Responsibility Determinations Under the Federal Acquisition Regulation: Legal Standards and Procedures

.

Responsibility Determinations Under

the Federal Acquisition Regulation:

Legal Standards and Procedures

Kate M. Manuel

Legislative Attorney

December 1, 2014

Congressional Research Service

7-5700

www.crs.gov

R40633

c11173008

Responsibility Determinations Under the Federal Acquisition Regulation

.

Summary

This report discusses the standards and procedures that federal agencies use in making

responsibility determinations under the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). As a general rule,

government agencies contract with the lowest-priced (or best-value) qualified responsible bidder

or offeror. Responsibility is an attribute of the contractor, while price and qualifications are

attributes of the bid or offer. Under the FAR, “[n]o purchase or award shall be made unless the

contracting officer makes an affirmative determination of responsibility.”

To be determined responsible, prospective contractors must meet general standards, which

include so-called “collateral requirements.” These standards apply to all procurement contracts,

even if they are not incorporated into the solicitation. They include the following seven criteria

related to contractors’ capabilities and conduct: (1) adequate financial resources; (2) ability to

comply with the delivery or performance schedule; (3) satisfactory performance record;

(4) satisfactory record of integrity and business ethics; (5) necessary organization and experience;

(6) necessary equipment and facilities; and (7) otherwise qualified and eligible. The first six of

these criteria are “performance standards,” and assess whether prospective contractors can be

expected to complete the contract work in a timely and satisfactory manner. In contrast, the

seventh criterion—“otherwise qualified and eligible”—encompasses so-called “collateral

requirements,” or other provisions of law specifying when contractors are disqualified from or

ineligible for awards. Such collateral requirements ensure that the government’s dealings with

contractors promote various socioeconomic goals incorporated into the procurement process.

Currently, there are five collateral requirements of permanent, government-wide applicability.

They exclude contractors who (1) do not comply with federal equal employment opportunity

requirements; (2) fail to agree to an acceptable plan for subcontracting with small businesses; (3)

are known government employees; (4) are quasi-military armed forces; or (5) have unavoidable

and unmitigated organizational conflicts of interest. Other collateral requirements apply to

specific funds or agencies (e.g., prohibitions on contracting with inverted domestic corporations).

In addition, contractors may have to meet special standards, also known as “definitive criteria,”

which apply only to specific acquisitions. Special standards must be expressly included in

agencies’ solicitations. They are used when unusual expertise, special facilities, or specific

experience or equipment are necessary to ensure that the government’s needs are satisfied.

Contracting officers determine prospective contractors’ responsibility prior to each contract award

by considering information submitted by the contractor or otherwise acquired by the agency.

When they lack sufficient information to determine that the contractor is responsible, they must

make a determination of nonresponsibility. Contractors are generally not entitled to due process

when contracting officers make a responsibility determination, meaning that they typically do not

get notice of nonresponsibility determinations or an opportunity to present evidence regarding

their responsibility.

Contracting officers have substantial discretion in making determinations, and judicial or other

tribunals will generally hear protests regarding responsibility determinations only in limited

circumstances. The Government Accountability Office (GAO), in particular, will only hear

protests which allege that special standards (i.e., definitive criteria) were not met, or that identify

evidence raising “serious concerns” that the contracting officer unreasonably failed to consider

available relevant information or otherwise violated statute or regulation.

c11173008

Congressional Research Service

Responsibility Determinations Under the Federal Acquisition Regulation

.

c11173008

Congressional Research Service

Responsibility Determinations Under the Federal Acquisition Regulation

.

Contents

Mechanisms for Ensuring Contractor Responsibility ...................................................................... 2

Responsibility Determinations .................................................................................................. 3

Exclusion Determinations ......................................................................................................... 3

Performance Standards and Collateral Requirements ...................................................................... 5

General Standards ...................................................................................................................... 6

Special Standards..................................................................................................................... 10

Procedures: Making and Protesting Determinations...................................................................... 10

Tables

Table 1. Comparison of Nonresponsibility Determinations and Debarment ................................... 4

Table 2. Permanent Collateral Requirements of Government-Wide Applicability .......................... 9

Contacts

Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 13

c11173008

Congressional Research Service

Responsibility Determinations Under the Federal Acquisition Regulation

.

L

ike private contracting parties, the federal government generally “enjoys the unrestricted

power ... to determine those with whom it will deal[] and fix the terms and conditions

upon which it will make needed purchases.”1 In exercising this power, the government

typically awards contracts to the lowest-priced (or best-value) qualified responsible bidder or

offeror, with responsibility being an attribute of the contractor and price and qualifications being

attributes of the bid or offer.2 The awardee must possess all three attributes. If a prospective

contractor is not responsible, for example, it is ineligible for the proposed contract even if it is

qualified to perform the work and its bid is the lowest, or its offer represents the best value for the

government.3 This focus upon contractors’ responsibility, in particular, exists because:

[t]he award of a contract to a supplier based on lowest evaluated price alone can be false

economy if there is a subsequent default, late deliveries, or other unsatisfactory performance

resulting in additional contractual or administrative costs. While it is important that

Government purchases be made at the lowest price, this does not require an award to a

supplier solely because that supplier submits the lowest offer.4

Currently, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) specifies that “[n]o purchase or award shall

be made unless the contracting officer makes an affirmative determination of responsibility.”5

Contracting officers make responsibility determinations after considering whether prospective

contractors meet certain legal standards specified in the FAR. They make these determinations

using procedures also specified in the FAR.

This report provides an overview of the legal standards and procedures currently used in making

responsibility determinations. Specifically, it discusses (1) how responsibility determinations

relate to other mechanisms that the government relies upon to ensure that contractors are

responsible and otherwise eligible for federal contracts; (2) the performance-related and collateral

standards used in making responsibility determinations; and (3) the procedures for making

responsibility determinations.

1

Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 127 (1940).

This has been the federal government’s policy since its earliest days. See, e.g., James F. Nagle, History of Government

Contracting 50 (2d ed. 1999) (describing how Robert Morris used awards to the lowest-priced qualified responsible

bidder in contracting for the U.S. Army during the Revolutionary War).

