FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Other Programs
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FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster
Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Other Programs
(name redacted), Coordinator
Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget
(name redacted)
Specialist in National Defense
(name redacted)
Analyst in Emergency Management Policy
(name redacted)
Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy
(name redacted)
Analyst in Foreign Affairs
(name redacted)
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
(name redacted)
Specialist in Foreign Affairs
August 6, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-....
www.crs.gov
R41232
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Other Programs
Summary
The Administration requested $64.3 billion in FY2010 supplemental appropriations:
•
$5.1 billion to replenish the U.S. Disaster Relief Fund administered by the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA);
•
$33 billion for the Department of Defense (DOD) primarily for deploying 30,000
additional troops to Afghanistan; $4.5 billion in war-related foreign aid; and $2.8
billion for Haiti earthquake-related relief and reconstruction aid;
•
$243 million for activities related to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill;
•
$600 million for border security, and $129 million to reduce backlogs in patent
requests; and
•
$13.4 billion to compensate veterans exposed to Agent Orange, and $3.4 billion
to settle court cases about trust claims of American Indians (Cobell) and $1.2
billion for discrimination claims of black farmers (Pigford II).
Much of the debate about this year’s supplemental focused on the effect on the deficit of
additional spending and, particularly, whether certain spending should be designated as
emergency spending that Congress is not required to offset under congressional rules. Offsets can
come from either rescissions, which cancel prior year budget authority (BA), and then apply that
BA to new spending, thus reducing the amount of new budget authority required, or from savings
in direct spending or mandatory programs.
On March 24, 2010, the House passed H.R. 4899, the Disaster Relief and Summer Jobs Act, by a
vote of 239 to 175, with $5.7 billion in funding, including $5.1 billion to replenish FEMA’s
Disaster Assistance Fund and $600 million for a Labor Department summer jobs program. Taking
the bill’s $600 million in offsetting rescissions into account, the bill required $5.1 billion in new
budget authority (BA). A House Appropriations Committee (HAC) markup of an $84.8 billion
draft bill with additional domestic spending scheduled for May 26, 2010, was cancelled.
On May 27, the Senate passed its version of H.R. 4899 by a vote of 67-28, with $59.2 billion in
funding for disaster assistance, war funding, Haiti relief, and new VA benefits, but without
funding for the two court cases. Including its $380 million in rescissions, the Senate version
required $58.8 billion in new budget authority.
On July 1, 2010, the House passed an amended version of H.R. 4899 totaling $81.8 billion for
disaster assistance, wars, Haiti relief, and new VA benefits, and additional domestic spending to
prevent teacher layoffs, provide agricultural and energy loans, and Pell Grants, in discretionary
spending and funding to settle the two court cases. With its $12.2 billion in rescissions and $4.5
billion in 10-year mandatory savings from lower government drug prices, this bill would have
required $65.1 billion in new BA. On July 22, 2010, the Senate sent a message to the House
disagreeing with the earlier version passed by the House on July 1, 2010. On July 27th, the House
passed the Senate’s May 27 version, which was signed by the President on July 29, 2010, and
became P.L. 111-212.
Part of the debate and timing of congressional action was driven by funding deadlines cited by the
Department of Defense, FEMA, and the Coast Guard, some which proved to be somewhat
flexible.
Congressional Research Service
FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Other Programs
Contents
Most Recent Developments.........................................................................................................1
Highlights of Congressional Action .............................................................................................2
House July 27, 2010, Debate on H.R. 4899 ...........................................................................2
Funding and War Issues ..................................................................................................2
Debate on H.Con.Res. 301 Requiring the Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from
Pakistan .......................................................................................................................3
Senate Action on July 22, 2010 .......................................................................................3
Final Version of H.R. 4899 and the Administration Request.........................................................3
War-Related Funding in the FY2010 Supplemental ...............................................................4
Summary of Congressional Action on H.R. 4899...................................................................9
Overview, Deadlines, and Potential Issues ...................................................................................9
Budget Rules and Supplemental Requests ........................................................................... 11
Potential Deadlines ............................................................................................................. 12
Concerns that Funds for Coast Guard Oil Spill Response Activities Could Run
Out in Mid-June......................................................................................................... 12
Concerns that Defense Department Deadline Could Be Mid-August.............................. 13
FEMA Limited Disaster Assistance to Extend Deadline................................................. 14
Concerns about State Department Disaster Funding Running Low................................. 15
Deadline for Funding Court Settlements Uncertain........................................................ 15
Issues: Emergency Designations, Timelines, and Effectiveness............................................ 15
Federal Emergency Management Agency Request..................................................................... 16
FY2010 Supplemental Issues .............................................................................................. 16
Regular vs. Emergency Budgeting for Disasters ............................................................ 16
Justifying the Current Estimate...................................................................................... 18
Congressional Action on U.S. Disaster Assistance Request.................................................. 18
Other Disaster Assistance.............................................................................................. 18
War-Related Supplemental Requests ......................................................................................... 19
Department of Defense War Funding Request ..................................................................... 19
Increases in U.S., NATO Troops, and Afghan Security Forces ....................................... 19
DOD Request Shifts Bulk of War Funding to Afghanistan ............................................. 21
Timeline for U.S. Military’s Role in Afghanistan........................................................... 22
Most of DOD’s Request Is for Afghanistan.................................................................... 23
Questions Could Be Raised About Per Troop Costs ....................................................... 24
Funds to Accelerate Training Afghan Security Forces .................................................... 26
Whether Some of DOD’s Request Could Have Been Funded in Regular FY2011
Bill ............................................................................................................................ 30
Final Congressional Action on the Defense Request ...................................................... 31
More Spending for Bases in Afghanistan Raises Questions of Permanency and
Execution......................................................................................................................... 33
Building to Fight vs. Building to Stay: Congressional Restrictions................................. 37
“Permanent Stationing” and “Long-term Presence” ....................................................... 37
Higher Funding and DOD’s Proposed Legislative Change............................................. 38
Execution Issues ........................................................................................................... 39
Final Congressional Action on the Defense Basing Request........................................... 40
War-Related Foreign Aid and Diplomatic Operations .......................................................... 40
Congressional Research Service
FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Other Programs
Congressional Action on War-Related Foreign Aid .............................................................. 41
Afghanistan .................................................................................................................. 43
Congressional Action on the Afghanistan Request ......................................................... 45
Iraq............................................................................................................................... 46
Congressional Action on the Iraq Request ..................................................................... 48
Pakistan ........................................................................................................................ 48
Congressional Action on the Pakistan Request............................................................... 49
Haiti FY2010 Supplemental Proposal........................................................................................ 50
Congressional Action on Haiti FY2010 Supplemental Proposal ........................................... 52
Humanitarian Relief Funding .............................................................................................. 52
Relief Funding: International Disaster Assistance and Emergency Food Aid .................. 52
Key Concerns and Priorities .......................................................................................... 55
Department of Defense and U.S. Coast Guard Relief Activities ..................................... 56
State Department’s Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) ........ 57
Assistance to Haitian Evacuees and Migrants ................................................................ 58
Final Congressional Action on Haiti Relief Funding ...................................................... 61
Recovery and Reconstruction Funding for Haiti .................................................................. 61
Key Concerns: Priorities, Decentralization, Poverty Reduction, and
Capacity Building ...................................................................................................... 62
Economic Support Funds for Infrastructure and Other Development Activities .............. 64
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Funds for Security ..................... 64
USAID and Treasury Funds for Oversight and Advisors ................................................ 65
U.S. Funds for International Donor Trust Fund and Debt Relief..................................... 65
Final Congressional Action on Haiti Recovery and Reconstruction Funding .................. 66
Funding for Diplomatic Operations in Haiti......................................................................... 67
Congressional Action on Diplomatic Operations Funding in Haiti FY2010.................... 68
Other Foreign Economic and Humanitarian Assistance.............................................................. 68
Other Domestic Program Funding ............................................................................................. 69
Congressional Action .......................................................................................................... 70
Funds to Prevent Layoffs of Teachers, Law Enforcement Officers and Firefighters .............. 70
Final Congressional Action in the Supplemental on Funds for Teachers ......................... 70
Final Congressional Action on Funds for Law Enforcement Officers ............................. 71
Final Congressional Action on Funds for Firefighters .................................................... 72
Agriculture and Energy Loans and Pell Grants .................................................................... 72
Final Congressional Action in Supplemental on Rural Housing and Agricultural
Loans, and Food Programs ........................................................................................ 73
Final Congressional Action in Supplemental on Department of Energy Loan
Guarantee Program .................................................................................................... 73
Final Congressional Action in Supplemental on Pell Grants181 ....................................... 74
Border Security Request...................................................................................................... 75
Administration Request for Border Security Funds........................................................ 75
Final Congressional Action in Supplemental on Border Security ................................... 75
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Provisions .................................................................................... 76
Final Congressional Action on Oil Spill Programs ............................................................... 77
Mandatory Spending for Veterans’ Benefits, Settling Court Cases, and Oil Spill Response
Activities ............................................................................................................................... 77
Additional Benefits for Veterans Exposed to Agent Orange ................................................. 78
Potential Change in the Estimate ................................................................................... 79
Congressional Research Service
FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Other Programs
Final Congressional Action on New Veterans’ Benefits.................................................. 79
Resolving Black Farmers and American Indian Trust Lands Court Cases............................. 79
Settlement of the Black Farmers Discrimination Case ................................................... 80
Indian Trust Litigation Settlement ................................................................................. 80
Final Congressional Action in Supplemental on Court Cases ......................................... 81
Reducing Medical Costs by Increasing Medicaid Drug Rebates and Improving
Generic Drug Access........................................................................................................ 81
Final Congressional Action in Supplemental on Proposed Changes in Drug
Purchasing ................................................................................................................. 82
Improving Access to Generic Drugs by Preventing Pay-for-Delay Agreements .............. 82
Targeting Waste, Fraud, and Abuse in Selected Programs .............................................. 83
Additional Funds for Coast Guard Response Activities and New Unemployment
Benefit ............................................................................................................................. 84
Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund: Advance of Funds for Federal Response Efforts.............. 85
Final Congressional Action on Oil Spill Trust Fund and Unemployment Benefit............ 85
House Passed H.R. 4899 on March 24, 2010 ....................................................................... 87
Procedures and Debate.................................................................................................. 90
Figures
Figure 1. U.S. Disaster Relief Funding, FY2000-FY2011 Request............................................. 17
Figure 2. Boots on the Ground in Afghanistan and Iraq, 2001-2010 ........................................... 20
Tables
Table 1. Overview of H.R. 4899: FY2010 Supplemental .............................................................5
Table 2. DOD War Funding, FY2001-FY2011 Request ............................................................. 22
Table 3. DOD Functional Categories for War Funding: Afghanistan, FY2009-FY2011 .............. 25
Table 4. Funding for Afghan Security Forces (ASFF), FY2009-FY2011 .................................... 28
Table 5. Department of Defense Bridge & Supplemental Funding, FY2009-FY2011 ................. 32
Table 6. Military Construction for the Afghan War, FY2003-FY2011 ........................................ 34
Table 7. War-Related Foreign Aid and Diplomatic Operations: FY2010 Supplemental............... 41
Table 8. Haiti Supplemental: Relief, Reconstruction and Diplomatic Operations,
FY2009-FY2011 .................................................................................................................... 51
Table 9. Haiti Relief Funding, FY2009-FY2011 ........................................................................ 53
Table 10. Haiti Recovery and Reconstruction Funding, FY2009-FY2011 .................................. 62
Table 11. Diplomatic Operations Funding for Haiti, FY2009-FY2011........................................ 68
Table 12. Foreign Economic and Humanitarian Assistance in FY2010 Supplemental................. 69
Appendixes
Appendix. Congressional Action on H.R. 4899.......................................................................... 87
Congressional Research Service
FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Other Programs
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 93
Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................... 93
Congressional Research Service
FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Other Programs
Most Recent Developments
On July 29, 2010, the President signed the final version of H.R. 4899, P.L. 111-212, which was
passed by the House on July 27 and by the Senate on May 27, 2010. The enacted version of the
bill includes $59.2 billion in spending for war costs, U.S. disaster assistance, Haiti relief and
reconstruction, and new benefits for Vietnam veterans. The House passed this bill under
suspension of the rules by a vote of 308 to 114 after receding from (or withdrawing its support of)
an amended version passed by the House on July 1, 2010, with $81.8 billion in spending.1 With
both houses adopting the same version of the bill, H.R. 4899 was cleared and sent to the
President.
Taking into account $380 million in rescissions of previously appropriated budget authority (BA),
P.L. 111-212 provides $58.8 billion in new BA, compared to the $65.1 billion in new BA
provided in the previous July 1 House version including its rescissions. Although the earlier
House version included $22.1 billion more in domestic spending, that was offset by $12.2 billion
in offsetting rescissions, and $4.5 billion in mandatory savings over 10 years (see Table 1).2
Rescissions and mandatory savings both offset or reduce the amount of new Budget Authority
(BA) required to finance spending. Rescissions cancel previously unobligated appropriated
budget authority (BA), and that BA can then be used to finance new spending. Savings in
mandatory programs reduce the amount needed for new direct spending.
As part of the consideration of H.R. 4899, the House also debated House Concurrent Resolution
301, proposed by Representative Kucinich and Representative Paul, that would require the
President to withdraw all U.S. troops from Pakistan within 30 days of adoption, or no later than
December 31, 2010, if the President determines the earlier date would not be safe. The resolution
was defeated by a vote of 38 to 372.3 Earlier, the House, passed H.Res. 1566, the rule which set
up an hour of debate on H.Con.Res. 301 under the War Powers Act, by a vote of 222 to 196. 4
The Senate sent the House its message of disagreement with the July 1 House amended version of
the bill on July 22, 2010, after failing by 46 to 51, to adopt a cloture vote on the House July 1
version of H.R. 4899, signaling an inability to limit debate, and prevent a filibuster.5 In light of
the Senate’s opposition to the House version of the bill which would have added $22.5 billion to
the Senate version to prevent teacher layoffs, for Pell grants, for agricultural and energy loans,
border security, and to settle the Cobell and Pigford II court cases, the House dropped its support
of this version and adopted the May 27, 2010, Senate version. The House also adopted the Senate
version because of concerns raised by Defense Department officials that the Army would run out
of funding in August unless additional funds were transferred from other DOD accounts.6 The
enacted version of H.R. 4899 adopts the $59.2 billion in the Senate’s version for war funding,
Haiti relief and reconstruction, other foreign aid, and new benefits for Vietnam veterans that were
1
Congressional Record, July 22, 2010, p. S6188-p. S6190.
See version of H.R. 4899 as passed by the House on July 1, 2010.
3
Congressional Record, July 27, 2010, p. H6112, p.H6124.
4
Congressional Record, July 27, 20102, p. H6106 and p. H6112.
5
Congressional Record, July 22, 2010,p. S6190.
6
See testimony by Undersecretary Joseph W. Westphal before the House Armed Services Committee, Transcript,
“Managing the Defense Department in a Time of Tight Budget,” p. 16, July 22, 2010.
2
Congressional Research Service
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FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Other Programs
included in its May 27, 2010, version that passed by a vote of 67 to 28. That version includes
$59.2 billion for wars, Haiti relief, FEMA and other disaster relief, and new VA benefits, but
excludes funds to settle the Pigford II and Cobell court cases requested by the Administration (see
Table 1 and Appendix).
Highlights of Congressional Action
The House and Senate debate on H.R. 4899 revolved around two main themes – whether
additional domestic spending proposals were appropriately considered to be emergencies that
would not require offsets, and whether the Administration’s new war policy in Afghanistan was
likely to succeed. (See Appendix for previous congressional action.)
House July 27, 2010, Debate on H.R. 4899
Funding and War Issues
In introducing the Senate version of H.R. 4899 for House consideration on July 27, 2010,
Representative David Obey, Chair of the House Appropriations Committee (HAC), said that the
House had added funds to the FEMA disaster funding in the original March 24, 2010, version of
the FY2010 Supplemental, first to include war funding, and then to “do something about other
emergencies this year, such as the loss of more than 100,l000 teachers’ jobs because of
devastating State and local budget cuts,” Pell fund shortfalls because more students qualified for
aid, and border security, which were “largely paid for with offsets to other programs,” but these
domestic proposals “fell by the wayside.”7
In stating his opposition to the bill, Representative Obey said that he could not support the war
funding in the bill because the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan were not able to “do
their parts” to support the war, and because Congress had not adopted a proposed House
amendment that would have required Congress to “vote up or down explicitly on whether or not
to continue this policy” after submission of a new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), but
which was not adopted. 8 Nevertheless, Representative Obey believed that the process needed to
go forward.
