International Climate Change Financing: The Climate Investment Funds (CIFs)

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International Climate Change Financing:

The Climate Investment Funds (CIFs)

(name redacted)

Analyst in Environmental Policy

June 3, 2013

Congressional Research Service

7-....

www.crs.gov

R41302

CRS Report for Congress

Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

International Climate Change Financing: The Climate Investment Funds (CIFs)

Summary

The United States contributes funding to various international financial institutions to assist

developing countries to address global climate change and other environmental concerns.

Congress is responsible for several activities in this regard, including (1) authorizing periodic

appropriations for U.S. financial contributions to the institutions, and (2) overseeing U.S.

involvement in the programs. Issues of congressional interest include the overall development

assistance strategy of the United States, U.S. leadership in global environmental and economic

affairs, and U.S. commercial interests in trade and investment. This report provides an overview

of two of the larger and more recently instituted international financial institutions for the

environment—the Climate Investment Funds (CIFs)—and analyzes their structure, funding, and

objectives in light of the many challenges within global environmental finance.

The CIFs are investment programs administered by the multilateral development banks (MDBs)

that aim to help finance developing countries’ transitions toward low-carbon and climate-resilient

development. Formally approved by the World Bank’s Board of Directors on July 1, 2008, the

CIFs are composed of two trust funds—the Clean Technology Fund (CTF) and the Strategic

Climate Fund (SCF)—each with a specific scope, objective, and governance structure. The CTF

provides financing for demonstrating, deploying, and diffusing low-carbon technologies that have

the potential for long-term avoidance of greenhouse gas emissions. The SCF—a suite of three

separate funds, including the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR), the Forest Investment

Program (FIP), and the Scaling Up Renewable Energy Program in Low Income Countries

(SREP)—supports the least developed countries in their efforts to achieve low-carbon, climateresilient development. Overall, donor countries have pledged $7.6 billion to the funds since

September 2008 in support of programs in 49 developing countries. The U.S. pledge in 2008 was

for a total of $2 billion. For FY2010, Congress approved $375 million for the CIFs (the

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, H.R. 3288; P.L. 111-117); for FY2011, Congress

approved $234.5 million (the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations

Act, 2011, H.R. 1473; P.L. 112-10); for FY2012, Congress approved $234.5 million (the

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, H.R. 2055; P.L. 112-74); and for FY2013, Congress

approved $234.5 million (the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013,

H.R. 933; P.L. 113-6). For FY2014, the Administration requested $283.7 million for the funds.

The CIFs are just one set of financial mechanisms in a larger network of international programs

designed to address the global environment. Accordingly, their effectiveness depends on how the

funds address programmatic issues, build upon national investment plans, react to recent

developments in the financial landscape, and respond to emerging opportunities. Proponents of

the CIFs point to several factors in support of the funds, including an innovative programmatic

design, a country-led investment process, and a balanced governance structure with enhanced

stakeholder engagement. Proponents of the MDBs’ role in environmental assistance emphasize

several advantages to financing climate programs through the MDBs, including its commitment

to private sector development, its capacity to leverage large co-financing arrangements, and its

possession of fiduciary standards and institutional expertise. However, critics highlight several

factors of concern with the CIFs and their Trustee, including a lack of transparency, coordination,

and “polluter pay” responsibilities; a potential for increased debt burdens on developing

countries; and a prior economic development policy at the development banks that is considered a

conflict of interest for environmental protection.

Congressional Research Service

International Climate Change Financing: The Climate Investment Funds (CIFs)

Contents

Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1

The Climate Investment Funds ........................................................................................................ 3

Background................................................................................................................................ 3

The Clean Technology Fund (CTF)........................................................................................... 4

Overview ............................................................................................................................. 4

Governance ......................................................................................................................... 5

Funding ............................................................................................................................... 6

Program Areas ..................................................................................................................... 7

The Strategic Climate Fund (SCF) ............................................................................................ 9

Overview ............................................................................................................................. 9

Governance ......................................................................................................................... 9

Funding ............................................................................................................................. 10

Program Areas ................................................................................................................... 10

Current Issues ................................................................................................................................ 13

Innovations by the CIFs........................................................................................................... 13

Issues in Support of the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) and Multilateral

Assistance ............................................................................................................................. 14

Issues of Concern for Developing Countries and NGOs ......................................................... 16

Tables

Table 1. Recent U.S. Budget Authority for Multilateral Climate and Environment Funds ............. 2

Table 2. Total Pledges and Contributions to the Clean Technology Fund ....................................... 6

Table 3. Clean Technology Fund Investment Plans ......................................................................... 8

Table 4. Total Pledges and Contributions to the Strategic Climate Fund ...................................... 11

Table 5. Pilot Program for Climate Resilience Investment Plans .................................................. 12

Contacts

Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 18

Congressional Research Service

International Climate Change Financing: The Climate Investment Funds (CIFs)

Introduction

Many governments acknowledge that environmental degradation and climate change pose

international and trans-boundary risks to human populations, economies, and ecosystems that

could result in a worsening of poverty, social tensions, and political stability. To confront these

global challenges, countries have negotiated various international agreements to protect the

environment, reduce pollution, conserve natural resources, and promote sustainable growth.

While some observers have called upon developed countries to take the lead in addressing these

issues, efforts are unlikely to be sufficient without similar measures being implemented in

developing countries. Developing countries, however, focused on poverty reduction and

economic growth, may not have the financial resources, technological know-how, or institutional

capacity to deploy such measures. Therefore, international support for these areas has remained

the principal method for governments to assist developing country action on global environmental

problems.1

The United States and other industrialized countries have committed to financial assistance for

environmental initiatives through several multilateral agreements (e.g., the Montreal Protocol

(1987), the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992), United Nations

Convention to Combat Desertification (1994), and the Copenhagen Accord (2009)). International

financial assistance takes many forms, from fiscal transfers to market transactions, and includes

foreign direct investment (FDI), bilateral overseas development assistance (ODA), and

contributions to multilateral development banks (MDB)2 and other international financial

institutions (IFI), as well as the offering of export credits, loan guarantees, and insurance

products.

