Congressional Oversight and Related Issues Concerning International Security Agreements Concluded by the United States
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Congressional Oversight and Related
Issues Concerning International Security
Agreements Concluded by the United States
/name redacted/
Legislative Attorney
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Legislative Attorney
June 7, 2012
Congressional Research Service
7-....
www.crs.gov
R40614
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Oversight and Related Issues Concerning International Security Agreements
Summary
The United States is a party to numerous security agreements with other nations. The topics
covered, along with the significance of the obligations imposed upon agreement parties, may
vary. Some international security agreements entered by the United States, such as those obliging
parties to come to the defense of another in the event of an attack, involve substantial
commitments and have traditionally been entered as treaties, ratified with the advice and consent
of the Senate. Other agreements dealing with more technical matters, such as military basing
rights or the application of a host country’s laws to U.S. forces stationed within, are entered more
routinely and usually take a form other than treaty (i.e., as an executive agreement or a nonlegal
political commitment).
Occasionally, the substance and form of a proposed security agreement may become a source of
dispute between Congress and the executive branch. In late 2007, the Bush Administration
announced its intention to negotiate a long-term security agreement with Iraq that would have
committed the United States to provide security assurances to Iraq and maintain a long-term
military presence in that country. This announcement became a source of congressional interest,
in part because of statements by Administration officials that such an agreement would not be
submitted to the legislative branch for approval. Congressional concern dissipated when U.S.-Iraq
negotiations culminated in an agreement that did not contain a long-term security commitment by
the United States, but instead called for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq by December 31,
2011.
On May 2, 2012, President Barack Obama and President Hamid Karzai signed the Enduring
Strategic Partnership Agreement Between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic
of Afghanistan. Under the terms of the Agreement, the parties pledge to work cooperatively in a
number of fields, including to promote shared democratic values, advance long-term security,
reinforce regional security, advance social and economic development, and strengthen Afghan
institutions and governance. Additionally, the Agreement provides that the United States and
Afghanistan shall initiate negotiations on a Bilateral Security Agreement (with the goal of
concluding such an agreement within a year), which is intended to replace the existing agreement
relating to the status of military and civilian personnel currently in Afghanistan.
It is likely that future disputes will arise between the political branches regarding the entering or
implementation of international security agreements. Regardless of the form a security
arrangement may take, Congress has several tools to exercise oversight regarding the negotiation,
form, conclusion, and implementation of the agreement by the United States. This report begins
by providing a general background on the types of international agreements that are binding upon
the United States, as well as considerations affecting whether they take the form of a treaty or an
executive agreement. Next, the report discusses historical precedents as to the role that security
agreements have taken, with specific attention paid to past agreements entered with Afghanistan,
Germany, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Iraq. The report discusses the oversight role
that Congress exercises with respect to entering and implementing international agreements
involving the United States.
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Oversight and Related Issues Concerning International Security Agreements
Contents
I. International Agreements Under U.S. Law .................................................................................. 1
Treaties ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Executive Agreements ............................................................................................................... 2
Congressional-Executive Agreements................................................................................. 4
Executive Agreements Made Pursuant to Treaties .............................................................. 5
Sole Executive Agreements................................................................................................. 5
Nonlegal Agreements .......................................................................................................... 7
Choosing Between a Treaty and Executive Agreement ...................................................... 8
II. Historical Practice Regarding Security Agreements ................................................................... 9
Categories of Security Agreements ........................................................................................... 9
Collective Defense Agreements/“Security Commitments”............................................... 10
Consultation Requirements/“Security Arrangements”...................................................... 11
Other Types of Military Agreements................................................................................. 12
Agreements Granting the Legal Right to Military Intervention........................................ 13
Non-Binding Security Arrangements ...................................................................................... 14
Examples of Bilateral Security Agreements ............................................................................ 16
Afghanistan ....................................................................................................................... 16
Iraq .................................................................................................................................... 20
Germany............................................................................................................................ 22
Japan.................................................................................................................................. 23
South Korea....................................................................................................................... 24
Philippines......................................................................................................................... 26
III. Congressional Oversight.......................................................................................................... 27
Notification.............................................................................................................................. 27
Notification Pursuant to the Case-Zablocki Act................................................................ 27
Notification Pursuant to Circular 175 Procedures............................................................. 28
Annual Reporting of Security Arrangements Required by the National Defense
Authorization Act of 1991.............................................................................................. 28
Consultation............................................................................................................................. 29
Approval, Rejection, or Conditional Approval of International Agreements .......................... 30
Implementation of an Agreement That Is Not Self-Executing ................................................ 31
Continuing Oversight .............................................................................................................. 31
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 32
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Oversight and Related Issues Concerning International Security Agreements
T
he United States is a party to numerous security agreements with other nations. The topics
covered, along with the significance of the obligations imposed upon agreement parties,
may vary. Some international security agreements entered by the United States, such as
those obliging parties to come to the defense of another in the event of an attack, involve
substantial commitments and have traditionally been entered as treaties, ratified with the advice
and consent of the Senate. Other agreements dealing with more technical matters, such as military
basing rights or the application of a host country’s laws to U.S. forces stationed within, are
entered more routinely and usually take a form other than treaty.
Regardless of the form of a security arrangement, Congress has several tools which enable it to
exercise oversight regarding the negotiation, form, conclusion, and implementation of the
agreement by the United States. This report begins by providing a general background as to the
types of international agreements that are binding upon the United States, as well as
considerations affecting whether they take the form of a treaty or an executive agreement. Next,
the report examines historical precedents, with specific attention paid to past agreements entered
with Afghanistan, Iraq, Germany, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. Finally, the report
discusses the oversight role that Congress exercises with respect to entering and implementing
international agreements involving the United States.
I. International Agreements Under U.S. Law
Under U.S. law, a legally binding international agreement can be entered into pursuant to either a
treaty or an executive agreement. The Constitution allocates primary responsibility for entering
such agreements to the executive branch, but Congress also plays an essential role. First, in order
for a treaty (but not an executive agreement) to become the “Law of the Land,”1 the Senate must
provide its advice and consent to treaty ratification by a two-thirds majority. Alternatively,
Congress may authorize congressional-executive agreements. Many treaties and executive
agreements are not “self-executing,” meaning that in order for them to take effect domestically,
implementing legislation is required to provide U.S. bodies with the authority necessary to
enforce and comply with the agreements’ provisions. While some executive agreements do not
require congressional approval, adherence to them may nonetheless be dependent upon Congress
appropriating necessary funds or authorizing the activities to be carried out (where compliance
with the agreement would contravene some statutory provision).
Treaties
Under U.S. law, a treaty is an agreement negotiated and signed2 by the executive branch, which
enters into force if it is approved by a two-thirds majority in the Senate and is subsequently
1
U.S. CONST., art. VI, §2. In this regard, it is important to distinguish “treaty” in the context of international law, in
which “treaty” and “international agreement” are synonymous terms for all binding agreements, and “treaty” in the
context of domestic U.S. law, in which “treaty” more narrowly refers to a particular subcategory of binding
international agreements. It should be noted, however, that the term “treaty” is not always interpreted under U.S. law to
refer only to those agreements described in Article II, §2 of the Constitution. See Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25
(1982) (interpreting statute barring discrimination except where permitted by “treaty” to refer to both treaties and
executive agreements); B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583 (1912) (construing the term “treaty,” as used in
statute conferring appellate jurisdiction, to also refer to executive agreements).
2
Under international law, States (i.e., countries) that have signed but not ratified treaties have the obligation to refrain
from acts that would defeat the object or purpose of the treaty. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, entered into
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ratified following presidential signature.3 The Senate may, in considering a treaty, condition its
consent on certain reservations,4 declarations,5 and understandings6 concerning treaty application.
If accepted, these reservations, declarations, and understandings may limit and/or define U.S.
obligations under the treaty.7
Executive Agreements
The great majority of international agreements that the United States enters into are not treaties
but executive agreements8—agreements made by the executive branch that are not submitted to
the Senate for its advice and consent. There are three types of prima facie legal executive
agreements: (1) congressional-executive agreements, in which Congress has previously or
retroactively authorized an international agreement entered into by the executive; (2) executive
agreements made pursuant to an earlier treaty, in which the agreement is authorized by a ratified
treaty; and (3) sole executive agreements, in which an agreement is made pursuant to the
President’s constitutional authority without further congressional authorization. The executive’s
authority to promulgate the agreement is different in each case.
Although executive agreements are not specifically discussed in the Constitution, they
nonetheless have been considered valid international compacts under Supreme Court
jurisprudence and as a matter of historical practice.9 Starting in the World War II era, reliance on
(...continued)
force January 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter “Vienna Convention”], art. 18. Although the United States has
not ratified the Vienna Convention, it recognizes it as generally expressing customary international law. See, e.g.,
Fujitsu Ltd. v. Federal Exp. Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 433 (2nd Cir. 2001) (“we rely upon the Vienna Convention here as an
authoritative guide to the customary international law of treaties ... [b]ecause the United States recognizes the Vienna
Convention as a codification of customary international law ... and [it] acknowledges the Vienna Convention as, in
large part, the authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice”) (internal citations omitted).
3
Oftentimes, a bilateral treaty will only come into effect after the parties exchange instruments of ratification. In the
case of multilateral treaties, ratification typically occurs only after the treaty’s instruments of ratification are submitted
to the appropriate body in accordance with the terms of the agreement.
4
A “reservation” is “a unilateral statement ... made by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or
acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in
their application to that State.” Vienna Convention, art. 2(1)(d). In practice, “[r]eservations change U.S. obligations
without necessarily changing the text, and they require the acceptance of the other party.” CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, A STUDY
PREPARED FOR THE SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 11 (Comm. Print 2001); Vienna Convention, arts. 19-23.
5
Declarations are “statements expressing the Senate’s position or opinion on matters relating to issues raised by the
treaty rather than to specific provisions.” TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 4, at 11.
6
Understandings are “interpretive statements that clarify or elaborate provisions but do not alter them.” Id.
7
As a matter of customary international law, States are “obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and
purpose of a treaty,” including entering reservations that are incompatible with a treaty’s purposes. Vienna Convention,
arts. 18-19.
8
LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 215 (2nd ed. 1996).
9
E.g., American Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003) (“our cases have recognized that the President has
authority to make ‘executive agreements’ with other countries, requiring no ratification by the Senate ... this power
having been exercised since the early years of the Republic”); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (“an
international compact ... is not always a treaty which requires the participation of the Senate”).
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executive agreements has grown significantly,10 with the number of international agreements
entered as executive agreements significantly dwarfing those entered as treaties.11
Although some have argued that certain agreements may only be entered as treaties, subject to the
advice and consent of the Senate,12 this view has been rejected by many scholars.13 Adjudication
of the propriety of executive agreements has been rare, in significant part because plaintiffs often
cannot demonstrate that they have suffered a redressable injury giving them standing to challenge
an agreement,14 or fail to make a justiciable claim. In 2001, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the issue of whether the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was a treaty
10
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 4, at 38-40.
According to one estimate, between 1789 and 2004, the United States entered 1,834 treaties and 16,704 executive
agreements, meaning that roughly 10% of agreements concluded by the United States during that period took the form
of treaties. WILLIAM R. SLOMANSON, FUNDAMENTAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 376 (5th ed. 2007). This
number may not take into account the numerous minor or technical agreements entered by the United States each year,
which are often entered to implement more general provisions found in treaties or executive agreements. Cf. 21 C.F.R.
§181.2(a)(2) (interpreting Case-Zablocki Act, 1 U.S.C. §112b, which requires congressional notification of
international agreements other than treaties which enter into force for the United States, and 1 U.S.C. §112a, requiring
the publishing of international agreements to which the United States is a party, to not cover “minor or trivial
undertakings, even if couched in legal language and form”).