Representative Lewis, Ranking Minority of the HAC complimented the Senate for “rejecting
billions of dollars of nonemergency spending placed on the backs of our troops,” that urged
enactment of the bill to “support our men and women in uniform, [and] support disaster
assistance for areas of the country in great need.”9
Other members voiced support for particular parts of the bill, including DOD’s war funding and
the additional disability benefits for Vietnam veterans who incur diseases linked to exposure to
Agent Orange. Representative Ike Skelton, Chair of the House Armed Services Committee,
supported the bill while Representative Jim McGovern raised concerns about “corruption and
7
Congressional Record, p. H6062 , July 27, 2010.
8
Congressional Record, p. H6062 , July 27, 2010; H.Rept. 111-522, pp. 59-p.62, and See Congressional Record, p.
D766, July 1, 2010, for consideration of Amendment No. 5.
9
Congressional Record, July 27, 2010, p.H6062.
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FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Other Programs
incompetence in the Afghan Government ... [and] the role of the Pakistani intelligence services,”
highlighted in the documents recently released by Wikileaks. 10 Representative Norm Dicks, Chair
of the HAC-Defense Subcommittee, and Representative Chris Van Hollen cited concerns raised
by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates that funding for the war would run out in August, with the
House due to go on recess.11
Debate on H.Con.Res. 301 Requiring the Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from
Pakistan
As part of the consideration of H.R. 4899, the House voted on H.Res. 1556, which set up an
hour’s debate on H.Con.Res. 301, the Kucinich-Paul resolution invoking the War Powers Act and
requiring the President to withdraw all U.S. troops from Pakistan within 30 days of passage or no
later than December 31, 2010, if the President determined it not to be safe, or earlier if the
President determined it to be safe.
After a debate about the applicability of the War Powers Act, the implications of expanding the
“footprint of our troops” in Pakistan with some 230 U.S. military personnel, and the effectiveness
of some $18.1 billion in U.S. aid since FY2002 in light of Pakistan public opinion polls citing
hostility to the United States, the resolution was defeated by 38 to 372.12
Senate Action on July 22, 2010
On July 22, 2010, the Senate failed to adopt cloture and limit debate on the House July 1 version
of H.R. 4899 by a vote of 46 to 51, suggesting that the Senate would be unable to pass the House
version of the bill. Under the rule adopted, the Senate then sent the House July 1 amended version
back to the House with a message stating their disagreement.13
Final Version of H.R. 4899 and the Administration
Request
The final version of H.R. 4899 appropriates $59.2 billion in spending, $5.0 billion below the
request. The total funding in the final version matches or is close to the Administration’s request
for the following:
•
$5.1 billion for FEMA’s Disaster Assistance Fund;
•
$13.4 billion for Vietnam veterans affected by Agent Orange; and
•
$30.8 billion for the Department of Defense (DOD) war-related funding ($148
million below the request) and $2.1 billion for DOD’s non-war request; and
10
Congressional Record, July 27, 2010, p. H6064.
Ibid., p. H6065 and p. H6067.
12
Congressional Record, July 27, 2010, pp. H6114-p. 6124.
13
Congressional Record, “Daily Digest,” p. D833.
11
Congressional Research Service
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FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Other Programs
•
$2.9 billion approved ($129 million above the request) for Haiti with small
adjustments in individual accounts (see Table 1).
The chief differences in funding between the enacted version and the Administration’s request
were:
•
$3.8 billion in funding for war-related foreign aid vs. $4.5 billion requested, a
decrease of $710 million;
•
Zero vs. the $4.6 billion requested to settle the Cobell and Pigford II court cases;
•
Zero vs. $600 million requested for border security;
•
Zero vs. $139 million requested to reduce backlogs in the U.S. Trademark and
Patent Office;
•
$600 million added by Congress in other foreign aid and humanitarian assistance
for Mexico, Jordan, El Salvador, Vietnam, and Congo that was not requested; and
•
$400 million added by Congress for flood and drought relief.
In the final version, Congress did not include additional domestic funding to prevent teacher
layoffs, provide more Pell grants, fund summer jobs, or provide agricultural and energy grants
funding that was not requested by the Administration, but which was included in an earlier
version of the bill that the House passed on July 1, 2010, and then receded from (withdrew its
support) on July 27, 2010. On July 27, the House adopted the Senate version of the bill that was
passed on May 27, 2010 (see Table 1).
The final version of H.R. 4899 also did not include $600 million for border security, and $129
million to reduce patent backlogs in the Commerce Department that was requested by the
Administration after passage of the Senate bill that was ultimately adopted. On July 28, 2010, the
House passed separate bills with this funding (H.R. 5874 and H.R. 5875) by voice vote, and those
bills went to the Senate.14
War-Related Funding in the FY2010 Supplemental
The FY2010 Supplemental, P.L. 111-212 includes a total of $34.2 billion for the Defense
Department and the State Department for the Afghan and Iraq wars. Of this amount,
•
$31.5 billion is for the Afghan war, including $29.8 billion for DOD and $1.7
billion for State/USAID programs; and
•
$2.7 billion for the Iraq war including $1.0 billion for DOD and $1.7 billion for
State/USAID programs (see Table 5 and Table 7).15
Taking into account funding already provided in DOD and the State Department’s regular
FY2010 appropriations bills, as well as funding for war-related VA medical costs, total FY2010
14
15
Congressional Record, “Daily Digest,” p. D865, July 28, 2010.
These figures exclude $2.0 billion of non-war funding that is within the total for Operation and Maintenance in Table
5.
Congressional Research Service
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FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Other Programs
for the Afghan and Iraq war as of the enactment of the FY2010 supplemental, P.L. 111-212 is
$$169.9 billion. This amount includes:
•
$104.4 billion is for the Afghan war, including $99.3 billion for DOD, $4.7
billion for State/USAID programs, and $471 million for VA/Medical; and
•
$65.5 billion for the Iraq war including $61.1 billion for DOD and $2.9 billion
for State/USAID programs, and $1.5 billion for VA/Medical. 16
These figures do not include some $2.0 billion in non-war funding provided to DOD and $375
million in funding in P.L. 111-212 for foreign aid for Pakistan.
Table 1. Overview of H.R. 4899: FY2010 Supplemental
in billions of dollars
Houseamended
version of
H.R. 4899 as
passed 7-1-10
and receded
from 7-27-10a
P.L. 111-212,
enacted
version of
H.R. 4899 as
passed by the
Senate
5-27-10 and
by the House
7-27-10
FY2010
Enacted
FY2010
Supp
Request
House
version
of H.R.
4899 as
passed
3-24-10
Federal Emergency
Management Agency:
Disaster Relief Fund
1.6
5.1
5.1
5.1
5.1
Replenishes the Disaster
Relief Fund.
Other U.S. Disaster
relief
10.9
0
0
.4
.4
Provides flood and
drought relief including
Community Development
Block grants.
Defense: Afghan and
Iraq wars
129.6
31.0
0
30.8
30.8
Includes $30 billion for
Afghanistan and $1 billion
for Iraq.
Defense: Non-WarRelated
NA
2.1
0
2.5
2.1
Funds baseline fuel
increases, Air Force family
housing utility cost
increases and, Guam
improvements.
State/USAID:
Afghanistan, Iraq, and
Pakistan war-related
aid
5.6
4.5
0
3.8
3.8
Includes $1.7 billion for
Afghanistan, $1.7 billion
for Iraq and $375 million
for Pakistan for foreign aid
and diplomatic operations.
State/USAID/DOD:
Haiti humanitarian
aid and
reconstruction
.6
2.8
0
2.9
2.9
Includes 1.6 billion for
disaster relief, $1.1 billion
for foreign aid activities
and $147 million for
diplomatic operations.
Agency/Purpose
Brief Description
16
See Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4 in CRS Report RL33110, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror
Operations Since 9/11, by (name redacted).
Congressional Research Service
5
FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Other Programs
Houseamended
version of
H.R. 4899 as
passed 7-1-10
and receded
from 7-27-10a
P.L. 111-212,
enacted
version of
H.R. 4899 as
passed by the
Senate
5-27-10 and
by the House
7-27-10
FY2010
Enacted
FY2010
Supp
Request
House
version
of H.R.
4899 as
passed
3-24-10
State/USAID: Other
foreign aid and
humanitarian
assistance
NA
0
0
.6
.6
Provides $592 million for
foreign aid to Mexico,
Jordan, El Salvador,
Vietnam and the Congo,
and humanitarian
assistance.
Education
Department:
Education Job Funds
0
0
0
10.0
0
Would have prevented
layoffs of 100,000 teachers
and other educational
staff.
Education Dept.: Pell
Grants
17.5
0
0
5.0
0
Would have provided
additional post-secondary
school Pell Grants.
Labor Department:
Training and
Employment Services
0
0
0.6
1.0
0
Would have funded Labor
Dept.’s summer Jobs
program.
Dept. of Homeland
Security and Dept. of
Justice: Border
Security
NA
.6
0
.7
0b
Would have provided
primarily additional border
security enforcement
personnel.
Various: Program
Integrity Initiatives
NA
0
0
.5
0
Would have targeted
Medicare and Medicaid
waste, fraud, and abuse.
Agriculture Dept.:
Agricultural and farm
loans and food aid
.6
0
0
.1
c
Would have funded rural
housing, farm loans, and
emergency food aid.
Various: Oil Spill
Recovery Activities
0
.1
0
.2
.1
Provides funds for
inspections, studies and
compensation for
fishermen.
Dept. of Energy:
Innovative
Technology Energy
Loan Guarantee
Program
d
0
0
.2
0
Would have supported
nuclear and alternative
energy loans.
Health and Human
Services and Dept. of
Labor: Mine Safety
NA
0
0
e
e
Funds additional
inspections and mine
safety research.
Commerce Dept.:
Patent Office
NA
.1
0
0
0f
Would have provided
funds to decrease backlogs
offset by additional fees.
Other Programsh
NA
i
i
i
i
Funds various other
programs.
Agency/Purpose
Congressional Research Service
Brief Description
6
FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Other Programs
Houseamended
version of
H.R. 4899 as
passed 7-1-10
and receded
from 7-27-10a
P.L. 111-212,
enacted
version of
H.R. 4899 as
passed by the
Senate
5-27-10 and
by the House
7-27-10
FY2010
Enacted
FY2010
Supp
Request
House
version
of H.R.
4899 as
passed
3-24-10
Total
DISCRETIONARY
SPENDING
167.1
46.3
5.7
63.8
45.8
Total spending
excluding the effect of
rescissions.
Department of
Veterans Affairs:
Compensation and
Pensions
0
13.4
0
13.4
13.4
Provides compensation for
Vietnam veterans likely to
become eligible for new
or additional benefits due
to diseases related to
exposure to Agent
Orange.
Treasury: Settling
Cobell v. Salazar
0
3.4
0
3.4
0
Would have authorized
and paid for recent
settlement of management
and accounting claims for
individual Indian trust
funds and lands.
Agriculture: Settling
Pigford Discrimination
Claims
0
1.2
0
1.2
0
Would have funded recent
court-approved settlement
of discrimination claims by
black farmers.
Oil Spill Recovery
Activities
0
0.2
0
j
j
Provides additional
financing for Coast Guard
response activities also
funded in a separate act;
would have set up
unemployment benefit
program for those affected
by the Gulf Oil spill.
MANDATORY
TOTAL
0
18.1
0
18.0
13.4
TOTAL
RESCISSIONS
0
0
-.6
-12.2
-.4
TOTAL 10-YEAR
MANDATORY
SAVINGSk
0
0
0
-4.5
0
DISCRETIONARY
AND
MANDATORY
SPENDING
TOTAL
167.1
64.3
5.7
81.8
59.2
Agency/Purpose
Congressional Research Service
Brief Description
Government drug cost
savings from increased
Medicaid price rebates
and improved access
to generic drugs.
7
FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Other Programs
Houseamended
version of
H.R. 4899 as
passed 7-1-10
and receded
from 7-27-10a
P.L. 111-212,
enacted
version of
H.R. 4899 as
passed by the
Senate
5-27-10 and
by the House
7-27-10
FY2010
Enacted
FY2010
Supp
Request
House
version
of H.R.
4899 as
passed
3-24-10
DISCRETIONARY
TOTAL WITH
RESCISSIONS
167.1
46.3
5.1
51.7
45.4
Reflects new
Budgetary Authority
(BA) required, that is,
total spending offset by
rescissions.
MANDATORY
TOTAL WITH 10YEAR SAVINGS
0
18.1
0
13.5
13.4
Reflects mandatory BA
and mandatory
savings.
DISCRETIONARY
AND
MANDATORY
WITH
RESCISSIONS
AND
MANDATORY
SAVINGS
167.1
64.4
541
65.1
58.8
Reflects total
discretionary and
mandatory spending
and total rescissions
and 10-year mandatory
savings.
Agency/Purpose
Brief Description
Sources: OMB, “FY2010 War-Related Supplemental;” http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2011/assets/sup.pdf;
OMB, “FY2010 Disaster Relief and Court Case Supplemental;” hereinafter, OMB, “FY2010 Haiti Supplemental,”
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/budget_amendments/amendment_03_24_10.pdf; OMB, “Oil Spill Request;”
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/budget_amendments/supplemental_05_12_10.pdf; OMB Estimate No. 4,
“FY2010 Supplemental Proposals For a General Provision to Allow the Transfer of Funds from the Department of
Defense to the Department of Transportation’s Maritime Administration for Improvements to the Port of Guam; and
for Additional FY2010 Funding to the Legislative Branch for the Capitol Police,” April 5, 2010;
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/budget_amendments/amendment_04_05_10.pdf; OMB, Border Security
Request, 6-22-10; http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/budget_amendments/amendment_06_22_10.pdf. OMB,
“Estimate No. 9, FY2010 Supplemental Proposals in the FY2011 Budget for the Department of Commerce to support
efforts to reduce patent pendency and reform U.S. Patent and Trademark Office operations and ensure continuation
of efforts to administer and oversee grants awarded under the Broadband Technology Opportunity Program, fully
offset from within the Department of Commerce’s Census Bureau,” 7-12-10; H.R. 4899 as passed by the Senate on
May 27, 2010, and H.Rept. 111-188, May 13, 2010; H.R. 4899 as amended by the House on July 1,2010, and receded
from on July 27, 2010, and H.Rept. 111-522 on H.Res. 1500, rule for H.R. 4899; H.R. 4899 as passed by the House
July 27, 2010.
Notes: CRS calculations based on sources above. May not add to total due to rounding.
a.
A motion to recede is a motion to withdraw from its previous position.
b.
House included $129 million in H.R. 5874, offset by additional fees, passed by voice vote, July 28, 2010, and
sent to the Senate.
c.
Final version included $32 million for the Farm Loan Program.
d.
FY2010 enacted included $3 million for this program.
e.
$22 million was provided for mine safety inspections and research.
f.
House passed H.R. 5875 with $701million in spending and $166.5 million in offsets on July 28, 2010; Senate
amended bill with funding of $600 million, fully offset, on August 5, 2010.
g.
The House included these funds in H.R. 5875, fully offset, passed by voice vote, July 28, 2010; passed by the
Senate on July 29th and sent to the President, July 30, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
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FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Other Programs
h.
Includes funds for D.C. Public Defender Service, Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Small Business
Administration loans, Coast Guard acquisition, House of Representatives Payments to widows of deceased
Members, Capitol Police and GAO audits of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act funding.
i.
$16 million was provided for “Other programs in the House March version, $67 million in the July 1, 2010,
version and $20 million in the enacted version.
j.
$27 million was provided in the July 1, 2010, version and $125 million in the final version but this funding
was also included in S. 3473/P.L. 111-191, separate legislation passed on June 5, 2010, so it is not counted
here.
k.
Savings for medical cost initiatives estimated by CBO.
