Health Care Providers’ Religious Objections to Medical Treatment: Legal Issues Related to Religious Discrimination in Employment and Conscience Clause Provisions

Congressional research reportJul 18, 2011

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Health Care Providers’ Religious Objections

to Medical Treatment: Legal Issues Related to

Religious Discrimination in Employment and

Conscience Clause Provisions

Cynthia Brougher

Legislative Attorney

name redacted

Legislative Attorney

July 18, 2011

Congressional Research Service

7-....

www.crs.gov

R40722

CRS Report for Congress

Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

Health Care Providers’ Religious Objections to Medical Treatment

Summary

Federal law provides various legal protections for individuals who object for religious reasons to

performing certain tasks required by their employer. The First Amendment to the U.S.

Constitution and statutory nondiscrimination laws provide general protection to individuals

wishing to exercise their religious beliefs without interference from the government or employers.

An individual’s right of refusal may also be protected by specific legislation known as

“conscience clauses.” These protections often arise with health care providers, including doctors

and pharmacists, who object to assisting with certain reproductive procedures or dispensing birth

control. Most often, objections are raised by doctors or hospitals who object to performing

abortion procedures because of religious beliefs or affiliations.

Medical providers with religious objections to certain treatments highlight the tension between

patients’ access to treatment and health providers’ religious freedom. In a recent example of this

debate, December 2008, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) issued a final rule

to ensure compliance with conscience clauses enacted beginning in the 1970s to protect

individuals who object to abortion and other procedures. The rule took effect on January 20,

2009, but was subsequently partially rescinded by the Obama Administration in February of 2011,

based on concerns that a broad reading of the 2008 final rule could be interpreted to limit

patients’ access to certain health care services.

This report will discuss situations in which religious objections may be raised in health care. The

report will examine the legal protections for individuals with religious and moral objections to

their employment duties offered by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and federal conscience clauses. Finally, the report will analyze the

two sets of protections and how they may affect health care providers who have religious

objections to medical procedures.

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Health Care Providers’ Religious Objections to Medical Treatment

Contents

Background...................................................................................................................................... 1

Legal Protections for Medical Providers Who Refuse to Provide Medical Care............................. 2

Religious Freedom Protections.................................................................................................. 2

First Amendment Protection of Religious Exercise ............................................................ 2

Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ....................................................................... 2

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964............................................................................. 3

Federal Conscience Clauses ...................................................................................................... 5

Church Amendment............................................................................................................. 6

Section 245 of the Public Health Service Act ..................................................................... 7

Weldon Amendment ............................................................................................................ 7

Other Federal Conscience Clauses...................................................................................... 8

2008 HHS Final Rule and Partial Rescission...................................................................... 8

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ........................................................................ 9

Distinctions Between Legal Religious Protections and Conscience Clause Legislation............... 10

Scope of Protections Offered................................................................................................... 10

Methods of Enforcement and Remedies Available.................................................................. 11

Contacts

Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 11

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Health Care Providers’ Religious Objections to Medical Treatment

Background

Federal law provides various legal protections for individuals who object for religious reasons to

performing certain tasks required by their employer. The First Amendment to the U.S.

Constitution and statutory nondiscrimination laws provide general protection to individuals

wishing to exercise their religious beliefs without interference from the government or employers.

In addition to religious freedom and anti-discrimination laws, an individual’s right of refusal may

be protected by specific legislation known as “conscience clauses.” These protections often arise

with health care providers, including doctors and pharmacists. For example, certain pharmacists

have raised religious objections to filling prescriptions for birth control medications because their

religious beliefs forbid the use of certain contraceptives. Additionally, in 2000, two California

fertility doctors refused to perform certain artificial insemination procedures because of their

religious objections to the patient’s sexual orientation and un-married status.1 Most often, though,

objections are raised by doctors or hospitals who object to performing abortion procedures

because of religious beliefs or affiliations.