12
E.g., Edwin Borchard, Treaties and Executive Agreements: A Reply, 54 YALE L. J. 616 (1945) (arguing that the
congressional-executive agreement is not a constitutionally permissible alternative to a treaty, and that sole executive
agreements are permissible in limited circumstances); Bradford C. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93
VA. L. REV. 1573 (2007) (arguing that the text and drafting history of the Constitution supports the position that treaties
and executive agreements are not interchangeable, and also arguing that the Supremacy Clause should be read to
generally preclude sole executive agreements from overriding existing law); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and
Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221
(1995) (arguing that the Treaty Clause is the exclusive means for Congress to approve significant international
agreements); John C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties?: the Constitutionality of Congressional-Executive Agreements, 99 MICH.
L. REV. 757 (2001) (arguing that treaties are the constitutionally required form for congressional approval of an
international agreement concerning action lying outside of Congress’s constitutional powers, including matters with
respect to human rights, political/military alliances, and arms control, but are not required for agreements concerning
action falling within Congress’s powers under Art. I of the Constitution, such as agreements concerning international
commerce).
13
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, §303 n.8 (1987) (“At one time it was argued that some agreements
can be made only as treaties, by the procedure designated in the Constitution.... Scholarly opinion has rejected that
view.”); HENKIN, supra note 8, at 217 (“Whatever their theoretical merits, it is now widely accepted that the
Congressional-Executive agreement is available for wide use, even general use, and is a complete alternative to a
treaty....”); Yoo, supra note 12, at 759 (noting that “a broad intellectual consensus exists that congressional-executive
agreements may serve as full substitutes for treaties”); Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, And
Future Of International Lawmaking In The United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1244 (2008) (noting that “weight of
scholarly opinion” since the 1940s has been in favor of the view that treaties and congressional-executive agreements
are interchangeable). Cf. Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1995)
(arguing that developments in the World War II era altered historical understanding of the Constitution’s allocation of
power between government branches so as to make congressional-executive agreement a complete alternative to a
treaty); Myres S. McDougal and Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements:
Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy (parts I and II), 54 YALE L. J. 181, 534 (1945) (arguing that historical
practice supports the interchangeability of congressional-executive agreements and treaties).
14
RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, at §302, n. 5; HENKIN, supra note 8, at 142-148. See also Greater Tampa Chamber of
Commerce v. Goldschmidt, 627 F.2d 258 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (finding that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the
propriety of the form taken by an international agreement between the United States and United Kingdom). Executive
agreements dealing with matters having no direct impact upon private interests in the United States (e.g., agreements
concerning military matters or foreign relations) are rarely the subject of domestic litigation, in part because persons
typically cannot demonstrate that they have suffered an actual, redressable injury and therefore lack standing to
challenge such agreements. RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, at §303, n. 11.
11
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requiring approval by two-thirds of the Senate presented a nonjusticiable political question.15 It
does not appear that an executive agreement has ever been held invalid by the courts on the
grounds that it was in contravention of the Treaty Clause.16 Nonetheless, as a matter of historical
practice, some types of agreements have been concluded as treaties, while others have been
concluded as executive agreements.17
Congressional-Executive Agreements
In the case of congressional-executive agreements, the “constitutionality ... seems well
established.”18 Unlike treaties, where only the Senate plays a role in authorization, both houses of
Congress are involved in the authorizing process for congressional-executive agreements.
Congressional authorization takes the form of a statute passed by a majority of both houses of
Congress. Historically, congressional-executive agreements cover a wide variety of topics,
ranging from postal conventions to bilateral trade to military assistance.19 NAFTA and the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) are notable examples of congressionalexecutive agreements.
Congressional-executive agreements also may take different forms. Congress may enact
legislation authorizing the executive to negotiate and enter agreements with other countries on a
specific matter.20 A congressional-executive agreement may also take the form of a statute passed
following the negotiation of an agreement which incorporates the terms or requirements of the
agreement into U.S. law.21 Such authorization may be either explicit or implied by the terms of
the congressional enactment.22
15
Made in the USA Foundation v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2001), cert. denied by United Steelworkers of
America, AFL-CIO, CLC v. United States, 534 U.S. 1039 (2001).
16
In 1997, a federal district court in Texas ruled petitioner was not extraditable pursuant to a federal statute
implementing an executive agreement, and held that extradition requires an extradition treaty ratified by the President
and approved by two-thirds of the Senate. In re Surrender of Ntakirutimana, 988 F.Supp. 1038 (S.D.Tex. 1997). The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the district court’s finding and held that a person could be extradited by
statute rather than treaty. Ntakirutimana v. Reno, 184 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied by 528 U.S. 1135 (2000).
17
See Yoo, supra note 12 (discussing the kinds of agreements historically taking the form of treaties in contrast to
those taking the form of executive agreements). See also infra pp. 9-15 (discussing form that different types of U.S.
security agreements have historically taken).
18
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 4, at 5. See also HENKIN, supra note 8, at 215-18.
19
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 4, at 5. Reciprocal trade agreements which were
once concluded as treaties now typically take the form of congressional-executive agreements. RESTATEMENT, supra
note 13, at §303, n. 9. See also 19 U.S.C. §2111 (conditionally authorizing the President to enter trade agreements with
other nations); CRS Report 97-896, Why Certain Trade Agreements Are Approved as Congressional-Executive
Agreements Rather Than as Treaties, by (name redacted).
20
See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §1822(a) (authorizing the Secretary of State to negotiate international fishery agreements); 22
U.S.C. §6445(c) (authorizing the President to enter binding agreements with other nations pledging to end practices
violating religious freedom).
21
See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. §3511 (approving agreements resulting from the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade
negotiations under the auspices of GATT).
22
See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. §3471 (authorizing U.S. participation in and appropriations for Commission on Labor
Cooperation, established by a supplemental NAFTA agreement not expressly approved by Congress).
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Executive Agreements Made Pursuant to Treaties
The legitimacy of agreements made pursuant to treaties is also well established, though
controversy occasionally arises as to whether the agreement was actually imputed by the treaty in
question.23 Since the earlier treaty is the “Law of the Land,”24 the power to enter into an
agreement required or contemplated by the treaty lies fairly clearly within the President’s
executive function. However, the Senate occasionally conditions its approval of a treaty upon a
requirement that any subsequent agreement made pursuant to the treaty also be submitted to the
Senate as a treaty.25
Sole Executive Agreements
Sole executive agreements rely on neither treaty nor congressional authority for their legal basis.
There are a number of provisions in the Constitution that may confer limited authority upon the
President to promulgate such agreements on the basis of his power to conduct foreign affairs.26
The Litvinov Assignment, under which the Soviet Union purported to transfer claims against
American assets previously nationalized by the Soviet Union, is an example of a sole executive
agreement.
If the President enters into an executive agreement pursuant to and dealing with an area where he
has clear, exclusive constitutional authority—such as an agreement to recognize a particular state
for diplomatic purposes—the agreement is legally permissible regardless of Congress’s opinion
on the matter.27 If, however, the President enters into an agreement and his constitutional
authority over the subject matter is unclear, or if Congress also has constitutional authority over
the subject matter, a reviewing court may consider Congress’s position in determining whether
the agreement is enforceable as U.S. law.28 If Congress has given implicit approval to the
President to enter into the agreement, or is silent on the matter, a reviewing court might be more
likely to view the agreement as valid.29 When Congress opposes the agreement and the
23
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 4, at 5.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, §2 (“the laws of the United States ... [and] all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land”).
25
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 25, §303 cmt. d.
26
U.S. CONST. art. II, §1 (“The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America ...”), §2
(“The President shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States ...”), §3 (“he shall receive
ambassadors and other public ministers ...”). Courts have recognized foreign affairs as an area of very strong executive
authority. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
27
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, §303 (4).
28
See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (establishing that Congress’s implicit approval of executive
action, such as historical practice of yielding authority in a particular area, may legitimize an agreement); Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (“When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress, his powers are at their maximum.... Congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may ...
invite, measures of independent Presidential responsibility.... When the President takes measures incompatible with the
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own
constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.”) (Jackson, J., concurring).
29
See citations accompanying note 28. But see Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 531-532 (2008) (suggesting that
Dames & Moore analysis regarding significance of congressional acquiescence might be relevant only in a “narrow set
of circumstances,” where presidential action is supported by a “particularly longstanding practice” of congressional
acquiescence).
24
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President’s constitutional authority to enter the agreement is ambiguous, it is unclear if or under
what circumstances a court would recognize such an agreement as controlling.
Because sole executive agreements do not rely on congressional authority to support their
legality, they do not require congressional approval to become binding, at least as a matter of
international law. Courts have recognized, however, that if a sole executive agreement conflicts
with preexisting federal law, the earlier law will remain controlling in most circumstances.30
Even if a sole executive agreement does not conflict with prior federal law, Congress may still act
to limit the agreement’s effect through a subsequent legislative enactment, so long as it has
constitutional authority to regulate the matter covered by the agreement.31 In the security context,
Congress has clear constitutional authority to enact measures that would limit the effect of sole
executive agreements involving military commitments. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution
accords Congress the power “To lay and collect Taxes ... to ... pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defence,” “To declare War, grant letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules
concerning Captures on Land and Water,” “To raise and support Armies,” “To provide and
maintain a Navy,” “To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces,” as well as “To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union,
suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions” and “To provide for organizing, arming, and
disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service
of the United States.”32 Further, Congress is empowered “To make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers” as well as “all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department
or Officer thereof.”33
In addition to the constitutional provisions that provide Congress with authority to legislate on
matters concerning military affairs,34 Congress also has virtual plenary power over
appropriations—authority not qualified with reference to Congress’s enumerated powers under
Article I, Section 8. The Appropriations Clause provides that “[n]o money can be paid out of the
Treasury unless it has been appropriated by an act of Congress.”35 Accordingly, adherence to
30
Executive agreements have been held to be inferior to conflicting federal law when the agreement concerns matters
expressly within the constitutional authority of Congress. See, e.g., United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655
(4th Cir. 1953) (finding that executive agreement contravening provisions of import statute was unenforceable);
RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, §115, n.5. However, an executive agreement might trump preexisting federal law if it
concerns an enumerated or inherent executive power under the Constitution, or if Congress has historically acquiesced
to the President entering agreements in the relevant area. See id.; United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230 (1942) (“[a]ll
Constitutional acts of power, whether in the executive or in the judicial department, have as much legal validity and
obligation as if they proceeded from the legislature”) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 64 (John Jay)); Dames & Moore,
453 U.S. at 654 (upholding sole executive agreement concerning the handling of Iranian assets in the United States,
despite the existence of a potentially conflicting statute, given Congress’s historical acquiescence to these types of
agreements). But see Medellin, 552 U.S. at 531-532 (suggesting that sole executive agreements may create
domestically enforceable law in a limited number of areas). See also Clark, supra note 12 (discussing and criticizing
development of pre-Medellin jurisprudence recognizing domestic legal effect of sole executive agreements).
31
The “last in time” rule establishes that a more recent statute trumps an earlier, inconsistent international agreement,
while a more recent self-executing agreement may trump an earlier, inconsistent statute. Whitney v. Robertson, 124
U.S. 190 (1888).
32
U.S. CONST. art. I, §8.
33
Id.
34
For additional discussion, see CRS Report R41989, Congressional Authority to Limit Military Operations, by
(name redacted), (name redacted), and (name redacted).
35
U.S. CONST. art. I, §9. Congress may specify the terms and conditions under which appropriations may be used, so
(continued...)
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pledges made in sole executive agreements may be dependent upon the availability of
appropriations authorized by Congress. Congress may specify the terms and conditions under
which appropriations may be used, so long as it does not impose unconstitutional conditions upon
the use of appropriated funds.36
Nonlegal Agreements
Not every pledge, assurance, or arrangement made between the United States and a foreign party
constitutes a legally binding international agreement. In some cases, the United States makes
“political commitments” or “gentlemen’s agreements” with foreign states. Although these
commitments are nonlegal, they may nonetheless carry significant moral and political weight.37
The executive has long claimed the authority to enter such agreements on behalf of the United
States without congressional authorization, asserting that the entering of political commitments
by the executive is not subject to the same constitutional constraints as the entering of legally
binding international agreements.38 An example of a nonlegal agreement is the 1975 Helsinki
Accords, a Cold War agreement signed by 35 nations, which contains provisions concerning
territorial integrity, human rights, scientific and economic cooperation, peaceful settlement of
disputes, and the implementation of confidence-building measures.