Summary of Congressional Action on H.R. 4899
Congress addressed the Administration’s $64.3 billion request for supplemental spending for
FY2010 in the following actions between March 24, 2010, and July 27, 2010 (see Table 1):
•
The House passed H.R. 4899 by a vote of 239-174 of H.R. 4899 on March 24,
2010 (no House report) with $5.1 billion in spending for the Disaster Relief Fund
in Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and $600 million for the
Department of Labor’s summer jobs program, to be funded by $5.1 billion in new
Budget Authority (BA) and $600 million in offsetting rescissions;
•
The Senate passed H.R. 4899 by a vote of 67 to 28 H.R. 4899 on May 27, 2010
(S.Rept. 111-188) with $59.2 billion in spending, for disaster relief, war funding,
war-related foreign assistance, Haiti relief and reconstruction, additional benefits
for Vietnam veterans exposed to Agent Orange; other disaster relief, other foreign
assistance, and oil spill recovery funding, funded with $58.9 billion in new BA
and $380 million in offsetting rescissions;
•
The House adopted the Senate’s May 25, 2010, version of H.R. 4899 and added
funds for the Education Jobs Fund, Pell Grants, summer youth employment,
funding for the Cobell and Pigford II court cases on July 1, 2010, with a total of
$81.8 billion in spending, funded with $65.1 billion in new BA and $16.7 billion
in rescissions and mandatory savings;
•
The Senate failed to invoke cloture on the House’s July 1, 2010, amended
version, and sent a message of disagreement with that version to the House on
July 22, 2010;
•
The House receded from (withdrew its support of) the July 1, 2010, version of
H.R. 4899 that it had passed, and adopted the Senate May 27 version by a vote of
308-114 (two-thirds of those present required under suspension of the rules) on
July 27, 2010; and
•
The President signed the bill on July 29, 2010, P.L. 111-212.
Overview, Deadlines, and Potential Issues
The Administration requested a total of $64.4 billion in supplemental funding in FY2010 to
deploy more U.S. troops for the Afghan War, replenish Disaster Assistance Funds, support
recovery and foreign aid funds for Haiti in response to the January 2010 earthquake, enhance
Congressional Research Service
9
FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Other Programs
border security, and settle two recently decided court cases for American Indians and black
farmers. Specifically, the FY2010 supplemental requests included:
•
$5.1 billion to replenish the U.S. Disaster Relief Fund administered by the
Federal Emergency Management Agency;
•
$33.0 billion for the Defense Department, primarily to deploy 30,000 more
troops to Afghanistan;
•
$4.5 billion in foreign assistance for Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan;
•
$2.8 billion for Haiti reconstruction and foreign aid in the wake of January’s
earthquake;
•
$13.4 billion to compensate veterans exposed to Agent Orange;
•
$243 million for appropriations-related responses to the Deepwater Horizon oil
spill;
•
$600 million primarily for additional border security personnel; and
•
$3.4 billion to settle land trust claims of American Indians in the long-standing
Cobell case and $1.2 billion to settle the discrimination claims of 70,000 black
farmers in the Pigford II case (see Table 1).
One of the chief issues that arose as the Senate and House considered H.R. 4899 was the effect of
this supplemental spending on the federal deficit. Each version had different amounts of
rescissions to offset discretionary spending—rescissions cancel earlier appropriations and thus
reduce the amount of new Budget Authority (BA) needed—and different amounts of mandatory
savings spending, which offset direct spending.
In the first version of H.R. 4899, passed by the House on March 24, 2010, the House bill included
$600 million in offsets for the $5.7 billion in spending. In the second version, passed by the
Senate on May 27, 2010, the bill included $380 million in offsets to offset the $59.3 billion
recommended in the bill. In the third version of the bill, amended by the House on July 1, 2010,
H.R. 4899 included $12.2 billion in rescissions and $4.5 billion in mandatory savings to offset the
$81.8 billion in proposed spending (see Table 1). The effect on the deficit depends on the net
amount of new BA needed for each version. 17
Congressional rules require that spending fit within totals set for discretionary and mandatory
spending in the annual budget resolution, unless the funds are designated as emergencies.
Although the budget resolution cites criteria for emergency spending, it is up to Congress to
designate spending as emergency. Of the $45.8 billion in discretionary spending in the final
version of H.R. 4899, almost all the spending was designated as emergency, and thus would not
count against the budget caps set in the FY2010 concurrent resolution. If those caps are exceeded,
spending could be subject to a point of order, which would need to be waived for the spending to
be approved (see discussion below).18
17
In many cases, rescissions cancel funding that would expire in the current fiscal year, raising some questions about
whether those monies would actually have been spent. If those appropriations were not rescinded, those funds would
expire and the deficit would decrease by those amounts.
18
See Sec. 3002 in Senate version of H.R. 4899, and Section 102 in House-passed version of H.R. 4899 for emergency
designation; see CBO, “H.R. 4899, Supplemental Appropriations, FY2010, Non-Emergency by Title, Discretionary
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
10
FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Other Programs
Federal budget rules distinguish between two types of federal spending, discretionary spending
(e.g., annual appropriations acts) and direct (or mandatory) (e.g., Medicare) spending. 19 Of the
$64.4 billion in the President’s supplemental request, $46.3 billion is discretionary spending and
$18.1 billion is mandatory or direct spending (see Table 1). The Administration submitted these
requests to Congress in supplemental proposals included as part of the Administration’s FY2011
budget, and in budget amendments submitted on February 12, 2010, March 24, 2010, April 5,
May 12, May 22, and July 12, 2010.20
Many see emergency supplemental appropriations as undermining budgetary discipline because
funding is not subject to annual caps in budget resolutions on overall discretionary spending that
often require trade-offs between different types of spending. Section 403 (f) in S.Con.Res. 13, the
FY2010 budget resolution, defines spending as emergency if it is “essential ... sudden ...
compelling ... unanticipated,” but it is a congressional prerogative to decide where the emergency
designation is appropriate. Supplementals are also perceived as receiving less scrutiny than
regular appropriations. In the current fiscal environment, some Members are concerned about the
impact of this additional spending on the deficit.
Budget Rules and Supplemental Requests21
In dealing with any supplemental appropriations request, Congress may debate whether to
increase spending above the level already appropriated for that year and, in some cases, levels for
subsequent fiscal years. If Congress decides the additional spending is necessary, it must also
decide whether the request warrants increasing the budget deficit or whether to offset the
additional spending by either cutting federal spending or increasing revenues.
(...continued)
Only,” 5/14/10.
19
Discretionary spending is provided in appropriations acts generally on an annual basis. Direct spending, in contrast,
is generally provided (in many cases, on a permanent basis, and in other cases, for a set number of fiscal years) in
authorizing legislation that requires federal payments to individuals or entities, often based on eligibility criteria and
benefit formulas set forth in statute. Some direct spending is provided in appropriations acts but is controlled by the
authorizing statute(s) or provided by legislative language in an appropriations acts, such as legislative language
authorizing a litigation settlement.
20
Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States, FY2011, “Supplemental Proposals,” 2-1-10,
hereinafter OMB, “FY2010 War-Related Supplemental;” http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2011/assets/
sup.pdf; OMB, FY2010 Supplemental, “Estimate No. 2, Request for Department of Homeland Security for Disaster
Relief, for continued response and recovery efforts associated with prior large events, such as Hurricane Katrina and
the Midwest floods; and for general provisions,” February 12, 2010, hereinafter, OMB, “FY2010 Disaster Relief and
Court Case Supplemental;” Request; Office of Management and Budget, “Estimate No. 3, March 24, 2010; FY2010
Emergency Supplemental Proposals in the FY2011 Budget for Costs Associated with Relief and Reconstruction
Support for Haiti following the Earthquake of January 12, 2010, for the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Health
and Human Services, Homeland Security, State, and the Treasury,“ March 24, 2010, hereinafter, OMB, “FY2010 Haiti
Supplemental,” http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/budget_amendments/amendment_03_24_10.pdf; OMB,
Estimate No. 5, “To provide critical funds and authorities for the Departments of Labor, Agriculture, Commerce,
Justice, the Interior, the Environmental Protection Agencies, the Departments of Health and Human Services,
Homeland Security, and the Treasury needed to respond to Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill in the Gulf of Mexico spill as
well as changes to current law to better prepare the nation for any future spills, 5/12/10,” hereinafter, OMB, “Oil Spill
Request;” http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/budget_amendments/supplemental_05_12_10.pdf..
21
Written by William Heniff, Analyst on Congress and the Legislative Process, Government and Finance Division,
707-8646, CRS.
Congressional Research Service
11
FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Other Programs
Congress considers all spending or revenue legislation, including supplemental appropriations
bills, within rules and procedures that are intended to address these policy options. 22 In particular,
Congress considered the FY2010 supplemental appropriations request within the constraints set
by the FY2010 budget resolution (S.Con.Res. 13, H.Rept. 111-89), as well as other budget rules,
such as congressional pay-as-you-go rules and the recently enacted Statutory PAYGO Act of 2010
(P.L. 111-139).
Under these budget rules, Congress could have exempted all or portions of the spending from
these constraints by designating the spending as an emergency (or as being for “overseas
deployments or other activities” in the House).23 Alternatively, under congressional rules, the
applicable points of order could have been waived, or simply not raised during consideration of
the supplemental appropriation measure.
While an emergency designation would exempt spending from these budget rules, the emergency
designation itself could be subject to a point of order. 24 This applicable point of order may be
waived in both houses. In the House, it can be waived by a special rule reported by the House
Rules Committee and agreed to by the House, and in the Senate, by waiver motion, which
requires a three-fifths affirmative vote of Senators (60 votes if there is no more than one vacancy
in the Senate).
Potential Deadlines
Throughout consideration of H.R. 4899 from late March to late July 2010, the Coast Guard, the
Defense Department, the State Department, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the
plaintiffs in the Cobell and Pigford II cases have all cited deadlines for when the supplemental
funding would be needed, although there appears to have been some flexibility in the dates.
Concerns that Funds for Coast Guard Oil Spill Response Activities Could Run
Out in Mid-June
In a June 4, 2010, letter to congressional leaders, Admiral Thad Allen, National Incident
Commander for the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, and Department of Homeland Security Secretary
Janet Napolitano urged Congress to act on the Administration’s proposal to raise the cap on funds
that could be drawn from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund for these response activities. They
stated that “at the current pace of BP/Deepwater Horizon response operations, funding available
22
For an overview of federal budget procedures, see CRS Report 98-721, Introduction to the Federal Budget Process,
by (name redacted); for more detailed information on points of order that apply to budgetary legislation, see CRS Report
97-865, Points of Order in the Congressional Budget Process, by (name redacted); for information on PAYGO rules,
see CRS Report RL33850, The House’s “Pay-As-You-Go” (PAYGO) Rule in the 110th Congress: A Brief Overview, by
(name redacted), CRS Report RL31943,
Budget Enforcement Procedures: Senate Pay-As-You-Go (PAYGO) Rule, by (name
redacted), and CRS Report R41157, The Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010: Summary and Legislative History, by
(name redacted).
23
The emergency and overseas deployments designations are provided for in Sections 403 and 423 of S.Con.Res. 13,
the FY2010 congressional budget resolution, as applicable to the Senate and House, respectively.
24
For additional information on the emergency designation, see CRS Report RS21035, Emergency Spending: Statutory
and Congressional Rules, by (name redacted).
Congressional Research Service
12
FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Other Programs
in the Emergency Fund [from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund] will be insufficient to sustain
Federal response operations within two weeks.” 25
This letter suggested that the Coast Guard could reach the current $150 million annual cap on the
amount that can be drawn from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund by June 18, 2010. If the Coast
Guard were not able to tap other funding sources (such as its regular operating account) to finance
its oil spill response activities, additional monies from the trust fund would not be available until
October 1, 2010. Concerned about the letter, the House and Senate passed S. 3473, P.L. 111-191,
on June 9 and June 20, 2010, raising the $150 annual cap on funds that can be drawn from the
trust to fund oil spill activities to $1 billion specifically for the Deepwater Horizon Spill. The act
allows funds to be withdrawn in $100 million increments and are to be reported to Congress
within seven days.26
Concerns that Defense Department Deadline Could Be Mid-August
The Department of Defense (DOD) received $129.6 billion, 80% of its total FY2010 war funding
in bridge funds included in its regular appropriations acts enacted last December (P.L. 111-118
and P.L. 111-117), almost double the 45% received in the bridge the previous year. In early May,
Secretary of Defense Gates reiterated that DOD would need the additional $33 billion for the
30,000 troops deploying to Afghanistan by Memorial Day, the same date cited in previous years
when the funding available was substantially lower.27
In February testimony, the Secretary of the Army, the department facing the greatest need for war
funding, testified that the timeframe for the Army “in which we can comfortably fund this [war
funding] would be at the end of June, beginning of July.”28 Based on CRS calculations using
DOD data, the Army, Navy and USMC could, if necessary, cover both its regular base activities
and war operations through August 2010 based on war obligations to date and the current request,
and even later if funds were temporarily transferred from other appropriation accounts using
currently available authority. 29
In June 16, 2010, testimony, Secretary of Defense Gates cited his concern about the “lack of
progress on the supplemental,” and urged passage by the July 4 recess, saying
the money that we have in the overseas contingency fund for the Navy and the Marine Corps
will begin to run out in July. We will then turn to O&M money in the base budget for them,
causing us to disrupt other programs. The Army comes along a little behind that ... we begin
to have to do disruptive planning and disruptive actions beginning in July We could reach a
pointing August, in early to mid-August, where we actually could be in a position where the
25
Letter to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Majority Leader Hoyer, Minority Leader Boehner, Senate Majority Leader
Reid and Minority Leader McConnell from Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano and Admiral Thad Allen,
National Incident Commander, June 4, 2010.
26
S. 3473 as passed by the House and the Senate.
27
CQ, Budget Tracker, “Morning Briefing,” May 7, 2010.
28
Senate Armed Services Committee, Transcript, “Fiscal 2011 Army Budget Request,” p. 16, February 23, 2010.
29
CRS calculation based on Operation and Maintenance obligations of services through May 31, 2010, for war funds
and estimates for base funding.
Congressional Research Service
13
FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Other Programs
money that we have available to us in the base budget runs out and we could have a situation
where we are furloughing civilians and where we have active duty military we cannot pay. 30
In mid-July, DOD press spokesman Geoff Morrell said that the Army and Marine Corps could run
out of funding sometime in August.31 In testimony, Under Secretary of the Army, Joseph Westphal
testified that the Army had sufficient funds through mid-August and could last through the recess
if reprogramming requests were approved. 32
Based on the May 31, 2010, DOD Cost of War report, the latest available during final
congressional consideration of H.R. 4899, each of the services had funds still available in their
War Bridge Operation and Maintenance accounts—$1.2 billion for the Marine Corps, $1.5 billion
for the Navy, $15.3 billion for the Army, and $2.2 billion for the Air Force. Assuming that
monthly spending increased by 20% from the April 2010 level as additional troops arrived in
theater, the Army and Marine Corps, the services most heavily taxed by war spending, could rely
on already appropriated war bridge funds through August, or somewhat sooner if spending
increased more rapidly. 33
Since 2004,the services have tapped funding from their base budget that would be needed at the
end of the fiscal year to fund war funding while awaiting passage of supplementals, at which
point funds are restored to the base budget accounts. Using base budget funding to finance or
“cash-flow” war funding temporarily, and assuming the services need all funding requested in the
supplemental, each of the services could have lasted through the end of July and into August and
still longer if funds were transferred from other accounts, which DOD has done in previous years
when necessary.34
FEMA Limited Disaster Assistance to Extend Deadline
To make the Disaster Relief Fund last longer pending consideration of the FY2010 Supplemental,
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) limited the release of funds for claims,
delayed interagency reimbursements, and recovered funds from previous years. Nevertheless, in
May 2010, FEMA estimated that the Disaster Relief Fund would become insolvent the end of
June assuming average monthly spending of $350 million and a balance at the end of April 2010
of $600 million. 35
30
Senate Appropriations Committee, Transcript, “FY2011 Budget Request for the Defense Department,” June 16,
2010,testimony of Secretary Gates, p. 5 and p. 28.
31
DOD, Press Transcript, July 14, 2010.
32
House Armed Services Committee, Transcript, “Managing the Defense Department in a Time of Tight Budgets,”
July 22, 2100, p. 16.
33
CRS calculations from Department of Defense, Cost of War Report as of May 31, 2010, taking into account amounts
in DOD’s base budget, FY2010 enacted bridge in P.L. 111-118, and obligations to date.
34
CRS calculations based on budget authority available in FY2010 for the base budget and from war bridge funding,
assuming average monthly obligations increase 20% above May level. The amounts in the request assume that O&M
funding for the services would be 36% higher in the last four months of the fiscal year than in May 2010; typically the
services spend at a higher rate in the last month of the fiscal year..
