Defense: FY2010 Authorization and Appropriations

Congressional research reportDec 23, 2009

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Defense: FY2010 Authorization and

Appropriations

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Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget

December 23, 2009

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R40567

Defense: FY2010 Authorization and Appropriations

Summary

For the Department of Defense (DOD) in FY2010, the Administration requested a total of $663.8

billion in discretionary budget authority. This includes $533.8 billion for the so-called “base

budget”—all DOD activities other than combat operations—and $130.0 billion for “overseas

contingency operations,” including operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Administration also

requested $75.9 billion in supplemental DOD appropriations for FY2009 to cover war costs. The

Administration’s DOD request, made public May 7, 2009, incorporated Defense Secretary Robert

Gates’s April 6 recommendations to curtail funding for several major weapons programs focused

on conventional warfare.

The FY2010 national defense authorization bills drafted by the House and Senate Armed Services

Committees generally supported this shift in policy, which the Obama Administration’s budget

request reflected. However, both committees added to their respective bills authorization to

continue production of the Air Force’s F-22 fighter and to continue development of an alternative

engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The Obama Administration warned that a bill that

continued either program would be vetoed. On June 25, the House passed by a vote of 389-22 its

version of the FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act, H.R. 2647, which would authorize a

total of $534.0 billion for the DOD base budget and $129.3 billion for war costs. The bill also

would authorize $16.5 billion for defense-related nuclear activities of the Department of Energy,

which was $83.3 million more than requested. On July 2, the Senate Armed Services Committee

reported its version of the authorization bill, S. 1390, which would authorize $534.6 billion for

the DOD base budget, $129.3 billion for war costs, and $16.4 billion for the Energy Department.

The Senate passed the bill on July 23 by a vote of 87-7 after adopting several amendments,

including two that would, in effect, end production of the F-22 and terminate the F-35 alternate

engine programs, as the Administration had requested.

The conference report on the authorization bill authorizes a total of $680.2 billion for military

activities of DOD and defense-related activities of other federal agencies, which is $14.9 million

more than the Obama Administration requested. The conference report, which terminates the F-22

but continues the alternate engine program, was adopted by the House on October 8 by a vote of

281-146. The Senate adopted the conference report October 22 by a vote of 68-29 and President

Obama signed the bill (P.L. 111-84) on October 28.

The House passed its version of the FY2010 defense appropriations bill (H.R. 3326) on July 30,

by a vote of 400-30. The bill would appropriate $497.6 billion for the DOD base budget (covering

all accounts except military construction) and $128.2 billion for FY2010 war costs.

The Senate Appropriations Committee reported September 10 an amended version of H.R. 3326

which would appropriate $497.6 billion for the DOD base budget and $128.2 billion for war

costs. The Senate passed the bill October 6 by a vote of 93-7.

In lieu of a conference report on the FY2010 defense appropriations bill, House and Senate

negotiators agreed on an amendment to the Senate-passed version of H.R. 3326 that would

appropriate $497.7 billion for the DOD base budget and $128.2 billion for war costs.

The House passed that compromise version of the bill December 16 (395-34); the Senate passed

it December 19 (88-10). The President signed the bill December 19 (P.L. 111-118).

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Defense: FY2010 Authorization and Appropriations

Contents

Most Recent Developments ............................................................................................................. 1

Defense Authorization Conference............................................................................................ 2

Compromise Version of Defense Appropriations Bill (H.R. 3326) ........................................... 3

Temporary Extensions of Non-Defense Programs .............................................................. 4

Overview of the Administration’s FY2010 Request ........................................................................ 5

Status of Legislation ........................................................................................................................ 6

War Costs and Issues ....................................................................................................................... 7

Debate About Potential Troop Increases in Afghanistan ........................................................... 8

Basis and Status of War Cost Request in Pending Legislation ................................................ 10

Authorization Action on War Funding (H.R. 2647. P.L. 111-84) ............................................ 14

Changes to DOD’s Request ............................................................................................... 14

Extensions and Additional Reporting Requirements......................................................... 15

Defense Appropriations Bill (H.R. 3326, P.L. 111-118) .......................................................... 17

Assessing Uncertainties In Operations Funding ............................................................... 18

Funding for Force Protection Vehicles .............................................................................. 18

Transfers from Funding in the Base Budget...................................................................... 18

Commanders Emergency Response Program Funding ..................................................... 19