An international agreement is generally presumed to be legally binding in the absence of an
express provision indicating its nonlegal nature. State Department regulations recognize that this
presumption may be overcome when there is “clear evidence, in the negotiating history of the
agreement or otherwise, that the parties intended the arrangement to be governed by another legal
system.”39 Other factors that may be relevant in determining whether an agreement is nonlegal in
nature include the form of the agreement and the specificity of its provisions.40
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long as it does not impose unconstitutional conditions on the use of appropriated funds.
36
See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (8 Wall.) 128 (1872) (holding invalid an appropriations proviso that effectively
nullified some effects of a presidential pardon and that appeared to prescribe a rule of decision in court cases); United
States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946)(invalidating as a bill of attainder an appropriations provision denying money to
pay salaries of named officials). For further discussion of Congress’s ability to use its appropriations power to limit the
deployment or use of U.S. military forces, see CRS Report R41989, Congressional Authority to Limit Military
Operations, by (name redacted), (name redacted), and (name redacted).
37
See generally Kal Raustiala, Compliance & Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation, 32 CASE W. RES.
J. INT'L L. 387, 423-427 (2000) (discussing advantages of nonlegal agreements, and suggesting that they may
occasionally facilitate greater changes in countries’ behavior than binding agreements); Oscar Schachter, Editorial
Comment, The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements, 71 AM. J. INT’L L. 296 (1977) (discussing
significance of nonlegal agreements in international practice).
38
See generally Robert E. Dalton, Asst. Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs, International Documents of a Non-Legally
Binding Character, State Department, Memorandum, March 18, 1994, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/65728.pdf (discussing U.S. and international practice with respect to nonlegal, political agreements);
Duncan B. Hollis and Joshua J. Newcomer, “Political” Commitments and the Constitution, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 507
(2009) (discussing U.S. political commitments made to foreign States and the constitutional implications of the
practice).
39
22 C.F.R. §181.2(a).
40
Id. See also infra at “Notification Pursuant to the Case-Zablocki Act”; State Department Office of the Legal Adviser,
Guidance on Non-Binding Documents, at http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/guidance/.
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Choosing Between a Treaty and Executive Agreement
A recurring concern for the executive and legislative branches is whether an international
commitment should be entered into as a treaty or an executive agreement. The Senate may prefer
that significant international commitments be entered as treaties, and fear that reliance on
executive agreements will lead to an erosion of the treaty power. The House may want an
international compact to take the form of a congressional-executive agreement, so that it may
play a greater role in its consideration. In cases where congressional action is necessary for an
agreement to be implemented, the executive may prefer to submit an international compact as a
congressional-executive agreement, so that approval of the agreement and the enactment of
necessary implementing legislation may be accomplished in a single step. The executive’s
preference as to whether an international compact takes the form of a treaty or executive
agreement may also be influenced by the agreement’s prospects for approval by a two-thirds
majority of the Senate or a simple majority of both houses.
State Department regulations prescribing the process for coordination and approval of
international agreements (commonly known as the “Circular 175 procedure”)41 include criteria
for determining whether an international agreement should take the form of a treaty or an
executive agreement. Congressional preference is one of several factors considered when
determining the form that an international agreement should take. According to State Department
regulations,
In determining a question as to the procedure which should be followed for any particular
international agreement, due consideration is given to the following factors:
(1) The extent to which the agreement involves commitments or risks affecting the nation as
a whole;
(2) Whether the agreement is intended to affect state laws;
(3) Whether the agreement can be given effect without the enactment of subsequent
legislation by the Congress;
(4) Past U.S. practice as to similar agreements;
(5) The preference of the Congress as to a particular type of agreement;
(6) The degree of formality desired for an agreement;
(7) The proposed duration of the agreement, the need for prompt conclusion of an agreement,
and the desirability of concluding a routine or short-term agreement; and
(8) The general international practice as to similar agreements.
In determining whether any international agreement should be brought into force as a treaty
or as an international agreement other than a treaty, the utmost care is to be exercised to
41
Circular 175 initially referred to a 1955 Department of State Circular which established a process for the
coordination and approval of international agreements. These procedures, as modified, are now found in 22 CFR part
181 and 11 Foreign Affairs Manual (F.A.M.) chapter 720.
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avoid any invasion or compromise of the constitutional powers of the President, the Senate,
42
and the Congress as a whole.
In 1978, the Senate passed a resolution expressing its sense that the President seek the advice of
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in determining whether an international agreement
should be submitted as a treaty.43 The State Department subsequently modified the Circular 175
procedure to provide for consultation with appropriate congressional leaders and committees
concerning significant international agreements.44 Consultations are to be held “as appropriate.”45
Congressional consultation on the substance and form of international agreements is discussed in
more detail later in this report.46
II. Historical Practice Regarding
Security Agreements
The following sections provide a general overview of the categories of security agreements
entered into by the United States of a legally binding nature. Such categories of security
agreements predominantly take the form of a treaty, while others typically take the form of an
executive agreement.
Categories of Security Agreements
Although some categories of security agreements have historically been entered as treaties and
others as executive agreements, this does not necessarily mean that future arrangements must
follow the same pattern. Arguably, an arrangement that has typically been entered into as a treaty
might instead take the form of a congressional-executive agreement, and vice versa.47 Similarly,
while some security arrangements have historically been entered as sole executive agreements,
Congress might effectively limit such agreements in the future via statutory enactment48—for
42
11 F.A.M. §723.3 (2006).
S.Res. 536, S.Rept. 95-1171, 95th Cong. (1977).
44
11 F.A.M. §724.4(b)-(c) (2006).
45
Id. at §724.4(c).
46
See infra at 27.
47
In 1976, the Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with
Spain, 27 U.S.T. 3005 (entered into force September 21, 1976), which included provisions relating to U.S. basing rights
and the status of U.S. forces in Spain. Following the end of the Franco regime and Spain becoming a member of
NATO, the United States concluded an executive agreement with Spain which was of similar scope to the 1976 treaty.
Agreement on Friendship, Defense and Cooperation Between the United States and Spain, with Complementary
Agreements, 34 U.S.T. 3885, entered into force May 14, 1983. But see Yoo, supra note 12, at 830 (arguing the military
commitments like NATO can only be effectuated by treaty, and not by way of congressional-executive agreement).
48
Legislation proposing to limit the usage of sole executive agreements has periodically been introduced, but thus far
no bill has been enacted. See, e.g., S.Res. 85, 91st Cong. (1969) (non-binding resolution passed by the Senate
expressing its sense that national commitments should be entered pursuant to treaty or executive agreement specifically
authorized by Congress); H.R. 4438, 94th Cong. (1976) (proposing to require the President to transmit any agreement
involving a national commitment to Congress, and allowing the agreement to take effect only if Congress did not pass a
measure disapproving it within 60 days).
43
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example, limiting the availability of appropriations to carry out commitments made in a sole
executive agreement.49
Collective Defense Agreements/“Security Commitments”
The State Department currently lists the United States as being party to seven collective defense
agreements, under which members are obligated to assist in the defense of a party to the
agreement in the event of an attack upon it: the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance;
the North Atlantic Treaty; the Australia, New Zealand, and United States Security Treaty; the
Southeast Asian Treaty; and bilateral security treaties with Japan, the Philippines, and South
Korea.50 All seven agreements take the form of treaties that were ratified by the United States
between 1947 and 1960.51 Each agreement, with the exception of the Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance (the first to be ratified by the United States), includes a provision
specifying that the agreement’s requirements are to be carried out in accordance with the parties’
respective constitutional processes. These provisions were included to assuage congressional
concerns that the agreements could be interpreted as sanctioning the President to engage in
military hostilities in defense of treaty parties without further congressional authorization (i.e., a
declaration of war or joint resolution authorizing the use of military force).52
In addition to these defense treaties, the United States has also adopted security commitments
with respect to several former territories and possessions,53 including pursuant to congressionalexecutive agreement. Congress has approved compacts changing the status of certain territories to
Freely Associated States (FAS), while also imposing upon the United States “the obligation to
defend the [FAS] ... from attack or threats thereof as the United States and its citizens are
defended.”54 Arguably, these security commitments are distinct from other international defense
49
The Constitution provides that “No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations
made by Law.” U.S. CONST., art. I, §9, cl. 7.
50
State Department, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Collective Defense Arrangements, at http://www.state.gov/s/l/
treaty/collectivedefense/.
51
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 62 Stat. 1681, entered into force December 3, 1948; North Atlantic
Treaty, 63 Stat. 2241, entered into force August 24, 1949; Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand and the
United States of America, 3 U.S.T. 3420, entered into force April 29, 1952; Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United
States of America and the Republic of the Philippines, 3 U.S.T. 3947, entered into force August 27, 1952; Mutual
Defense Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea, 5 U.S.T. 2368, entered into force
November 17, 1954; Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, 6 U.S.T. 81, entered into force February 19, 1955;
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of America and Japan, 11 U.S.T. 1632, entered
into force June 23, 1960 (replacing Security Treaty Between the United States of America and Japan, 3 U.S.T. 3329,
entered into force April 28, 1952). In 1954, the United States entered a mutual defense treaty with the Republic of
China (Taiwan), 6 U.S.T. 433, but this agreement was terminated by President Carter in 1979.
52
For background, see S.Rept. 797, 90th Cong., at 14-15 (1967) (describing ratification history of North Atlantic
Treaty); LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 105-111 (2004) (describing Senate deliberations on North Atlantic
Treaty).
53
For example, the Panama Canal treaties provided that the United States and Panama would, in accordance with their
respective constitutional processes, defend the Canal from attack. Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and
Operation of the Panama Canal, with Annexes and Protocol, 33 U.S.T. 1, entered into force October 1, 1979.
54
Act Approving Compacts of Free Association with the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of
Micronesia, P.L. 99-239, §311 (1986). See also Act approving Compact of Free Association between the United States
and the Government of Palau, P.L. 99-658, §352 (1986) (recognizing an attack on Palau as a danger to the United
States, and pledging that the United States “would take action to meet the danger to the United States and Palau in
accordance with its constitutional processes”).
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arrangements, as they concern commitments to newly sovereign entities over whom the United
States formerly exercised extensive and long-standing control.55
Consultation Requirements/“Security Arrangements”
The United States also has established security arrangements with other countries in which the
United States pledges to take some action in the event that the other country’s security is
threatened. A 1992 report submitted by President George H. W. Bush to Congress listing U.S.
security commitments and arrangements, claimed that unlike “security commitments,” which
oblige the United States to act in the common defense of a country in case of an armed attack,
“security arrangements” generally “oblige the United States to consult with a country in the event
of a threat to its security. They may appear in legally binding agreements, such as treaties or
executive agreements, or in political documents, such as policy declarations by the President,
Secretary of State or Secretary of Defense.”56
Most legally binding “security arrangements” listed in the President’s report constitute sole
executive agreements, including agreements with Israel, Egypt, Pakistan, and Liberia.57 Only one
arrangement, committing the United States to the establishment of the Multinational Force and
Observers in the Sinai, could clearly be described as a congressional-executive agreement.58
Although some scholars and government officials have characterized the terms “security
commitment” and “security arrangement” as having distinct and particular meanings, this practice
is by no means uniform. Indeed, the question of what constitutes a “security commitment” has
long been a subject of dialogue and dispute by the executive and legislative branches.59
55
Some have argued that these agreements are “more akin to the Texas and Hawaii annexation resolutions than to
international defense arrangements,” given the historical status of the FAS. Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, Executive
Agreements, and Constitutional Method, 79 TEX. L. REV. 961, n. 184 (2001).