Medical providers with religious objections to certain treatments highlight the tension between

patients’ access to treatment and health providers’ religious freedom. In a recent example of this

debate, December 2008, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) issued a final rule

to ensure compliance with conscience clauses enacted beginning in the 1970s to protect

individuals who object to abortion and other procedures.2 The rule took effect on January 20,

2009, but was subsequently partially rescinded by the Obama Administration in February of 2011,

based on concerns that a broad reading of the 2008 final rule could be interpreted to limit

patients’ access to certain health care services.3

This report will discuss situations in which religious objections may be raised in health care.4 The

report will examine the legal protections for individuals with religious and moral objections to

their employment duties offered by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and federal conscience clauses. Finally, the report will analyze the

two sets of protections and how they may affect health care providers who have religious

objections to medical procedures.

1

See North Coast Women’s Care Medical Group, Inc. v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 44 Cal. 4th 1145 (Cal.

2008) (holding that the constitutional right to religious exercise does not exempt a physician from complying with

California’s state civil rights nondiscrimination statute which prohibits discrimination based on a person’s sexual

orientation).

2

73 Fed. Reg. 78072 (Dec. 19, 2008). For a history of abortion conscience clause laws, see CRS Report RL34703, The

History and Effect of Abortion Conscience Clause Laws, by (name redacted).

3

76 Fed. Reg. 9968, 9974 (Feb. 23, 2011).

4

This report is limited to objections raised in the medical field. However, the relevant legal issues would apply

similarly to other fields in which public servants may object to certain tasks based on religious beliefs. See Endres v.

Indiana State Police, 349 F.3d 922 (7th Cir. 2003) (police officer challenging his dismissal after he refused to work at a

casino because his religious beliefs hold gambling to be a sinful enterprise).

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Health Care Providers’ Religious Objections to Medical Treatment

Legal Protections for Medical Providers Who Refuse

to Provide Medical Care

Religious Freedom Protections

The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of

1993 provide general protection for individuals’ religious exercise. These laws generally restrict

governmental entities from interfering with individuals’ religious beliefs and practices. Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides nondiscrimination protection for individuals in the

context of their employment. Title VII restricts both governmental entities and private entities

from discriminating against employees because of the employees’ religious exercise.

First Amendment Protection of Religious Exercise

The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law ...

prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].”5 The Free Exercise Clause prohibits the government

from interfering with an individual’s exercise of his or her religious beliefs unless the resulting

burden imposed on the individual arises from a valid and neutral law of general applicability.6

That is, if the law applies to all individuals without regard to their religion, the law would be

considered a neutral law of general applicability. Under the First Amendment, if an individual’s

exercise of religion is burdened by such a law, that burden does not violate the Free Exercise

Clause.

Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993

The constitutional protections for religious exercise have been augmented by the enactment of the

Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).7 RFRA prohibits federal government action

that has the effect of substantially burdening religious practice.8 RFRA provides that a statute or

regulation of general applicability could lawfully burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it

were shown to further a compelling governmental interest and to be the least restrictive means of

furthering that interest.9 This statutory requirement for any federal law, including those of general

applicability not aimed at religious practice, supplements the constitutional protection, which

prohibits only government action that intentionally burdens the exercise of religion.

5

U.S. Const. amend. I. For a legal analysis of the First Amendment’s requirements for religious exercise, see CRS

Report RS22833, The Law of Church and State: General Principles and Current Interpretations, by Cynthia Brougher.

6

See Employment Div., Oregon Dep’t of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).

7

P.L. 103-141, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (November 16, 1993); 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.

8

RFRA originally applied to federal, state, and local government actions. The Supreme Court held that the application

of RFRA to state and local government was unconstitutional under principles of federalism. See City of Boerne, Texas

v. Flores, 521 U.S. 407 (1997).

9

P.L. 103-141, § 3; 107 Stat. 1488, 1488-89; 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.