Table 1 outlines recent U.S. financial support for multilateral environmental initiatives. Congress

is responsible for several activities in this regard, including (1) authorizing periodic

appropriations for U.S. financial contributions to the institutions, and (2) overseeing U.S.

involvement in the programs. Issues of congressional interest include the overall development

assistance strategy of the United States, U.S. leadership in global environmental and economic

affairs, and U.S. commercial interests in trade and investment.3 As Congress considers potential

authorizations and/or appropriations for initiatives administered through the Department of State,

the Department of the Treasury, and other agencies with international programs, it may have

questions concerning the direction, efficiency, and effectiveness of current bilateral and

multilateral programs. This report provides an overview of two of the larger and more recently

instituted multilateral mechanisms—the Climate Investment Funds (CIFs)—and analyzes their

structure, funding, and objectives in light of the many challenges within the contemporary

landscape of global environmental finance.

For a more detailed discussion on various sources and mechanisms of financial assistance for climate change

activities, see CRS Report R41808, International Climate Change Financing: Needs, Sources, and Delivery Methods,

by (name redacted) and (name redacted).

The group of multilateral development banks referred to in this report includes the World Bank Group (WBG),

African Development Bank (AfDB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), European Bank for Reconstruction and

Development (EBRD), and Inter-American Development Bank Group (IDB).

For more substantive analysis of foreign aid and congressional roles, see CRS Report R40213, Foreign Aid: An

Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy, by (name redacted) and Marian Leonardo Lawson; and CRS Report R41170,

Multilateral Development Banks: Overview and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).

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International Climate Change Financing: The Climate Investment Funds (CIFs)

Table 1. Recent U.S. Budget Authority

for Multilateral Climate and Environment Funds

In nominal US$ million

2010

Enacted

2011

Enacted

2012

Enacted

2013

Enacteda

2014

Request

Least Developed Country Fund

30.0

25.0

TBD

Special Climate Change Fund

20.0

10.0

TBD

World Bank Forest Carbon

Partnership

10.0

8.0

TBD

Tropical Forests Conservation

Act

26.0

16.4

12.0

0.0

Global Environment Facility

86.5

89.8

119.8b

129.4c

143.8

Climate Investment Fund:

Clean Technology Fund

300.0

184.6

229.6d

175.3

215.7

Climate Investment Fund:

Strategic Climate Fund - Pilot

Program for Climate Resilience

55.0

10.0

18.7e

25.0f

34.0g

Climate Investment Fund:

Strategic Climate Fund - Forest

Investment Program

20.0

30.0

37.5e

12.5f

17.0g

Climate Investment Fund:

Strategic Climate Fund Scaling-Up Renewable Energy

0.0

10.0

18.7e

12.5f

17.0g

Agency/Program

Department of State

Department of Treasury

Source: Office of Management and Budget, The Budget of the United States Government, 2011, 2012, 2013, and

2014; CRS correspondence with Department of State and Department of the Treasury.

Notes: TBD, “to be determined”: Appropriated funds for some programs/activities are drawn from larger line

item categories in agency budget authorities, occasionally with “shall”-language implementing spending ceilings.

Allocations for these programs are left at the discretion of the agency and have yet to be determined and/or fully

reported.

Except where noted, FY2013 Enacted amount is as continuing resolution in the Consolidated and Further

Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 (P.L. 113-6). Figures do not include sequestration reduction.

FY2012 Enacted amount for GEF includes the transfer of $30 million from the Economic Support Fund as

provided in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 (P.L. 112-74).

FY2013 Enacted amount for the GEF is as provided in the Consolidated and Further Continuing

Appropriations Act, 2013 (P.L. 113-6).

FY2012 Enacted amount for CTF includes the transfer of $45 million from the Economic Support Fund as

provided in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 (P.L. 112-74).

FY2012 Enacted amount for SCF includes the transfer of $25 million from the Economic Support Fund as

provided in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 (P.L. 112-74).

FY2013 Enacted amount for SCF is $47.3 million for all three programs. The figures in the table reflect

Treasury’s internal proposal for contribution among the PPCR, FIP, and SREP.

FY2014 Request amount for SCF is $68.0 million for all three programs. The figures above are estimates of

contributions to each program. Treasury will finalize contributions among the PPCR, FIP, and SREP in spring

2014.

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International Climate Change Financing: The Climate Investment Funds (CIFs)

The Climate Investment Funds

Background

Projected climate change is considered a potential threat to economic development, with

anticipated effects on the environment, human health, food security, and economic activity.

Further, climate change disproportionately affects the urban and rural poor of developing

countries, thus making it a central concern to those interested in poverty reduction and sustainable

development.4 Under this context, and at the request of the G8/G20, the multilateral development

banks (MDBs) have recently sought to expand their support to low-carbon and climate-resilient

investments in several ways, including (1) creating new and additional environmental funding

resources, (2) repackaging their “core” financial products with specialized climate provisions, and

(3) leveraging their suite of financial instruments for greater private sector environmental

investment.5

In keeping with these aims, in February 2008, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States

announced their intention to create a set of funds at the MDBs to help developing countries

“bridge the gap between dirty and clean energy” and “boost the World Bank’s ability to help

developing countries tackle climate change.”6 The World Bank held the first design meeting for

the proposed Climate Investment Funds (CIFs) in March 2008 in Paris, France. Two subsequent

meetings were held in Washington, DC, and Potsdam, Germany, and on May 23, 2008,

representatives from 40 developing and industrialized countries reached agreement on the funds’

design and duration (the CIFs were programmed to sunset upon the commencement of a new

climate fund in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)).

Formally approved by the World Bank’s Board of Directors on July 1, 2008, the CIFs have

become an attempt to bridge the gap in climate financing between present obligations and a future

global climate change agreement.7

The CIFs are composed of two separate trust funds—the Clean Technology Fund (CTF) and the

Strategic Climate Fund (SCF)—each with a specific scope, objective, and governance structure.

Overall, 14 donor countries have pledged $7.6 billion (in historical value) to the funds since

September 2008, which supports programming in 49 developing countries.8 The U.S. pledge in

2008 was for a total of $2 billion. All U.S. funding is subject to annual congressional approval.

Authorizing legislation is managed by the House Financial Services Committee and Senate

Foreign Relations Committee. The House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees on State,

Foreign Operations, and Related Programs have jurisdiction over appropriations.

As summarized by the International Institute for Sustainable Development, at http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/sd/

ymbvol172num2e.pdf.

