerns for some observers.5 Others
respond that the uncertainties of geoengineering may only be resolved through further scientific
and technical examination.6
Proposed geoengineering technologies vary greatly in terms of their technological characteristics
and possible consequences. They are generally classified in two main groups:
1
For more information on the policy issues associated with climate change, see CRS Report R41973, Climate Change:
Conceptual Approaches and Policy Tools and CRS Report R43230, Climate Change Legislation in the 113th Congress.
2
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2013, the Physical Science Basis: Working Group I
Contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC, 2013 (AR5), http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg1/#.Uo-dFJiMcs .
3
The National Academies, Ecological Impacts of Climate Change, 2009, http://dels-old.nas.edu/dels/rpt_briefs/
ecological_impacts.pdf.
4
H.R. 2454, the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (Waxman/Markey), and S. 1733, the Clean Energy
Jobs and American Power Act (Kerry/Boxer), were the primary energy and climate change legislative vehicles in the
111th Congress. For a comparison of key greenhouse gas emission control provisions in both the House and Senate, see
CRS Report R40556, Market-Based Greenhouse Gas Control: Selected Proposals in the 111th Congress.
5
Alan Robock, “20 Reasons Why Geoengineering May Be a Bad Idea,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June
2008.
6
Jamais Cascio, “It’s Time to Cool the Planet,” The Wall Street Journal, June 15, 2009; and American Meteorological
Society, “Proposals to Geoengineer Climate Require More Research,” press release, July 21, 2009,
http://www.ametsoc.org/amsnews/2009geoengineering.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
1
Geoengineering: Governance and Technology Policy
•
Solar radiation management (SRM) method: technologies that would increase the
reflectivity, or albedo, of the Earth’s atmosphere or surface, and
•
Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) method: technologies or practices that would
remove CO2 and other GHGs from the atmosphere.
Much of the geoengineering technology discussion centers on SRM methods (e.g., enhanced
albedo, aerosol injection). SRM methods could be deployed relatively quickly if necessary, and
their impact on the climate would be more immediate than that of CDR methods. Because SRM
methods do not reduce GHG from the atmosphere, global warming could resume at a rapid pace
if a deployed SRM method fails or is terminated at any time. At least one relatively simple SRM
method is already being deployed with government assistance.7 Other proposed SRM methods
are at the conceptualization stage. CDR methods include afforestation, ocean fertilization, and the
use of biomass to capture and store carbon.
Prior to 2013, neither the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
nor the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) had made any official mention of
geoengineering science or technology in their negotiation texts or their reports. However, in the
IPCC’s Scientific-Technical Assessment for its Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), released on
September 26, 2013, the Panel addressed for the first time the current status of geoengineering
research and its potential impacts as follows:
Methods that aim to deliberately alter the climate system to counter climate change, termed
geoengineering, have been proposed. Limited evidence precludes a comprehensive
quantitative assessment of both Solar Radiation Management (SRM) and Carbon Dioxide
Removal (CDR) and their impact on the climate system. CDR methods have biogeochemical
and technological limitations to their potential on a global scale. There is insufficient
knowledge to quantify how much CO2 emissions could be partially offset by CDR on a
century timescale. Modeling indicates that SRM methods, if realizable, have the potential to
substantially offset a global temperature rise, but they would also modify the global water
cycle, and would not reduce ocean acidification. [Additionally, scaling SRM to substantial
levels would carry the risk that if] SRM were terminated for any reason, there is high
confidence that global surface temperatures would rise very rapidly to values consistent with
the greenhouse gas forcing. CDR and SRM methods carry side effects and long-term
consequences on a global scale.8
Neither the 112th nor the 113th Congress, thus far, has taken any legislative action on
geoengineering. In 2009, the House Science and Technology Committee of the 111th Congress
held hearings on geoengineering that examined the “potential environmental risks and benefits of
various proposals, associated domestic and international governance issues, evaluation
mechanisms and criteria, research and development (R&D) needs, and economic rationales
supporting the deployment of geoengineering activities.”9 Some foreign governments, including
the United Kingdom’s, as well as scientists from Germany and India, have considered engaging in
7
Enhanced albedo is one SRM effort currently being undertaken by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. See the
Enhanced Albedo section below for more information.
8
This summary statement is excerpted from IPCC AR5 op cit., Summary for Policy Makers, p. 27, http://www.ipcc.ch/
report/ar5/wg1/#.Uo_HV-JiMcs. More detailed discussion of geoengineering can be found in the following sections of
the full report: “Box TS.7,” “Chapter 6: Carbon and Other Biogeochemical Cycles,” and “Chapter 7: Clouds and
Aerosols.”
9
U.S. Congress, House Committee on Science and Technology, Geoengineering: Assessing the Implications of LargeScale Climate Intervention, 111th Cong., 1st sess., November 5, 2009.
Congressional Research Service
2
Geoengineering: Governance and Technology Policy
the research or deployment of geoengineering technologies because of concern over the slow
progress of emissions reductions, the uncertainties of climate sensitivity, the possible existence of
climate thresholds (or “tipping points”), and the political, social, and economic impact of
pursuing aggressive GHG mitigation strategies.10
Congressional interest in geoengineering has focused primarily on whether geoengineering is a
realistic, effective, and appropriate tool for the United States to use to address climate change.
However, if geoengineering technologies are deployed by the United States, another government,
or a private entity, several new concerns are likely to arise related to government support for, and
oversight of, geoengineering as well as the transboundary and long-term effects of
geoengineering. Such was the case in the summer of 2012, when an American citizen conducted a
geoengineering experiment (ocean fertilization) off the west coast of Canada that some say
violated two international conventions.11
This report is intended as a primer on the policy issues, science, and governance of
geoengineering technologies. The report will first set the policy parameters under which
geoengineering technologies may be considered. It will then describe selected technologies in
detail and discuss their status. The third section provides a discussion of possible approaches to
governmental involvement in, and oversight of, geoengineering, including a summary of
domestic and international instruments and institutions that may affect geoengineering projects.
Geoengineering Governance
Geoengineering technologies aim to modify the Earth’s energy balance in order to reduce
temperatures and counteract anthropogenic climate change through large-scale and deliberate
modifications. Implementation of some of the technologies may be controlled locally, while other
technologies may require global input on implementation. Additionally, whether a technology can
be controlled or not once implemented differs by technology type. Little research has been done
on most geoengineering methods, and no major directed research programs are in place. Peer
reviewed literature is scant, and deployment of the technology—either through controlled field
tests or commercial enterprise—has been minimal.12 Most interested observers agree that more
research would be required to test the feasibility, effectiveness, cost, social and environmental
impacts, and the possible unintended consequences of geoengineering before deployment; others
10
A tipping point is defined as a critical threshold at which a tiny perturbation can qualitatively alter the state or
development of a system. For more discussion on climate sensitivity, thresholds, and other scientific concerns, see CRS
Report R43229, Climate Change Science: Key Points. For international obligations pertaining to climate change, see
CRS Report R41175, International Agreements on Climate Change: Selected Legal Questions; and CRS Report
R40001, A U.S.-Centric Chronology of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Timothy M.
Lenton, Hermann Held, and Elmar Kriegler, et al., “Tipping Elements in the Earth’s Climate System,” Proceedings of
the National Academies of Sciences, vol. 105, no. 6 (February 12, 2008), pp. 1786-1793; The Royal Society,
Geoengineering the Climate: Science, Governance, and Uncertainty, September 2009; “Nature,” Grazing Limits
Effects of Ocean Fertilization, 2009.
11
Martin Lukacs, “World’s biggest geoengineering experiment ‘violates’ UN rules,” The Guardian, October 15, 2012.
12
Research has been minimal but not absent. In 2008, a German-Indian joint research venture on ocean fertilization
produced significant debate among Parties to the London Convention and the Convention on Biological Diversity
before being allowed to continue. Commercially, several companies, including Climos, Planktos, and Mantria, have
investigated avenues through which to use geoengineering techniques in the carbon markets by selling emission offsets
for ocean fertilization and biochar sequestration. Discussion of these and other examples can be found in Mason
Inman’s article, “Planning for Plan B,” Nature Reports Climate Change, Vol. 4, January 2010.
Congressional Research Service
3
Geoengineering: Governance and Technology Policy
reject exploration of the options as too risky. The uncertainties have led some policymakers to
consider the need and the role for governmental oversight to guide research in the short term and
to oversee potential deployment in the long term. Such governance structures, both domestic and
international, could either support or constrain geoengineering activities, depending on the
decisions of policymakers. As both technological development and policy considerations for
geoengineering are in their early stages, several questions of governance remain in play:
•
What risk factors and policy considerations enter into the debate over
geoengineering activities and government oversight?
•
At what point, if ever, should there be government oversight of geoengineering
activities?
•
If there is government oversight, what form should it take?
•
If there is government oversight, who should be responsible for it?
•
If there is publicly funded research and development, what should it cover and
which disciplines should be engaged in it?
Risk Factors
As a new and emerging set of technologies potentially able to address climate change,
geoengineering possesses many risk factors that must be taken into policy considerations. From a
research perspective, the risk of geoengineering activities most often rests in the uncertainties of
the new technology (i.e., the risk of failure, accident, or unintended consequences). However,
many observers believe that the greater risk in geoengineering activities may lie in the social,
ethical, legal, and political uncertainties associated with deployment. Given these risks, there is
an argument that appropriate mechanisms for government oversight should be established before
the federal government and its agencies take steps to promote geoengineering technologies and
before new geoengineering projects are commenced. Yet, the uncertainty behind the technologies
makes it unclear which methods, if any, may ever mature to the point of being deemed
sufficiently effective, affordable, safe, and timely as to warrant potential deployment.13 Some of
the more significant risks factors associated with geoengineering are as follows:14
•
Technology Control Dilemma. An analytical impasse inherent in all emerging
technologies is that potential risks may be foreseen in the design phase but can
only be proven and resolved through actual research, development, and
demonstration. Ideally, appropriate safeguards are put in place during the early
stages of conceptualization and development, but anticipating the evolution of a
new technology can be difficult. By the time a technology is widely deployed, it
may be impossible to build desirable oversight and risk management provisions
without major disruptions to established interests. Flexibility is often required to
13
See The Royal Society, Geoengineering the Climate: Science, Governance, and Uncertainty, 61 (2009), available for
download at http://royalsociety.org/Geoengineering-the-climate.
14
Sources: “Technology control dilemma” as outlined by the Royal Society from a definition in D. Collingridge, The
Social Control of Technology, Francis Pinter: New York, 1980. “Reversibility” and “encapsulation” as defined by the
Royal Society report, op. cit. “Commercial involvement” and “public engagement” as defined by the Royal Society
report as well as broached in many of the policy articles debating the acceptability of geoengineering research and
implementation.
Congressional Research Service
4
Geoengineering: Governance and Technology Policy
both support investigative research and constrain potentially harmful
deployment.
•
Reversibility. Risk mitigation relies on the ability to cease a technology program
and terminate its adverse effects in a short period of time. In principle, all
geoengineering options could be abandoned on short notice, with either an instant
cessation of direct climate effects or a small time lag after abandonment.
However, the issue of reversibility applies to more than just the technologies
themselves. Given the importance of internal adjustments and feedbacks in the
climate system—still imperfectly understood—it is unlikely that all secondary
effects from large-scale deployment would end immediately. Also, choices made
regarding geoengineering methods may influence other social, economic, and
technological choices regarding climate science. Advancing geoengineering
options in lieu of effectively mitigating GHG emissions, for example, could
result in a number of adverse effects, including ocean acidification, stresses on
biodiversity, climate sensitivity shocks, and other irreversible consequences.
Further, investing financially in the physical infrastructure to support
geoengineering may create a strong economic resistance to reversing research
and deployment activities.
•
Encapsulation. Risk mitigation also relies on whether a technology program is
modular and contained or whether it involves the release of materials into the
wider environment. The issue can be framed in the context of pollution (i.e.,
encapsulated technologies are often viewed as more “ethical” in that they are
seen as non-polluting). Several geoengineering technologies are demonstrably
non-encapsulated, and their release and deployment into the wider environment
may lead to technical uncertainties, impacts on non-participants, and complex
policy choices. But encapsulated technologies may still have localized
environmental impacts, depending on the nature, size, and location of the
application. The need for regulatory action may arise as much from the indirect
impacts of activities on agro-forestry, species, and habitat as from the direct
impacts of released materials in atmospheric or oceanic ecosystems.
•
Commercial Involvement. The role of private-sector engagement in the
development and promotion of geoengineering may be debated. Commercial
involvement, including competition, may be positive in that it mobilizes
innovation and capital investment, which could lead to the development of more
effective and less costly technologies at a faster rate than in the public sector.
However, commercial involvement could bypass or neglect social, economic, and
environmental risk assessments in favor of what one commentator refers to as
“irresponsible entrepreneurial behavior.”15 Private-sector engagement would
likely require some form of public subsidies or GHG emission pricing to
encourage investment, as well as additional considerations including ownership
models, intellectual property rights, and trade and transfer mechanisms for the
dissemination of the technologies.
