Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
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Changes in the Arctic:
Background and Issues for Congress
Updated July 14, 2025
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R41153
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
Summary
The diminishment of Arctic sea ice has led to increased human activities in the Arctic, and has
heightened interest in, and concerns about, the region’s future. The United States, by virtue of
Alaska, is an Arctic country and has substantial interests in the region. The seven other Arctic
states are Russia, Canada, Iceland, Denmark (by virtue of Greenland), Norway, Sweden, and
Finland. The Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984 (Title I of P.L. 98-373 of July 31,
1984) “provide[s] for a comprehensive national policy dealing with national research needs and
objectives in the Arctic.” The National Science Foundation (NSF) is the lead federal agency for
implementing Arctic research policy. The Arctic Council, created in 1996, is the leading
international forum for addressing issues relating to the Arctic. The United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) sets forth a comprehensive regime of law and order in the
world’s oceans, including the Arctic Ocean. The United States is not a party to UNCLOS.
An array of climate changes in the Arctic is now documented by observing systems, with more
expected with future greenhouse gas-driven climate change. Observed physical changes in the
Arctic include warming ocean, soil, and air temperatures; melting permafrost; shifting vegetation
and animal abundances; and altered characteristics of Arctic cyclones. A monitoring report of the
Arctic Council concluded in 2019 that “the Arctic biophysical system is now clearly trending
away from its previous state [in the 20th century] and into a period of unprecedented change, with
implications not only within but also beyond the Arctic.”
Over the past 10 to 15 years, the emergence of great power competition between the United
States, Russia, and China has introduced elements of competition and tension into the Arctic’s
geopolitical environment. The Russia-Ukraine war further affected the region’s geopolitical
environment. President Trump on multiple occasions has expressed an interest in having the
United States annex Greenland. U.S. annexation of Greenland would substantially expand U.S.
Arctic territory. The Trump Administration’s interest in annexing Greenland has affected U.S.Danish relations.
The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Coast Guard are devoting increased attention to the
Arctic in their planning, budgeting, and operations. Whether DOD and the Coast Guard are taking
sufficient actions for defending U.S. interests in the region is a topic of congressional oversight.
The Coast Guard has two operational polar icebreakers, has purchased a commercial icebreaker
that it is converting into a third polar icebreaker, and is procuring new polar icebreakers.
The diminishment of Arctic ice could lead in coming years to increased commercial shipping on
two trans-Arctic sea routes—the Northern Sea Route close to Russia, and the Northwest Passage
close to Alaska and through the Canadian archipelago—though the rate of increase in the use of
these routes might not be as great as sometimes anticipated in press accounts. International
guidelines for ships operating in Arctic waters have been updated.
Changes to the Arctic brought about by warming temperatures will likely allow more onshore and
offshore exploration for oil, gas, and minerals. Warming that causes permafrost to melt could
pose challenges to onshore exploration activities. Increased vessel traffic (e.g., oil and gas
exploration, cruise ships, expanded fishing activities) in the Arctic increase the risk of pollution in
Arctic waters. Cleaning up oil spills in ice-covered waters will be more difficult than in other
areas, primarily because effective strategies for cleaning up oil spills in ice-covered waters have
yet to be developed. Changes in the Arctic could result in migration of fish stocks to new waters,
and could affect protected species. The United States is working with other countries regarding
the management of Arctic fish stocks.
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Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Definitions of the Arctic ............................................................................................................ 1
Arctic Circle Definition ...................................................................................................... 1
Definition in Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984 .......................................... 2
Other Definitions ................................................................................................................ 3
Population of the Arctic ............................................................................................................ 5
Eight Arctic States, Including Seven NATO Members and Five Arctic Coastal States ............ 6
U.S. Identity as an Arctic Nation............................................................................................... 6
U.S. Arctic Research ................................................................................................................. 7
Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984, As Amended ......................................... 7
FY2026 NSF Budget Request for Arctic Research ............................................................. 7
March 2024 Report on Federal Agency Funding for Arctic Research ................................ 8
Major U.S. Policy Documents Relating to the Arctic ............................................................... 9
January 2009 Arctic Policy Directive (NSPD 66/HSPD 25) .............................................. 9
May 2013 National Strategy for Arctic Region ................................................................ 10
January 2015 Executive Order on Enhancing Coordination of Arctic Efforts .................. 10
October 2022 National Security Strategy Document .........................................................11
October 2022 National Strategy for the Arctic Region ......................................................11
Ambassador at Large for Arctic Affairs .................................................................................. 13
Arctic Executive Steering Committee (AESC) ....................................................................... 14
Arctic Council ......................................................................................................................... 15
Arctic and UN Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) .................................................... 16
House and Senate Arctic Member Organizations.................................................................... 17
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 17
Climate Change, with Biophysical and Economic Impacts .................................................... 17
Warming Temperatures and a More Intense Water Cycle ................................................. 19
Sea Ice Decline and Mobility ............................................................................................ 20
Land-Based Changes ........................................................................................................ 22
Geopolitical Environment ....................................................................................................... 24
Overview ........................................................................................................................... 24
Arctic in U.S. Policymaking ............................................................................................. 25
U.S. Interest in Greenland ................................................................................................. 26
Russia-Ukraine War .......................................................................................................... 33
NATO and European Union .............................................................................................. 39
Russia ................................................................................................................................ 40
China ................................................................................................................................. 45
Russia-China Cooperation ................................................................................................ 52
U.S. and Allied Military Forces and Operations ..................................................................... 55
Overview ........................................................................................................................... 55
Russia’s Arctic Military Modernization ............................................................................ 55
U.S. and Allied Arctic Military Activities ......................................................................... 56
Some Specific Developments ........................................................................................... 60
Sufficiency of U.S. Arctic Military Activities ................................................................... 63
FY2025 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 5009/P.L. 118-159).......................... 63
Polar Icebreaking .................................................................................................................... 64
Search and Rescue (SAR) ....................................................................................................... 65
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Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
Commercial Sea Transportation .............................................................................................. 67
Background ....................................................................................................................... 67
Destination Traffic, Not Trans-Arctic Traffic ................................................................... 68
Unpredictable Ice Conditions Hinder Trans-Arctic Shipping ........................................... 68
Basic Navigation Infrastructure Is Lacking ...................................................................... 69
Regulation of Arctic Shipping .......................................................................................... 70
Arctic Polar Code.............................................................................................................. 71
Oil, Gas, and Mineral Exploration .......................................................................................... 72
Offshore Oil and Gas Exploration .................................................................................... 72
Offshore Mineral Exploration ........................................................................................... 74
Extent of the Continental Margin...................................................................................... 76
Onshore Energy and Mineral Development ...................................................................... 81
Oil Pollution and Pollution Response ..................................................................................... 83
Oil Pollution Implications of Arctic Change..................................................................... 83
Response and Cleanup Challenges in the Arctic ............................................................... 85
Fisheries .................................................................................................................................. 88
Protected Species .................................................................................................................... 92
Indigenous People Living in Arctic ......................................................................................... 94
Background ....................................................................................................................... 94
Effects of Climate Change ................................................................................................ 96
CRS Reports on Specific Arctic-Related Issues ............................................................................ 98
Figures
Figure 1. Arctic Area of Alaska as Defined by ARPA ..................................................................... 3
Figure 2. Entire Arctic Area as Defined by ARPA .......................................................................... 4
Figure 3. Arctic Research Funding by Agency, FY2022-FY2024................................................... 9
Figure 4. 2012 Record-Low Sea Ice Extent .................................................................................. 20
Figure 5. Estimated Historical, Observed, and Projected September Arctic Sea Ice Extent ......... 21
Figure 6. Arctic SAR Areas in Arctic SAR Agreement ................................................................. 67
Figure 7. Seven Regions of the U.S. Extended Continental Shelf ................................................ 78
Tables
Table 1. Funding for OPP ................................................................................................................ 8
Contacts
Author Information........................................................................................................................ 99
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Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
Introduction
The diminishment of Arctic sea ice has led to increased human activities in the Arctic, and has
heightened interest in, and concerns about, the region’s future. Issues such as geopolitical
competition in the region between the United States, Russia, and the People’s Republic of China
(PRC, or China); increased military operations in the region by Russia and other Arctic countries;
growth in commercial shipping through the Arctic; and oil, gas, and mineral exploration in the
Arctic could affect the region’s future.
The United States, by virtue of Alaska, is an Arctic country and has substantial political,
economic, energy, environmental, and other interests in the region.1 Decisions that Congress
makes on Arctic-related issues could significantly affect these interests.
This report provides an overview of Arctic-related issues for Congress, and refers readers to more
in-depth CRS reports on specific Arctic-related issues. Congressional readers with questions
about an issue discussed in this report should contact the author or authors of the section of the
report discussing that issue. The authors are identified by footnote at the start of each section.
This report does not track legislation on specific Arctic-related issues. For tracking of legislative
activity, see the CRS reports relating to specific Arctic-related issues that are listed at the end of
this report.
Background2
Definitions of the Arctic
There are multiple definitions of the Arctic that result in differing descriptions of the land and sea
areas encompassed by the term. Policy discussions of the Arctic can employ varying definitions
of the region, and readers should bear in mind that the definition used in one discussion may
differ from that used in another. This CRS report does not rely on any one definition.
Arctic Circle Definition
The most common and basic definition of the Arctic defines the region as the land and sea area
north of the Arctic Circle (a circle of latitude at about 66° 34′ North).3 For surface locations
within this zone, the sun is generally above the horizon for 24 continuous hours at least once per
year (at the summer solstice) and below the horizon for 24 continuous hours at least once per year
(at the winter solstice). The land and sea area within the Arctic Circle is about 8.14 million square
1 This sentence originated in an earlier iteration of this CRS report and was later transferred by the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) with minor changes to Government Accountability Office, Coast Guard[:] Complete
Performance and Operational Data Would Better Clarify Arctic Resource Needs, GAO-24-106491, September 2024,
highlights page and page 1.
2 This section was prepared by Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade
Division.
3 Sources differ on the precise latitude of the Arctic Circle. One source states “The position of the Arctic Circle is not
fixed and currently runs 66°33′50.4″ north of the Equator. Its latitude depends on Earth's axial tilt, which fluctuates by
a margin of some 2° over a 41,000-year period, due to tidal forces resulting from the orbit of the Moon. Consequently,
the Arctic Circle is currently drifting northwards at a speed of about 14.5 m (48 ft) per year.” (“Arctic Circle,”
Wikipedia, updated May 16, 2025, accessed May 19, 2025, at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arctic_Circle.)
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miles,4 which is about 4.1% (or between 1/24th and 1/25th) of the Earth’s surface, and more than
twice the land area of the United States, which is about 3.5 million square miles.
The Arctic Circle definition of the Arctic includes the northernmost part of Alaska—more than
one-quarter of the state’s land area5—as well as the Chukchi Sea, which separates that part of
Alaska from Russia, and U.S. territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) waters north of
Alaska. It does not include the more southerly parts of Alaska or the Bering Sea, which separates
that lower part of the state from Russia.
The Arctic Ocean, which is roughly at the center of the Arctic region, accounts for much of the
region’s total area. By one calculation, the Arctic Ocean has an area of about 6.01 million square
miles, which is about 4.3% of the Earth’s ocean area.6 This figure uses boundaries for the Arctic
Ocean that include some waters south of the Arctic Circle.7 Other sources, using different
boundaries for the Arctic Ocean, put the size of the Arctic Ocean at about 5.4 million square
miles.8
Definition in Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984
Section 112 of the Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984 (Title I of P.L. 98-373 of July
31, 1984)9 defines the Arctic as follows:
As used in this title, the term “Arctic” means all United States and foreign territory north
of the Arctic Circle and all United States territory north and west of the boundary formed
by the Porcupine, Yukon, and Kuskokwim Rivers [in Alaska]; all contiguous seas,
including the Arctic Ocean and the Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi Seas; and the Aleutian
chain.
This definition, which is codified at 15 U.S.C. 4111,10 includes certain parts of Alaska below the
Arctic Circle, including the Aleutian Islands and portions of central and western mainland Alaska,
such as the Seward Peninsula and the Yukon Delta.
The U.S. Coast Guard states that “The U.S. Arctic encompasses some 2,521 miles of shoreline, an
international strait adjacent to the Russian Federation, and 647 miles of land border with Canada
above the Arctic Circle. The U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Arctic contains
4 Source: Figure provided to CRS by Geography and Map Division of Library of Congress, May 12, 2020, in
consultation with the National Geodetic Survey (NGS) of National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
Other sources provide different figures for the land and sea area within the Arctic Circle, such as 7.7 million square
miles. (See, for example, “Arctic Circle,” Wikipedia, updated May 16, 2025, accessed May 19, 2025.)
5 Source: Lawrence Hamilton, Jochen Wirsing, Jessica Brunacini, and Stephanie Pfirman, “Arctic Knowledge of the
U.S. Public,” Arctic Research Consortium of the United States (ARCUS), undated, but with an internet address
(https://www.arcus.org/witness-the-arctic/2017/5/highlight/2) and endnotes suggesting a date of 2017, which states:
“More than a quarter of Alaska's land area lies north of the Arctic Circle.”
6 Source: NOAA, National Geophysical Data Center, “World Ocean Volumes,” accessed May 19, 2025, at
https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/sites/g/files/anmtlf171/files/2023-01/World%20Ocean%20Volumes.pdf. The table
presented at that source states that the Arctic Ocean has an area of 15.558 million square kilometers, which converts to
about 6.007 million square miles.
7 See the map posted at NOAA, National Geophysical Data Center, “World Ocean Volumes,” accessed May 19, 2025,
at https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/sites/g/files/anmtlf171/files/2023-01/World%20Ocean%20Volumes.pdf.
8 See, for example, “Arctic Ocean,” Britannica (Encyclopedia Britannica), accessed May 19, 2025, at
https://www.britannica.com/place/Arctic-Ocean; or “Arctic Ocean,” World Atlas, accessed May 19, 2025, at
https://www.worldatlas.com/seas/arctic-ocean.html.
9 Title II of P.L. 98-373 is the National Critical Materials Act of 1984.
10 As codified, the definition reads, “As used in this chapter...”
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approximately 889,000 square miles of ocean.”11 Figure 1 shows the Arctic area of Alaska as
defined by ARPA; Figure 2 shows the entire Arctic area as defined by ARPA.
Figure 1. Arctic Area of Alaska as Defined by ARPA
Source: U.S. Arctic Research Commission (https://www.arctic.gov/uploads/assets/
ARPA_Alaska_only_150dpi.jpg, accessed May 19, 2025).
Other Definitions
Other definitions of the Arctic are based on factors such as average temperature, the northern tree
line,12 the extent of permafrost on land, the extent of sea ice on the ocean, or jurisdictional or
administrative boundaries. A definition based on a climate-related factor could circumscribe
differing areas over time as a result of changes in climate.
For example, the 10°C isotherm definition of the Arctic—a definition sometimes used in
scientific and environmental discussions of the Arctic13—defines the region as the land and sea
11 Coast Guard, Arctic Strategic Outlook, April 2019, p. 11.
12 For a map of the Arctic tree line boundary, see “Arctic Tree Line Boundary,” Arctic Portal.org, accessed May 19,
2025, at https://arcticportal.org/maps/download/arctic-definitions/2424-arctic-tree-line-boundary.
13 See, for example, “Boundaries of the Arctic,” Climate Policy Watcher, updated December 6, 2023, accessed May 19,
2025, at https://web.archive.org/web/20240307164536/https://www.climate-policy-watcher.org/atmosphericcirculation/boundaries-of-the-arctic.html; “What is the Arctic?” National Snow & Ice Data Center, accessed May 19,
2025, at https://nsidc.org/learn/parts-cryosphere/arctic-weather-and-climate; Hobart M. King, “Where is the Arctic?
(continued...)
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area in the northern hemisphere where the average temperature for the warmest month (July) is
below 10°C, or 50°F. This definition results in an irregularly shaped Arctic region that excludes
some land and sea areas north of the Arctic Circle but includes some land and sea areas south of
the Arctic Circle. This definition currently excludes all of Finland and Sweden, as well as some of
Alaska above the Arctic Circle, while including virtually all of the Bering Sea and Alaska’s
Aleutian Islands.
Figure 2. Entire Arctic Area as Defined by ARPA
Source: U.S. Arctic Research Commission (https://www.arctic.gov/uploads/assets/ARPA_Polar_150dpi.jpg,
accessed May 19, 2025).
As another example, the definition of the Arctic adopted by the Arctic Monitoring and
Assessment Programme (AMAP)—a working group of the Arctic Council—“essentially includes
the terrestrial and marine areas north of the Arctic Circle (66°32’ N),[14] and north of 62° N in
What is its Boundary?” Geology.com, undated, accessed May 19, 2025, at https://geology.com/maps/where-is-thearctic/; Fabian Baur and Bruno Kothe, “Climate and Climate Change in the Arctic,” European Organisation for the
Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT), April 28, 2020, accessed May 19, 2025, at
https://www.eumetsat.int/science-blog/climate-and-climate-change-arctic; “The Arctic, as Defined by Summer
Temperature,” GRID-Arendal, accessed May 19, 2025, at https://www.grida.no/resources/7743; Arctic Pollution
Issues: A State of the Arctic Environment Report, Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, Oslo, 1997, p. 6,
accessed May 19, 2025, at https://www.amap.no/documents/download/79/inline (cover page and front section) and
https://www.amap.no/documents/download/68/inline (section that includes page 6).