35
CQ, Budget Briefing, “A Bit More Breathing Room for FEMA,” May 7, 2010; Statement of James L. Oberstar,
Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management, May 5, 2010; telephone
conversation with a legislative liaison for the Department of Homeland Security, April 28, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
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FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Other Programs
As of June 7, 2010, however, FEMA had a balance of $952 million in the Disaster Relief Fund
(DRF) including recoveries of funds from previous years. These funds may have been available
in part because FEMA earlier adopted a policy to pay only for those projects necessary to meet
immediate needs or respond to life-threatening situations in order to ensure that funds would meet
the most urgent needs. If FEMA spent at its normal rate of about $350 million a month, these
funds would have lasted another three months or through August 2010. As of June 2010, FEMA
had a backlog of $1.4 billion in projects awaiting payment for existing or approved infrastructure
and mitigation projects across the nation but these projects did not meet the policy’s immediate
needs criteria.
Concerns about State Department Disaster Funding Running Low
The State Department reported that in order to respond to future humanitarian crises, its disaster
assistance funding would need to be replenished by June 1, 2010. If not replenished, U.S.
capacity to respond to other emergencies could be curtailed.
Deadline for Funding Court Settlements Uncertain
Congress did not enact the $1.15 billion appropriation by the mid-April 2010 deadline to settle
the Pigford II court case to recompense black farmers. Although the claimants could theoretically
void the settlement, plaintiffs may be unlikely to exercise that right knowing that the settlement is
clearly a priority of both the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the White House.
When Congress passed the final version of H.R. 4899, the latest deadline for Congress to approve
the settlement of the Cobell suit for government mismanagement of funds and lands held in trust
for individual American Indians is August 6, 2010. While deadlines have been extended several
times by mutual agreement, it is not clear whether another extension will be accepted by the
parties or the presiding judge.
Issues: Emergency Designations, Timelines, and Effectiveness
The issues below were raised by Members of Congress during consideration of the FY2010
supplemental:
•
Whether to set a timeline for congressional evaluation of continued spending on
the Afghan War;
•
How to prevent corruption and ensure that additional foreign aid for Afghanistan
and Iraq is effective and well-spent;
•
How to prevent corruption in Haiti relief and reconstruction funding with
additional monitoring; and
•
Whether additional domestic spending was appropriately considered emergency
spending or needed to be offset with rescissions of prior year budget authority to
prevent spending from increasing the deficit.
Congressional Research Service
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FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Other Programs
Federal Emergency Management Agency Request36
The Administration requested $5.1 billion for the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s
(FEMA) Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) because FEMA anticipated that this fund would run out of
funds to meet expected disaster needs and pay unanticipated claims awarded by arbitrators to
state, local, and nonprofits for Public Assistance (PA) recovery projects such as debris removal
and rebuilding public structures (see Table 1).37 According to FEMA, DRF spending averages
about $350 million a month and the current DRF balance is $600 million. Based on these figures,
FEMA projected the account would run out in May or June 2010.
In response to the anticipated shortage, FEMA sent guidance in February 2010 to reduce the rate
of expenditures of the Disaster Relief Fund by limiting payments to arbitration awards and
projects considered immediate needs and delaying payments for other projects, like mitigation
work. Representative James Oberstar noted in a May 5, 2010, hearing that FEMA limited claims
payments, delayed interagency reimbursements, and recovered funds from previous years in order
to stretch its available funds. 38
FY2010 Supplemental Issues
Congress raised questions about why FEMA had not requested disaster relief monies earlier,
which could reflect questions about whether the supplemental was an emergency; and delays in
congressional action on the supplemental raised questions about FEMA’s arguments that the
Disaster Relief Fund was running low. Higher spending levels in the past several years also raise
questions about FEMA’s budgeting practices. Members did not raise concerns about the limited
information FEMA provided about why the Disaster Relief Fund was running low or the likely
scope or timing of compensation payments that may result from arbitration rulings.
Regular vs. Emergency Budgeting for Disasters
In its first budget blueprint, A New Era of Responsibility, the Obama Administration criticized
previous administrations as “irresponsible” for unrealistic budgeting practices.39 In the FY2010
request, the Administration requested $2.0 billion for the DRF. Congress then provided $1.6
billion, $400 million below the request. In FY2011 the Obama Administration is requesting $1.9
billion for the DRF. Compared to previous years, it could be argued that neither request represents
significant increases (see Figure 1)
36
Written by (name redacted), Analyst in American National Government, Government and Finance Division, 7073752, CRS.
37
PA provides for debris removal, emergency protective measures, and the repair, replacement, or restoration of
disaster-damaged, publicly owned facilities and the facilities of certain Private Non-Profit (PNP) organizations.
38
CQ, Budget Briefing, “A Bit More Breathing Room for FEMA,” May 7, 2010; Statement of James L. Oberstar,
Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management, May 5, 2010; telephone
conversation with a legislative liaison for the Department of Homeland Security, April 28, 2010; email received from a
legislative liaison from the Department of Homeland Security.
39
Office of Management and Budget, A New Era of Responsibility: Renewing America’s Promise, Washington, DC,
February 26, 2009, p. 36.
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The rationale for the request and the current moratorium provided by OMB was that 59 disasters
have occurred in 2009 and another 18 have already taken place in 2010.40 By comparison, 74
disasters were declared in 2008 and 63 in 2007. The need for the current supplemental request is
mainly additional arbitration rulings, some related to Hurricane Katrina in 2005.
In recent years, regular requests have been insufficient to meet needs. Higher levels of funding for
the DRF may continue to be necessary to meet the devastation wrought by Gulf Coast hurricanes
in 2005 and 2008 because recovery could take five years or longer. Some might argue that given
the number of disasters and carryover needs from the Gulf hurricanes, Congress might consider
funding the DRF at a higher level to avoid the need for supplemental funding. On the other hand,
others would argue that disasters are inherently unpredictable, and hence qualify as emergency
needs. If this is so, Congress may choose to maintain the status quo if Members prefer waiting for
large-scale disasters to occur before providing disaster funding for recovery.
Figure 1. U.S. Disaster Relief Funding, FY2000-FY2011 Request
(in billions of dollars)
Source: CRS data using Administration budget documents and appropriations statutes.
Notes: CRS calculations based on source above. Figure by Amber Wilhelm, CRS Graphics.
40
Office of Management and Budget, Statement of Administration Policy, Washington, DC, March 24, 2010,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/sap_111/saphr4899h_20100324.pdf.
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Justifying the Current Estimate
Although the replenishment of the DRF may be justified, FEMA provided little information for
Congress to use to evaluate its request. The only example cited by FEMA in its current request is
an arbitration ruling awarding $475 million to the Charity Hospital in New Orleans, which has
been closed since Hurricane Katrina in 2005. To better make the case that there is a need to
supplement the DRF, FEMA could provide more information about how the DRF has been drawn
down for Katrina and other disasters, and the nature and the scope of pending arbitration cases.
Congressional Action on U.S. Disaster Assistance Request
P.L. 111-212, the enacted version of H.R. 4899 provides the $5.1 billion requested for FEMA’s
Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) as did the previous House and Senate versions (see Table 1). The
final version also stipulated that $5 million of the funding be transferred to the Department of
Homeland Security Office of the Inspector General.
In addition, the final version of H.R. 4899 added $396 million in other disaster relief funding for
recent floods in Tennessee and Rhode Island, fishery disasters in Alaska, tornado damages in the
Midwest, and recovery projects related to the 2005 and 2008 Gulf Coast hurricanes (see below).41
In its report, the Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC) voiced dissatisfaction with the
timeliness of information provided by OMB about disaster relief funding requirements since the
supplemental not submitted until February 2010 despite the fact that a shortfall was known in
May 2009. The SAC also noted that the FY2011 request is expected to be $1 billion to $2 billion
short of requirements for previous disasters including Hurricane Katrina.42
Other Disaster Assistance
In addition to the $5.1 billion for the DRF, the enacted version of H.R. 4899 included the
following funding for disaster-relief activities in other agencies.
41
42
•
Housing and Urban Development receives $100 million for community
development funds for long-term recovery, infrastructure repair, and economic
revitalization;
•
Army Corps of Engineers receives $227 million, including $173 million to repair
damage to federal projects, $20 million for flood control and coastal
emergencies, and $18.6 million for recovery projects involving the Mississippi
River and tributaries, and $10 million for drought relief;
•
Commerce Departments’ economic development assistance program receives $49
million;
•
Agriculture Department’s emergency forest restoration receives $18 million
program.
H.Rept. 111-522, p. 1-2 and Congressional Record, July 1, 2010, p. H5362.
S.Rept. 111-188, p. 45-p. 46.
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The final version of H.R. 4899 also stipulated that the federal cost share for recovery from
damages caused by the floods in Rhode Island and Tennessee be no less than 90%.
The final version directs FEMA to create an interagency taskforce, comprised of the Army Corps
of Engineers and OMB, to track, address, and report quarterly to the relevant congressional
committees on resolving community concerns related to FEMA’s updates of flood maps.
War-Related Supplemental Requests
The DOD and State Department/USAID FY2010 supplemental requests provide funding
primarily to deploy the additional 30,000 troops being deployed to Afghanistan and for economic
assistance intended to reinforce military operations. These two elements are considered essential
to the counterinsurgency strategy adopted by the Administration to “clear, build, hold, and
transition” as DOD and the State Department focus on population centers in Afghanistan.43
Department of Defense War Funding Request44
In its FY2011 budget submission, the Obama Administration requested a supplemental
appropriation of $33 billion for FY2010, primarily to deploy the additional 30,000 troops to
Afghanistan announced by President Obama on December 1, 2009. According to the President,
these additional troops are intended to reverse a deteriorating security situation and “break the
Taliban’s momentum” by targeting the insurgency, securing key population centers, and training
more Afghan forces, which, in turn, is expected to ”help create the conditions” to transfer
responsibility to the Afghans beginning in July 2011.45 Frequent evaluations were promised.46
Increases in U.S., NATO Troops, and Afghan Security Forces
According to the DOD, as of June 1, almost 94,000 troops were in Afghanistan, or all but about
4,000 of the 30,000 scheduled increase, with the remainder expected to arrive by September
2010, several months later than originally anticipated by the White House. 47 By this fall, some
43
Secretary of Defense, “Report to Congress in accordance with Section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (P.L. 110-181) as amended and United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National
Security Forces Report to Congress in accordance with section 1231 of the National Defense Authorization for Fiscal
Year 2008 (P.L. 110-181),” hereinafter DOD, “Section 1230 and Section 1231 Report; http://www.defense.gov/pubs/
pdfs/Report_Final_SecDef_04_26_10.pdf.
44
Written by (name redacted), Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade
Division, 707-7627.
45
The White House, “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and
Pakistan,” Delivered at West Point, December 1, 2009; http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-presidentaddress-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan. In the President’s speech, the additional troops were to be
deployed in the first half of the year, but more recently, the Defense Department has estimated that all 30,000 troops
will not be deployed until September 2010.
46
The White House, Press Release, “What’s New in the Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan;”
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Whats-New-in-the-Strategy-for-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan/THE
BRIEFING ROOM, March 27, 2009.
47
Department of Defense,”Boots on the Ground,“ June 1, 2010.
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98,000 troops would be deployed in Afghanistan, trebling the number of U.S. troops from the
number deployed in October 2008 (see Figure 2).
Before leaving office in January 2009, then-President Bush increased the number of troops in
Afghanistan in response to requests from the U.S. Commander in Afghanistan concerned about
the deteriorating security situation, which brought troop levels close to 46,000 in May 2009.48
Figure 2. Boots on the Ground in Afghanistan and Iraq, 2001-2010
Sources: DOD, Boots on the Ground Reports to Congress; CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban
Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by (name redacted); CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and
Security, by (name redacted); CRS Report RL34387, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies, Approaches, Results, and
Issues for Congress, by (name redacted); CRS Report R40156,War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and
Issues for Congress, by (name redacted) and (name redacted).
Note: Figure by Amber Wilhelm, CRS Graphics. Dashed lines indicate CRS estimates starting in June 2010.
After completion of the Obama Afghanistan strategy review in March 2009, the President
approved another increase of about 22,000 troops, bringing the total to 68,000 as of November
2009. The second Obama increase of 30,000 troops now underway will bring the U.S. total to
98,000 by this fall. 49 The FY2011 budget adds another 4,000 support troops in Afghanistan.50
48
DOD, “Boots on the Ground Report,” May 1, 2009 show a total of 45,000.
DOD, “Press Conference with Secretary of Defense Gates,” December 14, 2009; http://www.defenselink.mil/
transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4333. The 21,000 increase was funded in the FY2009 Supplemental and the
(continued...)
49
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After repeated requests from the United States, NATO allies troop levels have grown from 38,370
in December 2009 to 48,000 troops in March 2010. By this fall, this will bring the total number of
foreign troops in Afghanistan to about 148,000.51 By that time, plans call for Afghan security
forces to total 243,000, bringing the total number of foreign and Afghan forces to 389,000.52
DOD Request Shifts Bulk of War Funding to Afghanistan
The Defense Department’s $33 billion requested
•
$30 billion to support the additional troops deploying to Afghanistan;
•
$1 billion more to train Iraq Security Forces; and
•
$2 billion for higher-than-anticipated fuel costs in DOD’s regular (baseline)
budget.
Based on final congressional action, total DOD war spending in FY2010 rises from the $129
billion to $160 billion.53 Of that total, $99 billion would be for Afghanistan and $61 billion for
Iraq, reversing the funding shares for the two wars. The total in FY2010 is about $12 billion more
than in FY2009 and almost the same as the FY2011 request (Table 2).54
Before passage of the FY2010 Supplemental, DOD appropriations enacted for the Afghan War
total $284 billion. With passage of the FY2010 Supplemental, that total rises to $314.1 billion. If
the FY2011 request is approved, that total would rise to $427.7 billion. By comparison, the
enacted total for Iraq is now $705 billion, increasing to $706.2 billion with passage of the
FY2010 Supplemental and to $752 billion if the pending FY2011 request is approved. These
figures do not include war funding for State/USAID and VA Medical.55 (See CRS Report
RL33110, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11,
by (name redacted) for complete war costs.)
(...continued)
FY2010 DOD Appropriations Act (Title IX, P.L. 111-118, enacted December 16, 2009).
50
Then-President Bush increased troops in Afghanistan by about 15,000. For FY2011 increase, see Figure 6-2, DOD,
FY2011 Budget Request: Overview, February 1, 2010; http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2011/
FY2011_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.
51
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF): Facts and Figures, “International Security Assistance Force and
Afghan National Army Strength & Laydown,” December 23, 2009, and February 1, 2010; http://www.nato.int/isaf/
docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf.
52
Figure 6-3, DOD, FY2011 Budget Request: Overview, February 1, 2010; http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/
fy2011/FY2011_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf for request, see Table 1 for final congressional action.
53
This total includes funds enacted in the FY2010 DOD Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-118), and the FY2010 Veterans
and Military Construction Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-117).
54
FY2009 figure is CRS calculation excluding funding in supplementals not related to war, and including $2.4 billion
in funding that DOD tapped from its base budget for war needs; For FY2011 total, see Table 8-5 in DOD, FY2011
Budget Request: Overview, February 1, 2010; http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2011/
FY2011_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.
55
CRS calculations based on DOD data; see Table 2.
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Table 2. DOD War Funding, FY2001-FY2011 Request
(in billions of dollars and shares of total)
Operation
Total:
FY2001FY2008
FY2009
FY2010
Enacted
FY2010
Supplemental
Enacted
FY2010
Total as
enacted
7-27-10
FY2011
Request
IRAQ
Funding
$553.5
$92.0
$59.6
$1.0
$60.6
$45.8
Share of Total
78%
62%
46%
3%
38%
29%
AFGHANISTAN
Funding
$159.2
$56.1
$69.1
$29.8
$98.9
$113.5
Share of Total
22%
38%
54%
97%
62%
71%
TOTAL
Funding
$712.7
$148.2
$128.7
$31.0
$159.5
$159.3
Share of Total
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
Sources: CRS Report RL33110, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, by
(name redacted), and DOD,
FY2011 Budget Request: Overview, February 1, 2010; http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/
fy2011/FY2011_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.
Notes: CRS calculations exclude non-war funding in supplementals, and include funds from DOD’s regular budget
used for war needs.
