Quadrennial Defense Review 2010: Overview and Implications for National Security Planning
Congressional research reportMay 17, 2010
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Quadrennial Defense Review 2010: Overview
and Implications for National Security
Planning
-name redactedSpecialist in International Security
-name redactedSpecialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget
May 17, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-....
www.crs.gov
R41250
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Quadrennial Defense Review: Overview and Implications for National Security Planning
Summary
On February 1, 2010, the Defense Department released a report on the 2010 Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR), a legislatively mandated assessment of defense strategy and priorities. The
review is the sixth full scale assessment of U.S. defense policy since the end of the Cold War,
beginning with the 1990 Base Force analysis and the 1993 Bottom-Up Review and continuing
with QDRs completed in 1997, 2001, 2006, and 2010. These official reviews have been
supplemented by assessments of independently chartered panels.
The four QDRs reflect an ongoing evolution of strategic thinking away from planning for smaller
versions of Cold War-era conventional conflicts, on the model of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and
toward planning to cope with a much more diverse array of challenges. By the time of the 2006
and 2010 QDRs, the basic strategic assumptions guiding military planning had shifted
dramatically. One premise is that no future adversary is likely to confront U.S. conventional, Cold
War-era military capabilities directly. Instead, any foe, ranging from violent, radical non-state
terrorist groups to a technologically advanced near-peer competitor, will try to exploit weaknesses
in U.S. defenses through asymmetric means. A related premise is that the notion of a spectrum of
conflict, ranging from unsophisticated insurgents or terrorists at the low end to sophisticated
national armies at the high end, is becoming blurred, with “low-end” terrorist groups using
advanced technologies and near-peer competitors likely to use indirect means of attack.
The 2010 QDR concludes that changes in the global security environment require some
adjustments in the balance of investments among elements of the U.S. military force posture. It
argues for an emphasis, first of all, on prevailing in current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and
against Al Qaeda elsewhere. It revises force planning to put diverse, overlapping scenarios,
including long-duration stability operations and defense of the homeland, on a par with major
regional conflicts in assessing the size and composition of the force. And, it calls for new
investments in critical joint missions, including countering “anti-access strategies” aimed at
defeating U.S. power projection forces; building the capacity of partner states; and ensuring
access to cyberspace. The 2010 report also proposes measures to reform institutional procedures
that it sometimes describes as “relics of the Cold War,” including acquisition, security assistance,
and export control processes.
Critiques of the current and earlier QDRs raise a number of issues: Is the review overly
constrained by budget limitations? Does it make sufficiently disciplined choices among the many
priorities it cites? Does the focus on current conflicts come too much at the expense of
preparations for future conflicts? Does the review realistically assess threats from Russia and
China? A fundamental issue is whether the quite radical reassessment of global security
challenges in recent QDRs has been matched by sufficiently far-reaching changes in the
composition of the force.
A question for future QDRs may be whether the reviews should be tasked to address broader
security policy issues as a means of assessing defense plans in a more complete context. Potential
policy issues to address include when to use military force, the effects of global financial trends
on U.S. defense plans, the effects of domestic economic and budget trends on defense resources,
the evolution of alliances to reflect post-Cold War era challenges, the prospects for more
cooperative global security rules and institutions to enhance security, and the integration of U.S.
defense planning with broader, interagency policies to address global trends.
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Quadrennial Defense Review: Overview and Implications for National Security Planning
Contents
I. Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 1
Preview of Key Issues ............................................................................................................... 1
Changing Perspectives on the Global Security Environment.............................................. 2
Key Questions ..................................................................................................................... 3
Outline of this Report .......................................................................................................... 4
II. Legislative Mandate for the QDR ............................................................................................... 5
Additional Reports Related to the QDR .................................................................................... 7
Associated Reports Required by QDR Legislation ............................................................. 8
National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, and National Defense
Strategy Reports ............................................................................................................... 9
Nuclear Posture, Missile Defense Policy, and Space Posture Reports .............................. 11
III. Overview of the 2010 QDR ..................................................................................................... 13
Rebalancing Defense Priorities ............................................................................................... 13
Reforming Defense Business Practices That Are “Relics of the Cold War” ........................... 14
“Strengthening Relationships” with Regional and Intra-Governmental Partners.................... 16
Risk Management Framework................................................................................................. 17
Risk Assessment in Recent Defense Planning .................................................................. 18
Risk Assessment in the 2010 QDR.................................................................................... 19
IV. What’s New in the 2010 QDR.................................................................................................. 21
Deemphasizing Two Major Regional Conflicts in Force Planning ......................................... 21
Capabilities for Key Missions ................................................................................................. 23
Defeating Anti-Access Strategies ............................................................................................ 23
Counterinsurgency, Stability, and Counterterrorism Operations ............................................. 25
Building the Capacity of Partner States ................................................................................... 28
Shaping the Choices of “Nations at a Strategic Crossroads”................................................... 30
Cyberwar ................................................................................................................................. 31
Homeland Defense .................................................................................................................. 31
WMD Countermeasures .......................................................................................................... 32
V. Common Criticisms of the QDR ............................................................................................... 33
Planning Based on Budget Constraints Rather than Strategy .................................................. 34
Failure to Establish Realistic Priorities ................................................................................... 38
A Diminished Focus on Future Challenges ............................................................................. 39
Downplaying Threats from Russia and China ......................................................................... 41
Lack of a National Security Strategy, Unclear Connection Between Strategy and
Plans, Absence of Long-Term Planning ............................................................................... 42
Delay in release of National Security Strategy report ....................................................... 42
Unclear connection of strategy and force structure ........................................................... 43
Lack of long-term planning ............................................................................................... 44
VI. Are QDRs Far-Reaching Enough?........................................................................................... 47
The Evolution of Strategic Thinking in QDRs ........................................................................ 47
Changes in Service Organization from 1998 to 2003 .............................................................. 48
More Far-Reaching Changes in Posture to Reflect QDR Strategy .......................................... 50
Additional measures to bolster homeland defense ............................................................ 50
Implications of anti-access strategies for forward deployed forces .................................. 50
The balance between heavy ground forces and other capabilities..................................... 51
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Specialized forces for foreign internal defense ................................................................. 52
The case for adding capabilities to meet new challenges .................................................. 53
VII. Should the QDR Address Broader Security Issues? ............................................................... 54
When to Use Military Force .................................................................................................... 55
The Effect of Global Financial Trends on Security ................................................................. 58
The Effect of Domestic Economic and Budget Trends on Defense Planning ......................... 59
Cost Growth in Elements of the Defense Budget .................................................................... 61
The Evolution of Cold-War Era Alliances ............................................................................... 62
Global Security Cooperation and Global Rules of Behavior................................................... 64
The Integration of Defense and Non-Defense Responsibilities in National Security
Policy .................................................................................................................................... 65
Concluding Observations............................................................................................................... 66
Figures
Figure 1. 2006 QDR Four Challenges Framework for Setting Priorities ...................................... 37
Figure 2. DOD Base Budget with No Real Growth: FY2010-FY2020 ......................................... 61
Appendixes
Appendix A. Current QDR Legislation as Amended Through the FY2010 National
Defense Authorization Act.......................................................................................................... 67
Appendix B. Bibliography of Official Strategy Reports................................................................ 74
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 76
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Quadrennial Defense Review: Overview and Implications for National Security Planning
I. Introduction
On February 1, 2010, the Defense Department released a report on the 2010 Quadrennial Defense
Review,1 a legislatively mandated assessment of defense strategy, force structure, weapons
programs, and operations designed to guide defense programming, operational planning, and
budgets projected as far as twenty years ahead. The 2009-20102 exercise is the fourth Quadrennial
Defense Review carried out under that name and the sixth comprehensive reexamination of U.S.
defense policy since the end of the Cold War. It was preceded by earlier QDRs completed in
February 2006, September 2001, and May 1997; by the Bottom-Up Review conducted at the
beginning of the Clinton Administration and completed in May 1993; and by the Base Force
analysis carried out by the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the George H.W. Bush Administration in
1990 and described in congressional testimony in 1991.3 These official reassessments have been
supplemented by reviews conducted by independently chartered panels, including the 1995
Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, the 1997 National Defense Panel that
followed the 1997 QDR, and the 1998-1999 Commission on National Security/21st Century.
The 2010 QDR was formally conducted from April 2009, when Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates issued guidance on the main tasks of the exercise,4 through the writing and release of the
report on the review on February 1. The QDR report, though quite extensive, is not the main
result of the process. Officials who have participated in the review say, rather, that its value lies in
having the senior leadership of the Department systematically assess defense strategy, force
planning, and programs with a relatively long view ahead.
Ultimately, the review resulted in concrete decisions on a broad range of program and policy
matters. Much of the 2010 QDR report is devoted to listing initiatives intended to improve
capabilities to accomplish critical missions. The QDR also resolved a number of policy matters
that have been ongoing topics of discussion within the Defense Department. This CRS report
provides an overview of the 2010 QDR, partly with a view toward putting matters the QDR
addresses into the context of the ongoing evolution of defense policy, and partly in an effort to
identify issues for future QDRs or for a broader review of national security strategy.
Preview of Key Issues
A recurring question in assessments of the QDR process is to what extent successive QDRs have
helped the Defense Department to keep up with changes in the international security
environment. Previous QDRs have often been criticized because it has been difficult to trace
significant changes in defense policy to the results of each review. If, the critics argue, one of
1
U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010, online at http://www.defense.gov/
qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf.
2
The current QDR is often referred to, particularly in legislation, as the “2009 QDR,” since it was carried out mainly in
calendar year 2009. QDRs are more commonly identified by the date on which the final report was released, and this
CRS report follows that precedent.
3
See the Bibliography appended to this report for citations and links.
4
Department of Defense Press Release, “DOD Begins QDR, NPR Processes,” April 23, 2009, online at
http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=12627; and Department of Defense, “2010 QDR Terms of
Reference Fact Sheet,” April 27, 2009, online at http://www.defense.gov/news/d20090429qdr.pdf.
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Congress’s goals in mandating quadrennial reviews was to encourage a more radical rethinking of
defense policy, it is hard to see it in the results of each successive QDR. A contrary view is that,
to the extent successive QDRs have redefined global security challenges, changes in force
planning in the future may eventually catch up with the evolution of defense strategy.
In describing trends in global security, the new QDR differs quite significantly from QDRs prior
to 2006, and the 2010 QDR breaks some new ground even compared to its immediate
predecessor. As a guide to force programming, however, the outcome of the 2010 QDR appears
rather conservative. Through FY2015, the QDR anticipates only minimal changes in force
structure, and it does not lay out a force structure beyond the end of the current six-year defense
planning period at all.
Changing Perspectives on the Global Security Environment
Looking at the cumulative results of post-Cold War defense reviews, beginning with the 1990
Base Force analysis and the 1993 Bottom-Up Review and culminating in the 2010 QDR, the net
effect has been a substantial change in the conceptual underpinnings of U.S. defense strategy. In
retrospect, the outcome of the 1990 and 1993 reviews was mainly to provide a rationale for not
dismantling U.S. military capabilities after the Cold War, as the nation had done following World
War I and World War II, and, many argue, after the Vietnam conflict. Both the Base Force
analysis and the Bottom-Up Review argued for maintaining essentially a scaled down version of
Cold War-era forces. Following the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Bottom-Up
Review differed from the Base Force analysis in that it did not identify a requirement to be able to
reconstitute forces in the event of a renewed threat. Neither provided a basis for substantially
redirecting priorities or for making major changes in the organization of the military services.
Reviews at least since the 1995 report of the Commission on Roles and Missions, however, have
progressively expanded the range of challenges for which planners see a need to prepare. The
four QDRs, in 1997, 2001, 2006, and 2010, can perhaps best be seen as snapshots of an ongoing
evolution of strategic thinking away from planning for smaller versions of Cold War-era
conventional conflicts, on the model of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and toward planning to cope
with a much more diverse array of challenges and responsibilities. By the time of the 2006 and
2010 QDRs, the basic strategic assumptions guiding military planning had shifted dramatically.
One premise is that no future adversary is likely to confront U.S. conventional, Cold War-era
military capabilities directly. Instead, any foe, ranging from violent, radical non-state terrorist
groups to a technologically advanced near-peer competitor, will try to exploit weaknesses in U.S.
defenses through asymmetric means.
Moreover, even terrorist groups may use advanced technology to carry out attacks, and competing
nations might use irregular means to exploit U.S. vulnerabilities. So the notion of a spectrum of
conflict, ranging from unsophisticated insurgents or terrorists at the low end to sophisticated
national armies at the high end, is becoming blurred. As Secretary Gates explained,
the black-and-white distinction between irregular war and conventional war is an outdated
model. We must understand that we face a more complex future than that, a future where all
conflict will range along a broad spectrum of operations and lethality. Where near-peers will
use irregular or asymmetric tactics and non-state actors may have weapons of mass
destruction or sophisticated missiles as well as AK-47s and RPGs. This kind of warfare will
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require capabilities with the maximum possible flexibility to deal with the widest possible
range of conflict.5
Planners now discuss “hybrid threats” that combine means of attack across the whole spectrum of
conflict in almost any confrontation.6 The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the
spread of cyberwar capabilities further complicate, and, perhaps, multiply the dangers.
A key conclusion of the new QDR is that operations short of a major regional conflict may be at
least as demanding, and therefore at least as important in determining the size and composition of
the force, as requirements for short-duration, high intensity wars. Operations short of a major
regional conflict include what one QDR briefing refers to as “foundational activities,” such as
permanent and rotational forward deployments and engagement with other nations to prevent and
deter conflict. Homeland defense missions, small-scale peacekeeping operations abroad, and
foreign military training activities may also cumulatively require the assignment of a substantial
number of troops. The QDR report particularly emphasizes the point that long-duration stability
or counter-insurgency operations, even if they involve fewer troops than a major conflict, can be
especially demanding. Operations such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan require a very large
standing force to provide a sufficient rotation base for deploying forces abroad without overly
straining combat units and personnel.
The 2010 QDR concludes that changes in the global security environment require some
adjustments in the balance of investments among elements of the U.S. military force posture. It
argues for an emphasis, first of all, on prevailing in current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and
against Al Qaeda elsewhere. It also elevates maintaining the quality of the all volunteer force to
the level of a strategic objective in itself. It puts particular emphasis on managing the impact on
military personnel and their families of a long-duration conflict, with repeated rotations of forces
abroad. For future planning, it calls for new initiatives in a number of joint mission areas,
including homeland defense, countering weapons of mass destruction, the ability to project power
into key regions of the globe in the face of challenges to U.S. access, building the capacity of
partner nations to defeat terrorism, and means of ensuring access to cyberspace.