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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides statutory protections for individuals based on

their religion in the context of their employment.10 Specifically, Title VII prohibits employers,

including both governmental and private entities, from basing employment decisions (including

hiring and firing, or decisions regarding compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of

employment) on an employee’s religion.11 Under Title VII, religion is defined to include “all

aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates

that he is unable to reasonably accommodate an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious

observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”12

Religious practices and observances are generally considered “to include moral or ethical beliefs

as to what is right and wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious

views.”13

Reasonable Accommodations Without Undue Hardship

Thus, the general prohibition on discrimination based on religion in Title VII requires the

employer to make reasonable accommodations for employees’ observance of their religion if such

accommodations would not cause undue hardship to the employer. Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulations provide guidelines for what constitutes reasonable

accommodation and undue hardship. Once an employee requests religious accommodation, the

employer must consider whether the requested accommodation is reasonable or what reasonable

alternatives might be provided.14 If more than one accommodation is possible without causing

undue hardship, the EEOC determines the reasonableness of the chosen accommodation by

examining the alternatives considered by the employer and the alternatives actually offered to the

employee.15 If more than one manner of accommodation would not cause undue hardship, “the

employer ... must offer the alternative which least disadvantages the individual with respect to his

or her employment opportunities.”16

In order for these accommodations to be required under Title VII, they must not cause undue

hardship to the employer. Employers cannot claim undue hardship on “a mere assumption that

many more people ... may also need accommodation.”17 The regulations provide two general

bases that may justify undue hardship: cost and seniority rights.18 An employer may refuse to

10

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. For a legal analysis of Title VII’s protections for religious exercise, see CRS Report

RS22745, Religion and the Workplace: Legal Analysis of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as It Applies to

Religion and Religious Organizations, by Cynthia Brougher.

11

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

12

42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).

13

29 C.F.R. § 1605.1. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970);

see also Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981) (“religious beliefs

need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection”).

14

See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2.

15

29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(c)(2).

16

Id. See also Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 67-69 n. 6 (1986) (holding that Title VII does not

require “an employer to choose any particular reasonable accommodation” but also noting a distinction between the

lower court’s ruling and the explicit limitation included in the EEOC regulations).

17

29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(c)(1).

18

29 C.F.R. § 1605(e). See also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).

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accommodate an employee’s religious practice if “the accommodation would require more than a

de minimis cost.”19 The EEOC determines whether an accommodation exceeds a de minimis cost

by evaluating the cost incurred to the employer and the number of employees that will need the

accommodation.20 The regulations also provide that “undue hardship would also be shown where

a variance from a bona fide seniority system is necessary in order to accommodate an employee’s

religious practices when doing so would deny another employee his or her job or shift preference

guaranteed by that system.”21

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that Title VII’s protection of religion does not require an

accommodation that would cause more than minimal hardship to the employer or other

employees.22 The Court has also held that Title VII requires employers to work with employees to

find a reasonable alternative that would accommodate the employee’s objection.23 However, Title

VII does not require “an employer to choose any particular reasonable accommodation.”24 That

is, the accommodation offered to the employee need not be the most reasonable one, the one

requested by the employee, or the one that imposes the least burden on the employee.25

Accommodations for Health Care Providers Under Title VII

EEOC guidance issued in July 2008 specifically addressed the application of Title VII’s

accommodation requirements in the context of pharmacists who object to dispensing

contraceptives because of their religious beliefs.26 Under Title VII, a pharmacist who is employed

by a pharmacy with multiple pharmacists and who objects to distributing contraceptives or

assisting customers with questions about contraceptives may signal another pharmacist to assist

the customer. However, the pharmacist would not be permitted to ignore customers with

contraceptive requests or questions. According to the EEOC regulations and guidance, “the

employer is not required to accommodate [a pharmacist’s] request to remain in [the position] yet

avoid all situations where he might even briefly interact with customers who have requested

contraceptives, or to accommodate a disruption of business operations. The employer may

discipline or terminate [the pharmacist] for not meeting legitimate expectations.”27

Another common employment task to which health care providers may object based on their

religious beliefs is the performance of or assistance in abortion procedures. Courts have struck a

similar balance in accommodating medical staff with religious objections to abortion as the

19

29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(e)(1) (internal quotations omitted).