14 Regarding the precise latitude of the Arctic Circle, see footnote 3.
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Asia and 60° N in North America, modified to include the marine areas north of the Aleutian
chain, Hudson Bay, and parts of the North Atlantic, including the Labrador Sea.”15
Some observers use the term “high north” as a way of referring to the Arctic, or make a
distinction between the “high Arctic”—meaning, in general, the colder portions of the Arctic that
are closer to the North Pole—and other areas of the Arctic that are generally less cold and farther
away from the North Pole, which are sometimes described as the low Arctic or the subarctic.
Population of the Arctic
According to one estimate, about 4 million people, or about 0.05% of the world’s population, live
in the Arctic, of which roughly half (roughly 2 million) live in Russia’s part of the Arctic,16 and
roughly 500,000 belong to Indigenous peoples.17 Another source states “Approximately two and a
half million of Russia’s inhabitants live in Arctic territory, accounting for nearly half of the
population living in the Arctic worldwide.”18 Another source, using a broader definition of the
Arctic, concluded that just over 10 million people live in the Arctic, including 7 million in
Russia’s Arctic.19
15 For examples of maps of the Arctic reflecting various definitions of the Arctic, see
•
the map of the geographic areas described in Annex 1 of the May 2017 Agreement on Enhancing
International Arctic Scientific Cooperation, accessed May 19, 2025, at both “Arctic Region,” U.S.
Department of State, https://2021-2025.state.gov/key-topics-office-of-ocean-and-polar-affairs/arctic/, and
“Maps,” U.S. Arctic Research Commission, https://www.arctic.gov/uploads/assets/arctic-sci-agree-150dpicolor.jpg.
•
“Definitions of the Arctic,” UN Environment Programme, accessed May 19, 2025, at https://www.grida.no/
resources/7010;
•
the collection of maps posted at “Arctic Definitions,” Arctic Portal, accessed May 19, 2025, at
https://arcticportal.org/maps/download/arctic-definitions;
•
“Arctic Definition Map,” Arctic Portal Library, accessed May 19, 2025, at http://library.arcticportal.org/
1492/;
•
the maps posted by the Arctic Centre of the University of Lapland, accessed May 19, 2025, at
https://www.arcticcentre.org/EN/arcticregion/Maps/definitions and https://www.arcticcentre.org/EN/
arcticregion/Maps/permafrost;
•
Michael Paul and Göran Swistek, Russia in the Arctic: Development Plans, Military Potential, and Conflict
Prevention, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) (German Institute for International and Security
Affairs), SWP Research Paper 3, February 2022, p. 10 (Map 1).
16 Sources: “Arctic Peoples,” Arctic Council, accessed May 19, 2025, at https://arctic-council.org/en/explore/topics/
arctic-peoples/; National Snow & Ice Data Center, “Arctic People,” accessed May 19, 2025, at https://web.archive.org/
web/20220702084552/https://nsidc.org/cryosphere/arctic-meteorology/arctic-people.html; United Kingdom, House of
Commons, Defence Committee, On Thin Ice: UK Defence in the Arctic, Twelfth Report of Session 2017–19, August
15, 2018 (Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 19 July 2018), p. 6; “Arctic Indigenous Peoples,” Arctic
Centre, accessed May 19, 2025, at https://www.arcticcentre.org/EN/arcticregion/Arctic-Indigenous-Peoples.
17 Source: “Permanent Participants,” Arctic Council, accessed May 19, 2025, at https://arctic-council.org/en/about/
permanent-participants/. The term Indigenous is not consistently defined in the international or domestic legal context.
Some entities, such as the United Nations, have developed general guidelines for identifying Indigenous groups based
on a variety of factors (see United Nations, “Who Are Indigenous Peoples?” fact sheet,
https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/5session_factsheet1.pdf).
18 “The Russian Federation,” Arctic Council, accessed May 19, 2025, at https://arctic-council.org/en/about/states/
russian-federation/.
19 Timothy Heleniak, “The Future of Arctic Populations,” Polar Geography, January 3, 2020. Another source states
that “using more broad definition, according to the University of the Arctic Atlas, there are approximately 13.1 million
people living in the area of the circumpolar North” (“Arctic Indigenous Peoples,” Arctic Centre, accessed May 19,
2025, at https://www.arcticcentre.org/EN/arcticregion/Arctic-Indigenous-Peoples).
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Eight Arctic States, Including Seven NATO Members and Five
Arctic Coastal States
Eight countries have territory north of the Arctic Circle: the United States (Alaska), Russia,
Canada, Iceland,20 Denmark (by virtue of Greenland, a self-governing part of the Kingdom of
Denmark), Norway, Sweden, and Finland. These eight countries are often referred to as the Arctic
countries or Arctic States, and they are the member states of the Arctic Council, which is
discussed further below.
The seven Arctic countries other than Russia are all members of NATO, and are sometimes
referred to as the Arctic 7 or A7 states. Five of the eight Arctic countries—the United States,
Canada, Denmark (by virtue of Greenland), Norway, and Russia—are considered Arctic coastal
states because they have mainland coasts that front onto waters north of the Arctic Circle.
U.S. Identity as an Arctic Nation
As mentioned earlier, the United States, by virtue of Alaska, is an Arctic country and has
substantial political, economic, energy, environmental, and other interests in the region. Even so,
Alaska is geographically separated and somewhat distant from the other 49 states, and relatively
few Americans—fewer than 70,000 as of 2024—live in the Arctic part of Alaska as shown in
Figure 1.21 A March 6, 2020, research paper on the Arctic in U.S. national identity, based on data
collected in online surveys conducted in October-December 2019, stated: “We found that
Americans continue to mildly disagree with the assertion that the United States is an Arctic nation
with broad and fundamental interests in the region.”22
20 The northern coast of mainland Iceland is just south of the Arctic Circle, but the Arctic Circle passes through
Grimsey Island, a small offshore island of Iceland that is about 25 miles north of the northern coast of mainland
Iceland. The northern part of Grimsey Island is Iceland’s territory north of the Arctic Circle. See, for example,
“Grímsey,” Wikipedia, updated April 3, 2025, accessed May 19, 2025 at
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gr%C3%ADmsey; “Is Iceland in the Arctic Circle?” Iceland Unlimited, January 2017,
accessed May 19, 2025, at https://icelandunlimited.is/blog/is-iceland-in-the-arctic-circle/.
21 Source for figure of fewer than 70,000: CRS analysis of data presented at Alaska Department of Labor and
Workforce Development, “Alaska Population Estimates,” updated January 7, 2025, accessed May 19, 2025, at
https://live.laborstats.alaska.gov/data-pages/alaska-population-estimates. Figures presented there for Alaska’s 2023
population estimates by borough, census area, and economic region show that of Alaska’s estimated population of
741,147 as of 2024, fewer than 70,000 were in areas wholly or partially north of the boundary of the Arctic area of
Alaska that is shown in Figure 1.
22 Zachary D. Hamilla, The Arctic in U.S. National Identity (2019), Arctic Studio, March 6, 2020, p. 1. See also Rodger
Baker, “Remapping the American Arctic,” Stratfor, July 28, 2020. See also Lawrence Hamilton, Jochen Wirsing,
Jessica Brunacini, and Stephanie Pfirman, “Arctic Knowledge of the U.S. Public,” Arctic Research Consortium of the
United States (ARCUS), undated, but with an internet address (https://www.arcus.org/witness-thearctic/2017/5/highlight/2) and endnotes suggesting a date of 2017.
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U.S. Arctic Research
Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984, As Amended
The Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984 (Title I of P.L. 98-373 of July 31, 1984;23
(15 U.S.C. 4101 et seq.) “provide[s] for a comprehensive national policy dealing with national
research needs and objectives in the Arctic.”24 The act, among other things
•
•
•
•
•
made a series of findings concerning the importance of the Arctic and Arctic
research;
established the U.S. Arctic Research Commission (USARC) to promote Arctic
research and recommend Arctic research policy;25
designated the National Science Foundation (NSF) as the lead federal agency for
implementing Arctic research policy;
established the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee (IARPC) to
develop a national Arctic research policy and a five-year plan to implement that
policy, and designated the NSF representative on the IARPC as its chairperson;26
and
defined the term “Arctic” for purposes of the act.
The Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984 was amended by P.L. 101-609 of November 16,
1990. In the 118th Congress, S. 5081, the Arctic Research and Policy Amendments Act of 2024,
introduced in the Senate on September 18, 2024, would further amend the Arctic Research and
Policy Act of 1984.27
FY2026 NSF Budget Request for Arctic Research
NSF, which is the lead federal agency for implementing Arctic research policy, carries out Arctic
and Antarctic research activities through its Office of Polar Programs (OPP). NSF states that
“OPP is the primary U.S. supporter of fundamental research in the polar regions. In the Arctic,
NSF facilitates coordination of research planning as directed by the Arctic Research Policy Act of
1984, and the NSF Director chairs the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee (IARPC)
created for this purpose.”28 Table 1 shows NSF’s FY2026 funding request for OPP and compares
it to NSF’s current plan for FY2024 funding.
23 Title II of P.L. 98-373 is the National Critical Materials Act of 1984.
24 These words are taken from the official title of P.L. 98-373. (Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984 is the short title
of Title I of P.L. 98-373.) The remainder of P.L. 98-373’s official title relates to Title II of the act, the short title of
which is the National Critical Materials Act of 1984.
25 USARC publishes a biennial report to the White House and Congress outlining goals and objectives for Arctic
research; the 2023-2024 edition is United States Arctic Research Commission, Report on the Goals and Objectives for
Arctic Research 2023-2024 for the US Arctic Research Program Plan, January 2023, accessed May 19, 2025,
https://www.arctic.gov/goals-and-objectives/.
26 The IARPC currently includes more than a dozen federal agencies, departments, and offices. Additional information
on the IARPC is available at https://www.nsf.gov/geo/opp/arctic/iarpc/start.jsp.
27 See https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/senate-bill/5081. See also “Senator Murkowski Introduces Arctic
Research and Policy Amendments Act of 2024,” press release dated September 23, 2024.
28 National Science Foundation, FY 2025 Budget Request to Congress, May 30, 2025, p. R&RA-11 (PDF page 117 of
222).
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Table 1. Funding for OPP
Dollar amounts in millions
FY2026 Request
Change from FY2024
Current Plan
FY2024
Current
Plan
FY2025
FY2026
request
Research
86.00
TBD
25.00
-61.00
-70.9%
Education
3.92
TBD
0
-3.92
-100.0%
Infrastructure
469.84
TBD
472.22
2.38
0.5%
Total
559.76
TBD
497.22
-62.54
-11.2%
Amount
Percentage
Source: National Science Foundation, FY 2025 Budget Request to Congress, May 30, 2025, p. R&RA-11 (PDF page
117 of 222). TBD means to be determined.
March 2024 Report on Federal Agency Funding for Arctic Research
A March 2024 report from the National Science and Technology Council—the FY2025 edition of
a congressionally mandated annual report—presents a compilation of budgetary information
reported by federal agencies and departments engaged in Arctic research. The report states
The federal government spent over $550 million on Arctic research in fiscal year (FY)
2023…. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the National
Science Foundation (NSF), and the Department of Defense (DoD)—agencies with the
three largest Arctic budgets—account for over 80% of the FY 2023 total. Based on agency
summaries, NSF invests primarily in basic research, DoD invests primarily in applied
research, and NASA invests primarily in research infrastructure.29
Figure 3 presents the report’s summary table of Arctic research funding by agency.
29 Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee of the National Science and Technology Council, Arctic Research
Crosscut Budget Report FY 2022-2024, March 2024, p. 4. The reported is mandated by Section 5912 of the FY2023
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (H.R. 7776/P.L. 117-263 of December 23, 2022).
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Figure 3. Arctic Research Funding by Agency, FY2022-FY2024
Table from March 2024 Arctic Research Crosscut Budget Report for FY2022-FY2024
Source: Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee of the National Science and Technology Council, Arctic
Research Crosscut Budget Report FY 2022-2024, March 2024, p. 4.
Major U.S. Policy Documents Relating to the Arctic
The executive branch has issued a number of policy documents concerning the Arctic, including
those mentioned below.
January 2009 Arctic Policy Directive (NSPD 66/HSPD 25)
On January 12, 2009 (i.e., eight days before its final day in office), the George W. Bush
Administration released a presidential directive establishing a new U.S. policy for the Arctic
region. The directive, dated January 9, 2009, was issued as National Security Presidential
Directive 66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25 (NSPD 66/HSPD 25).30 The directive
was the result of an interagency review, and it superseded for the Arctic (but not the Antarctic) a
1994 presidential directive on Arctic and Antarctic policy. The directive, among other things
•
states that the United States is an Arctic nation, with varied and compelling
interests in the region;
30 The text of NSPD 66/HSPD 25 is posted at the Homeland Security Digital Library at https://www.hsdl.org/?
abstract&did=750476.
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•
•
•
sets forth a six-element overall U.S. policy for the region;
describes U.S. national security and homeland security interests in the Arctic; and
discusses a number of issues as they relate to the Arctic, including international
governance; the extended continental shelf and boundary issues; promotion of
international scientific cooperation; maritime transportation; economic issues,
including energy; and environmental protection and conservation of natural
resources.
May 2013 National Strategy for Arctic Region
On May 10, 2013, the Obama Administration released a document entitled National Strategy for
the Arctic Region.31 The document appears to supplement rather than supersede the January 2009
Arctic policy directive (NSPD 66/HSPD 25) discussed above.32 The document states that the
strategy is built on three lines of effort:
•
•
•
advancing U.S. security interests,
pursuing responsible Arctic region stewardship, and
strengthening international cooperation.
Actions taken under the strategy, the document states, will be informed by four guiding
principles:
•
•
•
•
safeguarding peace and stability,
making decisions using the best available information,
pursuing innovative arrangements, and
consulting and coordinating with Alaska natives.
On January 30, 2014, the Obama Administration released an implementation plan for the May
2013 national strategy for the Arctic region.33 The implementation plan outlines about 36 specific
initiatives.
January 2015 Executive Order on Enhancing Coordination of Arctic Efforts
On January 21, 2015, then-President Obama issued Executive Order 13689, entitled “Enhancing
Coordination of National Efforts in the Arctic.” The order established an Arctic Executive
Steering Committee is to “provide guidance to executive departments and agencies and enhance
coordination of Federal Arctic policies across agencies and offices, and, where applicable, with
State, local, and Alaska Native tribal governments and similar Alaska Native organizations,
academic and research institutions, and the private and nonprofit sectors.”
31 National Strategy for the Arctic Region, May 2013, 11 pp.
32 National Strategy for the Arctic Region states on page 6 that the “lines of effort” it describes are to be undertaken
“[t]o meet the challenges and opportunities in the Arctic region, and in furtherance of established Arctic Region
Policy,” at which point there is a footnote referencing the January 2009 Arctic policy directive.
33 Implementation Plan for The National Strategy for the Arctic Region, January 2014, 32 pp. The news release
announcing the implementation plan is posted at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2014/01/30/white-housereleases-implementation-plan-national-strategy-arctic-region. The document itself is posted at
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/implementation_plan_for_the_national_strategy_for_the_
arctic_region_-_fi....pdf.
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October 2022 National Security Strategy Document
A national security strategy document released by the Biden Administration in October 2022
includes a section on the Arctic, entitled “Maintain a Peaceful Arctic,” which states
The United States seeks an Arctic region that is peaceful, stable, prosperous, and
cooperative. Climate change is making the Arctic more accessible than ever, threatening
Arctic communities and vital ecosystems, creating new potential economic opportunities.
and intensifying competition to shape the region’s future. Russia has invested significantly
in its presence in the Arctic over the last decade, modernizing its military infrastructure
and increasing the pace of exercises and training operations. Its aggressive behavior has
raised geopolitical tensions in the Arctic, creating new risks of unintended conflict and
hindering cooperation. The PRC has also sought to increase its influence in the Arctic by
rapidly increased its Arctic investments, pursuing new scientific activities, and using these
scientific engagements to conduct dual-use research with intelligence or military
applications.
We will uphold U.S. security in the region by improving our maritime domain awareness,
communications, disaster response capabilities, and icebreaking capacity to prepare for
increased international activity in the region. We will exercise U.S. Government presence
in the region as required, while reducing risk and preventing unnecessary escalation. Arctic
nations have the primary responsibility for addressing regional challenges, and we will
deepen our cooperation with our Arctic allies and partners and work with them to sustain
the Arctic Council and other Arctic institutions despite the challenges to Arctic cooperation
posed by Russia’s war in Ukraine. We will continue to protect freedom of navigation and
determine the U.S. extended continental shelf in accordance with international rules. We
must build resilience to and mitigate climate change in the region, including through
agreements to reduce emissions and more cross-Arctic research collaboration. As
economic activity in the Arctic increases, we will invest in infrastructure, improve
livelihoods, and encourage responsible private sector investment by the United States, our
allies, and our partners, including in critical minerals, and improve investment screening
for national security purposes. Across these efforts, we will uphold our commitment to
honor Tribal sovereignty and self-governance through regular, meaningful, and robust
consultation and collaboration with Alaska Native communities.34
October 2022 National Strategy for the Arctic Region
A national strategy for the Arctic region that was also released by the Biden Administration in
October 2022, and which states that it is an update of the above-noted May 2013 national strategy
for the Arctic region, states the following in its executive summary:
The United States seeks an Arctic region that is peaceful, stable, prosperous, and
cooperative. The National Strategy for the Arctic Region articulates an affirmative U.S.
agenda over the next ten years, from 2022 to 2032, to realize this vision. This strategy, an
update of its 2013 predecessor, addresses the climate crisis with greater urgency and directs
new investments in sustainable development to improve livelihoods for Arctic residents,
while conserving the environment. It also acknowledges increasing strategic competition
in the Arctic since 2013, exacerbated by Russia’s unprovoked war in Ukraine, and seeks
to position the United States to both effectively compete and manage tensions.