Key Questions
At least two key questions follow, however, from the rather radical reassessment of the global
security environment in the last two QDRs. The obvious issue is whether new security challenges
require not only marginal shifts in the balance among defense programs, but more far-reaching
changes in the composition of the force. The 2010 QDR endorses no such major changes in force
posture, though it hints that some may become matters of discussion in the future.
A second and perhaps even more fundamental issue is to what extent the QDR should address
broader trends in the international security environment that affect the role of military power in
5
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, “Remarks by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates at Maxwell Air Force Base,
Ala.,” April 15, 2009, online at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4403. Secretary Gates
made similar remarks on April 16 at the Army War College, and on April 17 at the Naval War College.
6
The concept of hybrid threats was initially discussed by retired Marine Lt. Col. Frank Hoffman and has since been
referred to repeatedly by senior defense officials, including Secretary of Defense Gates. For a discussion, see Frank G.
Hoffman, “Hybrid Threats: Reconceptualizing the Evolving Character of Modern Conflict,” Strategic Forum, Institute
for National Security Studies, National Defense University, No.240, April 2009.
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global affairs and the relationship of military power to other means of U.S. influence. As the
QDR report acknowledges, global security relations are being reshaped not just by novel threats,
but by many other developments, including the shift of global financial resources to Asia; the
growing influence of new powers including the BRIC states, Brazil, Russia, India, and China; the
global reach of non-state actors; the further weakening of already fragile states; lowered barriers
to acquisition of dangerous technologies, particularly weapons of mass destruction; potential
resource scarcity; climate change; demographic trends; and the rapidity with which new diseases
can spread. The QDR report discusses how some of these developments may affect defense
planning, but it does not generally explain defense planning in the context of broader policies
needed to adapt to these trends.
Moreover, the QDR report affirms that many global security challenges, including proliferation
and terrorism, can only be addressed through multilateral cooperation, but the report discusses
collective security largely by reaffirming the value of current regional relationships rather than by
discussing the potential value of expanded cooperative security arrangements. Even if the latest
QDR ultimately leads to significant changes in the U.S. defense posture, a key question is
whether the QDR fully reflects the implications of the global environment that it identifies or
whether a more comprehensive assessment of national security policy is necessary.
Outline of this Report
This CRS report (1) cites the legislative mandate for the QDR and reviews legislative
requirements for a number of related reports; (2) outlines the results of the 2010 QDR; (3)
identifies what is new in the 2010 review and discusses how thinking on key matters has evolved;
(4) reviews some common criticisms of the 2010 QDR and of the QDR process; (5) discusses
whether the quite radical changes in the nature of conflict that the 2006 and 2010 QDRs describe
have been reflected in sufficiently far-reaching changes in defense plans and programs, and
(6) concludes with a discussion of matters that future QDRs—or a more extensive interagency
study—might address more fully as a means of putting defense planning into the context of a
broader perspective on U.S. national security.
Readers interested only in a substantive discussion of the QDR, or who are already familiar with
the legislative background of the QDR and with the statutory requirements for related reports on
nuclear, missile defense, and space policy, may want to skip over Section II, that provides a
detailed discussion of statutory requirements, and begin with Section III, that provides an
overview of the QDR. Those familiar with the QDR report may want to skim Section III and
focus more on Sections IV, V, VI, and VII, that together constitute a more substantive discussion
of policy issues, beginning with an assessment of what is new in the 2010 QDR. This CRS report
sometimes restates certain key points in order to allow readers with extensive background on the
QDR to focus on sections of most interest to them without having to review matters with which
they are familiar.
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II. Legislative Mandate for the QDR
Under current law,7 the Secretary of Defense is required every four years, in the year following a
presidential election, and in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to
“conduct a comprehensive examination … of … national defense strategy, force structure, force
modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense program and
policies of the United States with a view toward determining and expressing the defense strategy
of the United States and establishing a defense program for the next 20 years.” This exercise,
known as the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), is required
(1) to delineate a national defense strategy consistent with the most recent National Security
Strategy prescribed by the President pursuant to section 108 of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 404a);
(2) to define sufficient force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan,
and other elements of the defense program … required to execute successfully the full range
of missions called for in that national defense strategy;
(3) to identify (A) the budget plan that would be required to provide sufficient resources to
execute successfully the full range of missions called for in that national defense strategy at a
low-to-moderate level of risk, and (B) any additional resources (beyond those programmed
in the current future-years defense program) required to achieve such a level of risk; and
(4) to make recommendations that are not constrained to comply with the budget submitted
to Congress by the President pursuant to section 1105 of title 31.
The statute further requires that the Secretary provide a report on the QDR to the House and
Senate Armed Services Committees no later than the following February, when the President’s
annual budget is due to be delivered to Congress.8 The report is required to address 16 specific
topics, plus “any other matters the Secretary considers appropriate.” The topics required to be
addressed, quoted in full, include: 9
7
The current QDR requirement is in Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 118. Congress originally required a QDR in the
FY1997 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 104-201, and made the requirement permanent as a part of Title 10
in the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 106-65. For the current full text of the requirement, see
Appendix A.
8
The FY1997 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), P.L. 104-201, required that a QDR be conducted in 1997
and that the Secretary provide a report by May 15, 1997, unless the Presidential election in 1996 results in the selection
of a new President, in which case the deadline, and other deadlines in the legislation, would be extended by three
months. The FY2000 NDAA, P.L. 106-65, required a report on the QDR “not later than September 30 of the year in
which the review is conducted.” The FY2003 NDAA, P.L. 107-314, amended the statute to require a report “in the year
following the year in which the review is conducted, but not later than the date on which the President submits the
budget for the next fiscal year to Congress under section 1105(a) of title 31.” 31 USC 1105(a) requires the budget to be
submitted by the first Monday in February.
9
The FY1997 NDAA, P.L. 104-201, specified most of these topics to be addressed in the original 1997 QDR. The
FY2000 NDAA, P.L. 106-65 added topic 2 , requiring a definition of U.S. national security interests, and expanded
what is now topic 4 to include statements regarding force readiness and regarding levels of engagement in operations
other than war and smaller-scale contingencies. The FY2003 NDAA, P.L. 107-314, added what is now topic 15,
regarding the role of the Coast Guard. The FY2007NDAA, P.L. 109-364 added what is now topic 9, regarding the type
and number of specific platforms, and topic, 16 regarding homeland defense and civil support missions.
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(1) The results of the review, including a comprehensive discussion of the national defense
strategy of the United States, the strategic planning guidance, and the force structure best
suited to implement that strategy at a low-to-moderate level of risk.
(2) The assumed or defined national security interests of the United States that inform the
national defense strategy defined in the review.
(3) The threats to the assumed or defined national security interests of the United States that
were examined for the purposes of the review and the scenarios developed in the
examination of those threats.
(4) The assumptions used in the review, including assumptions relating to—
(A) the status of readiness of United States forces;
(B) the cooperation of allies, mission-sharing and additional benefits to and burdens on
United States forces resulting from coalition operations;
(C) warning times;
(D) levels of engagement in operations other than war and smaller-scale contingencies
and withdrawal from such operations and contingencies; and
(E) the intensity, duration, and military and political end-states of conflicts and smallerscale contingencies.
(5) The effect on the force structure and on readiness for high-intensity combat of
preparations for and participation in operations other than war and smaller-scale
contingencies.
(6) The manpower and sustainment policies required under the national defense strategy to
support engagement in conflicts lasting longer than 120 days.
(7) The anticipated roles and missions of the reserve components in the national defense
strategy and the strength, capabilities, and equipment necessary to assure that the reserve
components can capably discharge those roles and missions.
(8) The appropriate ratio of combat forces to support forces (commonly referred to as the
“tooth-to-tail” ratio) under the national defense strategy, including, in particular, the
appropriate number and size of headquarters units and Defense Agencies for that purpose.
(9) The specific capabilities, including the general number and type of specific military
platforms, needed to achieve the strategic and warfighting objectives identified in the review.
(10) The strategic and tactical air-lift, sea-lift, and ground transportation capabilities required
to support the national defense strategy.
(11) The forward presence, pre-positioning, and other anticipatory deployments necessary
under the national defense strategy for conflict deterrence and adequate military response to
anticipated conflicts.
(12) The extent to which resources must be shifted among two or more theaters under the
national defense strategy in the event of conflict in such theaters.
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(13) The advisability of revisions to the Unified Command Plan as a result of the national
defense strategy.
(14) The effect on force structure of the use by the armed forces of technologies anticipated
to be available for the ensuing 20 years.
(15) The national defense mission of the Coast Guard.
(16) The homeland defense and support to civil authority missions of the active and reserve
components, including the organization and capabilities required for the active and reserve
components to discharge each such mission.
(17) Any other matter the Secretary considers appropriate.
The FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 110-181, enacted in January, 2008,
also requires the next QDR, i.e., the one due in February 2010, to
examine the capabilities of the armed forces to respond to the consequences of climate
change, in particular, preparedness for natural disasters from extreme weather events and
other missions the armed forces may be asked to support inside the United States and
overseas.
The same provision requires the national defense strategy and the national security strategy
completed after January 2008
(A) to assess the risks of projected climate change to current and future missions of the
armed forces;
(B) to update defense plans based on these assessments, including working with allies and
partners to incorporate climate mitigation strategies, capacity building, and relevant research
and development; and
(C) to develop the capabilities needed to reduce future impacts.
The national security strategy that the law refers to is required to be prepared annually by the
White House. The national defense strategy that the law refers to is required by the original
Quadrennial Defense Review statute as part of each QDR (see below for a further discussion).
Additional Reports Related to the QDR
In addition to the QDR, Congress has established a substantial number of other reporting
requirements on national security policy for the Defense Department and for other agencies.
Amendments to the QDR statute require an assessment of the QDR by an independent panel, a
Government Accountability Office (GAO) review of the extent to which the QDR fulfills some
aspects of its statutory guidance, and additional DOD reports on the force structure analysis
carried out during the QDR and on overseas basing plans. Other legislation requires that the
White House prepare a National Security Strategy report on which the QDR is to base a statement
of national defense strategy—in practice, the Defense Department released separate National
Defense Strategy documents in 2005 and 2008. Congress has added additional requirements for
separate reports on missile defense, nuclear weapons, and space policy, and it has required the
Department of Homeland Security to carry out a Quadrennial Homeland Security Review and the
Department of State to conduct a Quadrennial Development and Diplomacy Review.
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Associated Reports Required by QDR Legislation
In addition to the report on the QDR, the QDR statute has been amended to require four
associated reports.
•
Concurrent with delivery of the QDR report, the Secretary of Defense is required
to provided the congressional defense committees with a classified annex
describing the analyses used to determine the military force structure needed to
carry out the defense strategy and any changes from the previous quadrennial
defense review in minimum requirements for major military capabilities. This
annex has been delivered to the appropriate congressional committees.
•
Within 90 days of the report’s release, the Government Accountability Office is
tasked to deliver a report on the extent to which the QDR complies with the
statutory requirement in 10 U.S. Code 118, subsection (d) that directs the QDR to
address 16 specific topics (the legislative language identifying these topics is
quoted in full in the following section of this CRS report). GAO released the
required report on April 30, 2010.10
•
Also within 90 days of delivery of the QDR report, the Secretary of Defense is
required to provide the congressional defense committees with a report detailing
how the review will affect the status of overseas base closure and realignment
plans, the development and execution of master plans for overseas military
deployments, and any recommendations for additional closures or realignments
of military installations outside of the United States.
•
In addition, an independent panel, with members selected by the Secretary of
Defense and by the chairs and ranking minority members of the House and
Senate Armed Services Committees, is established to carry out an assessment of
the QDR, with an interim report due within 90 days of the release of the QDR—
i.e., by May 1, 2010—and a final report due by July 15. The independent
commission is tasked to assess “assumptions, strategy, findings, and risks” in the
report on the QDR; to conduct an independent review of alternative force
structures; and to compare the cost of alternative forces with the cost of the
defense program recommended by the QDR.11 The statute specifically directs the
independent panel to “include analyses of the trends, asymmetries, and concepts
of operations that characterize the military balance with potential adversaries,
focusing on the strategic approaches of possible opposing forces.”
10
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Quadrennial Defense Review: 2010 Report Addressed Many but Not All
Required Items, GAO Report GAO-10-575R, April 30, 2010, online at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10575r.pdf.
11
The appointment of an independent panel following each QDR was required by the FY2007 John Warner National
Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 109-364. The FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 111-84, revised the
composition and tasks of the independent panel following the 2009-2010 QDR to include congressionally appointed
members and to address additional matters. These changes apply to the 2009-2010 QDR only.
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National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, and National Defense
Strategy Reports
White House National Security Strategy Report
The QDR statute stipulates that “each quadrennial defense review shall be conducted so as—(1)
to delineate a national defense strategy consistent with the most recent National Security Strategy
prescribed by the President pursuant to section 108 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 404a).” The requirement for the President to issue a National Security Strategy report was
established by the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, P.L. 99-433.12 The
statute requires the White House to issue a report within 150 days of the beginning of a new
Administration and annually thereafter.
In practice, except for the first National Security Strategy report, which was published in 1987, no
Administration has met the deadline for issuing an initial report, and the requirement for annual
reports has not always been followed. From 1987 to 2000, the Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and
Clinton Administrations submitted reports in each year except 1989 and 1992. During the George
W. Bush Administration, the White House produced two national security strategy statements,
one in September 2002 and a second in March 2006.13 The Obama Administration has not yet
completed its initial report, though preparation of the National Security Strategy was carried out
in parallel with the QDR, and a report is expected to be released soon.
National Military Strategy Report
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili, prepared reports on the
National Military Strategy of the United States in 1995 and again in 1997, though there was no
legislative requirement for it.14 Subsequently, the FY2004 National Defense Authorization Act
established a permanent requirement for the Chairman of Joint Chiefs to prepare a biennial report,
due on February 15 of each even-numbered year, “containing the results of a comprehensive
examination of the national military strategy.”15 The report is required to delineate a national
military strategy consistent with the most recent National Security Strategy and Quadrennial
Defense Review, and to include a description of the strategic environment; regional threats;
threats posed by terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and asymmetric challenges; U.S. military
12
For the full text of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, see http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&ct=res&cd=2&
ved=0CA8QFjAB&url=
https%3A%2F%2Facquisition.navy.mil%2Fcontent%2Fdownload%2F5326%2F24165%2Ffile%2Fpubl%252099433%2520Goldwater-Nichols01Oct1986.pdf&ei=1z-eS5LEMIP78AbA-fS7Cg&usg=
AFQjCNF6rXMFZkKAarDxB8_71wLpNNZT3Q&sig2=V0kToaR1PiIjsKBojxoDYQ.