Id.

21

29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(e)(2).

22

See Trans World Airlines, Inc., 432 U.S. at 84; Ansonia Board of Education, 479 U.S. at 67-69.

23

See Ansonia Board of Education, 479 U.S. at 68-69 (internal citation omitted).

24

Id. at 68.

25

Id. at 68-69 (noting that the lower court interpreted EEOC guidelines to require a certain accommodation). The Court

stated that “though superficially consistent with the burden imposed by the Court of Appeals, this guideline, by

requiring the employer to choose the option that least disadvantages an individual’s employment opportunities, contains

a significant limitation not found in the court’s standard. To the extent that the guideline ... requires the employer to

accept any alternative favored by the employee short of undue hardship, we find the guideline simply inconsistent with

the plain meaning of the statute.” Id. at n. 6.

26

EEOC Compliance Manual, No. 915.003, July 22, 2008, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/religion.html.

27

Id. at § 12-IV.C.3 (Examples 43 and 44).

20

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EEOC interpretation suggests in the context of pharmacists and contraceptives.28 That is, courts

have required that employees with religious objections to abortion procedures be provided any

reasonable accommodation that would resolve the staff member’s objection without undue

hardship to the employer. Accordingly, employees with religious objections to abortion

procedures likely would be allowed to trade tasks with other employees or be reassigned within

the hospital to avoid such procedures. However, in situations where such accommodations would

not be possible (e.g., emergency procedures) the employee would not be permitted to refuse to

perform required duties because to do so would cause hardship to the employer and the

employer’s clients (in this case, patients).

For example, a federal appellate court held that a hospital had complied with Title VII when it

offered alternative employment tasks or positions to a nurse who objected to assisting in abortion

procedures.29 The nurse worked in the delivery unit of the hospital, which did not perform

elective abortions. Because the nurse had religious objections to abortion, she refused to assist in

emergency procedures that she considered to be abortions and instead traded assignments to

avoid participating in the procedures she considered objectionable. However, when the nurse

refused to assist in a particular procedure and a substitute was not immediately available to

replace her, the hospital determined that her refusal to assist in such circumstances risked the

safety of the patient. To accommodate the nurse’s religious objection, the hospital suggested a

transfer to a different operating unit or to another available position. The nurse refused and the

hospital terminated her employment. The court rejected the nurse’s claim that the hospital

violated Title VII. Noting that Title VII was intended to foster cooperation to avoid objections by

the employee and hardships to the employer, the court held that, because the nurse refused to

cooperate with the accommodations offered to her, she could not claim that the hospital’s actions

were legally inadequate.30 The court noted that public protectors (e.g., police, firefighters, and

public health care providers) “must be neutral in providing their services” and that “public trust

and confidence requires that a public hospital’s health care practitioners ... will provide treatment

in time of emergency.”31

Federal Conscience Clauses

In contrast with the broad religious protections offered by Title VII, federal conscience clauses

can be described as narrower pieces of legislation that apply only to specific recipients of federal

funds. The scope of federal conscience clauses not only varies with respect to their applicability,

but also with respect to the scope of protections offered. For example, the majority of federal

conscience clauses deal only with refusals to perform, provide, or pay for certain reproductive

procedures, rather than any procedure to which an individual might have a religious objection.

28

See, e.g., Shelton v. Univ. of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, 223 F.3d 220 (3rd Cir. 2000); Grant v. Fairview

Hospital and Healthcare Services, 93 Fair Empl. Cas. (BNA) 685 (D. Minn. 2004); Benson v. Schwarga, 1997 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 684 (E.D. Va 1997).

29

Shelton, 223 F.3d 220 (3rd Cir. 2000).