Timeline for U.S. Military’s Role in Afghanistan
One issue that arose during debate on the FY2010 supplemental was the timeline for evaluating
the effectiveness of President’s Obama’s new strategy (see Appendix). When President Obama
approved the new deployment, he warned that the U.S. commitment was not “open-ended,” and
“will allow us to begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011” after a
review in December 2010.56 Based on testimony and DOD statements, the timeframe could slip
and the U.S. drawdown in July 2011 could be minor. 57
Both Secretary of Defense Gates and Admiral Mullen, Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have
cautioned that the July 2010 date is “a day we start transitioning ... not a date that we’re leaving,”
which would be based on “conditions on the ground.”58 Recently, Secretary Gates said, “I think
56
The White House, “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and
Pakistan,” Delivered at West Point, December 1, 2009; http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-presidentaddress-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan.
57
Testimony of Robert Gates before the Senate Armed Services Committee, “Afghanistan Assessment,” December 2,
2009: “we will have a thorough review in December 2010. If it appears that the strategy’s not working and that we are
not going to be able to transition in 2011, then we will take a hard look at the strategy itself. [The plan would be to]
begin the transition [to Afghan forces] in local areas in July of 2011.... General Petraeus would tell you by six or seven
months later [after the Iraq surge began], he had enough indications of things happening on the ground that he could
tell that this effort was going to work within six months.”
58
Ibid.
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this is a several-year process.”59 In March 2010, General Petraeus, now head of U.S. Central
Command, characterized the initiative as “an 18-month campaign, as we see it,”60 to be evaluated
according to JCS Chair Admiral Mullen “eighteen months from now, ” which would be
September 2011.61
Members of Congress cited concerns about the timing of the initial evaluation, the length of the
new campaign, and the long-term future of U.S. military involvement. During House
consideration of H.R. 4899 on July 1, 2100, three amendments were debated and rejected that
looked at ways to increase congressional participation in decision making about the extent and
nature of the U.S. military commitment. Amendment No. 3 would have cut off all funding for
Afghanistan and was defeated 25 to 376.
Amendment Number 4 would have limited DOD funding to the withdrawal of U.S. troops and
was defeated 100 to 321. Amendment No. 5 required the Administration submit a new National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE), a plan by April 4, 2010, with a timetable for the redeployment of
troops, and required that if the President’s plan is not consistent with beginning an orderly
withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan after July 1,2011 as announced by the President on
December 1, 2009, then Congress would have to approve a joint resolution allowing the
obligation and expenditure of funds. That amendment was defeated 162 to 260 (see Appendix). 62
Concerns about Afghanistan have risen since the first operation using the additional U.S. troops to
re-take Marjah, a town of 85,000, in Helmand Province in southern Afghanistan, launched on
February 13, 2010. While DOD considers Marjah to be free of Taliban, press reports suggest a
mixed picture. The next key test was to be the campaign for Kandahar, a Taliban stronghold and
city of 1 million in southern Afghanistan, a campaign delayed from its planned summer date,
cited by military officials.63
Most of DOD’s Request Is for Afghanistan
Of the $33 billion in DOD’s supplemental request, $30 billion was for Afghanistan, $1 billion to
train Iraqi Security Forces, and $2 billion was to pay for higher fuel prices in DOD’s base budget
(see Table 3). The $30 billion for Afghanistan included
•
$19 billion for “Operations” including Military Personnel and Operation and
Maintenance costs to pay, conduct operations and support deployed soldiers;
59
Department of Defense, Press conference with Secretary of Defense Gates and Chair, Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mullen,
March 25, 2010; http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=4592.
60
Testimony of General Petraeus before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans
Affairs, and Related Agencies Budget Request for the U.S. Central Command,” March 17, 2010.
61
House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, “Hearing on President Obama’s Fiscal 2011 Budget Request fore
the Defense Department,” March 24, 2010, p. 10 of transcript.
62
See H.Rept. 111-522, p. 59-62 for text of amendments; see Congressional Record, “Daily Digest,” p. D766 for votes
on amendments.
63
CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by
(name redacted); DOD, “Transcript, Press conference with Geoff Morrell,” March 30, 2010;
http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=4595; The New York Times,
“Elite U.S. Units Step Up Drive in Kandahar,” April 26, 2010.
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•
$3.3 billion for force protection;
•
$2.6 billion to accelerate the training of Afghan security forces;
•
$2.0 billion to pay for higher fuel costs in DOD’s regular budget;
•
$1.7 billion for reconstitution or reset of war-worn equipment;
•
$1.3 billion for military intelligence;
•
$1.2 billion for national intelligence;
•
$500 million for military construction;
•
$400 million to defeat Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) (see Table 3).
Questions Could Be Raised About Per Troop Costs
Some policy makers have suggested that the DOD cost for deploying 30,000 more troops would
average $1 million per troop (including both the White House and Secretary of Defense Gates). 64
While dividing the $30 billion request for Afghanistan by the 30,000 additional troops yields an
average of $1 million, this does not reflect the different types of activities and programs that
DOD is requesting or the factors affecting the cost of these activities.
To describe its request, DOD developed functional categories ranging from “Operations,” which
includes funding for military personnel and O&M costs, to Coalition Support Funds for
Pakistan’s counter-terror operations. Different categories increase at rates ranging from 123% for
Operations to 35% for Coalition Support. Table 3 shows funding between FY2009 and FY2011
for the Afghan war.
Unlike other categories, the Operations category would be expected to increase at least roughly in
concert with troop levels. DOD estimates differ substantially from CBO’s estimates. DOD’s
reported obligations for the first five months of the fiscal year also suggest that DOD’s estimates
may be somewhat high unless spending increases substantially later in the year.
DOD estimates for the FY2010 cost deploying 30,000 troops to Afghanistan reflect a per troop
cost of $875,000 based on the “Operations” category in the FY2010 Supplemental request and
taking into account changes in funding since enactment (see Table 3). The DOD per troop cost is
not quite double the $467,000 in CBO’s estimate. Both DOD and CBO assume the same average
monthly troop strength which reflects the gradual deployment of troops over the fiscal year, and
CBO’s estimate builds on DOD reported war obligations.65
64
The Los Angeles Times, “Pricing an Afghanistan troop buildup is no simple calculation,” November 23, 2009.
The monthly average increase in troop levels as a result of the surge is assumed to be 16,000 by DOD and 15,000 by
CBO, both averages taking into account the gradual deployment of additional troops during FY2010. For DOD, see
DOD, FY2011 Budget Request: Overview, Figure 6-3, February 1, 2010; http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/
fy2011/FY2011_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf. For CBO, see CBO, “Letter to Congressman Spratt on
Analysis of Scenarios for Funding Iraq and Afghanistan,” January 21, 2010, Table 1; http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/
109xx/doc10995/01-20-CostOfChangesinTroops.pdf; DOD, FY2011 Budget Request: Overview, February 1, 2010,
Figure 6-2; CBO’s estimate assumes that per person costs for operations, transportation, supplies, and services will be
50% higher in Afghanistan than in Iraq based on DOD data; http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2011/
FY2011_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf. This comparison is based on “Adjusted Operations” figures that
exclude $5 billion in the FY2010 Supp. Request that is intended to restore funds originally allocated to O&M that were
(continued...)
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Table 3. DOD Functional Categories for War Funding: Afghanistan, FY2009-FY2011
(in billions of dollars)
FY2010
with
Request
FY2010
Total vs.
FY2009
FY2011
Cumulative
Change,
FY2011 vs.
FY2009
130%
62.7
163%
FY2009
Requesta
FY2010
Enacted
FY2010
Supp.
Request
Operations Request
23.9
36.0
19.0
55.0
Operations Adjustedb
24.6
41.0
14.0
55.0
123%
62.7
155%
Overseas Contingency Operations
Fund (OCOTF)b
0
5.0
0
5.0
NA
[.4]
NA
Force Protection
4.7
7.8
3.3
11.1
135%
10.5
122%
Improvised Explosive Device
(IED)Defeat Fund
0.7
0.9
0.4
1.3
78%
2.7
266%
Military Intelligence Program
1.9
3.7
1.3
5.0
156%
6.1
216%
Afghan National Security Forces
5.6
6.6
2.6
9.2
63%
11.6
107%
Pakistan Counterinsurgency
Capability
0.4
0
0
0
-100%
0
-100%
Coalition Support
1.4
1.8
0
1.8
35%
2.0
45%
Commanders Emergency
Response Program (CERP)
0.7
1.0
0
1.0
39%
1.1
53%
Military Construction
0.9
1.4
0.5
1.9
117%
1.2
37%
Army Temporary End Strength
0
0.4
0
0.4
NA
1.1
NA
Navy Individual Augmentees
0
0.1
0
0.1
NA
0.2
NA
Subtotal: Ongoing Operationsc
41.0
69.7
27.1
91.8
124%
99.2
142%
Reconstitution/Reset
6.6
7.7
1.7
9.4
41%
11.2
68%
Total War-Related
47.6
72.4
28.8
96.2
102%
110.3
132%
Baseline Fuel/Add'l Requestsd
0
0
2.0
2.0
NA
0
NA
Non-DOD Classified
NR
NR
1.2
NR
NA
NR
NA
Subtotal Additional Requests
NA
NA
3.2
NA
NA
NA
NA
TOTAL DOD REQUESTc
47.6
69.2
32.0
96.2
102%
110.3
132%
By DOD Functional Category
Additional Requests
Source: : DOD, Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Request, Summary Justification, May 2009, Table 5-11; Additional DOD
tables provided to CRS, March 2010.
Notes: NR = Not reported; NA = Not applicable.
a.
FY2009 figures reflect DOD’s FY2010 Summary Justification, and adjustment to add $2.4 billion that DOD
used to cover war costs that came from DOD baseline accounts.
b.
The “Operations Adjusted” figure moves $5 billion requested in the FY2010 Supplemental Request to
FY2010 Enacted to reflect the fact that DOD used $5 billion requested for operations and moved by
(...continued)
used instead to purchase additional Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles, as permitted P.L. 111-118, the FY2010
DOD Appropriations Act.
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Congress to the Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund (OCOTF) to purchase Mine Resistant
Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles as permitted by law (see OCOTF in P.L. 111-118).
c.
Total reflects amount requested for “Operations,” not amount allocated in the adjusted figure.
d.
Includes $2.0 billion for higher prices for baseline budget fuel.
DOD would argue that operations costs in the FY2010 supplemental request are particularly high
because the new troops will be deploying primarily to southern Afghanistan where the United
States has had few troops, requiring DOD to set up, expand, and operate many more facilities. It
is not clear, however, whether these factors are sufficient to account for the difference.
In 2009, citing concerns about whether DOD could “accurately budget” for the Afghan and Iraq
wars in light of significant changes in military operations, the FY2010 DOD Appropriations Act
transferred $5 billion of DOD’s request for Operation and Maintenance funding to the Overseas
Contingency Operations Transfer Fund (OCOTF) to be held aside until DOD notified
congressional defense committees of where the funds were needed. 66 Similar concerns may be
raised about DOD’s FY2010 request for all of the reasons above. 67
Another indicator that DOD’s estimates may be high is the fact that obligations reported in the
first five months of FY2010 for operational costs are about 22% of the total amount that DOD has
requested assuming the FY2010 supplemental is enacted. To use all these funds, monthly
spending would need to more than double in the next seven months, suggesting that DOD
estimates—developed last fall—may be somewhat high.68 Although obligations are typically
lower in the first few months of the fiscal year and only some of the 30,000 troops were incountry, the rate of spending still appears to be lower than would be expected.
Funds to Accelerate Training Afghan Security Forces
To accelerate the training and expand Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), and hence be able to
reduce the U.S. role, DOD requested an additional $2.6 billion. This request was approved
bringing total FY2010 ASFF funding to $9.2 billion, an increase of 63% (see Table 3).
Concerns about this request included
•
whether DOD needs all the additional funds requested in FY2010 to meet current
plans in light of current spending rates.
•
whether the ramp-up in DOD’s plan is achievable and whether there is sufficient
oversight given persistent training problems, recent contracting disputes, and
possible shortages in trainers.
66
House Appropriations Committee, H.Rept. 111-230, p. 329; the enacted version endorsed this House action.
Congressional Quarterly,“Extra War Funding Is Anticipated, But Lawmakers Are Not in Any Rush,” April 20, 2010.
68
CRS average strength calculation is based on DOD’s Boots on the Ground Report and Cost of War Reports.
Like DOD’s Operations category, CRS adjusted reported obligations for O&M and Military personnel to exclude the
following categories that are not related to changes in troop strength: coalition support, Commanders Emergency
Response Program (CERP), depot maintenance, and body armor. DOD’s Operations category, with a somewhat lower
per troop cost, may exclude additional O&M costs that CRS cannot capture from the Cost of War Reports. O&M funds
are only available for one year and so would lapse if not used by September 30, 2010.
67
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Relating DOD’s Plan to Its Funding Request
Under the new plan, the Afghan Security forces would reach a total of 243,000 by October
2010—higher levels to be achieved over a year earlier—and 305,600 by FY2011. The Afghan
Army would grow from 97,000 in November 2009 to 134,000 in October 2010 and 171,000 in
October 2011, a 76% increase in two years. The Afghan Police would grow from 93,800 in
November 2009 to 109,000 this October and to 134,000 in October 2011, a 43% increase over
two years.69 In January 2010, NATO partners endorsed these increases.70
It is not clear whether DOD’s FY2010 supplemental request is necessary to meet these levels or
entails some forward-financing or requirements—providing funds before they are needed. DOD
states that the additional $2.6 billion is necessary to “sustain the growth” of the Afghan Army “on
a glide slope that exceeds 134,000,” to pay Afghan Army soldiers more, and provide additional
infrastructure and equipment. 71 The same question can be raised about DOD’s FY2011 request.72
69
For prior plan, see DOD, Fiscal Year 2010: Summary Justification, May 2009, pp. 4-33-4-34;
http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2010/fy2010_SSJ.pdf. For current plan, see DOD, FY2011 Budget
Request:Overview, February 1, 2010, p. 6-7 to 6-8; http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2011/
FY2011_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.
70
DOD, “Section 1230 and Section 1231 Report,” p. 6; http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/
Report_Final_SecDef_04_26_10.pdf.
71
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense Budget, Fiscal Year (FY) 2010, “Justification for FY
2010 Supplemental Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), p. 4, p.8, p.25, and passim, February 2010;
http://asafm.army.mil/Documents/OfficeDocuments/Budget/BudgetMaterials/FY11/OCO//asff-sup.pdf.
72
DOD’s additional $11.6 billion is “to procure long-lead items in fiscal year 2011 in order to remain on a growth glide
slope for a force beyond 171,600 and 134,000;” see Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense Budget
Fiscal Year (FY) 2011, “Justification for FY 2011 Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF); http://asafm.army.mil/
Documents/OfficeDocuments/Budget/BudgetMaterials/FY11/OCO//asff.pdf.
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Table 4. Funding for Afghan Security Forces (ASFF), FY2009-FY2011
(in billions of dollars)
passed
3-24-10
Houseamended
version
of 4899
as passed
7-1-10
and
receded
from
7-27-10
Enacted
version
of H.R.
4899 as
passed
by the
Senate
5-27-10
and by
the
House
7-27-10c
FY2010
Total as
Enacted
(Bridge
and
Supp)
Pending
FY2011
Request
Pending
Requests:
FY2010
Supp &
FY2011
Request
House
version
of H.R.
4899 as
FY2009
Bridge
& Suppa
FY2010
Enacted
Bridgeb
FY2010
Supp.
Request
Afghan
Police
1.5
2.5
1.1
0
1.1
1.1
3.6
4.1
5.2
Afghan
Army
4.0
4.0
1.5
0
1.5
1.5
5.6
7.5
9.0
Related
0.1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.1
0.1
TOTAL
ASFF
5.6
6.6
2.6
0
2.6
2.6
9.2
11.6
14.2
Category
Sources: Department of Defense Budget, Fiscal Year (FY) 2011, Justification for FY 2010 Supplemental, Afghanistan
Security Forces Fund (ISFF), February 2010, p.2; http://asafm.army.mil/Documents/OfficeDocuments/Budget/
BudgetMaterials/FY11/OCO//asff.pdf; unnumbered House Appropriations Committee Majority bill and draft
report, 5-26-10.
a.
FY2009 Bridge is P.L.110-252; FY2009 Supplemental is P.L. 110-32.
b.
P.L.111-1117 and P.L. 111-118.
c.
P.L. 111-212.