56
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 4, at 248 (quoting A Report on United States
Security Arrangements and Commitments with Other Nations, Submitted to the Congress in accordance with Section
1457 of P.L. 101-510, the National Defense Authorization Act of 1991, August 17, 1992).
57
Id. See also Memorandum of Agreement Between the Governments of Israel and the United States Concerning
Assurances, Consultations, and United States Policy on Middle East Peace, 32 U.S.T. 2160, entered into force February
27, 1976; Agreement Between the United States and Egypt Concerning Implementation of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace
Treaty of March 26, 1979, 32 U.S.T. 2148, entered into force March 26, 1979; Agreement of Cooperation Between the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of Pakistan, 10 U.S.T. 317, entered into force May
19, 1959; Agreement of Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
Liberia, 10 U.S.T. 1598, entered into force July 8, 1959.
58
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 4, at 248. See also Multinational Force and
Observers Participation Resolution, P.L. 97-132 (1981).
59
See The Proposed U.S. Security Commitment to Iraq: What Will Be In It and Should It Be a Treaty?: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight & Subcomm. on the Middle East and
South Asia of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, January 23, 2008 (statement by Prof. Michael J. Matheson)
(recognizing distinction between “security commitment” and “security arrangement,” while acknowledging that the
“question of what constitutes a ‘security commitment’ ... has been the subject of dialogue between the executive branch
and Congress for decades”). See also TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 4, at 213-215,
247-250 (discussing legislation considered and enacted by Congress in response to concerns that the Executive had
entered agreements imposing national commitments upon the United States without congressional notification or
approval).
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Other Types of Military Agreements
The United States is also a party to a significant number of defense agreements that do not
obligate the United States to take action when another country is attacked, but nonetheless
involve military affairs. Categories of such agreements include
•
military basing agreements, permitting the United States to build or use
permanent facilities, station forces, and conduct certain military activities within
a host country;60
•
access and pre-positioning agreements, permitting the stationing of equipment in
a host country and the improvement and use of the country’s military or civilian
facilities, without establishing a permanent military presence;61
•
Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs), defining the legal status of U.S. forces
within a host country and typically according them with certain privileges and
immunities from the host country’s jurisdiction;62
•
burden-sharing agreements, permitting a host country to assume some of the
financial obligations incurred by the stationing of U.S. forces within its
territory;63 and
•
agreements providing for arms transfers, military training, and joint military
exercises.64
Historically, almost all such agreements have taken a form other than treaty. Sometimes these
arrangements have taken the form of sole executive agreements; others could be deemed
executive agreements pursuant to treaty (e.g., military stationing agreements concluded with other
NATO parties); still others have been explicitly or implicitly authorized by statute and may be
considered congressional-executive agreements.
As a matter of historical practice, the types of agreements described above have not directly
authorized the United States to engage in significant military operations in defense of the host
country, though such agreements may supplement separate agreements or U.N. mandates that do.
60
See, e.g., Agreement Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Greece Concerning Military
Facilities, 4 U.S.T. 2189, entered into force October 12, 1953.
61
An example of such an agreement is the 2005 memorandum of understanding between the United States and
Norway, discussed in more detail at American Forces Press Service, Rumsfeld Signs Pre-positioning Agreement With
Norway, June 8, 2005, at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=16458.
62
See, e.g., Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Regarding Facilities and
Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan, 11 U.S.T. 1652, entered into force June 23, 1960. The
only SOFA agreement to which the United States is a party that was concluded as a treaty is the North Atlantic Treaty
Status of Forces Agreement (NATO SOFA), 4 U.S.T. 1792, entered into force August 23, 1953. All supplementary
agreements to the NATO SOFA have been executive agreements. For further discussion and background on the use of
SOFAs, see CRS Report RL34531, Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA): What Is It, and How Has It Been Utilized?, by
(name redacted).
63
See, e.g., Memorandum of Agreement Between The Ministry of National Defense Republic of Korea and the United
States Forces in Korea Regarding The Construction of Facilities at 2nd ID USA To Improve Combined Defense
Capabilities, 34 U.S.T. 125, entered into force February 2, 1982.
64
See, e.g., Agreement for Cooperation on Defense and Economy Between the Governments of the United States of
America and of the Republic of Turkey in Accordance with Articles II and III of the North Atlantic Treaty, 32 U.S.T.
3323, entered into force December 18, 1980.
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For example, although U.S. basing agreements with Germany, Japan, and South Korea do not
expressly authorize the United States to use military force to defend those countries in case of
attack, they assist the United States in fulfilling security commitments owed to those countries
under separate defense treaties. Arguably, an exception to this practice occurred in 2008, when the
United States and Iraq concluded a security agreement, sometimes characterized as a SOFA,
which authorized U.S. forces to engage in military operations within Iraq. The agreement is
discussed in more detail infra.65
Agreements Granting the Legal Right to Military Intervention
Besides the categories of agreements described above, the United States has, on occasion, entered
into long-term agreements that grant the United States the legal right to intervene militarily within
the territory of another party to defend it against internal or external threats. Unlike collective
defense agreements, these security agreements provide the United States with the right, but not
the duty, to militarily intervene when the security of the other country is threatened. Such
agreements may also be distinguished from the authority to intervene recognized under the
United Nations Charter. Whereas military intervention agreements discussed below provide the
United States with the positive legal right to intervene in a country, the U.N. Charter merely
provides that its provisions do not “impair the inherent right of individual or collective selfdefense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”66
In the early part of the 20th century, the United States entered into legal agreements with several
Latin American countries which granted the United States the right to use military force either to
defend those countries from external threat or to preserve domestic tranquility.67 All of these
agreements were concluded as treaties. In 1903, following the Spanish-American War, the United
States concluded a treaty with the newly independent Republic of Cuba under which the United
States was expressly given “the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the
maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual
liberty.”68 Similarly, in the aftermath of the U.S. invasion and occupation of Haiti in 1915, a treaty
between the two countries was concluded that provided the United States with the right to
intervene in Haiti when the United States deemed it necessary.69 In 1904, the United States
ratified a treaty with Panama that provided the United States “the right, at all times and in its
discretion” to employ its armed forces for the safety and protection of the Panama Canal and the
shipping occurring therein.70 In 1907, the United States concluded a treaty with the Dominican
65
See infra at “Iraq.”
Charter of the United Nations, 59 Stat. 1031, entered into force October 24, 1945, art. 51 (italics added).
67
See generally Charles Henry Hyde, 1 International Law: Chiefly As Interpreted and Applied by the United States 2736 (1922).
68
Treaty on Relations Between the United States and Cuba, May 22, 1903, 33 Stat. 2248, at art. III. In 1906, acting
pursuant to this authority, the United States intervened in Cuba following serious revolutionary activity in order to
establish a stable government there.
69
Treaty on Administration of Haiti: Finances and Development, entered into force November 15, 1915, T.S. 623,
1915 U.S.T. LEXIS 29, at art. XIV (providing that “The high contracting parties shall have authority to take such steps
as may be necessary to insure the complete attainment of any of the objects comprehended in this treaty; and, should
the necessity occur, the United States will lend an efficient aid for the preservation of Haitian Independence and the
maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property and individual liberty.”).
70
Isthmian Canal Convention with the Republic of Panama, entered into force February 26, 1904, 33 Stat. 2234, at art.
XXIII. More generally, the agreement provided that the United States “guarantees and will maintain the independence
(continued...)
66
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Republic establishing plans for the financial rehabilitation of that country, and authorizing the
United States to use military force necessary to effectuate the carrying out of those plans.71
There have been numerous instances where a country has permitted or invited the United States
to use military force within its territory,72 but authority to intervene has not been given via treaty.
When the Senate initially opted not to approve a treaty authorizing U.S. military and financial
involvement in the Dominican Republic, President Theodore Roosevelt entered a temporary
“modus vivendi” executive agreement adopting similar policies as the unapproved treaty. This
agreement, which elicited significant opposition from many Members of Congress as an
unconstitutional usurpation of the Senate’s treaty power, was terminated following Senate
approval of a modified version of the treaty in 1907.73 Another example of a significant security
agreement taking a form other than treaty occurred in 1941 when, prior to the United States
entering World War II, President Franklin D. Roosevelt concluded sole executive agreements
concerning the stationing of U.S. troops in Iceland and Greenland to protect those territories from
attack.74
Although publicly available agreements expressly granting the United States the legal right to
intervene militarily in another country generally take the form of a treaty, this report does not
consider whether any comparable authority is provided pursuant to classified agreements.
Non-Binding Security Arrangements
Some security arrangements are not legally binding; though they may nonetheless carry
significant political or moral weight. While executive practice of extending political defense
commitments to foreign countries can be traced back to the Monroe Doctrine, in which the United
States proclaimed its opposition to further colonization of the Americas by European powers,
U.S. pledges to assist foreign states in security matters have become more commonplace in the
(...continued)
of Panama.” Id. at art. I. The agreement also provided the United States with authority to ensure public order in the
cities of Panama City and Colon if, in the opinion of the United States, the government of Panama was unable to
maintain order. Id. at art. VII.
71
Treaty Between the United States and Dominican Republic Concerning the Collection and Application of Dominican
Customs Revenues, proclaimed July 25, 1907, 35 Stat. 1880.
72
For example, in 1958, President Dwight Eisenhower deployed U.S. troops to Lebanon at the invitation of its
government to help protect against a threatened insurrection. Congress had passed legislation in 1957 that authorized
such action. See P.L. 85-7 (1957). Specifically, the legislation permitted the President to “undertake, in the general area
of the Middle East, military assistance programs with any nation or group of nations of that area desiring such
assistance.” The enactment further provided that “if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is
prepared to use armed forces to assist any such nation or group of such nations requesting assistance against armed
aggression from any country controlled by international communism: Provided, that such employment shall be
consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and with the Constitution of the United States.”
73
For further discussion, see W. Stull Holt, TREATIES DEFEATED BY THE SENATE 212-229 (1933) (discussing events
leading to the ratification of the 1907 treaty with the Dominican Republic). In his autobiography, Roosevelt suggested
that a treaty was preferable to the executive agreement he entered with the Dominican Republic, because “a treaty ...
was the law of the land and not merely ... a direction of the Chief Executive which would lapse when that particular
executive left office.” ACKERMAN & GOLOVE, supra note 13, at 819 (italics omitted) (quoting THEODORE ROOSEVELT,
AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 510 (1920)).
74
Agreement Between the United States and Denmark Concerning the Defense of Greenland, signed April 9, 1941, 55
Stat. 1245; Agreement Concerning Defense of Iceland By United States Forces, July 1, 1941, 55 Stat. 1547.
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post-World War II era. Such commitments may take several forms, including a unilateral pledge
or policy statement by the executive or a joint declaration between U.S. and foreign officials.
For example, bilateral arrangements authorizing U.S. military intervention, when not concluded
as treaties, generally have not taken the form of a legally binding, permanent agreement.75
Instead, in non-treaty arrangements authorizing U.S. intervention, the host country often retains
full discretion as to the degree and duration of U.S. presence within its territory. In 1962, for
instance, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman issued a
joint declaration in which Secretary Rusk expressed “the firm intention of the United States to aid
Thailand, its ally and historic friend, in resisting Communist aggression and subversion.”76 The
United States thereafter deployed armed forces to Thailand to assist the government in combating
communist forces.
The executive’s authority to enter such arrangements, and, more broadly, to engage in military
operations in other countries without congressional approval, has been the subject of longstanding dispute between Congress and the executive.77 In 1969, the Senate passed the National
Commitments Resolution, stating the sense of the Senate that “a national commitment by the
United States results only from affirmative action taken by the executive and legislative branches
of the United States government by means of a treaty [or legislative enactment] ... specifically
providing for such commitment.”78 The Resolution defined a “national commitment” as including
“the use of the armed forces of the United States on foreign territory, or a promise to assist a
foreign country ... by the use of armed forces ... either immediately or upon the happening of
certain events.”79
According to the committee report accompanying the Resolution, the motivation for the
Resolution was concern over the growing development of “constitutional imbalance” in matters
of foreign relations, with Presidents frequently making significant foreign commitments on behalf
75
See supra note 72 (discussing U.S. intervention in Lebanon in 1958).