30

Id. at 228.

31

Id.

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Church Amendment

The Church Amendment, named for its principal sponsor, Senator Frank Church, was enacted in

1973 to protect conscientious objections to abortion and sterilization.32 The inclusion of abortion

refusal was likely a response to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Roe v. Wade. However, the

inclusion of objections to sterilization was instigated by a lower court decision, Taylor v. Saint

Vincent’s Hospital.33 This case dealt with a couple in Billings, Montana, who were seeking a tubal

ligation concurrently with a scheduled caesarean delivery.34 At the time, the maternity wards

serving the Billings area had been consolidated on the grounds of a Catholic hospital which, as a

policy, prohibited surgical sterilizations. The couple sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a

deprivation of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law. Because the hospital had

received funds under the Hill-Burton act, the court found sufficient jurisdiction and issued a

preliminary injunction allowing the sterilization procedure on the Catholic hospital’s grounds.

Later that year, Congress enacted the Church amendment to prohibit the receipt of federal funds

under the Public Health Service Act, and certain other statutes, from being used as grounds to

compel providers or facilities to perform abortions or sterilizations. In light of this amendment,

the court in Montana vacated its preliminary injunction although the procedure had long since

taken place.35

The Church Amendment provides protections in the context of four different classes of recipients

of federal funds. First, the receipt of any grant, contract, loan, or loan guarantee under the Public

Health Service Act, the Community Mental Health Centers Act, or the Developmental Disabilities

Services and Facilities Construction Act cannot be used to require an individual or entity to

perform or assist36 an abortion or sterilization procedure, or make facilities available for such

procedures, if the performance of those procedures would be contrary to the religious beliefs or

moral convictions of the recipient. Entities receiving federal funds also cannot be required to

provide personnel to perform or assist with sterilization or abortion procedures if such assistance

would be contrary to the religious beliefs or moral convictions of the personnel.37 Furthermore,

entities receiving assistance under the acts mentioned above are prohibited from discriminating in

employment or the extension of staff privileges to physicians or health care personnel on the basis

of an individual’s nonperformance of sterilization or abortion procedures based on that

individual’s religious beliefs or moral convictions.38

Second, recipients of HHS grants for biomedical or behavioral research may not discriminate in

employment or staff privileges on the basis of the refusal to perform or assist “any lawful health

service or research activity” on religious or moral grounds.39 This clause applies to a more

32

P.L. 93-45, § 401, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7.

369 F. Supp. 948 (D. Mont. 1973).

34

Performing these procedures simultaneously eliminates the need to have a second surgical procedure.

35

Taylor v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 523 F.2d 75, 76 (9th Cir. 1975).

36

The statutory text of the Church Amendment does not identify what conduct constitutes assistance for these

purposes.

37

42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b).

38

42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c)(1). This clause also provides a reciprocal prohibition against discrimination on the basis of an

individual’s performance of abortion or sterilization.

39

42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c)(2) (emphasis added). Discrimination on the basis of an individual’s performance of a lawful

health service or activity is also prohibited.

33

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specific category of recipients of federal funds than the first Church category, but also protects

refusals based on conscience in procedures besides abortion or sterilization.

Third, no person may be compelled to perform or assist in a health service program funded in

whole or in part by a program administered by HHS, if the procedure is contrary to the

individual’s religious beliefs or moral convictions.40

Fourth, recipients of any grant, contract, loan, loan guarantee, or interest subsidy under the Public

Health Service Act, the Community Mental Health Centers Act, or the Developmental Disabilities

Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 2000 may not discriminate among applicants for training or

study on the basis of the applicant’s unwillingness to counsel, suggest, recommend, assist, or in

any way participate in abortion or sterilization procedures on religious or moral grounds.41

Section 245 of the Public Health Service Act

Section 245 of the Public Health Service Act prohibits abortion-related discrimination in

governmental activities regarding training and licensing of physicians. Specifically, the federal

government and any state or local recipient of federal funds may not discriminate among health

care entities based upon an entity’s refusal to engage in abortion training.42 This provision also

prohibits discrimination in accreditation determinations on the basis of a failure to perform

induced abortion, or require, provide, or refer for training in the performance of induced

abortions, or make arrangements for such training.43 The protections offered by this clause protect

individual physicians, postgraduate physician training programs, and participants in a program of

training in the health professions.44 Unlike the provisions of the Church Amendment, there is no

requirement under Section 245 that the refusal be made on the basis of a religious or moral

objection.