Altogether, Congress has appropriated $25.5 billion for the Afghan Security Forces thus far.73 The
pending requests for FY2010 and FY2011 would provide another $14.2 billion and bring the total
through FY2011 to $39.8 billion (see Table 4). DOD has not provided an estimate of the ultimate
cost or number of years that the United States would need to support Afghan Security forces.
While General Gary McChrystal (ret.), former U.S. NATO Commander in Afghanistan, had
proposed doubling the Afghan Army and Police from the current goal of 243,000 to 400,000,
General Mullen characterized this as “an aspirational goal out several years from now,” that has
not been endorsed by the Obama Administration.74
Problems in Training Afghan Security Forces
While DOD has responsibility to train the Afghan Army, DOD and the State Department jointly
manage training of the Afghan police. The training of Afghan Security forces is actually carried
out by U.S. military personnel, NATO coalition teams, and private contractors
73
CRS Report R40699, Afghanistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance, by (name redacted).
CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by (name redacted), p.
46; House Armed Services Committee, Transcript, “Afghanistan Assessment,” p. 18, December 3, 2009.
74
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DOD and the State Department have experienced a myriad of problems in carrying out this
training. For the Afghan Army, problems include attrition rates of about 20%, deficiencies in
leadership, frequent absenteeism that can reduce units to 50% of their strength, limited logistical
capabilities, and questionable behavior. For the police, training has been hampered by illiteracy,
corruption, and the targeting and killing of police recruits and police by insurgents.75
Hearings in the spring of 2010 on Afghan police training cited the following problems, which
have also been identified in GAO, Special Inspector General Reports, audit reports by the State
and Defense Departments, and press articles:
•
Difficulties in coordinating DOD, State Department, and NATO coalition
training;
•
Persistent problems in relying on private contractors including poor performance
and bad behavior, unauthorized use of firearms and inadequate vetting, and
shortages of contractor personnel; and
•
Lack of sufficient personnel to manage contracts and insufficient contract
oversight including invalid invoices as well as inadequate performance. 76
Although DOD has sent additional trainers, and requested more from NATO allies, there still are
reported shortages, which could increase reliance on contractors and raise more concerns among
Members. Senator Levin cited concerns about a shortfall in trainers for the Afghan army and
police, a shortfall acknowledged in DOD’s April 1, 2010, Afghan Section 1230 Metrics report,
which noted that 44% of the 4,083 trainers required are currently assigned. 77
To gauge whether sufficient trainers are available and whether the current ramp-up is realistic,
Members may want to know
•
How many trainers are needed for initial and follow-on training to meet the
higher targets funded in the FY2010 supplemental request for Afghanistan?
•
How is that requirement to be met in terms of the number of U.S. military
personnel, coalition partner teams, and contractor personnel?
•
How many of those trainers are currently in-country, scheduled to arrive, pledged
but not yet available, or still to be hired?
75
Ibid. and p. 47-p. 48; GAO, Afghanistan Security: U.S. Programs to Further Reform Ministry of Interior and
National Police Challenged by Lack of Military Personnel and Afghan Cooperation, GAO-09-280, March 2009;
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09280.pdf; Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan, Quarterly Report,
January 2010; http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/jan2010/pdf/SIGAR_Jan2010.pdf.
76
Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight, “Hearing on
Contracts for Afghan National Police Training,” Transcript, April 15, 2010; statements and video of hearing at
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=6ad2b464-2877-4107-9159da85dc461030; Senate Armed Services Committee, “Contracting in a counterinsurgency: an examination of the
Blackwater-Paravant contract and the need for oversight,” February 24, 2010; http://armed-services.senate.gov/
e_witnesslist.cfm?id=4419.
77
Congressional Quarterly, “Levin Pushes Back Against Veto Threat on F-35 Engine, Transport Plane,” by Eugene
Mulero, February 2, 2010; Secretary of Defense, “Report to Congress in accordance with section 1230 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (P.L. 110-181) as amended and United States Plan for Sustaining the
Afghanistan National Security Forces Report to Congress in accordance with section 1231 of the National Defense
Authorization At for Fiscal Year 2008 (P.L. 110-181),” hereinafter DOD, “Section 230 and Section 1231 Report;
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Report_Final_SecDef_04_26_10.pdf.
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•
How would DOD’s funding change if these personnel are not available as
anticipated?
These shortfalls could hamper the ramp-up.
The plan to speed up training of the Afghan police could also have been affected by a sustained
bid-protest, which could have delayed contract award, but Congress included a provision
allowing the Secretary of State to continue to rely on a previously awarded contract.78 Earlier,
when asked to describe DOD’s plan for providing Afghan police training because there was no
longer a contract in effect, DOD Assistant Secretary David Sedney stated that “We don’t have a
final answer for you on that,” and suggested that DOD intended to do a full and open
competition, which would have taken more time and delay training, and reduced the funding
needed in FY2010.79
FY2010 Spending Rates
Based on DOD’s May 31, 2010, Cost of War obligation reports, DOD still has available almost
$3.6 billion in funding appropriated in FY2009 and FY2010. In the first eight months of FY2010,
DOD obligated funds in these accounts at a rate of about $540 million a month, suggesting that
DOD already had an additional six months available for the rest of FY2010 even without the
additional $2.6 billion requested in the supplemental. 80
Whether Some of DOD’s Request Could Have Been Funded in Regular FY2011
Bill
As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan continue, some Members have raised concerns about whether
emergency supplementals for war are still justified, or whether war spending should be included
in regular appropriations acts. DOD’s original request for FY2010 was enacted as Title IX in the
FY2010 DOD Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-118).
Because the February 2009 budget submission of FY2010 war funding preceded the
Administration’s decision in December 2009 to deploy 30,000 more troops, some would argue
that an emergency designation for the FY2010 supplemental request is appropriate. Section 403
(f) in S.Con.Res. 13 defines spending as emergency if it is “essential ... sudden ... compelling ...
unanticipated,” but it is a congressional prerogative to decide where the emergency designation is
appropriate. Some of DOD’s request, however, including the $1 billion for training in the Iraqi
Security Forces Fund (ISFF), the $2 billion to offset fuel increases, and the $1.7 billion for reset
or replacement of war-worn equipment is less clearly related to the new deployments, and some
could argue should be considered as part of DOD’s regular FY2011 appropriation request.
With the turnover of responsibility for security to the Iraqi government, and the rise in oil prices
in 2008, Congress has become less willing to pay for Iraqi security forces. DOD argued that the
78
DynCorp protested being excluded from bidding on the contract; see GAO, “Matter of: DynCorp International LLC;
File: B-402349; Date: March 15, 2010;” http://www.gao.gov/decisions/bidpro/402349.pdf. See Section 1004 (g) (1) of
H.R. 4899 as passed by the House and the Senate.
79
See Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight, “Hearing on
Contracts for Afghan National Police Training,” Transcript, April 15, 2010, p. 18.
80
CRS calculations based on DOD, “Cost of War Report,” September 30, 2009 and May 31, 2010.
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$1 billion for the ISFF is necessary to complete and sustain modernization efforts underway, and
ensure that Iraq can provide for its security particularly when faced with lower revenues as oil
prices have fallen. 81 While these are important policy considerations, its emergency designation
could be challenged.
Some may also argue that providing $2 billion to cover higher than expected fuel costs in DOD’s
base budget could be covered in its base budget. Typically, DOD has financed unanticipated
increases in fuel prices by using cash resources in the Working Capital Funds, which provide oil
to the services, or by transferring funds from less urgent needs.82 DOD presumably would argue
that these actions would be difficult so an infusion of budget authority is needed.
Another request that could be considered more loosely tied to the additional 30,000 troops is the
$1.7 billion for reset, to replace war-worn equipment, particularly losses. Some might argue that
the effect of the additional combat operations on equipment in Afghanistan is likely to be gradual
particularly with the phasing-in of troops over the course of the year making it particularly
difficult to predict the need to replace war-worn equipment. Others would argue that replacement
needs from the additional deployment of troops can be estimated based on past experience. As in
the case of the ASFF, DOD also has a substantial backlog of war-related procurement that
remains to be spent.
Final Congressional Action on the Defense Request
The enacted version of H.R. 4899 provided DOD with $32.9 billion, $148 million less than the
DOD request. This includes adjustments in particular accounts for funding in excess of
requirements, fuel pricing changes, and combat losses including:
•
$108 million decrease to military personnel for excess requirements;
•
$436 million decrease to operation and maintenance reflecting rejection of
DOD‘s request for $350 million in the Overseas Contingency Operations Fund
for unspecified requirements, and rejection of funding for contingency
construction projects using an authority designed for unanticipated requirements
rather than regular military construction funding;
•
$400 million cut rejecting a DOD proposal to fund two Army force protection
programs in the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Fund; and
•
$512 million increase to procurement accounts for additional combat losses not
known at the time of the request.83
These adjustments were included in the Senate May 27, 2010, version of H.R. 4899, which was
ultimately adopted by the House and enacted. Both the House and Senate versions approve the
amounts requested to train Afghan and Iraq security forces (see Table 5).84
81
Department of Defense Budget, Fiscal Year (FY) 2010, Justification for FY 2010 Supplemental, Iraq Security Forces
Fund (ISFF), February 2010.
82
The Working Capital Funds are set up to include cash reserves to cover unanticipated price changes, with reserves
replenished by charging service customers higher prices the following year.
83
See Chapter 3 in S.Rept. 111-188 on H.R. 4899 as passed by the Senate May 25, 2010, and by the House July 25,
2010.
84
See S.Rept. 111-188, p. 7- p.39; H.R. 4899 as passed by the Senate 5-27-10 and by the House, 7-27-10.
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The final version also includes a requirement that congressional intelligence committees be
provided assessments of threats from Guantanamo detainees, but dropped a provision in an earlier
House version that allocated $300 million for the Office of Economic Adjustment to deal with
base closure related transportation improvements.
Table 5. Department of Defense Bridge & Supplemental Funding, FY2009-FY2011
in billions of dollars
House
version
of
Title/Service/Category
FY2009
Bridge
&
Suppa
FY2010
Enacted
Bridgeb
FY2010
Supp.
Request
H.R.
4899
as
passed
3-24-10
Houseamended
version
of 4899
as passed
7-1-10
and
receded
from
7-27-10
Final
version
of H.R.
4899 as
passed
by the
Senate
5-27-10
and by
the
House
7-27-10c
FY2010
Total as
Enacted
(Bridge
and
Supp)
Pending
FY2011
Request
AFGHANISTAN
Military Personnel
7.2
6.3
1.9
0
1.8
1.8
8.1
9.4
Operation and Maintenance
27.2
39.4
20.8
0
20.3
20.3
59.7
69.9
Special Funds
6.7
7.5
3.0
0
3.6
3.6
10.1
14.3
Procurement
12.5
13.7
4.4
0
5.0
5.0
18.6
16.7
Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation (RDT&E)
0.8
0.2
0.3
0
0.3
0.3
0.5
0.3
Revolving and Management Funds
0.2
0.2
1.0
0
1.1
1.1
1.3
0.3
Other Department of Defense
Programs
0.5
0.9
0.1
0
0.1
0.1
1.0
1.5
Military Construction
0.8
1.4
0.5
0
0.6
0.6
2.0
1.3
Total, Department of Defense
56.1
69.5
32.0
0
31.9
31.9
101.4
113.5
IRAQ
Military Personnel
11.0
8.7
0.0
0
0
0
8.7
5.9
Operation and Maintenance
55.0
40.1
0.0
0
0
0
40.1
31.7
Special Funds
3.4
0.9
1.0
0
1.0
1.0
1.9
2.6
Procurement
19.5
9.4
0.0
0
0
0
9.4
4.7
Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation (RDT&E)
0.5
0.0
0.0
0
0
0
0.0
0.3
Revolving and Management Funds
0.7
0.2
0.0
0
0
0
0.2
0.2
Other Department of Defense
Programs
1.6
0.7
0.0
0
0
0
0.7
0.4
Military Construction
0.1
0.0
0.0
0
0
0
0.0
0.0
General Provisions
0.3
0.0
0.0
0
0
0
0.0
0.0
Total, Department of Defense
92.0
60.1
1.0
0.0
1.0
1.0
61.1
45.8
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House
version
of
Title/Service/Category
FY2009
Bridge
&
Suppa
FY2010
Enacted
Bridgeb
FY2010
Supp.
Request
H.R.
4899
as
passed
3-24-10
Houseamended
version
of 4899
as passed
7-1-10
and
receded
from
7-27-10
Final
version
of H.R.
4899 as
passed
by the
Senate
5-27-10
and by
the
House
7-27-10c
FY2010
Total as
Enacted
(Bridge
and
Supp)
Pending
FY2011
Request
AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ
Military Personnel
18.2
15.0
1.9
0.0
1.8
1.8
16.8
15.3
Operation and Maintenance
82.2
79.5
20.8
0.0
20.3
20.3
99.9
101.6
Special Funds
10.1
8.3
4.0
0.0
3.6
3.6
11.9
16.9
Procurement
32.0
23.1
4.4
0.0
5.0
5.0
28.0
21.4
Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation (RDT&E)
1.3
0.3
0.3
0.0
0.3
0.3
0.5
0.6
Revolving and Management Funds
0.9
0.4
1.0
0.0
1.1
1.1
1.4
0.5
Other Department of Defense
Programs
2.1
1.6
0.1
0.0
0.1
0.1
1.7
1.9
Military Construction
0.9
1.4
0.5
0.0
0.7
0.7
2.0
1.3
Total, Department of Defense
148.2
129.6
33.0
0.0
32.9
32.9
162.5
159.3
Sources: Department of Defense Budget, Fiscal Year (FY) 2011, Justification for FY 2010 Supplemental, Afghanistan
Security Forces Fund (ISFF), February 2010, p.2; http://asafm.army.mil/Documents/OfficeDocuments/Budget/
BudgetMaterials/FY11/OCO//asff.pdf; H.R. 4899 as passed by the Senate and S. Rept. 111-188; unnumbered
House Appropriations Committee Majority bill and draft report, 5-26-10.
Notes: Includes $2.0 billion for higher base fuel prices,$50 million for Guam improvements, and $8 million for
Air Force Family Housing in request and final version, and $2.5 billion in House-amended July version with these
pieces, plus BRAC funding, that are non-war costs.
a.
FY2009 Bridge is P.L.110-252; FY2009 Supplemental is P.L. 110-32.
b.
P.L.111-117 and P.L. 111-118.
c.
P.L. 111-212.
More Spending for Bases in Afghanistan Raises Questions of
Permanency and Execution85
The Administration requested a total of $529 million for military construction in its supplemental
request including an additional $521 million for military construction in Afghanistan and a non
war-related request of $8 million to pay higher utilities bills for Air Force family housing.
86
Adding the Afghanistan funding to the FY2010 enacted amount would bring the FY2010 total
85
Written by (name redacted), Specialist in National Defense, 707-4996, and (name redacted), Specialist in U.S. Defense
Policy and Budget, 707-7627, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division.
86
OMB, Budget of the United States, FY2011, “Supplemental Proposals,” pp.1359-1360, February 1, 2010;
(continued...)
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to $1.9 billion for war-related construction—double the FY2009 level—raising questions about
whether DOD is building facilities to support the temporary stationing of warfighting troops or
creating permanent bases in Afghanistan (see Table 6). In recent statutory language, Congress
permitted spending for a “long-term presence” but prohibited spending for “permanent
stationing” of U.S. troops in Afghanistan (see “War-Related Military Construction Provisions”).
In light of current spending rates for military construction in Afghanistan, it is also not clear how
urgently the current funds are needed.
DOD’s $521 million request would create and expand basic infrastructure at various locations in
Afghanistan including roads, runways, quarters, and other facilities to support the deployment of
30,000 additional U.S. troops. The justification for the request stated that the construction “will
expand airfield capacity for increased airlift and combat operations, increase logistics capacity at
key locations, and provide the minimum infrastructure necessary.... ”87
The supplemental request was split roughly evenly between Army and Air Force construction.
Army projects are focused in the southern provinces of Helmand, Nimruz, and Kandahar, the area
of most new military operations, and Balkh and Kunduz provinces in the north, where
Afghanistan borders the three former Soviet republics of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and
Tajikistan. Air Force construction is planned for Nimruz province in the south, Balkh province in
the north, and Herand province in the west of the country in support of airlift and special
operations forces.