15
See John Virgoe’s comments in the “Uncorrected Transcript of Oral Evidence,” presented before the U.K. House of
Commons Science and Technology Committee on January 13, 2010. Please note that the uncorrected transcript is not
yet approved as a formal record of the proceedings. Transcript can be found at http://www.parliament.uk/
parliamentary_committees/science_technology/s_t_geoengineering_inquiry.cfm.
Congressional Research Service
5
Geoengineering: Governance and Technology Policy
•
Public Engagement. The consequences of geoengineering—including both
benefits and risks discussed above—could affect people and communities across
the world. Public attitudes toward geoengineering, and public engagement in the
formation, development, and execution of proposed governance, could have a
critical bearing on the future of the technologies. Perceptions of risks, levels of
trust, transparency of actions, provisions for liabilities and compensation, and
economies of investment could play a significant role in the political feasibility
of geoengineering. Public acceptance may require a wider dialogue between
scientists, policymakers, and the public.
Policy Considerations
Since geoengineering activities are intended to affect the climate of the planet, their consequences
implicate policy considerations at both the national and international level. Accordingly, whether
a country or region deems these activities, and their potential consequences, acceptable will likely
depend not only on the scientific and technical underpinnings for the geoengineering technology
involved, but also by a range of social, legal, and political factors that vary across countries and
cultures. For example, while some may view geoengineering through the lens of religious and
ethical concerns about its potential impacts, others may feel that the risk of climate inaction is too
great and, therefore, that constraining geoengineering activities is as morally hazardous as
promoting and engaging in geoengineering activities.
Public opinion on geoengineering is difficult to gauge at this early stage. It is likely to both
evolve as more information becomes available and vary depending on the particular technology
being discussed. Nevertheless, a 2009 report by the United Kingdom’s Royal Society,16 which is
widely considered to be the first comprehensive analysis of geoengineering technologies, has
broadly identified three categories of perspectives held within the scientific community about the
deployment of geoengineering technologies:
•
Geoengineering is a dangerous manipulation of Earth systems and therefore
intrinsically unethical;
•
Geoengineering is strictly an insurance policy against major mitigation failure;
and
•
Geoengineering will help buy back time lost during international mitigation
negotiations.
The following table identifies and explains the scientific underpinnings for many of the
perspectives on geoengineering that have been articulated to date.
16
The Royal Society, Geoengineering the Climate: Science, Governance, and Uncertainty, 61 (2009), at
http://royalsociety.org/Geoengineering-the-climate.
Congressional Research Service
6
Table 1. Scientific Underpinnings for Different Perspectives on Geoengineering
Primary Concern
Arguments in Favor
Arguments Against
Climate uncertainty
Uncertainties in the Earth’s climate may lead to
catastrophic climate change and necessitate the
deployment of geoengineering technologies. Adequate
research, modeling, field tests, and evaluation are
required to accumulate empirical evidence to prepare
for, and to hedge against, a crisis.
Inadequate information about the Earth’s climate system
creates technical, political, social, and economic risk in
geoengineering activities. Deployment of unknown
technologies may lead to unintended consequences.
Prudence suggests that technologies should be fully vetted
for potential negative environmental or social impacts prior
to deployment and a “precautionary approach” should be
applied to technologies that pose a threat of serious of
irreversible damage. Conceivably, some technologies, once
developed, could be used adversely by hostile entities and
pose threats to security.
Mitigation of GHG release
Current mitigation efforts are too slow or inadequate
to achieve the emission reductions needed to reduce
long-term accumulation of CO2 and avoid dangerous
changes to the climate. Geoengineering technologies
may be required to augment existing mitigation
strategies or to replace failing ones in order to avert a
potential climate crisis.
Geoengineering activities may make permissible the
continuation of business-as-usual practices and weaken
conventional mitigation efforts (the “Moral Hazard”
argument). In terms of climate change, this may lead to some
early adopters asserting that geoengineering provides
“insurance” against crisis and could embolden stakeholders
to act more carelessly.
Cost of geoengineering activities
The cost of geoengineering activities could be quite
small compared to the economics of mitigation or
adaptation strategies. Technological innovation and
entrepreneurship would only lower these costs.
It is difficult to assess the true cost of geoengineering
schemes due to the uncertainties of potential side effects.
Investment in market mechanisms may distort
geoengineering research and deployment instead of
facilitating it. Countries, corporations, and even individuals
with means to pursue geoengineering may be tempted to do
so out of commercial or entrepreneurial considerations that
bypass or neglect risk assessments of social, economic, and
environmental effects.
CRS-7
Primary Concern
Arguments in Favor
Arguments Against
Contingency planning for climate change
Both society and the scientific community are obliged
to invest enough knowledge and resources into
geoengineering that it may serve as a contingency plan
in case of a climate emergency. Research in and of
itself is neither good nor bad, and information about
geoengineering technologies is beneficial to have “on
the shelf.”
Societies rarely invest adequately in contingency plans.
Innovative and entrepreneurial organizations seldom
mobilize themselves to put complex technologies “on the
shelf.” Government endorsement prematurely stamps
geoengineering activities as acceptable; and given the nascent
state of understanding in the science, a rush toward
implementation may result in potentially dangerous
proposals being mistakenly promoted and potentially useful
techniques mistakenly ignored.
Governance of technologies and their deployment
Without appropriate frameworks or oversight,
geoengineering technologies could be researched and
deployed unilaterally by public or private actors to the
detriment of other countries or populations that did
not consent to the geoengineering project. In that
situation, those harmed could find themselves unable
both to remedy the harm and to hold the actor
responsible liable for the damage suffered. Moreover,
absent governance, geoengineering activities could be
“spatially heterogeneous,” that is, disproportionately
impact particular populations and ecosystems.
If governments choose to ban or substantially restrict
geoengineering, they might be constraining those actors
most likely to test, assess, and deploy the technologies
responsibly and, therefore leave geoengineering in the hands
of the least transparent and least trustworthy actors.
Moreover, too much government involvement could stifle
experimentation, innovation, and entrepreneurship in
technologies that could prove vital to averting excessive
global warming.
Source: Congressional Research Service.
CRS-8
Geoengineering: Governance and Technology Policy
Geoengineering Technologies
A wide range of geoengineering technologies have been proposed to address climate change.
Geoengineering technologies attempt to mitigate continued warming of the Earth’s climate. The
technologies vary in complexity from planting trees for carbon sequestration to launching mirrors
into space for sunlight reflection. Most of the technologies are not yet proven and are at the
theoretical or research phase. Several of the proposed technologies were recently conceived; if
they prove feasible and effective, they would require large amounts of funding for full-scale
deployment; and currently they generally lack political, scientific, and public support.
Figure 1. Geoengineering Technology Options
Source: T. M. Lenton and N.E. Vaughan, “The Radiative Forcing Potential of Different Climate Geoengineering
Options,” Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics, vol. 9, no. 15 (August 6, 2009). Adapted by CRS.
Note: The figure displays engineered flow of carbon as a separate geoengineering technology option. However,
this report considers “engineered flow of carbon” technologies as a CDR technique.
The two main categories of geoengineering technologies are carbon dioxide removal (CDR) and
solar radiation management (SRM) (see Figure 1). CDR methods remove CO2 from the
atmosphere. SRM methods increase the reflectivity of the Earth’s atmosphere or surface, thus
reducing incoming solar radiation.17
17
House of Commons (U.K.) Science and Technology Committee, “The Regulation of Geoengineering,” Fifth Report
of Session 2009-10, March 18, 2010, p. 20, http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
9
Geoengineering: Governance and Technology Policy
Carbon Dioxide Removal
Carbon dioxide is the primary GHG that has been linked to increases in atmospheric temperature.
CDR methods remove CO2 from the atmosphere and are intended to cool the planet by reducing
the absorption of heat in the atmosphere. CDR methods involve the uptake and storage of CO2 by
biological, physical, or chemical means. CO2 may be stored (or sequestered) via afforestation,18
ocean fertilization, weathering of certain sedimentary rocks, or combining carbon capture and
storage technology with the production of biofuels, among other approaches. The duration of
carbon storage differs depending on the approach. For instance, carbon storage may last from
decades to centuries for ocean fertilization, or thousands of years for weathering of carbonate
rock.19
Although CDR techniques could lower atmospheric CO2 levels eventually leading to a decrease
in temperatures, they would require considerably more time to have an impact on climate change
than SRM techniques.20 Thus, CDR techniques are not ideal methods to deploy if immediate
alteration of the climate is necessary. While the impacts of CDR methods could take years to
realize, many CDR methods could be governed more easily than SRM methods by existing laws.
For example, carbon capture and storage from a biomass power plant could be subject to the same
environmental and energy laws as carbon capture and storage from a coal-fired power plant.
This section describes some of the better-examined CDR methods: carbon capture and
sequestration, ocean fertilization, afforestation, and enhanced weathering.
Carbon Capture and Sequestration
Carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) is the capture and storage of CO2 to prevent it from
being released to the atmosphere. CCS generally refers to the process of using technology to
remove CO2 released from anthropogenic sources rather than CO2 that is captured naturally as
part of the Earth’s carbon cycle.21 Because CO2 emissions from anthropogenic sources continue
to increase CO2 levels in the atmosphere, CCS engineering technologies are being pursued for
three sources: biomass, bioenergy, and fossil fuels (mainly power generation).
CCS technology tends to be labeled a geoengineering technology only if the source is biomass or
bioenergy. It is not clear why the distinction of labeling CCS as a geoengineering technology
(...continued)
cmsctech/221/22102.htm.
18
Afforestation is the creation of forests on land that has not recently been, or has never been, forest land.
19
The Royal Society, Geoengineering the Climate: Science, Governance, and Uncertainty, 61 (2009), available for
download at http://royalsociety.org/Geoengineering-the-climate.
20
U.S. Congress, House Committee on Science and Technology, Subcommittee on Energy and Environment,
Geoengineering II: The Scientific Basis and Engineering Challenges, statement of David Keith Canada Research Chair
in Energy and Environment University of Calgary, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., February 4, 2010.
21
Vegetation and plankton naturally capture CO2 and sequester it in matter. A significant fraction of the CO2 released
from fossil fuel combustion is being stored in “natural” carbon sinks in the oceans and land vegetation.
CCS is a technology that can sequester large quantities of CO2 from point sources of GHG emissions, mainly fossil fuel
combustion. CCS would reduce the amount of CO2 released into the atmosphere while allowing fossil fuel use to
continue. For more information on CCS from fossil fuels, see CRS Report R42532, Carbon Capture and Sequestration
(CCS): A Primer.
Congressional Research Service
10
Geoengineering: Governance and Technology Policy
depends on the source from which carbon will be captured, and not its outcome, which is the
reduction in the amount of CO2 released to the atmosphere.22 According to this view, CCS from
fossil fuels may be excluded as a geoengineering technology because fossil fuels are carbonpositive, while bioenergy and biomass are viewed as carbon-neutral or carbon-negative.23
Additional intervention could increase the amount of CO2 that is sequestered. Biomass that
otherwise would not be used for crops or energy production could be buried in the land or deep
ocean to slow the rate at which CO2 is released to the atmosphere. Carbon can also be sequestered
if biomass is pyrolyzed into biochar: a charcoal produced under high temperatures using crop
residues, animal manure, or other organic material with the potential to sequester carbon in the
soil for hundreds to thousands of years at an estimate.24 Large-scale carbon capture that uses
biomass would require a steady biomass supply and a place to store it.
The process to capture CO2 is relatively well understood compared to sequestering CO2
permanently in geologic reservoirs. However, CCS technology for fossil fuels for the purposes of
permanent sequestration has not been deployed at the commercial scale thus far due to costs, and,
until recently, due to the absence of a regulatory requirement to reduce CO2 emissions. Arguably,
the September 2013 rule proposed by EPA to limit CO2 emissions from new power plants may
change the policy incentives for incorporating CCS into new power plant design and
construction.25 Carbon dioxide has been captured on a small scale for commercial applications for
a few decades (e.g., for soda production, to enhance oil and gas recovery), but not on a large scale
to sequester CO2 as a long-term climate change mitigation method. Estimates of CO2
sequestration performance are based partially on oil and gas recovery efforts, which have
sequestered CO2 for approximately 30 years. It may take at least 10-15 years before CCS for
fossil fuels is ready for commercial deployment.26
In addition to crop-based carbon capture, bioenergy generation coupled with CO2 capture and
sequestration (BECS) could sequester carbon. BECS consists of three phases: planting and
growing a biomass crop such as switchgrass, harvesting the crop for biofuel production, and
capturing and storing the carbon released during this process.27 BECS is expected to use
technology similar to CCS technology used for capturing CO2 from fossil fuel combustion.28
When biomass is used to generate electricity, the CO2 released in the process may be sequestered
22
House of Commons (U.K.) Science and Technology Committee, “The Regulation of Geoengineering,” Fifth Report
of Session 2009-10, March 18, 2010, p. 20, http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/
cmsctech/221/22102.htm.; The Royal Society, Geoengineering the Climate: Science, Governance and Uncertainty,
September 2009.