13
The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002 online at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss.pdf; and The White House, The National Security
Strategy of the United States of America, March 16, 2006, online at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/
nss/2006/nss2006.pdf.
14
General John M. Shalikashvili, National Military Strategy: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement,
Department of Defense, February 1995, online at http://www.fas.org/man/docs/nms_feb95.htm; General John M.
Shalikashvili, National Military Strategy, 1997: Shape, Respond, Prepare Now—A Military Strategy for a New Era,
Department of Defense, 1997, online at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nms/.
15
FY2004 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 108-136, November 24, 2003, Section 903. The requirement is
codified as Subsection 153(d) of Title 10 U.S. Code. Section 153 delineates the responsibilities of the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs.
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objectives; strategy that contributes to meeting the objectives; an assessment of the adequacy of
forces to successfully execute the strategy; and an assessment of allied contributions. As part of
the review, the Chairman is also required to assess the risks in executing the strategy, and to
report the assessment, through the Secretary of Defense, to the House and Senate Armed Services
Committees. The first subsequent report, dated 2004, was publicly released in March 2005, along
with a National Defense Strategy report prepared by the Secretary of Defense.16
National Defense Strategy Required as Part of the QDR
A statement of U.S. national defense strategy is not required as a separate document. The only
statutory requirement is the mandate that the QDR “delineate a national defense strategy” and that
the report on the QDR include “a comprehensive discussion of the national defense strategy of
the United States.” The first two QDR reports contained statements of defense strategy. In 2005,
however, the Defense Department released a separate National Defense Strategy document,
which served as a basis for the 2006 QDR.17 DOD has since continued the practice, releasing a
revised National Security Strategy statement in June 2008 in advance of the 2009 review process
that concluded with the 2010 QDR report. Though it was prepared during the Bush
Administration, the 2008 National Defense Strategy (NDS) articulated themes that were reflected
in the strategic priorities of the 2009-2010 QDR, though with some significant changes in
emphasis.
DOD officials have said that the absence of a new National Security Strategy statement was not a
significant constraint in preparing the 2010 QDR, in part because the reappointment of Robert
Gates as Secretary of Defense provided continuity in defense planning and in part because the
White House, through the National Security Staff, was consulted at every stage of the review
process. In the absence of a new National Security Strategy document, guidance in carrying out
the QDR was drawn from DOD’s National Defense Strategy, which was published in June 2008.18
The extent to which the 2010 QDR breaks new ground in defining strategic objectives and in
identifying critical missions is discussed later in this report. This report also discusses at some
length whether future QDRs might benefit from a broader discussion of global security policy as
a means of putting defense policy into a more complete context. One question is whether the
National Security Strategy, though cited in law as a foundation for the QDR, is timely enough, or
detailed enough as a statement of policy to provide a full perspective on the role of military
power as an element of national security policy.
16
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Richard B. Myers, The National Military Strategy of the United States of
America: A Strategy for Today, A Vision for Tomorrow, 2004, Department of Defense, March, 2005, online at
http://www.defense.gov/news/Mar2005/d20050318nms.pdf. For an announcement of the release, see Department of
Defense News Release, “Department of Defense Releases the National Defense and the National Military Strategies,”
March 18, 2005, online at http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=8318.
17
For the 2005 document, see U.S. Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy, March 2005, online at
http://www.defense.gov/news/mar2005/d20050318nds1.pdf.
18
U.S. Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy, June 2008, online at http://www.defense.gov/news/
2008%20National%20Defense%20Strategy.pdf.
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Nuclear Posture, Missile Defense Policy, and Space Posture Reports
In addition to the national security strategy report and to the four reports that are directly
associated with the QDR, separate statutes require the Defense Department and other agencies to
prepare three additional reports addressing specific aspects of U.S. defense and security policy in
more depth, including—
•
A Nuclear Posture Review, which is required to discuss the role of nuclear
weapons in U.S. military strategy, the number and composition of nuclear
delivery systems required to implement U.S. strategy, and the nuclear weapons
production capabilities and warhead stockpiles needed to support U.S. policy.
The report was required to be delivered concurrently with the report on the QDR,
was then delayed until March 1, and was finally released on April 6, 2010.19
•
A Ballistic Missile Defense Review, which is mandated to assess missile defense
strategy and objectives, missile threats, the process for determining missile
defense requirements, and standards for assessing the military utility, operational
effectiveness, suitability, and survivability of U.S. missile defense systems. A
report on the review was required by January 31, 2010, and was released along
with the QDR report on February 1.20
•
A Space Posture Review, which is required, first, to define requirements and
objectives for space situational awareness, space control, space superiority, force
enhancement, space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and the
integration of space- and ground-based equipment; second, to describe planned
acquisition programs related to these objectives; third, address future systems
required to meet requirements; and, fourth, to assess the effect of the space policy
on proliferation of weapons capable of targeting objects in space or objects on
Earth from space. The report was due by December 1, 2009, but has been
delayed, and officials now expect to complete it in the fall of 2010.21
While DOD addresses the results of these studies in separate reports, DOD carried out its
work on them in parallel with work on the QDR, and officials say that work on each is reflected
in the results of the QDR and that the QDR, in turn, informed each of them. The fact that the
Nuclear Posture Review and the Space Posture Review were delayed is reflected in the QDR as
well. The QDR report, for example, discusses the Administration’s intent to consult with allies
about “tailored, regional deterrence architectures” combining forward presence, conventional
military capabilities, missile defense, and a “continued commitment to extend our nuclear
deterrent.” The QDR report asserts that this tailored deterrence will “make possible a reduced role
19
Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 6, 2010; available online at http://www.defense.gov/
npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review was required by
Section 1070 of the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 110-181, January 28, 2008. Previous NPRs were
conducted in 1994 and 2002.
20
The BMD Review was required by Section 234 of the FY2009 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 110-417,
October 14, 2008. The BMD report was released along with the report on the QDR on February 1, 2010. Links to the
report on the review and associated material are available online at http://www.defense.gov/bmdr/. The report on the
review, U.S. Department of Defense, Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, February 2010, is online at
http://www.defense.gov/bmdr/BMDR%20as%20of%2026JAN10%200630_for%20web.pdf.
21
The space posture review is required by Section 913 of the FY2009 Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization
Act, P.L. 110-417, October 14, 2008.
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for nuclear weapons in our national security strategy.”22 But it defers any detailed discussion of
the rationale for that conclusion to the Ballistic Missile Defense Review and the Nuclear Posture
Review.
22
2010 QDR Report, p. 14.
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III. Overview of the 2010 QDR
The 2010 QDR report begins with a forceful assertion that has become almost a mantra in
statements by Secretary of Defense Gates and other senior defense officials for the past couple of
years. “[W]e must recognize” says the opening of the Executive Summary, “that first and
foremost, the United States is a nation at war.”
That precept is echoed throughout the report and it is reflected in the two central themes of the
review. First, the report says, the Defense Department must rebalance its priorities to put more
emphasis on support for forces engaged in current operations; to institutionalize capabilities for
counterinsurgency, stability, and counter-terrorism operations; and to counter emerging
challenges to U.S. military capabilities. Second, the report asserts, the Defense Department must
reform its ways of doing business to be more agile, innovative, and streamlined in adapting to the
diverse challenges of a rapidly changing international security environment and in using limited
resources efficiently.
Rebalancing Defense Priorities
On the theme of rebalancing priorities, the report discusses the need to allocate resources and
manage risk among four strategic objectives:
•
Prevail in today’s wars;
•
Prevent and deter conflict;
•
Prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies; and
•
Preserve and enhance the all-volunteer force.
Ongoing operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, says the report, will continue to
determine the size and composition of major elements of the force for several years. Preventing
and deterring conflict, and thus avoiding the need to resort to arms, the report says, is a hallmark
of U.S. policy, which requires the integrated use of diplomacy and development assistance as well
as the maintenance of military forces sufficient to discourage challenges to peace and security. If
threats materialize, the report says, U.S. forces must be able prevail in a varying types of
operations in multiple theaters in overlapping time frames and against efforts to exploit U.S.
vulnerabilities. Through war games and simulations designed to stress planned capabilities, the
QDR tested the ability of U.S. forces to succeed in a wide range of operations occurring nearly
simultaneously. The emphasis on sustaining the all volunteer force by managing overseas
rotations, by ensuring adequate health care, and by expanding family support, is identified in the
QDR report as a critical objective in itself.
The most extensive discussion in the QDR report is devoted to measures to improve capabilities
in six joint mission areas that officials conclude should be the focus of particular attention:
•
Defend the United States and support civil authorities at home;
•
Conduct counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations;
•
Build the capacity of partner states;
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•
Deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments;
•
Prevent the proliferation of and counter weapons of mass destruction; and
•
Operate effectively in cyberspace.
The identification of such a diverse array of key missions reflects the breadth of challenges that
the Defense Department now recognizes as a basis for planning. These mission areas have
evolved from similar lists in the 2006 QDR and 2008 National Defense Strategy, but with some
key differences that are discussed later in this report.
Reforming Defense Business Practices That Are “Relics of the Cold
War”
On a par with the theme of rebalancing investments, the QDR report discusses the need to reform
DOD’s ways of doing business. The report identifies six specific areas of reform:
•
Reforming Security Assistance
•
Reforming How We Buy
•
Institutionalizing Rapid Acquisition Capability
•
Strengthening the Industrial Base
•
Reforming the U.S. Export Control System
•
Crafting a Strategic Approach to Climate and Energy
The report’s discussion of reform echoes to a considerable degree its treatment of the need for
forces to be flexible enough to adapt to a new and rapidly evolving variety of threats. Similarly,
the report says, DOD’s business practices need to be redesigned to adapt more quickly and
flexibly to rapidly changing requirements.
Security Assistance: In providing security assistance to foreign partners, the report says, current
processes reflect a Cold War-era framework in which the goal was to assist allies in modernizing
their long-term military capabilities in a manner that would reinforce cooperative planning and
encourage the adoption of common technologies. Officials complain that a Cold War-era
programming and budgeting cycle, that takes two years or more to reallocate resources, is not
responsive enough to keep up with the pace of global change or flexible enough to provide tools
needed to give timely support to allies in combating highly adaptive, immediate threats.23 The
National Security Council has initiated a comprehensive review of security assistance, the report
says, and the Administration expects to propose significant statutory revisions when the review is
completed. In the mean time, the Defense Department is streamlining its internal processes for
managing foreign military sales, and DOD is working with the State Department and the Agency
for International Development (USAID) to integrate defense and development assistance and to
23
Under Secretary of Defense Michèle Flournoy, Interview on the Charlie Rose Show, PBS, March 27, 2010: “The
mechanisms we use to actually build that capacity are all from the Cold War. They’re slow. They’re bureaucratic.
They’re unresponsive. They’re meant to deliver large numbers of big platforms over many years, not near term
equipment that somebody who’s under attack needs tomorrow.”
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use available flexible funding, such as global “train and equip” authorities granted to the Defense
Department, to support critical initiatives.
Acquisition: Similarly, the weapons acquisition process, the report says, still largely follows
Cold War-era practices in which the goal was to maintain an advantage over a technologically
advanced enemy that was always assumed to be pursuing new capabilities and that could be overmatched only by remaining at the cutting edge of new technology. New challenges require,
instead, a more selective process of establishing requirements based on a more realistic
assessment of evolving threats. Moreover, the report says, the acquisition process should ensure
that new technology is mature enough to warrant proceeding ahead at each milestone of weapons
development. And the process also should be able to respond much more rapidly to new
requirements evolving from unexpected developments.
Rapid Acquisition: As to rapid acquisition, the Defense Department, the report says, has been
able to acquire new capabilities required in current conflicts quickly—counter IED systems, for
example, and mine resistant, ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles—only by by-passing the regular
budgeting and procurement process. Now, says the report, DOD needs to institutionalize the
flexibility to identify new threats, establish requirements for systems able to respond, allocate
resources to the new programs, and carry out procurement and fielding of new capabilities rapidly
and efficiently.
Export Controls: The U.S. system of export controls, the report says, is also “a relic of the Cold
War.” It was designed largely to limit Soviet access to advanced technologies with potential
military applications at a time when such technologies could be segregated, so some degree at
least, from commercial developments. Now, however, the system has become overly complicated,
and it “impedes cooperation, technology sharing, and interoperability with allies and partners.” It
has become, says the report, “an impediment to U.S. security.” The report says that the
Administration will, at some point, propose not just incremental changes in laws and regulations
governing high technology exports, but a comprehensive reform of the system with a view toward
making necessary limits enforceable without hindering U.S. international competitiveness and
cooperation with allies.
Industrial Base: This is the first QDR to discuss at any great length measures to strengthen the
defense industrial base. Notably, the QDR discussion focuses more on second and third tier
producers than on large prime contractors. The discussion also identifies a need to ensure that
critical suppliers, including small technologically innovative start-up firms and the large
traditional systems integrators, can get access to adequate sources of capital from financial
markets.
Climate Change and Energy Policy: Finally, the report discusses a strategic approach to climate
change and energy policy as part of a defense reform agenda, though both matters have
implications that go well beyond means of improving DOD business practices. A discussion of
the impact of climate change on the Defense Department is required by law. The FY2008
National Defense Authorization Act included a provision requiring the next White House
National Security Strategy report and the next National Defense Strategy, to include a
comprehensive discussion of the effects of climate change on DOD facilities, capabilities, and
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missions.24 The 2010 QDR report includes an extensive discussion of climate change that appears
to be intended to meet the requirements of the statute.25
Intelligence assessments, the report says, conclude that climate change could deepen global
poverty, exacerbate water and other resource shortages, further weaken already fragile
governments, accelerate the spread of disease, and create more demands for humanitarian and
disaster assistance. Climate change, the report says, may multiply the burdens on already fragile
societies because regions of the globe likely to be most adversely affected overlap to a large
degree with regions that are already resource poor and suffer from poor governance. These likely
effects, the report concludes, do not require any fundamental changes in defense planning but,
rather, reemphasize the need to be able to respond flexibly to a wide variety of unplanned and to
some degree unexpected developments. The report also says that climate change may also affect
DOD bases and other facilities, particularly because rising sea levels could threaten a number of
major installations.