3

Under the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA), federal agencies may award procurement contracts only to

“responsible bidders” or “responsible sources.” 10 U.S.C. §2305(b)(3) and 41 U.S.C. §3702(b) (“responsible bidders”

in sealed bidding); 10 U.S.C. §2305(b)(4)(C) and 41 U.S.C. §3703(c) (“responsible sources” in negotiated

procurements). Citations to CICA’s codification generally reference two titles of the United States Code: Title 10

governing procurements by defense agencies, NASA, and the Coast Guard, and Title 41 governing procurements by

civilian agencies. When the lowest priced bid or best-value offer is from a nonresponsible contractor, the award is made

to the next lowest bidder (or the next best-value offeror) who is responsible.

4

48 C.F.R. §9.103(c).

5

48 C.F.R. §9.103(b). Federal statutes provide a definition of “responsible source,” and generally require that contracts

be awarded to responsible sources. See, e.g., 41 U.S.C. §113 (defining “responsible source”); 41 U.S.C. §3702(b) (“The

executive agency shall evaluate the bids in accordance with section 3701(a) of this title without discussions with the

bidders and … shall award a contract with reasonable promptness to the responsible source whose bid conforms to the

solicitation and is most advantageous to the Federal Government, considering only price and the other price-related

factors included in the solicitation.”). However, most of the requirements pertaining to responsibility determinations

discussed herein derive from regulations (i.e., the FAR), not statute.

2

c11173008

Congressional Research Service

1

Responsibility Determinations Under the Federal Acquisition Regulation

.

Mechanisms for Ensuring Contractor Responsibility

In considering whether contractors are sufficiently “responsible” to perform federal contracts,

agencies consider whether prospective contractors (1) can be expected to complete contract work

on time and in a satisfactory manner; (2) are organized in such a way that doing business with

them promotes socioeconomic goals; and (3) meet statutory or regulatory requirements for

eligibility.6 Currently, under the FAR, the government relies upon two primary mechanisms for

avoiding nonresponsible contractors: responsibility determinations and exclusion (i.e., debarment

and suspension).7 This section provides a basic overview of the differences between responsibility

determinations and exclusion. The remainder of the report then explores how responsibility

determinations help ensure that federal contractors are responsible. A separate report, CRS Report

RL34753, Debarment and Suspension of Government Contractors: A Legal Overview, by Kate

M. Manuel, describes the role of debarment and suspension in excluding nonresponsible

contractors.

Responsibility determinations are sometimes also confused with responsiveness determinations;8

evaluation of past performance in negotiated procurements;9 and qualification requirements.10

However, all of these focus upon contractors’ bids—not the contractors themselves—and are thus

beyond the scope of this report.

6

The government had a practice of avoiding awards to nonresponsible contractors prior to CICA. See, e.g., O’Brien v.

Carney, 6 F. Supp. 761 (D.C. Mass. 1934); 7 Comp. Gen. 547 (1928). However, the concept of responsibility was not

expressly included in federal procurement statutes until 1947-1949, when the Armed Services Procurement Act and the

Federal Property and Administrative Services Act were enacted, requiring awards to responsible bidders. See 10 U.S.C.

§2305(c) (1948) and 41 U.S.C. §253 (1950).

7

See 48 C.F.R. §§9.100 to 9.108-5 (nonresponsibility determinations); 48 C.F.R. §§9.400-9.409 (exclusion).

8

Responsiveness determinations focus upon whether bids conform in all material respects to agencies’ invitations for

bids. 48 C.F.R. §14.404-2(a) (“Any bid that fails to conform to the essential requirements of the invitation for bids shall

be rejected.”). While responsibility is determined when the contract is awarded, responsiveness is determined when the

bid is opened. This difference in timing means that a contractor that was not responsible at the time of bid opening

could become so prior to the time of contract award. See, e.g., LORS Med. Corp., Comp. Gen. B-259829.2 (April 25,

1995) (contractor responsible by the time of award because it had adequate financial resources after forming a joint

venture subsequent to bid opening). The same is not true with responsiveness; a bid that is not responsive at the time

when bids are opened cannot later become so.

9

Responsibility determinations are themselves based, in part, on consideration of contractors’ past performance, or

factual information and qualitative judgments about contractors’ performance history. See 48 C.F.R. §9.105-1(c) (“In

making the determination of responsibility, the contracting officer shall consider information in FAPIIS [the Federal

Awardee Performance Integrity Information System] ..., including information that is linked to FAPIIS such as from

the System for Award Management Exclusions and the Past Performance Information Retrieval System (PPIRS), and

any other relevant past performance information ....”). Past performance can also serve as an evaluation factor in

determining to whom to award contracts in negotiated procurements above the simplified acquisition threshold

(generally $150,000). See generally CRS Report R41562, Evaluating the “Past Performance” of Federal Contractors:

Legal Requirements and Issues, by Kate M. Manuel.

10

Qualification requirements are “requirement[s] for testing or other quality assurance demonstration that must be

completed by an offeror before award of a contract.” 41 U.S.C. §3311(a). CICA allows federal agencies to consider

only contractors that have already met testing or quality-assurance requirements when certain conditions are satisfied.

See 10 U.S.C. §2319 and 41 U.S.C. §3311. Chief among these conditions is that the agency head prepares a written

justification (1) stating the need for the qualification requirement, as well as why the requirement must be demonstrated

before contract award; (2) estimating contractors’ likely costs for testing and evaluation; and (3) specifying all

requirements a potential offeror or product must satisfy to become qualified. 48 C.F.R. §9.202(a)(1)(i)-(iii).

Qualification requirements are generally thought to increase the likelihood that government contractors will perform

successfully by limiting the pool of eligible contractors to those that have already demonstrated specific capabilities.

c11173008

Congressional Research Service

2

Responsibility Determinations Under the Federal Acquisition Regulation

.