See the World Bank website for additional information at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/Resources/

Climate_Change_Results_Brief_4-12-10.pdf.

Henry Paulson, Alistair Darling, and Fukushiro Nukaga, “Financial bridge from dirty to clean,” Financial Times,

February 7, 2008.

For a full description of purpose and programs, see the CIFs website at http://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/.

Valued on the basis of exchange rates as of December 31, 2012, the last recorded Trustee Report for the CIFs, at

https://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/funding-basics.

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International Climate Change Financing: The Climate Investment Funds (CIFs)

U.S. contributions include the following:

•

FY2010, Congress approved $300 million for the CTF and $75 million for the

SCF (the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, H.R. 3288; P.L. 111-117).

•

FY2011, Congress approved $184.6 million for the CTF and $49.9 million for

the SCF (the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations

Act, 2011, H.R. 1473; P.L. 112-10).

•

FY2012, Congress approved $184.6 million for the CTF and $49.9 million for

the SCF; however, provisions for funding transfers were included. Using these

provisions, the Department of State transferred $45 million from its Economic

Support Fund to the CTF, and $25 million to the SCF during FY2012 (the

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, H.R. 2055; P.L. 112-74).

•

FY2013, Congress approved $184.6 million for the CTF and $49.9 million for

the SCF through a continuing resolution (the Consolidated and Further

Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, H.R. 933; P.L. 113-6). FY2013-enacted

account level estimates are subject to the budget sequestration process as

established by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25) and the American

Taxpayer Relief Act (P.L. 112-240). The total budget impact of sequestration has

yet to be determined.

•

For FY2014, the Administration has requested $215.7 million for the CTF and

$68 million for the SCF.9

The Clean Technology Fund (CTF)

Overview

Faced with energy and environmental challenges, among others, many developing countries see

value in clean technology to meet their energy security, poverty alleviation, and sustainable

development goals while also reducing their growth in emissions. However, the costs to

developing countries of switching to cleaner technologies without financial assistance may be

prohibitive. The CTF seeks to provide financing—principally to larger emerging economies and

to regional groups—for demonstrating, deploying, and diffusing low-carbon technologies with

the potential for long-term avoidance of greenhouse gas emissions. The fund promotes renewable

energy and energy efficient technologies in the power sector as well as energy efficiency

strategies in the transportation, building, industry, and agricultural sectors. Currently, the CTF is

designed to support 15-20 country and regional investment plans and/or co-financed projects. As

of March 2013, the CTF has endorsed 16 investment plans for $5.58 billion in direct funding

(with a projected $40 billion in leveraged co-financing), including plans from Chile, Colombia,

Egypt, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Philippines, South Africa,

Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, and Vietnam, and one regional investment plan in the Middle East and

North Africa (MENA) covering Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia. Projects include

support for wind energy, urban public transportation systems, solar water heaters, smart-grid

U.S. Department of State, FY 2014 Executive Budget Summary - Function 150 and Other International Programs, at

http://www.state.gov/f/budget/

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International Climate Change Financing: The Climate Investment Funds (CIFs)

development, and concentrating solar thermal power programs, among others (see Table 3 for

more detailed descriptions of the national investment plans).

Governance

The CTF is implemented through a partnership of the multilateral development banks (MDBs)

and governed by representatives from the donor and recipient countries. The role of governance

for the CTF is to approve investment plans, programming, and the allocation of financial

resources; and to provide guidance, performance evaluation, and reporting. It is further tasked

with ensuring that the strategic orientation of the CTF is guided by the principles of the

UNFCCC. The organizational structure of the CTF is equally balanced between donor and

developing countries. All decisions are made by consensus. Other international organizations, the

private sector, and civil society representatives are included as observers. All observer roles are

“active,” allowing them to take the floor to make interventions, propose agenda items, and

recommend experts. Observers do not vote during consensus decisions. The governance structure

includes the following:

•

The CTF Trust Fund Committee, which oversees and decides on the operations

and activities of the CTF and includes (1) eight representatives from contributor

countries; (2) eight representatives from eligible recipient countries; (3) a

representative from the project recipient country (during deliberations on the

investment plan, program, or project); (4) a representative of the World Bank;

and (5) a representative for the other MDBs.

•

The MDBs Committee, which facilitates collaboration, coordination, and the

exchange of information, knowledge, and experience among MDBs partners.

•

The Partnership Forum, which supports civil society engagement and includes

representatives of donor and eligible recipient countries, MDBs, U.N. and U.N.

agencies, Global Environment Facility (GEF), UNFCCC, Adaptation Fund,

bilateral development agencies, NGOs, indigenous peoples, private sector

entities, and technical experts.

•

The Administrative Unit, which supports the work of the CIFs, is housed in the

World Bank’s Washington, DC, offices.

•

A Trustee (the World Bank), which holds in trust, as the legal owner and

administrator, the funds, assets, and receipts that constitute the Trust Fund,

pursuant to the terms entered into with the contributors.

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International Climate Change Financing: The Climate Investment Funds (CIFs)

Funding

Since September 2008, 14 donor countries have pledged over US$7.6 billion (in historical value)

to finance the two CIF trust funds. The total amount pledged by the nine contributing countries to

the CTF has been US$5.154 billion (in historical value)10 as of March 31, 2013 (see Table 2 for

pledges and contributions; Table 1 for U.S. Budget Authority). The funds are to be disbursed as

grants, concessional loans, loan guarantees, and other risk management instruments. Endorsed

funding by the CIFs also serves to leverage co-financing from additional sources, including the

private sector, multilateral financial institutions, recipient governments, state-owned enterprises,

and carbon finance.

Table 2. Total Pledges and Contributions to the Clean Technology Fund

As of March 31, 2013 (USD millions)

Donor

Contribution

Typea

Amount Pledged

(historical value)b

Amount Pledged

(current value)c

Receipts

(current value)d

Australia

Grant

$84

$86

Canada

Loan

$193

$199

France

Loan

$300

$268

Germany

Loan

$739

$615

Japan

Grant

$1,000

$1,114

Spain

Capital

$118

$109

Sweden

Grant

$92

$80

United Kingdom

Capital

$1,135

$973

United Statese

Grant

$1,492

$714

$5,154

$4,937

$4,158

Total

Source: The CIFs website at http://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/.