Table 6. Military Construction for the Afghan War, FY2003-FY2011
(in billions of dollars)
FY2009
Enacteda
FY2010
Enactedb
FY2010
Supp
Request
as
passed
3-24-10
Houseamended
version
of 4899
as passed
7-1-10
and
receded
from
7-27-10
Military
Construction
0.9
1.4
0.5
0
.7
.7
1.9
1.3
5.4
O&MFunded
Construction
0.4
TBDd
0
0
0
0
TBDd
0
0.5
TOTAL
1.3
1.4
0.5
0
.7
.7
1.9
1.3
5.9
House
version
of
H.R.
4899
Final
version of
H.R. 4899
as passed
by the
Senate
5-27-10
and by the
House 727-10c
FY2010
Total as
enacted
(regular
and
supp)
FY2011
Request
Total
(...continued)
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2011/assets/sup.pdf. For Air Force request, see Department of the Air Force,
Military Construction Program, Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 Overseas Contingency Operations Supplemental Request,
February 2010, pg. 6. Department of the Air Force, Military Construction Program, Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 Overseas
Contingency Operations Supplemental Request, February 2010, pg. 6. http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/budget/pbfy10.asp.
87
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Request: Overview, Department of
Defense, Washington, DC, February 2010, pp. 6-8.
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Sources: Department of Defense budget justification materials (various years) and briefing to Senate
Appropriations Committee staff.
a.
FY2009 Bridge is P.L.110-252; FY2009 Supplemental is P.L. 110-32.
b.
P.L.111-1117 and P.L. 111-118.
c.
P.L. 111-212.
d.
DOD can use up to $500 million in previously appropriated O&M funds for military construction for
contingency operations in Central Command according to Sec. 2806, P.L. 111-84, the FY2010 National
Defense Authorization Act (see “War-Related Military Construction Provisions”).
Army construction included waste and waste water management systems, fuel storage and
distribution facilities, utilities infrastructure, gravel roads, and a command and control
headquarters at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Tombstone near Lashkar Gah in Helmand in the
south. Projects also include perimeter security facilities and a helicopter apron at Kunduz and
Mazar e Sharif in the country’s extreme north.
Air Force construction included a runway and associated apron at FOB Delaram, located in the
west approximately halfway between Kandahar and the Iranian border, a Special Operations
helicopter apron at FOB Dwyer (in southern Helmand province near the town of Garmsir),
helicopter and airlift aprons at Mazar e Sharif in the north, and aircraft aprons and fuel and
munitions storage at Shindad Airfield in the west.
A fundamental issue for Congress, expressed in legislation over a number of years, is whether
spending on construction signals a long-term, indefinite U.S. troop commitment to Afghanistan.
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FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Other Programs
War-Related Military Construction Provisions
Prohibitions on Establishing Permanent Bases in Afghanistan [italics added]
FY2009 (Sec. 315, P.L. 110-32,)
The FY2009 Supplemental Appropriation Act states “None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available by
this or any other Act shall be obligated or expended by the United States Government for the purpose of establishing
any military installation or base for the purpose of providing for the permanent stationing of United States Armed
Forces in Afghanistan.
FY2010 (Secs. 1237 and 2806, P.L. 111-84)
The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) bars any defense funds from being “obligated or expended by the
United States Government to establish any military installation or base for the purpose of providing for the permanent
stationing of United States Armed Forces in Afghanistan
Using Operation and Maintenance Funds for Urgent, Temporary Operational Needs
FY2004 (Sec. 2808, P.L. 108-136)
NDAA temporarily authorizes DOD to obligate up to $200 million of FY2004 O&M funds "to carry out a
construction project outside the United States" that is necessary to meet "urgent military operational requirements of a
temporary nature in support of a declaration of war, the declaration by the President of a national emergency ..., or a
contingency operation [italics added]."
Authorization does not apply to a military installation "where the United States is reasonably expected to have a longterm presence”
FY2005 (Sec. 2810, P.L. 108-375)
NDAA extends authority to obligate up to $200 million in O&M funds for urgent, temporary military construction
through FY2005 contingent upon submitting FY2004 quarterly reports.
FY2006 (Sec. 2809, P.L. 109-163)
NDAA extends but halves authority to $100 million in O&M funds for urgent, temporary military construction but
only if DOD submits quarterly report by deadline.
FY2007 (Sec. 2802, P.L. 109-702)
NDAA extends authority to use $100 million for urgent, temporary military construction for a year.
FY2008 (Sec. 2801, P.L. 110-181)
NDAA extends and raises authority to use $200 million for urgent, temporary military construction for a year and
requires 7-10-day advance notification for projects of $2 million or more (i.e. “minor construction”).
FY2009 (Sec. 2806, P.L. 110-417)
NDAA authorizes up to $200 million in O&M funds for urgent, temporary military construction only for U.S. Central
Command and U.S. Africa Command.
Exempts military installations located in Afghanistan from the ban on the use of O&M construction funds "deemed as
supporting a long-term presence"[italics added].
Authorizes up to $300 million of O&M funds for Afghanistan if the Secretary of Defense certifies to the congressional
defense committees that additional construction "is required to meet urgent military requirements in Afghanistan."
FY2010 (Secs. 1237 and 2806, P.L. 111-84)
NDAA authorizes up to $200 million of O&M funds until the later of September 30, 2010, or enactment of FY2011
military construction. Limits authority to U.S. Central Command.
FY2011 (DOD Legislative Proposals, April 1, 2010)
DOD requests authorization through FY2012 to spend from O&M funds “amounts necessary to carry out unspecified
minor construction projects in support of contingency operations,” and raises the threshold on these unspecified
minor construction projects in support of contingency operations from $750,000 to $3 million.
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FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Other Programs
Building to Fight vs. Building to Stay: Congressional Restrictions
Both appropriators and authorizers in Congress have sought to distinguish between military
construction intended to support expeditionary, short-term warfighting and military construction
for permanent stationing of troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. As it did in the case of Iraq, Congress
has adopted language intended to prevent the establishment of permanent bases in Afghanistan
(see “War-Related Military Construction Provisions”).
In the FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-84), Congress banned “any defense
funds” from being “obligated or expended by the United States Government to establish any
military installation or base for the purpose of providing for the permanent stationing of United
States Armed Forces in Afghanistan [italics added].”88 The FY2009 Supplemental Appropriation
adopted the same language but stated that none of the funds “available by this or any other Act
shall be obligated or expended by the United States Government for the purpose of establishing
any military installation or base for the purpose of providing for the permanent stationing of
United States Armed Forces in Afghanistan [italics added].”89 There is no definition of the types
of projects that would signal permanency.
At the same time, Congress carved out an exception to this ban in P.L. 111-84 to permit DOD to
use Operation & Maintenance (O&M) funds for military construction that supports a “long-term
presence” in Afghanistan, reversing language from prior years that limited such funding to
“urgent ... temporary“ facilities (see “War-Related Military Construction Provisions”).Where the
line exists between funding for facilities to support permanent stationing of U.S. troops, which is
banned, and facilities to support a long-term presence, which is permitted, may be unclear, as
some projects (housing, waste treatment, etc.) could plausibly be devoted to either purpose.
Congress has periodically denied funds in supplemental appropriations requests for projects
perceived as signaling a permanent presence—a permanent fuel facility and power generation
plant at Bagram, for example, in the FY2005 supplemental appropriations request—without first
seeing them justified as part of a comprehensive plan for troop stationing.90 Some of the projects
proposed in the FY2010 Supplemental could fall into this category.
“Permanent Stationing” and “Long-term Presence”
To respond to rapidly changing military situations in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD requested and
received additional flexibility to use already-appropriated O&M funds to build facilities to meet
“urgent military operational requirements of a temporary nature[italics added]”starting in
FY2004.91 Congress renewed this authority every year until FY2009 while at the same time
capping the amount between $100 million and $200 million and forbidding funds from being
88
P.L. 111-84, Secs. 1237 and 2806.
P.L. 110-32, Sec. 315.
90
For example, the Senate Committee on Appropriations wrote, “A longer-term presence with more permanent force
structure may be in the interests of the United States, but plans for such a presence—and requests for the facilities to
support that presence—should be presented to the Congress in the regular authorization and appropriation process.”
U.S. Congress, Senate Appropriations, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on
Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Report to Accompany H.R. 1268, 109th Cong., 1st sess., April 6, 2005, S.Rept. 10952 (Washington: GPO, 2005), pp. 35-36.
91
P.L. 108-136, Sec. 2808.
89
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FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Other Programs
used for construction at a military installation “where the United States is reasonably expected to
have a long-term presence.”92
Over the years, DOD planners have concluded that some form of U.S. military presence in
Afghanistan is likely to continue for several years, possibly even after military operations end. In
response, Congress changed the law in 2009 and permitted DOD to use $200 million in O&M
funds for projects in U.S. Central Command and an additional $300 million in O&M funds for
construction in Afghanistan to meet “urgent military requirements” as certified by the Secretary
of Defense, and exempted installations there from the ban on the use of O&M construction funds
“deemed as supporting a long-term presence.”93 The FY2010 NDAA again extended the authority
to use O&M funding for military construction and continued the $500 million total limit on
projects in Central Command (see “War-Related Military Construction Provisions”).
Higher Funding and DOD’s Proposed Legislative Change
Taking O&M funding for military construction into account increases the amount spent for
military construction appreciably. For example, in FY2009, DOD added $409 million from O&M
accounts for construction in Afghanistan to the $900 million appropriated, raising the total to $1.4
billion. The $1.4 billion for construction in Afghanistan in FY2009 nearly equaled the entire
amount spent on construction between FY2003 and FY2008, and in a single year, doubled DOD’s
construction investment in Afghanistan (see Table 6).
If DOD dedicated the full $500 million in O&M available to military construction in Afghanistan,
the total in FY2010 would reach $2.4 billion, which would again almost double the entire prior
seven-year investment. DOD has also submitted new legislative proposal to use 0&M monies for
unspecified minor construction in support of contingency operations until October 1, 2012. If that
FY2011 proposal is approved by Congress, total funding for military construction in Afghanistan
could rise further (see “War-Related Military Construction Provisions”).
Another possible sign of DOD’s commitment in Afghanistan is the amount invested in certain key
bases of the more than 25 identifiable sites. This includes:
•
$1.3 billion invested in Bagram Air Base, $248 million requested for a total of
$1.6 billion if the request is approved;
•
$767 million appropriated for Kandahar Air Base, $181 million requested for a
total of $948 million if the request is approved;
•
$595 million for Forward Operating Base Tombstone/Bastion (U.S. and U.K
funding),$299 million requested for a total of $894 million if the request is
approved.
DOD has also requested new language for the FY2011 DOD authorization that would permit
DOD to use O&M funds in “amounts necessary to carry out unspecified minor military
construction projects of up to $3 million each in support of contingency operations” through
September 30, 2012 [italics added]. 94 If enacted, this would create a temporary two-year authority
92
Ibid.
P.L. 110-417, Sec. 2806.
94
DOD, “Enhanced Authority for Use of Operation and Maintenance Funds for Unspecified Minor Military
(continued...)
93
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FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Other Programs
allowing DOD to draw on O&M funds up to any amount for unspecified military construction in
support of contingency operations anywhere in the world.
For these projects, the proposal also raised the current per project cap for unspecified minor
construction projects from $750,000 to $3 million, which DOD argued was necessary because
construction costs in Afghanistan have grown. 95 Because the proposal says that DOD could spend
“amounts necessary,” for these types of projects, there would be no limit on the total amount of
O&M funds that could be drawn upon for military construction in support of contingency
operations anywhere in the world. DOD proposed after-the-fact quarterly reporting to the four
congressional defense committees within 60 days rather than the 7-10 day pre-notification
required to use O&M funds for Central Command projects.
Execution Issues
Another issue that could arise is whether the $521 million supplemental request was urgently
needed in light of DOD’s current spending rates for military construction projects in Afghanistan.
While DOD’s request identifies individual projects the services consider needed, DOD currently
had $2.1 billion in budget authority available from previous appropriation acts that has not yet
been obligated (i.e., placed on contract). In FY2009, DOD obligated about $607 million for
military construction projects in Afghanistan or an average of about $50 million a month. For the
first five months of FY2010, that average fell to $26 million a month for reasons that are not
identified in DOD’s report.96
To obligate all of the $2.1 billion in funds available at that time by the end of this fiscal year,
DOD would have to increase its monthly average obligations six-fold to $300 million. Not all of
those monies have to be obligated before the end of this fiscal year. The $2.1 billion includes
$700 million that has to be obligated by September 30, 2010, or the monies return to the Treasury
and another $1.4 billion that has to be obligated by September 30, 2011.
To spend all of the FY2009 monies before they lapse, DOD would need to increase its current
$26 million monthly obligation rate four-fold to $100 million in the second half of this fiscal year.
Similarly, to spend the $1.4 billion already available for FY2010 projects, monthly obligations
would need to average $116 million, or more than four times as high as the current rate.
With the additional supplemental funds, monthly obligations would have to treble from the
FY2009 rate (to $150 million a month) and increase six-fold from the current FY2010 rate.97
Some may argue that in light of how quickly current monies were being spent, the FY2010
supplemental request could be considered as part of DOD’s FY2011 war request when there
could be additional evidence about current spending rates and the prospects for the Afghan war.
(...continued)
Construction Projects in Support of Contingency Operations;” 3rd package of Legislative Proposals, April 1, 2010.
95
DOD, “Enhanced Authority for Use of Operation and Maintenance Funds for Unspecified Minor Military
Construction Projects in Support of Contingency Operations,” 3rd package of Legislative Proposals, April 1, 2010.
96
CRS calculations based on DOD, Cost of War Report, September 30, 2009; and DOD, Cost of War Report, February
28, 2010.
97
CRS calculations based on data in DOD’s Cost of War reports for FY2009 and February 28, 2010.
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FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Other Programs
Final Congressional Action on the Defense Basing Request
Total funding for million for military construction/family housing in the enacted version of H.R.
4899 was $657 including $649 million for war-related construction in Afghanistan, and $8
million for the Air Force request for a non war-related request to cover higher utility bills in Air
Force family housing.98 Matching the May version passed by the Senate, the final military
construction funding was $127.5 million above the request in order to accelerate projects that the
Air Force proposed to fund in FY2011 using its authority to tap O&M monies for unanticipated
contingency-related projects.
In adding these funds, the Senate report stated that “If the requirements for contingency
construction are known at the time of the budget request, then they should be included in the
Military Construction budget request. If they are not known at that time, then the Department of
Defense should continue the practice of notifying the Committee when projects and their
corresponding funding sources are identified.”99
These military construction funds would be available through September 30, 2011—for two
years—rather than the four years requested by the Administration.100 The final version of the bill
also did not include $16.5 million added by the House in its July 1 version to build a new Soldier
Readiness Processing Center at Fort Hood, TX, the site of the fatal shootings of November 9,
2009.
War-Related Foreign Aid and Diplomatic Operations101
The Administration’s FY2010 Supplemental request under the 150 international affairs budget
function addressed specific foreign economic assistance and related civilian operational
requirements of three strategic frontline nations—Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan.102 In the case
of Iraq, the request was meant to respond to the drawdown of U.S. military forces and the
consequent shift of greater responsibility to civilian personnel. In the case of Afghanistan, it
reflected a strategy that increases both U.S. military and civilian responsibilities. The Pakistan
request addressed the Administration’s desire to demonstrate U.S. support to Pakistan and to
strengthen the Pakistan government’s presence in insurgent areas of the country.
The total international affairs budget request for these war-related programs was $4.46 billion,
$1.8 billion of which was under the State Department portion of the account and meant to provide
personnel and infrastructure to enable diplomatic and assistance programs. The Foreign
Operations, i.e. foreign aid, segment, amounting to $2.6 billion, was requested to provide a wide
range of aid in support of U.S. security, economic growth, social service, and democratization
objectives. For each country, the Administration only requested funding in discrete sub-accounts
98
Department of the Air Force, Military Construction Program, Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 Overseas Contingency
Operations Supplemental Request, February 2010, pg. 6; http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/budget/pbfy10.asp.
99
S.Rept. 111-188, p. 20. See “Highlights of Congressional Action” for status of HAC majority draft.
100
See H.R. 4899 as passed by the House, July 1, 2010, incorporating the Senate version passed May 27, 2010, with the
addition of $16.5 million for the soldier readiness center at Fort Hood.
101
Written by (name redacted), Specialist in Foreign Affairs, 707-7656, and Kennon Nakamura, Analyst in Foreign
Affairs, 707-9514, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division.
102
U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development, Supplemental Budget Justification
FY2010, available at http://www.state.gov/f/releases/iab/fy2010supp/index.htm.