Responsibility Determinations

Contracting officers make responsibility determinations after considering seven factors, discussed

in more detail below, related to contractors’ resources and conduct.11 Because no purchase or

award may be made “unless the contracting officer makes an affirmative determination of

responsibility,” a nonresponsible contractor is ineligible for the proposed contract.12

Determinations of nonresponsibility are, however, award-specific, and contractors who are

determined nonresponsible for the award of one contract could become responsible prior to the

award of another contract.13 New, current, and former government contractors are equally subject

to the requirement for responsibility determinations. Contractors are generally not guaranteed due

process when contracting officers make responsibility determinations.14 These determinations are

largely committed to the contracting officer’s discretion.15 Protesters have standing to challenge

responsibility determinations before the Government Accountability Office (GAO) or the federal

courts only in limited circumstances.16 Moreover, even when protesters can demonstrate standing,

judicial and administrative tribunals generally decline to overturn contracting officers’

responsibility determinations unless the protester can show that the determination was clearly

unreasonable given the record before the contracting officer.17

Exclusion Determinations

Agencies also use exclusion—as debarment and suspension are collectively known—to avoid

dealing with nonresponsible contractors.18 Decisions to exclude are made by agency heads or

their designees (generally above the contracting officer’s level) based upon evidence that

contractors have committed certain integrity offenses, including any “offenses indicating a lack of

business integrity or honesty that seriously affect the present responsibility of a contractor.”19

11

48 C.F.R. §9.104-1(a)-(g).

48 C.F.R. §9.103(b).

13

See, e.g., LORS Med. Corp., Comp. Gen. B-259829.2 (April 25, 1995) (contractor responsible by the time of award

because it had adequate financial resources after forming a joint venture subsequent to bid opening).

14

But see Old Dominion Dairy Prods., Inc. v. Sec’y of Def., 631 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that the

government denied a bidder found to be nonresponsible because of concerns about its integrity due process when it

failed to advise the bidder of these concerns on the grounds that notice and an opportunity to be heard are “essential”

“where a person’s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the Government is doing to

him”).

15

See, e.g., Molded Insulation Co., Comp. Gen. B-151834 (November 29, 1963) (“In view of the discretion vested in

the contracting agency with respect to such matters we must conclude that there is no basis upon which we may

question the legality of the award made pursuant to the invitation.”).

16

See, e.g., GAO, Office of General Counsel, Bid Protests at GAO: A Descriptive Guide 39 (9th ed. 2009), available at

http://www.gao.gov/decisions/bidpro/bid/d09471sp.pdf (protester has standing only when the protest alleges that

definitive responsibility criteria were not met or “identif[ies] evidence raising serious concerns that ... the contracting

officer unreasonably failed to consider available relevant information or otherwise violated statute or regulation.”).

17

See, e.g., Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United States, 238 F.3d 1324, 1334-35 (2001). Because

the record upon which contracting officers made their determinations is not part of the file when contractors are

determined to be responsible, courts may permit limited depositions of contracting officers in order “to plac[e] on the

record the basis for [their] responsibility determination.” Id. at 1339. There is generally no corresponding need to

depose contracting officers when they determine a contractor is nonresponsible because their files must contain

documents stating the basis for the nonresponsibility determination, among other things. See 48 C.F.R. §9.105-2(a)(1).

18

See 48 C.F.R. §§9.406-1-9.406-5 (debarment) and 48 C.F.R. §§9.407-1-9.407-5 (suspension).

19

See 48 C.F.R. §9.406-1 (debarring official); 48 C.F.R. §9.407-1 (suspending official); 48 C.F.R. §9.403 (definitions

of debarring official and suspending official). Grounds for debarment include, among other things, convictions or civil

(continued...)

12

c11173008

Congressional Research Service

3

Responsibility Determinations Under the Federal Acquisition Regulation

.

Contractors are considered for exclusion only when specific conduct occurs, not as a routine

matter each time a contract is awarded. Exclusion is also government-wide and not contractspecific.20 Excluded contractors are barred from receiving future government contracts, among

other things, for as long as the exclusion lasts.21 Debarment lasts for a “period commensurate

with the seriousness of the cause(s),” generally not exceeding three years, while suspension lasts

as long as any agency investigation of the underlying conduct or ensuing legal proceeding.22 Only

current government contractors are typically debarred or suspended, although contracting officers

may refer prospective contractors to agency debarring or suspending officials for consideration

for exclusion based upon information submitted in bids or offers.23 Contractors that are debarred

or suspended are guaranteed due process, and decisions to exclude are not committed to debarring

or suspending officials’ discretion in the same way that responsibility determinations are.24 While

exclusion determinations are not generally protestable, at least not with the GAO,25 they may be

reversed on appeal to the federal courts when they are improperly punitive, or arbitrary,

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.26

Table 1. Comparison of Nonresponsibility Determinations and Debarment

Nonresponsibility

Debarment

Decision maker

Contracting officer

Debarring/suspending official (not the

contracting officer)

Criteria

Adequate financial resources

Fraud or criminal offenses in obtaining or

performing a public contract or subcontract

Ability to comply with delivery and

(...continued)

judgments involving fraud or criminal offenses in connection with obtaining or performing a government contract;

violations of federal or state antitrust laws relating to the submission of offers; embezzlement, theft, forgery, or similar

offenses; and intentional misuse of the “Made in America” designation. 48 C.F.R. §9.406-2(a)(1)-(5).

20

48 C.F.R. §9.405(a) (“[A]gencies shall not solicit offers from, award contracts to, or consent to subcontracts with

[debarred or suspended] contractors.”).

21

Id. Debarred contractors are also generally precluded from (1) receiving new work or an option under an existing

contract; (2) receiving orders in excess of the guaranteed minimum under an indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity

contract; (3) serving as a subcontractor on certain contracts with executive branch agencies; or (4) serving as an

individual surety. See 48 C.F.R. §9.405(a)-(c); 48 C.F.R. §9.405-1(b)(1)-(3); §9.405-2(a)-(b). However, any current

contracts or subcontracts of debarred or suspended contractors continue unless the agency head directs otherwise. 48

C.F.R. §9.405-1(a).

22

48 C.F.R. §9.406-4(a)(1) (debarment) and 48 C.F.R. §9.407-4(a) (suspension). Debarments are generally limited to

one year for violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act, but can last up to five years for violations of the DrugFree Workplace Act. 48 C.F.R. §9.406-4(a)(1)(i)-(ii). Suspensions may not exceed 18 months unless legal proceedings

are initiated within that period. 48 C.F.R. §9.407-4(b). See also CRS Legal Sidebar WSLG826, 11th Circuit Finds That

Agencies Have Broad Discretion to Suspend Affiliates of Federal Contractors, But Additional Challenges Are Pending

in Other Jurisdictions, by Kate M. Manuel.