Realizing our vision during this dynamic and challenging period will require U.S.
leadership at home and abroad. We will advance U.S. interests across four mutually
reinforcing pillars spanning both domestic and international issues.
34 White House, National Security Strategy, October 2022, pp. 44-45.
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• Pillar 1—Security: We will deter threats to the U.S. homeland and our allies by
enhancing the capabilities required to defend our interests in the Arctic, while
coordinating shared approaches with allies and partners and mitigating risks of
unintended escalation. We will exercise U.S. government presence in the Arctic region
as required to protect the American people and defend our sovereign territory.
• Pillar 2—Climate Change and Environmental Protection: The U.S. government
will partner with Alaskan communities and the State of Alaska to build resilience to
the impacts of climate change, while working to reduce emissions from the Arctic as
part of broader global mitigation efforts, to improve scientific understanding, and to
conserve Arctic ecosystems.
• Pillar 3—Sustainable Economic Development: We will pursue sustainable
development and improve livelihoods in Alaska, including for Alaska Native
communities, by investing in infrastructure, improving access to services, and
supporting growing economic sectors. We will also work with allies and partners to
expand high-standard investment and sustainable development across the Arctic
region.
• Pillar 4—International Cooperation and Governance: Despite the challenges to
Arctic cooperation resulting from Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, the United States
will work to sustain institutions for Arctic cooperation, including the Arctic Council,
and position these institutions to manage the impacts of increasing activity in the
region. We also seek to uphold international law, rules, norms, and standards in the
Arctic.
This strategy is intended to serve as a framework to guide the U.S. government’s approach
to tackling emerging challenges and opportunities in the Arctic. Our work will be guided
by five principles that will be applied across all four pillars.
• Consult, Coordinate, and Co-Manage with Alaska Native Tribes and
Communities: The United States is committed to regular, meaningful, and robust
consultation, coordination, and co-management with Alaska Native Tribes,
communities, corporations, and other organizations and to ensuring equitable
inclusion of Indigenous Peoples and their knowledge.
• Deepen Relationships with Allies and Partners: We will deepen our cooperation
with Arctic Allies and partners: Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark (including
Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. We will also expand Arctic
cooperation with other countries that uphold international law, rules, norms, and
standards in the region.
• Plan for Long-Lead Time Investments: Many of the investments prioritized in this
strategy will require long lead times. We will be proactive, anticipating changes
coming to the Arctic over the next several decades and making new investments now
to be prepared.
• Cultivate Cross-Sectoral Coalitions and Innovative Ideas: The challenges and
opportunities in the Arctic cannot be solved by national governments alone. The
United States will strengthen and build on coalitions of private sector; academia; civil
society; and state, local, and Tribal actors to encourage and harness innovative ideas
to tackle these challenges.
• Commit to a Whole of Government, Evidence-Based Approach: The Arctic
extends beyond the responsibility of any single region or government agency. U.S.
Federal departments and agencies will work together to implement this strategy. We
will deploy evidence-based decision-making and carry out our work in close
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partnership with the State of Alaska; Alaska Native Tribes, communities, corporations,
and other organizations; and local communities, as well as with the U.S. Congress.35
In October 2023, the Biden Administration released an implementation plan for its October 2022
national strategy for the Arctic region.36 The implementation plan includes 13 strategic objectives
in support of the October 2022 document’s four pillars.37
Ambassador at Large for Arctic Affairs
On July 16, 2014, then-Secretary of State John Kerry announced the appointment of retired Coast
Guard Admiral Robert J. Papp Jr., who served as Commandant of the Coast Guard from May
2010 to May 2014, as the first U.S. Special Representative for the Arctic.38 Papp served as the
U.S. Special Representative until January 20, 2017, the final day of the Obama Administration
and the first day of the Trump Administration.
The position of U.S. Special Representative for the Arctic remained unfilled from January 20,
2017, through July 29, 2020, when it was effectively replaced by the newly created position of
the U.S. coordinator for the Arctic region. On July 29, 2020, the Trump Administration
announced that career diplomat James (Jim) DeHart would be the first U.S. coordinator for the
Arctic region; DeHart began his work in the position that day.39
In the 117th Congress, H.R. 3361, the United States Ambassador at Large for Arctic Affairs Act of
2021, H.R. 3433, the Arctic Diplomacy Act of 2021, and H.R. 9112, the United States
Ambassador at Large for Arctic Affairs Act of 2022, each would have established a position of
United States Ambassador at Large for Arctic Affairs, while S. 2967, the Arctic Diplomacy Act of
2021, would have established the position of Assistant Secretary of State for Arctic Affairs. In the
118th Congress, S. 821 would establish an Ambassador-at-Large for the Arctic Region.
On August 26, 2022, the Biden Administration announced that it was planning to appoint an
Ambassador-at-Large for the Arctic Region.40 On February 13, 2023, the Biden Administration
announced that it was nominating Mike Sfraga, chair of the U.S. Arctic Research Commission
35 White House, National Strategy for the Arctic Region, October 2022, pp. 3-4.
36 White House, Implementation Plan for the 2022 National Strategy for the Arctic Region, October 18, 2023, 58 pp.
37 The 13 strategic objectives are improve our understanding of the Arctic operating environment; exercise presence to
support priority goals; maximize unity of effort with allies and partners; advance community adaptation and climate
resilience; pursue international initiatives to mitigate emissions in the Arctic; expand research to better understand
climate change and inform policy decisions; conserve and protect Arctic ecosystems, including through Indigenous coproduction and co-management; invest in infrastructure; improve access to services and protect subsistence lifestyles
and cultural traditions; develop emerging economic sectors in Alaska; work with allies and partners to increase
responsible Arctic investment, including in critical minerals; sustain the Arctic Council and other arctic institutions and
agreements; and protect freedom of navigation and continental shelf limits.
38 See “Retired Admiral Robert Papp to Serve as U.S. Special Representative for the Arctic,” Press Statement, John
Kerry, Secretary of State, Washington, DC, July 16, 2014.
39 See Department of State, “Appointment of U.S. Coordinator for the Arctic Region,” Media Note, Office of the
Spokesperson, July 29, 2020. See also Matthew Lee, “US Names New Arctic Envoy in Push to Expand Reach in
Region,” Associated Press, July 29, 2020; Timothy Gardner, “U.S. Appoints Coordinator for Arctic Policy As Mineral
Race Heats Up,” Reuters, July 29, 2020; Courtney McBride, “New Cold War: U.S. Names Arctic Policy Czar to Keep
Tabs on China, Russia,” Wall Street Journal, July 29, 2020; Melody Schreiber, “The Trump Administration Appoints a
New State Department Arctic Coordinator,” ArcticToday, July 29, 2020; Levon Sevunts (Radio Canada International),
“Appointment of U.S. Arctic Co-ordinator May Signal More Muscular American Policy,” CBC, July 31, 2020.
40 Department of State, “Establishing an Ambassador-at-Large for the Arctic Region,” press statement, August 26,
2022. See also Melody Schreiber, “US to Create New Arctic Ambassador Position,” ArcticToday, August 26, 2022.
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(USARC), for the position of Ambassador at Large for Arctic Affairs.41 The nomination was
received in the Senate on February 16, 2023. On January 3, 2024, the nomination was returned to
the President under the provisions of Senate Rule XXXI, paragraph 6 of the Standing Rules of the
Senate.42 The Biden Administration subsequently renominated Sfraga for the position; the
nomination was received in the Senate on January 11, 2024, and the Senate confirmed Sfraga for
the position on September 24, 2024.43 Sfraga served in the position until January 20, 2025. The
position as of June 18, 2025, is vacant.44
In the 119th Congress, H.R. 3328, introduced in the House on May 13, 2025, and S. 1000,
introduced in the Senate on March 12, 2025, would amend Title I of the State Department Basic
Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a et seq.) to establish an Ambassador-at-Large for Arctic
Affairs as a permanent position.
Arctic Executive Steering Committee (AESC)
On September 24, 2021, the Biden Administration announced that it was “[r]eactivating the
Arctic Executive Steering Committee (AESC), a mechanism to advance U.S. Arctic interests and
coordinate Federal actions in the Arctic. The AESC will also facilitate the implementation of the
Northern Bering Sea Climate Resilience Area, including by standing up the Northern Bering Sea
Task Force and Tribal Advisory Council. These structures reinforce collaborative partnerships—
particularly with Alaska Native communities—and harness science and Indigenous Knowledge to
inform management and policy.”45 The AESC was initially established by the above-mentioned
January 2015 Executive Order 13689 on enhancing coordination of Arctic efforts.46
41 White House, “President Biden Announces Key Nominees,” February 13, 2023. See also https://www.congress.gov/
nomination/118th-congress/358; Melody Schreiber, “Sfraga Named New Arctic Ambassador,” ArcticToday, February
13, 2023; Riley Rogerson, “Biden Nominates Alaskan as 1st Arctic Ambassador,” Anchorage Daily News, February 14,
2023.
42 See the Congress.gov entry for the nomination at https://www.congress.gov/nomination/118th-congress/358. Senate
Rule XXXI, paragraph 6 of the Standing Rules of the Senate states
Nominations neither confirmed nor rejected during the session at which they are made shall not be
acted upon at any succeeding session without being again made to the Senate by the President; and
if the Senate shall adjourn or take a recess for more than thirty days, all nominations pending and
not finally acted upon at the time of taking such adjournment or recess shall be returned by the
Secretary to the President, and shall not again be considered unless they shall again be made to the
Senate by the President.
(“Rules of the Senate,” accessed May 19, 2025, at https://www.rules.senate.gov/rules-of-thesenate.)
43 See “PN1342—Michael Sfraga—Department of State” at https://www.congress.gov/nomination/118thcongress/1342. See also Leland Schwartz, “Dr. Mike Sfraga confirmed as US Ambassador-at-Large for Arctic Affairs,”
ArcticToday, September 25, 2024; Yereth Rosen, “Alaska Scientist Mike Sfraga Confirmed as U.S. Arctic
Ambassador-at-Large,” Alaska Beacon, September 24, 2024.
44 For an opinion piece concerning the vacancy, see Nathaniel Herz (Northern Journal), “As Trump Eyes Greenland
and Arctic Resources, America’s Ambassadorship for the Region Goes Unfilled,” ArcticToday, April 24, 2025.
45 White House, “Biden-Harris Administration Brings Arctic Policy to the Forefront with Reactivated Steering
Committee & New Slate of Research Commissioners,” press release, September 24, 2021.
46 A September 24, 2021, press report stated: “The steering committee had been moribund for the past four years, not
meeting at a high level, said David Balton, appointed to direct it. He said ‘it will step up and do more in the Arctic.’
The revamped committee will try to figure out what ‘needs to be done to get a better handle on addressing the changes
in the Arctic,’ Balton said.” (Seth Borenstein, “White House Steps Up Work on What to Do About Thawing Arctic,”
Associated Press, September 24, 2021. See also Melody Schreiber, “Biden Appoints New U.S. Arctic Research,
Leadership Officials in Science-Based approach,” ArcticToday, September 24, 2021.)
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Arctic Council
The Arctic Council, created in 1996, is the leading international forum for addressing issues
relating to the Arctic. Its founding document is the Ottawa Declaration of September 19, 1996, a
joint declaration (not a treaty) signed by representatives of the eight Arctic states. The State
Department described the council as “the preeminent intergovernmental forum for addressing
issues related to the Arctic Region. …The Arctic Council is not a treaty-based international
organization but rather an international forum that operates on the basis of consensus, echoing the
peaceful and cooperative nature of the Arctic Region.”47
The Arctic Council’s membership consists of the eight Arctic states. All decisions of the Arctic
Council and its subsidiary bodies are by consensus of the eight Arctic states. In addition to the
eight member states, six organizations representing Arctic Indigenous peoples have status as
Permanent Participants. Thirteen non-Arctic states, 13 intergovernmental and interparliamentary
organizations, and 12 nongovernmental organizations have been approved as observers, making
for a total of 38 observer states and organizations.48
The council has a two-year chairmanship that rotates among the eight member states. The United
States held the chairmanship from April 24, 2015, to May 11, 2017, and is scheduled to next hold
it in 2031-2033. On May 12, 2025, the chairmanship was transferred from Norway to Greenland
on behalf of the Kingdom of Denmark.49
Thematic areas of work addressed by the council include environment and climate, biodiversity,
oceans, Arctic peoples, and agreements on Arctic scientific cooperation, cooperation on marine
oil pollution preparedness and response in the Arctic, and cooperation on aeronautical and
maritime search and rescue (SAR) in the Arctic. The Ottawa Declaration states explicitly that
“The Arctic Council should not deal with matters related to military security.”
The eight Arctic states have signed three legally binding agreements negotiated under the
auspices of the Arctic Council: a May 2011 agreement on cooperation on aeronautical and
maritime SAR in the Arctic, a May 2013 agreement on cooperation on marine oil pollution
preparedness and response in the Arctic, and a May 2017 agreement on enhancing international
Arctic scientific cooperation.50
In the 119th Congress, H.Res. 431, introduced in the House on May 20, 2025, and S.Res. 167,
introduced in the Senate on April 9, 2025, would recognize the importance of the Arctic Council
and reaffirm the commitment of the United States to the Arctic Council.
47 “Arctic Region,” U.S. Department of State, accessed May 19, 2025, at https://2021-2025.state.gov/key-topics-office-
of-ocean-and-polar-affairs/arctic/.
48 For list of the 38 observers and when they were approved for observer status, see “Who We Are” in Arctic Council,
“Arctic Council,” accessed May 19, 2025, at https://arctic-council.org/en/. For a discussion of the non-Arctic observer
states, see Evan T. Bloom, “The Rising Importance of Non-Arctic States in the Arctic,” Wilson Quarterly, Winter
2022.
49 See, for example, Elías Thorsson, “Greenland Assumes Arctic Council Chairmanship During Challenging Times,”
ArcticToday, May 12, 2025.
50 For brief summaries of these three agreements and links to the texts of these agreements, see “Arctic Region,” U.S.
Department of State, accessed May 19, 2025, at https://2021-2025.state.gov/key-topics-office-of-ocean-and-polaraffairs/arctic/. For additional information on the Arctic Council’s organization and operations, see the Arctic Council’s
website at https://arctic-council.org/.
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Arctic and UN Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) “lays down a comprehensive
regime of law and order in the world’s oceans and seas[,] establishing rules governing all uses of
the oceans and their resources.”51 UNCLOS was adopted in 1982, and modified in 1994 by an
agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI of the treaty, which relates to the seabed and
ocean floor and subsoil thereof that are beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. UNCLOS
entered into force in November 1994. As of July 23, 2024, 170 parties (169 states and the
European Union) were party to the treaty.52
The United States is not a party to UNCLOS.53 The 1982 treaty and the 1994 agreement were
transmitted to the Senate on October 6, 1994, during the 103rd Congress, becoming Treaty
Document 103-39. The full Senate to date has not voted on the question of whether to give its
advice and consent to ratification of Treaty Document 103-39. Some Members of Congress,
citing the Arctic, have introduced resolutions in favor of the United States becoming a party to
UNCLOS.54 Although the United States is not a party to UNCLOS, the United States accepts and
acts in accordance with the non-seabed mining provisions of the treaty, such as those relating to
navigation and overflight, which the United States views as reflecting customary international
law of the sea.55
Part VI of UNCLOS (consisting of Articles 76 through 85), which covers the continental shelf,
and Annex II to the treaty, which established a Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf, are particularly pertinent to the Arctic, because Article 77 states that “The coastal State
exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting
its natural resources,” and that these natural resources include, among other things, “mineral and
other nonliving resources of the seabed and subsoil,” including oil and gas deposits.56
51 United Nations, “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, Overview and full text,”
updated July 13, 2022, accessed May 19, 2025, at https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/
convention_overview_convention.htm.
52 Chronological lists of ratifications of, accessions and successions to the Convention and the related Agreements as of
July 23, 2-24, accessed May 19, 2025, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/
chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm. The list shows that most recent state to become a party to the treaty is San
Marino, which became a party on July 19, 2024.
53 The United States is not a signatory to the treaty. On July 29, 1994, the United States became a signatory to the 1994
agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI of the treaty. The United States has not ratified either the treaty or
the 1994 agreement.
54 In the 118th Cong., see, for example, S.Res. 466, a resolution calling upon the United States Senate to give its advice
and consent to the ratification of UNCLOS, which was introduced in the Senate on November 15, 2023. For a press
report about S.Res. 466, see Yereth Rosen, “Alaska’s Sen. Murkowski and Colleagues Make Another Attempt to Win
Ratification of Oceans Treaty,” Alaska Beacon, November 17, 2023. For additional discussion of the question of
whether the United States should become a party to UNCLOS, including arguments both for and against, see CRS
Report R42784, U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress,
by Ronald O'Rourke.
55 In a March 10, 1983, statement on U.S. oceans policy, President Reagan stated that “the United States is prepared to
accept and act in accordance with the [treaty’s] balance of interests relating to traditional uses of the oceans—such as
navigation and overflight. In this respect, the United States will recognize the rights of other states in the waters off
their coasts, as reflected in the Convention, so long as the rights and freedoms of the United States and others under
international law are recognized by such coastal states.” (Statement on United States Oceans Policy, March 10, 1983,
accessed May 19, 2025, at https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/statement-united-states-oceans-policy, and
https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/143224.pdf.)