Donor contribution types include grants, loans, and equity, and describe in broad terms the general

requirements stipulated by the donors on their contributed funds. The U.S. government has historically

contributed grant financing for reasons that include ease, ODA accounting practices, and flexible capital

reflow provisions.

Represents pledges valued on the basis of exchange rates as of September 25, 2008, the CIF official pledging

date.

Valued on the basis of exchange rates as of December 31, 2012.

The total U.S. pledge to the CIFs remains at $2 billion. Contributions across funds are extrapolated from

current allocations.

As of December 31, 2012, current value of the pledges was USD equivalent $4.937 billion.

Congressional Research Service

International Climate Change Financing: The Climate Investment Funds (CIFs)

Program Areas

The CTF is based on country and regional investment plans that aim to support climate-friendly

technologies. Investment plans are undertaken jointly by the recipients, the MDBs, other

development partners, private industry, and civil society to build upon existing national strategies

and demonstrate how the CTF can be complementary to the country’s overall developmental

activities. The CTF supports investment plans that are cost-effective and implementation-ready,

can be scaled up quickly to impact development, and have the potential for significant greenhouse

gas emission reductions. To receive CTF funding, a country must be eligible for official

development assistance (ODA) and have an active MDB program.

The majority of CTF funding supports programs that help shape demand side markets for

technology diffusion. The fund’s criteria for lending allow for all renewable and energy efficiency

initiatives, as well as large-scale hydroelectric power plants, natural gas plants, some forms of

biofuels, power plant refits, and ultra-supercritical coal plants.11 Funds are commonly targeted to

support a variety of investment activities, including (1) direct purchase of technological goods

and services; (2) direct investment into government infrastructure for transport or transmission

modernization; (3) seed funds for financial intermediaries to incentivize clean technology

lending; and (4) investment support and risk mitigation strategies for private sector entry into the

market. In short, the CTF attempts to address the additional costs contained in lower-carbon

energy investment such that it becomes a viable option to conventional fossil-fuel power

generation. Table 3 outlines the endorsed investment plans as of March 31, 2013.

No coal-fired power plants have been proposed or approved at this time. Hydroelectric power generation is currently

included in the Ukraine proposal.

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International Climate Change Financing: The Climate Investment Funds (CIFs)

Table 3. Clean Technology Fund Investment Plans

(In USD millions)

Date of

Endorsement /

Revision

Country

Direct CTF Funding

/ Co-financing

Investment Plan

January 2009 /

November 2012

Egypt

$300 / $1,817

Wind power; Urban transport (natural gas buses and a

subway); Transmission upgrades.

January 2009

Mexico

$500 / $6,624

Energy efficiency (appliance & lighting); Urban transport

(rapid bus); Wind power.

January 2009 /

Novermber 2012

Turkey

$250 / $2,378

Renewable energy and energy efficiency; Smart-grid

technology.

October 2009 /

October 2011

Morocco

$150 / $2,470

Energy sector privatization; Energy conservation; Urban

transport.

October 2009

South Africa

$500 / $3,147

Concentrated solar power; Wind power; Solar water

heaters; Energy efficiency.

December 2009

Middle East / N.

Africa region

$750 / $4,391

Concentrated solar power; Transmission and distribution

infrastructure.

December 2009 /

February 2012

Thailand

$170 / $216

Renewable energy and efficiency; Urban transport (bus

system).

December 2009 /

August 2012

Philippines

$250 / $2,095

Solar power; Transmission infrastructure; Demand side

management; Sustainable transport strategy.

December 2009 /

June 2011

Vietnam

$250 / $3,978

Renewable energy and industrial energy efficiency; Urban

transport (rail system); Initial capitalization of funds;

Transmission infrastructure.

March 2010

Colombia

$150 / $2,340

Sustainable transport program; Public/private sector

energy efficiency program.

March 2010

Indonesia

$400 / $2,630

Large-scale geothermal power; Biomass and other

renewable energy.

March 2010

Kazakhstan

$200 / $719

Hydro and wind power; Public sector transport fuel

switch; District heating; Energy efficiency.

March 2010

Ukraine

$350 / $2,012

Wind, hydro, biomass; Residential and government

energy efficiency; District heating; Smartgrid technology.

November 2010

Nigeria

$250 / $510

Transport sector structure; Clean and renewable energy

development; Energy efficiency; Financial sector reform.

November 2011

India

$775 / $4,069

Energy efficiency; Large-scale solar.

May 2012

Chile

$200 / $610

Concentrated solar power; Large-scale solar PV; energy

efficiency and small-scale self-supply.

November 2012

Turkey-Stage 2

$140 / $397

Energy efficiency, energy finance.

Source: CTF committee meeting documents and national Investment plans, available at the CIFs website.

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International Climate Change Financing: The Climate Investment Funds (CIFs)

The Strategic Climate Fund (SCF)

Overview

Some governments and civil society organizations are concerned that climate change may

exacerbate poverty situations and reverse economic gains in the developing world through the

possibility of temperature increases, rising sea levels, droughts, changes in rainfall patterns,

heightened disease patterns, and the lack of drinkable water. They believe that resources may be

necessary to help low-income countries manage a response. Responses to climate change are

likely to entail both mitigation efforts (i.e., slowing, then reducing greenhouse gas emissions) and

adaptation efforts (i.e., managing the effects of short- and long-term climate outcomes). The SCF

aims to help developing countries prepare for climate change by promoting low-carbon, climateresilient development. Three targeted programs provide grants and concessional loans to pilot

new approaches aimed at specific challenges:12

•

The Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR) supports ways to integrate

climate risk and resilience into the development strategies of low-income

countries. Funds can be used to provide technical assistance to help with capacity

building, policy reform, and sector investment.

•

The Forest Investment Program (FIP) provides financing to countries to help

them prepare for and participate in programs that aim to reduce deforestation.

Funds can be used for managing forests and for educating indigenous and local

communities about forest policies.

•

The Scaling Up Renewable Energy Program in Low Income Countries (SREP)

helps low-income countries adopt renewable energy solutions to aid in the

development of their power generation sector. Funds can be used to provide

policy support, technical assistance, financial management, and sector

investment.