23

48 C.F.R. §9.104-5(a)(2).

24

48 C.F.R. §9.406-3. When debarment is based on a conviction, the hearing that the contractor received prior to the

conviction suffices for due process in the debarment proceeding. The due process protections with suspension are not

as extensive as those with debarment because suspension is commonly viewed as “less serious” than debarment since it

is temporary. 48 C.F.R. §9.407-3(a)-(d).

25

4 C.F.R. §21.5(i).

26

See, e.g., Frequency Elecs., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 14888 (4th Cir. 1998) (“[The

court] may disturb the [agency’s exclusion] determination if it is ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or

otherwise not in accordance with the law.’”); IMCO, Inc. v. United States, 97 F.3d 1422, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1996)

(suggesting that a proposed debarment that was intended as a punishment could be impermissible).

c11173008

Congressional Research Service

4

Responsibility Determinations Under the Federal Acquisition Regulation

.

Nonresponsibility

Debarment

performance schedule

Violations of federal or state antitrust laws

Satisfactory performance record

Embezzlement, theft, forgery, bribery, etc.

Satisfactory record of integrity and business

ethics

Intentionally misusing “Made in America"

designation

Necessary organization and experience

Other offenses indicating a lack of business

integrity or honesty that seriously affect the

present responsibility of a contractor

Necessary equipment and facilities

Otherwise qualified and eligible

Duration

Single contract award

Fixed time proportionate to the offense

(generally not more than three years)

Application

Applies to companies that have not previously

had government contracts, as well as current

and prior government contractors

Generally applied to current government

contractors, although potentially applicable to

prospective or prior contractors

Due Process

Generally not

Yes

Review of

Agency

Determinations

Responsibility determinations may generally be

challenged with GAO only when any special

standards are not met or other “serious

concerns” are raised

Exclusion determinations are generally not

protestable with GAO

Source: Congressional Research Service, based on Subparts 9.1 and 9.4 of the FAR.

Performance Standards and Collateral

Requirements

When determining whether prospective contractors are responsible, agencies consider both (1)

general standards that apply to all contracts, regardless of whether they are incorporated into the

solicitation, and (2) special standards, also known as “definitive criteria,” that apply only if

included in the solicitation. These standards—whether general or special—are largely

performance standards. They assess whether prospective contractors can be expected to complete

the contract work on time and in a satisfactory manner. One of the general standards introduces

so-called “collateral requirements,” however, by specifying that contractors must be “otherwise

qualified and eligible” in order to be found responsible.27 Collateral requirements are other

provisions of law disqualifying some prospective contractors or declaring them ineligible for

awards. Collateral requirements are not performance standards. Rather, they ensure that the

government’s dealings with contractors promote socioeconomic goals such as equal employment

opportunity (EEO) or subcontracting with small businesses.28

General standards, as well as any special standards, apply to all prospective contractors located in

the United States and its outlying areas or elsewhere, unless application of the standards “would

be inconsistent with the laws or customs where the contractor is located.”29 They do not apply to

27

48 C.F.R. §9.104-1(g).

See, e.g., 48 C.F.R. §22.802(b) (compliance with EEO requirements); 15 U.S.C. §637(d)(4)(C) (subcontracting with

small businesses); 15 U.S.C. §637(d)(5)(B) (same).

29

48 C.F.R. §9.102(a)(1)-(2).

28

c11173008

Congressional Research Service

5

Responsibility Determinations Under the Federal Acquisition Regulation

.

contracts with foreign, state, or local governments; other U.S. government agencies or their

instrumentalities; or “agencies for the blind or severely disabled.”30 While responsibility

determinations generally focus upon agencies’ prospective prime contractors, contracting officers

may inquire into the responsibility of prospective subcontractors in making their determinations.31

However, contracting officers are not required to independently investigate the responsibility of

each proposed subcontractor.32 Rather, once they determine that a contractor is responsible, they

may generally presume that the contractor has ascertained that its subcontractors are

responsible.33

General Standards

For prospective contractors to be determined responsible, they must satisfy seven criteria, each of

which is discussed in more detail below.34 These criteria require contractors to:

1. Have adequate financial resources to perform the contract, or the ability to

obtain them.35 In assessing this criterion, contracting officers consider the factors

generally used to assess businesses’ financial health: ratio of assets to liabilities,

working capital, cash flow projections, credit ratings, profitability, and liquidity

of assets.36 A contractor’s filing for bankruptcy does not, in itself, mean that the

contractor lacks adequate financial resources.37 Contractors may demonstrate

their financial capacity by offering performance bonds.38

2. Be able to comply with the required or proposed delivery or performance

schedule. Any circumstances suggesting that a contractor might not comply with

the contract’s schedule for delivery or performance could form the basis for an

unfavorable finding on this criterion. Such circumstances may include recent

relocation; labor disputes; delivery problems under prior contracts; and inability

to demonstrate that suppliers or subcontractors are committed to delivering

necessary items or equipment.39

3. Have a satisfactory performance record. Under the FAR, a “prospective

contractor that is or recently has been seriously deficient in contract performance

30

48 C.F.R. §9.102(b)(1)-(3). When nonprofit agencies serving the blind or persons with severe disabilities are

involved, the focus is on capability, not responsibility. See 48 C.F.R. §9.107.

31

See, e.g., Linde Construction, Comp. Gen. B-206442 (March 17, 1983).

32

Id.

33

See, e.g., FHC Options, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-246793.3 (April 14, 1992).

34

48 C.F.R. §9.104-1(a)-(g).

35

When contractors are required to have certain resources or the ability to obtain them (e.g., adequate financial

resources), contractors may demonstrate responsibility by showing a commitment or explicit agreement to rent,

purchase, or otherwise acquire the resources. 48 C.F.R. §9.104-3(a).