Energy security is a high priority for the Defense Department, says the report, in part because
energy, particularly fuel, is a significant and growing budget cost and, in part because energy
supply is a potential source of vulnerability to asymmetric attack. The report says that the
Defense Department will focus more effort on improved energy efficiency as a means of
increasing the range and endurance of forces in the field and of reducing the need to divert
combat forces to protect energy supply lines. The report also points to measures designed to
improve the security of energy supplies for key facilities and missions, and the report identifies
several efforts to diversify the sources of energy available for military forces.
“Strengthening Relationships” with Regional and IntraGovernmental Partners
An extensive section of the QDR report is devoted to a discussion of U.S. security relationships
with foreign nations and of Defense Department cooperation with other U.S. agencies. It includes
a region-by-region assessment of shared security interests with other nations, a somewhat more
specific region-by-region overview of the U.S. military presence abroad, and a brief discussion of
cooperation with other U.S. agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security, the State
Department, and the Agency for International Development.
The region by region discussion of shared security interests mainly reaffirms the importance of
existing alliances and also includes brief, generally positive statements about relations with
Russia and China. For the most part, the discussion is quite cursory, and it does not address
problematic matters, such as the burden-sharing issues that Secretary Gates and others have raised
in NATO or negotiations over bases in Japan.
With regard to Russia, the report cites shared U.S. and Russian interests in countering
proliferation and terrorism, mentions arms control negotiations, and promises continued
24
See Section 951 of the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 110-181, January 28, 2008.
As discussed earlier in this report, a statement of national defense strategy is required by the QDR statute as part of
each QDR report. In 2005 and 2008, however, the Defense Department published national defense strategy reports in
advance of the 2005-2006 and 2009-2010 QDRs. Since the law require a national defense strategy statement as part of
each QDR report, the requirement that the next national defense strategy include a discussion of climate change should
probably be seen as requiring that it be addressed in the 2009-2010 QDR.
25
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discussions on missile defense and about the Arctic. The report also affirms, though without
providing any context, that the United States “will continue to engage with Russia’s neighbors as
fully independent and sovereign states,” a clear, though not overtly confrontational statement to
the effect that Russia should not expect U.S. acquiescence to a separate sphere of influence in
what Russians often call the “near abroad.”
With regard to China, the report notes that China’s rising global influence is “one of the most
consequential aspects of the evolving strategic landscape;” says that China’s growing military
capabilities “could enable it to play a more substantial and constructive role in international
affairs;” and affirms, in language similar to that in many official U.S. statements for many years,
that “The United States welcomes a strong, prosperous, and successful China that plays a greater
global role.” The statement also criticizes China for a lack of transparency about its military
development plans and decision-making processes and concludes that this raises “legitimate
questions” about China’s future conduct and intentions. It concludes that relations with China
must be “multidimensional,” which is as close as the discussion comes to treating China’s
growing military capabilities as a potential threat. The report does not mention Taiwan.
In general, the QDR report does not identify particular nations as posing threats to security, nor
does it specifically refer to “Islamic” terrorism. The Administration’s approach, rather, is to
discuss potential threats in abstract terms, choosing not to say anything—even in a report on
defense planning—that could alienate potential support or undermine efforts to ameliorate
conflicts and build cooperation.
In similarly general terms, the QDR report also says that defense plans must be coordinated with
measures to build multilateral regional security systems. “The presence of U.S. military forces
overseas,” says the report, “can be a powerful catalyst for promoting multilateral approaches and
regional security architectures that serve both U.S. and partner states’ interests.” Similarly, within
the U.S. government, the report says, defense planning must be part of a collaborative policymaking process. “Global defense posture,” the report says, “is a key means of communicating
U.S. foreign and security policy and thus must be closely coordinated throughout the national
security community.”
In discussing collaboration with other U.S. agencies, the report reaffirms DOD support for greater
investments in the capabilities of the State Department and U.S. AID, saying that civilian
agencies need to develop the ability to operate alongside military forces in operations abroad. The
report agrees that the Defense Department is not the most appropriate agency to build the civilian
institutional governance capabilities of foreign partner nations, but also says that it will take more
time for U.S. civilian agencies to develop their capacity to take the lead. Similarly, the report
says, the Defense Department should generally play a supporting role in responding to domestic
security challenges, with the Department of Homeland Security in the lead.
Risk Management Framework
The QDR statute requires the report on the QDR to identify the budget plan required to “provide
sufficient resources to execute successfully the full range of missions” called for in the defense
strategy at a “low-to-moderate level of risk.” It also directs the Secretary of Defense to assess risk
in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and it and requires that “That assessment
shall define the nature and magnitude of the political, strategic, and military risks associated with
executing the missions called for under the national defense strategy.” The statute further requires
that the QDR report to Congress include “a comprehensive discussion of the national defense
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strategy of the United States, the strategic planning guidance, and the force structure best suited
to implement that strategy at a low-to-moderate level of risk.” And it requires that, “Upon the
completion of each review …, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall prepare and submit
to the Secretary of Defense the Chairman’s assessment of the review, including the Chairman’s
assessment of risk and a description of the capabilities needed to address such risk.”
Risk Assessment in Recent Defense Planning
The concept of assessing and balancing risks has a long pedigree in defense planning. By its very
nature, from the most basic tactical level to the realm of global grand strategy, military planning
involves assessing risks. To the extent that resources are not sufficient to provide certainty of
success, military plans and operations involve accepting varying degrees risk and deciding
whether one course of action is, in view of what is at stake, worth the likely cost in blood and
treasure, or is too risky to undertake, or whether another course of action would entail more or
less risk.
In setting overall priorities, the Defense Department has long attributed varying degrees of risk to
its global plans. For many years until the mid-1980s, the Joint Chiefs appended to each year’s
defense program an assessment of what was called the “minimum risk force,” meaning a force
large enough and well-equipped enough to be able to accomplish all the mission objectives
identified in current defense plans with a minimum risk of failure. Even in the mid-1980s,
however, after defense spending had climbed by about 40% above inflation over a five year
period, the minimum risk force remained about half again as large, and easily half again as
expensive, as the force that was being planned. At that point, the Defense Department stopped
assessing the minimum risk force.
Under current law, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is required to submit to the Secretary of
Defense an annual assessment of “the nature and magnitude of the strategic and military risks
associated with executing the missions called for under the current National Military Strategy.”
The Secretary is then required to forward the assessment, with or without comments, to the
congressional defense committees.26 Conclusions of the report, known as the “Chairman’s Risk
Assessment,” are often reflected in subsequent congressional testimony by the JCS Chairman and
other senior officers, and the report is often reflected in comments by Members of Congress.27
The Chairman’s Risk Assessment generally focuses on short-term military readiness. In recent
years, a recurring theme, reportedly, has been that ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
entail an increased risk in responding to major regional conflicts. Increased risk does not mean
that U.S. efforts would fail, but that operations would take longer and casualties would likely be
higher than otherwise would be the case.28
26
The “Chairman’s Risk Assessment” is required by Section 153(b) of Title 10 U.S. Code. The requirement was
established by Section 1033 of the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 106-65, October 5, 1999.
27
See, for example, Jason Sherman, “Mullen Sees ‘Elevated Risk’ in Executing National Military Strategy,” Inside the
Navy, September 29, 2009.
28
For a recent discussion, see Department of Defense New Transcript, “Media Availability with Secretary Gates en
route to Kansas City, Missouri,” May 7, 2010, online at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?
transcriptid=4621: “… one of the things I go back and forth with on the services is their assessment of risk. The risk
isn't in terms of whether you can accomplish the mission; the risk is in terms of whether you can accomplish the
mission in the timeline that the plan calls for. So the risk is to the plan, not getting the job done. And so—but when
somebody says there is significant risk, or high risk, if we don't buy all of these or all of those, what that means is there
is risk in achieving the planned mission within the time frame and at a cost that's been laid out.”
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Risk Assessment in the 2010 QDR
To the extent that forces invariably fall short of a the level needed to keep risks to a minimum,
DOD planners have to determine where to accept relatively greater risk of failure and where to
invest more to reduce unacceptable risks. The 2010 QDR report includes a quite extensive
discussion of risk management, following a framework that was first articulated in the 2001
QDR. The report identifies matters that may pose relatively high risks to the Defense
Department’s ability to accomplish its objectives in four categories:
•
Operational risk, which assesses the ability of the force to execute current,
planned, and contingency operations successfully with acceptable human and
material costs;
•
Force management risk, which examines DOD’s ability to recruit, retain, train,
and equip the All-Volunteer Force in the near term, midterm, and long term;
•
Institutional risk, which measures the capacity of DOD management and
business practices to plan for, enable, and support the execution of key missions;
and
•
Future challenges risk, which judges the capacity to execute future missions
successfully, and to hedge against shocks, with particular attention given to the
ability to field superior capabilities and to deter or defeat emerging threats in the
mid- and long-term.
In each of these areas, the report highlights matters that could worsen risks, and it identifies
improvements in DOD capabilities and processes that, it says, may be needed to mitigate
shortcomings.
Current operational risk: To mange current operational risks, the report says, the Department
must provide more “enabling” capabilities, including intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR) systems, more vertical lift aircraft, better electronic warfare capabilities,
and better cultural and language skills. Limitations on support from allies, the report says, may
impose higher risks on U.S. forces, and the United States must build the capacity of indigenous
partner states to manage their own security. The report also cites cyberspace is an area of growing
danger. Notably, the report does not discuss the extent to which current large-scale operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan may limit the availability of forces for other missions and, accordingly,
increase risks if a new conflict should arise.
Force management risk: To contain force management risk, the report says, DOD must manage
the strain on forces imposed by ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. While the quality of
DOD health care is good at present, increasing costs pose a risk in the future. The extensive use
of reserve forces as part of the operational rotation base in current operations requires a thorough
reexamination of the role of reserve components.
Institutional risk: Institutional risk includes the prospect that the acquisition process may be
unable to deliver capabilities when needed and at acceptable cost. The acquisition process appears
to be especially poorly suited to keep pace with rapid advances in information technology. And
the current industrial base, the report says, is focused too narrowly on 20th century weapons
platforms and may be ill-suited to meet future requirements for competition, innovation, and the
rapid acquisition of new capabilities.
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Future challenges risk: To address the risk associated with future challenges, the report says, the
Department must follow through on improvements in capabilities to accomplish key missions
identified throughout the QDR report. In addition, the report says, the difficulty of anticipating
future threats poses a risk that forces may be unprepared for suddenly appearing new dangers, so
the Defense Department must improve the analytic capabilities of the intelligence community and
hedge against uncertainty in its force planning. The report notes that developments in science and
technology may also make it more difficult for the United States to maintain a competitive
advantage across the whole spectrum of defense capabilities. To mitigate such risks, the report
says, requires a planning process that addresses not only traditional defense capabilities, but also
areas of technology not unique to defense requirements but that may have major effects on
security.
Along with this brief, though quite blunt analysis of the four categories of risk identified in the
2001 QDR, the 2010 report adds a discussion of “strategic, military, and political” risk, which the
QDR statute specifically mentions. As the report puts it,
strategic risk constitutes the Department’s ability to execute the defense priority objectives in
the near term, midterm, and long term in support of national security. Military risk
encompasses the ability of U.S. forces to adequately resource, execute, and sustain military
operations in the near- to midterm, and the mid- to longer term. In the international context,
political risk derives from the perceived legitimacy of our actions and the resulting impact on
the ability and will of allies and partners to support shared goals. In the domestic context,
political risk relates to public support of national strategic priorities and the associated
resource requirements in the near term, midterm, and long term.
The risk management discussion closes by briefly noting that the QDR addressed these matters
and concludes that “the Department is positioned to successfully balance overarching strategic,
military, and political risk between the near to midterm and the mid- to long term, as well as
across the full range of military missions required to protect and advance national interests.”
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IV. What’s New in the 2010 QDR
The 2010 QDR does not represent a stark break with earlier defense strategy and plans, and it
reflects, in particular, a considerable degree of continuity with the 2005 National Defense
Strategy, the 2006 QDR, and the 2008 National Defense Strategy, all prepared after the attacks of
9/11 and the beginning of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The 2010 QDR is new in some important
ways, however. Most apparently, it reflects Secretary Gates’ insistence that prevailing in current
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is the first priority in military planning. It also puts an emphasis on
support for military personnel and their families, on the premise that the quality of the AllVolunteer Force is an essential pillar of long-term military strength.
Deemphasizing Two Major Regional Conflicts in Force Planning
To the extent the new QDR differs from its predecessors in other ways, the changes mainly reflect
the continuing evolution of official strategic thinking away from a focus on smaller, regional
versions of a conventional, armor-heavy, high-tech, force-on-force conflict on the model of Cold
War conceptions of a war in Europe, and toward planning for a much more varied array of
challenges. The QDR does not abandon the requirement, originally laid out in the 1993 BottomUp Review, that forces should be able to defeat aggression by conventionally-armed regional
powers in two geographically separate theaters occurring nearly simultaneously. The 2010 QDR,
however, no longer treats the two-war requirement as the fundamental factor in determining the
composition of the force. Rather, as the report explains,
U.S. forces today and in the years to come can be plausibly challenged by a range of threats
that extend far beyond the familiar “major regional conflicts” that have dominated U.S.
planning since the end of the Cold War. We have learned through painful experience that the
wars we fight are seldom the wars that we would have planned…. Because America’s
adversaries have been adopting a wide range of strategies and capabilities that can be
brought to bear against the United States and its forces, allies, and interests, it is no longer
appropriate to speak of “major regional conflicts” as the sole or even the primary template
for sizing, shaping, and evaluating U.S. forces. Rather, U.S. forces must be prepared to
conduct a wide variety of missions under a range of different circumstances.
Secretary Gates explained the decision to deemphasize the two war requirement as a matter of
capturing the real-world complexity of current defense planning. As he put it,
[O]ne of the steers that I gave to the folks working on the QDR was that I felt that, for some
time, the two-major-theater-of-operations construct was out of date, that we are already in
two major operations. What if we should have a homeland disaster? What if we have another
encounter? What if we have a Haiti? The world is very much more complex than when the
two-MCO concept came together in the early 1990s. And what I wanted to convey was a
much more complex environment, in which you may have to do not just two major conflicts,
but a broad range of other things, as well, or, perhaps in the future, one of those conflicts and
then a number of other contingencies. So I just felt that construct was too confining and did
not represent the real world that our country and our military forces are going to face in the
future.29
29
Department of Defense Transcript, “DoD News Briefing with Secretary Gates and Adm. Mullen from the Pentagon,”
(continued...)