23
For more information on the carbon neutrality of one type of bioenergy, see CRS Report R41603, Is Biopower
Carbon Neutral?
24
For more information on biochar, see CRS Report R40186, Biochar: Examination of an Emerging Concept to
Sequester Carbon. For more information on agricultural practices that sequester carbon, see CRS Report RL33898,
Climate Change: The Role of the U.S. Agriculture Sector.
25
For more information, see CRS Report R42496, Carbon Capture and Sequestration: Research, Development, and
Demonstration at the U.S. Department of Energy.
26
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Coal Power Plants: Opportunities Exist for DOE to Provide Better
Information on the Maturity of Key Technologies to Reduce Carbon Dioxide Emissions, GAO-10-675, June 2010,
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10675.pdf.
27
Peter Read and Jonathan Lermit, “Bio-energy with Carbon Storage (BECS): A Sequential Decision,” Energy, 2005,
pp. 2654-2671.
28
Past Congresses have considered several bills to promote the development and deployment of CCS from fossil fuel
sources.
Congressional Research Service
11
Geoengineering: Governance and Technology Policy
in geologic formations, in the same way as it would be used in a fossil-fuel generation CCS
operation.
BECS is an unproven CDR method because no commercial-scale CCS facility exists for either
fossil fuels or bioenergy. Many of the lessons learned from CCS in the fossil fuels sector over the
next few years should be applicable to BECS. BECS deployment could take as long or longer
than fossil-fuel CCS. Some contend that BECS could not be deployed fast enough to have a
significant impact on climate change.29
One of the main challenges to CCS deployment is the lack of a regulatory framework to permit
geologic sequestration of CO2. An integrated structure would be necessary to deploy CCS at a
large scale, whether for fossil fuels or bioenergy. This structure involves identifying who owns
the sequestered CO2, where to sequester the CO2, defining what constitutes leakage, identifying
who will be held liable if the sequestered CO2 leaks, developing a monitoring and maintenance
plan, and developing a robust pipeline infrastructure specifically for CO2 that will be sequestered,
among other things.30 Some contend that if CCS were implemented on a large scale for both fossil
fuels and bioenergy, there would be less motivation to reduce the use of fossil fuels. An increase
in BECS, however, might not face the same argument. Further, BECS might be considered
“carbon-negative” whereas CCS from fossil fuel combustion is at least slightly carbon-positive.31
Additionally, there is concern that CO2 storage from fossil fuels, and perhaps bioenergy, may lead
to contamination of underground sources of drinking water. In 2010, the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency finalized a rule that sets requirements for geologic sequestration of carbon
dioxide, using the authority granted the agency in the 1974 Safe Drinking Water Act.32
Ocean Fertilization
Ocean fertilization is the addition of nutrients such as iron to the ocean to expedite carbon
sequestration from phytoplankton.33 Phytoplankton photosynthesize CO2, retaining the carbon in
their cells, which then is sequestered as carbon in the deep ocean when they die and settle through
the waters. Studies suggest that a ton of iron added to certain parts of the ocean could remove
30,000 to 110,000 tons of carbon from the air.34 Ocean fertilization is estimated to cost
approximately $30 to $300 per ton of carbon sequestered.35
29
Christian Azar, Kristian Lindgren, and Eric Larson, “Carbon Capture and Storage from Fossil Fuels and Biomass—
Costs and Potential Role in Stabilizing the Atmosphere,” Climatic Change, vol. 74, no. 1-3 (2006).
30
For more information on pipeline construction challenges for CCS, see CRS Report RL33971, Carbon Dioxide
(CO2) Pipelines for Carbon Sequestration: Emerging Policy Issues.
31
Carbon-positive fuels are drawn from fossil fuel deposits and are burned, releasing CO2 into the atmosphere. Carbonneutral fuels absorb CO2 as they grow and release the same carbon back into the atmosphere when burnt. Carbonnegative fuels absorb CO2 as they grow and release less than this amount into the atmosphere when used as fuel, either
through directing part of the biomass as biochar back into the soil or through CCS.
32
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “EPA Finalizes Rules to Foster Safe Carbon Storage Technology Actions,”
press release, November 22, 2010, http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/0/
2300005FBC11568D852577E3006058BD. The Safe Drinking Water Act gives the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) the authority to regulate underground injections of numerous substances. For more information on the
Safe Drinking Water Act and the Underground Injection Control Program, see CRS Report RL31243, Safe Drinking
Water Act (SDWA): A Summary of the Act and Its Major Requirements .
33
Iron is the primary nutrient discussed in literature for ocean fertilization, although other nutrients (e.g., nitrogen) may
be used. References to ocean fertilization in this report refer to iron as the fertilizing nutrient unless otherwise noted.
34
“Fertilizing the Ocean with Iron: Should We Add Iron to the Sea to Help Reduce Greenhouse Gases in the Air,”
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
12
Geoengineering: Governance and Technology Policy
The ecological, economic, and climatological impacts of ocean fertilization, in both the short term
and the long term, are uncertain.36 Some suggest that ocean fertilization may enhance fish stocks
and augment production of dimethylsulfide, a chemical that may cool the atmosphere, but has
undesirable characteristics at high concentrations.37 Others are concerned that ocean fertilization
will lead to ocean acidification, additional emissions of potent greenhouse gases, and reduction of
oxygen to levels not habitable by certain species. Critics also argue that ocean fertilization is not
an effective way to combat climate change because the technique requires widespread long-term
implementation on a continual basis.38
Studies have yet to demonstrate that ocean fertilization will work as a long-term carbon
sequestration strategy. Further research is likely needed to answer numerous questions: Will
phytoplankton increase in sufficient numbers to sequester significant amounts of CO2? How long
will the carbon stay sequestered? What disruptions will occur to marine ecosystems? Currently,
there are no analogues to compare what may occur if ocean fertilization is deployed on a large
scale.
Some envision CO2 sequestered via ocean fertilization as a potential carbon credit to be sold as a
carbon offset or traded within an environmental market.39 There appear to be no legal frameworks
that endorse or reject ocean fertilization for the purpose of acquiring carbon credits. Thus, for the
time being, any carbon credits garnered for ocean fertilization would have to be used in a
voluntary carbon market.40
Afforestation
Afforestation involves planting tree seedlings on sites that have been without trees for several
years, generally a decade or more. The primary climate change benefit of afforestation discussed
in scientific and policy literature is carbon sequestration. It is regarded as a prime carbon
sequestration strategy because forest communities can store about 10 times more carbon in their
vegetation than non-forest communities and for longer time periods (decades to hundreds of
years). Other benefits include erosion control, recreational value, wildlife habitat, and production
of forest goods. On a large scale, afforestation can modify local climates by increasing humidity,
(...continued)
Oceanus, November 13, 2007.
35
Philip W. Boyd, “Implications of large-scale iron fertilization of the oceans,” Marine Ecology Progress Series, vol.
364 (July 29, 2008), pp. 216-217.
36
R. Sagarin et al., “Iron Fertilization in the Ocean for Climate Mitigation: Legal, Economic, and Environmental
Challenges,” Duke University, Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions, 2007.
37
“Fertilizing the Ocean with Iron: Should We Add Iron to the Sea to Help Reduce Greenhouse Gases in the Air,”
Oceanus, November 13, 2007. Dimethyl sulfide has an unpleasant odor at low concentrations, and is flammable and an
eye irritant at high concentrations.
38
Aaron Strong, Sallie Chisholm, and Charles Miller et al., “Ocean Fertilization: Time to Move On,” Nature, vol. 461
(September 17, 2009), pp. 347-348; and Aaron L. Strong, John J. Cullen, and Sallie W. Chisolm, “Ocean Fertilization:
Science, Policy, and Governance,” Oceanography, vol. 22, no. 3 (2009).
39
Ocean fertilization is not recognized as a creditable offset under the Kyoto Protocol for the first commitment period
effective through 2012. For more information on carbon offsets, see CRS Report RL34241, Voluntary Carbon Offsets:
Overview and Assessment, and CRS Report RL34436, The Role of Offsets in a Greenhouse Gas Emissions Cap-andTrade Program: Potential Benefits and Concerns.
40
“Dumping Iron and Trading Carbon: Profits, Pollution, and Politics All Will Play Roles in Ocean Iron Fertilization,”
Oceanus, January 10, 2008.
Congressional Research Service
13
Geoengineering: Governance and Technology Policy
altering cloud and precipitation patterns, and reducing wind speeds. Challenges associated with
afforestation include measurement and reporting of carbon storage, landowners’ reluctance to
grow trees on private land for extensive time periods, and a reduction in runoff that may impact
the ecology of the afforested area, among other issues.41 Potential drawbacks to wide-scale
implementation of afforestation include unexpected releases of CO2 from newly forested lands
due to acts of nature (e.g., fire, drought), future changes in land management (e.g., harvesting)
that could result in release of the carbon, the potentially significant cost for afforestation, and
possible effects on crop production and agricultural commodity prices if significant croplands are
afforested.
The planting of trees is well known and well practiced; afforestation is an accepted project
activity under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol.42 The amount
and rate at which CO2 is sequestered depends on the tree species, climate, soil type, management,
and other site-specific features. The estimated sequestration potential ranges from 2.2 to 9.5
metric tons of CO2 per acre per year.43 It may take at least 20 years to reap the carbon
sequestration benefit depending on the growth rate of the trees. Carbon accumulation in the early
years of tree growth is slow and increases during the strong growth period; there is controversy
whether carbon accumulation continues or peaks when net additional wood growth is minimal.44
Most afforestation projects occur on marginal croplands. Certain models estimate that a total of
60 million to 65 million acres of U.S. agricultural land could be converted to woodlands by 2050,
including 35 million to 50 million acres of cropland.45 Changes in climate may impact which
forestry species are planted at afforestation sites. Therefore, forestry species planted at
afforestation projects may not be similar to species found at the site in the past. The cost of an
afforestation project can range from approximately $65 to $200 per acre due in part to the
previous land use of the site and the terrain.46
Enhanced Weathering
Carbon dioxide is naturally removed from the atmosphere slowly through weathering (or
disintegration) of silicate and carbonate rocks. Expediting the weathering process—enhanced
weathering—could remove large amounts of CO2 from the atmosphere.47 The disintegrated
41
Kathleen A. Farley, Esteban G. Jobbagy, and Robert B. Jackson, “Effects of Afforestation on Water Yield: A Global
Synthesis with Implications for Policy,” Global Change Biology, vol. 11 (2005), pp. 1565-1576. For more information
on the impacts of afforestation, see CRS Report R41144, Deforestation and Climate Change.
42
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) allows a country with an emission-reduction or emission-limitation
commitment under the Kyoto Protocol to implement an emission-reduction project in developing countries. Such
projects can earn saleable certified emission reduction (CER) credits, which can be counted towards meeting Kyoto
targets. The mechanism stimulates sustainable development and emission reductions, while giving industrialized
countries some flexibility in how they meet their emission reduction or limitation targets.
43
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Atmospheric Programs, Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Potential in
U.S. forestry and Agriculture, EPA 430-R-05-006, Washington, DC, November 2005, Table 2-1.
44
For more information, see CRS Report R40562, U.S. Tree Planting for Carbon Sequestration.
45
For more information on afforestation as a carbon offset practice, see CRS Report R41086, Potential Implications of
a Carbon Offset Program to Farmers and Landowners.
46
Lucas S. Bair and Ralph J. Alig, Regional Cost Information for Private Timberland Conversion and Management,
U.S. Department of Agriculture., PNW-GTR-684, September 2006, http://www.fs.fed.us/pnw/pubs/pnw-gtr684.pdf.
47
“Silicate Rocks React with CO2 to Form Carbonates Thus Consuming CO2.” The Royal Society, Geoengineering the
Climate: Science, Governance, and Uncertainty, September 2009.
Congressional Research Service
14
Geoengineering: Governance and Technology Policy
materials containing CO2 removed from an enhanced weathering project could be stored in the
deep ocean or in soils.
A paucity of literature exists about how to conduct an enhanced weathering project or its
environmental implications. One proposed method is to spread crushed olivine, a type of silicate
rock, on agricultural and forested lands to sequester CO2 and improve soil quality.48 This
technique would require large amounts of rocks to be mined, ground, and transported. The
lifecycle carbon benefit has not been calculated. Significant amounts of additional resources, such
as energy and water, may be required to conduct an enhanced weathering project.
Further research would be needed to assess the potential benefits and drawbacks of this
technology. Barriers to enhanced weathering include its scale, cost, energy requirements, and
potential environmental consequences.49 Decisions would need to be made on which landscape to
alter, where to dispose of the disintegrated material, and who pays for the project. There may be
long-term adverse impacts on air quality, water quality, and aquatic life.