For text of the joint declaration, see Dept. of State, American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 10911093.
77
See S.Rept. 91-129 (1969) (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations report in favor of the National Commitments
Resolution, S.Res. 85, criticizing the undertaking of “national commitments” by the Executive, either through
international agreements or unilateral pledges to other countries, without congressional involvement) [hereinafter
“Committee Report”]. The vast majority of U.S. military interventions in other countries have been to protect U.S.
persons, property, or interests. See CRS Report R41677, Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad,
1798-2010, by (name redacted). The Executive has historically claimed broad authority to deploy armed forces to
protect these interests, even in the absence of clear congressional authorization. See, e.g., Dept. of Justice, Office of
Legal Counsel (OLC), Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 2011 OLC LEXIS 1, at 8 (2011) (claiming that
“prolonged and substantial military engagements, typically involving exposure of U.S. military personnel to significant
risk over a substantial period” may generally require prior congressional authorization, but “historical practice of
presidential military action without congressional approval precludes any suggestion that Congress’s authority to
declare war covers every military engagement, however limited, that the President initiates”); OLC, 4A U.S. OP. OFF.
LEGAL COUNSEL 185, Presidential Power to Use the Armed Forces Abroad Without Statutory Authorization (1980)
(alleging presidential authority to deploy forces to protect, and retaliate for injuries suffered by U.S. persons and
property); OLC, The President’s Constitutional Authority To Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorists And
Nations Supporting Them, 2001 OLC LEXIS 14 (2001) (asserting presidential authority, even in the absence of
congressional action, to take military action against entities responsible for the 9/11 terrorist attacks, as well authority
to preemptively use force against entities that “pose a similar threat to the security of the United States and the lives of
its people, whether at home or overseas”).
78
S.Res. 85, 91st Congress, 1st Sess. (1969).
79
Id.
76
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of the United States without congressional action. Among other things, the report criticized a
practice it described as “commitment by accretion,” by which a
sense of binding commitment arises out of a series of executive declarations, no one of
which in itself would be thought of as constituting a binding obligation. Simply repeating
something often enough with regard to our relations with some particular country, we come
to support that our honor is involved in an engagement no less solemn than a duly ratified
treaty.80
The National Commitments Resolution took the form of a sense of the Senate resolution, and
accordingly had no legal effect. Although Congress has occasionally considered legislation that
would bar the adoption of significant military commitments without congressional action,81 no
such measure has been enacted. The executive branch regularly makes unilateral security pledges
or enters non-binding arrangements with foreign countries concerning security matters.82 The
primary means Congress uses to exercise oversight authority over such non-binding arrangements
is its appropriations power, by which it may limit or condition actions the United States may take
in furtherance of the arrangement.
Examples of Bilateral Security Agreements
The following sections discuss in greater detail the form, nature, and content of bilateral security
agreements made by the United States with Afghanistan, Germany, Japan, South Korea, the
Philippines, and Iraq.
Afghanistan
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States initiated Operation
Enduring Freedom to combat Al Qaeda and prevent the Taliban regime in Afghanistan from
providing them with safe harbor. Shortly thereafter, the Taliban regime was ousted by U.S. and
allied forces, and the United States thereafter concluded a number of security agreements with the
new Afghan government. In 2002, the United States and Afghanistan, by an exchange of notes,83
entered into an agreement regarding economic grants under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,84
as amended. Additionally, the agreement allows for the furnishing of defense articles, defense
80
Committee Report, supra note 77, at 26.
See, e.g., H.R. 4438, Executive Agreements Review Act, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (proposing to establish legislative veto
over executive agreements involving national commitments); S.Res. 24, Treaty Powers Resolution, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(proposing that it would not be in order for the Senate to consider any legislation authorizing funds to implement any
international agreement which the Senate has found to constitute a treaty, unless the Senate has given its advice and
consent to treaty ratification).
82
See generally The November 26 Declaration of Principles: Implications for UN Resolutions on Iraq and for
Congressional Oversight: Hearing of the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight,
February 8, 2008 (statement of Prof. Michael J. Glennon discussing presidential practice of entering non-binding
security arrangements).
83
Agreement Regarding Grants under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,U.S.-Afghanistan, T.I.A.S. No. 02-413,
entered into force April 13, 2002, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/165174.pdf.
84
P.L. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 (September 4 1961). The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and related
legislation provide statutory authority for a broad range of executive agreements in matters including security and
economic cooperation, and appear to serve as a legal authority supporting a substantial number of executive agreements
entered into in recent decades.
81
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services, and related training, pursuant to the United States International Military and Education
Training Program (IMET),85 from the U.S. government to the Afghanistan Interim Administration
(AIA).
An agreement exists regarding the status of military and civilian personnel of the U.S.
Department of Defense present in Afghanistan in connection with cooperative efforts in response
to terrorism, humanitarian and civic assistance, military training and exercises, and other
activities.86 Such personnel are to be accorded “a status equivalent to that accorded to the
administrative and technical staff” of the U.S. Embassy under the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations of 1961.87 Accordingly, U.S. personnel are immune from criminal
prosecution by Afghan authorities, and are immune from civil and administrative jurisdiction
except with respect to acts performed outside the course of their duties.88 In the agreement, the
Islamic Transitional Government of Afghanistan (ITGA)89 explicitly authorizes the U.S.
government to exercise criminal jurisdiction over U.S. personnel, and the government of
Afghanistan is not permitted to surrender U.S. personnel to the custody of another state,
international tribunal, or any other entity without consent of the U.S. government. Although the
agreement was signed by the ITGA, the subsequently elected government of the Islamic Republic
of Afghanistan assumed responsibility for ITGA’s legal obligations, and the agreement remains in
force. The agreement does not appear to provide immunity for contract personnel.
The agreement with Afghanistan does not expressly authorize the United States to carry out
military operations within Afghanistan, but it recognizes that such operations are “ongoing.”
Congress authorized the use of military force there (and elsewhere) by joint resolution in 2001,
for targeting “those nations, organizations, or persons [who] planned, authorized, committed, or
aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.”90 The U.N. Security Council
implicitly recognized that the use of force was appropriate in response to the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks,91 and subsequently authorized the deployment of an International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) to Afghanistan.92 Subsequent U.N. Security Council resolutions provide
a continuing mandate for ISAF,93 calling upon it to “work in close consultation with” Operation
85
22 U.S.C. §2347 et seq.
Agreement Regarding the Status of United States Military and Civilian Personnel of the U.S. Department of Defense
Present in Afghanistan, T.I.A.S., 2002 U.S.T. LEXIS 100, entered into force May 28, 2003 [hereinafter “U.S.-Afghan
SOFA”].
87
Id.
88
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of April 18, 1961, T.I.A.S. 7502; 23 U.S.T. 3227.
89
The transitional government has since been replaced by the fully elected Government of the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan. For information about the political development of Afghanistan since 2001, see CRS Report RS21922,
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance, by (name redacted).
90
P.L. 107-40 (September 18, 2001); 115 Stat. 224.
91
U.N.S.C. Res. 1368 (September 12, 2001) (“Recognizing the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in
accordance with the [UN] Charter,” and expressing its “readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist
attacks”).
92
U.N.S.C. Res. 1386 (December 20, 2001).
93
ISAF has its own status of forces agreement with the Afghan government in the form of an annex to a Military
Technical Agreement entitled “Arrangements Regarding the Status of the International Security Assistance Force.” The
agreement provides that all ISAF and supporting personnel are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective
national elements for criminal or disciplinary matters, and that such personnel are immune from arrest or detention by
Afghan authorities and may not be turned over to any international tribunal or any other entity or State without the
express consent of the contributing nation. In 2003, NATO assumed command of ISAF in Afghanistan.
86
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Enduring Freedom (OEF—the U.S.-led coalition conducting military operations in Afghanistan)
in carrying out the mandate.94 While there is no explicit U.N. mandate authorizing the OEF,
Security Council resolutions appear to provide ample recognition of the legitimacy of its
operations, most recently by calling upon the Afghan government, “with the assistance of the
international community, including the International Security Assistance Force and Operation
Enduring Freedom coalition, in accordance with their respective designated responsibilities as
they evolve, to continue to address the threat to the security and stability of Afghanistan posed by
the Taliban, Al-Qaida, other extremist groups and criminal activities.”95
In 2004, the United States and Afghanistan entered an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement,
with annexes.96 An acquisition and cross-servicing agreement (ACSA) is an agreement providing
logistic support, supplies, and services to foreign militaries on a cash-reimbursement,
replacement-in-kind, or exchange of equal value basis.97 After consultation with the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to enter into an ACSA with a government of a NATO
country, a subsidiary body of NATO, or the United Nations Organization or any regional
international organization of which the United States is a member.98 Additionally, the Secretary of
Defense may enter into an ACSA with a country not included in the above categories, if after
consultation with the Secretary of State, a determination is made that it is in the best interests of
the national security of the United States.99 If the country is not a member of NATO, the Secretary
of Defense must submit notice, at least 30 days prior to designation, to the Committee on Armed
Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Armed
Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.100
Since at least 2003, the United States has entered into several accommodation assignment
agreements with Afghanistan regarding the use of land and facilities, including for the internment
of captured enemy forces.101 Beginning in late 2001, the United States and its coalition partners
utilized the Bagram Airfield for military purposes in the conflict against the Taliban and Al
Qaeda. The Bagram Airfield also served as the primary facility used to detain suspected enemy
belligerents captured in the conflict until 2010,102 when a new detention facility was completed in
Parwan, Afghanistan.103 The detention center had reportedly been slated to be turned over to
Afghan authority by January 2012, but rapid growth of the prisoner population caused the transfer
to be delayed.104 In March 2012, the United States and the Afghan government concluded an
94
See U.N.S.C. Res. 1776 §5 (September 19, 2007); U.N.S.C. Res. 1707 §4 (2007).
U.N.S.C. Res. 1746 §25 (2007). For additional information on the war in Afghanistan, see CRS Report R40156, War
in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).
96
Acquisition and Cross-servicing Agreement, with Annexes, U.S.-Afghanistan, T.I.A.S. No. 04-216, entered into
force February 16, 2004, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/173052.pdf.
97
10 U.S.C. §§2341-2350.
98
Id. at §2342(a)(1).
99
Id. at §2342(b)(1).
100
Id. at §2342(b)(2).
101
Declaration of Colonel James W. Gray, filed March 5, 2007, Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 06-CV-01669 (U.S. D.D.C.),
available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/topics/bagram/Affidavit.pdf [hereinafter “Gray Declaration”].
102
Detainees were held in the Bagram Theater Internment Facility within the Airfield.
103
See Lisa Daniel, “Task Force Ensures Fair Detainee Treatment, Commander Says,” American Forces Press Service,
August 6, 2010, available at http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=103004.
104
See Kevin Sieff, “Afghan Prison Transfer Delayed,” Washington Post, August 12, 2011, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/afghan-prison-transfer-delayed/2011/08/12/
gIQApCGMBJ_story.html.
95
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agreement effectuating the transfer of the Parwan detention facility to Afghan control.105 The
memorandum also contemplates U.S. forces maintaining continued control of Parwan detainees
during a six-month handover period, at which point all Afghan nationals in U.S. custody shall be
transferred to the control of Afghanistan.
A separate memorandum of understanding was also concluded in April 2012 concerning special
operations (night raids) on Afghan soil. Under the agreement, the parties affirm that such
operations will be “conducted by Afghan Forces with support of U.S. Forces in accordance with
Afghan laws.”106 Afghan forces are designated with responsibility for the “temporary holding” of
persons captured in the course of such operations. Afghan citizens detained by U.S. forces outside
of special operations are to be transferred to Afghan authorities or released.