56 Other parts of UNCLOS relevant to the Arctic include those relating to navigation and high-seas freedoms, fisheries,
and exclusive economic zones.
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Article 76 states that “the coastal State shall establish the outer edge of the continental margin
wherever the margin extends beyond 200 nautical miles,” and that “Information on the limits of
the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles ... shall be submitted by the coastal State to the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf set up under Annex II.... The Commission
shall make recommendations to coastal States on matters related to the establishment of the outer
limits of their continental shelf. The limits of the shelf established by a coastal State on the basis
of these recommendations shall be final and binding.”
House and Senate Arctic Member Organizations
In the House, a Congressional Arctic Working Group was listed as a Congressional Member
Organization (CMO) from the 114th Congress through the 118th Congress. As of June 18, 2025,
such a group was not listed as a CMO in the 119th Congress.57
In the Senate, Senator Lisa Murkowski and Senator Angus King announced on March 4 and 5,
2015, the formation of a Senate Arctic Caucus.58
Issues for Congress
Climate Change, with Biophysical and Economic Impacts59
An array of climate changes in the Arctic is now documented by observing systems, with more
expected with future greenhouse gas-driven climate change. Observed physical changes in the
Arctic include warming ocean, soil, and air temperatures; melting permafrost; shifting vegetation
and animal abundances; and altered characteristics of Arctic cyclones. These changes continue to
affect traditional livelihoods and cultures in the region, infrastructure, and the economy, as well as
the distribution and health of animal populations and vegetation. The changes raise risks of
pollution, food supply, safety, cultural losses, and national security. The state government of
Alaska concluded that observed climate changes “have resulted in a reduction of subsistence
57 Committee on House Administration, “Congressional Member And Staff Organizations,” Congressional Member
Organizations (CMOs) for 107th through 119th Congresses, accessed June 18, 2025, at https://cha.house.gov/
congressional-member-and-staff-organizations. The publication for the 119th Congress that was accessed on May 19,
2025, was updated on May 9, 2025. In the 116th Cong., the group was listed as the Arctic Working Group Caucus; in
the 117th Cong., it was listed as the Arctic Working Group.
58 Press release from the office of Sen. Angus King, “King, Murkowski Announce U.S. Senate Arctic Caucus,” March
4, 2015, accessed May 19, 2025, at http://www.king.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/king-murkowski-announceus-senate-arctic-caucus. See also press release from the office of Sen. Lisa Murkowski, “Senators Murkowski, King
Announce U.S. Senate Arctic Caucus,” March 5, 2015, accessed May 19, 2025, at http://www.murkowski.senate.gov/
public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ID=1ce5edcb-540d-4c43-b264-56bdbb570755, which includes a similar phrase.
Sen. Murkowski states “In April 2015, Senator Murkowski and Senator Angus King of Maine joined forces to establish
the Senate Arctic Caucus. The Arctic Caucus is the first entity in Congress to bring attention to the laws and policies at
stake in the Far North. The purpose of the Caucus is to convene members of Congress, subject matter experts, federal
agency heads, and the public to confront policy questions and advance a coordinated investment in arenas such as
national security, scientific research, commerce, global trade, the environment, maritime affairs, and other relevant
issues impacting the Arctic region.” (Sen. Lisa Murkowski, “Arctic,” accessed May 19, 2025, at
https://www.murkowski.senate.gov/issues/issues-and-priorities/arctic.)
59 This section was prepared by Jane Leggett, who was a Specialist in Energy and Environmental Policy, Resources,
Science, and Industry Division until her retirement from CRS on July 15, 2023.
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harvests, an increase in flooding and erosion, concerns about water and food safety and major
impacts to infrastructure: including damage to buildings, roads and airports.”60
A monitoring report of the Arctic Council concluded in 2019 that
the Arctic biophysical system is now clearly trending away from its previous state [in the
20th century] and into a period of unprecedented change, with implications not only within
but also beyond the Arctic.61
A few broad points raise particular concerns about changes in the Arctic:
•
•
•
•
Long lag times between cause and full effects: Changes once set in motion
prompt further and often slow effects in different components of the Arctic
system, such as the influence of rising atmospheric temperatures on ocean and
permafrost temperatures. Scientists expect the full effects of near-term climate
changes to play out over a period of decades to many centuries.
Feedbacks that mostly further increase warming: Greenhouse gas-induced
warming leads to positive (enhancing) and some negative (dampening) feedbacks
within the Arctic system, which scientists expect in net to amplify warming and
pursuant effects. For example, temperature-driven melting sea ice reduces
reflection of incoming solar energy, leading to absorption by the Arctic Ocean
and further warming of the ocean and the planet.
Abrupt change risks: The freezing point for water, including permafrost, is one
example of thresholds that certain Arctic systems may cross, leading to rapid
state changes.
Risks of irreversibilities: Some Arctic climate impacts, such as loss of sea ice and
glaciers, may lead to system changes that scientists expect would be irreversible
on a human timescale, even if temperatures stabilize (at a higher level than
today).
Understanding remains incomplete regarding future Arctic climate changes and their implications
for human and natural systems. With current knowledge, projections point to growing risks, as
well as some opportunities.
The Arctic is interconnected to the rest of the globe through circulation of water, energy (e.g.,
heat), and carbon, including through the atmosphere and oceans. It is also connected through
human systems of transport, energy and mineral production, tourism, and security. Consequently,
Arctic changes are of import to both Arctic and non-Arctic regions of United States and the rest
of the globe.
This section summarizes a variety of observed and projected climate changes in the Arctic and
identifies some of their impacts on human and ecological systems.62 Other sections in this report
provide further discussion of implications for, for example, national security and energy
production.
60 Department of Commerce, Community, and Economic Development, “Climate Change in Alaska.” The Great State
of Alaska. Accessed May 19, 2025, at https://www.commerce.alaska.gov/web/dcra/ClimateChange.aspx.
61 Jason E Box et al., “Key Indicators of Arctic Climate Change: 1971–2017,” Environmental Research Letters 14, no.
4, April 2019.
62 Although much of Greenland is above the Arctic Circle, and many of the changes and implications apply also to
Greenland, this section emphasizes other parts of the Arctic and does not attempt to summarize the often large and
complex change in Greenland.
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Warming Temperatures and a More Intense Water Cycle
The Arctic warmed at approximately three times the global average rate from 1971 to 2019, with
the region’s surface temperature increasing by more than 3°C (5.5°F).63 Summers have warmed
more than winters. In tandem are trends of fewer cold days, cold nights, frost days, and ice days
in the North American Arctic.64 Researchers found that warming trends as well as climate cycles,
including the North Atlantic Oscillation and the Arctic Oscillation, influence observed extreme
temperatures, ice distribution, and other facets of the Arctic system.65 In addition, positive
feedbacks from the loss of summer sea ice and spring snow cover on land have amplified
warming in the Arctic.66
With warming, the water cycle has become more intense. The Arctic has experienced increasing
precipitation and an increasing share of precipitation falling as rain. The first recorded rainfall at
Greenland’s 10,500-foot Summit Station was on August 14, 2021.67
Warming and increasing rainfall have led to permafrost thaw, glacier melt, and sea ice decline,
leading to greater flows of organic matter and nutrients to Arctic near‐coastal zones, with
implications for algae, ecosystems, fisheries and other systems.
63 T.J. Ballinger et al., “Surface Air Temperature,” Arctic Program, Arctic Report Card 2021.
64 Alvaro Avila-Diaz et al., “Climate Extremes across the North American Arctic in Modern Reanalyses,” Journal of
Climate 34, no. 7, April 1, 2021.
65 Ibid.
66 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Summary for Policymakers,” Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere in a Changing Climate, 2019, https://www.ipcc.ch/srocc/chapter/summary-for-policymakers/. (Hereinafter,
SROCC SPM 2019.)
67 National Snow and Ice Data Center, “Rain at the Summit of Greenland,” August 18, 2021.
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Sea Ice Decline and Mobility
Arctic sea ice has declined in extent, area, and
thickness over recent decades; it has become
more mobile and its spatial distribution has
shifted. The record low extents of Arctic sea
ice in 2012 and 2007 (Figure 4 and Figure
5), as recorded by U.S. National Snow and
Ice Data Center, increased scientific and
policy attention on climate changes in the
high north, and on the implications of
projected ice-free68 seasons in the Arctic
Ocean within decades. Recent late summer
minima may be unprecedented over the past
1,000 years.69 (Some implications are
discussed in sections of this report on
Commercial Sea Transportation; Oil, Gas, and
Mineral Exploration; and others.) The 2021
Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) concluded that “human influence is
very likely the main driver of ... the decrease
in Arctic sea ice area between 1979–1988 and
2010–2019 (about 40% in September and
about 10% in March).”70
Figure 4. 2012 Record-Low Sea Ice Extent
(Compared with long-term median)
Source: National Snow and Ice Data Center, Sea Ice
Index, accessed February 28, 2022.
Simulations under a wide range of future
climate change scenarios indicate that the Arctic could be ice-free in late summers in the second
half of this century in model simulations of low to very high greenhouse gas scenarios (Figure
5).71 The first instances of an ice-free Arctic in late summers could occur by mid-century in all
scenarios, although model simulations provide a wide range of results.72 The mean results of
model simulations reach ice-free seasons in the 2070s in the highest and low warming scenarios,
and later in the very low scenarios. In an analysis of the most recent modeling, a selection of
those models that “reasonably” simulate historical sea ice extent indicated that practically ice-free
conditions may occur at global temperature increases of 1.3°C to 2.9°C above preindustrial
68 In scientific analyses, “ice-free” does not necessarily mean “no ice.” The definition of “ice-free” or sea ice “extent”
or “area” varies across studies. Sea ice “extent” is one common measure, equal to the sum of the area of grid cells that
have ice concentration of less than a set percentage—frequently 15%. For more information, see the National Snow and
Ice Data Center, http://nsidc.org/seaice/data/terminology.html.
69 SROCC SPM 2019.
70 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “AR6 Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis - Summary
for Policy Makers,” August 9, 2021. https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/.
71 Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), “Arctic Climate Change Update 2021: Key Trends and
Impacts. Summary for Policy-Makers,” Arctic Council, May 21, 2021; Marika Holland, Cecilia M. Bitz, and Bruno
Tremblay, “Future abrupt reductions in the summer Arctic sea ice,” Geophysical Research Letters 33, no. L23503
(2006). But see also Julien Boé, Alex Hall, and Xin Qu, “Sources of spread in simulations of Arctic sea ice loss over
the twenty-first century,” Climatic Change 99, no. 3 (April 1, 2010): 637-645; I. Eisenman and J. S. Wettlaufer,
“Nonlinear threshold behavior during the loss of Arctic sea ice,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 106,
no. 1 (January 6, 2009): 28-32; Dirk Notz, “The Future of Ice Sheets and Sea Ice: Between Reversible Retreat and
Unstoppable Loss,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 106, no. 49 (December 8, 2009): 20590-20595.
72 Global climate models do not, in general, simulate past sea ice change realistically and tend to produce less decline in
sea ice extent than the latest 15-year trend.
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levels.73 Although sea ice would remain variable in extent and distribution, modeling of future sea
ice conditions indicate opportunities for transport through the Northwest Passage and the
Northern Sea Route, extraction of potential oil and gas resources, and expanded fishing and
tourism, though also increasing competition and potential security risks and of oil spills and
maritime accidents.
Figure 5. Estimated Historical, Observed, and Projected September
Arctic Sea Ice Extent
Source: Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), “Arctic Climate Change Update 2021: Key
Trends and Impacts. Summary for Policy-Makers,” Arctic Council, May 21, 2021.
Notes: NSIDC is the U.S. National Snow and Ice Data Center, the source that synthesized the satellite
observation data (the bold black line) in this figure. The “historical” values result from model simulations,
showing the modeled mean and the ranges. The projections (in colors) are for a range of greenhouse gas
scenarios and associated climate changes, with the means of results represented by lines. SSP means “Shared
Socioeconomic Pathway” scenarios produced in support of the International Panel on Climate Change depicting
high (SSP585), medium high (SSP30), low (SSP245) and very low (SSP126) scenarios. The shaded areas represent
the ranges of numerical model estimates (number), either historical and projected. The horizontal line
represents sea-ice areal extent of 1 million square kilometers, below which scientists consider the Arctic to be
practically ice-free.
The U.S. Arctic Report Card 2021 noted, in addition, the importance of melting of Arctic landbased ice to experienced sea level rise globally:
In the 47-year period (1971–2017), the Arctic was the largest global source of sea-level
rise contribution, 48% of the global land ice contribution 2003–2010 and 30% of the total
sea-level rise since 1992. Temperature effects are dominant in land ice mass balance.
A special report of the IPCC stated that “for Arctic glaciers, different regional studies consistently
indicate that in many places glaciers are now smaller than they have been in millennia.”74
The Arctic Ocean has been undergoing additional changes: It has been acidifying—with some
parts acidifying more rapidly than the Atlantic or Pacific Oceans.75 Some scientists estimate that
73 The current temperature increase above the 1850-1900 average is about 1.1°C.
74 SROCC SPM 2019.
75 Di Qi et al., “Increase in Acidifying Water in the Western Arctic Ocean,” Nature Climate Change 7, no. 3, March
2017.
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acidification of the Arctic Ocean may increase enough by the 2030s to significantly influence
coastal ecosystems.76 Primary production in the ocean has increased, due to decreases in sea ice
and increases in nutrient supply.
Land-Based Changes
Climate changes in the Arctic have important implications for human and natural land-based
systems, through permafrost thawing, erosion, instability, and ecosystem shifts.
The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) concluded that an increase in coastal erosion on the North
Slope of Alaska was “likely the result of several changing Arctic conditions, including declining
sea-ice extent, increasing summertime sea-surface temperature, rising sea level, and possible
increases in storm power and corresponding wave action.”77 The USGS found that erosion has
been occurring at an average rate of 1.4 meters annually and that, while some areas are accreting,
others are eroding at rates as high as 20 meters per year. Coastal erosion poses risks for native
communities, oil and gas infrastructure, and wildlife; adaptations to mitigate and manage adverse
impacts can be costly and risky.
Warming temperatures have increased thawing of near-surface permafrost. “The majority of
Arctic infrastructure is located in regions where permafrost thaw is projected to intensify by midcentury,” according to the IPCC special report on the cryosphere.78 Existing infrastructure was not
generally placed or engineered for the instability, posing risks to human safety and property, and
potentially disruption. The IPCC report assessed that “about 20% of Arctic land permafrost is
vulnerable to abrupt permafrost thaw and ground subsidence,”79 increasing risks of sudden
failures. According to one study, 30%–50% of critical circumpolar infrastructure may be at high
risk by 2050. “Accordingly, permafrost degradation-related infrastructure costs could rise to tens
of billions of U.S. dollars by the second half of the century.”80 Other costs could be incurred for
relocation of infrastructure and villages, and to manage habitat for subsistence wildlife and
endangered and threatened species.
Impacts of climate change on species have been positive and negative. Longer growing seasons
have resulted in vegetation growth around the Arctic with overall “greening,” though also some
“browning” in some regions in some years. Woody shrubs and trees are projected to expand to
cover 24%–52% of Arctic tundra by 2050.81 Vegetation changes can provide amplifying
feedbacks that increase temperature and permafrost instability. In particular, scientists have
assessed significant methane emissions from some thawing peat bogs.
Potential area burned by wildfire could increase by 25% to 53% by 2100. This could affect, for
example, forage for caribou and shifting competition between caribou and moose, with likely
detriments to subsistence users of caribou.82
76 U.S. Global Change Research Program, “Climate Science Special Report,” Fourth National Climate Assessment, vol.
1, October 2017, https://science2017.globalchange.gov/.
77 Pacific Coastal and Marine Science Center, “Climate Impacts to Arctic Coasts,” U.S. Geological Survey, October 15,
2021.
78 SROCC SPM 2019.
79 SROCC SPM 2019.
80 Hjort, Jan, Dmitry Streletskiy, Guy Doré, Qingbai Wu, Kevin Bjella, and Miska Luoto, “Impacts of Permafrost
Degradation on Infrastructure,” Nature Reviews Earth & Environment 3, no. 1 (January 2022): 24–38, https://doi.org/
10.1038/s43017-021-00247-8.
81 SROCC SPM 2019.
82 SROCC SPM 2019.
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The IPCC special report on the cryosphere also found that
On Arctic land, a loss of globally unique biodiversity is projected as limited refugia exist
for some High-Arctic species and hence they are outcompeted by more temperate species
(medium confidence).83
It identified negative impacts also on food and water security in the Arctic, “disrupt[ing] access
to, and food availability within, herding, hunting, fishing, and gathering areas, harming the
livelihoods and cultural identity of Arctic residents including Indigenous populations.”84 More
broadly, warming and ecosystem shifts have “increased risk of food- and waterborne diseases,
malnutrition, injury, and mental health challenges especially among Indigenous peoples.”85
Few studies have investigated the potential economic effects of the array of physical impacts. A
report for the state of Alaska on the economic effects of climate change
estimated that five relatively certain, large effects that could be readily quantified would
impose an annual net cost of $340–$700 million, or 0.6%–1.3% of Alaska’s GDP. This
significant, but relatively modest, net economic effect for Alaska as a whole obscures large
regional disparities, as rural communities face large projected costs while more southerly
urban residents experience net gains.86
The research did not consider “nonuse” impacts, such as on culture, subsistence harvests, or other
nonmarket values, as well as additional sectors, such as military installations, housing, and others.