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To be sure, the two major war requirement never reflected an assumption that conventional
regional conflicts were the only threats for which forces needed to be prepared. Rather, the
premise of the 1993 Bottom-Up Review was that forces sufficiently strong and deployable
enough to prevail in two nearly simultaneous wars would also generally be capable of responding
to what were regarded as less demanding challenges. Moreover, the 1997 and 2001 QDRs put
considerable emphasis on identifying and correcting shortfalls in capabilities to sustain other
kinds of operations.
The 1997 QDR articulated a strategy that was quite broad. It recognized that military forces were
normally deployed to “shape” the international security environment, and it said that forces
should also be able to “respond” quickly in a wide range of missions, including multiple smaller
scale contingency operations, such as peacekeeping in the Balkans. The third element of the
strategy was to “prepare” for future, more demanding conflicts that could reflect revolutionary
changes in military technology. The two war requirement remained, the QDR report said, the
“sine qua non” of defense planning.30 But the review also specifically recognized the strain that
long-duration smaller operations could impose on the force, and it identified a number of “low
density, high demand” capabilities as a focus of increased investment.
For its part, the 2001 QDR announced a new “force sizing construct” that went considerably
beyond the two-war requirement. The new construct, said the QDR report,
explicitly calls for the force to be sized for defending the homeland, forward deterrence,
warfighting missions, and the conduct of smaller-scale contingency operations. As a result,
the construct should better account for force requirements driven by forward presence and
rotational issues. It will also better address requirements for low-density/high-demand
(LD/HD) assets, enabling forces (e.g., transport aircraft), and active and reserve force-mix
issues.
The shorthand for the new construct was the “1-4-2-1 strategy”: 1, defend the homeland; 4, deter
conflicts with forward deployed forces in four major regions; 2, halt aggression in two regions
simultaneously; and the other 1, decisively defeat an adversary in one of those theaters.
The 2010 QDR pointedly does not endorse any easily summarized set of metrics for determining
the size and makeup of the force. Rather, the review tested the ability of planned forces to
respond flexibly and effectively when confronted with “several scenario combinations” that were
intended to stress capabilities. Examples of scenarios with overlapping operations include,
•
A major stabilization operation, deterring and defeating a highly capable regional
aggressor, and extending support to civil authorities in response to a catastrophic
event in the United States.
•
Deterring and defeating two regional aggressors while maintaining a heightened
alert posture for U.S. forces in and around the United States.
(...continued)
February 1, 2010, online at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4549.
30
“A force sized and equipped for deterring and defeating aggression in more than one theater,” said the report, “... is
the sine qua non of a superpower and is essential to the credibility of our overall national security strategy.” U.S.
Department of Defense, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, May, 1997, p. 12. An on-line version of the 1997
report, divided into sections without pagination, is available at http://www.fas.org/man/docs/qdr/.
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•
A major stabilization operation, a long-duration deterrence operation in a
separate theater, a medium-sized counterinsurgency mission, and extended
support to civil authorities in the United States.
Planning for two major wars remains as an element of the new process, but the Defense
Department now sees other requirements as equally important in shaping the force.
Capabilities for Key Missions
Much of what is new in the 2010 QDR is in recommendations for improvements in six joint
mission areas:
•
Defend the United States and support civil authorities at home;
•
Succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations
•
Build the capacity of partner states;
•
Deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments;
•
Prevent proliferation and counter weapons of mass destruction; and
•
Operate effectively in cyberspace.
By comparison, the 2006 QDR focused its recommendations for improvements on four priority
areas:
•
Defeating terrorist networks.
•
Defending the homeland in depth.
•
Shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads.
•
Preventing hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using WMD.
Changes that most stand out include, in the 2010 QDR, a new focus on defeating efforts by
potential foes to prevent U.S. access to key regions, a new focus on cyberspace, and a new focus
on building the capacity of partner states. The 2006 QDR discussion of shaping the choices of
“countries at a strategic crossroads” is dropped. The 2006 QDR focus on defeating terrorist
networks is replaced by a somewhat broader mandate to institutionalize capabilities for
counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations. Also, the 2010 QDR report does not
describe such missions as elements of a “long war” against terrorism, or against violent Islamic
extremism. And there are also some changes in the ways in which homeland defense and
measures to counter weapons of mass destruction are discussed.
Defeating Anti-Access Strategies
For those who have followed debates over defense strategy since the end of the Cold War, the
2010 QDR discussion of measures to defeat anti-access threats is one of the most significant new
themes in the review. The current U.S. ability to project substantial military power far around the
globe is unique. Few other nations can deploy any significant amount of force at a distance at all,
no others can project enough power to defeat a major regional power except over fairly short land
routes, and none can independently sustain the deployment of large numbers of forces to noncontiguous regions over a long period of time. The U.S. ability to project power is the bedrock of
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U.S. alliances in Europe and Asia, and it is the key to U.S. efforts to bolster stability in other
important regions as well. Such capabilities are also expensive. The cost of power projection
capabilities is the main reason why U.S. defense spending dramatically exceeds that of any other
nation.
Following the end of the Cold War, regional conflicts became a focus of U.S. strategic planning,
and a number of serious and well-regarded American strategists warned that the U.S. ability to
project power to key areas—particularly East Asia and the Persian Gulf—could be put at risk by a
determined regional power. Andrew Marshall, the Director of Net Assessment in the Defense
Department, and retired Army Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Krepinevich, an alumnus of the Net
Assessment Office who has directed the Center Strategic and Budgetary Assessments since the
early 1990s, have long argued that “anti-access” or “area denial” strategies could pose a major
asymmetric challenge to the critical U.S. ability to operate effectively in distant regions.31
Their argument is that nations such as China or Iran could use a variety of simple and
sophisticated technologies to target U.S. forward bases in nearby nations and naval forces
operating relatively close to shore. Overseas ground bases may be increasingly vulnerable to
ballistic missile, cruise missile, and bomber attacks. Naval forces, particularly aircraft carriers and
other service combatants, may be increasingly vulnerable to anti-ship cruise missiles; modern,
quiet diesel electric submarines; smart mines that can be activated on command and maneuvered
into place; small, fast boats laden with explosives; or, at the high end of the technological
spectrum, ballistic missiles with maneuverable warheads that can be redirected in flight to strike
moving ships.
Anti-access threats have been highlighted more and more frequently in recent years. In 1997, the
National Defense Panel, which was appointed to review the first QDR, and on which Krepinevich
served, identified anti-access strategies as one of a number of asymmetric challenges which, the
panel recommended, should be accorded much more attention in defense planning.32 During the
2006 review process, a QDR “red team” headed by Marshall and assigned to prepare an
independent assessment, also addressed anti-access threats and reportedly recommended a cut of
as much as one-third in short-range fighter aircraft.33 In 2002, in a major war game, called
“Millennium Challenge,” that modeled a conflict in the Persian Gulf, the “Opposing Force”
(OPFOR) commander, retired Marine Lieutenant General Paul van Riper, succeeded in doing
extensive damage to notional U.S. naval forces in the region by launching attacks from swarming,
explosives-laden small boats and anti-ship cruise missiles. The Office of Naval Intelligence has
recently released unclassified reports on Iranian and Chinese naval capabilities that point to
considerable investments by each nation in anti-access capabilities.34
31
For a discussion of the evolution of the concept, starting in the Office of Net Assessment, see Andrew Krepinevich,
Why AirSea Battle?, Washington: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, February 19, 2010, online at
http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20100219.Why_AirSea_Battle/
R.20100219.Why_AirSea_Battle.pdf.
32
National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century, Report of the National
Defense Panel, December, 2007, online at http://www.dtic.mil/ndp/FullDoc2.pdf, pp. 12-13.
33
See Jason Sherman, “QDR Spares Fighter Cuts, but Pentagon Still Considering Tactical Aircraft Consolidation,”
InisdeDefense.com, January 31, 2006.
34
Office of Naval Intelligence, The People’s Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics,
August, 2009, online at http://www.nmic.navy.mil/Intelligence_Community/docs/china_army_navy.pdf and Office of
Naval Intelligence, Iran’s Naval Forces: From Guerilla Warfare to a Modern Naval Strategy, Fall 2009, online at
http://www.nmic.navy.mil/Intelligence_Community/docs/iran_navy_forces.pdf.
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The 2010 QDR makes a number of recommendations for improving capabilities to counter antiaccess strategies, including
•
Develop a joint air-sea battle concept;
•
Expand future long-range strike capabilities;
•
Exploit advantages in subsurface operations;
•
Increase the resiliency of U.S. forward posture and base infrastructure;
•
Assure access to space and the use of space assets;
•
Enhance the robustness of key ISR capabilities;
•
Defeat enemy sensors and engagement systems; and
•
Enhance the presence and responsiveness of U.S. forces abroad.
These initiatives may, over time, entail some substantial new investments. Long-range strike
forces might include a new manned or unmanned bomber, perhaps armed with long-range cruise
missiles for stand-off attacks. It is likely to be a major new investment in future years. To exploit
advantages in subsurface operations, the QDR report says, “The Navy is increasing funding for
the development of an unmanned underwater vehicle that will be capable of a wide range of
tasks.” How significant a new program this might become is as yet unclear. Measures to defeat
enemy sensors and engagement systems include development of offensive “electronic attack”
capabilities, which remain highly classified.
The Defense Department has not specifically discussed what is being considered in developing a
new air-sea battle concept, but it also might involve new investments in, for example, such
systems as carrier-based, long-range, unmanned strike systems. Conversely, it is conceivable that
studies of the concept could be used as a rationale for limiting Air Force and Navy spending on
the grounds that better optimized joint planning will reduce some requirements. Missile defense
may be a major and expensive part of measures to protect forward deployed forces. All told, the
anti-access measures addressed in the 2010 QDR appear likely to entail some major new
initiatives.
Counterinsurgency, Stability, and Counterterrorism Operations
The 2010 QDR’s treatment of counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations
(COIN, Stability, CT) reflects a number of significant shifts in emphasis compared to earlier
strategic assessments. The 2010 QDR report does not refer to the “Global War on Terrorism,”
which was the last Administration’s term. Operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere are now
referred to rather drily as “Overseas Contingency Operations” rather than parts of a single global
war. The 2010 QDR report also does not refer to the “long war,” also a staple of the prior
Administration’s analysis, and though it frequently identifies “extremism” or “violent extremism”
as a source of instability, it does not specifically mention “violent Islamic extremism” as a threat.
It is particularly notable that the 2010 QDR report does not refer to “irregular warfare,” which
was discussed in the 2005 National Defense Strategy and in later strategy documents as one of
four kinds of security challenges facing the United States—the others being “traditional,”
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“disruptive,” and “catastrophic” challenges.35 This by now familiar “four challenges” framework
for classifying dangers to U.S. security has, at least in this 2010 QDR report, been replaced by a
discussion of more specific kinds of missions, with an emphasis on the broad range of operations
that U.S. forces might be called upon to carry out.
In part these changes appear to reflect Secretary Gates’ judgment that distinctions between
irregular warfare and other kinds of challenges do not capture the complexity of a security
environment in which “near-peers will use irregular or asymmetric tactics and non-state actors
may have weapons of mass destruction or sophisticated missiles.”36 In a January 2009 Foreign
Affairs article, Secretary Gates wrote:
When thinking about the range of threats, it is common to divide the “high end” from the
“low end,” the conventional from the irregular ... In reality ... the categories of warfare are
blurring and no longer fit into neat, tidy boxes. One can expect to see more tools and tactics
of destruction—from the sophisticated to the simple—being employed simultaneously in
37
hybrid and more complex forms of warfare.
The QDR analysis of overlapping scenarios reflects the premise that all four kinds of challenges
may have to be confronted simultaneously, and might even be dimensions of a single conflict.38
In addition, the terminology used in the 2010 QDR appears to reflect the outcome of quite
extensive efforts by military strategists to develop new doctrine for counterinsurgency, stability,
counterterrorism, and related operations. In 2005, the Defense Department issued a formal
instruction that defined stability operations as “a core U.S. military mission that the Department
of Defense shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations.” In
2006, the Army and Marine Corps jointly published a new counterinsurgency Field Manual that
subsequently contributed to revised strategic approaches in Iraq in 2007 and now in Afghanistan.
In October 2008, the Army produced a new Field Manual on stability operations.39 Subsequently,
35
The “four challenges” framework was first briefly mentioned publicly in March 2004 in a congressionally mandated
report on base closures, entitled, “Report Required by Section 2912 of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act
of 1990, as Amended through the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003,” (March 2004), available
online at http://www.defenselink.mil/brac/docs/04_0_body032403.pdf. The framework was later discussed in March
2005 in Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2004, (March, 2005),
available online at http://www.defense.gov/news/Mar2005/d20050318nms.pdf. The presentation that initially drew
some public attention to the concepts was in a briefing for the Department of Defense “Senior Level Review Group,”
entitled “A Framework for Strategic Thinking,” (August 2004), not released publicly by the Defense Department and
restricted as “For Official Use Only,” but available online at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/framework.pdf. The
briefing was first discussed in Thomas E. Ricks, “Shift from Traditional War Seen at Pentagon,” Washington Post,
September 3, 2004, p. 1.
36
See Secretary Gates’ speech at the Air Warfare College on April 15, 2009, cited above.
37
Robert M. Gates, “A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age,” Foreign Affairs, January
2009, pp. 28-40.
38
Disruptive threats, in particular, may be elements of an anti-access strategy in an otherwise quite “traditional”
regional conflict, or could be reflected in cyber war, in anti-satellite attacks, in sabotage of transportation or
communications systems even in the U.S. homeland in the event of almost any violent confrontation. Dangers to the
homeland could span the range from disruptive to catastrophic threats.
39
Department of Defense Instruction DODI 3000.05, “Stability Operations,” initially issued in November 2005 and
reissued on September 16, 2009, online at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300005p.pdf; Headquarters,
Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency: FM 3-24, December 2006, online at http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/coin/
repository/FM_3-24.pdf; Headquarters, Department of the Army, Stability Operations: FM 3-07, October 2008, online
at http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/Repository/FM307/FM3-07.pdf.