On May 2, 2012, U.S. President Barack Obama and Afghan President Hamid Karzai signed the
Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement Between the United States of America and the Islamic
Republic of Afghanistan (Strategic Partnership Agreement).107 The Strategic Partnership
Agreement is a legally binding agreement under which the parties pledge to work cooperatively
in a number of fields, including on promoting shared democratic values, advancing long-term
security, reinforcing regional security, social and economic development, and strengthening
Afghan institutions and governance. The agreement remains in force until the end of 2024, unless
terminated at an earlier date by either party.
In the area of security, the Strategic Partnership Agreement provides that the United States and
Afghanistan shall “initiate negotiations on a Bilateral Security Agreement … with the goal of
concluding within one year” an agreement to replace the current agreement relating to the status
of military and civilian personnel currently in Afghanistan.108 The Strategic Partnership
Agreement also states that Afghanistan “shall provide U.S. forces continued access to and use of
Afghan facilities through 2014, and beyond as may be agreed in the Bilateral Security
Agreement” and that the United States “reaffirms that it does not see permanent military facilities
in Afghanistan, or a presence that is a threat to Afghanistan’s neighbors.” Additionally, the
Agreement determines that the “nature and scope of the future presence and operations of U.S.
forces in Afghanistan” shall be addressed in the Bilateral Security Agreement to be negotiated.
105
Memorandum of Understanding between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United States of America on
Transfer of U.S. Detention Facilities in Afghan Territory to Afghanistan, signed March 9, 2012, available at
http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/2012-03-09-Signed-MOU-on-Detentions-Transfer-2.pdf.
106
Memorandum of Understanding between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United States of America on
Afghanization of Special Operations on Afghan Soil, signed April 8, 2012, available at http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/
20120408_01_memo.pdf.
107
The text of this agreement is available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/2012.06.01u.s.afghanistanspasignedtext.pdf [hereinafter “Strategic Partnership Agreement”].
108
U.S.-Afghan SOFA, supra note 86.
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Iraq109
In 2007, following the removal of the Saddam Hussein regime from power, the United States and
the post-Saddam government of Iraq signed a Declaration of Principles for a Long-Term
Relationship of Cooperation and Friendship Between the Republic of Iraq and the United States
of America.110 The Declaration announced the intention of the parties to negotiate a long-term
security agreement that would have committed the United States to provide security assurances to
Iraq and maintain a long-term military presence in that country. This announcement became a
source of congressional interest, in part because of statements by Administration officials that
such an agreement would not be submitted to the legislative branch for approval.111
Congressional concern dissipated when U.S.-Iraq negotiations culminated in the signing of two
separate agreements on November 17, 2008, neither of which provided for a long-term security
commitment by the United States:112 (1) the Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of
Friendship and Cooperation between the United States and the Republic of Iraq (Strategic
Framework Agreement),113 and (2) the Agreement Between the United States of America and
Republic of Iraq On the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of
Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq (Security Agreement).114 Indeed, rather
than establishing a long-term security commitment by the United States, the Security Agreement
concluded by the parties instead called for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq within three
years.
The concluded agreements cover different issues and were intended by the parties to have
different legal significance. The Strategic Framework Agreement, which remains in force, is a
legally binding agreement under which the parties pledge to work cooperatively in a number of
fields, including on diplomatic, security, economic, cultural, and law enforcement matters. In the
area of security, the Agreement provides that the United States and Iraq shall “continue to foster
close cooperation concerning defense and security arrangements,” which are to be undertaken
109
In the 1950s, almost 40 years prior to the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the United States entered into a series of
agreements with Iraq, including (1) a military assistance agreement (T.I.A.S. 3108. Agreement of April 21, 1954); (2)
an agreement relating to the disposition of military equipment and materials provided under the military assistance
agreement (T.I.A.S. 3289. Agreement of July 25, 1955); and (3) an economic assistance agreement (T.I.A.S. 3835.
Agreement of May 18 and 22, 1957). However, in response to the Revolution of July 14, 1958 and the subsequent
change in the government of Iraq, the United States agreed to a termination of the above agreements (10 U.S.T. 1415;
T.I.A.S. 4289; 357 U.N.T.S. 153. Exchange of notes at Baghdad May 30 and July 7, 1959. Entered into force July 21,
1959).
110
The text of this agreement is available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/11/
20071126-11.html [hereinafter “Declaration of Principles”]. For a historical perspective of U.S. operations in Iraq and
issues related to Iraqi governance and security, see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and
Security, by (name redacted), and CRS Report RL33793, Iraq: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy, by
(name redacted) et al.
111
For further discussion, see CRS Report RL34568, U.S.-Iraq Agreements: Congressional Oversight Activities and
Legislative Response, by (name redacted).
112
Prior to concluding the agreements, the United States entered into numerous defense-related agreements with the
Interim Government of Iraq, including an agreement regarding grants under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or
successor legislation, and other items provided to the government of Iraq.
113
Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States of
America and the Republic of Iraq, T.I.A.S., 2008 U.S.T. LEXIS 116. Signed in Baghdad November 17, 2008. Entered
into force January 1, 2009.
114
Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary
Presence in Iraq, T.I.A.S. 2008 U.S.T. LEXIS 115. Signed in Baghdad November 17, 2008. Entered into force January
1, 2009.
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pursuant to the terms of the Security Agreement.115 The Strategic Framework Agreement also
states that “the temporary presence of U.S. forces in Iraq [was] at the request and invitation of the
sovereign government of Iraq,” and that the United States could not “use Iraqi land, sea, or air as
a launching or transit point for attacks against other countries[,] nor seek or request permanent
bases or a permanent military presence in Iraq.”
The Security Agreement remained in effect for three years, and contained provisions addressing a
variety of military matters, including a deadline for the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Iraq by
December 31, 2011. The Agreement also contained numerous provisions resembling those
regularly contained in SOFAs concluded by the United States.116 Specifically, the Agreement
contained provisions concerning the parties’ right to assert civil and criminal jurisdiction over
U.S. forces, as well as provisions which establish rules and procedures applicable to U.S. forces
relating to the carrying of weapons, the wearing of uniforms, entry and exit into Iraq, taxes,
customs, and claims. The Security Agreement established other rules and requirements
traditionally not found in SOFAs concluded by the United States, including provisions addressing
combat operations by U.S. forces.
The Security and Strategic Framework Agreements entered into force on January 1, 2009,
following an exchange of diplomatic notes between the United States and Iraq. Although the
agreements required approval on multiple levels by the Iraqi government, the Bush
Administration did not submit the agreements to the Senate for its advice and consent as a treaty
or request statutory authorization for the agreements by Congress.
There has been some controversy regarding whether these agreements were properly entered on
behalf of the United States by the executive without the participation of Congress.117 As
previously discussed, security agreements authorizing the United States to take military action in
defense of another country have typically been ratified as treaties.118 It could be argued that the
Security Agreement, which contemplated the United States engaging in military operations in
Iraq and potentially defending the Iraqi government from external or internal security threats,
properly required congressional authorization for it to be legally binding under U.S. law. On the
other hand, because Congress had authorized the President to engage in military operations in
Iraq, both pursuant to the 2002 Authorization to Use Military Force Against Iraq and subsequent
appropriations measures in effect for the duration of the Security Agreement, it arguably had
115
Initially, the Bush Administration expected any negotiated strategic framework agreement with Iraq to take the form
of a political, rather than a legally binding agreement. Hearing of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia,
and the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee; Declaration and Principles: Future U.S. Commitments to Iraq, March 4, 2008 (statement by Ambassador
David M. Satterfield in response to question by Representative William Delahunt). Subsequent developments,
including pressure from the Iraqi parliament that the negotiated U.S.-Iraq security agreements be submitted to it for
approval before they could go into effect for Iraq, resulted in the agreements taking the form of legally binding
instruments. See also STATE DEPT, TREATIES IN FORCE, A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE (2011) (listing both the U.S.-Iraq Security and Strategic Framework Agreements as
legal agreements).
116
For further discussion, see CRS Report R40011, U.S.-Iraq Withdrawal/Status of Forces Agreement: Issues for
Congressional Oversight, by (name redacted).
117
See CRS Report RL34568, U.S.-Iraq Agreements: Congressional Oversight Activities and Legislative Response, by
(name redacted) (discussing congressional hearings and proposed legislation addressing the U.S.-Iraq security
arrangement).
118
See supra at “Collective Defense Agreements/“Security Commitments”’”
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impliedly authorized the President to enter short-term agreements with Iraq in order to facilitate
these operations.119
Germany
In 1951, the United States and Germany entered into an agreement120 related to the assurances
required under the Mutual Security Act of 1951.121 This act is “an act to maintain the security and
promote the foreign policy and provide for the general welfare of the United States by furnishing
[material] assistance to friendly nations in the interest of international peace and security.”122
Specifically, the agreement references the “statement of purpose contained in Section 2 of the
Mutual Security Act of 1951, and reaffirms that ... [Germany] is firmly committed to join in
promoting international understanding and good will and in maintaining world peace and to take
such action as may be mutually agreed upon to eliminate causes of international tension.”123 The
statement of purpose in Section 2 of the act is
to maintain the security and to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing
military, economic, and technical assistance to friendly countries to strengthen the mutual
security and individual and collective defense of the free world, to develop their resources in
the interest of their security and independence and the national interest of the United States
and to facilitate the effective participation of those countries in the United Nations system for
collective security.124
In 1955, the United States and Germany, both parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, entered into an
agreement on mutual defense assistance,125 obligating the United States to provide for “such
equipment, materials, services, or other assistance as may be agreed” to Germany.126 The
agreement reflected the
desire to foster international peace and security through measures which further the ability of
nations dedicated to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations to
participate effectively in arrangements for collective self-defense in support of those
purposes and principles, and conscious of the determination to give their full cooperation to
United Nations collective security arrangements and measures and efforts to obtain
agreement on universal regulation of armaments under adequate guarantees against violation
119
The 2002 Authorization to Use Military Force Against Iraq (2002 AUMF, P.L. 107-243) authorized the President to
use military force as he deemed necessary and appropriate to “(1)defend the national security of the United States
against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and (2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions
regarding Iraq.” It could be argued that the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime from power in Iraq and the
termination of the U.N. Security Council mandate mean that the 2002 AUMF no longer serves as a legal basis for U.S.
operations in Iraq. Regardless of the continuing viability of the 2002 AUMF, Congress’s appropriation of funds in
support of ongoing military operations may be viewed as legal authorization for those operations. For further
discussion, see CRS Report RL33837, Congressional Authority to Limit U.S. Military Operations in Iraq, supra note
34.
120
3 U.S.T. 4564; T.I.A.S. 2607; 181 U.N.T.S. 45. Exchange of letters at Bonn December 19 and 28, 1951.
121
P.L. 82-165, 65 Stat. 373 (October 10, 1951).
122
Id.
123
3 U.S.T. 4564; T.I.A.S. 2607; 181 U.N.T.S. 45.
124
65 Stat. 373.
125
6 U.S.T. 5999; T.I.A.S. 3443; 240 U.N.T.S. 47. Signed at Bonn June 30, 1955. Entered into force December 27,
1955.
126
Id.
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or evasion; [and] considering the support which the Government of the United States of
America has brought to these principles by enacting the Mutual Security Act of 1954,127
which authorizes the furnishing of military assistance to certain nations[.]128
Germany guarantees that it “will not use such assistance for any act inconsistent with the strictly
defensive character of the North Atlantic Treaty, or, without the prior consent of the [United
States], for any other purpose.”129 The mutual defense assistance agreement is the basis for
numerous subsequent agreements between the United States and Germany.130
In 1959, the countries entered into an agreement implementing the NATO SOFA of 1953.131 The
agreement provided additional supplemental agreements, beyond those contained in the NATO
SOFA, specific to the relationship between the United States and Germany.