36

See, e.g., Costec Assocs., Comp. Gen. B-215827 (December 5, 1984) (working capital); Tomco, Inc., Comp. Gen. B210023.2 (February 15, 1984) (type of credit obtained by the contractor); Lear & Scout, Comp. Gen. B-143208 (June

29, 1960) (net worth, operating losses, cash flow).

37

See, e.g., Hunter Outdoor Prods., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-179922 (October 16, 1974).

38

33 Comp. Gen. Dec. 549 (May 12, 1954).

39

See, e.g., Sys. Dev. Corp., Comp. Gen. B-212624 (December 5, 1983) (inability to demonstrate that suppliers or

subcontractors are committed to delivering necessary items or equipment); X-tyal Int’l Corp., Comp. Gen. B-190101

(March 30, 1978) (relocation, labor strike, delivery problems under other government contracts).

c11173008

Congressional Research Service

6

Responsibility Determinations Under the Federal Acquisition Regulation

.

shall be presumed to be nonresponsible, unless the contracting officer determines

that the circumstances were ... beyond the contractor’s control, or that the

contractor has taken appropriate corrective action.”40 Serious deficiencies in

performance may include delinquent performance; delivery of nonconforming

items; failure to adhere to contract specifications; late deliveries; poor

management or technical judgment; failure to correct production problems;

failure to perform safely; and inadequate supervision of subcontractors.41

Contracting officers must consider the circumstances surrounding any deficient

performance when making determinations,42 and poor performance or default on

one or several prior contracts is not, per se, sufficient ground for

disqualification.43

4. Have a satisfactory record of integrity and business ethics. In evaluating this

criterion, contracting officers may consider convictions or indictments of

corporate officers; integrity offenses constituting grounds for suspension under

the FAR; repeated violations of state law; or pending debarments.44 A lack of

integrity on the part of entities with which the contractor has close relationships

may also be considered.45 Due process could potentially be required when

nonresponsibility determinations are based on concerns about the contractor’s

integrity because contractors have been found to have a protected liberty interest

in being able to challenge allegations about their integrity that could deprive

them of their livelihood, as discussed below.46

5. Have the necessary organization, experience, accounting and operational

controls, and technical skills, or the ability to obtain them. Contracting officers

considering this criterion focus on prior work experiences, as well as the present

organization of corporations.47 Inability to implement necessary programs or

procedures (e.g., for quality assurance), unsatisfactory experience, or lack of

experience may be grounds for nonresponsibility determinations.48 Agencies may

40

48 C.F.R. §9.104-3(b).

See, e.g., Campbell Indus., Comp. Gen. B-238871 (July 3, 1990) (poor management and technical judgment); Ford

Motor Co., Comp. Gen. B-207179 (January 20, 1983) (late deliveries); United Power & Control Sys., Inc., Comp. Gen.

B-184662 (December 27, 1978) (nonconforming items); Bill Ward Painting & Decorating, Comp. Gen. B-184612

(January 28, 1976) (unsafe performance; inadequate supervision of subcontractors); Marine Eng’rs Beneficial Ass’n,

Comp. Gen. B-181265 (November 27, 1974) (failure to take corrective action); Kennedy Van & Storage Co., Inc.,

Comp. Gen. B-180973 (June 19, 1974) (failure to adhere to specifications); Land-Air, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-166969

(September 2, 1969) (delinquent performance).

42

See, e.g., Marine Eng’rs Beneficial Ass’n, Comp. Gen. B-181265 (November 27, 1974).

43

See, e.g., id.

44

See, e.g., Traffic Moving Sys., Comp. Gen. B-248572 (September 3, 1992) (officers’ criminal convictions); Standard

Tank Cleaning Corp., Comp. Gen. B-245364 (January 2, 1992) (repeated violations of state law); Drexel Indus., Inc.,

Comp. Gen. B-189344 (December 6, 1977) (integrity offenses that are grounds for suspension under the FAR);

Greenwood’s Transfer & Storage Co., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-186438 (August 17, 1976) (pending debarment).

45

See, e.g., Speco Corp., Comp. Gen. B-211353 (April 26, 1983) (upholding a nonresponsibility determination where a

contractor repeatedly allowed another business with an unsatisfactory record of integrity and business ethics to do

business under its name).

46

See Old Dominion Dairy Prods., 631 F.2d at 963.

47

See, e.g., Certified Testing Corp., Comp. Gen. B-212242 (November 8, 1983) (present organization); Otis Elevator

Corp., Comp. Gen. B-140481 (September 8, 1959) (prior experience).

48

See, e.g., Omneco, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-218343 (June 10, 1985) (unable to implement quality assurance program);

Columbus Jack Corp., Comp. Gen. B-211829 (September 20, 1983) (unsatisfactory experience); CEA Indus., Inc.,

(continued...)

41

c11173008

Congressional Research Service

7

Responsibility Determinations Under the Federal Acquisition Regulation

.

consider the experience of (1) predecessor firms, when the contractor retains key

personnel; (2) parent firms, when their resources would be committed to

performing the contract; and (3) principal officers or key employees.49

6. Have the necessary production, construction, and technical equipment and

facilities, or the ability to obtain them. Contractors may be found nonresponsible

based on this criterion when they do not presently possess necessary equipment

or facilities, or cannot prove ability to access them in the future.50 Contracting

officers may also evaluate the safety or capacity of equipment or facilities.51

7. Be otherwise qualified and eligible to receive an award under applicable laws

and regulations. Contracting officers evaluating this criterion consider whether

contractors are disqualified from or ineligible for a proposed award because of

collateral requirements, or other provisions of law specifying when contractors

are disqualified from or ineligible for awards. Table 2 lists the collateral

requirements of permanent, government-wide applicability. Other collateral

requirements apply to procurements conducted using specific funds or by specific

agencies.52 Contracting officers may also consider whether contractors have or

can acquire any necessary federal licenses or permits.53

(...continued)

Comp. Gen. B-169160 (May 4, 1970) (lack of experience). Lack of experience is treated differently than lack of

performance history. Lack of experience can count against prospective contractors when contracting officers consider

whether contractors have the necessary organization and experience. Lack of performance history, however, generally

cannot count against prospective contractors when contracting officers either (1) consider whether contractors have a

satisfactory performance record or (2) evaluate past performance. See 41 U.S.C. §1126; 48 C.F.R. §9.104-1(c); 48

C.F.R. §15.305(a)(2)(iv).