Another study estimating the effects of climate change on Alaskan infrastructure found
“cumulative estimated expenses from climate-related damage to infrastructure without adaptation
measures (hereinafter damages) from 2015 to 2099 totaled $5.5 billion (2015 dollars, 3%
discount) for RCP8.5 [a high climate scenario] and $4.2 billion for RCP4.5 [a moderate climate
scenario], suggesting that reducing greenhouse gas emissions could lessen damages by $1.3
billion this century.”87 Costs were mostly due to road flooding and permafrost instability, and
mostly in the interior and southcentral Alaska. It also concluded that adaptation measures could
mostly reduce or entirely avoid the estimated economic losses for this land-based infrastructure.
83 SROCC SPM 2019.
84 SROCC SPM 2019.
85 SROCC SPM 2019.
86 Berman, Matthew, and Jennifer I. Schmidt, “Economic Effects of Climate Change in Alaska.” Weather, Climate, and
Society 11, no. 2 (April 1, 2019): 245–58, https://doi.org/10.1175/WCAS-D-18-0056.1. The five effects evaluated were
change in value added in Alaska (value of shipments less cost of inputs purchased from outside Alaska) for specific
industries; change in household cost of living; change in purchased input costs for businesses and governments; change
in nonwage benefit flows to households, including subsistence benefits; and change in value of buildings and
infrastructure.
87 Melvin, April M., Peter Larsen, Brent Boehlert, James E. Neumann, Paul Chinowsky, Xavier Espinet, Jeremy
Martinich et al., “Climate Change Damages to Alaska Public Infrastructure and the Economics of Proactive
Adaptation,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 114, no. 2 (January 10, 2017): E122–31, https://doi.org/
10.1073/pnas.1611056113.
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Geopolitical Environment88
Overview
Developments Since End of Cold War
Following the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and particularly after the
founding of the Arctic Council in 1996, the Arctic states sought to maintain the Arctic as a region
of cooperation, low tension, peaceful resolution of disputes, and respect for international law—an
approach sometimes referred to as the “Arctic spirit” or “High North, low tension.” The Nordic
countries in particular were committed to this approach.
Over the past 10 to 15 years, the emergence of great power competition (also called strategic
competition) between the United States, Russia, and China has introduced elements of
competition and tension into the Arctic’s geopolitical environment. Russia’s increased military
presence and operations in the Arctic—and responding actions by other Arctic states—are one
source of competition and tension. China’s increased activities in the Arctic are another.
Some observers view the Arctic as having become an arena for geopolitical competition among
the United States, Russia, and China,89 or argue that the diminishment of Arctic ice and
potentially increased maritime access to the region’s resources has prompted or could prompt a
race for Arctic resources (or words to that effect) among Russia, China, the United States, and
other countries.90 Other observers argue that competitive aspects of the region’s geopolitical
environment and the notion of a race for Arctic resources are sometimes overstated.91
88 This section was prepared by Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade
Division. It incorporates material prepared by Kristin Archick, Specialist in European Affairs, Foreign Affairs,
Defense, and Trade Division, and Derek E. Mix, Analyst in European Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade
Division.
89 See, for example, Heather A. Conley, “The Arctic Great Game, And Why America Risks Losing It,” Foreign Affairs,
June 24, 2025; Katya Adler, “Tensions Rise as Superpowers Scrap for a Piece of the Arctic,” BBC, May 23 2025;
Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen, “Divided Arctic in a Divided World Order,” Strategic Analysis, vol. 48, 2024, Issue 6
(posed online March 4, 2025); Vivienne Machi, “Melting Ice Is Spurring Strategic Competition in the Arctic,” Aviation
Week, December 18, 2024; Mathieu Boulègue with Minna Ålander, Charlotta Collén, Edward Lucas, Catherine
Sendak, and Krista Viksnins, Up North, Confronting Arctic Insecurity Implications for the United States and NATO,
Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), 2024 (posted online December 5, 2024), 44 pp.; Elizabeth Buchanan,
“How America Lost the Arctic,” National Interest, November 13, 2024; Ryan Chan, “US-Russia Rivalry Heats Up in
Arctic Arena,” Newsweek, September 18, 2024; Chloe Hadavas, “Inside the Battle for the Arctic, What to Know as
Great-Power Politics Heat Up in the High North,” Foreign Policy, September 8, 2024.
90 See, for example, Economist, “The Arctic: Climate Change’s Great Economic Opportunity,” Economist, January 23,
2025; Joanna Rozpedowski, “Resource Wars: How Climate Change Is Fueling Militarization of the Arctic,”
RealClearDefense, August 7, 2024; The Week Staff, “Under the Melting Ice: The Race for the Arctic’s Riches,” The
Week, May 11, 2023; Margaret Sutherlin, “Who Owns the North Pole? A Race Is Underway to Decide,” Bloomberg,
May 5, 2023; Elizabeth Buchanan, “Russia’s Gains in the Great Arctic Race,” War on the Rocks, May 4, 2023; Lisa
Desjardins, Andrew Corkery, and Azhar Merchant, “Tensions Rise as Nations Race for Valuable Resources in the
Arctic,” PBS, April 23, 2023; “Arctic Resources Race,” Wikipedia, updated April 8, 2023.
91 See, for example, Rebecca Pincus, “Small Ocean, Big Hype: Arctic Myths and Realities,” War on the Rocks, May 3,
2024; Anna Valberg, “War in the Arctic? Researchers Debunk Three Myths about the High North,” ScienceNorway.no,
January 26, 2024; Jo Inge Bekkevold and Paal Sigurd Hilde, “Europe’s Northern Flank Is More Stable Than You
Think,” Foreign Policy, July 28, 2023; P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Adam Lajeunesse, and Ryan Dean, “Why China Is
Not a Peer Competitor in the Arctic,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, October 3, 2022; Øystein Tunsjø, “The Great
Hype: False Visions of Conflict and Opportunity in the Arctic,” Survival, 2020 (published online September 23, 2020);
Thomas Graham and Amy Myers Jaffe, “There Is No Scramble for the Arctic,” Foreign Affairs, July 27, 2020; Jeremy
Tasch, “Why the Talk of an ‘Artic Cold War’ Is Exaggeration,” Valdai Discussion Club, July 7, 2020; Danita Catherine
Burke, “Why the New Arctic ‘Cold War’ is a Dangerous Myth,” The Conversation, December 13, 2018.
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Arctic Governance
Prior to the Russia-Ukraine war, great power competition and increased human activities in the
Arctic resulting from the diminishment of Arctic ice put a spotlight on the issue of Arctic
governance and the limits of the Arctic Council as a governing body.92 The Russia-Ukraine war
(see discussion below) prompted new or heightened questions about the future of the Arctic
Council and Arctic governance.
Regarding the limits of the Arctic Council as a governing body, the council states that it “does not
and cannot implement or enforce its guidelines, assessments or recommendations. That
responsibility belongs to individual Arctic States or international bodies. The Arctic Council’s
mandate, as articulated in the Ottawa Declaration, explicitly excludes military security.”93 Arctic
security issues currently can be addressed, to some degree at least, through other existing
mechanisms, such as the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable (ASFR) and the Arctic Chiefs of
Defense (ACHOD) Forum.
Prior to the Russia-Ukraine war, China raised questions as to whether the Arctic Council as
currently constituted and the current broader legal framework for the Arctic should continue to be
the principal means for addressing issues relating to the Arctic, and had begun to use other
approaches for influencing Arctic governance.94
Arctic in U.S. Policymaking
In light of great power competition and increased human activities in the Arctic resulting from the
diminishment of Arctic ice, some observers argue that there is a need to devote more U.S.
attention and resources to the region.95 On the other hand, great power competition is also being
expressed in Europe, the Middle East, the Indo-Pacific, Africa, and Latin America. In a situation
of finite U.S. policymaker attention and resources, the Arctic competes with these other regions
for attention and resources. Some observers argue that the United States is not allocating
92 See, for example, Benjamin J. Sacks et al., Exploring Gaps in Arctic Governance, Identifying Potential Sources of
Conflict and Mitigating Measures, RAND, 2021, 29 pp. (report RRA1007.1); Joshua Tallis, “The Phantom of Arctic
Misgovernance,” War on the Rocks, June 11, 2021; Ebru Caymaz, “Rethinking Governance in Time of Pandemics in
the Arctic,” Arctic Institute, January 14, 2021; Ian Birdwell, “Arctic Governance: Keeping The Arctic Council On
Target,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), July 29, 2020; Benjamin Chiacchia, “The Case for an
Arctic Treaty,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 2020; Rashmi Ramesh, “Changing Geopolitics of the Arctic:
Challenges for Governance,” IndraStra, April 9, 2020; Angus Parker, “Looking North: How Should the Arctic Be
Governed?” Geographical (UK), March 17, 2020; Kevin McGwin, “An Arctic Treaty Has Been Rejected by the
Region’s Leaders. Again; Academics Will Tell You the Idea of an Arctic Treaty Sounds Terribly Exciting. Diplomats
Think It Is Just Terrible,” ArcticToday, February 12, 2020; Marc Lanteigne, “So You Want to Write an Arctic Treaty?”
Over the Circle, February 10, 2020; Heather Exner-Pirot et al., “Form and Function: The Future of the Arctic Council,”
Arctic Institute, February 5, 2019.
93 Arctic Council, “About the Arctic Council,” accessed May 19, 2025, at https://arctic-council.org/en/about/.
94 See, for example, Pan Yixuan, “Global Governance Needed for Arctic Affairs,” China Daily, May 10, 2019; Zhang
Yao, “Ice Silk Road Framework Welcomed by Countries, Sets New Direction for Arctic Cooperation,” Global Times,
April 7, 2019; Liu Caiyu, “China’s Role in Arctic Governance ‘Cannot Be Ignored,’” Global Times, November 22,
2018; Harriet Moynihan, “China Expands Its Global Governance Ambitions in the Arctic,” Chatham House, October
15, 2018; Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “China & Russia In The Arctic: Axis Of Ambivalence,” Breaking Defense, July 6,
2018; Nengye Liu and Michelle Lim, “How Arctic Governance Could Become a Testing Ground for Sino-US
Relations,” The Conversation, March 29, 2017.
95 See, for example, Kenneth R. Rosen, “A Battle for the Arctic Is Underway. And the U.S. Is Already Behind,”
Politico, December 17 (updated December 18), 2022; Daniel Kochis and Johnathan Little, “As Russia Invests in Arctic,
America Falls Behind,” Heritage Foundation, November 3, 2021; Heather A. Conley and Matthew Melino, The
Implications of U.S. Policy Stagnation toward the Arctic Region, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS),
May 2019, 5 pp.
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sufficient attention or resources to defend and promote its interests in the Arctic.96 A September
2023 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report stated,
Management roles for advancing U.S. Arctic priorities span the federal government….
While many federal entities engage with foreign partners on Arctic issues, the Department
of State serves as the lead for Arctic diplomacy efforts….
Stakeholders identified five factors that facilitated and five factors that hindered the federal
government’s management of U.S. Arctic priorities. For example, stakeholders identified
U.S. Arctic expertise and engagement as factors that facilitated its influence in the Arctic
Council. However, some stakeholders said that the Arctic Executive Steering Committee
and the broader federal government face various challenges related to interagency
coordination that hinder implementation of U.S. Arctic priorities outlined in the [October]
2022 [Arctic] strategy.
Stakeholders identified three factors pertaining to State’s structures that facilitated and two
factors that hindered State’s management of U.S. Arctic priorities. For example,
stakeholders identified continuity within the Senior Arctic Official position and supporting
office as a factor that has deepened institutional knowledge for Arctic Council work,
facilitating efforts to promote U.S. priorities. However, some stakeholders identified gaps
in leadership and limited convening authority as factors that had hindered management.
Many stakeholders viewed the announcement of the Ambassador-at-Large for the Arctic
Region position positively but identified elements State and the new Ambassador should
consider to manage U.S. Arctic priorities successfully going forward. These elements
include consistency in position and title, a formalized office structure, clarity of
Ambassador’s role within the department, and greater authority to coordinate with all the
relevant bureaus across the department.97
U.S. Interest in Greenland
President Trump on multiple occasions has expressed an interest in having the United
States annex Greenland. (As noted earlier, Greenland is a self-governing part of the
Kingdom of Denmark.)98 For example, in his address to a joint session of Congress on
March 4, 2025, President Trump stated
96 See, for example, Kenneth R. Rosen, “A Battle for the Arctic Is Underway. And the U.S. Is Already Behind,”
Politico, December 17 (updated December 18), 2022; Mir Sadat, “The US Is Unprepared to Face the Challenge in the
Arctic. Here’s What It Should Do,” Atlantic Council, January 31, 2022; Tyler Olson, “Biden Admin Faces Lack of
Icebreakers, Increasing Russian and Chinese Threats in Arctic,” Fox News, May 9, 2021; Rockford Weitz,
“Competition Heats Up in the Melting Arctic, and the US Isn’t Prepared to Counter Russia,” The Conversation, April
19 (updated June 11), 2021; John Rossomando, “Will Joe Biden Lose the Arctic to Russia or China?” National Interest,
April 18, 2021.
97 Government Accountability Office, Arctic Region: Factors That Facilitate and Hinder the Advancement of U.S.
Priorities, GAO-23-106002, September 2023, highlights page.
98 The CIA World Factbook states that
Danish colonization [of Greenland] began in the 18th century, and Greenland became part of the
Kingdom of Denmark in 1953. It joined the European Community (now the EU) with Denmark in
1973 but withdrew in 1985 over a dispute centered on stringent fishing quotas. Greenland remains a
member of the EU's Overseas Countries and Territories Association. The Danish parliament
granted Greenland home rule in 1979; the law went into effect the following year. Greenland voted
in favor of self-government in 2008 and acquired greater responsibility for internal affairs when the
Act on Greenland Self-Government was signed into law in 2009. The Kingdom of Denmark,
however, continues to exercise control over several policy areas on behalf of Greenland, including
foreign affairs, security, and financial policy, in consultation with Greenland's Self-Rule
Government.
(CIA, “Greenland,” World Factbook.)
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And I also have a message tonight for the incredible people of Greenland. We strongly
support your right to determine your own future, and if you choose, we welcome you into
the United States of America.
We need Greenland for national security and even international security. And we’re
working with everybody involved to try and get it. But we need it really for international
world security. And I think we’re going to get it. One way or the other, we’re going to get
it.
We will keep you safe. We will make you rich. And together we will take Greenland to
heights like you have never thought possible before.
It’s a very small population, but very, very large piece of land and very, very important for
military security.99
In August 2019, President Trump similarly expressed an interest in the idea of buying Greenland
from Denmark.100 Denmark rejected the idea, stating that Greenland was not for sale.101 Prior
instances of U.S. interest in acquiring Greenland occurred in 1868, 1910, and 1946.102
99 Source: Associated Press transcript of address, as printed in “Read the Full Text of Trump’s Speech to a Joint
Session of Congress,” PBS, March 4, 2025. The text of the address is also available at “Address Before a Joint Session
of the Congress,” American Presidency Project, March 04, 2025. See also, for example, Francesca Chambers and Zac
Anderson, “Trump Says US Will Acquire Greenland ‘One Way or the Other’ in Presidential Address,” USA Today,
March 4 (updated March 5), 2025; Annie Nova, “Trump Says the U.S. Will Take Control of Greenland ‘One Way or
the Other,’” CNBC, March 4 (updated March 5), 2025.
For additional discussion of President Trump’s interest in annexing Greenland as U.S. territory, see, for example, Isaac
B. Kardon and Alexander Gabuev, “Trump’s Greenland Obsession Will Not Secure America,” Foreign Policy, May
26, 2025; Michael Crowley and Maggie Haberman, “Inside Trump’s Plan to ‘Get’ Greenland: Persuasion, Not
Invasion,” New York Times, April 10, 2025; Lisa Rein, Michael Birnbaum, Natalie Allison, and Jeff Stein, “White
House Studying Cost of Greenland Takeover, Long in Trump’s Sights,” Washington Post, April 1, 2025; Anders
Hagstrom, “Trump Says ‘We Need Greenland for International Safety and Security’ Ahead of Vance Trip,” Fox News,
March 27, 2025; Danny Nguyen, “‘We Have to Have It’: Trump Ups the Pressure on Greenland,” Politico, March 26,
2025; Agence France-Presse, “Trump Reiterates US Need to ‘Have’ Greenland Ahead of Vance Visit,” Agence
France-Presse, March 26, 2025; Steve Holland, “Trump Tells NATO Chief the US Needs Greenland,” Reuters, March
13, 2025; Ishaan Tharoor, “The Curious Momentum behind Trump’s Quest for Greenland,” Washington Post, January
29, 2025; Ian Aikman, “Trump Says He Believes US Will ‘Get Greenland,’” BBC, January 25, 2025.
100 See, for example, Marc Lanteigne and Mingming Shi, “‘No Sale’: How Talk of a US Purchase of Greenland
Reflected Arctic Anxieties,” Over the Circle, September 17, 2020; Stuart Lau, “Did China’s Growing Presence in
Arctic Prompt Donald Trump’s Offer to Buy Greenland?” South China Morning Post, September 1, 2019; Nadia
Schadlow, “Why Greenland Is Really About China,” The Hill, August 28, 2019; Daniel Lippman, “Trump’s Greenland
Gambit Finds Allies Inside Government,” Politico, August 24, 2019; Seth Borenstein (Associated Press), “Icy Arctic
Becomes Hot Property for Rival Powers,” Navy Times, August 22, 2019; Ragnhild Grønning, “Why Trump Is Looking
to Buy Greenland—Even If It’s Not for Sale,” High North News, August 19, 2019. See also Caitlin Hu and Stephen
Collinson, “Why Exactly Is the US So Interested in Greenland?” CNN, July 23, 2020. See also Tarisai Ngangura, “ExStaffer: Trump Wanted to Trade ‘Dirty’ Puerto Rico for Greenland,” Vanity Fair, August 19, 2020; Jacob GronholtPedersen, “As the Arctic’s Attractions Mount, Greenland is a Security Black Hole,” Reuters, October 20, 2020; Gordon
Lubold, “U.S. Holds Talks Over Economic, Security Arrangements With Greenland,” Wall Street Journal, October 28,
2020. See also Peter Baker, “Cosmetics Billionaire Convinced Trump That the U.S. Should Buy Greenland,” New York
Times, September 14, 2022.