Japan
In 1954, the United States and Japan entered into a mutual defense assistance agreement with
annexes.132 The agreement was amended on April 18 and June 23, 2006. The agreement
references the Treaty of Peace signed between the countries in San Francisco, CA, in 1951.133 The
Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949134 and the Mutual Security Act of 1951135 are also
referenced in the agreement as they provide for the furnishing of defense assistance by the United
States.136 The agreement provides that the United States and Japan “will make available to the
other and to such other governments as the two Governments signatory to the present Agreement
may in each case agree upon, such equipment, materials, services, or other assistance as the
Government furnishing such assistance may authorize” subject to the conditions and provisions of
the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, the Mutual Security Act of 1951, and appropriation
acts which may affect the furnishing of assistance.137
In 1960, the countries entered into the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the
United States of America and Japan.138 The treaty was amended on December 26, 1990.139 Article
127
P.L. 83-665, 68 Stat. 832 (August 26, 1954).
6 U.S.T. 5999; T.I.A.S. 3443; 240 U.N.T.S. 47.
129
Id.
130
See, e.g., Mutual Defense Assistance: Disposition of Military Equipment and Materials. 6 U.S.T. 6005; T.I.A.S.
3444; 240 U.N.T.S. 69. Exchange of notes at Bonn June 30, 1955. Entered into force December 27, 1955. Mutual
Defense Assistance: Purchase of Certain Military Equipment, Materials, and Services. 7 U.S.T. 2787; T.I.A.S. 3660;
278 U.N.T.S. 9. Exchange of notes at Washington October 8, 1956. Entered into force December 12, 1956. Defense:
Training of German Army Personnel. 8 U.S.T. 149; T.I.A.S. 3753; 280 U.N.T.S. 63. Exchange of notes at Bonn
December 12, 1956. Entered into force December 12, 1956.
131
14 U.S.T. 689; T.I.A.S. 5352; 490 U.N.T.S. 30. Signed at Bonn August 3, 1959. Entered into force July 1, 1963.
132
5 U.S.T. 661; T.I.A.S. 2957; 232 U.N.T.S. 169. Signed at Tokyo March 8, 1954. Entered into force May 1, 1954.
133
3 U.S.T. 3169; T.I.A.S. 2490. Signed at San Francisco September, 8, 1951. Entered into force April 28, 1952.
134
63 Stat. 714.
135
65 Stat. 373.
136
5 U.S.T. 661; T.I.A.S. 2957; 232 U.N.T.S. 169.
137
Id.
138
11 U.S.T. 1632; T.I.A.S. 4509; 373 U.N.T.S. 186. Signed at Washington January 19, 1960. Entered into force June
23, 1960.
139
T.I.A.S. 12335.
128
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III of the Treaty provides that the countries, “individually and in cooperation with each other, by
means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop, subject to
their constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack.”140 Article V provides that
the countries recognize “that an armed attack against either party in the territories under the
administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would
act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.”141
Under Article VI of the Treaty, the United States is granted “the use by its land, air and naval
forces of facilities and areas in Japan” in order to contribute “to the security of Japan and
maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East[.]”142 Article VI provides further
that the use of facilities and the status of U.S. Armed Forces will be governed under a separate
agreement.143
Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of
America and Japan, the countries entered into a SOFA in 1960.144 The SOFA addresses the use of
facilities by the U.S. Armed Forces, as well as the status of U.S. forces in Japan. The agreement
has been modified at least four times since the original agreement.145
South Korea
In 1948, the United States and South Korea entered into an agreement related to the transfer of
authority to the government of South Korea and the withdrawal of U.S. occupation forces.146
Shortly after the initial agreement, the United States and Korea entered into a second agreement
concerning interim military and security matters during a transitional period.147 This executive
agreement was between the President of the Republic of Korea and the Commanding General,
U.S. Army Forces in Korea.148 The agreement calls for the “Commanding General, United States
Army Forces in Korea, pursuant to directives from his government and within his capabilities” to
“organize, train and equip the Security forces of the Republic of Korea” with the obligation to
train and equip ceasing “upon the completion of withdrawal from Korea of forces under his
command.”149 The agreement also requires the Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in
Korea, to retain authority to exercise over-all operational control of security forces of Korea until
withdrawal, as contemplated by Resolution No. II passed by the United Nations General
Assembly on November 14, 1948.150
140
11 U.S.T. 1632; T.I.A.S. 4509; 373 U.N.T.S. 186.
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
11 U.S.T. 1652; T.I.A.S. 4510; 373 U.N.T.S. 248. Signed at Washington January 19, 1960. Entered into force June
23, 1960.
145
Agreements concerning new special measures relating to Article XXIV (related to costs of maintenance of U.S.
forces in Japan and furnishment of rights of way related to facilities used by U.S. forces in Japan) of the agreement of
January 19, 1960, have been signed in 1991, 1995, 2000, and 2006.
146
Exchange of letters at Seoul August 9 and 11, 1948. Entered into force August 11, 1948.
147
62 Stat. 3817; T.I.A.S. 1918; 9 Bevans 477; 79 U.N.T.S. 57. Signed at Seoul August 24, 1948. Entered into force
August 24, 1948.
148
Id.
149
62 Stat. 3818.
150
Id.
141
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Oversight and Related Issues Concerning International Security Agreements
Article III of the Agreement contains provisions related to the status of U.S. forces during the
transition period. The Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in Korea, “shall retain exclusive
jurisdiction over the personnel of his command, both military and civilian, including their
dependents, whose conduct as individuals shall be in keeping with pertinent laws of the Republic
of Korea.”151 The agreement provides that any individuals under the jurisdiction of the
Commanding General who are apprehended by law enforcement agencies of South Korea shall be
immediately turned over to the custody and control of the Commanding General. Individuals not
under jurisdiction of the Commanding General, but apprehended in acts detrimental to the
security of personnel or property under his jurisdiction, shall be turned over to the custody and
control of the government of South Korea.152
In 1950, the countries entered into a mutual defense assistance agreement.153 The mutual defense
agreement references the Military Defense Act of 1949,154 which provides for the furnishing of
military assistance by the United States to South Korea. The mutual defense assistance agreement
provides that each country “will make or continue to make available to the other, and to other
Governments, such equipment, materials, services, or other military assistance” in support of
economic recovery that is essential to international peace and security.155
The United States and South Korea entered into a mutual security agreement in 1952.156 The
mutual security agreement references the Mutual Security Act of 1951,157 which provides for
military, economic, and technical assistance in order to strengthen the mutual security of the free
world. The mutual security agreement provides that South Korea agrees to promote international
understanding and good will and to take action, that is mutually agreed upon, to eliminate causes
of international tensions.158
In 1954, the countries entered into a mutual defense treaty.159 As part of the treaty the countries
agree to attempt to settle international disputes peacefully, consult whenever the political
independence or security of either party is threatened by external armed attack, and that either
party would act to meet the common danger in accordance with their respective constitutional
processes.160 Article IV of the treaty grants the United States “the right to dispose ... land, air and
sea forces in and about the territory” of South Korea.161 Pursuant to the treaty, specifically Article
IV, in 1966, the countries entered into a SOFA with agreed minutes and an exchange of notes.162 It
was subsequently amended January 18, 2001.
151
Id. at 3819.
Id.
153
1 U.S.T. 137; T.I.A.S. 2019; 80 U.N.T.S. 205. Signed at Seoul January 26, 1950. Entered into force January 26,
1950.
154
P.L. 81-329, 63 Stat. 714 (October 6, 1949).
155
1 U.S.T. 137; T.I.A.S. 2019; 80 U.N.T.S. 205.
156
3 U.S.T. 4619; T.I.A.S. 2612; 179 U.N.T.S. 105. Exchange of notes at Pusan January 4 and 7, 1952. Entered into
force January 7, 1952.
157
P.L. 82-165, 65 Stat. 373 (October 10, 1951).
158
3 U.S.T. 4619; T.I.A.S. 2612; 179 U.N.T.S. 105.
159
5 U.S.T. 2368; T.I.A.S. 3097; 238 U.N.T.S. 199. Signed at Washington October 1, 1953. Entered into force
November 17, 1954.
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
17 U.S.T. 1677; T.I.A.S. 6127; 674 U.N.T.S. 163. Signed at Seoul July 9, 1966. Entered into force February 9,
(continued...)
152
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Oversight and Related Issues Concerning International Security Agreements
Philippines
In 1947, the United States and the Republic of the Philippines entered into an agreement on
military assistance.163 The agreement was for a term of five years, starting July 4, 1946, and
provided that the United States would furnish military assistance to the Philippines for the
training and development of armed forces. The agreement further created an advisory group to
provide advice and assistance to the Philippines as had been authorized by the U.S. Congress.164
The agreement was extended, and amended, for an additional five years in 1953.165
A mutual defense treaty was entered into by the United States and the Philippines in 1951.166 The
treaty publicly declares “their sense of unity and their common determination to defend
themselves against external armed attack, so that no potential aggressor could be under the
illusion that either of them stands alone in the Pacific Area[.]”167 The Treaty does not address or
provide for a SOFA.
The countries entered into a mutual security agreement in 1952,168 as related to the assurances
required by the Mutual Security Act of 1951. The assurances required under the Mutual Security
Act of 1951 included a commitment to accounting procedures for monies, equipment, and
materials furnished by the United States to the Philippines.169
In 1993, the countries entered into a SOFA.170 The agreement was subsequently extended on
September 19, 1994; April 28, 1995; and November 29, December 1, and December 8, 1995. The
countries entered into an agreement regarding the treatment of U.S. Armed Forces visiting the
Philippines in 1998.171 The distinction between this agreement and the SOFA originally entered in
1993 is that this agreement applies to U.S. Armed Forces visiting, not stationed in the Philippines.
The countries also entered into an agreement regarding the treatment of Republic of Philippines
personnel visiting the United States.172
(...continued)
1967.
163
61 Stat. 3283; T.I.A.S. 1662. Signed at Manila March 21, 1947. Entered into force March 21, 1947.
164
61 Stat. 3284.
165
4 U.S.T. 1682; T.I.A.S. 2834; 2163 U.N.T.S. 77. Exchange of notes at Manila June 26, 1953. Entered into force July
5, 1953.
166
3 U.S.T. 3947; T.I.A.S. 2529; 177 U.N.T.S. 133. Signed at Washington August 30, 1951. Entered into force August
27, 1952.
167
Id.
168
3 U.S.T. 4644; T.I.A.S. 2617; 179 U.N.T.S. 193. Exchange of notes at Manila January 4 and 7, 1952. Entered into
force January 7, 1952.
169
Id.
170
Agreement Regarding the Status of U.S. Military and Civilian Personnel, U.S.-Philippines, T.I.A.S. Exchange of
notes at Manila April 2, June 11 and 21, 1993. Entered into force June 21, 1993.
171
Agreement Regarding the Treatment of United States Armed Forces Visiting the Philippines, T.I.A.S. 12931.
Signed at Manila February 10, 1998. Entered into force June 1, 1999.
172
Agreement Regarding the Treatment of Republic of Philippines personnel visiting the United States, T.I.A.S. 12931.
Signed at Manila October 9, 1998. Entered into force June 1, 1999.
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Oversight and Related Issues Concerning International Security Agreements
III. Congressional Oversight
Congress has several tools at its disposal to exercise oversight regarding the negotiation,
conclusion, and implementation of international security agreements entered by the United States.
Notification
One manner in which Congress exercises oversight of international agreements is via notification
requirements. Obviously, in cases where an agreement requires action from one or both houses of
Congress to take effect, notification is a requisite. Before a treaty may become binding U.S. law,
the President must submit it to the Senate for its advice and consent. Likewise, the executive must
inform Congress when it seeks to conclude an executive agreement that requires congressional
authorization and/or implementing legislation to become U.S. law, so that appropriate legislation
may be considered.