Weldon Amendment

The Weldon Amendment, named for Representative Dave Weldon, has been regularly included in

recent HHS appropriations legislation. It is not permanent legislation, but only applies to the

funds appropriated in the respective act in which it appears. It prohibits federal agencies, states,

and local governments that receive appropriated funds from discriminating among institutional or

individual health care entities on the basis of a health care entity’s refusal to provide, pay for,

provide coverage of, or refer for abortions.45 For purposes of the Weldon Amendment, the term

‘‘health care entity’’ includes individual physicians or other health care professionals, hospitals,

provider-sponsored organizations, health maintenance organizations, health insurance plans, and

any other kind of health care facility, organization, or plan.46 As with Section 245 of the PHSA,

40

42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(d).

42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(e). Discrimination on the basis of an applicant’s willingness to counsel, suggest, recommend,

assist, or in any way participate in abortion or sterilization procedures is also prohibited.

42

42 U.S.C. § 238n(a). This provision is also known as the Coats Amendment.

43

42 U.S.C. § 238n(b).

44

42 U.S.C. § 238n(c)(2).

45

See, e.g., P.L. 111-8, div. F, § 508(d)(1).

46

Id. at § 508(d)(2).

41

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the Weldon Amendment has not historically required that the refusal be made for religious or

moral reasons.

The text of the Weldon Amendment does not expressly limit its applicability to non-emergency

abortions. Therefore, questions have arisen regarding how the Weldon Amendment would operate

in situations where a hospital may be required to provide an emergency abortion under the

Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA)47 or state law. Shortly after the

Weldon Amendment was first included in the annual Labor, HHS, and Education appropriations

bill, the Attorney General of California sued the federal government alleging that the Weldon

Amendment would prevent the state from insuring that emergency abortions would be provided,

as required by state law. Therefore, the California Attorney General argued that the Weldon

Amendment unconstitutionally interfered with the state’s sovereignty. The court ultimately

dismissed the claim as unripe, based in part on the lack of any expressed intent by HHS to

enforce the Weldon Amendment in this way.48 Furthermore, in response to the lawsuit,

Representative Weldon argued on the floor of the House of Representatives that there was no

conflict between his amendment and EMTALA (or the state equivalent of that statute). Instead, he

stated that “it simply prohibits coercion in nonlife-threatening situations.”49 Therefore, there

exists some support for the proposition that, despite any textual limitation, the Weldon

Amendment does not bar either states or the federal government from requiring providers to

perform emergency abortions in life threatening situations.

Other Federal Conscience Clauses

Other federal laws permit educational institutions or managed care organizations to refuse to pay

for certain services that are contrary to the religious or moral beliefs of the institution or

organization.50 However, these laws are beyond the scope of this report as they do not provide

protections for individual health care providers that refuse to perform services based on their

individually held religious beliefs or moral conviction.

2008 HHS Final Rule and Partial Rescission

In 2008, HHS published a final rule (2008 Final Rule) “intended to ensure that, in the delivery of

health care and other health services, recipients of [HHS] funds do not support coercive or

discriminatory practices in violation of [federal health care conscience laws].”51 The rule

provided protections similar to those contained in the Church Amendment, section 245 of the

Public Health Service Act, and the Weldon Amendment. The 2008 Final Rule also generally

required recipients of federal funds to certify, in writing, that they were compliant with the

provisions of the Final Rule.