Solar Radiation Management
Solar radiation management methods work to reduce or divert the amount of incoming solar
radiation by making the Earth more reflective (i.e., enhancing albedo) and do not have any effect
on GHG emission rates.50 SRM methods involve modifying albedo via land-based methods such
as desert reflectors, cloud-based methods such as cloud whitening, stratosphere-based methods
such as aerosol injection, and spaced-based methods such as shields. The effectiveness of an
SRM method depends on its geographical location, the altitude at which it is applied (surface,
atmosphere, space), and the radiative properties of the atmosphere and surface.
If proven effective and desirable, SRM methods could be deployed faster than CDR methods
should the need arise to cool the planet quickly. SRM methods have been described, theoretically,
as cheap, fast, and imperfect.51 However, these methods have not been proven on any scale. Some
argue the U.S. government should create a research or oversight program potentially with
international cooperation that examines SRM technologies prior to a potentially hasty deployment
by an individual or country, which could result in an array of unanticipated consequences.52
Research could improve understanding of the feasibility of different SRM approaches, their
opportunities and limitations, and their potential role in climate change mitigation.53 Other
commentators favor constraints on SRM research, given the significant environmental risks posed
by these techniques:
48
R. D. Schuiling and P. Krijgsman, “Enhanced Weathering: An Effective and Cheap Tool to Sequester CO2,” Climatic
Change, vol. 74 (2006), pp. 349-354.
49
The Royal Society, Geoengineering the Climate: Science, Governance, and Uncertainty, 61 (2009), available for
download at http://royalsociety.org/Geoengineering-the-climate.
50
Ibid.
51
David W. Keith, Edward Parson, and M. Granger Morgan, “Research on Global Sun Block Needed Now,” Nature,
vol. 463 (January 28, 2010), pp. 426-427.
52
Ibid.
53
Lee Lane, Ken Caldeira, and Robert Chatfield, et al., Workshop Report on Managing Solar Radiation, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA/CP-2007-214558, Hanover, MD, April 2007, http://event.arc.nasa.gov/
main/home/reports/SolarRadiationCP.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
15
Geoengineering: Governance and Technology Policy
•
System failure. If an SRM technique breaks down or is shut down, the climate
may warm very quickly, possibly leaving little time for humans and nature to
adapt.
•
Changes in regional and seasonal climates. SRM techniques may alter
precipitation patterns, which could have consequences for ecosystems and
affected societies.
•
Ozone depletion. Under certain circumstances, use of SRM techniques such as
sulfate aerosol injection may lead to ozone depletion which would allow harmful
UVB rays to reach the Earth.
•
Preservation of non-CO2 greenhouse gases. SRM techniques applied in the
stratosphere or space lessen the amount of ultraviolet radiation striking the
Earth’s atmosphere, which is likely to extend the atmospheric lifetime of nonCO2 greenhouse gases that are more potent than CO2.
•
Diversion from more permanent solutions. If societies conclude that SRM
techniques can provide quick relief, they may invest less in developing and
deploying more permanent GHG emission reduction solutions.
•
“Unknown unknowns.” The history of the Earth’s climate demonstrates that
small changes may result in abrupt changes, raising concerns about unknown
effects of large-scale geoengineering.54
The following section explores some of the more widely discussed SRM techniques: enhanced
albedo, aerosol injection, and space-based reflectors.
Enhanced Albedo (Surface and Cloud)
One suggested method to modify the temperature of the planet is to increase the reflectivity, or
albedo, of certain surfaces. Increasing surface reflectivity directs more solar radiation back
toward space thus limiting temperature increases. Surface types, application areas, and costs for
enhanced albedo are all under investigation.
One of the most widely discussed targets for enhancing surface albedo is urban areas. Applying
enhanced albedo methods in urban areas such as painting roofs and paved areas white on a global
basis is estimated to cost several billion dollars for materials and labor, but could save money on
energy costs.55 For example, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) has reduced building heating and cooling costs by an average of 70%
annually on reroofed areas partly due to installing cool roofs.56 Some drawbacks to increased
reflectivity of roofs and paved areas include uncomfortable glare, concern for the aesthetic appeal
of the roof or paved area depending on its location, the loss of reflectivity benefits if the roof is
54
First four constraints attributed to Lane et. al (2007). For more information on non-CO2 greenhouse gases, see CRS
Report R40813, Methane Capture: Options for Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction, and CRS Report R40874, Nitrous
Oxide from Agricultural Sources: Potential Role in Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction and Ozone Recovery.
55
Hashem Akbari, Surabi Menon, and Arthur Rosenfeld, “Global Cooling: Increasing World-Wide Urban Albedos to
Offset CO2,” Climatic Change, vol. 94, no. 3-4 (2009), pp. 275-286.
56
Department of Energy, “Secretary Chu Announces Steps to Implement Cool Roofs at DOE and Across the Federal
Government,” press release, July 19, 2010, http://www.energy.gov/news/9225.htm. Cool roofs are roofs that are
designed to maintain a lower roof temperature than traditional roofs while the sun is shining.
Congressional Research Service
16
Geoengineering: Governance and Technology Policy
poorly maintained, and increased energy costs in colder climates due to reduced beneficial winter
time heat gains.57 Additionally, if enhanced surface albedo for paved areas is pursued
aggressively, there may be a decline in the use of asphalt—a petroleum residue.
Additional techniques are being considered for enhancing surface albedo. One proposal is to
modify plants through genetic engineering to augment albedo with relatively low implementation
costs.58 Some maintain it will take at least a decade for enhanced albedo plant varieties to be
available commercially.59 A second proposal is covering oceans with reflective surfaces to
enhance albedo. There are concerns about where an enhanced albedo project would take place in
the ocean and what impact it would have on aquatic life.
Cloud whitening is another proposed method for enhancing albedo. Cloud whitening is the
dispersion of cloud-condensation nuclei (e.g., small particles of sea salt) in clouds in desired areas
on a continual basis (see Figure 2). Aircraft, ships, or unmanned, radio-controlled seacraft could
disperse the nuclei.60 Satellites have been proposed as a way to measure cloud albedo and
determine the amount of cooling needed. Spraying for cloud whitening could be halted quickly if
unexpected consequences arose with cloud properties expected to return to normal within a few
days.61
The long-term implications of deploying cloud whitening are not yet fully understood. Depending
on the scale of the project, marine ecosystems could be disturbed. Further research is needed for
spray generator development, and to assess potential impacts on ocean currents and precipitation
patterns. Moreover, the amount of cooling that could take place and at which locations requires
greater study. One study identified the west coast of North America, among other locations, as an
area where cloud albedo might be effectively enhanced.62
57
Bryan Urban and Kurt Roth, Guidelines for Selecting Cool Roofs, U.S. Department of Energy, July 2010,
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/femp/pdfs/coolroofguide.pdf.
58
Andy Ridgwell, Joy S. Singarayer, and Alistair M. Hetherington, et al., “Tackling Regional Climate Change by Leaf
Albedo Bio-geoengineering,” Current Biology, vol. 19 (January 27, 2009). The authors propose to genetically modify
plant leaf or canopy structure to achieve greater temperature reductions.
59
Joy S. Singarayer, Andy Ridgwell, and Peter Irvine, “Assessing the Benefits of Crop Albedo Bio-geoengineering,”
Environmental Research Letters, vol. 4 (2009).
60
The Royal Society, Geoengineering the Climate: Science, Governance, and Uncertainty, 61 (2009), available for
download at http://royalsociety.org/Geoengineering-the-climate.
61
John Latham, Philip Rasch, and Chih-Chieh Chen, et al., “Global Temperature Stabilization via Controlled Albedo
Enhancement of Low-level Maritime Clouds,” Philosophical Transaction of the Royal Society, vol. 366 (August 29,
2008), pp. 3969-3987.
62
Ibid.
Congressional Research Service
17
Geoengineering: Governance and Technology Policy
Figure 2. Cloud Whitening Schematic
Source: Oren Dorell, “Can Whiter Clouds Reduce Global Warming?,” USA Today, June 11, 2010. Adapted by
CRS.
Aerosol Injection
Aerosol injection is the dispersal of aerosols, such as hydrogen sulfide (H2S) or sulfur dioxide
(SO2), into the stratosphere to direct solar radiation back toward space or absorb heat, thus
cooling the Earth.63 Military aircraft, artillery shells, or stratospheric balloons could be employed
to inject the aerosols. The annual cost for sulfur particle injection using airplanes is calculated to
be several billion dollars, depending on the amount, location, and type of sulfur particle injected
into the stratosphere.64 However, there has not been any testing to determine whether the
theoretical predictions will match reality.
Aerosol injection seeks to imitate large volcanic eruptions. Indeed, many studies have based
aerosol injection simulations on data gathered and analyzed from the Mount Pinatubo volcanic
eruption in the Philippines in 1991, which led to a reduction in global temperatures, though not
distributed evenly across regions.65 Sulfur releases from volcanic eruptions are random, with
63
Sulfate particles are the primary injectant discussed in the literature on aerosol injection, although other particles may
some day be studied and recommended for use.
64
Alan Robock, Allison Marquardt, and Ben Kravitz et al., “Benefits, Risks, and Costs of Stratospheric
Geoengineering,” Geophysical Research Letters, vol. 36 (October 2, 2009).
65
Ingo Kirchner, Georgiy L. Stenchikov, and Hans-F. Graf et al., “Climate Model Simulation of Winter Warming and
Summer Cooling Following the 1991 Mount Pinatubo Volcanic Eruption,” Journal of Geophysical Research, vol. 104,
no. D16 (August 27, 1999), pp. 19039-19055; and Kevin E. Trenberth and Aiguo Dai, “Effects of Mount Pinatubo
Volcanic Eruption on the Hydrological Cycle as an Analog of Geoengineering,” Geophysical Research Letters, vol. 34
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
18
Geoengineering: Governance and Technology Policy
cooling impacts that have lasted no more than a few years. Aerosol injection would probably have
to occur several times over decades or centuries to offset radiative forcing caused by greenhouse
gases due to the short effectiveness time frame of aerosol injection.66
The benefits and risks of aerosol injection would not be evenly distributed around the globe. A
potential benefit, in addition to cooling of the planet, could be reduced or reversed sea and land
ice melting (as long as the aerosols don’t settle on and darken snow and ice).67 Some risks could
be drought in Africa and Asia leading to a loss in agricultural productivity, the GHG impact that
would accumulate from transporting the aerosol to the site of injection, stratospheric ozone
depletion, weakening of sunlight for solar power, a less blue sky, and obstruction of Earth-based
optical astronomy.68
Space-Based Reflectors
Space-based reflectors—a theoretical geoengineering technology proposal—would be shields
positioned in space to reduce the amount of incoming solar radiation. The effectiveness of the
shield would vary based on its design, material, location, quantity, and maintenance. The types of
shield materials that have been suggested are lunar glass, aluminum thread netting, metallic
reflecting disks, and refracting disks.69 Proposed shield locations include the low Earth orbit and
Lagrange point 1 (L1).70
Many aspects of using space-based reflectors require additional study. In particular, further
research is needed to assess shield costs; appropriate steps for implementation, including
transportation to the desired location; maintenance needs; shield disposal; and ecological impacts.
Several questions have yet to be answered: Would the space-based reflectors be deployed to alter
the climate at a global or regional level? Is the science behind reflector deployment mature
enough to provide guidance on where shield protection would be most needed? It may take
several decades to construct and deploy a shield. Should the shield fail or be removed, warmer
temperatures would ensue rapidly if CO2 emission rates continued to rise. One study suggests that
launching a shield to fully reverse global warming may cost a few trillion dollars, implemented
over a 25-year time frame.71
(...continued)
(August 1, 2007).
66
The Royal Society, Geoengineering the Climate: Science, Governance, and Uncertainty, 61 (2009), available for
download at http://royalsociety.org/Geoengineering-the-climate.
67
Alan Robock, Allison Marquardt, and Ben Kravitz, et al., “Benefits, Risks, and Costs of Stratospheric
Geoengineering,” Geophysical Research Letters, vol. 36 (October 2, 2009).
68
Ibid.
69
The Royal Society, supra note 13.
70
Lagrange points are imaginary points in space at which objects sent from Earth will stay put. Lagrange point 1 (L1)
is located about four times farther from Earth than the moon.
71
Roger Angel, “Feasibility of Cooling the Earth with a Cloud of Small Spacecraft Near the Inner Lagrange Point
(L1),” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, vol. 103, no. 46 (November
14, 2006), pp. 17184-17189.
Congressional Research Service
19
Geoengineering: Governance and Technology Policy
The Debate over the Methods of Oversight
Geoengineering is an emerging policy area. The decision of policymakers to either pursue or
constrain geoengineering research and/or deployment activities may be based on a wide
assortment of factors, including social, legal, and political factors as well as scientific and
technical ones—not the least of which may be progress on other climate-related policies. The
debate over the point at which governments may choose to oversee geoengineering activities as
well as the form which potential oversight may take is presented in the following section.