49

See, e.g., Tri-Star Indus., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-254767.2 (January 18, 1994) (parent corporation); J.D. Miles & Sons,

Inc., Comp. Gen. B-251533 (April 7, 1993) (key employees); Sun Elec. Corp., Comp. Gen. B-202325 (August 10,

1981) (predecessor firm); Nello T. Leer Co., Comp. Gen. B-130910 (March 26, 1957) (principal officers). However,

contracting officers are not obligated to consider the experience of the parent of a newly formed subsidiary. See, e.g.,

Med. Servs. Consultants, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-203998 (May 25, 1982).

50

See, e.g., McLaughlin Res. Corp., Comp. Gen. B-247118 (May 5, 1992) (agreement showing ability to use

warehouse in the future).

51

See, e.g., GSE Dynamics, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-175545 (August 17, 1972).

52

For example, the Federal Protective Service Guard Contracting Reform Act of 2008 prohibits businesses that are

owned, controlled, or operated by individuals convicted of “serious felonies” from participating in the contract security

guard program of the Federal Protective Service, a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). See

P.L. 110-356, §2, 122 Stat. 3996 (October 8, 2008). In November 2009, DHS promulgated a final rule implementing

this act, identifying what constitutes a “serious felony,” among other things. Dep’t of Homeland Security, Prohibition

on Federal Protective Service Guard Services Contracts With Business Concerns Owned, Controlled, or Operated by an

Individual Convicted of a Felony, 74 Fed. Reg. 58851 (November 16, 2009). See also 48 C.F.R. §§9.108-1—9.108-5

(prohibiting the use of specified funds to contract with inverted domestic corporations).

53

See, e.g., What-Mac Contractors, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-192188 (September 6, 1979). Any requirements for state or

local licenses or permits included in a solicitation are special standards, discussed below, not general ones. See, e.g.,

GSE Dynamics, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-175545 (August 17, 1972).

c11173008

Congressional Research Service

8

Responsibility Determinations Under the Federal Acquisition Regulation

.

Table 2. Permanent Collateral Requirements of Government-Wide Applicability

Requirement

Equal Employment

Opportunity (EEO)

Application

•

Contractors ineligible if they do not comply with the EEO requirements in

Executive Order 11246, which, among other things, obligates contractors to “take

affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are

treated during employment, without regard to their race, color, religion, sex or

national origin.”

•

Contractors cannot receive an award whose expected value is $10 million or

higher (excluding construction contracts) unless the Office of Federal Contract

Compliance Programs at the Department of Labor determines in writing that the

contractor is compliant with Executive Order 11246.

•

Contractors ineligible if they fail to agree to an acceptable plan for subcontracting

with small businesses under the contract. Section 637(d) of the Small Business Act

requires that all contracts whose expected value is over $650,000 ($1.5 million, in

the case of construction contracts) include a “subcontracting plan” that provides

the “maximum practicable opportunity” for various types of small businesses to

participate in performing the contract. Plans must include percentage goals for

subcontracting with small businesses; veteran-owned and service-disabled veteranowned small businesses; Historically Underutilized Business Zone (HUBZone)

small businesses; small disadvantaged businesses; and women-owned small

businesses. Plans must also describe the steps that contractors will take to ensure

that small businesses have an equitable opportunity to compete for subcontracts.

•

Agencies may not knowingly award contracts to government employees or

entities owned, or substantially owned or controlled, by government employees.

•

Contracting with government employees is permitted under certain narrow

exceptions, such as when the government’s needs cannot otherwise be met.

•

If a contracting officer unknowingly contracts with a government employee, the

award generally will not be disturbed unless there appears to have been favoritism

or other impropriety.

Quasi-military Armed

Forces

•

Agencies may not contract with the Pinkerton Detective Agency or “similar

organizations.”

(5 U.S.C. §3108; 48 C.F.R.

§37.109)

•

Prohibition applies “only to contracts with organizations that offer quasi-military

armed forces for hire, or with their employees, regardless of the contract’s

character.” (48 C.F.R. §37.109)

Organizational Conflicts of

Interest (OCIs)

•

Agencies may not award contracts where there are OCIs that cannot be avoided

or mitigated. Disqualifying OCIs could arise if a prospective contractor provided

systems engineering and technical direction, prepared specifications or work

statements, provided evaluation services, or obtained access to other contractors’

proprietary information while performing other government contracts.

•

Possibility of an OCI is not, in itself, grounds for disqualification. Rather, when

contracting officers identify an OCI, they must notify the contractor and allow the

contractor a reasonable opportunity to respond.

•

Contracting officers have substantial discretion in determining whether OCIs exist,

and their determinations will generally be reversed, if protested, only when they

are clearly unreasonable or directly contrary to statute or regulation.

(48 C.F.R. §22.802(b);

Exec. Order No. 11246,

30 Fed. Reg. 12319

(September 24, 1965))

Small Business

Subcontracting Plans

(15 U.S.C. §637(d)(4)(C)

(plans in negotiated

procurements); 15 U.S.C.

§637(d)(5)(B) (plans in

sealed-bid procurements))

Government Employees

(48 C.F.R. §§3.601-603)

(48 C.F.R. §§9.500-9.508)

Source: Congressional Research Service, based on various sources cited in Table 2.

c11173008

Congressional Research Service

9

Responsibility Determinations Under the Federal Acquisition Regulation

.

Special Standards

In addition to the general standards (including collateral requirements), which typically apply to

all contracts,54 there may be special standards, also known as definitive criteria, that contractors

must meet in order to be determined responsible for specific acquisitions.55 Contracting officers

may incorporate such standards into solicitations when unusual expertise, special facilities, or

specific experience or equipment are necessary to ensure that the government’s needs are

satisfied.56 Contracting officers may not waive any special standards when making awards.57

However, they have some discretion in determining whether particular offerors meet the special

standards, provided that their determinations are based upon adequate and objective evidence.58

Contractors may rely upon the experience or facilities of their affiliates or subcontractors, or any

fellow venturer in a joint venture.59 Where experience is involved, they may also rely on

employees’ experiences while working for other companies.60

Procedures: Making and Protesting Determinations

Agency contracting officers must make an affirmative determination that a prospective contractor

is responsible prior to awarding the contract.61 They do so after considering a range of

information about the contractor. Specifically, they are required to consider information that is

included in the Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity Information System (FAPIIS),

“including information that is linked to FAPIIS such as from the Excluded Parties List System

(EPLS) and the Past Performance Information Retrieval System (PPIRS),” and other relevant

“past performance” information.62 In addition, they are encouraged to consider:

(1) [r]ecords and experience data, including verifiable knowledge of personnel within the

contracting office, audit offices, contract administration offices, and other contracting

offices.