Governance

The SCF is implemented through a partnership of the multilateral development banks (MDBs)

and governed by representatives from the donor and recipient countries. The governance and

decision-making structure is similar to the CTF, but specifically includes the following:

•

The SCF Trust Fund Committee, which oversees and decides on the operations

and activities of SCF and includes (1) eight representatives from contributor

countries; (2) eight representatives from eligible recipient countries; (3) a

representative of the World Bank; and (4) a representative for the other MDBs.

•

An SCF subcommittee for each of the targeted programs, which includes up to

six representatives from contributor countries to the SCF Program, a matching

number of representatives from eligible recipient countries, and such other

representatives designated by the SCF Trust Fund.

Description of SCF overview and governance from CIFs, Annual Report 2009, on the CIFs website at

http://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/sites/climateinvestmentfunds.org/files/cif_annual_report_final_021810.pdf.

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International Climate Change Financing: The Climate Investment Funds (CIFs)

•

The MDBs Committee, which facilitates collaboration, coordination, and the

exchange of information, knowledge, and experience among the MDBs partners.

•

The Partnership Forum, which supports civil society engagement and includes

representatives of donor and eligible recipient countries, MDBs, U.N. and U.N.

agencies, GEF, UNFCCC, Adaptation Fund, bilateral development agencies,

NGOs, indigenous peoples, private sector entities, and technical experts.

•

The Administrative Unit, which supports the work of the CIFs, is housed in the

World Bank’s Washington, DC, offices.

•

A Trustee (the World Bank), which holds in trust, as the legal owner and

administrator, the funds, assets, and receipts that constitute the Trust Fund,

pursuant to the terms entered into with the contributors.

Funding

Since September 2008, 14 donor countries have pledged over US$7.6 billion (in historical value)

to finance the two CIF trust funds. The total amount pledged by 13 countries to the SCF has been

US$2.413 billion (in historical value)13 as of March 31, 2013 (see Table 4 for pledges and

contributions; Table 1 for U.S. Budget Authority). The funds are to be disbursed as grants,

concessional loans, loan guarantees, and other risk management instruments.

Program Areas

The programming of the SCF is newer than that of the CTF, having launched no earlier than

January 2009. However, each of the funds has begun endorsing investment plans. As of the April

30, 2013 meeting of the Joint CTF and SCF Trust Fund Committees, the status of each fund was

reported as follows:14

•

The Pilot Program for Climate Resilience. The PPCR became operational in

January 2009. The program provides funding to the countries in two phases: (1) a

technical assistance phase, which includes looking at how countries’

development plans can be made more climate-resilient and deciding upon the

types of investments countries could make; and (2) an implementation phase,

which includes the dispersal of grants of up to $1.5 million with the option of

additional loans to implement programs. The PPCR Sub-Committee has endorsed

20 investment plans for $1,034.4 million in PPCR funding. This includes plans

for 18 countries (Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cambodia, Dominica, Grenada, Haiti,

Jamaica, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, St. Lucia, St.

Vincent and the Grenadines, Tajikistan, Tonga, Yemen, and Zambia) and two

regional programs (Caribbean Regional Program and the Pacific Regional

Program). The plans are expected to leverage an additional $1.47 billion in cofinancing. Table 5 outlines the endorsed investment plans as of March 31, 2013.

As of December 31, 2012, current value of the pledges was USD equivalent $2.257 billion.

See SCP Committee document, “SCF/TFC.10/3/Rev.1, Progress report on SCF targeted programs,” at

https://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/workingdocuments/11015.

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International Climate Change Financing: The Climate Investment Funds (CIFs)

•

The Forest Investment Program. The FIP became operational in February

2010. The FIP Sub-Committee has endorsed seven investment plans (Brazil,

Burkina Faso, DR Congo, Ghana, Indonesia, Lao PDR, and Mexico) for $370

million in FIP funding. These plans are projected to leverage an additional $993

million in co-financing. An investment plan for Peru is expected to be endorsed

in November 2013.

•

The Scaling Up Renewable Energy Program in Low Income Countries. The

SREP become operational in December 2009. The SREP Sub-Committee has

endorsed six investment plans (Ethiopia, Honduras, Kenya, Maldives, Mali, and

Nepal) for $240 million in SREP funding. The plans are expected to leverage an

additional $1.74 billion in co-financing. Investment plans for Liberia and

Tanzania are expected for endorsement by November 2013.

Table 4. Total Pledges and Contributions to the Strategic Climate Fund

As of March 31, 2013 (USD millions)

Donor

Contribution

Typea

Amount Pledged

(historical value)b

Amount Pledged

(current value)c

Receipts

(current value)d

Australia

Grant

$72

$79

Canada

Grant

$97

$84

Denmark

Grant

$47

$45

Germany

Grant

$88

$78

Japan

Grant

$200

$218

Korea

Grant

Netherlands

Grant

$76

Norway

Grant

$241

$229

Spain

Grant / Capital

$34

$30

Sweden

Grant

$42

$41

Switzerland

Grant

$26

United Kingdom

Capital

$976

$838

United Statese

Grant

$508

$200

$2,413

$2,257

$1,950

Total

Source: The CIFs website at http://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/.

Donor contribution types include grants, loans, and equity, and describe in broad terms the general

requirements stipulated by the donors on their contributed funds. The U.S. government has historically

contributed grant financing for reasons that include ease, ODA accounting practices, and flexible capital

reflow provisions.

Represents pledges valued on the basis of exchange rates as of September 25, 2008, the CIF official pledging

date.

Valued on the basis of exchange rates as of December 31, 2012.

The total U.S. pledge to the CIFs remains at $2 billion. Contributions across funds are extrapolated from

current allocations.

Congressional Research Service

International Climate Change Financing: The Climate Investment Funds (CIFs)

Table 5. Pilot Program for Climate Resilience Investment Plans

(In USD millions)

Date of

Endorsement

Country

Direct

PPCR

Funding

/ Cofinancing

Investment Plan

November 2010

Bangladesh

$110 / $566

Enabling environment; infrastructure; coastal zone management;

agriculture and landscape management.

November 2010

Niger

$110 / $2

Agriculture and landscape management; climate information systems and

disaster risk management; water resources management.

November 2010

Tajikistan

$58 / $84

Climate information systems and disaster risk management; enabling

environment; agriculture and landscape management; water resources

management; infrastructure.