The Status Quo
One possible governmental response to geoengineering activities is to continue the status quo.
While the status quo varies depending on the country and technology being discussed, it can
broadly be described as the provision of modest funding for geoengineering research, the limited
regulation of particular geoengineering activities, and a lack of a comprehensive system of
oversight or technology promotion. Advocates of maintaining this status quo tend to see private
industry and commercial development as the best avenue through which to determine the merits
of geoengineering research and entrepreneurship and/or to pursue it. They may contend that the
commercial sector is structured to promote innovation, and that current and proposed regulation
and/or legislation for greenhouse gas emission reductions (or lack thereof) is fully adequate to
push the market toward the development of climate engineering, if necessary. Advocates of the
status quo may stress that currently funded research in marine and atmospheric science, carbon
capture and sequestration, and adaptation strategies can lay sufficient groundwork for
technological transformation, and that significant investment in a contingency strategy or an
“insurance policy” is economically misplaced. Greater government intervention in
geoengineering research and development may stifle fact gathering and agenda setting,
incorrectly choose winners and losers, and unnecessarily circumscribe a science still in its
infancy. Additionally, those who want to avoid governmental support of geoengineering may
consider new methods of support an inappropriate stamp of acceptability on a technology some
consider deleterious. As such, further support may be unwarranted because public opinion and
civic engagement may have already soured to either the technological uncertainty of the science
or the cost considerations of research and regulation.
If governments opt to address geoengineering activities without engaging in new law or treaty
making, they would essentially endorse the status quo. The arguments for governmental
abstention will play a role as governments begin to determine the appropriate thresholds for,
types, and extent of government interventions in geoengineering.
Threshold for Oversight
If policymakers decide to address geoengineering more aggressively or comprehensively, one
possible policy proposal will entail creating a system for government oversight of both research
and deployment of geoengineering technologies. The question of when governments should
intervene to monitor or regulate geoengineering activities will be key for determining an
appropriate system of oversight. In other words, policymakers must identify the particular harms
or effects that they may wish to monitor or regulate and then determine the de minimis level of
geoengineering activity that is likely to cause them. Observers have suggested some criteria for
Congressional Research Service
20
Geoengineering: Governance and Technology Policy
determining the point at which geoengineering activities should become subject to a larger system
of oversight or regulation.72 These criteria include:
•
the extent to which the impacts of geoengineering are transboundary or
international in scope;
•
the extent to which the impacts of geoengineering include the introduction of
hazardous material into the environment;
•
the extent to which the impacts of geoengineering directly intervene in the
balance of ecosystems; and
•
the potential perturbation, reversibility, and duration of the geoengineering
activity under discussion.
Ultimately, this assessment may require substantial scientific, as well as political, insight.
Accordingly, some observers have suggested that governments set up an international panel
process, similar to the one used by the National Academy of Science/National Research Council,
under which scientific experts would testify and debate the merits of particular issues and
approaches with the aim of providing insight to policymakers. However, this suggestion has been
criticized for excluding social scientists, ethics analysts, the greater public, and other interested
parties. An alternate suggestion is that governments should evaluate research and deployment
activities in a manner similar to the one prescribed by the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), under which federal agencies prepare environmental impact statements for actions that
significantly affect the quality of the human environment.73
Methods for Oversight
Beyond the determination of appropriate threshold levels for public oversight for geoengineering
technologies, questions concerning the potential forms of oversight may arise. It is possible that
different policies may be required in order to address different concerns about the technologies.
These concerns include:
•
the technology is new and unproven, with ongoing and transformative scientific
and technical evidence;
•
the impacts of geoengineering activities are uncertain in scope, timing, and
intensity;
•
the range of stakeholders potentially affected by geoengineering activities is
broad, including most nations, subnational groups, nongovernmental
organizations, corporations, and civil societies;
•
the number of actors potentially employing geoengineering activities may be
small in comparison to the number of those affected;
72
Royal Society memorandum to the U.K. House of Commons, op.cit.
Geoengineering III: Domestic and International Research Governance Hearing Before H. Comm. on Science and
Technology, 111th Cong. (2010) (written testimony of Dr. Jane C. S. Long, Associate Director at Large, Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory), available at http://democrats.science.house.gov/Media/file/Commdocs/hearings/2010/
Full/18mar/Long_Testimony.pdf.
73
Congressional Research Service
21
Geoengineering: Governance and Technology Policy
•
the global impacts of geoengineering activities—both its benefits and risks—may
be unevenly distributed across stakeholders; and
•
the costs of implementing geoengineering activities may be small compared to
the economics of their full global impact.
As such, different technologies, different stages of the research and deployment cycle, and
different environments for research and deployment activities may require different methods for
oversight.
Different technologies may require different methods for oversight. To the extent that CDR
technologies are similar to known and existing ones, their development and implementation may
be adequately governed at the domestic level by existing U.S. laws. Air capture technologies are
similar to those of carbon capture and sequestration for power generation. Biochar and biomass
sequestration face similar life cycle analyses and regulatory issues to biofuels. Ecosystem impacts
of enhanced terrestrial weathering would likely be contained within national boundaries.
Enhanced weathering in oceans and ocean fertilization techniques, however, are CDR
technologies that may not be currently governed by U.S. law and if deployed, could cause nontrivial effects across national boundaries. Similarly, sequestration of CO2 geologically or in the
oceans may not be analogous to regulation of other underground injection or well management.74
In addition, the scope, dispersions, and interventions of most SRM technologies are very likely to
cause significant effects across national boundaries. While land surface albedo modification could
potentially be managed under national regulatory frameworks, other technologies may trigger
transboundary issues. While some existing treaties address atmosphere and space, their
enforcement has rarely been tested.
Different stages of the research and deployment cycle may require different methods for oversight.
Geoengineering development involves several stages. Regulatory frameworks must be flexible
enough to cover the full cycle (from assessment through research, modeling, laboratory trials,
field trials, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation). Many scientists stress a difference in
regulatory needs between geoengineering research activities and full-scale deployment. But while
some contend that the early stages of investigation may require little oversight, transboundary
environmental impacts could grow quickly during technological development, and negative social
and economic consequences may be felt as early as small-scale field trials.
Different environments for potential research or deployment may require different methods for
oversight. To the extent that geoengineering technologies are governed by existing laws and
treaties, they tend to fall within the provisions of legal instruments designed to regulate the uses
of particular environments (e.g., space, atmosphere, ocean, land). Whereas the uses of some of
these environments, such as land and the local atmosphere, are amenable to regulation via
domestic laws, the uses of others, such as the high seas, transboundary and upper atmosphere, or
outer space, cannot be effectively regulated without international cooperation.
74
CRS Report RL33971, Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Pipelines for Carbon Sequestration: Emerging Policy Issues. See also
The Royal Society, Geoengineering the Climate: Science, Governance, and Uncertainty, 61 (2009), at
http://royalsociety.org/Geoengineering-the-climate, at 51 (suggesting that different kinds of regulations will be
appropriate for different methods of geoengineering).
Congressional Research Service
22
Geoengineering: Governance and Technology Policy
Moratoriums or Bans
A final consideration for potential government oversight may be the imposition of a moratorium
or a ban on geoengineering research, deployment, or both for some technologies or practices. In
general, advocates of a moratorium or a ban state that (1) the underlying science is too uncertain
and too risky and should be avoided as a precaution against adverse effects to the ecosystem; (2)
the potential impacts are too uneven, or disproportionately weighted toward vulnerable groups,
societies, or developing countries; (3) geoengineering research would distract from the global
goal of mitigation, adaptation, and emission reductions (the “moral hazard” argument); (4)
geoengineering could be used by governments and industry as a “time buying” strategy to delay
mitigation commitments; and (5) geoengineering techniques have the potential of being co-opted
by commercial or unethical interests.
Others suggest that a moratorium or a ban on geoengineering technologies would be ill-advised.
From their perspective, these actions would (1) inhibit research, some of which has been ongoing
for decades in the context of marine ecology, oceanographic studies, and atmospheric
meteorology; (2) make it difficult to accumulate the information needed to make informed
judgments about the feasibility and the acceptability of the proposed technology; and (3) likely
deter only those countries, corporations, and individuals who are most likely to develop the
technology in a responsible fashion, thus failing to discourage potentially dangerous
experimentation by less responsible parties.
The Debate over Oversight and Governmental
Involvement
At present, only a few of the possible geoengineering activities appear to be under the jurisdiction
of domestic laws or international treaties, and it is largely unclear how those legal instruments
would encourage or constrain these activities in practice. While some continue to debate the
merits of government oversight of geoengineering activities, others have suggested that new legal
frameworks should be enacted to support coordinated and collaborative research, develop
normative standards for enforcement, and/or prevent or minimize the risks in development and
deployment. Moreover, whether frameworks are best implemented at a local, national, or
international level (perhaps different for different technologies) is uncertain, and debate remains
over what agencies or organizations should be tasked with oversight.
The following section summarizes three different approaches to government oversight of
geoengineering activities: methods of sub-national oversight, methods of national oversight, and
methods of international oversight. In doing so, it also summarizes existing laws and treaties that
may affect geoengineering research and deployment activities.
State Policies Addressing Geoengineering
In the United States, one possible method for the governance of geoengineering activities is to let
states develop their own policies. A component of U.S. federalism is the potential for states to act
as laboratories for regulatory innovation and experimentation. However, the potential impacts of
geoengineering activities across state and regional boundaries may necessitate the development of
a more comprehensive federal policy. In addition, the likely diversity and plurality of state
Congressional Research Service
23
Geoengineering: Governance and Technology Policy
geoengineering policies may make it difficult for private actors—be they scientific researchers or
corporations—who often find it easier to operate under a single uniform set of laws rather than
under a multitude of different ones. An examination of current state involvement in
geoengineering policy is beyond the scope of this report.
National Policies Addressing Geoengineering
Efforts by the U.S. government to develop policies addressing the use of emerging technologies
are well documented (e.g., nuclear science, molecular biology, and nanotechnology).75 These
efforts may indicate best practices for developing effective policies to address the deployment of
geoengineering technologies, which, like prior emerging technologies, are associated with
uncertainty and a variety of social, ethical, and environmental risks.76 From a research standpoint,
emerging high-risk technologies (such as geoengineering) often struggle to obtain private sector
financing and/or research support during the initial phases of investigation. Reasons for the lack
of private sector involvement in geoengineering may include (1) aversion to investing in longterm technical uncertainty; (2) lack of a price mechanism on carbon to incentivize deployment of
the technologies; (3) uncertainty over the commercial or private sector use of the technologies
beyond large-scale government implementation; and (4) a desire not to engage until certain
social, economic, and environmental risks are addressed. Consequently, emerging technologies
(such as geoengineering) may require some measure of initial public subsidy to help spur
development. Some such subsidies already exist at the federal level in the United States for some
technologies (e.g., carbon sequestration, renewable energy). Conversely, from a regulatory
standpoint, emerging technologies (such as geoengineering) carry the risk of hazard and
unintended consequences. Due to the uncertainties for public health, safety, and welfare,
geoengineering activities may require constraints, prohibitions, or bans comparable to the
regulatory controls placed on hazardous materials or waste streams.
Current U.S. Policies Addressing Geoengineering
While no federal law has been enacted with the express purpose of covering geoengineering
activities, some legal instruments may currently apply to domestic geoengineering practices and
their impacts, depending on the type, location, and sponsor of the activity. The federal
government could expand these existing laws to specifically address geoengineering activities or
develop new laws. In addition, administrative agencies could interpret their statutory authority to
authorize new rules explicitly addressing particular geoengineering activities. Among the
geoengineering activities that may already be affected by existing federal laws:
75
For example, the fields of nuclear science, molecular biology, and nanotechnology represent areas in which the U.S.
government has developed policies to address new and potentially risky technologies. For analysis of the science and
governance behind these fields, see CRS Report RL33558, Nuclear Energy Policy; CRS Report RL34376, Genetic
Exceptionalism: Genetic Information and Public Policy; and CRS Report RL34511, Nanotechnology: A Policy Primer.
76
See generally Lynn Frewer & Brian Salter, Public Attitudes, Scientific Advice, and the Politics of Regulatory Polices:
The Case of BSE, 29 Sci. & Pub. Pol’y 137 (2002) (identifying lessons for future regulatory approaches to emerging
technologies from the United Kingdom’s response to mad cow disease in the early 1990s); Lynn Frewer, Risk
Perception, Social Trust, and Public Participation in Strategic Decisionmaking: Implications for Emerging
Technologies, 28 Ambio 569 (1999) (identifying and discussing components of effective policy about risk management
in the context of emerging technologies).