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FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Other Programs
that address certain needs. It did not request funding for P.L.480 food aid, Global Health/Child
Survival, or other accounts.
If the request had been approved, the FY2010 total of those specific accounts for the three
countries affected by the request would increase by more than two-thirds over the FY2009 figure
from roughly $6 billion to $10 billion. In the end, the enacted version raised the FY2010 total
level to about $9.2 billion, a 55% increase over the FY2009 appropriation.
Congressional Action on War-Related Foreign Aid
The enacted version of the FY2010 supplemental provides total international affairs war-related
foreign aid and diplomatic operations funding at $3.7 billion, $714 million less than the
Administration request (see Table 7). Details of congressional action regarding each country are
discussed below.
Table 7. War-Related Foreign Aid and Diplomatic Operations: FY2010 Supplemental
In millions of dollars
House
version
of
Accounts
FY2009
FY2010
Enacted
FY2010
Supp.
Request
H.R.
4899
as
passed
3-24-10
H.R. 4899
as passed
by the
House
7-1-10 and
receded
from
7-27-10
Enacted
version
of H.R.
4899 as
passed by
the
Senate
5-27-10
and by
the
House
7-27-10
FY2010
Total as
Enacted
(regular
and supp)
Pending
FY2011
Request
AFGHANISTAN
Economic Support
Fund (ESF)
2,048.0
2,037.0
1,576.0
0.0
1,309.0
1,309.0
3,346.0
3,316.3
Int’l Narcotics & Law
Enforcement (INCLE)
484.0
420.0
200.0
0.0
169.0
169.0
589.0
450.0
State Diplomatic and
Consular Programs—
Operations (D&CP)a
368. 6a
485.6a
211.0
0.0
200.0
200.0
1,182.2
754.1b
State Inspector
General
NAc
4.5
3.0
0.0
3.6
3.6
8.1
7.1
SIGAR
12.2
23.0
14.0
0.0
7. 2d
7.2d
30.2
35.3
USAID Inspector
General
N/A
N/A
0.0
0.0
3.4
3.4
3.4
NA
2,912.8
2,970.1
2,004.0
0.0
1,692.2
1,692.2
4,662.3
4,562.8
650.0
650.0
702.0
314.6
Total Afghanistan,
FY2010 Supp.
Request Accounts
IRAQ
Int’l Narcotics & Law
Enforcement (INCLE)
20.0
52.0
Congressional Research Service
517.4
0.0
41
FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Other Programs
H.R.
4899
Enacted
version
of H.R.
4899 as
passed by
the
Senate
5-27-10
and by
the
House
7-27-10
FY2010
Total as
Enacted
(regular
and supp)
Pending
FY2011
Request
House
version
of
FY2009
FY2010
Enacted
FY2010
Supp.
Request
as
passed
3-24-10
H.R. 4899
as passed
by the
House
7-1-10 and
receded
from
7-27-10
State Operations
(D&CP)
1,506.9
1,121.6
1,570.0
0.0
1,030.0
1,030.0
2,151.6
1,787.0g
Total Iraq, FY2010
Supp. Request
Accounts
1,526.9
1,173.6
2,087.4
0.0
1,680.0
1,680.0
2,853.6
2,101.6
Accounts
PAKISTAN
Economic Support
Fund (ESF)
1,114.0
1,033.0
244.0
0.0
259.0
259.0
1,292.0
1,321.7
Int’l Narcotics & Law
Enforcement (INCLE)
87.5
130.0
40.0
0.0
40.0
40.0
170.0
140.0
Foreign Military
Financing (FMF)
300.0
238.0
60.0
0.0
50.0
50.0
288.0
296.0
State Operations
(D&CP)
65.1
45.8
26.0
0.0
26.0
26.0
71.8
101.6
Total Pakistan,
FY2010 Supp.
Request Accounts
1,566.6
1,446.8
370.0
0.0
375.0
375.0
1,821.8
1,859.3
TOTAL
INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS: FY2010
SUPP. REQUEST
ACCOUNTS
6,006.3
5,590.5
4,461.4
0.0
3,747.2
3,747.2
9,337.7
8,523.7
Source: Department of State,”FY2011 Executive Budget Summary; S. Rept. 111-188; Congressional Record,
July 1, 2010.
a.
$25 million provided under the FY2009 supplemental (P.L.111-32) and counted here as FY2009 funding was
considered by appropriators forward funding to address in advance a portion of the FY2010 request.
b.
Figure does not include security.
c.
Breakdown for country specific Afghanistan/Pakistan oversight not available.
d.
Bill rescinds $7.2 million from FY09 supplemental and re-appropriates it here.
e.
Figures are for oversight of both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
f.
$336 million provided under the FY2009 supplemental (P.L.111-32) and counted here as FY2009 funding
was considered by appropriators forward funding to address in advance a portion of the FY2010 request.
g.
Figure includes security.
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FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Other Programs
Afghanistan103
The Administration’s international affairs State, Foreign Operations request for Afghanistan
reflected a strategy that asserts the importance of civilian programs in governance, economic
growth, and social services, provided in conjunction with U.S. military efforts in the country.
While the approach of strengthening the U.S. civilian presence, increasing aid to local
government, and enhancing the role of the national government in providing local services, has
been in effect for more than a year, the December 2009 “surge” strategy might be seen to have
accelerated and heightened the need for civilian assistance delivery, especially as follow-up in
insurgent areas being contested by the U.S. military. A major element of the new strategy has
been to rapidly increase stability and reduce the strength of the insurgency in problematic
provinces by creation of jobs and provision of social services through a more capable and visible
Afghan government.
The coming months will tell whether this strategy is working. However, key concerns include the
extent to which the Afghan government is prepared to provide sufficient leadership, staff, and
support to local communities in the forefront of the conflict, the ease of coordination between the
U.S. military and civilian aid programs and personnel, and the level of cooperation offered by the
local populace. One question is whether high levels of corruption in the Afghan government will
impede its ability to provide services effectively. As increasing amounts of aid are made available
through the supplemental, the ability of the U.S. government to monitor and insure accountability
is an associated concern. The corresponding increase in numbers of U.S. aid personnel as well as
an increase in the request for the offices of inspector general reflects U.S. government worries
about the impact of corruption on aid programs.
The Afghanistan supplemental request was meant to provide a significant boost to total U.S.
international affairs funding levels for that country, and, although not as large as the request, P.L.
111-212 does significantly raise aid and State support to Afghanistan. Under the request, the total
FY2010 State Department diplomatic operations account, already under the regular FY2010
appropriations a third larger than in FY2009, would rise by nearly 90% above the previous year’s
level. 104 In the enacted version of H.R. 4899, the total FY2010 diplomatic operations account has
been increased by 86%. The foreign aid portion of the supplemental request would have raised
total FY2010 levels of all the major non-humanitarian civilian aid accounts going to Afghanistan
by 67% over the equivalent FY2009 level of assistance. The enacted version of the legislation
raises total FY2010 aid levels by 55% over the previous year.
Elements of the Afghanistan Foreign Aid and Diplomatic
Operations Supplemental
The Administration sought $1.6 billion in Economic Support Funds (ESF) and $200 million in
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funding under the foreign operations
portion of the request, and $211 million in Diplomatic and Consular Programs (D&CP) funds
under the State Department portion.
103
For further discussion on Afghanistan, see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security,
and U.S. Policy, by (name redacted), and CRS Report R40699, Afghanistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance, by (name
redacted).
104
And rise by 110%, if amounts considered by appropriators as forward funded are counted in FY2010.
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FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Other Programs
ESF is a main source of economic, political, and social aid, mostly channeled through the Agency
for International Development (USAID). The ESF request broke downs as follows:
•
Alternative development: $135 million, mostly for agriculture in poppyproduction areas;
•
Conflict mitigation and reconciliation: $216 million to support consultative
processes in local communities, including quick impact, small grants projects;
•
Rule of law: $50 million to support the judicial system, especially in recently
secured areas;
•
Good governance: $760 million to strengthen Afghan government agencies,
including $450 million in support of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
which funnels funds to the National Solidarity Program, and $115 million in
direct budget support to the Ministry of Finance;
•
Health: $50 million to expand Ministry of Health services;
•
Education: $50 million to expand secondary and vocational education;
•
Macroeconomic growth: $7 million to help the Ministry of Finance improve
revenue collection through tax administration reform;
•
Trade and investment: $19.5 million to support implementation of trade
agreements and support trade infrastructure, such as industrial parks and border
facilities;
•
Financial sector: $4.5 million to strengthen branches of the Central Bank;
•
Agriculture: $215 million to build capacity countrywide in the Ministry of
Agriculture, and support watershed rehabilitation and irrigation, agriculture
credit, extension services, and market development;
•
Private sector development: $60.4 million; and
•
Economic opportunity: $8.6 million to expand credit union services, including
Islamic-compliant financing.
The INCLE account is implemented by the State Department. Three quarters of the $200 million
request was aimed at supporting the justice sector, especially to inject rule of law activities into
the provinces. The remainder targeted counter-narcotics programs. The request included
•
$60 million to expand the corrections program;
•
$25 million for model prisons;
•
$50 million to increase the number of judges, prosecutors, criminal investigators;
•
$25 million for the Counter-Narcotics Justice Center, the Criminal Justice Task
Fore, the Anti-Corruption Unit and Anti-Corruption Tribunal;
•
$5 million to support legal aid;
•
$8 million specifically for women’s justice activities;
•
$22 million for counternarcotics police; and
•
$2 million for drug treatment facilities and support for children.
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FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Other Programs
Largely to support the full range of ongoing and proposed international affairs assistance
programs, the FY2010 State Department Diplomatic and Consular Programs (D&CP) request of
$211 million furthered the growth of civilian personnel begun in the FY2010 regular request. The
Supplemental proposed a 457 position increase, in addition to the 764 positions funded in the
regular FY2010 appropriations, at a cost of $211 million. These positions included 212 U.S.
direct hires to work at the district level and startup funding to hire 245 staff for work with Kabul
ministries and in Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). The Administration stated that it was
applying a “whole of government” approach with federal employees drawn on an as-needed
reimbursable basis from the Department of State, USAID, Department of Agriculture,
Department of Justice, and eight other federal agencies to provide the vital expertise in
specialized skills. The Department also proposed the hiring of about 200 locally employed staff
(LES) to provide administrative and local knowledge support to American personnel working in
the field.
A February 2010 Department of State Inspector General’s report praised management and
personnel working at the U.S. embassy in Kabul, but expressed concern that they were
overworked and struggling to meet the demands resulting from a tripling of staff over the past
year.105 The expansion proposed under the supplemental would further strain resources. This rapid
expansion has its implications in management of staff and providing for their housing and office
space in Kabul or just basic housing and sanitation in the field. Not addressed in the supplemental
request were the added security needs that are a further consequence of increased civilian staff.
An additional $14 million in funding for the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction (SIGAR) and $3 million for the State Department Inspector General was also
requested to support their continuing oversight of the assistance program.
Congressional Action on the Afghanistan Request
The original version of H.R. 4899, passed by the House in March, did not include funds for
Afghanistan assistance, but the House-amended version, passed in July, adopted funding levels
for Afghanistan approved by the Senate in May. The final enacted version of H.R. 4899 provides
a total of $1.7 billion for Afghanistan foreign aid and diplomatic operations compared with the
$2.0 billion request. There are several major differences between P.L. 111-212 and the
Administration request.
The enacted version cuts the ESF request by $267 million. The Senate Appropriations
Committee, in its report on the bill, recommends specific funding levels for multiple program
sectors within the ESF account, most notably slashing proposed good governance activities by
$160 million and alternative development by $35 million. The Senate report expresses concerns
regarding provision of aid, even in the form of project assistance, directly to the government of
Afghanistan, and recommends assessments and reviews of the effectiveness of this type of aid.
The Senate report limits direct government budget support, i.e. cash funding, to $100 million.
The enacted version cut the INCLE account by $31 million because of concerns, as reported by
the Senate Committee, that the political will may not exist in the Government of Afghanistan to
justify large investments in reforming the “weak and corrupt” justice system.
105
Office of the Inspector General, Report of Inspection: Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan, Department of State, ISP-I-1032A, Washington, DC, February 2010, http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/138084.pdf .
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The enacted version also addresses oversight issues. It rejects the request for SIGAR, because, as
Senate appropriators reported, sufficient funding was still available from previous appropriations.
In order to extend the availability of that funding to the end of FY2011, P.L. 111-212 rescinds
$7.2 million in FY2009 supplemental SIGAR appropriations and re-appropriates it in the FY10
supplemental.
The enacted legislation contains a number of conditions on Afghanistan aid. Among these are that
aid may be obligated only if the Secretary of State reports that Afghan local and national
government representatives, local communities, and civil society have been consulted and
participated in the design of projects and will participate in their implementation, and that
progress will be measured by specific benchmarks. Further, aid will only be made available if the
Secretary determines that the Government of Afghanistan is cooperating in reform efforts,
respecting internationally recognized human rights of women, and demonstrating a commitment
to removing corrupt officials.
Funds to support the Electoral Commission may only be provided if the Commission has no
members or employees who participated in or covered up acts of fraud in the 2009 elections.
Further, aid is available to support the reconciliation with former combatants, i.e. members of the
Taliban, only if the Secretary of State determines that Afghan women are participating in the
reconciliation process in all levels of government and their rights are protected in this process and
that funds will not protect from prosecution those responsible for war crimes.
The enacted version of H.R. 4899 allows up to $300 million in DC&P and Embassy Construction
and Maintenance funding to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan from any year’s appropriation to be
transferred or merged with funding for activities supporting U.S. civilian security in any of these
countries.
Iraq106
The Administration’s international affairs request for Iraq in the FY2010 supplemental had two
components, both reflecting the new strategic environment created by the drawdown of U.S.
military forces. The response to this dramatic change in the U.S. role in Iraq was, perhaps
counter-intuitively, a significant increase in U.S. assistance and State Department operations.
Counting all major non-humanitarian foreign economic aid accounts, the total FY2010 U.S.
assistance program to Iraq would have risen by 64% from the FY2009 level under the request.
With the enacted version of H.R. 4899, total Iraq economic aid programs will have been boosted
by 89% over the previous year. Taken alone, the State operations account would have risen by
79%.107 Under the enacted legislation, total FY2010 State operations rise by only 43% over the
FY2009 level.
Elements of the Iraq Foreign Aid and Diplomatic Operations Supplemental
The most significant element in the international affairs component of the supplemental for Iraq
`was the request for $517.4 million in INCLE funds (see Table 7), a down payment on the
106
For further discussion on Iraq, see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by (name re
dacted).
107
And by 159%, if forward funded amounts are counted in FY2010.
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transition of responsibility for police training from the Department of Defense to the Department
of State, effective October 1, 2011. While the State Department has responsibility for training
police forces in most other countries, it ceded that role to DOD in the case of Iraq prior to the
invasion. Its new duties will include advising the Ministry of Interior, police, and border forces.
According to the State Department, a smooth transition from DOD to the State Department
requires that a successor program be in place at the end of FY2010. Training of the Iraqi military
remains in the hands of DOD.
The INCLE request included the deployment of 350 advisors to work at the Ministry and police
colleges, academies, and headquarters throughout the country. It also funded construction of
necessary infrastructure and security staff to support expert personnel—INCLE’s program
ultimately is expected to employ up to 2,000 U.S. government and contractor personnel. To
permit efficient staff travel around the country, funding would provide aircraft and expanded
aviation facilities.
The FY2010 supplemental request also included funding for State Department operational costs
under the D&CP account amounting to $1.57 billion. This significant boost in Iraq operations
funding was meant to address the problem of maintaining civilian outreach to the provinces
following the U.S. military drawdown. Currently, the United States maintains over 1,200 directhire Americans employees from 14 civilian agencies in Iraq. These civilian federal employees are
posted at the Embassy in Baghdad, the Regional Embassy Office in Basrah, or one of the 16
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), often co-located with the military with the logistical and
security costs supported by the military. During the 2007 surge, a number of embedded PRTs
(ePRTs) were also established that allowed a civilian presence in additional locations protected by
the combat battalions with which they were embedded. These civilian federal employees conduct
business on a broad range of bilateral and multilateral missions from the regular diplomatic work
of furthering U.S. economic and commercial interests, and providing U.S. policy makers with
political analysis, public diplomacy outreach, and oversight of U.S. government assistance
programs. These employees also
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