April 2011

Caribbean Grenada

$25 / $13

Climate information systems and disaster risk management; agriculture

and landscape management.

April 2011

Caribbean - St.

Vincent and the

Grenadines

$15 / $12

Climate information systems and disaster risk management.

April 2011

Pacific - Samoa

$30 / $15

Infrastructure; coastal zone management.

June 2011

Cambodia

$91 / $340

Infrastructure, enabling environment; water resources management;

agriculture and landscape management.

June 2011

Mozambique

$91 / $190

Agriculture and landscape management; enabling environment; water

resources management; infrastructure; urban development.

June 2011

Nepal

$91 / $20

Enabling environment; climate information systems and disaster risk

management; agriculture and landscape management; water resources

management.

June 2011

Zambia

$91 / $116

Agriculture and landscape management; enabling environment.

June 2011

Caribbean - St.

Lucia

$27 / $15

Climate information systems and disaster risk management.

November 2011

Bolivyesia

$91 / $49

Water resources management.

November 2011

Caribbean Jamaica

$30 / $18

Enabling environment; climate information systems and disaster risk

management; water resources management.

April 2012

Caribbean Dominica

$21 / $17

Climate information systems and disaster risk management.

April 2012

Yemen

$58 / $5

Climate information systems and disaster risk management; coastal zone

management.

April 2012

Caribbean Regional Track

$11 / $11

Enabling environment.

April 2012

Pacific - Tonga

$20 / $0

Enabling environment.

April 2012

Pacific - Regional

Track

$11 / $0

Enabling environment; coastal zone management.

November 2012

Pacific - Papua

New Guinea

$30 / $0

Agriculture and landscape management.

May 2013

Caribbean - Haiti

$25 / $110

Agriculture and landscape management; climate information systems;

infrastructure; urban development.

Source: PPCR committee meeting documents and national Investment plans, available at the CIFs website.

Congressional Research Service

International Climate Change Financing: The Climate Investment Funds (CIFs)

Current Issues

Each year, billions of dollars in environmental aid flow from developed country governments—

including the United States—to developing ones.15 While the efficiency and the effectiveness of

these programs are of concern to donor country governments, a full analysis of the purposes,

intents, results, and consequences behind these financial flows has yet to be conducted.16

International relations, comparative politics, and developmental economics can often collide with

global environmental agendas. Critics contend that the existing system has had limited impact in

addressing major environmental concerns—specifically climate change and tropical

deforestation—and has been unsuccessful in delivering global transformational change. A desire

to achieve more immediate impacts has led to a restructuring of the MDBs’ role in environmental

finance and the introduction of many new bilateral and multilateral funding initiatives. The CIFs

grew out of these concerns.

The effectiveness of the CIFs depends on how the trust funds address their programmatic issues,

build upon their national investment plans, react to recent developments in the financial

landscape, and respond to emerging opportunities. The following section investigates some of the

current challenges facing the CIFs and summarizes some of the responses initiated by the funds.

Innovations by the CIFs

Since their inception, the CIFs have attempted to provide innovative approaches to global

environmental issues and have introduced several processes to address the limitations of previous

environmental finance.17 These innovations include, but are not limited to, the following:

•

Programmatic Design. While the CIFs still aim to scale up existing practices

and fund activities at the project level, they also were created to serve as

laboratories for new financing schemes and vehicles for developing sustainable

strategies. Funding strives to target the potential for large-scale transformation

and to attain global environmental benefits. Stakeholders seek to share

knowledge gained and inspire the use of best practice. As such, multinational or

regional investment plans that support global development goals, energy security,

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) maintains information on Member

countries’ Official Development Assistance. Current data (accessed April 15, 2011) reflect that all OECD DAC

Member countries contributed, on average, a total of $2,283 million per annum over the period 2005-2009 to multisectoral environmental protection assistance (in 2010 US$), and that the United States contributed, on average, $285

million per annum over the same period to multi-sectoral environmental protection assistance (in 2010 US$). See

OECD StatExtracts database at http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=ODA_DONOR#.

This report does not aim to unpack the full range of discussions on environmental and developmental assistance. For

a discussion on international development assistance in general, see CRS Report R40213, Foreign Aid: An Introduction

to U.S. Programs and Policy, by (name redacted) and Marian Leonardo Lawson. An overview and analysis of the history

of environmental financing can be found in a number of source materials including recent book length studies by Inge

Kaul and Pedro Conceição, The New Public Finance: Responding to Global Challenges, New York: Oxford University

Press, 2006; and Robert L. Hicks, Bradley C. Parks, J. Timmons Roberts, and Michael J. Tierney, Greening Aid?:

Understanding the Environmental Impact of Development Assistance, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

For further discussion regarding the limitations of past mechanisms for global environmental finance, see the section

on institutional challenges in CRS Report R41165, International Environmental Financing: The Global Environment

Facility (GEF), by (name redacted).

Congressional Research Service

International Climate Change Financing: The Climate Investment Funds (CIFs)

industrial growth, diversification, and regional integration (e.g., the M.E.N.A.

plan) best exemplify the CIFs’ programmatic approach.

•

Country-led Process. Beyond a simple project-by-project approach, the purpose

of the CIFs is to bolster the efforts of countries’ official adaptation plans and their

actions toward low-carbon, climate-resilient development. The country-led

approach aims to integrate funding into the country-owned development

strategies consistent with the Paris Declaration.18

•

Innovative Governance and Stakeholder Engagement. In an effort to attain

transparency and accountability, the governing structure of the CIFs is equally

balanced between donor and developing countries. All decisions are taken by

consensus, with no provision for voting. If a consensus is not possible, the

proposal is postponed or withdrawn. Representatives from other international

organizations, the private sector, and civil society are included as observers. All

observer roles are “active,” allowing them to take the floor to make interventions,

propose agenda items, and recommend experts.

Issues in Support of the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs)

and Multilateral Assistance

The choice of financial mechanism and its administration is an important element to

environmental finance. The differences among multilateral or bilateral assistance, grant or lending

institutions, regional or global organizations, etc., all play a role in the structure of assistance. The

decision to employ the MDBs as trustees for the CIFs has both advantages and disadvantages.