Congressional Research Service
24
Geoengineering: Governance and Technology Policy
•
Subterranean carbon dioxide sequestration, which may implicate provisions of
the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. 300f et. seq., and the Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. § 7401 et. seq. In July 2008, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) relied on its authority under the Safe Water Drinking Act to issue a draft
rule that would regulate CO2 injection for the purposes of geological
sequestration.77 More recently, the EPA relied on its authority under § 307(d) and
§ 114 of the Clean Air Act to issue a rule that would require reporting on
greenhouse gas emissions from carbon dioxide injection and geologic
sequestration.78 The 111th Congress considered amending the Clean Air Act to
broaden the EPA’s authority to promulgate similar regulations relating to
geologic sequestration.79
•
Ocean fertilization, which may implicate provisions of, inter alia, the Marine
Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (MPRSA), 16 U.S.C. § 1431
et. seq., 33 U.S.C. § 1401 et. seq., 33 U.S.C. § 2801 et. seq. Title I of the MPRSA
prohibits unpermitted ocean dumping by any U.S. vessel or other vessel sailing
from a U.S. port in ocean waters under U.S. jurisdiction. Permits may be issued
by the EPA if it determines that the dumping will not unreasonably degrade or
endanger human health, welfare, the marine environment, ecological systems, or
economic potentialities. MPRSA also authorizes NOAA to conduct general
research on ocean resources and the EPA to conduct research specifically related
to phasing out ocean disposal activities.80
•
Stratospheric aerosol injection, which may implicate the ozone depletion
provisions of Title VI of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §
7401 note. Under those amendments, the Environmental Protection Agency must
adjust its phase-out schedules for ozone-depleting substances in accordance with
any future changes in Montreal Protocol schedules. The EPA is required to add
any substance with an ozone depletion potential (ODP) of 0.2 or greater to the
list of Class 1 substances and set a phase-out schedule of no more than seven
years. Also, the EPA is required to add any substance that is known or may be
reasonably anticipated to harm the stratosphere to the list of Class 2 substances
and set a phase-out schedule of no more than ten years.81
Moreover, in the absence of federal lawmaking, some states have begun developing their own
policies to address particular geoengineering activities.82
77
Federal Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program for Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Geologic
Sequestration Wells, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,492 (July 25, 2008). The proposed rule was based on the existing Underground
Injection Control (UIC) regulatory framework with modifications to address the unique nature of carbon dioxide
injection. Ibid.
78
Environmental Protection Agency, “Federal Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program
for Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Geologic Sequestration (GS) Wells,” 75 Federal Register 77230, December 10, 2010.
79
E.g., American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. §112 (as passed by the House,
2009).
80
See CRS Report RS20028, Ocean Dumping Act: A Summary of the Law.
81
See CRS Report RL30853, Clean Air Act: A Summary of the Act and Its Major Requirements.
82
E.g., Cal. Pub. Resources Code § 3650(b)(2)(J)(i) (Deering) (supporting research of the ocean’s role in carbon
sequestration); Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 8341(d)(5) (Deering) (permitting utilities to exclude carbon dioxide that they
have injected into the Earth from being counted as greenhouse gas emissions); Tex. Nat. Res. Code § 91.802 (stating
that the Texas Water Code governs anthropogenic carbon dioxide injection wells).
Congressional Research Service
25
Geoengineering: Governance and Technology Policy
Potential Roles for Federal Agencies and Other Federally Funded Entities
At this point, federal agencies and other federally funded entities have dedicated minimal efforts
and funding to the development and implementation of national geoengineering policies. In
testimony before the House Committee on Science and Technology, officials from various
interagency bodies coordinating the U.S. response to climate change stated that their offices “(1)
have not developed a coordinated research strategy [for geoengineering activities], (2) do not
have a position on geoengineering, and (3) do not believe it is necessary to coordinate efforts due
to the limited federal investment to date.”83 However, there are numerous potential roles for these
entities to play in the development and implementation of national geoengineering policies.
In assessing what agencies should be involved and to what extent, policymakers may consider:
•
The advantages or disadvantages of involving multiple agencies and entities;
•
The different legislative authorities and areas of expertise that different agencies
and entities offer;
•
The advantages and disadvantages of relying on independent, executive, and/or
legislative bodies; and
•
The need to expand or constrict the legislative authority for some federal
agencies, so as to give them either more or less jurisdiction over geoengineering
activities.
There are, broadly speaking, at least six categories of authorized functions that different federal
entities can perform to assist the development and implementation of national policies on new
technologies. These categories are (1) conducting research on the science or other aspects of
geoengineering, (2) facilitating an exchange of information about geoengineering, (3) funding
geoengineering activities, (4) monitoring geoengineering projects and their effects, (5)
promulgating regulations, and (6) enforcing regulations. Table 2 lists selected agencies and
entities that currently have the legislative authority to perform various sets of these different
functions. These agencies and entities were selected for inclusion in the table because they may
assist in the formulation or implementation of future policies on geoengineering, or, in some
instances, have already begun to address geoengineering.84 However, it appears that, to date, no
single federal entity is authorized to address the full range of geoengineering technologies.
83
See Geoengineering III: Domestic and International Research Governance Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Science
and Technology, 111th Cong. (2010) (written testimony by Dr. Frank Rusco, Director of Natural Resources and the
Environment, GAO) available at http://democrats.science.house.gov/Media/file/Commdocs/hearings/2010/Full/18mar/
Rusco_Testimony.pdf.
84
For examples of agencies that have already begun to address geoengineering in some fashion, see the discussion in
notes for Table 2.
Congressional Research Service
26
Table 2. Six Types of Functions Federal Entities Can Perform and Selected Federal Entities Authorized to Perform Them
Federal Agency
or Entity
Conducting
Research
Facilitating
Information
Exchange
Funding
Monitoring
Projects or Effects
Promulgating
Regulations
Enforcing
Regulations
Environmental
Protection Agency
(EPA)a
X
X
X
X
X
X
Department of
Energy (DOE)b
X
X
X
Department of
Agriculture (USDA)c
X
X
X
Army Corps of
Engineers (ACE)d
X
X
National Science
Foundation (NSF)e
X
X
X
National
Aeronautics and
Space
Administration
(NASA)f
X
X
X
National Oceanic
and Atmospheric
Administration
(NOAA)g
X
X
X
United States Global
Climate Change
Research Program
(USGCRP)h
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Source: Congressional Research Service.
Notes: This table is intended only as an illustrative list of agencies and entities authorized to perform these types of functions. It is not a comprehensive list of agencies and
entities that are addressing or could potentially address geoengineering by performing these functions.
a.
CRS-27
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has initiated rulemakings to regulate certain geoengineering activities. In addition, the EPA and other federal bodies have
begun funding research and small-scale demonstration projects of certain geoengineering technologies. To date, these efforts have been limited, fragmented, and not
coordinated as part of a federal geoengineering strategy.
b.
The Department of Energy (DOE) has already sponsored research in both land-based and ocean-based carbon storage, including small-scale demonstration projects of
geological sequestration as part of its Regional Carbon Sequestration Partnerships. The agency also funded studies on carbon dioxide air capture techniques. For SRM
approaches, DOE, through its Sandia National Laboratories and its Pacific Northwest National Laboratories, has conducted several technology assessments for sulfur
aerosol injection and cloud-brightening techniques. However, some suggest that geoengineering technologies not directly related to energy and power generation (i.e.,
SRM) could remain outside the scope of DOE research and financial support. Moreover, providing grants for research is a different function than providing oversight,
regulation, or other governance functions, and the difference could arguably risk conflict-of-interest.
c.
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) has sponsored research relevant to CDR technologies, including an examination of land-based carbon storage
approaches such as biochar through its Agricultural Research Service and carbon sequestration in soil and biomass through its Economic Research Service. Some
suggest its continued support for research related to soil, crop, and forest sequestration methods. Beyond research, USDA also provides assistance and incentives to
promote deployment of selected technologies, and geoengineering could be added to those. Potential conflict could arise between promotional and regulatory
functions.
d.
The Department of Defense (DOD) has conducted research on weather modification techniques and other ocean and atmospheric studies. However, many believe
that support for geoengineering activities by the defense or intelligence communities could be ill-advised in the international sphere, due to concerns about openness,
transparency, and unilateral deployment. The Army Corps of Engineers (ACE), a sub-agency of the DOD with both military and civilian responsibilities, has longstanding responsibilities for projects involving navigable waters, environmental protection, and environmental infrastructure, and, therefore, it was selected for
inclusion in the table rather than the DOD.
e.
The National Science Foundation (NSF) supports investigator-initiated research through many open and transparent programs and has already funded several projects
related to both SRM and CDR approaches, including modeling studies for stratospheric aerosol injection, space-based reflectors, carbon storage in geologic
formations, saline aquifers, and biomass. NSF also supports research in the social and behavioral sciences and has conducted studies on the ethical issues of
geoengineering. Some suggest its continued support for research related to the science and policy considerations surrounding both CDR and SRM technologies. Again,
providing grants is a different function, potentially conflicting with oversight or other governance functions.
f.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has jurisdiction over, inter alia, space-related technologies and their use. NASA has previously funded
some studies investigating the practicality of using solar shields and reflectors as part of its former Institute for Advanced Concepts program. NASA is a technology
development agency, not currently designed for long-term operational or oversight functions.
g.
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) appears to have the capacity to model, measure, record, and verify geoengineering technologies as
well as to prepare instrumentation, computation, and data analysis. Data NOAA collects about natural climate events also may assist in furthering an understanding of
the potential impacts of geoengineering on the ecosystem.
h.
The United States Global Climate Change Research Program (USGCRP) conducts ongoing research related to atmospheric circulation, aerosol/cloud interaction, and
oceanic chemistry. However, the USGCRP has very limited staff and serves primarily to facilitate cooperation among the various scientific research agencies. It does
not have authority for oversight or regulation of technology deployment.
CRS-28
Geoengineering: Governance and Technology Policy
International Cooperation on Geoengineering
When considering forms of international environmental cooperation or oversight, some suggest
some form of multilateral agreement that would supplement existing treaties or develop out of
ongoing negotiations on other issues of international concern, such as climate change.
International agreements have the capacity to codify normative standards for an emerging science
on an international level, create institutions for global enforcement and research, and provide a
framework under which transparency can be enhanced, development modifications can be made,
and future multilateral discussions can occur.
The strengths of international treaties, however, may also be their weakness.85 Treaties are based
on a process that is inherently conservative. Nations often negotiate by adjusting their
commitments to a level where they are sure that compliance is technically, economically, socially,
and politically feasible at the domestic level. If commitments are perceived as being too high,
nations may insert vague language to make the agreement more palatable or simply refuse to
join.86
Moreover, it can be difficult, particularly when an international situation is new and evolving, to
develop international consensus on a set of norms, let alone commitments, given the cultural,
political, environmental, and economic diversity of the world’s nations. Consequently, the process
of developing these norms may be time-intensive and carry the risk of stalemate.87 Some fear that,
given these obstacles, the only “norm” that countries would be willing to agree to at this early
stage in the geoengineering science is a moratorium on research and deployment activities. These
individuals suggest that those countries who lack the capacity and political incentive to
geoengineer may believe there is little to gain from permitting other countries to experiment.
Thirdly, the implementation of international agreements can be difficult to monitor and enforce
effectively. On one hand, countries may seek to avoid creating compliance mechanisms and new
international institutions on the grounds that they are infringing on a country’s sovereignty, and
thereby interfering with its ability to experiment with domestic measures that best address local
needs and capabilities. On the other, in the absence of such mechanisms, international agreements
can be viewed as ineffective if they ultimately fail to change the status quo. Finally, even when
international agreements do create new dispute settlement systems, these systems tend to be best
equipped to resolve disputes between countries, which are considered the principal actors in
international law, and not necessarily between one country and one private actor, or between
private actors, especially since private actors may shift locations to suit their interests.
Consequently, while countries may see advantages to coordinating a global plan for
geoengineering activities, local and national laws might still be needed to address aspects of
geoengineering that could not be addressed on an international scale.
85
See e.g. David Victor, Kal Raustiala, Eugene Skolnikoff, and Lee Lane. See specifically: David Victor, “On the
Regulation of Geoengineering,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2008, pp. 322-336; as well as
comments made in the Royal Society report, op.cit.
86
Such was the situation in negotiations leading to the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity, which, as outlined by
Victor, op.cit., “contained European-inspired language that was hostile to genetically engineered crops and developing
country-inspired language that demanded complicated revenue-sharing for some kinds of germplasm collections. The
USA, world leader in these investments, simply refused to join the treaty.”
87
Although, others might argue that opportunities to limit commercial or national activities may decrease as
investments are made and economic and political stakes grow larger.
Congressional Research Service
29
Geoengineering: Governance and Technology Policy
To date, no multilateral treaty has been proposed with the intent of addressing the full spectrum of
possible geoengineering activities. However, principles of customary international law and
existing international agreements may be implicated by geoengineering research or deployment
projects. Governments would likely draw on these principles if they chose to develop a more
comprehensive international approach to geoengineering, either by negotiating a new
international agreement or expanding upon an existing one. This section will review many of
these principles, but, because geoengineering is an umbrella term for a broad array of methods of
global climate adjustment, including some that are largely theoretical, it is very likely that
particular projects may be affected by international obligations and principles that are not
identified in this report.