(2) [t]he prospective contractor—including bid or proposal information (including the

certification at 52.209-5 or 52.212-3(h)), questionnaire replies, financial data, information on

production equipment, and personnel information.

54

But see 48 C.F.R. Subpart 1.4 (allowing contracting officers to deviate from the requirements of the FAR in certain

circumstances). For more on deviations, see generally CRS Report R42826, The Federal Acquisition Regulation

(FAR): Answers to Frequently Asked Questions, by Kate M. Manuel et al.

55

48 C.F.R. §9.104-2(a).

56

See, e.g., Breland Co., Comp. Gen. B-217552 (February 21, 1985) (unusual expertise); Aero Corp., Comp. Gen. B201581 (June 23, 1981) (special facilities).

57

See, e.g., The Mary Kathleen Collins Trust, Comp. Gen. B-261019.2 (September 29, 1995).

58

See, e.g., Reliance Elec. Co., Comp. Gen. B-184865 (May 3, 1976) (determining whether the offeror has equivalent

experience). In granting a Certificate of Competence, discussed below, the Small Business Administration (SBA) must

consider, but is not bound by, definitive criteria in the solicitation. See Baxter & Sons Elevator Co., Inc., Comp. Gen.

B-197595 (December 3, 1980).

59

See, e.g., Tutor Saliba Corp., Comp. Gen. B-255756 (March 29, 1994).

60

See, e.g., Tucson Mobilephone, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-258408.3 (June 5, 1995).

61

48 C.F.R. §9.103(b).

62

48 C.F.R. §9.105-1(c). “Past performance” generally refers to “an offeror’s or contractor’s performance on active

and physically completed contracts.” 48 C.F.R. §2.101.

c11173008

Congressional Research Service

10

Responsibility Determinations Under the Federal Acquisition Regulation

.

(3) [c]ommercial sources of supplier information of a type offered to buyers in the private

sector.

(4) [p]reaward survey reports.63

(5) [o]ther sources such as publications; suppliers, subcontractors, and customers of the

prospective contractor; financial institutions; Government agencies; and business and trade

associations.64

Contracting officers must obtain “information sufficient to be satisfied” that the prospective

contractor meets all performance standards and collateral requirements.65 However, until recently,

contracting officers had almost unfettered discretion as to the nature and quantity of information

considered.66 Although they were encouraged to consider other information,67 they were required

to consider only “relevant past performance information.”68 The Clean Contracting Act of 2008

(P.L. 110-417, §§871-873) effectively changed this by requiring contracting officers to consult the

Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity Information System (FAPIIS) database—whose

establishment was required under the act—when making responsibility determinations for

contracts in excess of the simplified acquisition threshold (generally $150,000).69 FAPIIS

contains brief descriptions of all civil, criminal, and administrative proceedings involving federal

contracts that result in a conviction or finding of fault, as well as all terminations for default,

administrative agreements, and nonresponsibility determinations relating to federal contracts,

within the past five years for all entities holding a federal contract or grant worth $500,000 or

more.70 Contracting officers are, thus, required to review this information when making

responsibility determinations. However, what other information, if any, contracting officers

consider generally remains within their discretion, and they are not bound by any

recommendations contained in the information that they consider.71

63

A preaward survey is “an evaluation of a prospective contractor’s capability to perform a proposed contract.” 48

C.F.R. §2.101.

64

48 C.F.R. §9.105-1(c)(1)-(5) (internal citations omitted).

65

48 C.F.R. §9.105-1(a).

66

See, e.g., John C. Grimberg Co. v. United States, 185 F.3d 1297, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[T]he contracting officer is

the arbiter of what, and how much, information he needs.”). An affirmative determination is improper if not based on

sufficient information. 48 C.F.R. §9.105-1(a). However, the amount of information needed depends upon the

conclusions that can be drawn from it. See, e.g., John F. Small & Co., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-207681.2 (December 6,

1982). Determinations must also be supported by the record and based on the most current information available. See,

e.g., 48 C.F.R. §9.105-1(b)(1); Gary Aircraft Corp., Comp. Gen. B-174455 (July 6, 1972).

67

48 C.F.R. §9.105-1(c)(1)-(5) (“In addition, the contracting officer should use the following sources of

information ... ”) (emphasis added).

68

48 C.F.R. §9.105-1(c) (2007).

69

P.L. 110-417, §872(b)(1) & (c), 122 Stat. 4356 (October 14, 2008).

70

P.L. 110-417, at §872(b)(1) & (c). Prior to the Clean Contracting Act, determinations that contractors were

nonresponsible were recorded only in the contract files, whose contents are not easily accessed by other agencies or the

general public. See 48 C.F.R. §9.105-2(a)(1) (2008). However, contracting officers could potentially engage in de facto

debarment, discussed below, if they based a nonresponsibility determination for a prospective contractor solely on the

fact that a contractor had previously been determined nonresponsible. For more on de facto debarment generally, see

CRS Report RL34753, Debarment and Suspension of Government Contractors: A Legal Overview, by Kate M.

Manuel.

71

See, e.g., Carl Weissman & Sons, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-190304 (February 17, 1978).

c11173008

Congressional Research Service

11

Responsibility Determinations Under the Federal Acquisition Regulation

.