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a December 2008 DOD directive defined irregular warfare in a manner that encompassed
counterinsurgency, stability and other activities:
IW can include a variety of steady-state and surge DoD activities and operations:
counterterrorism; unconventional warfare; foreign internal defense; counterinsurgency; and
stability operations that, in the context of IW, involve establishing or re-establishing order in
a fragile state.”40
Collectively, the outcome of the Defense Department’s effort to articulate doctrine for each of
these kinds of operations is a means of institutionalizing the lessons learned in Iraq and
Afghanistan and in other post-9/11 military activities. By discussing COIN, stability, and CT
operations separately, the 2010 QDR appears to be drawing attention to the evolution of DOD
doctrinal thinking about these issues.
A change that may be far more politically controversial is the Administration’s rejection of the
“war on terrorism” terminology. Substantively, it appears to reflect the Administration’s premise
that defeating global terrorist groups requires not only military, intelligence, and law enforcement
measures to destroy their leadership and infrastructure, but also and perhaps mainly other means
of weakening their appeal. As John Brennan, the senior counterterrorism advisor in the National
Security Staff commented last year,
It needs to be much more than a kinetic effort, an intelligence, law enforcement effort. It has
to be much more comprehensive. This is not a 'war on terror.' ... We cannot let the terror
prism guide how we're going to interact and be involved in different parts of the world.41
This may be an area in which the QDR could have benefited from a broader discussion of policy.
It might have been valuable not only to address counterterrorism policy in general, but also to
have discussed in some depth the role of military power in addressing evolving security
challenges relative to the role of other instruments of influence.
Programmatically, most of the specific initiatives in the QDR to bolster the COIN, stability, CT
mission involve an increase in resources to “enhance” current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Such measures include increases in helicopters, UAVs, intelligence and analysis capabilities,
counter IED technologies, and AC-130 aircraft gunships.42 This is a direct reflection of Secretary
Gates’ emphasis on prevailing in current wars.
The QDR report also identifies some longer-term initiatives, including the conversion of one
heavy Army brigade combat team (BCT) into a Stryker brigade—such brigades use wheeled
Stryker armored vehicles for mobility. The report says that “several more BCTs” may be
converted “as resources become available and future global demands become clearer.” This is one
40
Department of Defense Directive 3000.07, “Irregular Warfare (IW)”, December 1, 2008, online at
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300007p.pdf. It also defined IW as “A violent struggle among state and
non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and
asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an
adversary’s power, influence, and will.” This is a refinement of earlier definitions—the 2006 QDR report defined
irregular warfare as simply as “conflicts in which enemy combatants are not regular military forces of nation-states.”
41
Quoted in Spencer S. Hsu and Joby Warrick, “Obama's Battle Against Terrorism to Go Beyond Bombs and Bullets,”
Washington Post, August 6, 2008, p. 3.
42
“UAVs” refers to unmanned or unpiloted aerial vehicles, particularly used for intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) missions. IEDs are improvised explosive devices, including roadside, car, and truck bombs.
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of a number of areas in which the relatively radical reassessment of the strategic environment in
this and previous QDRs may be interpreted as a rationale for more sweeping changes in force
structure than any QDR to date has ventured to propose.
The report also discusses very generally measures to improve strategic communications, which
refers to efforts to gain support for U.S. security goals by appealing to critical foreign audiences
effectively. The report adds that DOD initiatives to “improve language and cultural capabilities
and to increase educational and training programs that prepare our people to work in and among
foreign populations,” are critical elements of a strategic communications capability. This is an
area in which a broader, inter-agency oriented assessment of policy may be of value.
Collectively, these measures do not appear to reflect a diminished effort to “defeat terrorist
networks” or to prevail in what had been called the “long war” against terrorism. On the contrary,
the 2010 QDR appears determined to bolster capabilities for the kinds of operations the Defense
Department has been engaged in since 9/11, including COIN, stability, CT, and related activities
such as foreign internal defense (i.e., direct support to foreign militaries). The 2010 QDR reflects
both the Secretary’s emphasis on current conflicts and the considerable evolution of doctrinal
thinking in the military. What were once regarded as less demanding missions are now seen as
core responsibilities with major implications for force planning and investments.
Building the Capacity of Partner States
The QDR report’s discussion of capacity building is closely related to the evolution of military
planning for COIN, stability, and CT operations. The discussion is by no means entirely new.
Much of the terminology and many of the programmatic measures that the 2010 QDR report
discusses were initiated in the last Administration and addressed in the 2006 QDR. Moreover, the
2006 QDR identified “building partnership capacity” as one of five areas in which the Defense
Department would develop follow-on “road maps” to refine policy.43
It is new, however, to elevate the discussion of capacity building to the level of a critical mission
and to assert as forcefully that it will become progressively more important in the future. The
2010 report says that “As U.S. forces draw down in Iraq and make progress toward building
stability in Afghanistan, more capacity will be available for training, advising, and assisting
foreign security forces in other parts of the globe.” The extent of the requirement is so great, the
report concludes, that it cannot be met by special operations forces, some of which have long
been assigned to train foreign militaries, but must also be assigned to general purpose forces:
Many governments facing active or latent threats from violent extremist groups would
welcome tailored advisory assistance from the United States…. Although special operations
forces will be able to meet some of this demand, especially in politically sensitive situations,
U.S. general purpose forces will need to be engaged in these efforts as well. The deploying
units will require specialized training and preparation for these operations.
In addition to measures to strengthen the ability of general purpose forces to provide support to
foreign militaries, other initiatives include the reform of security assistance to be much more
flexible and responsive, including measures to facilitate more rapid transfers of materiel to other
43
The other areas were Department institutional reform and governance, irregular warfare, strategic communications,
and intelligence.
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countries, more language and cultural training for military personnel in general, and additional
steps to support UN and other multilateral peacekeeping efforts. The report also calls for the
expansion of DOD programs established in the past two years to strengthen “ministerial-level”
governance in key nations. This is a potential matter of discussion in Congress, since it appears to
expand further the Defense Department’s role in areas of foreign policy that have traditionally
been mainly the State Department’s responsibility.
The requirement that general purpose forces—particularly in the Army—be prepared for foreign
military assistance missions as well as for the full range of combat missions and for stability,
counterinsurgency and related activities, may, again, draw into question whether changing
perceptions of the security environment should entail more far-reaching changes in defense
posture than the QDR has proposed. In situations such as Iraq and Afghanistan, where large
numbers of U.S. combat troops are deployed, and where training of large numbers of foreign
military forces is an urgent task, it might be necessary to assign training responsibilities to
deployed regular combat units. Moreover, in those cases, partnering of U.S. combat units with
indigenous forces may be of significant value.
To the extent U.S. forces are not so heavily, directly engaged in combat operations, however, the
case for assigning foreign assistance missions to general purpose forces may be more debatable.
In a number of hearings, House Armed Services Committee Chairman Ike Skelton has expressed
doubts about the ability of troops to retain the specialized skills needed for stability and
counterinsurgency operations, for training and support of foreign militaries, and for high intensity
combat without much more training that Army plans for.44 A number of strategists, including
some of the Army’s leading thinkers about counterinsurgency and stability operations, have called
for the Army to create either specialized advisory and assistance brigades specifically organized
and trained to support foreign militaries or, “constabulary” units for large scale stability
operations.45 Unless the Army was larger, however, this would require reducing capabilities for
more traditional missions. For its part, the Army has, instead, adopted a plan to augment selected,
deploying infantry brigades with additional personnel for training, security, and economic
infrastructure development.46 It has also used contractors extensively for foreign military training.
44
See, for example, Representative Skelton’s questions in a House Armed Services Committee Hearing on the
Quadrennial Defense Review with the co-chairs of the QDR Independent Panel on April 15, 2010: “The question I put
to you about being able to do the full- spectrum really bothers me, and I know you think that a soldier can be trained to
do something other than his main occupation in the military in three weeks or so. We should explore that a little bit
more in your final determination. It really does worry me that we've found ourselves in the horns of a dilemma with
fantastically trained troops to do one thing, and they be thrown into another situation where they would be very, very
unfamiliar.”
45
John A. Nagl, Institutionalizing Adaptation: It’s Time for a Permanent Army Advisor Corps, Washington: Center for
a New American Security, June 2007, online at http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/
Nagl_AdvisoryCorp_June07.pdf. Nagl was one of the authors of the Army-Marine Corps counterinsurgency Field
Manual. See also Don M. Snider, “Let the Debate Begin: The Case for a Constabulary Force,” Army Magazine, June
1998; Andrew Krepinevich, Transforming the Legions: The Army and the Future of Land Warfare, Washington: Center
for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2004, online at http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/
R.20040114.Transforming_the_L/R.20040114.Transforming_the_L.pdf; and Andrew Krepinevich, An Army at the
Crossroads, Washington: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, November, 2008, online at
http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20081117.An_Army_At_The_Cro/
R.20081117.An_Army_At_The_Cro.pdf.
46
Kris Osborn, “New U.S. Army Unit Adds Stability-Ops Troops,” Defense News, March 10, 2009.
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Shaping the Choices of “Nations at a Strategic Crossroads”
A review of what’s new in the 2010 QDR involves not only what has been added, but also what
themes in earlier QDRs have been, to some degree at least, deemphasized. The 2006 QDR report
included an extensive discussion of measures to “shape the choices of nations at a strategic
crossroads,” which the 2010 QDR report drops. In general, the 2006 QDR discussion
encompassed measures to dissuade other nations, particularly “major and emerging powers” from
challenging U.S. security interests, and it proposed engaging in cooperative endeavors instead.
Among nations at a strategic crossroads, the report mentioned nations in the Middle East, Central
Asia, and Latin America. It discussed in particular, what it saw as progress in extending
democracy in the Middle East, and it pointed to Libya’s announcement that it would abandon its
nuclear weapons program as a success. It also identified India, Russia, and China as the key
major and emerging powers.
With regard to Russia, like the 2010 QDR report, the 2006 report mainly focused on shared U.S.
and Russian interests, but, unlike the 2010 QDR, it also expressed concern about “the erosion of
democracy in Russia, the curtailment of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and freedom of
the press, the centralization of political power and limits on economic freedom.” An extensive
discussion in the 2006 report was devoted to concerns about China’s military buildup, which
explicitly concluded that
Chinese military modernization has accelerated since the mid-to-late 1990s in response to
central leadership demands to develop military options against Taiwan scenarios. The pace
and scope of China’s military build-up already puts regional military balances at risk.
In response, the 2006 report says, the United States must take a balanced approach that integrates
new powers into the international system as constructive partners, but that also seeks “to dissuade
major and emerging powers from developing capabilities that could threaten regional stability, to
deter conflict, and to defeat aggression should deterrence fail.” It specifically highlights measures
to defeat anti-access strategies and it identifies as critical a number of capabilities that the 2010
report says should be improved in order to defeat anti-access challenges, including “undersea
warfare capabilities,” though there is no mention of a new, unmanned underwater vehicle;
“prompt and high-volume global strike;” and integrated short- and intermediate-range ballistic
missile defense. “The aim,” says the 2006 report, “is to possess sufficient capability to convince
any potential adversary that it cannot prevail in a conflict and that engaging in conflict entails
substantial strategic risks beyond military defeat.”
Some analysts read into the analysis in the 2006 QDR an argument that the United States should
maintain a sufficient degree of strategic predominance to convince potential competitors that it is
of no use to make big investments in military capabilities, since the United States will retain the
ability to overmatch any buildup. The 2006 report does not explicitly make such an argument,
however. Rather, for the most part, the 2006 report discusses investments in key capabilities as
“prudent hedges against the possibility that cooperative approaches by themselves may fail to
preclude future conflict.”
Substantively, the 2010 QDR differs from the 2006 report in focusing somewhat less on acrossthe-board military capabilities to maintain a military advantage and more on specific measures to
counter efforts by potential competitors to challenge U.S. capabilities through asymmetric means.
The anti-access challenge is seen as one of a number of areas in which U.S. forces might be
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vulnerable, and which even an enemy without the ability to compete directly with the United
States might seek to exploit as a means of evening the odds. The 2010 report does not discuss
potential threats from specific nations in as much detail as earlier reports on strategy, but it is
somewhat more specific in identifying the technological nature of potential challenges and
measures to counter them.
Cyberwar
The 2010 report identifies the ability to operate successfully in cyberspace as one of six critical
mission areas in which it proposes efforts to bolster capabilities. Moreover, the 2010 report
identifies cyberspace as a critical part of the “global commons” on a par with air, sea, and space
realms of interchange. It cites secure and open access to the global commons as a critical interest
of the United States that is shared with other responsible actors around the globe. Defending
against disruptive cyber attacks has been discussed in earlier strategy documents for many
years—the 1997 QDR report mentioned “attacks via information warfare” as one of several
asymmetric threats that would receive increased attention and the 1997 National Defense Panel
report mentioned cyber-attacks as a danger to U.S. information dominance, proposed greater
efforts to defense access to cyberspace, and even warned against cyberterrorism as a specific
threat.
The 2010 QDR puts greater emphasis on cyberwar, however, than any review in the past. It
reflects a growing awareness of the dependence of military forces on cyberspace for the
management of information even in wartime, an awareness of the vulnerability of military and
civilian information systems to disruption, and the exponential growth of assaults on cyber
systems.47 It also reflects experience with efforts by a number of nations to experiment with
cyberwar. The 2010 QDR treats cyberspace, in effect, as a new theater of warfare, and elevates
the importance of planning to cope in it.
Homeland Defense
The 2010 QDR report agrees with the 2006 report in identifying homeland defense and protection
against weapons of mass destruction as critical focuses of attention. The 2010 report identifies
some new measures to improve capabilities in each area. For homeland defense, the QDR
reorganizes DOD chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE)
response teams to correspond to more quickly and to add capabilities. It also builds on current
National Guard plans to establish Homeland Response Forces (HRFs) in each of the ten Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regions. It also enhances efforts to develop and deploy
standoff radiological detection equipment.48
These measures reflect a great deal of continuity with earlier defense plans to contribute to
homeland defense in support of other agencies, most of which are incorporated into the
47
See Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn, III, “Remarks at the Defense Information Technology Acquisition
Summit,” November 12, 2009, online at http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1399.
48
For a discussion of homeland defense initiatives and some of the WMD-related steps discussed below, see John P.