101 See, for example, Sophie Lewis, “’Not for Sale’: Danish Officials Unanimously Reject Trump’s Interest in Buying
Greenland,” CBS News, August 16, 2019; Jacob Gronholt-Pedersenwith additional reporting by Sarah N. Lynch,
“Danish PM Says Trump's Idea of Selling Greenland to U.S. Is Absurd,” Reuters, August 18, 2019.
102 Sources: Steven Press, “Buying Greenland Isn’t a New Idea,” Wall Street Journal, January 1, 2025; Elías Thorsson
and Marybeth Sandell, “Trump’s Greenland Purchase Plan Has Been a US Ambition Since 1868,” ArcticToday,
January 6, 2025; Jamie Dettmer, “Trump Joins History’s Long Line of Suitors Coveting Greenland,” Politico, January
11, 2025; Dave Roos, “America’s Long History of Trying to Acquire Greenland,” History.com, February 5 (updated
May 27), 2025. Another source (“Proposed United States Acquisition of Greenland,” Wikipedia, update June 10, 2025,
accessed June 11, 2025) cites an additional instance in 1955.
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U.S. annexation of Greenland would substantially expand U.S. Arctic territory: the total land area
of Greenland is about 836,330 square miles,103 which is about 43% greater than the total land area
of Alaska,104 and while most of Alaska’s land area is south of the Arctic Circle,105 most of
Greenland’s land area is north of the Arctic Circle.106 Current U.S. Arctic territory (i.e., the Arctic
part of Alaska) is on the Pacific-facing side of the Arctic, to the west of Canada; the addition of
Greenland to U.S. territory would result in the United States also having Arctic territory on the
Atlantic-facing side of the Arctic, to the east of Canada. The addition of Greenland to U.S.
territory could increase requirements for U.S. polar icebreakers and would significantly expand
the U.S. area of responsibility for search and rescue (SAR) under the 2011 Arctic Council
agreement on cooperation on aeronautical and maritime SAR in the Arctic. (See the section of
this report entitled “Search and Rescue (SAR),” including Figure 6.) The annexation of
Greenland would expand the U.S. population in the Arctic: the estimated population of Greenland
in 2024 was about 57,750,107 of which a portion live north of the Arctic Circle. (Greenland’s
population centers south of the Arctic Circle include the capital city of Nuuk, which accounts for
about one-third of Greenland’s population.108)
The U.S. military presence in Greenland dates to World War II and continues under a 1951 U.S.Denmark agreement that was amended and supplemented in 2004.109 The current U.S. military
presence in Greenland is primarily at Pituffik (pronounced bee-doo-FEEK) Space Base
(previously called Thule Air Base), which is located near the west coast of Greenland, toward the
top of Baffin Bay.
In June 2025, it was reported that the Department of Defense intends to transfer operational
responsibility for Greenland from U.S. European Command (USEUCOM, the U.S. unified
combatant command for Europe and Russia) to U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM, the
U.S. unified combatant command for the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, and
portions of the Caribbean region, including the Bahamas, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin
Islands).110
103 See, for example, CIA, “Greenland,” World Factbook, which states that the land area of Greenland is 2,166,086
square kilometers, which equates to 836,330.5 square miles.
104 The land area of Alaska is 586,412 square miles. (Source: State of Alaska, “Geography of Alaska.”)
105 As stated earlier in this report, the Arctic Circle definition of the Arctic includes the northernmost part of Alaska—
more than one-quarter of the state’s land area. (Source: Lawrence Hamilton, Jochen Wirsing, Jessica Brunacini, and
Stephanie Pfirman, “Arctic Knowledge of the U.S. Public,” Arctic Research Consortium of the United States
[ARCUS], undated, but with an internet address [https://www.arcus.org/witness-the-arctic/2017/5/highlight/2] and
endnotes suggesting a date of 2017, which states: “More than a quarter of Alaska’s land area lies north of the Arctic
Circle.”)
106 Some sources state that two-thirds of Greenland is north of the Arctic Circle. (See, for example, “Greenland,”
Britannica, undated, and Aaron Sidder, “Greenland,” National Geographic, undated. Another source states that more
than 80% of Greenland is north of the Arctic Circle. (“Greenland,” Wikipedia, updated May 28, 2025.)
107 CIA, “Greenland,” World Factbook, which states that the estimated population in 2024 was 57,751.
108 For a list of Greenland’s most populous cities and towns, see “List of Cities and Towns in Greenland,” Wikipedia,
updated April 26, 2025, accessed June 11, 2025.
109 U.S. Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series 04-806, Agreement between the United States
of America and Denmark Amending and Supplementing the Agreement of April 27, 1951, Signed at Igaliku, August 6,
2004, with Joint Declarations.
110 See, for example, Corey Dickstein, “Pentagon Moves Control of Greenland from Europe to Northern Command,”
Stars and Stripes, June 17, 2025; Noah Robertson, “Pentagon Shifts Greenland to US Northern Command in Shakeup,”
Defense News, June 17, 2025.
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Some observers view the Trump Administration’s interest in annexing Greenland as reflecting a
desire to gain U.S. possession of Greenland’s mineral deposits and a desire to gain a direct U.S.
ability to
•
•
•
deny China and Russia access to Greenland’s mineral deposits,
deny China and Russia the use of Greenland as a potential location for
establishing military or other facilities, and
preclude China and Russia from otherwise increasing their presence and
influence in Greenland.111
A May 27, 2025, press report stated
US and European mining companies need to hurry up and invest in Greenland, otherwise
it will have to look elsewhere for help exploiting its minerals, including from China, a
minister for the vast Arctic territory has warned.
“We want to develop our business sector and diversify it, and that requires investments
from outside,” Naaja Nathanielsen, Greenland’s minister for business and mineral
resources, told the Financial Times.
When asked about turning to China, she replied: “We do want to partner up with European
and American partners. But if they don’t show up I think we need to look elsewhere.”112
Some observers view the Trump Administration’s interest in annexing Greenland as additionally
forming part of a broader Administration strategy to enhance U.S. influence or control over the
111 See, for example, Karoun Demirjian, “Why Does Trump Want Greenland? Here’s What to Know,” New York
Times, March 28, 2025. See also Tom Little, Leonhard Foeger, and Nandita Bose, “Vance Accuses Denmark of Not
Keeping Greenland Safe from Russia, China,” Reuters, March 29, 2025; Natalie Andrews, Sune Engel Rasmussen, and
Alexander Ward, “In Greenland, Vance Criticizes Denmark’s Stewardship of the Island,” Wall Street Journal, March
28, 2025; Karoun Demirjian, “Why Does Trump Want Greenland? Here’s What to Know,” New York Times, March 28,
2025; Luke McGee, “Europe Wonders if Trump Can Be Bought Off With Arctic Concessions,” Foreign Policy, March
26, 2025; James Jay Carafano, “Greenland and Trump’s Strategy to Deal with China and Russia,” Real Clear Defense,
Geopolitical Intelligence Services (GIS), February 26, 2025; Christina Lu, “Trump’s Chaotic Agenda Has a Critical
Through Line, What Do Greenland, Canada, and Ukraine Have in Common? Critical Minerals,” Foreign Policy,
February 26, 2025; Sandra Erwin, “Trump’s Interest in Greenland Highlights Space Race in the High North,” Space
News, February 13, 2025; Ryan. P. Burke, “Trump’s Greenland Gambit Is a Masterclass in Statecraft,” Real Clear
Defense, February 12, 2025; Guy Laron, “What Trump actually wants in the Middle East,” The Hill, February 6, 2025
(includes discussion of Greenland); Steven W. Mosher, “From Panama to Greenland — All of Trump’s Problems Lead
to China,” New York Post, February 1, 2025; Amanda Friedman, “‘This Is Not a Joke’: Rubio Says Trump Is Serious
About Buying Greenland,” Politico, January 30, 2025; Matthew Lee, “Rubio Says Trump’s Interest in Greenland and
Panama Canal Is Legit and Driven by China Concerns,” Associated Press, January 30, 2025; Iain Marlow, “Rubio Says
Trump Greenland Bid ‘Not a Joke,’ Citing China Risks,” Bloomberg, January 30 (updated January 31), 2025; Daphne
Psaledakis, “Trump Interest in Buying Greenland ‘Not a Joke,’ Rubio Says,” Reuters, January 30, 2025; Filip Timotija,
“Rubio on Buying Greenland: ‘This Is Not a Joke,’” The Hill, January 30, 2025; Seong Hyeon Choi, “China, Russia’s
Growing Arctic Presence Underpins Trump’s Greenland Musings,” South China Morning Post, January 22, 2025;
Regin Winther Poulsen, “What Does Trump Want in Greenland?” Foreign Policy, January 17, 2025; Evan Dyer (CBC
News), “Why Acquiring Greenland Is More than Just a Whim of Trump,” Eye on the Arctic (Radio Canada
International), January 16, 2025; James Stavridis, “Trump Is Right: Greenland Is Vital to US National Security,”
Bloomberg, January 10, 2025; Georgi Kantchev, “What Trump Wants With Greenland,” Wall Street Journal, January
8, 2025; John Vandiver, “Why Greenland and the Broader Arctic Have Had the Pentagon’s Growing Attention for
Years,” Stars and Stripes, January 8, 2025; Janet Levy, “Trump’s Arctic Policy Is No Folly,” American Thinker,
January 7, 2025; Ken Moriyasu, “Greenland Crucial to Arctic Race vs. Russia, China: ex-Trump Aide,” Nikkei Asia,
December 30, 2024; Kelsey Baker and Mikhail Klimentov, “Who Controls Greenland, and Why Does Trump Want to
Buy It?” Washington Post, December 26, 2024. See also Aaron Brady, “Greenland’s Military Possibilities for the
United States,” War on the Rocks, April 4, 2025. For an alternate view, see Andreas Østhagen, “Trump Has
Misunderstood the Importance of Greenland,” Arctic Institute, March 29, 2025.
112 Richard Milne and Leslie Hook, “Greenland Says It Will Turn to China If US and EU Shun Its Mining Sector,”
Financial Times, May 27, 2025.
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Western Hemisphere—a goal some observers refer to as a Monroe Doctrine 2.0—perhaps in
preparation for a so-called spheres-of-influence world featuring three primary spheres of
influence led by the United States, Russia, and China, with the U.S. sphere being centered on (but
not necessarily limited to) the Western Hemisphere.113
An April 1, 2025, press report stated: “The White House is preparing an estimate of what it would
cost the federal government to control Greenland as a territory, according to three people with
knowledge of the matter, the most concrete effort yet to turn President Donald Trump’s desire to
acquire the Danish island into actionable policy.”114
A May 6, 2025 press report stated
The U.S. is stepping up its intelligence-gathering efforts regarding Greenland, drawing
America’s spying apparatus into President Trump’s campaign to take over the island,
according to two people familiar with the effort.
Several high-ranking officials under Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard issued
a “collection emphasis message” to intelligence-agency heads last week. They were
directed to learn more about Greenland’s independence movement and attitudes on
American resource extraction on the island.”115
113 See, for example, Howard LaFranchi and Whitney Eulich, “As China’s Influence Grows in the Americas, Trump
Hints at a Monroe Doctrine 2.0,” Christian Science Monitor, May 30, 2025; Francis P. Sempa, “Trump’s
Reinvigoration of the Monroe Doctrine Informs His Turn to Greenland,” American Spectator, May 19, 2025; Stacie E.
Goddard, “The Rise and Fall of Great-Power Competition, Trump’s New Spheres of Influence,” Foreign Affairs,
May/June 2025 (published online April 22, 2025); Chuck DeVore, “Why Trump Is Right to Revitalize the Monroe
Doctrine,” Fox News, April 18, 2025; Brahma Chellaney, “Trump Is Taking the Monroe Doctrine Global,” The Hill,
April 9, 2025; Max Boot, “Trump’s Emerging Foreign Policy Is a Disturbing 19th-Century Throwback,” Washington
Post, April 7, 2025; Hal Brands, “The US Is Losing the Contest to Divide the World,” Bloomberg, March 31, 2025;
Karen DeYoung, “Trump Revives Monroe Doctrine in U.S. Relations with Western Hemisphere,” Washington Post,
February 28, 2025; Robert D. Kaplan, “Trump’s New Map,” Foreign Policy, February 25, 2025; Scott Neuman, “What
Does Trump Mean When He Invokes America's ‘Manifest Destiny’?” NPR, February 7, 2025; John Yoo and Robert J.
Delahunty, “Return to the Monroe Doctrine,” American Enterprise Institute (AEI), February 5, 2025; James Holmes,
“The Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine,” National Interest, January 21, 2025; Jeremiah Poff, “Trump Is Making
the Monroe Doctrine Great Again,” Washington Examiner, January 18, 2025; Alexander B. Gray, “Trump Will End
U.S. Passivity in the Western Hemisphere,” Foreign Policy, January 13, 2025; Edward Luce, “Trump, Greenland and
the Rebirth of the Monroe Doctrine,” Financial Times, January 10, 2025; Tim Hains, “Trump National Security
Advisor Mike Waltz on Greenland, Panama Canal: ‘Call It Monroe Doctrine 2.0,’” Real Clear Politics, January 9,
2025; Stephen Collinson, “Trump’s Threats to Greenland, Canada and Panama Explain Everything about America
First,” CNN, January 8, 2025; Stewart Patrick, “Trump’s Greenland and Panama Canal Threats Are a Throwback to an
Old, Misguided Foreign Policy,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 7, 2025; Karen DeYoung,
“Trump’s Panama Canal Threats Designed to Scuttle China Influence,” Washington Post, December 24, 2024.
114 Lisa Rein, Michael Birnbaum, Natalie Allison, and Jeff Stein, “White House Studying Cost of Greenland Takeover,
Long in Trump’s Sights,” Washington Post, April 1, 2025.
115 Katherine Long and Alexander Ward, “U.S. Orders Intelligence Agencies to Step Up Spying on Greenland,” Wall
Street Journal, May 6, 2025. See also Julian E. Barnes and Maggie Haberman, “Intelligence Agencies Increase Focus
on Greenland, U.S. Officials Say,” New York Times, May 8, 2025.
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The Trump Administration’s interest in annexing Greenland has affected U.S.-Danish relations116
and U.S. relations with other European countries.117 A May 8, 2025, press report stated
The Danish government summoned the American ambassador to express its displeasure
after a report that the Trump administration was escalating its spying on Greenland.
The Danish foreign ministry said that Jennifer Hall Godfrey, the acting U.S. ambassador
to Denmark, had been called for a meeting after the Wall Street Journal reported that the
Trump administration had ordered U.S. intelligence agencies to step up their surveillance
116 See, for example, Terje Solsvik, “Denmark Won’t Bend to Trump's Pressure over Greenland, Prime Minister Says,”
Reuters, June 5, 2025; Csongor Körömi, “Denmark’s Defense Boss Not ‘Able to Imagine’ a US Takeover of
Greenland,” Politico, May 13, 2025; Jan Cienski, “Hands off Greenland, ex-NATO Chief Defies Trump,” Politico,
May 12, 2025 (quoting remarks by former Danish Prime Minister and NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh
Rasmussen); Elías Thorsson, “No Good Options as Denmark Seeks to Counter U.S. Threats to Greenland,”
ArcticToday, May 8, 2025; Jacob Gronholt-Pedersen and Louise Rasmussen, “Greenland, Denmark Affirm Alliance
amid Trump’s Interest in US Control,” Reuters, April 27, 2025; Associated Press, “Danish Leader Tells the US ‘You
Cannot Annex Another Country’ as She Visits Greenland,” Associated Press, April 4, 2025; Associated Press, “Danish
Prime Minister Visits Greenland as Trump Seeks Control of the Arctic Territory,” Associated Press, April 3, 2025;
Tom Little and Louise Rasmussen, “Danish PM Pledges to Support Greenland Against Trump Pressure,” Reuters, April
2, 2025; Jacob Gronholt-Pedersen and Louise Rasmussen, “Denmark Condemns What It Calls Trump's Escalated
Rhetoric on Greenland,” Reuters, March 27, 2025; Joseph Curl, “‘One Way or the Other’: Trump’s Vow To ‘Get’
Greenland Sparks International Tension and Local Outrage,” New York Sun, March 5, 2025; Sudip Kar-Gupta and
Charlotte Van Campenhout, “Denmark PM Repeats that Greenland Is Not for Sale,” Reuters, February 3, 2025; Jacob
Gronholt-Pedersen, “Denmark Stands Firm on Greenland after Rubio Says Trump’s Interest Is No Joke,” Reuters,
January 31, 2025; Jacob Gronholt-Pedersen, “Denmark Has Full European Backing to Maintain Respect of Borders,
Danish Prime Minister Says,” Reuters, January 28, 2025; Elías Thorsson, “Danish PM Seeks to Counter Trump with
One-Day European Charm Offensive,” ArcticToday, January 28, 2025; Associated Press, “Danish Leader on European
Tour as Copenhagen Moves to Strengthen Presence Around Greenland,” Associated Press, January 28, 2025; Elías
Thorsson, “Danish Experts Baffled: What More Does Trump Want?” ArcticToday, January 27, 2025; Steven Erlanger
and Jeanna Smialek, “Trump Alarms Denmark in an Icy Exchange Over Greenland,” New York Times, January 26
(updated January 28), 2025; Richard Milne, “Donald Trump Ridicules Denmark and Insists US Will Take Greenland,”
Financial Times, January 26, 2025; Richard Milne, Gideon Rachman, and James Politi, “Donald Trump in Fiery Call
with Denmark’s Prime Minister over Greenland,” Financial Times, January 24, 2025; Stine Jacobsen, “Danish PM
Tells Trump It Is Up to Greenland to Decide on Independence,” Reuters, January 15, 2025; Seb Starcevic and Jakob
Weizman, “‘Greenland Belongs to the Greenlanders,’ Says Danish PM as Donald Trump Jr. Arrives,” Politico, January
7, 2025.