Principles of Customary International Law
Customary international law results from the general and consistent practice by countries which
are followed from a sense of legal obligation.88 Duties established by customary international law
are generally deemed binding on countries that have not persistently objected to it.89 It can be
difficult to determine when a widespread “practice” evolves into a “duty” imposed by customary
international law. Nevertheless, under customary international law, countries have a duty not to
cause significant transboundary harm.90 Because geoengineering carries with it the potential for
transboundary effects, this duty could be implicated by geoengineering research and/or
deployment projects.
International Agreements with Potential Relevance for Geoengineering
In addition to establishing substantive obligations, customary international law also informs the
legal significance given by countries to international agreements. As reflected in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), customary international law establishes that
signatories of an international agreement must refrain from acts that would defeat the object and
purpose of that agreement unless the country makes clear its intent not to ratify the treaty.91 The
VCLT also codifies the customary rule that a treaty may not create rights and obligations for a
non-party without its consent.92 In other words, countries that are not parties to an international
agreement may not be bound to adhere to it.
88
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 102 (1987).
Ibid. at §102 n.2.
90
Ibid. at §601(1) (stating that a nation is generally obligated to take “such measures as may be necessary, to the extent
practicable under the circumstances, to ensure that activities within its jurisdiction or control ... are conducted so as not
to cause significant injury to the environment of another state.”) Countries are also obligated under international law to
take necessary measures to the extent practicable to prevent, reduce, and control pollution that is causing or threatening
to cause significant injury to the marine environment. Ibid. at §603(2).
91
Restatement (Third), supra note 88, at §312(3); VCLT, Art. 18. The United States signed the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties (VCLT), but the VCLT has not received the Senate’s advice and consent and, consequently, the
United States is not a Party to the VCLT. Nevertheless, the United States considers most of the VCLT to constitute
customary international law on the law of treaties. See, e.g., Fujitsu Ltd. v. Federal Exp. Corp., 247 F.3d 423 (2d Cir.
2001) ("we rely upon the Vienna Convention here as an authoritative guide to the customary international law of
treaties ... [b]ecause the United States recognizes the Vienna Convention as a codification of customary international
law ... and [it] acknowledges the Vienna Convention as, in large part, the authoritative guide to current treaty law and
practice”) (internal citations omitted).
92
VCLT, Art. 34; Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 102 (1987), at §324(1).
89
Congressional Research Service
30
Geoengineering: Governance and Technology Policy
The obligations arising from the following treaties and international agreements should be
construed in light of these principles of customary international law. The international agreements
on climate change are the most likely agreements to have significance for the full spectrum of
geoengineering projects because they encourage their parties to implement national policies and
mitigation actions to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. However, these agreements do not
currently address geoengineering explicitly. These agreements include:
•
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).93 The
UNFCC opened for signature in 1992 and entered into force in 1994. The United
States became a party to the UNFCCC in 1992. Under the UNFCCC, parties are
required to (1) gather and share information on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions,
national policies, and best practices; (2) launch national strategies for addressing
GHG emissions and adapting to expected impacts; and (3) cooperate in preparing
for adaptation to the impacts of climate change. Parties are also obligated to
cooperate and exchange information on technologies, and potential economic and
social consequences of response strategies, as well as to give full consideration to
actions to meet the needs and concerns of developing countries that may be
adversely affected by, inter alia, the implementation of measures to respond to
climate change.
•
Kyoto Protocol (the Protocol).94 The Kyoto Protocol opened for signature in
1997 and entered into force in 2005. The United States has signed but not
become a party to the Kyoto Protocol.95 The Protocol supplements the UNFCCC
by committing its high income parties to legally binding reductions in emissions
of greenhouse gases through 2012.
•
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).96 The CBD opened for signature in
June 1992 and entered into force in December 1993. The United States has
signed but has not become a party to the CBD. The key principle of the CBD is
that countries have both the sovereign right to exploit their own resources
pursuant to their own domestic policies and the responsibility to ensure that
activities within their control do not cause damage to the environment of other
states or to areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.97 In October 2010, the
10th Conference of the Parties (COP) to the CBD adopted provisions calling for
the parties to abstain from geoengineering—including “any technologies that
deliberately reduce solar insolution or increase carbon sequestration from the
93
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107; S. Treaty Doc No.
102-38 available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf.
94
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, December 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22,
U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1 available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf.
95
As a non-party, the United States is not obligated to comply with the Kyoto Protocol, but, as a signatory, the United
States may be obligated to avoid undermining the Kyoto Protocol. For more on this distinction, see CRS Report
R41175, International Agreements on Climate Change: Selected Legal Questions.
96
United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, May 22, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818, available at http://www.cbd.int/
convention/convention.shtml.
97
Ibid. at Art. 3. For example, under Article 8, parties must establish a system and guidelines for the selection of
protected areas where special measures need to be taken to conserve biological diversity. Ibid. at Art. 8(a)-(b). They
must also regulate, manage, or control the risks associated with the use and release of living modified organisms which
are likely to have adverse environmental impacts and must prevent the introduction of, control, or eradicate alien
species that threaten ecosystems, habitats, or species. Ibid. at Art. 8(g)-(h).
Congressional Research Service
31
Geoengineering: Governance and Technology Policy
atmosphere on a large scale that may affect biodiversity”—unless the parties
have fully considered the risks and impacts of those activities on biodiversity.98
The COP also affirmed its earlier decision, IX/16C, which acknowledged the
work of the London Convention and the London Protocol regarding ocean
fertilization and requested that its own Parties ensure that ocean fertilization
activities do not take place until either there is adequate scientific basis on which
to justify such activities or the activities are small-scale scientific research studies
within coastal waters.99
In addition to the international climate change agreements, the following international agreements
may be relevant to the use of CDR technologies.
•
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).100 UNCLOS
opened for signature in December 1982 and entered into force on November 16,
1994. Despite participating in the UNCLOS negotiations, the United States
declined to sign the final agreement and has not become a party since then,
although it views many provisions of UNCLOS as customary international law
that it was already obligated to follow. UNCLOS establishes a legal regime
governing activities on, over, and under the world’s oceans and defines countries’
jurisdictions over, and rights of access to, the oceans and their resources. Article
194 of the UNCLOS imposes a duty on its parties to take, individually or jointly,
measures that are necessary to prevent, reduce, and control pollution of the
marine environment from any source. The UNCLOS defines pollution as any
human-driven introduction of substances or energy into the marine environment
that results or is likely to result in deleterious effects such as harm to living
resources and marine life, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine
activities, or impairment of sea water quality.101 This provision could have
significance for a geoengineering project that pollutes the marine environment,
by land, sea, or air. In addition to, arguably, mandating that a country not engage
in that activity, once a geoengineering project resulted in the pollution of the
ocean environment, Article 194 would impose a duty on the member country
responsible for that pollution to control and limit its spread. Article 192 of the
UNCLOS imposes a general obligation on countries to protect and preserve the
marine environment. These provisions could be implicated by ocean fertilization
and some other geoengineering activities if they have a negative effect on the
marine ecosystem.102 Large-scale ocean fertilization projects could also implicate
several UNCLOS provisions, including Article 56, and 238 through 241 on
marine scientific research.
98
Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, October 18-19, 2010, Decision X/33, available
at http://www.cbd.int/climate/doc/cop-10-dec-33-en.pdf.
99
Ibid.
100
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, December 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, 397; 21 I.L.M. 1261
available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.
101
UNCLOS, Art. 1.1(4).
102
A thorough review of these “living resources provisions” can be found in CRS Report RL32185, U.N. Convention
on the Law of the Sea: Living Resources Provisions.
Congressional Research Service
32
Geoengineering: Governance and Technology Policy
International Cooperation Example—Ocean Fertilization
Ocean fertilization is subject to some level of international governance, but it is unclear who
would oversee a worldwide effort to implement ocean fertilization techniques. Most notably, in
2008 a resolution was passed by the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by
Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (1972, the London Convention) and the 1996 Protocol
(London Protocol) to bar ocean fertilization activities other than “legitimate scientific
research.”103 The Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (MPRSA or Ocean
Dumping Act, P.L. 92-532) identifies the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as
responsible for enforcing the standards and criteria listed in the London Convention.104 Also, the
United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in 2008 requested member parties to
“ensure that ocean fertilization activities do not take place until there is an adequate scientific
basis on which to justify such activities.”105 It is possible the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which provides an international legal and scientific framework to
coordinate international decisionmaking about ocean management, could be applied to the
management of ocean fertilization activities. The United States is not a party to UNCLOS.106
•
London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes
and Other Matter (London Convention),107 and London Protocol.108 The London
Convention was opened for signature in December 1972 and entered into force in
August 1975. The London Protocol was agreed to in 1996 as a means of
modernizing and eventually replacing the London Convention. The United States
became a party to the London Convention in 1974, but it has not become a party
to the London Protocol. Contracting parties pledge to take all possible steps to
prevent the pollution of the sea by the dumping of substances that are liable to
create hazards to human health, harm living resources and marine life, or
interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea.109 However, ocean fertilization and
other geoengineering projects that entail the deliberate disposal of substances into
the sea might not implicate the London Convention’s prohibitions on dumping if
they are deemed placed into the sea “for a purpose other than the mere disposal
thereof, if not contrary to the aim of the Convention.”110 Nevertheless, the parties
have recently considered amendments and resolutions to these agreements to
103
Additional details regarding the stipulations of the London Convention are provided on page 27 of this report. The
United States became a party to the London Convention in 1974, but it has not become a party to the London Protocol.
104
For more information on the Ocean Dumping Act, see CRS Report RS20028, Ocean Dumping Act: A Summary of
the Law, by (name redacted).
105
“COP 9 Decision IX/16,” Biodiversity and climate change, http://www.cbd.int/decision/cop/?id=11659. Additional
details regarding the Convention on Biological Diversity is available on page 32 of this report. The United States has
signed but has not become a party to the CBD.
106
UNCLOS is currently before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and awaiting the Senate’s advice and consent
on the question of U.S. accession.
107
London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, Dec. 29, 1972,
26 U.S.T. 2403, 11 I.L.M. 1294.
108
1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter,
November 7, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 7.
109
London Convention, Art. 1.
110
Ibid. at Art. 19.1. See also London Protocol, Art. 1.4 (adopting a very similar definition of dumping).
Congressional Research Service
33
Geoengineering: Governance and Technology Policy
address some geoengineering technologies more explicitly. For example, the
2006 amendments to the London Protocol provide guidance on the means by
which sub-seabed geological sequestration of carbon dioxide can be conducted,
stating that carbon dioxide streams may only be considered for dumping if (1)
disposal is into a sub-seabed geological formation; (2) the substances dumped
consist overwhelmingly of carbon dioxide; and (3) no other wastes or matter
were added to them for the purpose of disposing of them. Two years later, in
2008, the parties adopted Resolution LC-LP.1,111 agreeing that ocean fertilization
research activities do not to constitute dumping under the London Convention
and Protocol.112
Finally, in addition to the climate change agreements, the use of SRM technologies may implicate
the following international agreements:
•
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques (ENMOD or the Convention).113 ENMOD opened for
signature in May 1977 and entered into force on October 5, 1978. The United
States became a party to ENMOD in 1979. ENMOD’s aim is to prohibit the
military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques which
have widespread, long-lasting, or severe effects as the means of destruction,
damage, or injury to any party. The Convention defines the term “environmental
modification techniques” as any technique for changing—through the deliberate
manipulation of natural processes—the dynamics, composition, or structure of
the Earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere, atmosphere, or outer
space.114 This definition may encompass certain geoengineering activities.
However, the Convention further states that the provisions of the Convention do
not hinder the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful
purposes, such that parties to the Convention may undertake to facilitate, and
have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of scientific and
technological information on the use of environmental modification techniques
for peaceful purposes.115
•
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP or the
Convention).116 CLRTAP opened for signature in 1979 and entered into force on
March 16, 1983. The United States became a party to the Convention in 1979.
Contracting parties commit themselves to limiting, and to gradually preventing
and reducing their discharges of air pollutants and thus to combating the resulting
transboundary pollution. Long-range transboundary air pollution is defined by
111
Available at http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D24337/LC-LP1%2830%29.pdf.
2008 Resolution on Ocean Fertilization specifically excludes ocean fertilization research from the London
Convention and London Protocol’s definition of dumping by stating that ocean fertilization is a placement of matter for
a purpose other than mere disposal. It urges Contracting Parties to use the “utmost caution and the best available
guidance” to evaluate scientific research proposals for ocean fertilization and says that ocean fertilization activities
other than research should not be allowed given the present state of knowledge.
113
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, May 18,
1977, 31 U.S.T. 333, 16 I.L.M 88, available at http://www.un-documents.net/enmod.htm.
114
Ibid. at Art. II.
115
Ibid. at Art. III.
116
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, November 13, 1979, 34 U.S.T. 3043, 18 I.L.M. 1442,
available at http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/full%20text/1979.CLRTAP.e.pdf.