Caves, Jr., “Countering WMD in the 2010 QDR,” CSWMD Proceedings, March 11, 2010. The article is based on
remarks by Mr. Caves at a National Defense University Symposium on the Quadrennial Defense Review held on
March 10 and 11, 2010.
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Department of Homeland Security. To the extent the 2010 QDR reflects a new perspective, it is in
the premise that the U.S. homeland is no longer, as it was even in the middle the last century, a
sanctuary in the event of U.S. involvement in conflicts abroad. Rather, the QDR report implies,
the global reach of new technologies may turn the U.S. homeland into a theater of operations, and
measures to protect the homeland, therefore, must be planned for as part of any major conflict.
Many of the scenarios that the QDR studied, included homeland defense missions as critical
responsibilities that the Defense Department must be able to manage while engaged in operations
abroad.
WMD Countermeasures
The 2010 report’s treatment of measures to “prevent proliferation and counter weapons of mass
destruction (WMD)” also reflects more continuity than change compared to earlier strategy
statements. The 2006 QDR directed that an Army command be expanded to operate as a rapidly
deployable command element of WMD elimination missions. The 2010 QDR establishes this as a
standing joint task force.49 The 2006 QDR addressed measures to tag and track nuclear materials,
and cited the Bush Administration’s Proliferation Security Initiative to interdict shipments of
WMD-related material. The 2010 QDR calls for improved nuclear forensics to identify the source
of nuclear material if used in a weapon, and it cites President Obama’s proposal to securely “lock
down” all weapons-grade fissile material within four years.
Where there have been significant changes in WMD policy, the 2010 QDR report largely leaves
any discussion to the report on the Nuclear Posture Review, which was due along with the QDR
report, but that was finally released on April 5, 2010. The 2010 QDR report does not specifically
address steps toward the elimination of nuclear weapons, which the President called for at a major
speech in Prague on April 5, 2009.50
49
Ibid.
White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by President Barack Obama, Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech
Republic,” April 5, 2009, online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-BarackObama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/.
50
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V. Common Criticisms of the QDR
The Base Force analysis, the Bottom-Up Review, and the four QDRs have generated considerable
debate. Often, the criticisms of successive reviews have at least as much to do with the
perspectives of the critics as with the logic of the reviews. Some commentators consistently think
that reviews have led to too small a military force, others to a force too large. Reformers who
think the acquisition process is flawed or corrupt argue that reviews to date have simply
confirmed a continuation of business as usual. The technology-driven elements of the force, they
say, have become progressively less relevant to real defense requirements, and forces are less
ready for war at ever increasing cost. In the past, some complained that defense policy was losing
its focus on major wars because it was diverted by missions in Somalia or the Balkans that had
little to do with U.S. security. Today, that criticism is echoed to some degree by those who object
to a strategy that explicitly accepts greater risk in capabilities for traditional, state-on-state
conflicts. Many warn that China or Russia, like resentful, rising, and ambitious powers in the
past, may pose the gravest long-term threats to peace, and complain that the current QDR
neglects the danger.
A persistent line of criticism, reflected to a considerable extent in the 1997 National Defense
Panel report and pursued further in a number of subsequent commentaries, argues that QDRs
have been too slow to adapt to new, non-traditional threats to security and to the danger of
asymmetric threats that exploit U.S. weaknesses. Force planning has been even slower to adapt,
in this view, than formal statements of strategy. That critical view is addressed at some length in
the following section of this report, which discusses whether quite radically new assessments of
the international security environment in recent QDRs may warrant more far-reaching changes in
defense posture than the Defense Department has so far been willing to accept.
While critical reviews of the current QDR and its predecessors cover the gamut, and are often
diametrically at odds with each other, a few recurring themes stand out, including the following:
•
The current QDR, like some of its predecessors, is too constrained by budgets
and does not, therefore, adequately address shortfalls in critical military
capabilities;
•
A contrary view, that the current QDR, like some of its predecessors, fails to
make necessary choices among major programs;
•
While a focus on current wars is appropriate, the 2010 QDR puts too little
emphasis on investments in conventional forces needed to prepare for future
threats;
•
The current QDR is too timid in its characterization of threats from Russia and
China, and underplays tensions with China in particular;
•
The delay in issuing a White House National Security Strategy statement left the
QDR without sufficient guidance on strategic priorities;
•
The current QDR does not clearly show how force plans are derived from its
assessments of strategy, so it is hard to understand the rationale for maintaining a
force of the current size and composition;
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•
QDRs are, by law, required to look ahead twenty years, but the current QDR
appears to have a much shorter time horizon and says little about long-term
planning.
Planning Based on Budget Constraints Rather than Strategy
Perhaps the most common criticism of earlier defense reviews, beginning with the Bottom-Up
Review, holds that they were little more than budget drills, designed to justify cuts in programs
needed to fit defense plans into a constrained budget, rather than exercises in strategic planning.
From the beginning, some of the sponsors of QDR legislation in the Congress quite clearly
intended QDRs to be, if anything, the opposite. The original QDR statute was written in 1996 and
revised in 1999, when the predominant view on the Armed Services Committees, if not in the rest
of Congress, appeared to be that defense budgets had fallen too low, and that weapons
procurement funding, in particular, needed to turn up substantially to recapitalize the force. Many
legislators clearly wanted QDRs to make a case for spending more on defense. Over time, the
QDR statute has been revised to become more and more explicit in requiring that reviews should
not be budget constrained.
The “Military Force Structure Review Act of 1996,” the subtitle of the FY1997 National Defense
Authorization Act that mandated the 1997 QDR, required the review to address the budget, but
only in very general terms:
The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
shall complete in 1997 a review of the defense program of the United States intended to
satisfy the requirements for a Quadrennial Defense Review as identified in the
recommendations of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces. The
review shall include a comprehensive examination of the defense strategy, force structure,
force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense
program and policies with a view toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of
the United States and establishing a revised defense program through the year 2005.51
The 1997 QDR explicitly acknowledged that resource constraints were an underlying premise of
the review. The report on the review said that the assessment first identified evolving threats,
risks, and opportunities in national security; developed a defense strategy; identified required
capabilities; defined programs and policies needed to sustain such capabilities; and assessed
alternative approaches reflecting a different balance between investments in current, short-term
readiness and the development of long-term capabilities. The strategy called for a military posture
able to shape the international security environment, respond to the full spectrum of current
requirements, and prepare for future threats. The report also said:
Finally, the Department's plans are fiscally responsible. They are built on the premise that,
barring a major crisis, national defense spending is likely to remain relatively constant in the
future. There is a bipartisan consensus in America to balance the federal budget by the year
2002 in order to ensure the nation's economic health, which in turn is central to our
fundamental national strength and security. The direct implication of this fiscal reality is that
Congress and the American people expect the Department to implement our defense program
within a constrained resource environment. The fiscal reality did not drive the defense
51
FY1997 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 104-201, September 23, 1996, Section 923(a).
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strategy we adopted, but it did affect our choices for its implementation and focused our
attention on the need to reform our organization and methods of conducting business.52
Following the 1997 QDR, the section of the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act that
established a permanent requirement for quadrennial reviews laid out a rather classical, idealized
view of the planning process in which budgets were to be derived from force plans, which were,
in turn, to be derived from strategy, though it did not explicitly rule out a consideration of
resource constraints. In the revised statute, the QDR was required
(1) to delineate a national defense strategy consistent with the most recent National Security
Strategy …; (2) to define sufficient force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure,
budget plan, and other elements of the defense program … required to execute successfully
the full range of missions called for in that national defense strategy; and (3) to identify …
the budget plan that would be required to provide sufficient resources to execute successfully
the full range of missions called for in that national defense strategy at a low-to-moderate
level of risk, and … any additional resources (beyond those programmed in the current
future-years defense program) required to achieve such a level of risk.”53
Defense budgets increased substantially from FY1999 on, and the subsequent 2001 and 2006
QDR reports did not explicitly discuss budget constraints as a factor shaping defense choices.
Neither advocated substantial increases in planned spending, however. Moreover, as discussed
further below, rather than propose simply adding capabilities, the 2006 QDR called for shifting
resources to some degree away from capabilities for traditional state-on-state conflicts and toward
preparations for a broader array of challenges, at least implicitly accepting limits on resources.
Following the 2006 review, the FY2007 John Warner National Defense Authorization Act
amended earlier language specifically to prohibit the QDR from being constrained by the budget,
adding a provision that required the QDR
to make recommendations that are not constrained to comply with the budget submitted to
Congress by the President…54
Congress’s intent in mandating that the QDR make budget recommendations that are derived
from strategy; that will sustain a force sufficient to execute all the missions required by the
strategy at a low to moderate level of risk; that will identify additional resources necessary to
reduce risks; and that may not be constrained by the Administration’s budget plan is, therefore,
quite clear. It is not so clear, however, exactly how the statutory requirement can be expected to
affect how QDRs are carried out.
The requirement that the Defense Department propose a budget plan that is not constrained to
comply with the President’s budget is difficult for any Secretary of Defense to comply with.
Ultimately, within the Executive Branch, the White House will decide how much to propose for
defense in part by balancing defense with competing demands in other parts of the budget, and
52
Department of Defense, The Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, May 1997, “Secretary’s Message,” online at
http://www.fas.org/man/docs/qdr/msg.html. In conversations with the author of this report, participants in the 1997
review have said that that the exercise began without specific budget guidance, but funding assumptions were soon
specified.
53
FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 106-65, October 5, 1999, Section 901(a).
54
FY2007 John Warner National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 109-364, October 17, 2006, Section 301(c)(3).
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neither a Secretary of Defense, nor a military service chief, would likely survive long by openly
challenging a President’s decision.55
Leaving such dynamics aside, some defense planners object to the premise that effective strategic
thinking can be carried out without considering realistic resource constraints from the start. At its
root, they argue, strategy is about how to allocate resources to accomplish policy objectives, and
objectives themselves may be adjusted in view of what it is possible to achieve.56 For the QDR to
be useful to the Defense Department, in this view, it must provide guidance in establishing
priorities among defense programs based on an assessment of urgent and less urgent challenges to
U.S. security based on realistic expectations about funding.
On these grounds, Robert Hale, the current Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller, directly took
issue with the premise that effective defense planning can be conducted without initially taking
resource constraints into account:
I would personally argue that there is no such thing as requirements without some kind of
fiscal constraints. The whole … process of determining a defense budget is the process of
trading off risks against how much you're willing to spend. Obviously, if we had infinite
resources, there'd be no risk, but that clearly is never going to be the circumstance. So I
almost think you always—you have to balance risk against dollars.
And the way I think we've done that, while obeying the law with the Quadrennial Defense
Review, is to make it—and the term we use is “resource informed.” We didn't say, “You
have just so much money.” But the people doing the QDR were involved with the budget
process. They knew generally what our resource levels were going to be, and I think that
clearly informed the choices that they made. So it was not budget-constrained, as required by
law, but I think it was resource- informed, and should be. And I think the process works fine.
I don't think we need additional legislation.57
Hale’s perspective is reflected in the discussion of strategic priorities in the 2006 and 2010 QDRs.
The four challenges framework that the Defense Department developed in the run up to the 2006
QDR made the case that resources should be shifted to some degree away from capabilities for
traditional conflicts, in which the United States possessed a secure advantage, and toward
55
The one obvious exception might be Caspar Weinberger, who openly disputed OMB budget decisions in the mid1980s, though even he lost the argument. On its face, the requirement seems to reflect a premise that defense spending
should take priority over other demands in allocating resources. That view has seldom, if ever, prevailed in the United
States in the post-World War II era. For a discussion of defense budget politics in the 1950s, see Samuel P. Huntington,
The Common Defense, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961). Huntington’s preface cites the Janus face of
national policy which looks in two directions, one toward the international environment and one toward the realm
domestic political priorities. Both are equally important, he said.
56
The Defense Department’s “Dictionary of Military Terms,” JP 1-02, defines strategy as “A prudent idea or set of
ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater,
national, and/or multinational objectives.” For a thorough discussion of strategic planning, see John M. Collins,
Military Strategy: Principles, Practices, and Historical Perspectives (Dulles, Virginia: Brassey’s Incorporated, 2002).
Collins, a former senior specialist at CRS, posits a six step strategic process: (1) Specify national interests, (2) appraise
opposition, (3) define politico-military objectives, (4) devise strategies to achieve objectives, (5) allocate resources to
cover requirements without intolerable risk, (6) ascertain whether resources are sufficient and, if not, consider
alternatives. “Few strategists,” he says, “quibble about the sequence of steps 1 – 3 (ends and threats thereto), but
whether step 4 (ways) should precede step 5 (means) incites disputes…. Both views are correct.”
57
“Department of Defense Bloggers Roundtable With Undersecretary Of Defense (Comptroller) And Chief Financial
Officer Robert Hale Via Teleconference, Subject: The Defense Department Budget For Fiscal Year 2011,” Tuesday,
February 2, 2010, online at http://www.dodlive.mil/files/2010/02/0202hale.pdf.
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capabilities to cope with irregular, disruptive, or catastrophic challenges, which were more likely
to materialize or to which the nation was more vulnerable. Figure 1, taken from a DOD briefing
on the 2006 QDR, graphically illustrates the proposed reallocation of resources among the four
challenges that DOD had identified.
Figure 1. 2006 QDR Four Challenges Framework for Setting Priorities
Source: Department of Defense, Briefing Slides on the 2006 Quadrennial Review, February 3, 2006, online at
http://www.defense.gov/news/Feb2006/d20060203qdrslides.pdf.
The 2010 QDR is based on a similar premise. The risk associated with current conflicts, and risks
arising from the likely hybrid, asymmetric nature of future conflicts, are relatively high, the
assessment concludes, while risks arising from traditional threats are relatively low. In this view,
the Defense Department can afford to accept somewhat greater risks, therefore, in traditional,
conventional warfare capabilities where U.S. forces maintain a substantial advantage, in order to
reduce risks from asymmetric attacks to which forces may be more vulnerable.
As it turned out, as the QDR was being conducted, there proved to be some flexibility in
adjusting budget trends. According to one of the coordinators of the 2010 QDR, the review began
with an assumption that future base defense budgets would be essentially flat, with no growth for
inflation.58 The Administration’s FY2011-FY2015 base budget plan, however, provides growth of
58
See Hon. David Ochmanek, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense-Force Planning, Transcript of Meeting with the
Defense Writers Group, July 28, 2009: “The analysis we've done in the QDR to date took as an assumption that there
would be zero real growth in defense spending across the FYDP. That was an assumption to drive the analysis,” online
at http://www.airforce-magazine.com/DWG/Documents/2009/July%202009/072809Ochmanek.pdf.