117 See, for example, Joseph Ataman, “French President Touches Down in Greenland, in Solidarity with Territory Eyed
by Trump,” CNN, June 15, 2025; William Booth, “Macron Visits Greenland in Show of Support for Territory Coveted
by Trump,” Washington Post, June 15, 2025; Ania Nussbaum, “Macron Offers Aid For Greenland Security Amid
Trump Threats,” Bloomberg, June 15, 2025; Ellis Quinn, “EU Reaffirms Greenland’s Right to Decide Its Future amid
Rising Arctic Tensions,” Eye on the Arctic (Radio Canada International), May 8, 2025; Elías Thorsson, “Icelandic
Support for EU Membership Increases as Alliances Become Unreliable,” ArcticToday, April 9, 2025; Luke McGee,
“Europe Wonders if Trump Can Be Bought Off With Arctic Concessions,” Foreign Policy, March 26 2025;
Reuters/Deutsche Presse-Agentur, “Germany Backs Denmark amid Trump’s Claims to Greenland, says Merz,”
ArcticToday, June 12, 2025; Andrew Gray, “Greenland Should Make Own Decisions Free of Interference, EU's Kallas
Says,” Reuters, May 6, 2025; Eilís Quinn, “EU Reaffirms Greenland’s Right to Decide Its Future amid Rising Arctic
Tensions,” Eye on the Arctic (Radio Canada International), May 6, 2025; Sophia Besch and Jeremy Shapiro, “The
New American Imperialism: How Europe Can Deal With Trump’s Threat to Greenland,” Lawfare, March 2, 2025;
Julia Payne, “Denmark’s Sovereignty Is ‘Essential Issue’ for the EU, European Council President Says,” Reuters,
January 29, 2025; Clea Caulcutt, “France Floated Sending Troops to Greenland, Foreign Minister Says,” Politico,
January 28, 2025; Steven Erlanger and Lynsey Chutel, “Confronted by Trump, Denmark Looks to Its European
Neighbors for Support,” New York Times, January 28, 2025; Tim Ross, Clea Caulcutt, Nicholas Vinocur, Aitor
Hernández-Morales, Jakob Weizman, and Hans von der Burchard, “Europe’s Leaders Plot to Stop Trump from Taking
Greenland,” Politico, January 28, 2025; Sarah Fortinsky, “EU Official: Europe ‘Not Negotiating’ on Greenland,” The
Hill, January 27, 2025; Andrew Gray and Makini Brice, “EU's Kallas Says EU Is ‘Not Negotiating’ on Greenland,”
Reuters, January 27, 2025; Leonie Cater, “Putting EU Troops in Greenland Makes Sense, Bloc’s Top Military Official
Says,” Politico, January 26, 2025.
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on Greenland, an overseas territory of Denmark. A representative from Greenland’s
government was also at the meeting.
Lars Lokke Rasmussen, the Danish foreign minister, said the purpose was to make
“absolutely clear” that Denmark was unhappy, and he emphasized that any efforts to “drive
wedges into the unity of the kingdom” would not be tolerated. He declined to discuss the
substance of the conversation at the meeting. 118
A May 6, 2025, press report stated:
EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said on Tuesday [May 6] the people of Greenland
should be able to make their own choices free from external pressure, following repeated
Trump administration calls for the Arctic territory to become part of the United States.
Speaking in a debate on Greenland in the European Parliament in Strasbourg, Kallas did
not criticise President Donald Trump or the United States by name but she stressed that
"borders are inviolable and territorial integrity must be respected".
“The future and the destiny of Greenland can only be decided by the Greenland people.
They should be able to make their choices free from outside pressure or external
interference,” Kallas said.119
As President-elect on January 7, 2025,120 and as president on March 29, 2025,121 and May 4,
2025,122 President Trump reportedly declined to rule out the use of military force to seize
Greenland. At a June 12, 2025, hearing before the House Armed Services Committee on the
FY2026 Department of Defense budget, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth declined to state that
the United States has no plans to invade or militarily take over Greenland.123 A June 27, 2025,
press report stated: “The head of Denmark’s Arctic command said the prospect of a U.S. takeover
of Greenland was not keeping him up at night after talks with a senior U.S. general last week but
that more must be done to deter any Russian attack on the Arctic island.”124
118 Jeffrey Gettleman and Maya Tekeli, “Denmark Outraged by Report of Increased Spying in Greenland,” New York
Times, May 8, 2025. See also Gwladys Fouche with additional reporting by Daphne Psaledakis and Steve Holland,
“Denmark Plans to Call in US Ambassador over Greenland Spying Report,” Reuters, May 7, 2025.
119 Andrew Gray, “Greenland Should Make Own Decisions Free of Interference, EU's Kallas Says,” Reuters, May 6,
2025.
120 See, for example, Minho Kim, “At a News Conference, President Refuses to Rule Out Using Force to Take
Greenland,” New York Times, January 7, 2025.
121 See, for example, Philip Crowther, Kirsten Grieshaber, and Aamer Madhani, “Trump Says Military Force Not Off
the Table for Greenland after Danish FM Scolds His Administration,” Associated Press, March 29, 2025; Ellie Cook,
“Trump Doesn't Rule Out Military Force to Take Greenland,” Newsweek, March 30, 2025.
122 See, for example, “Trump Won’t Rule Out Military Force on Greenland,” NBC News, May 4, 2025 (video); Edward
Helmore, “Trump Says He ‘Doesn’t Rule Out’ Using Military Force to Control Greenland,” Guardian, May 4 2025;
Gregory Svirnovskiy, “Trump Still Would Like to Add Canada and Greenland but Says Attack on Canada ‘Highly
Unlikely,’” Politico, May 4, 2025; Jessie Yeung and Piper Hudspeth Blackburn, “Trump Renews Threat of Military
Force to Annex Greenland,” CNN, May 4, 2025.
123 Source: CQ transcript of hearing. See also Lolita C. Baldor and Tara Copp, “Hegseth Says the Pentagon Has
Contingency Plans to Invade Greenland if Necessary,” Associated Press, June 12, 2025; Leo Shane III and Noah
Robertson, “Hegseth Won’t Rule out Military Actions against Greenland, Panama,” Defense News, June 12, 2025;
Elías Thorsson, “US Secretary of Defense Hegseth Refuses to Rule Out Plans to Seize Greenland by Force,”
ArcticToday, June 12, 2025.
124 Jacob Gronholt-Pedersen, “Danish General Says He Is Not Losing Sleep over US Plans for Greenland,” Reuters,
June 27, 2025.
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Russia-Ukraine War
The Russia-Ukraine war substantially affected the Arctic’s geopolitical environment in a number
of ways, including but not necessarily limited to the following, some of which have added to
tensions in the region:125
•
Operations of Arctic Council substantially affected. The war substantially
affected the operations of the Arctic Council, prompting new or heightened
questions about the future of the Arctic Council, Arctic governance, and
cooperation in general among the eight Arctic states.126 Specific reported
developments include the following:
• On March 3, 2022, in response to Russia’s invasion, the A7 states announced
that they would be “temporarily pausing participation in all meetings of the
[Arctic] Council and its subsidiary bodies.”127
• The Nordic Council of Ministers similarly stated that it was suspending its
cooperation with Russia and Belarus,128 and Finland, Denmark, Iceland,
Norway, Sweden, and the EU suspended activities involving Russia within
125 For general discussions of how the Russia-Ukraine war, has affected the Arctic’s geopolitical environment, see, for
example, Karen van Loon and Dick Zandee, Shifts in Arctic security, Ripples of Russia’s War against Ukraine,
Clingendael (Netherlands Institute of International Relations), December 2024, 8 pp.; Florian Vidal, Russia in the
Arctic, The End of Illusions and the Emergence of Strategic Realignments, French Institute of International Relations
(IFRI), 2024 (posted online July 31, 2024), 27 pp.; Iselin Németh Winther and Andreas Østhagen, editors, The Big
Picture of Arctic Geopolitics: An Actor-Oriented Analysis,” Fridtjof Nansen Institute, FNI Report 1/2024, 22 pp.; Gry
Thomasen, Chiara Cervasio, and Mhairi McClafferty, Arctic Diplomacy at a Crossroads, Addressing Present and
Future Geopolitical and Strategic Risk, British American Security Information Council (BASIC), December 2023, 31
pp.
126 See, for example, Jennifer Spence, “The Future of Arctic Council Innovation: Charting a Course for Working-Level
Cooperation,” Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, February 20, 2024; Emilie
Canova and Pauline Pic, “The Arctic Council in Transition: Challenges and Perspectives for the New Norwegian
Chairship,” Arctic Institute, June 13, 2023; Brett Simpson, “The Rise and Sudden Fall of the Arctic Council,” Foreign
Policy, May 31, 2023; Abbie Tingstad and Stephanie Pezard, “What Is Next for the Arctic Council in the Wake of
Russian Rule?” The Hill, May 14, 2023; Humeyra Pamuk, Gloria Dickie, and Gwladys Fouche, “Fears mount for the
Arctic as cooperation with Russia stalls,” Reuters, May 9, 2023; Atle Staalesen, “‘Barents and Arctic Cooperation Can
Continue without Russia,’” Barents Observer, March 7, 2023, Nong Hong, “As War in Ukraine Freezes the Arctic
Council, How Will Asia Break the Ice?” South China Morning Post, February 25, 2023; Malte Humpert, “Cooperation
with Russia in the Arctic is Virtually Impossible Says US Official,” High North News, February 16, 2023; Kai
Kornhuber et al., The Disruption of Arctic Exceptionalism, Managing Environmental Change in Light of Russian
Aggression, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), February 2023, 18 pp.; Trine Jonassen, “Arctic Council
Chairmanship: ‘Norway Knows How to Do It,’” High North News, January 31 (updated February 3), 2023; Benjamin J.
Sacks, Marigold Black, and Peter Dortmans, “Arctic Governance Is in Trouble. The Antarctic Could Be Next,” RAND
Blog, December 7, 2023; Karsten Friis, Elana Wilson Rowe, Mike Sfraga, and Ulf Sverdrup, editors, Navigating
Breakup: Security Realities of Freezing Politics and Thawing Landscapes in the Arctic, Norwegian Institute of
International Affairs, January 2023, 63 pp.; Nima Khorrami and Andreas Raspotnik, “Forced to Look East? Russia,
China, India, and the Future of Arctic Governance,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, September 16, 2022.
See also Rob Huebert, “Can the Arctic Council Survive the Trump Administration? Probably Not. Here’s Why,”
ArcticToday, March 3, 2025.
127 U.S. Department of State, “Joint Statement on Arctic Council Cooperation Following Russia’s Invasion of
Ukraine,” March 3, 2022.
128 See, for example, Niina Aagaard, “Nordic Council of Ministers Suspends All Co-operation with Russia,” Nordic
Co-operation, March 3, 2022; Atle Staalesen, “Nordic Countries Halt All Regional Cooperation with Russia,” Barents
Observer, March 6, 2022. For a press report on separate developments, see David Lochead, “Russian Invasion of
Ukraine Creates Strain for Arctic Organization,” Nunatsiaq News, March 1, 2022; Eilís Quinn, “Sweden, Finland Pull
Out of Arctic360 Conference in Toronto Where Russian Diplomats Scheduled to Attend,” Eye on the Arctic (Radio
Canada International), February 25, 2022. See also Eye on the Arctic, “Russia High on Agenda at Nordic Council
Meeting,” Eye on the Arctic (Radio Canada International), November 1, 2022.
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the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), which was established in 1993 for
collaboration primarily between Russia, Norway, Finland, and Sweden to
promote stability and sustainable development in the Barents region.129 In
September 2023, Russia announced that it would withdraw from BEAC,
citing what it said was a failure by Finland to confirm the transfer of the
BEAC presidency from Finland to Russia as scheduled in October 2023.130
In October 2022, China’s special envoy to the Arctic reportedly stated that
China would not recognize the legitimacy of an Arctic Council that does not
include Russia. He also reportedly stated that China would continue to
cooperate in the Arctic with both the A7 states and Russia.131
On February 21, 2023, Russia published amendments to its Arctic policy
statement that removed mentions of the Arctic Council.132
In May and June 2023, it was reported that while all cooperation with Russia
would remain suspended, other activities of the Council and its working
groups would resume in mid-June 2023.133 The suspension of Arctic Council
meetings did not prevent the chairmanship of the council from being
transferred from Russia to Norway on May 11, 2023.
A June 2023 press report stated: “At the end of his tenure as chair of the
Arctic Council’s senior officials committee in May, Russia’s Nikolai
Korchunov said Moscow could withdraw from the organisation if it was not
invited to participate in events during the Norwegian presidency.”134
A September 2023 press report stated that an August 29, 2023, meeting of all
eight Arctic Council member states and the six Arctic Indigenous groups that
129 In November 2024, Finland announced that it would leave BEAC after 2025. (See Eye on the Arctic, “Finland
leaving Barents Euro-Arctic Council after 2025,” Eye on the Arctic (Radio Canada International), November 21,
2024.)
130 Astri Edvardsen, “Russia Withdraws from the Barents Cooperation,” High North News, September 19, 2023
(updated September 29); “Russia withdraws from Barents Euro-Arctic Council,” Arctic Portal.org, September 19,
2023; Thomas Nilsen, “Lavrov Formally Withdraws Russia from Barents Cooperation,” Barents Observer, September
18, 2023. See also Hannah Thule and Thomas Nilsen, “Finland Mulls an End to Barents Cooperation,” Barents
Observer, July 25, 2024.
131 Melody Schreiber, “China Will Not Recognize an Arctic Council Without Russia, Envoy Says,” ArcticToday,
October 17, 2022; Trine Jonassen, “China: ‘Will Not Acknowledge Arctic Council Without Russia,’” High North
News, October 15 (updated October 18), 2022. See also Astri Edvardsen, “China Wants to Support Norway in
Restoring the Arctic Council,” High North News, April 28, 2023.
132 See, for example, Malte Humpert, “Russia Amends Arctic Policy Prioritizing ‘National Interest’ and Removing
Cooperation Within Arctic Council,” High North News, February 23, 2023. See also Astri Edvardsen, “The Arctic
Council With New Decisive Step Forward,” High North News, February 29, 2024; Ellis Quinn, “Arctic Council
Resumes Working Group Meetings, Held Virtually,” Eye on the Arctic (Radio Canada International), March 1, 2024.
133 Trine Jonassen, “The Arctic Council Resumes Some Activities in Mid-June,” High North News, May 16 (updated
May 19), 2023; Eilís Quinn, “Seven Western Countries on Arctic Council to Resume Limited Work in Forum,” Eye on
the Arctic, June 8, 2022; Melody Schreiber, “Arctic Council Nations to Resume Limited Cooperation—Without
Russia,” ArcticToday, June 8, 2022. Nikolaj Skydsgaard, “Arctic Council Countries to Resume Limited Work
Excluding Russia,” Reuters, June 8, 2022.
134 Richard Milne, “Arctic Chill: Western Nations Fear China and Russia Will Exploit Regional Tensions,” Financial
Times, June 5, 2023. See also Astri Edvardsen, “Lavrov: ‘The Arctic Council’s Future Depends on Whether a Civilized
Dialogue Can Continue,’” High North News, May 15, 2023; Astri Edvardsen, “Russia: ‘The Risk of Weakening the
Arctic Council Should Not Be Underestimated,’” High North News, May 12, 2023; Trine Jonassen, “‘Russia Will Stay
in The Arctic Council as Long as it Serves Our Interests,’” High North News, May 11 (updated May 12), 2023; Astri
Edvardsen, “Russia’s Top Arctic Diplomat: Long-Term Cooperation in the Arctic Requires Conditions Now Lost,”
High North News, May 3, 2023.