Historically, the MDBs have provided financial assistance to developing countries, typically in

the form of loans and grants, for investment projects and organizational capacity.19 Donor country

support for the MDBs—including U.S. support—has assisted efforts to promote institutions,

strengthen financial systems, undertake large infrastructure and social welfare projects, and

develop property rights and rules of law. Through increased global integration, the aim of the

MDBs has been to bolster economic growth, poverty alleviation, and resource allocation

(including greater access to electricity) in developing countries while simultaneously building

new markets for developed countries’ exports and jobs. In 2008, at the urging of some donor

countries,20 a strategy to address climate change was added to the MDBs’ development agenda.

The “Strategic Framework on Development and Climate Change”21 analyzed the risks of climate

change to economic development and served as a basis for integrating mitigation and adaptation

planning into national development plans. Donor countries see several advantages to financing

climate programs through the institutional structure of the MDBs. These advantages include, but

are not limited to, the following:

The 2005 Paris Declaration, endorsed by over 100 countries, aims to increase harmonization, alignment, and

management of aid for results with a set of actions and indicators that can be monitored. See http://www.oecd.org/

dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf.

For a fuller discussion on the structure and the role of the MDB system, refer to CRS Report R41170, Multilateral

Development Banks: Overview and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).

Including the United States. See the negotiations at the 2005 G8 Gleneagles Summit at http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/

summit/2005gleneagles/.

See http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTCC/Resources/407863-1219339233881/DCCSFTechnicalReport.pdf.

Congressional Research Service

International Climate Change Financing: The Climate Investment Funds (CIFs)

•

Commitment to Private Sector Development. Many donor countries—

including the United States—believe that climate-friendly economic growth can

be led by the private sector through such efforts as improving access to financial

markets, building the capacity of entrepreneurs, and providing training to civilian

society. One aim of the MDBs is to help foster private sector development by

leveraging donor funds into highly effective co-financing arrangements.

Historically, the U.S. Administration has supported these efforts. In a March 25,

2010, hearing before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign

Operations, and Related Programs, the Treasury Department went on record as

stating that the United States invests in the MDBs because “they help generate

new engines of growth that benefit the U.S. economy and the global economy as

a whole.”

•

Economies of Scale, Coordination, and Co-financing. Proponents of the

MDBs argue that multilateral assistance can solve problems of scale and

efficiency by providing specialized expertise while lowering administration and

coordination costs. Similarly, more competitive procurement rules, attractive

cost-sharing opportunities, and the ability to leverage co-financing from other

public and private organizations allow the MDBs to play a catalytic role in

mobilizing financial aid.22 At the March 25, 2010, hearing noted above, the

Treasury Department stated that the MDBs “provide strong, effective and highly

leveraged means to advance global prosperity.... For every dollar the United

States contributes to paid-in capital for the World Bank, six dollars of additional

capital is generated by other donors. And, for every dollar we invest in the World

Bank, $26 worth of aid is delivered.”23

•

Responsiveness to Donors. The Treasury Department has similarly stated that

the United States invests in the MDBs because they “promot[e] core American

interests and values.” This arrangement is due primarily to the structure and

organization of the banks. MDBs’ governance is weighted on the basis of the

cumulative financial contributions and commitments by the donor countries, and

thus, while a single trust fund, like the CIFs, may be designed to balance equally

the roles of developed and developing countries, the MDBs are designed to give

greater weight to the major donors. The United States retains the most influence

on World Bank matters, with a 14.97% voting share and the ability to veto major

policy decisions. It is followed by Japan in second place, Germany in third, and

France and the United Kingdom tied for fourth. The only developing or emerging

country with as much voting interest is China, at fifth, with 3.21%.24 With a

governing structure that requires one representative from the World Bank, as

trustee, and one representative from the group of remaining MDBs, as well as

eight representatives from participating donor countries, the overall governance

structure of the CIFs has remained responsive to donor interests.

Sources of additional funds most often include other MDBs and multilateral financial institutions, the recipient

governments, state-owned enterprises, and carbon finance, as well as the private sector.

See testimony at http://appropriations.house.gov/images/stories/pdf/sfo/Secretary_Geithner.3.25.10.pdf.

As reported on the World Bank website, “Voting Powers,” at http://go.worldbank.org/VKVDQDUC10. These

figures are for country voting shares at the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). Shares for

the IFC, IDA, and MIGA may vary.

Congressional Research Service

International Climate Change Financing: The Climate Investment Funds (CIFs)

•

Possession of Fiduciary Standards. Both current and past U.S. Administrations

have argued that the World Bank has the proper internal safeguards to oversee

large amounts of financing. As reported by the Department of Treasury, “the

World Bank is an attractive trustee [for environmental funds] precisely because

of its strong fiduciary standards and its extensive capacity to uphold them.”25

•

Possession of Institutional Expertise, Information, and Credibility

Provisions. Proponents of the MDBs claim that multilateral agencies offer larger

and better trained staffs with greater technical expertise. They state that large

infrastructure investment, particularly in innovative technologies and methods,

requires professionals who are experienced in identifying and facilitating access

to technology, sharing risks associated with commercialization, and improving

institutional capacity. Beyond institutional knowledge, multilaterals also collect,

interpret, and disseminate costly information on a global scale and provide

credibility controls for both recipient and donor governments.

Issues of Concern for Developing Countries and NGOs

While advantages exist to financing climate programs through the institutional structure of the

MDBs, concerns also persist. A variety of recipient countries and nongovernmental organizations

(NGOs)26 have highlighted a number of issues, including, but not limited to, the following:

•

Coordination with Other Funds. Proponents argue that the fundamental

principle of the CIFs is coordination at the country-level among interested

stakeholders, including other developmental partners. However, some

observers believe that the CIFs have created a parallel structure for financing

climate change efforts outside both bilateral and the ongoing multilateral

framework for climate change negotiations. They are concerned that without

harmonization between the CIFs and the other sources of environmental finance

(e.g., funds managed by the U.N., the Global Environment Facility, and bilateral

sources), overlaps, redundancies, competing views, and lack of synergy may

affect climate priorities, funding processes, and qualifying criteria.

•

Potential to Prejudice U.N. Climate Provisions. Some commentators and

several governments have expressed concerns that the establishment of the CIFs

as trust funds in the MDBs may prejudice the outcomes of the international

negotiations on climate finance within the framework of the United Nations.