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about 1 percent above inflation each year in overall DOD funding, reflecting adjustments that
were made in discussions about the budget at the end of 2009, which presumably reflected the
main conclusions of the QDR.
That is not a large change in the short term, although, if sustained over several years, it would
amount to a substantial increase in resources. Many congressional critics of the QDR clearly feel
that such increases are inadequate. They point to apparent shortfalls in inventories of Navy and
Air Force fighter aircraft, to a QDR decision not to deploy as many amphibious ships as the
Marine Corps says it requires, to quite substantial cuts in major weapons programs that Secretary
Gates announced in April 2009, and to additional cuts announced in the QDR report. They see
such reductions not as a result of new strategic priorities, but as a result of budget constraints
imposed outside the defense planning process.
Failure to Establish Realistic Priorities
A contrary view is held by those who argue that the QDR does not reflect a realistic perspective
on budget constraints and does not establish clear priorities. In this view, federal budget deficits
are likely to impose stringent limits on defense spending in the long term. While resources, from
this perspective, are sufficient to sustain an effective force, to do so requires much more extensive
trade-offs between programs designed to cope with current and future dangers on the one hand,
and inherited programs built to meet Cold War-era threats on the other. As one commentary
argues,
The QDR places some emphasis on rebalancing defense resources toward the capabilities
needed to fight and win today’s wars—but the FY 2011 budget does not fully reflect this
emphasis. The QDR does call for greater investment in technology to defeat improvised
explosive devices, more helicopters and special forces, and more unmanned aerial vehicles,
all of which have direct relevance to the troops on the ground. But according to Secretary
Gates’s own estimates after eight years of war in Afghanistan and nearly seven in Iraq, the
FY 2011 defense budget represents a shift of only 7 percent to 10 percent of spending to
today’s missions and needs, while 40 percent is allocated toward weapons that can fight all
types of wars. That leaves half the budget still devoted to threats from a bygone era.59
In this view, the Defense Department should sustain increases in the size of the Army and Marine
Corps; invest more in equipment for forces engaged in counterinsurgency and stability
operations, such as force protection, communications, and transportation equipment; scale back
purchases of weapon systems for conventional warfare; and reallocate resources to fully fund the
costs of expanding ground forces and of resetting forces following the conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan.60
Commentators taking this view appear to be particularly critical of the planning scenarios used to
test the capabilities of the force. Although the QDR claims to make a case for shifting resources
59
Lawrence J. Korb, Sean Duggan, Laura Conley, “Quadrennial Defense Review Fails to Match Resources to
Priorities,” Center for American Progress, February 4, 2010, online at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/
02/qdr_fail_resource.html.
60
Lawrence J. Korb, Peter M. Juul, Laura Conley, Major Myles B. Caggins III, Sean E. Duggan, Building a Military
for the 21st Century: New Realities, New Priorities (Washington: Center for American Progress, December 2008),
online at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/12/pdf/military_priorities.pdf.
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away from capabilities for conventional conflict, in this view, the requirements that it establishes
are still based on out-of-date planning for major wars:
The QDR … does not prioritize the missions that the military must be prepared for. The
document states that “successfully balancing [DOD’s priorities] requires that the Department
make hard choices on the level of resources required as well as accepting and managing risk
in a way that favors success in today’s wars,” yet it also notes that “U.S. forces must be
prepared to conduct a wide variety of missions under a range of different circumstances.” In
other words, the QDR promises to make tradeoffs but asserts that DOD must be capable of
confronting every contingency.61
This perspective appears to put a very high priority on preparations for counterinsurgency,
stability, and counterterrorism operations, echoing statements by Secretary Gates and others to the
effect that the wars the nation is in now are representative of the kinds of conflicts that are most
likely in the foreseeable future. This view appears to put less emphasis on what have been called
“high-end asymmetric threats.” The 2010 QDR, in contrast, emphasizes not only challenges to
U.S. security from insurgencies or terrorist groups, but also potential challenges posed by future
peer or near peer competitors who, like less advanced competitors, would try to exploit U.S.
vulnerabilities in the event of a conflict. A case can be made that the 2010 QDR broadens the list
of challenges to U.S. security even more than some of those who criticize it for not setting
priorities would have it. This could argue either for more resources for defense, or for more farreaching efforts to eliminate outdated capabilities in order to reallocate resources to respond to
new high-end dangers such as anti-access strategies and cyberwar.
A Diminished Focus on Future Challenges
In a hearing immediately after the QDR was released, Representative Howard P. “Buck”
McKeon, the Ranking Minority Member of the House Armed Services Committee, expressed a
view that has been reflected in a number of subsequent criticisms of the QDR:
While we commend the department for its laser focus on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, I
believe efforts to make balance a fixture in the QDR in the out year budget is short sighted
and puts the department on the wrong path to the next 20 years. Choosing to win in Iraq and
Afghanistan should not mean our country must also choose to assume additional risk in the
conventional national defense challenges of today and tomorrow.
Last April we received a glimpse of the cost of balance when the secretary announced over
$50 billion in cuts to defense programs. This year the impact is more subtle, but I fear more
severe. As I told the secretary yesterday in my view the QDR understates the requirements to
deter and defeat challenges from state actors. And it overestimates the capabilities of the
force the department would build.62
As Representative McKeon’s statement reflects, the debate about long-term defense planning has
to do, in part, with recommendations Secretary Gates made in April 2009 to eliminate funding for
several major weapons programs and with some similar, follow-on decisions in the QDR. Major
program cuts include terminating the Navy DDG-1000 and CG-X shipbuilding programs,
61
Korb, Duncan, and Conley, cited above.
Hon. Howard P. “Buck” McKeon, House Armed Services Committee, Hearing on the 2009 Quadrennial Defense
Review, February 4, 2010, from CQ Transcripts.
62
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stretching out planned procurement of new aircraft carriers to one every five years; terminating
the F-22 aircraft program after buying 183 aircraft; halting production of C-17 airlift aircraft; and
terminating the transformational communications satellite (TSAT), VH-71 Presidential
Helicopter, and Air Force Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) helicopter programs. Other issues
have to do with apparent shortfalls in some systems, including the number of Navy fighter
aircraft. There has been some debate, as well, about the number of amphibious ships for the
Marine Corps, about whether the planned shipbuilding rate can be financed with available
budgets and whether the Navy can sustain its goal of 313 ships, and about developing an
alternative engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.
The debate is not just about program terminations, however. There is a much broader dimension
to the argument, as well. Ever since the Bottom-Up Review, some have doubted the ability of
U.S. forces to manage more than a single major combat operation at a time. Many question, even
today, whether the United States could manage a major conventional conflict in Korea, for
example, with so many troops committed in stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Senior
officers answer that the United States would prevail, but only with higher casualties and only by
effectively eliminating the ability to rotate deployed forces out of Iraq and Afghanistan on
schedule.63 If that is so, the critics ask—if current forces would find another conflict so difficult
to cope with—how can the Defense Department conclude that capabilities for traditional conflicts
are more than adequate? Moreover, according to some press accounts, the military service chiefs,
initially at least, did not concur with parts of the 2008 National Defense Strategy that called for
taking “additional acceptable risk” in traditional military capabilities in order to bolster
capabilities for irregular conflicts.64
For his part, Secretary of Defense Gates plays down such concerns:
All told, this year’s National Defense Strategy concluded that although U.S. predominance in
conventional warfare is not unchallenged, it is sustainable for the medium term given current
trends. It is true that the United States would be hard pressed to fight a major conventional
ground war elsewhere on short notice, but as I’ve said before, where on Earth would we do
that? We have ample, untapped striking power in our air and sea forces should the need arise
to deter or punish aggression—whether on the Korean Peninsula, in the Persian Gulf, or
across the Taiwan Strait. So while we are knowingly assuming some additional risk in this
area, that risk is, I believe, a prudent and manageable one.65
More generally, in his view, Congress’s continued support for current programs, and its
skepticism about efforts to redirect investments, is a symptom of a deep-rooted inertia that he sees
as a barrier to necessary changes in priorities:
63
Representative McKeon posed a question about DOD’s two-war capabilities in the February 4, 2010, hearing on the
QDR cited above. Vice Admiral Stephen Stanley replied, “Another operation in the near term the size of a Korea would
… require the nation to mobilize…. It would take away our ability to rotate the forces even … as we are now…. Would
we still prevail? Yes. Would there be increased losses? Yes.”
64
Jason Sherman, “Gates Approves New Defense Strategy over Objections of Service Chiefs,” InsideDefense.com,
June 12, 2008 (also in Inside the Pentagon, June 19, 2008). See also Josh White, “Gates Sees Terrorism Remaining
Enemy No. 1: New Defense Strategy Shifts Focus From Conventional Warfare,” Washington Post, July 31, 2008, p. 1;
Carlos Muñoz, “Official Proposes Interagency Oversight: Rehorn: Irregular Warfare Shift Among Services Is
Acceptable Risk,” Inside the Pentagon, October 23, 2008; Greg Jaffe, “A Single-Minded Focus on Dual Wars: Defense
Secretary Is Reorienting the Military to Meet U.S. Troops' Needs Now,” Washington Post, May 15, 2009.
65
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Remarks at the National Defense University, September 29, 2008, transcript
online at http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1279.
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Support for conventional modernization programs is deeply embedded in our budget, in our
bureaucracy, in the defense industry, and in Congress. My fundamental concern is that there
is not commensurate institutional support—including in the Pentagon—for the capabilities
needed to win the wars we are in, and of the kinds of missions we are most likely to
undertake in the future.66
In all, Secretary Gates has posed as a far-reaching a critique of the defense planning process as
any senior official since President Eisenhower warned against “the acquisition of unwarranted
influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex.”67 He has expressed
frustration not only with a reluctance in the military services to devote resources to current wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also about the institutional conservatism of the military services at a
time when, in his view, the nature of war is rapidly changing. Early in his tenure as Defense
Secretary, he felt it necessary to prod the Air Force very aggressively to allocate more
reconnaissance UAV resources to Afghanistan, an effort he later described as “like pulling
teeth.”68 He has pointed to past cases of resistance to new initiatives, such as Air Force delays in
developing with the CIA an unmanned aerial vehicle for surveillance, as representative of similar
barriers to change today.69
Ultimately, the debates over program terminations and over the priorities enunciated in the 2006
and 2010 QDRs reflect a quite profound, underlying dispute. Secretary Gates has been
particularly forceful in arguing that current processes are not sufficiently adaptable to changing
security requirements. Others question the wisdom of major shifts of resources away from current
capabilities, which they see as the bedrock of U.S. military power and national security.
Downplaying Threats from Russia and China
As discussed above, compared to previous strategy statements, the 2010 QDR report does not
include critical comments about Russia’s record on human rights and democratization, and it
includes only a very brief expression of concern about the lack of transparency in China’s
military plans and intentions. In a hearing shortly before the QDR report was released,
Representative McKeon expressed a concern that the QDR would not be realistic about China:
When we receive the QDR, I will be looking closely at any changes to the [Defense]
Department's assessment of China. My fear is that we will downgrade the China threat in an
attempt to justify last year's and future cuts to key defense programs.70
Some commentaries after the report was released see evidence of efforts to downgrade the
Chinese threat in changes in the language of the QDR report between a draft circulated for
comment in December 2009 and the final version of the report released on February 1, 2010.
Apparently reflecting a review by other agencies and by the White House, the final version
66
Ibid.
Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Farewell Address,” January 17, 1961, online at http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/
dwightdeisenhowerfarewell.html.
68
For a thorough account of the UAV episode, see Greg Jaffe, “A Single-Minded Focus on Dual Wars: Defense
Secretary Is Reorienting the Military to Meet U.S. Troops' Needs Now, Washington Post, May 15, 2009; for “pulling
teeth,” see Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, remarks at the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base, April 21,
2008 , cited above.
69
Also see Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, remarks at the Air War College, April 21, 2008, ibid.
70
John T. Bennett, “McKeon Fears 2010 QDR To Scale Back 'China Threat',” DefenseNews.com, January 13, 2010.
67
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deletes comments about China that were very similar to those in the 2006 QDR and the June 2008
National Defense Strategy statement. 71
The change in tone has, however, received less attention than might have been expected, perhaps
because many of the recommendations for force enhancements in the QDR reflect a concerted
effort to counter high-end asymmetric challenges that have been identified with China. These
include many measures to cope with anti-access strategies, measures to counter anti-satellite
systems, and cyberwarfare initiatives.
For its part, the Administration’s approach appears to be determined by the very high priority the
President accords to efforts to gain cooperation from Russia and China on arms control and nonproliferation, reflected in the “New START” treaty agreed to on March 27, 2010, and signed in
Prague on April 8; on global measures to tighten the security of bomb-grade fissile material
addressed at the Washington Nuclear Summit on April 12-13; and, perhaps most importantly, on
efforts to gain Russian and Chinese support for sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program. Officials
insist that the government continues to express its concern about human rights, democratization,
and military intentions in private meetings.
Lack of a National Security Strategy, Unclear Connection Between
Strategy and Plans, Absence of Long-Term Planning
Three additional criticisms of the QDR are closely related:
•
The delay in issuing a White House National Security Strategy statement left the
QDR without sufficient guidance on strategic priorities;
•
The current QDR does not clearly enough show how force plans are derived from
its assessment of strategy—indeed, some would argue the QDR does not endorse
any specific force plans at all, but simply lists existing force levels as a given,
and
•
QDRs are, by law, required to look ahead twenty years, but the current QDR
appears to have a much shorter time horizon and says little about long-term
planning.
Delay in release of National Security Strategy report
As discussed above, current law requires the White House to issue a statement of National
Security Strategy within 150 days of the start of a new presidential term and annually thereafter.
No new Administration has issued a report so early in its tenure, however, and the George W.
Bush Administration did not attempt to issue annual reports but, rather, issued only two in its
eight years in office. Obama Administration officials insist that the absence of a national security
strategy report did not limit the QDR, in part because of the continuity of planning with Secretary
Gates remaining in office, in part because of extensive previous experience of the senior officials
in the Office of the Under Secretary for Policy who directed the QDR, and in part because of
71
John Bennett, “China Language Softened in Final Version of QDR,” Defense News, Febuary 7, 2010, p. 8; and Bill
Gertz, “Inside the Ring,” Washington Times, February 18, 2010, p. 8.
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