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are permanent participants had decided on guidelines for restarting the
council’s working groups.135
• In early February 2024, Russia’s ambassador-at-large for the Arctic
reportedly stated that Russia would withdraw from the Arctic Council if the
council’s activities council “do not correspond to Russia’s interests.”136
• On February 14, 2024, it was reported that Russia had suspended annual
payments to the Arctic Council until “real work” resumes at the Council with
the participation of all member states.137
• On February 28, 2024, the Arctic Council stated that “consensus was reached
for the gradual resumption of official Working Group meetings in a virtual
format, enabling project-level work to further advance. In February [2024],
the eight Arctic States, in consultation with the Indigenous Permanent
Participant organizations, reached consensus to gradually resume official
Working Group meetings in a virtual format. Prior to this update, Working
Groups advanced project work and decision-making only via written
procedures after consensus was reached in August 2023.”138
Concerns about Russia’s Arctic military activities heightened. For the A7
states, the war heightened concerns about the purpose behind Russia’s military
modernization in the Arctic, and reinforced cooperative security links among the
seven countries.139 Russia reportedly has withdrawn military personnel and
equipment from its Arctic bases to help provide reinforcements for its war in
Ukraine, and some of these forces reportedly have been destroyed in combat
operations there.140 Other press reports state that, while Russia’s Arctic military
Astri Edvardsen, “Light at the End of the Tunnel for the Arctic Council,” High North News, September 12 (updated
November 21), 2023; Eilís Quinn, “Arctic Council Charting Way Forward to Resume Work Says Norwegian SAO,”
Barents Observer, September 6, 2023. See also “Arctic Council Continues Steps Towards Resuming Expert Group
Work,” Eye on the Arctic (Radio Canada International), October 11, 2023; Trine Jonassen, “Arctic Council After
Russia’s Handover: ‘We Are Still Here,’” High North News, October 23, 2023. See also Gwladys Fouche and Gloria
Dickie, “West, Russia Manage Limited Cooperation in Arctic Despite Chill in Ties,” Reuters, May 14, 2024.
136 Trine Jonassen (translation by Birgitte Annie Molid Martinussen), “Russia Threatens to Withdraw From the Arctic
Council,” High North News, February 7 (updated February 15), 2024; Daniel Cusick, “Russia Threatens to Quit Arctic
Council,” Politico Pro, February 9, 2024.
137 Lidia Kelly, “Russia Suspends Annual Payments to Arctic Council, RIA Agency Reports,” Reuters, February 14,
2024. See also Thomas Nilsen, “’We Should Not Close Those Doors and Throw the Keys Away,’ Says Norway PM on
Arctic Council Cooperation with Russia,” Barents Observer, February 14, 2024; Jennifer Spence, “Russia Suspends
Funding for the Arctic Council: Wake up Call Not Death Knell,” High North News, February 15 (updated February
17), 2024.
138 “Arctic Council Advances Resumption of Project-Level Work,” Arctic Council, February 28, 2024.
139 See, for example, Astri Edvardsen (translation by Birgitte Annie Molid Martinussen), “NATO’s Military Leader:
“We Must Be Prepared for Military Conflicts Arising in the Arctic,” High North News, October 30 (updated November
1), 2023; Barry Gardiner, “As the Ice Melts, a Perilous Russian Threat Is Emerging in the Arctic,” Guardian, June 13,
2023.
140 See, for example, Atle Staalesen, “Counting of Killed Komi Warriors Reaches 400,” Barents Observer, January 17,
2024; Atle Staalesen, “Deputy Commander of Russian Arctic Brigades Is Killed in Ukraine,” Barents Observer,
November 30, 2023; Danielle Wallace, “Russian Troops Withdraw from Norway Border in Drop Since Start of
Ukraine War: Official,” Fox News, September 17, 2023; Atle Staalesen, “More Indigenous Men from Russian Arctic
Are Killed in Moscow’s War of Aggression,” Barents Observer, September 7, 2023; Atle Staalesen, “Anniversary
Celebrations in Arctic Spetsnaz Base Sputnik as Number of Marines Killed in Ukraine Rises,” Barents Observer, May
5, 2023; Atle Staalesen, “Russia’s Arctic Brigade in Alakurtti Is Counting Its Many Dead,” Barents Observer, February
22, 2023; Malte Humpert, “Ukraine War Taking Toll on Arctic Material and Personnel,” High North News, February
17, 2023; Thomas Nilsen, “Land Forces at Kola Reduced to One-Fifth, Norwegian Intelligence Says,” Barents
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forces have been degraded as a result of the war, Russia’s military modernization
in the Arctic has nevertheless continued.141
Finland and Sweden become members of NATO. The war prompted Finland
and Sweden to apply for NATO membership.142
• On April 4, 2023, Finland became a member of NATO,143 which converted
Finland’s 833-mile border with Russia144 into a NATO-Russia frontier. More
than 300 miles of this border (i.e., more than 36% of the border’s length) is
north of the Arctic Circle.145 (By way of comparison, Norway’s border with
Russia, all of which is above the Arctic Circle, is about 123 miles in
length.146) Almost one-third of Finland’s territory is north of the Arctic
Circle.147 In these ways, Finland becoming a member of NATO has increased
the Arctic as an area of focus for NATO.148
Observer, February 13, 2023; David Axe, “Russia Built A Dozen Air-Defense Vehicles For War In The Arctic. Then
Sent Them To Ukraine To Get Blown Up.” Forbes, February 4, 2023. See also Mathieu Boulègue, “Russia's Arctic
Military Posture in the Context of the War against Ukraine,” Arctic Institute, October 31, 2024; Colin Wall and Njord
Wegge, The Russian Arctic Threat, Consequences of the Ukraine War, Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS), January 2023, 16 pp.
141 See, for example, Mathieu Boulègue, The Impact of the War Against Ukraine on Russia's Arctic Posture: Hard
Power on Vulnerable Ice, Wilson Center, June 2024, 42 pp.; Astri Edvardsen (translation by Birgitte Annie Molid
Martinussen), “Russia’s Forces in the High North: Weakened by the War, Yet Still A Multidomain Threat,” High North
News, January 12 (updated January 16), 2023; Holly Williams and Analisa Novak, “Russia Ramps Up Its Military
Presence in the Arctic Nearly 2 Years into the Ukraine War,” CBS News, December 18, 2023; Mika Mäkeläinen,
“Satellite Images: New Buildings Appear at Russian Military Bases Near Finnish Border,” Yle, September 10, 2023
(updated September 13); Justin Katz, “ Admiral Sounds Alarm amid Rising Russian, Chinese Movement in High
North,” Breaking Defense, September 5, 2023; Nick Paton Walsh and Sarah Dean, “Russia’s Militarization of the
Arctic Shows No Sign of Slowing Down,” CNN, December 22, 2022. See also Heather A. Conley, Sophie Arts,
Kristine Berzina, and Mathieu Boulègue, Defending America’s Northern Border and Its Arctic Approaches Through
Cooperation With Allies and Partners, German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF), August 2023, 31 pp.
142 See, for example, Trine Jonassen (translation by Birgitte Annie Molid Martinussen), “Sanna Marin: ‘Everything
Changed Overnight,’” High North News, January 11, 2024.
143 For additional discussion, see CRS Insight IN11949, NATO: Finland Joins as Sweden’s Accession Faces Delay, by
Kristin Archick, Paul Belkin, and Andrew S. Bowen.
144 Finland’s border with Russia is usually said to have a length of 1,340 kilometers, or 832.6 miles. (See, for example,
U.K Parliament, House of Lords, European Union Committee, 9th Report of Session 2007–08, FRONTEX: the EU
External Borders Agency, Report with Evidence, Ordered to be printed 26 February 2008 and published 5 March 2008,
Tables 1, 2, and 3 [pages 13 and 14]); Salla Korpela, “A Border That Once Divided Now Unites,” This Is Finland, June
2008; Henry Ridgwell, “Will Finland’s 1,300-Kilometer Border Become NATO-Russia Frontier?” Voice of America,
May 12, 2022; James Frater and Xiaofei Xu, “Finland Plans to Start Building a Fence on Russian Border Next Year,”
CNN, November 18, 2022; Jari Tanner, “Finland to Start Building Fence on Russian Border Next Year,” Associated
Press, November 18, 2022.
145 Source: CRS measurement, February 27, 2023.
146 Source: Norway’s border with Russia, which was previously said to have a length of 195.7 kilometers, was
resurveyed and in 2018 was determined to have a length of 197.7 kilometers (or about 122.8 miles), with the difference
attributed to changes in the flow of a river and improvements in measuring devices. (See Thomas Nilsen, “Russia Just
Got a “Longer” Border to Norway,” Barents Observer, September 26, 2018. See also, for example, Nina Berglund,
“Norway Tightens Russian Border Control,” NewsinEnglish.no, October 2, 2022; Astri Edvardsen, “Norway To
Strengthen Control on the Border With Russia–And Is Ready to Close It At Short Notice,” High North News, October 3
[updated October 4], 2022.)
147 See, for example, “Finland,” Arctic Council, undated, accessed May 19, 2025, at https://arctic-council.org/about/
states/finland/; “Finland,” Arctic Institute, updated on August 1, 2022; “Finland,” Britannica, updated February 21,
2023.
148 See, for example, Heather A. Conley and Sophie Arts, NATO’s Policy and Posture in the Arctic: Revisiting Allied
Capabilities and Command Plans, German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF), July 5, 2023, 6 pp.; Anne
(continued...)
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On March 7, 2024, Sweden became a member of NATO, which further
increased the Arctic as an area of focus for NATO,149 given that about 15% of
Sweden’s land area is north of the Arctic Circle.150
• Russia’s defense minister reportedly stated in December 2022 that in
response to Finland and Sweden seeking to join NATO, Russia would
reorganize some of its military forces near the Nordic countries.151
Increased Russian cooperation in Arctic with China. Russia’s diplomatic
isolation from the A7 states in the Arctic led to increased Russian cooperation in
the Arctic with non-A7 countries, particularly China152—a development that
could strengthen China’s presence and activities in the region and affect views
among observers in the A7 states and elsewhere regarding China’s motivations
and goals for its Arctic activities and China’s ability to work with the A7 states
on matters relating to the Arctic.153
Kauranen and Johan Ahlander, “In NATO’s New North, Fresh Chances to Contain Moscow,” Reuters, July 3, 2023;
Ruby Mellen and Dylan Moriarty, “Four Maps Explain How Finland Could Alter NATO’s Security,” Washington Post,
May 19, 2022 (updated April 3, 2023); Janne Kuusela, “As a New Arctic Ally, Finland Contributes to Arctic Security
and Defence,” Wilson Center, March 1, 2024.
149 See, for example, Anna Wieslander, How Sweden and Finland’s Membership in NATO Affects the High North,
Atlantic Council, October 2024, 9 pp.; Henrik Breitenbauch and Benjamin Jensen, “A New Nordic NATO?” Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), July 10, 2024; Rachael Gosnell and Benjamin Jensen, “NATO and the
Arctic,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 10, 2024; Sophie Arts, “The NATO Washington Summit
and the Arctic,” German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF), July 2, 2024; James Stavridis, “Sweden and
Finland Give NATO an Arctic Opportunity,” Bloomberg, July 13, 2023.
150 Source for 15% figure: “Climate of Sweden,” Britannica, undated, accessed May 19, 2025, at
https://www.britannica.com/place/Sweden/Climate. Another source states “The two northernmost counties [of
Sweden], Västerbotten and Norrbotten, are defined as Sweden’s Arctic territory. This region represents about one-third
of Sweden’s territory, but is populated with just over half of a million inhabitants—more sparsely populated than the
southern parts of the country.” (Sweden, Arctic Council, undated, accessed May 19, 2025, at https://arcticcouncil.org/about/states/sweden/.) See also Alina Bykova, “NATO Has Always Been an Arctic Alliance (Part I),”
Arctic Institute, May 28, 2024; Alina Bykova, “NATO Has Always Been an Arctic Alliance (Part II),” Arctic Institute,
June 11, 2024.
151 See Thomas Nilsen, “Shoigu Vows More Troops Near Nordic Countries,” Barents Observer, December 21, 2022.
152 See, for example, Georgi Kantchev, “Russia and China Defy the West Deep in the Arctic, The Svalbard Archipelago
Has Become a Critical Steppingstone for Projecting Power across One of the World’s Most Sensitive Regions,” Wall
Street Journal, September 28, 2024; Seong Hyeon Choi, “‘Arctic ambition’: 3 Chinese icebreakers forge polar presence
and unity with Russia, Recent Agreements, Including between Xi and Putin, Seek China-Russia Collaboration on
Shipping Routes, Research and Tech in the Region,” South China Morning Post, September 5, 2024; Didi Kirsten
Tatlow, “China and Russia to Expand Scientific Cooperation in Arctic: Report,” Newsweek, August 30, 2024; Heather
A. Conley, Sophie Arts, Bonnie S. Glaser, Kristine Berzina, and Jaine Archambeau, A New Era of Arctic Geopolitics:
Russia-PRC Strategic Alignment Is Driving Unprecedented Regional Collaboration, German Marshall Fund of the
United States (GMF), May 2024 (posted online July 18, 2024), 10 pp.; Luke Coffey, “Where The Ice Is Melting
Between Beijing And Moscow – Analysis,” Eurasia Review, July 6, 2024; “China and Russia Have Chilling Plans for
the Arctic,” Economist, June 19, 2024; Alexander Dalziel, Eurasian North – The geopolitics of Russia and China in the
Arctic, Macdonald-Laurier Institute (MIL), 2024 (posted online June 13, 2024), 40 pp.; Jay Heisler, “China’s Shrinking
Arctic Ambitions Are Seen as Confined Largely to Russia,” VOA, May 17, 2024; Aaron Mc Nicholas, “Breaking the
Ice, Russia and China’s Shifting Relations Are Helping to Encourage a Flood of Chinese Companies into the Arctic,”
Wire China, February 25, 2024; Ken Dilanian, “Russia’s Isolation Is Forcing It to Look to China for Support in the
Arctic, Raising U.S. Concerns,” NBC News, February 7, 2024; Shifting Ice, Russia’s Increasing Reliance on the Private
Sector and the PRC in the Arctic, Strider Technologies, undated, posted online February 7, 2024, 17 pp.; Daniel
Cusick, “Russia-China Partnership Prompts New US Arctic Strategy,” Politico Pro, January 3, 2024 (a similar article
was published as Daniel Cusick and E&E News, “Are Russia and China Teaming Up to Control the Arctic?” Scientific
American, January 3, 2024).
153 See, for example, Greg Hadley, “DOD: Russian Weakness Fuels China’s Rise in the Arctic,” Air & Space Forces
(continued...)
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Arctic scientific research projects disrupted. Actions taken by governments in
response to the war substantially disrupted international scientific research
projects in the Arctic that involved Russian participation.154
Russian Arctic oil and gas operations and exports impacted. Western
economic sanctions imposed against Russia have reportedly impeded Russian
energy projects in the Arctic.155 In September 2023, the United States announced
further sanctions against Russia’s Arctic energy activities amid reports that
Magazine, December 5, 2024; Jacob Judah, “Russia’s Warming Arctic Is a Climate Threat. War Has Shut Scientists
Out of It,” New York Times, October 22 (updated October 23), 2024; Austin Ramzy, “China Is Gaining Long-Coveted
Role in Arctic, as Russia Yields,” Wall Street Journal, October 2, 2023; Paul Goble, “China Strengthening Its Position
in Northern Russia and the Arctic Sea,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, September 28, 2023; Faustine Ngila, “China Is
Cementing Its Position as an Arctic Superpower through Russia,” Quartz, April 20, 2023; Matthew P. Funaiole, Brian
Hart, Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., and Aidan Powers-Riggs, “Frozen Frontiers, China’s Great Power Ambitions in the Polar
Regions,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), April 18, 2023; Paul Goble, “Amid Russia’s Problems,
China Assumes a Larger Role in the Arctic,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, March 28, 2023; Matti Puranen and Sanna Kopra,
“Finland and the Demise of China’s Polar Silk Road,” China Brief, December 30, 2022; Marc Lanteigne, “China and
the ‘Two Arctics,’” Diplomat, October 18, 2022; Danielle Bochove, “NATO-China Tension Over Ukraine Flares at
Conference in Iceland,” Bloomberg, October 15, 2022; Kristin Huang, “Warm Russian Ties Are Key to China’s Arctic
Aspirations: Report,” South China Morning Post, October 2, 2022.
154 See, for example, Megan Gannon, “War In Ukraine Causes Disruption To Arctic Research,” Nome Nugget,
February 22, 2024; Malte Humpert, “Lack of Russian Data Reduces Understanding of Climate Change in the Arctic,”
High North News, February 2, 2024; Martin Breum, “The Lack of Data from Russia May Render Arctic Climate
Forecasting Meaningless,” Arctic Business Journal, January 23, 2024; Rebecca Hersher, “Why the War in Ukraine is
Bad for Climate Science,” NPR, January 22, 2024; Efrén López-Blanco et al., “Towards an Increasingly Biased View
on Arctic Change,” Nature, February 2024 (published online January 22, 2024): 152-155; Agence France-Presse
(AFP), “Russia’s Isolation Takes Toll on Arctic Climate Science,” France 24, December 17, 2023; Saleem H. Ali,
“Arctic Science Diplomacy With Russia,” Forbes, August 31, 2023; Warren Cornwall, “‘We are cut off.’ Tensions
with Russia Are Hobbling Arctic Research,” Science, May 3, 2023; Dino Grandoni, “Why Russia’s War in Ukraine Is
Bad News for Polar Bears, Too,” Washington Post, April 15, 2023; Karen van Loon, “The Like-Minded, The Willing...
and The Belgians: Arctic Scientific Cooperation after February 24 2022,” Arctic Institute, March 21, 2023; Ed Struzik,
“How Tensions With Russia Are Jeopardizing Key Arctic Research,” Yale Environment 360, February 7, 2023; Lori
Valigra, “Arctic Researchers Forced to Modify Projects amid Geopolitical Tensions with Russia,” Science Business,
November 21, 2022; Gastautor, “Political Tensions Lead to ‘Gaps’ in Scientific Data in the Arctic Region, Polar
Journal,” September 10, 2022.
155 See, for example, Atle Staalesen, “Paralysis Looms over Russia’s Arctic Oil,” Barents Observer, January 13, 2025;
Malte Humpert, “U.S. Cracks Down on Russian ‘LNG Shadow Fleet’ and Arctic LNG Project in Latest Sanctions,”
gCaptain, October 30, 2024
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