Although the rule largely reiterated the language of these federal conscience clauses, there was at

least one significant difference. The 2008 Final Rule provided a definition for “assist[ing] in the

47

42 U.S.C. § 1395dd.

California v. U.S., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21258 (N.D. Cal., Mar. 18, 2008).

49

151 CONG. REC. H177 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 2005) (statement of Rep. Weldon).

50

See CRS Report RL34703, The History and Effect of Abortion Conscience Clause Laws, by (name redacted), at

1-2 (discussing Danforth Amendment and Medicare and Medicaid amendments in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997).

51

73 Fed. Reg. 78072 (Dec. 19, 2008).

48

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performance” of a procedure that encompassed the acts of counseling, referring, or training for a

procedure. In contrast, the Church Amendment does not specify what conduct would constitute

assistance in the performance of an abortion, leaving open the possibility that refusals to refer for

abortion are not protected by the Church Amendment. Nevertheless, under the 2008 Final Rule,

referring a patient for an abortion would have been considered assisting in the performance of an

abortion.52 Earlier versions of the rule also provided a definition for abortion, but the 2008 Final

Rule was silent on that issue.

The rule took effect on January 20, 2009,53 but the Obama Administration partially rescinded the

regulation in 2011.54 The 2011 rescission removed the definitions provided by the rule, the rule’s

recapitulation of the protections in the various federal health care conscience laws, and the

certification requirement.55 However, the portion of the rule designating the Office of Civil Rights

within HHS to receive complaints of violations of the federal health care conscience laws was left

intact.56

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) was a major piece of health care

legislation enacted during the 111th Congress. Among other things, PPACA established statebased health insurance exchanges to provide a marketplace within which individuals and small

employers could purchase private health insurance offered by qualified health plans.57 PPACA

includes a conscience clause to prohibit qualified health plans offered through an exchange from

discriminating amongst individual health care providers or facilities on the basis of the refusal,

for religious or moral reasons, to perform an abortion.58 This prohibition would appear to regulate

the conduct of private health insurers that may not be regulated by any of the existing federal

conscience clauses, which are attached as conditions to the receipt of federal funds.

PPACA also prohibits certain public and private actors from engaging in discrimination amongst

individual or institutional health care providers on the basis of the providers’ objections to

assisted suicide.59 Physician-assisted suicide has been legal under Oregon state law since 1998.60

In 2008, the voters of Washington state passed a ballot initiative legalizing physician-assisted

52

The 2008 Final Rule was the center of controversy because of the effect that the regulation could have on the

availability of certain services. Legislation was also introduced in the Senate to block the rule from taking effect. S. 20,

110th Cong. (2008).

53

Challenges to the regulation were filed in federal district court on January 16, 2009, seeking court order to prevent

the rule from taking effect and a decision to void the rule.

54

76 Fed. Reg. 9968 (Feb. 23, 2011).

55

Id. at 9975. The respective protections provided by the Church Amendment, § 245 of the PHSA, and the Weldon

Amendment are not affected by the partial rescission of the 2008 Final Rule.

56

45 C.F.R. § 88.2.

57

42 U.S.C. § 18021 et seq.

58

42 U.S.C. § 18023(b)(4).

59

42 U.S.C. § 18113(a). The provision would prohibit discrimination by the federal government; a state, local, or

private recipient of funds authorized under the bill; and any health plan created under PPACA. This provision would

protect objections to assisted suicide held by health care professionals, and hospitals, in addition to managed-care

organizations and insurance plans. 42 U.S.C. § 18113(b).

60

OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800.

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Health Care Providers’ Religious Objections to Medical Treatment

suicide.61 In 2009, the Supreme Court of Montana held that the state’s criminal laws did not apply

to physician-assisted suicide because the patient had consented to such treatment.62

Distinctions Between Legal Religious Protections

and Conscience Clause Legislation

Federal legal protections for individuals with religious beliefs that conflict with employment

duties differ. Title VII and the federal conscience clauses address the goal of preventing

individuals from being forced to violate their religious beliefs in the course of their employment.