Funding for Training Afghan Security Forces and for Guantanamo Bay ......................... 19

Base Budget: Comparison and Context ......................................................................................... 19

Defense Priorities: Budget and Strategy ........................................................................................ 23

Background: Strategic Direction ............................................................................................. 24

Strategic Processes .................................................................................................................. 25

Issues for Congress: Secretary Gates’s Proposals .......................................................................... 26

Quality of Life Issues .............................................................................................................. 26

End-Strength Increase ....................................................................................................... 27

Health Care and Family Support ....................................................................................... 27

Preparing for “The Wars We’re In” ......................................................................................... 29

Intelligence, Reconnaissance, and Surveillance (ISR) ...................................................... 29

Developing Partner Capacity (Section 1206) .................................................................... 30

Army Brigade Combat Teams ........................................................................................... 31

Special Operations Forces ................................................................................................. 32

Helicopter Crew Training .................................................................................................. 32

Shipbuilding—Request............................................................................................................ 32

Aircraft Carriers ................................................................................................................ 33

DDG-1000 and DDG-51 Destroyers ................................................................................. 34

CG(X) Cruiser ................................................................................................................... 34

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) .............................................................................................. 35

LPD-17, Mobile Landing Platform (MLP), and Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) ........... 35

Aircraft—Request.................................................................................................................... 36

Tactical Combat Aircraft (F-35, F-22, F/A-18) ................................................................. 36

F-22 Raptor ....................................................................................................................... 37

Air Mobility (KC-X, C-17) ............................................................................................... 38

Acquisition Reform (VH-71, CSAR-X)............................................................................ 39

Missile Defense—Request ...................................................................................................... 40

Theater Defenses (THAAD, SM-3, Aegis) ....................................................................... 40

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Ground-Based National Missile Defense .......................................................................... 41

Boost-Phase Defenses (Airborne Laser and KEI) ............................................................. 41

Congressional Perspectives ............................................................................................... 42

Ground Combat Systems (FCS and EFV)—Request .............................................................. 42

Congressional Perspectives ............................................................................................... 43

Bill-by-Bill Synopsis of Congressional Action to Date ................................................................. 44

FY2010 Congressional Budget Resolution ............................................................................. 44

National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2647, S. 1390) ..................................................... 44

Ballistic Missile Defense—Authorization......................................................................... 45

Shipbuilding—Authorization ............................................................................................ 47

Combat Aircraft—Authorization....................................................................................... 49

Ground Combat Systems—Authorization......................................................................... 52

Military Personnel Policy: End-Strength, Pay Raise......................................................... 53

DOD Civilian Employees: NSPS, A-76 ............................................................................ 53

Concurrent Receipt............................................................................................................ 54

Military Commissions, Detainees and Guantanamo Bay .................................................. 54

Hate Crimes (Title XLVII) ................................................................................................ 56

Economic Development Conveyance of Surplus Real Property (BRAC) ........................ 57

Guam Realignment ............................................................................................................ 57

Other Senate Provisions .................................................................................................... 58

FY2010 Defense Appropriations Bill (H.R. 3326) .................................................................. 60

Ballistic Missile Defense—Appropriation ........................................................................ 62

Shipbuilding—Appropriation............................................................................................ 64

Aircraft—Appropriation.................................................................................................... 65

Ground Combat Systems—Appropriation ........................................................................ 69

Other Provisions ................................................................................................................ 70

Tables

Table 1. DOD Base Budget Request Discretionary Budget Authority, FY2009-2010 .................... 5

Table 2. Status of FY2010 Defense Authorization Bills, H.R. 2647/S. 1390 .................................. 7

Table 3. Status of FY2010 Defense Appropriations Bills (H.R. 3326) ............................................ 7

Table 4. Congressional Action on DOD’s War FY2010 Budget Request ...................................... 13

Table 5. Actual and Projected DOD Base Budgets Compared with 4% of Gross Domestic

Product (GDP) ............................................................................................................................ 20

Table 6. DOD Discretionary Budget Authority, FY1998-FY2009 ................................................ 21

Table 7. FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act, House and Senate Action by Title,

H.R. 2647, S. 1390 ..................................................................................................................... 59

Table 8. FY2010 Defense Appropriations Act (H.R. 3326, P.L. 111-118) Summary by

Title ............................................................................................................................................. 71

Table A-1. Congressional Action on FY2010 Missile Defense Funding: Authorization ............... 72