112
Congressional Research Service
34
Geoengineering: Governance and Technology Policy
the Convention as the human introduction of substances or energy into the air
which have deleterious effects on human health, the environment, or material
property in another country, and for which the contribution of individual
emission sources or groups of sources cannot be distinguished.117 It is uncertain
which geoengineering activities CLRTAP would regulate, or how such regulation
would be implemented.
•
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (the Convention).118
The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer was opened for
signature in 1985 and entered into force in 1988. The Convention, along with the
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete Ozone Layer, which was opened
for signature in 1987 and entered into force in 1989, aims to control the
production and consumption of the most commercially and environmentally
significant ozone-depleting substances.119 The United States became a party to
the Vienna Convention in 1986. It is also a party to the Montreal Protocol (since
1988) and has agreed to all four amendments to the Protocol. Parties to these
agreements, within their capabilities, are expected to (1) cooperate to better
understand and assess the effects of human activities on the ozone layer and the
effects of the modification of the ozone layer; (2) adopt appropriate measures and
cooperate in harmonizing appropriate policies to control the activities that are
causing the modification of the ozone layer; (3) cooperate in formulating
measures for the implementation of the Convention; and (4) cooperate with
competent international bodies to implement the Convention.120 Certain
stratospheric aerosol injection technologies for geoengineering, to the extent that
they pose a risk to the ozone layer, have the potential to implicate many of the
phase-out provisions of the Convention and the protocols.
The Relevance and Functions of Various International Bodies
At this point, no international organization has a direct mandate to address the full spectrum of
possible geoengineering activities.121 It is possible, however, that existing institutions could fit
this purpose if their charters were modified and expanded. Assessing what kinds of institutions
would be best suited for this enterprise is difficult, given how little is currently understood about
the technical, economic, social, and political components of the technologies. Consequently, there
is debate over the ideal structure and framework of an international institution that should have
responsibility for geoengineering activities or policies.
117
Ibid. at Art. 1.a-b.
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, March 22, 1985, T.I.A.S. No. 11,097, 13 I.L.M. 1529,
available at http://www.unep.ch/ozone/pdfs/viennaconvention2002.pdf.
119
Ibid. at Art. 2.1.
120
Ibid. at Art. 2.2.
121
However, in the absence of any official international entity charged with addressing geoengineering activities, three
organizations founded the Solar Radiation Management Governance Initiative (SRMGI). About SRMGI,
http://www.srmgi.org (last visited January 7, 2011). The three founding partners of SRMGI are (1) the Royal Society,
which is funded in part by the United Kingdom; (2) the Academy of Sciences for the Developing World, an
autonomous international organization funded primarily by Italy and administered by the United Nations; and (3) the
Environmental Defense Fund, a U.S. nonprofit focused on environmental protection and advocacy. Id. SRMGI plans to
release a set of recommendations for the governance of geoengineering—particularly, SRM—research in the spring of
2011. Id. SRMGI states that will involve a wide variety of stakeholders in the development of its recommendations,
including representatives of governments of the developed and developing countries. Id.
118
Congressional Research Service
35
Geoengineering: Governance and Technology Policy
There are many factors to consider before deciding whether to create a new international body to
address geoengineering or to grant jurisdiction over geoengineering to an existing international
body or group thereof. Among these factors are:
•
The functions the international body should perform (see Table 2);
•
The level of membership and inclusiveness the international body should have;
•
The level of resources and experience on which the international body should be
able to draw;
•
The appropriate subject-area jurisdiction, or jurisdictions, that the international
body should have; and
•
The voting rules that will best enable the international body to make careful
inclusive decisions but still respond with appropriate speed to new issues.
Some observers suggest that, because engineering the climate system is a global activity with
transboundary effects, only a multilateral body is appropriate for addressing it. This kind of body
could be the United Nations, a specialized body or agency contained within it, such as the United
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) or International Maritime Organization (IMO), or an
environmental convention secretariat associated with it, such as the secretariat for the United
Nations Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Among the advantages of involving this
kind of international institution are that it typically has (1) a truly international reach, (2) access
to existing budgets and resources, (3) legitimacy and leverage with different countries and
stakeholders, and (4) experience in handling and developing consensus around controversial
issues on an international scale. However, while a multilateral body may assist in bringing
transparency, inclusiveness, and equitability to geoengineering oversight, the U.N. process is slow
and complicated by design and may fail to provide a sufficiently rapid response to geoengineering
activities.122 Furthermore, some worry that folding geoengineering into the jurisdiction of a preexisting multilateral institution might result in mission creep and conflicts of interest. These
critics suggest that the institution might be biased against geoengineering because of its primary
mission or, alternately, that it might be forced to allocate less of its time and resources to
achieving that primary mission.
Another type of international organization that could be involved in geoengineering is plurilateral
or ad hoc bodies, which are frequently groups of countries with shared characteristics thta might
facilitate dialogue and coordination on particular issues. For example, members of groups like the
G-20 or Major Economies Forum (MEF) may share similar economic situations, technical
abilities, or climate concerns that would enable these groups to coordinate research agendas and
facilitate the exchange of information. But, because these groups have limited membership, their
involvement might undermine the legitimacy of their response to geoengineering. The countries
that are excluded from participating from the plurilateral organization, and therefore from
formulating its response to geoengineering, may demand adequate voice and representation.
Moreover, the same issues of mission creep and conflict of interest might plague the use of
existing plurilateral groups just as they would the use of existing multilateral institutions.
122
See Virgoe’s written and oral testimony to the U.K. House of Commons, op. cit. The testimony also includes the
critique that follows.
Congressional Research Service
36
Geoengineering: Governance and Technology Policy
A third type of international organization that could be involved is that of the intergovernmental
organization, which typically acts a policy advisor to its member countries. The International
Energy Association (IEA), for example, has a mandate to coordinate government measures
affecting energy security, economic development, and environmental protection. These measures
include those related to carbon capture and sequestration, and the IEA has published reports
assessing its members’ progress towards implementing CCS projects and setting
recommendations for next steps.
A fourth type of international organization that could be involved is that of the international
nongovernmental organization, which is exemplified by the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO). The ISO is a network of the national standards institutes of 163 countries,
some of which are affiliated with their national governments and others of which are more closely
associated with the private sector. The ISO develops an international set of standards in response
to a clearly established need by a particular sector or group of stakeholders. Most ISO members
have some form of public review procedures so that outside feedback can be incorporated into the
draft standard. For that standard to then be accepted as an ISO International Standard, it must be
approved by at least two-thirds of the ISO national members. To date, the ISO has not developed
a comprehensive set of standards addressing geoengineering activities. However, it has created
standards in other potentially related areas including air quality, water quality, and the
quantification and reporting of greenhouse gas emissions.
Finally, international research consortia represent a fifth type of potentially relevant international
body. Research consortia are generally well equipped to (1) set scientific research priorities at the
initial stages of an emerging technology; (2) explore and evaluate the feasibility, benefits, risks,
and opportunities presented by an emerging technology; (3) coordinate existing research, identify
new research agendas, and develop effective and objective assessment frameworks to inform the
initial stages of regulation; (4) collaborate with the scientific, policy, commercial, regulatory, and
nongovernmental communities to provide independent oversight of evolving regulatory issues for
an emerging technology; and (5) formulate, develop, and socialize an international and voluntary
code of practice to govern research in an emerging technology to provide guidance and
transparency for the public, private, and commercial sectors. Accordingly, loosely coordinated
international consortia could support cooperative geoengineering research through transparent
and informal consultations on risk assessment, acceptability, and oversight. These collaborations
could engage a broad group of experts and stakeholders, from scientists to public policy-makers
to civil society and explore the safest and most effective forms of geoengineering while building
a community of responsible researchers. International policy norms on geoengineering could then
be built from the bottom up, as knowledge and experience regarding geoengineering technologies
continued to develop. Interactive links between emerging governance and ongoing scientific and
technical research could be the core of this approach.123 Observers point to similar international
collaborations where the science has had potentially hazardous side effects such as the European
Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) and the Human Genome Project.124 Currently,
however, no collaborative mechanism is applicable to geoengineering.
Notably, any international body granted jurisdiction over geoengineering will likely lack the
authority to fully regulate or enforce its members’ compliance with the terms of the body’s
123
As proposed by David Keith, Edward Parson, and M. Granger Morgan, “Opinion: Research on Global Sun Block
Needed Now,” Nature, Vol. 463, No. 28, January 2010, pgs. 426-7.
124
See Victor, op. cit.
Congressional Research Service
37
Geoengineering: Governance and Technology Policy
charter or the underlying international agreement. Even international bodies with dispute
settlement mechanisms in place depend, ultimately, on their members’ cooperation to conform
their measures and actions with the terms of either the international agreement in question or any
decision reached pursuant to the dispute settlement process. For example, the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) handles disputes between Members of the United Nations and other countries that
have either become parties to the Statute of the Court or otherwise accepted the ICJ’s jurisdiction.
However, if a party to an ICJ dispute fails to act in accordance with the ICJ’s judgment, the other
party may present the matter to the U.N. Security Council, which may “if it deems necessary,
make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.”125
Similarly, the World Trade Organization has a dispute settlement process for disputes involving
allegations of a Member’s non-compliance with the provisions of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) or one of the WTO agreements. However, it is ultimately up to the
WTO Dispute Settlement Body, which is composed of representatives of all WTO Members, to
authorize the complaining Member to retaliate (generally by raising tariffs against) the defending
Member for non-compliance with a WTO panel or Appellate Body decision.126 Consequently,
while the decisions rendered by the ICJ and the WTO panels and Appellate Body generally
persuade countries to comply, international institutions must ultimately rely on international
negotiations and diplomacy to ensure universal compliance with the underlying agreements.
Conclusion
Geoengineering is an emerging field that, like other areas of scientific innovation, requires careful
deliberation by policymakers, and possibly, the development or amendment of international
agreements, federal laws, or federal regulations. Currently, many geoengineering technologies are
at the conceptual and research stages, and their effectiveness at reducing global temperatures has
yet to be proven. Very few studies have been published documenting the cost, environmental
effects, socio-political impacts, and legal implications of geoengineering. Nevertheless, if
geoengineering technologies are deployed, they are expected to have the potential to cause
significant transboundary effects.
Some foreign governments and private entities have expressed an interest in pursuing
geoengineering projects, largely out of concern over the slow progress of greenhouse gas
reductions under the international climate change agreements, the possible existence of climate
“tipping points,” and the apparent political or economic obstacles to pursuing aggressive
domestic greenhouse gas mitigation strategies. However, in the United States, there is limited
federal involvement in, or oversight of, geoengineering. Consequently, to the extent that some
federal agencies and U.S. states have begun addressing geoengineering projects, they are doing so
in a largely piecemeal fashion.
If the U.S. government opts to address geoengineering at the federal level, there are several
approaches that are immediately apparent. First, it may continue to leave geoengineering policy
development in the hands of federal agencies and states. Second, it might impose a temporary or
125
U.N. Charter, Art. 94(2).
For more on the WTO dispute settlement system, read CRS Report RS20088, Dispute Settlement in the World Trade
Organization (WTO): An Overview. Notably, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body applies a reverse consensus voting
rule for the authorization of retaliation: the DSB will adopt a panel or Appellate Body decision authorizing retaliation
unless, by consensus, it decides not to adopt it.
126
Congressional Research Service
38
Geoengineering: Governance and Technology Policy
permanent moratorium on geoengineering, or on particular geoengineering technologies, out of
concern that its risks outweigh its benefits. Third, it might develop a national policy on
geoengineering by authoring or amending laws. Fourth, it could work with the international
community to craft an international approach to geoengineering by writing or amending
international agreements. That the government can play a substantial role in the development of
new technologies has been manifested in such areas as nanotechnology, nuclear science, and
genetic engineering.
Author Contact Information
(name redacted)
Specialist in Agricultural Conservation and Natural
Resources Policy
[redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....
Congressional Research Service
(name redacted)
Analyst in Environmental Policy
[redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....
39
EveryCRSReport.com
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) is a federal legislative branch agency, housed inside the
Library of Congress, charged with providing the United States Congress non-partisan advice on
issues that may come before Congress.
EveryCRSReport.com republishes CRS reports that are available to all Congressional staff. The
reports are not classified, and Members of Congress routinely make individual reports available to
the public.
Prior to our republication, we redacted names, phone numbers and email addresses of analysts
who produced the reports. We also added this page to the report. We have not intentionally made
any other changes to any report published on EveryCRSReport.com.
CRS reports, as a work of the United States government, are not subject to copyright protection in
the United States. Any CRS report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without
permission from CRS. However, as a CRS report may include copyrighted images or material from a
third party, you may need to obtain permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or
otherwise use copyrighted material.
Information in a CRS report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public
understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to members of Congress in
connection with CRS' institutional role.
EveryCRSReport.com is not a government website and is not affiliated with CRS. We do not claim
copyright on any CRS report we have republished.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.