However, the scope and enforcement mechanisms of Title VII and the federal conscience clauses

provide varying degrees of protection.

Scope of Protections Offered

Title VII applies broadly, to governmental and private employers with 15 or more employees, to

protect religious exercise in the workplace. It applies regardless of the nature of the belief,

whether grounded in religion or morality. It would protect religious refusals of any job task, and

is not limited to certain contexts. On the other hand, the federal conscience clauses are of limited

applicability. They only prohibit discrimination by certain recipients of federal funds and also

only prohibit discrimination on refusals to perform a relatively narrow scope of procedures.

It has been argued that conscience clause legislation is redundant and overlaps with the

protections offered by Title VII. For instance, officials from the EEOC, including legal counsel

appointed under the Bush Administration, argued that “the rule was unnecessary for the

protection of employees and potentially confusing to employers.”63 Employees of entities covered

by Title VII that also receive funds under programs subject to conscience clause legislation may

appear to have a greater expectation of accommodation for their religious beliefs because their

employers are subject to multiple laws requiring nondiscrimination. In other words, the employer

would have a greater incentive to comply with their request for accommodation because the

employer would otherwise lose federal funding. However, Title VII would apply regardless, and

would guarantee the employee a reasonable accommodation if it did not pose more than a

minimal hardship on the employer.

Some have argued that the currently pending HHS conscience clause regulation would contradict

Title VII’s protections. Under this argument, the balance struck by Title VII, requiring

accommodations for employees to the extent that they do not pose undue hardship on employers,

is abandoned by federal conscience clauses because they do not include the caveat that the

accommodation cannot pose an undue hardship. Arguably, under the federal conscience clauses, if

an employer who received designated federal funds were to refuse to accommodate individuals

61

WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245.010 et seq.

Baxter v. State, 354 Mont. 234 (2009). A lower court had held that the state constitution contained a right to receive

and provide aid in dying, Baxter v. State, 2009 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 482 (Mont. Dist. Ct. Dec. 5, 2008), but the Montana

Supreme Court declined to rule on constitutional grounds.

63

Robert Pear, Protests Over a Bush Rule To Protect Health Providers, NY TIMES, November 18, 2008, at A14.

62

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Health Care Providers’ Religious Objections to Medical Treatment

with religious objections, the federal funds would be withdrawn even if any such accommodation

would have posed an undue hardship.

Methods of Enforcement and Remedies Available

Title VII provides specific remedies to correct unlawful employment discrimination. Individuals

who believe they are the victims of employment discrimination must file a complaint with the

EEOC, which is responsible for enforcing individual Title VII claims against private employers.

The Department of Justice (DOJ) enforces Title VII against state and local governments, but may

do so only after the EEOC has conducted an initial investigation.64

None of the federal conscience clauses expressly provide for an individual remedy. One might be

implied, but at least two federal courts have held that the Church Amendment is enforceable only

through withholding federal funds.65 Enforcement does not appear to be available through private

litigation. Therefore, an individual who has been the subject of discrimination in violation of the

Church Amendment may not be able to pursue remedies such as reinstatement or back pay unless

such violations also constitute violations of Title VII or state employment laws. This result is also

likely with respect to the other federal conscience clauses, although no court has been presented

with that question.

Author Contact Information

Cynthia Brougher

Legislative Attorney

[redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....

(name redacted)

Legislative Attorney

[redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....

64

For more information on Title VII, see the EEOC website, http://www.eeoc.gov/, and the DOJ’s Employment

Litigation Section website, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/emp/index.html.

65

Nead v. Bd. of Trs., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36897 (C.D. Ill. June 6, 2006); Moncivaiz v. Dekalb, 2004 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 3997 (N.D. Ill. March 12, 2004).

Congressional Research Service

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