While constitutional considerations necessitate congressional notification in many circumstances,
it has historically been more difficult for Congress to keep informed regarding international
agreements or pledges made by the executive that did not require additional legislative action to
take effect—that is, sole executive agreements and executive agreements made pursuant to a
treaty. Additionally, even in cases where congressional action is necessary for an agreement to
take effect, the executive has sometimes opted not to inform Congress about an agreement until it
has already been drafted and signed by the parties. In response to these concerns, Congress has
enacted legislation and the State Department has implemented regulations to ensure that Congress
is informed of the conclusion (and in some cases, the negotiation) of legally binding international
agreements.
Notification Pursuant to the Case-Zablocki Act
The Case-Zablocki Act173 was enacted in 1972 in response to congressional concern that a
number of secret agreements had been entered by the executive imposing significant
commitments upon the United States.174 It is the primary statutory mechanism used to ensure that
Congress is informed of international agreements entered by the United States. Pursuant to the
act, all executive agreements are required to be transmitted to Congress within 60 days of their
entry into force.175 If the President deems the immediate public disclosure of an agreement to be
prejudicial to national security, the agreement may instead be transmitted to the House Committee
on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The President is also required
to annually submit a report regarding international agreements that were transmitted after the
expiration of the 60-day period, describing the reasons for the delay.176
Although the Case-Zablocki Act originally only imposed reporting requirements with respect to
executive agreements that had entered into force, the act was amended in 2004 to ensure that
Congress was regularly notified regarding the status of signed agreements which have yet to enter
173
1 U.S.C. §112b.
See H.Rept. 92-1301, 92nd Cong. (1972).
175
1 U.S.C. §112b(a).
176
Id. at §112b(b).
174
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Oversight and Related Issues Concerning International Security Agreements
force, as well. The Secretary of State is required to annually report to Congress a list of executive
agreements which (1) have not been or are not proposed to be published in the United States
Treaties and Other International Agreements compilation and (2) the United States has “signed,
proclaimed, or with reference to which any other final formality has been executed, or that has
been extended or otherwise modified, during the preceding calendar year.”177
The Case-Zablocki Act does not define what sort of arrangements constitute “international
agreements” falling under its purview, though the legislative history suggests that Congress “did
not want to be inundated with trivia ... [but wished] to have transmitted all agreements of any
significance.”178 In its implementing regulations, the State Department has established criteria for
determining whether an arrangement constitutes a legally binding “international agreement”
requiring congressional notification. These include
•
the identity of the parties, and whether they intended to create a legally binding
agreement;
•
the significance of the agreed-upon arrangement, with “[m]inor or trivial
undertakings, even if couched in legal language and form,” not considered to fall
under the purview of the Case-Zablocki Act;
•
the specificity of the arrangement;
•
the necessity that the arrangement constitute an agreement by two or more
parties; and
•
the form of the arrangement, to the extent that it helps to determine whether the
parties intended to enter a legally binding agreement.179
Notification Pursuant to Circular 175 Procedures
The State Department’s Circular 175 procedure also contemplates that Congress will be notified
of developments in the negotiation of “significant” international agreements. Specifically,
department regulations provide that
With the advice and assistance of the Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, the
appropriate congressional leaders and committees are advised of the intention to negotiate
significant new international agreements, consulted concerning such agreements, and kept
informed of developments affecting them, including especially whether any legislation is
considered necessary or desirable for the implementation of the new treaty or agreement.180
Annual Reporting of Security Arrangements Required by the
National Defense Authorization Act of 1991
In addition to the Case-Zablocki Act, Congress has on occasion enacted legislation designed to
ensure that it remains informed about existing U.S. security arrangements. Section 1457 of the
177
Id. at §112b(d).
H.Rept. 92-1301, 92nd Cong. (1972).
179
22 C.F.R. §181.2(a).
180
11 F.A.M. §725.1(5).
178
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Oversight and Related Issues Concerning International Security Agreements
National Defense Authorization Act for FY1991 (P.L. 101-510) requires the President to submit
an annual report to specified congressional committees regarding “United States security
arrangements with, and commitments to, other nations.”181 The report, produced in classified and
unclassified form, is to be submitted by February 1 each year to the Committee on Armed
Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the Committee on Armed
Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.182 In addition to
legally binding security arrangements or commitments (e.g., mutual defense treaties and prepositioning agreements), the report must describe non-binding commitments, such as expressed
U.S. policy formulated by the executive branch. It must also include, among other things, “[a]n
assessment of the need to continue, modify, or discontinue each of those arrangements and
commitments in view of the changing international security situation.”183
Although reports were submitted to the appropriate committees pursuant to this statutory
requirement in 1991 and 1992, it does not appear that any subsequent reports have been issued.
The Federal Reports Elimination and Sunset Act of 1995 (Sunset Act, P.L. 104-66) terminated
many reporting requirements existing prior to its enactment. The act eliminated or modified
several specific reporting requirements, and also generally terminated any reporting requirement
that had been listed in House Doc. 103-7, unless such a requirement was specifically exempted.
However, the reporting requirement contained in Section 1457 of the FY1991 National Defense
Authorization Act was neither specifically terminated by the Sunset Act nor listed in House Doc.
103-7. Moreover, Congress has twice amended Section 1457 after the enactment of the Sunset
Act, in 1996 and 1999.184 Accordingly, it does not appear that this requirement has been
terminated.
Consultation
State Department regulations requiring consultation with Congress regarding significant
international agreements may provide a means for congressional oversight as to the negotiation of
security arrangements. One of the stated objectives of the Circular 175 procedure is to ensure that
“timely and appropriate consultation is had with congressional leaders and committees on treaties
and other international agreements.”185 To that end, State Department regulations contemplate
congressional consultation regarding the conduct of negotiations to secure significant
international agreements.186
Circular 175 procedures may also provide for congressional consultation concerning the form that
a legally binding international agreement should take. When there is question as to whether an
international agreement should be entered as a treaty or an executive agreement, the matter is first
brought to the attention of the State Department’s Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs. If the
Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs believes the issue to be “a serious one that may warrant
181
50 U.S.C. §404c(a).
Id. at §404c(c)-(d).
183
Id.
184
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, P.L. 104-106, Div A, §1502(c)(4)(C) (rearranging and
revising provisions §1457 of the 1991 National Defense Authorization Act ); National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2000, P.L. 106-65, Div A, §1067(10) (amending §1457 to reflect name change of House Committee on
National Security to House Committee on Armed Services).
185
11 F.A.M. §722(4).
186
Id. at §725.1(5).
182
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Oversight and Related Issues Concerning International Security Agreements
formal congressional consultation,”187 consultations are to be held with appropriate congressional
leaders and committees. State Department regulations specify that “every practicable effort will
be made to identify such questions at the earliest possible date so that consultations may be
completed in sufficient time to avoid last minute consideration.”188
Approval, Rejection, or Conditional Approval of
International Agreements
Perhaps the clearest example of congressional oversight in the agreement-making context is
through its consideration of treaties and congressional-executive agreements. For a treaty to
become binding U.S. law, it must first be approved by a two-thirds majority in the Senate. The
Senate may, in considering a treaty, condition its consent on certain reservations, declarations,
and understandings concerning treaty application. For example, it may make its acceptance
contingent upon the treaty being interpreted as requiring implementing legislation to take effect,
or condition approval on an amended version of the treaty being accepted by other treaty
parties.189 If accepted, these reservations, declarations, and understandings may limit and/or
define U.S. obligations under the treaty.
As previously discussed, a congressional-executive agreement requires congressional
authorization via a statute passed by both houses of Congress. Here, too, approval may be
conditional. Congress may opt to authorize only certain types of agreements, or may choose to
approve only some provisions of a particular agreement. In authorizing an agreement, Congress
may impose additional statutory requirements upon the executive (e.g., reporting requirements).
Congress may also include a statutory deadline for its authorization of an agreement to begin or
expire.
Because sole executive agreements do not require congressional authorization to take effect, they
need not be approved by Congress to become binding, at least as a matter of international law.
Nonetheless, as discussed earlier, Congress may limit the effect of a sole executive agreement
through a subsequent legislative enactment or through the conditioning of appropriations
necessary for the agreement’s commitment to be implemented.190 Similar measures could also be
taken to limit or condition U.S. adherence to a non-binding security arrangement.
187
11 F.A.M. §724.4(b)-(c).
Id. at §724.4(b).
189
In 2007, for instance, the Executive negotiated and signed treaties with the United Kingdom and Australia
concerning the export of defense articles, both of which included language in their preambles stating that the treaties
were self-executing for the United States. Treaty with the United Kingdom Concerning Defense Trade Cooperation,
preamble, SEN. TREATY DOC. 110-7, entered into force April 13, 2012 (“Understanding that the provisions of this
Treaty are self-executing in the United States …”); Treaty with Australia Concerning Defense Trade Cooperation,
Treaty with the United Kingdom Concerning Defense Trade Cooperation, preamble, SEN. TREATY DOC. 110-10,
entered into force April 13, 2012 (“Understanding that the provisions of this Treaty are self-executing in the United
States …”). However, the Senate conditioned its approval of both treaties on declarations that they were not selfexecuting, notwithstanding the language in the agreements’ preambles. 156 CONG REC. S7719, 7772, and 7724
(September 29, 2010).
190
In the 110th Congress, legislation was introduced that would have prohibited appropriations from being used to carry
out any U.S.-Iraqi security agreement that was not approved by the Senate as a treaty or authorized by legislation
passed by both houses of Congress. See, e.g., S. 2426 (Congressional Oversight of Iraq Agreements Act of 2007); H.R.
4959 (Iraq Strategic Agreement Review Act of 2008); H.R. 5626 (the Protect Our Troops and Our Constitution Act of
2008).
188
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Oversight and Related Issues Concerning International Security Agreements
Implementation of an Agreement That Is Not Self-Executing
Congress may exercise oversight regarding international agreements via legislation implementing
the agreements’ requirements. Certain international treaties or executive agreements are
considered “self-executing,” meaning that they have the force of law without the need for
subsequent congressional action.191 However, many other treaties and agreements are not
considered self-executing, and are understood to require implementing legislation to take effect,
as enforcing U.S. agencies otherwise lack authority to conduct the actions required to ensure
compliance with the international agreement.192
Treaties and executive agreements have, in part or in whole, been found to be non-self-executing
for at least three reasons: (1) implementing legislation is constitutionally required; (2) the Senate,
in giving consent to a treaty, or Congress, by resolution, requires implementing legislation for the
agreement to be given force;193 or (3) the agreement manifests an intention that it shall not
become effective as domestic law without the enactment of implementing legislation.194
Until implementing legislation is enacted, existing domestic law concerning a matter covered by
an international agreement that is not self-executing remains unchanged and is controlling law in
the United States. However, when a treaty is ratified or an executive agreement is entered, the
United States acquires obligations under international law and may be in default of those
obligations unless implementing legislation is enacted.195 Perhaps for this reason, Congress
typically appropriates funds necessary to carry out U.S. obligations under international
agreements.196
Continuing Oversight
After an international agreement has taken effect, Congress may still exercise oversight over
executive implementation. It may require the executive to submit information to Congress or
congressional committees regarding U.S. implementation of its international commitments. It
may enact new legislation that modifies or repudiates U.S. adherence or implementation of an
international agreement. It may limit or prohibit appropriations necessary for the executive to
implement the provisions of the agreement, or condition such appropriations upon the executive
implementing the agreement in a particular manner.
191
For purposes of domestic law, a self-executing agreement may be superseded by either a subsequently enacted
statute or a new self-executing agreement. Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194.
192
See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, §111(4)(a) & cmt. h.
193
For example, in the case of the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, Annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984), the
Senate gave advice and consent subject to a declaration that the treaty was not self-executing. U.S. Reservations,
Declarations, and Understandings to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, 136 CONG. REC. S17486-01 (daily ed., October 27, 1990).
194
RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, §111(4)(a) & n. 5-6.
195
See id., §111, cmt. h.
196
See TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 4, at 166-170 (discussing congressional use of
the appropriations power to influence the implementation of international agreements by the United States).
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