A contractor’s failure to provide necessary information could result in a nonresponsibility

determination because contracting officers must determine that contractors are nonresponsible

when they lack information “clearly indicating that the prospective contractor is responsible.”72

The only exception to this rule involves small businesses. Prior to determining that a small

business is nonresponsible due to lack of information, or upon any other basis, contracting

officers must consult the Small Business Administration (SBA), which may—but is not required

to—issue a Certificate of Competence declaring the contractor eligible for the award.73 When the

SBA issues a Certificate of Competence, contracting officers “shall accept [its] decision ... and

award the contract to the concern.”74

Contractors do not routinely receive notice of nonresponsibility determinations concerning

them,75 and they are generally not entitled to due process when contracting officers make

responsibility determinations. Due process, where it applies, may require that parties get some

sort of notice and opportunity to be heard before the government takes actions involving their life,

liberty, or property.76 Because contractors do not have property interests in prospective

government contracts, they are generally not entitled to notice or a hearing before contracting

officers determine they are nonresponsible.77 However, when nonresponsibility determinations

are based upon concerns about contractors’ integrity, contractors are potentially entitled to due

process because courts have recognized that contractors have a protected liberty interest in being

able to challenge allegations about their integrity that could deprive them of their livelihood:

[W]hen a determination is made that a contractor lacks integrity and the Government has not

acted to invoke formal suspension and debarment procedures, notice of the charges must be

given to the contractor as soon as possible so that the contractor may utilize whatever

opportunities are available to present its side of the story before adverse action is taken.78

Contractors could potentially also be entitled to due process if repeated nonresponsibility

determinations were made on the same basis—even when that basis is not integrity-related—if

the determinations constitute de facto debarment, as discussed below.79

Contracting officers have substantial discretion in making responsibility determinations,80 and

judicial or other tribunals will generally hear protests regarding responsibility determinations only

72

48 C.F.R. §9.103(b); Sec. Assistance Forces & Equip. Int’l, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-194876 (November 19, 1980).

48 C.F.R. §9.103(b); 48 C.F.R. Subpart 19.6.

74

48 C.F.R. §9.105-2(a)(2).

75

Contractors are, however, entitled to written notice of nonresponsibility determinations, as well as the basis for such

determinations, when making bids or offers to the General Service Administration (GSA). See GSA Acquisition Manual

Part 509.105-2(a); 48 C.F.R. §509.105-2(a). Notice is intended to allow prospective contractors to correct problems for

future solicitations. Id.

76

See, e.g., Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 64 (1972) (holding that people must have recourse to procedures for

determining the fairness of how the government has treated them when life, liberty, or property is involved).

77

See, e.g., Old Dominion Dairy Prods., 631 F.2d at 961 (contractor cannot claim a property interest in a prospective

contract).

78

Id. at 955-56. See also Conset Corp. v. Cmty. Servs. Admin., 655 F.2d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (circulation of a

memorandum alleging that a grant recipient had a conflict of interest, coupled with a subsequent refusal to approve the

firm for a grant, violated due process); Related Indus., Inc. v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 517 (1983) (contractor denied due

process when a contracting officer stated that “under no circumstances will he award any contract” to the contractor).

79

See, e.g., Shermco Indus., Inc. v. Sec’y of the Air Force, 584 F. Supp. 76 (N.D. Tex. 1984) (holding that when

successive determinations of nonresponsibility are made on the same basis, de facto debarment may have occurred).

80

Molded Insulation Co., Comp. Gen. B-151834 (November 29, 1963).

73

c11173008

Congressional Research Service

12

Responsibility Determinations Under the Federal Acquisition Regulation

.

in limited circumstances. Such tribunals do not routinely review contracting officers’

responsibility determinations because such determinations are “practical, ... not legal

determination[s]”81 and “are not readily susceptible to judicial review.”82 The GAO, in particular,

hears protests regarding responsibility determinations only when the protester alleges that

definitive responsibility criteria were not met or “identif[ies] evidence raising serious concerns

that ... the contracting officer unreasonably failed to consider available relevant information or

otherwise violated statute or regulation.”83 The federal courts similarly consider the merits of

protested responsibility determinations only when the protester’s allegations that the agency’s

determination was arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance

with the law can survive a preliminary motion to dismiss.84 Moreover, judicial and administrative

tribunals decline to overturn contracting officers’ responsibility determinations in many of the

protests that they do hear. They generally overturn a determination only when the protester can

show that the determination was clearly unreasonable given the record before the contracting

officer.85 In addition, the GAO and the courts have held that a contracting officer’s determination

is not unreasonable merely because another contracting officer made a different determination

after considering the same information.86

Author Contact Information

Kate M. Manuel

Legislative Attorney

kmanuel@crs.loc.gov, 7-4477

81

Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’r, 714 F.2d 163, 167 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

YRT Servs. Corp. v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 366, 394 (1993). These tribunals also take the view that federal

agencies “bear the burden of difficulties experienced in obtaining the required performance.” See, e.g., News Printing

Co. v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 740, 746 (2000).

83

See, e.g., Bid Protests at GAO, supra note 16, at 39. Prior to 2003, the GAO exercised more limited jurisdiction over

protested responsibility determinations, hearing only protests alleging “bad faith” by agency officials or failure to meet

definitive criteria. However, the GAO changed its policy in response to the decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for

the Federal Circuit in Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United States, 238 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

84

Watts-Healy Tibbitts v. United States, 84 Fed. Cl. 253 (2008). Claims that agency actions are arbitrary and

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law derive from the Administrative

Procedure Act (APA), which allows persons “suffering legal wrong because of agency action” to seek judicial review

of that action. See 5 U.S.C. §702 (right of review); 5 U.S.C. §706 (2)(A) (arbitrary and capricious standard).

85

See, e.g., Impresa Construzioni, 238 F.3d at 1334-35. Because the record upon which contracting officers made their

determinations is not part of the files when they find contractors responsible, courts may permit limited depositions of

contracting officers in order “to plac[e] on the record the basis for [their] responsibility determination.” Id. at 1339.

There is usually no parallel need to depose contracting officers when they determine a contractor is nonresponsible

because their files must contain documents stating the basis of the nonresponsibility determination, among other things.

See 48 C.F.R. §9.105-2(a)(1).

86

See, e.g., MCI Constructors, Comp. Gen. B-240655 (November 27, 1990); S.A.F.E. Exp. Corp., Comp. Gen. B151834 (April 22, 1983).

82

c11173008

Congressional Research Service

13