Many developing countries have expressly stated that they do not consider funds

contributed to the CIFs as meeting U.N. Annex I obligations. Furthermore, the

design of the CIFs includes a “sunset clause” stating that the CIFs “will take

As reported in Climatewire, “Eskom fallout spurs new opposition to World Bank’s role in climate funding,” May 24,

2010.

There are many published critiques on the environmental agenda of the MDBs. Of specific relevance for CIFs, see,

for example, Celine Tan, “No Additionality, New Conditionality: A Critique of the World Bank’s Proposed Climate

Investment Funds,” TWN, 2008, at http://www.twnside.org.sg/bangkok.briefings.htm; Smita Nakhooda, “Catalyzing

Low-carbon Development?” WRI, 2009, at http://pdf.wri.org/working_papers/

development_clean_technology_fund.pdf; and Heike Mainhardt-Gibbs, et al., “Fuelling Contradictions: The World

Bank’s Energy Lending and Climate Change,” Bretton Woods Project, CRBM & URGEWALD, 2010, at

http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-566198.

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International Climate Change Financing: The Climate Investment Funds (CIFs)

necessary steps to conclude its operations once a new [UNFCCC] financial

architecture is effective.” The nature of these steps has yet to be determined.

Further, additional contributions to the CIFs beyond the initial 2008 pledges (e.g.,

by Canada ($193 million), United Kingdom (£375 million), Denmark ($8

million), Germany ($12 million), Norway ($19 million), Sweden ($25 million),

and Switzerland ($6 million)) may complicate these negotiations.

•

Potential for Additionality. The UNFCCC provides that developed country

signatories to the Convention “provide new and additional financial resources to

meet the agreed full costs incurred by developing country Parties” in their efforts

at mitigation and adaptation.27 Some observers fear that the design of the CIFs

establishes a parallel process for climate financing that does not result in new and

additional resources. They are concerned that significant portions of the aid

budgets of donors may be diverted into the CIFs and counted as part of their

annual ODA commitments.

•

Lack of Polluter Responsibility. Some commentators claim that the provision of

loans as a financial instrument to eligible developing countries contradicts the

internationally agreed principle of “polluter pays” as stated in the Rio

Declaration. Some argue that the repayment of a loan, notwithstanding the degree

of concessionality,28 burdens a developing country with self-paying for a problem

(climate change) that was caused by others (i.e., developed countries). They

believe this burden may affect the country’s ability to generate resources for

growth.

•

Commercial Influence. While advantages exist in prioritizing market-based

solutions to dealing with the problems of climate, some groups express concern

that the private sector may be unduly driven by commercial interests at the

expense of social or environmental safeguards.29 Concern also exists that a

dependence on market mechanisms as a source of climate financing may be

inadequate and inconsistent for meeting the financial needs of developing

countries charged with the responsibility of both implementing climate change

commitments and mediating the social, economic, and environmental

dislocations brought on by climate change.

•

Energy and Environmental Policy at the Banks. Many observers claim that the

history of the World Bank’s energy and infrastructure lending undermines its

credibility as an institution committed to combating the impacts of climate

change. Environmental NGOs have often highlighted the inconsistencies between

the Bank’s rhetoric on climate change and its operational policies and practices.

They emphasize that while the Bank has increased financing for renewable

energy and energy efficiency in recent years, its fossil fuel lending still accounts

for 56% of the energy sector share for fiscal years 2008 to 2010 (compared to

See UNFCCC, Article 4:3, at http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/background/items/1362.php.

“Concessional” or “soft” loans are loans extended on terms substantially more generous than market loans. The

concessionality is achieved either through interest rates below those available on the market or by extended grace

periods, or a combination of these.

This concern has been levied against the Bank’s brokering of carbon purchases through its Prototype Carbon Fund.

See Bank Information Center, et al., “How the World Bank’s Energy Framework Sells the Climate and Poor People

Short,” 2006, at http://www.bicusa.org/en/Article.2954.aspx.

Congressional Research Service

International Climate Change Financing: The Climate Investment Funds (CIFs)

15% for renewable energy, 20% for energy efficiency, and 9% for large

hydropower).30 The controversy is compounded by the Bank’s inability to reach a

consensus on the definition of “clean energy technology,” retaining provisions for

ultra-supercritical coal-fired power generation in its environmental strategies.31

Recent guidance from the U.S. Administration regarding the World Bank’s

engagement with coal-fired power generation in developing countries similarly

leaves the definition open, stating that projects “could include more carbon

efficient fossil fuel generation” in their portfolio.32 While observers generally

agree that funding from the CIFs is unlikely to be used in coal-fired power

generation projects, most agree that continued investment by the World Bank in

fossil fuel energy and infrastructure may have several unintended effects,

including (1) counteracting any gains made with the Bank’s renewable portfolio,

(2) directing resources toward large-scale power generation for industrial use

rather than energy access and poverty reduction in poor urban and rural

communities, and (3) drawing the Bank’s professional and technical staff away

from a concentration on energy efficiency and renewable energy activities to

remain involved with fossil fuels.33

Author Contact Information

(name redacted)

Analyst in Environmental Policy

[redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....

See Bank Information Center, “World Bank Group Energy Sector Financing Update,” November 2010, at

http://www.bicusa.org/en/Document.102339.pdf.

Ultra-supercritical coal-fired power generation is defined as “new pulverised coal combustion systems ... [that]

operate at increasingly higher temperatures and pressures and therefore achieve higher efficiencies than conventional

PCC units and significant CO2 reductions. Supercritical steam cycle technology has been used for decades and is

becoming the system of choice for new commercial coal-fired plants in many countries.” See World Coal Institute

website at http://www.worldcoal.org/coal-the-environment/coal-use-the-environment/improving-efficiencies/.

See U.S. Treasury memorandum at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/development-banks/Pages/

guidance.aspx.

For discussion of further debate on this issue, see the World Bank’s issue brief on “Energy,” available at

http://go.worldbank.org/E084GP3GQ0; and, as one example, Heike Mainhardt-Gibbs, et al., “Fuelling Contradictions:

The World Bank’s Energy Lending and Climate Change,” the Bretton Woods Project, CRBM & URGEWALD, 2010,

at http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-566198.

Congressional Research Service

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