Table A-2. Congressional Action on FY2010 Missile Defense Funding: Appropriations ............. 76

Table A-3. Congressional Action on Selected FY2010 Army and Marine Corps Programs:

Authorization .............................................................................................................................. 80

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Table A-4. Congressional Action on Selected FY2010 Army and Marine Corps

Programs: Appropriations ........................................................................................................... 84

Table A-5. Congressional Action on Selected FY2010 Shipbuilding Programs:

Authorization .............................................................................................................................. 88

Table A-6. Congressional Action on Selected FY2010 Shipbuilding Programs:

Appropriations ............................................................................................................................ 90

Table A-7. Congressional Action on Selected FY2010 Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force

Aircraft Programs: Authorization ............................................................................................... 92

Table A-8. Congressional Action on Selected FY2010 Navy, Marine Corps, and Air

Force Aircraft Programs: Appropriations ................................................................................... 97

Table A-9. Congressional Action on FY2010 DOD War Funding Request (Defense

Appropriations and Military Construction Appropriations Bills) ............................................. 103

Appendixes

Appendix. Program Funding Tables .............................................................................................. 72

Contacts

Author Contact Information......................................................................................................... 108

Key Policy Staff ........................................................................................................................... 108

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Defense: FY2010 Authorization and Appropriations

Most Recent Developments

The conference report on the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010 defense

authorization bill (H.R. 2647), as well as a compromise version of the FY2010 defense

appropriations bill (H.R. 3326) that was agreed to by House and Senate negotiators in lieu of a

conference report, largely support proposals by the Obama Administration to terminate some

major weapons programs that were designed for traditional combat—such as the Air Force’s F-22

fighter. The rationale for these cuts, according to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, was to allow

DOD to focus more resources on equipment better suited to the type of operations underway in

Iraq and Afghanistan.

The House approved the authorization conference report on October 8 by a vote of 281-146. The

Senate approved the conference report October 22 by a vote of 68-29 and the President signed the

bill into law (P.L. 111-84) on October 28.

In lieu of a conference report on the FY2010 defense appropriations bill, House and Senate

negotiators agreed on a compromise amendment to the Senate-passed version of the bill, which

would appropriate $497.7 billion for the DOD base budget (covering all accounts except military

construction) and $128.2 billion for FY2010 war costs.1 The House passed that compromise

version of the bill December 16 by a vote of 395-34. The Senate approved it on December 18 by

a vote of 88-10. The President signed the bill on December 19 (P.L. 111-118).

Neither the FY2010 defense authorization act nor the companion defense appropriations bill

covered funds that will pay for President Obama’s decision, announced December 1, to increase

by 30,000 the number of U.S. troops deployed in Afghanistan. The bills do cover funds to pay for

operations in Afghanistan and Iraq that already were underway prior to the December 1

announcement that additional forces would be deployed. (See “War Costs and Issues,” below.)

The enacted versions of both the authorization and appropriations bills fund continued

development of an alternate engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The Office of Management

and Budget (OMB) had warned in its official Statement of Administration Policy (SAP) on each

of the defense bills that the President might veto any bill that continued the alternate engine

program. Defense Secretary Robert Gates echoed that warning in an October 13 letter to the

chairman and ranking minority member of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee.

The Administration’s veto threats concerning the alternate engine program were more ambiguous

than the flat, unqualified declaration by President Obama earlier in the year that he would veto

any bill that funded continued production of the F-22. In the case of the alternate engine program,

both OMB and Secretary Gates said that the President’s senior advisors would recommend a veto

of any bill that would “seriously disrupt” the F-35 program, which, Administration officials

contend, the alternate engine program might do. For details on the alternate engine issue, see

“Defense Authorization Conference,” below.

The Administration had taken a less adamant stance in its opposition to provisions of the defense

appropriations bill which would continue production of the C-17, a wide-body cargo jet. Like

An additional $1.4 billion in war-related military construction is funded in the FY2010 Military Construction and

Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies appropriations bill which was enacted as Part E of the Consolidated

Appropriations Act of 2010 (H.R. 3288).

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Defense: FY2010 Authorization and Appropriations

OMB, Secretary Gates said that he “strongly objects” to the Senate bill’s addition of $1.5 billion

for 10 C-17s and to the House bill’s addition of $674 million for three of the planes. Neither

OMB’s Statement of Administration Policy (SAP) nor Secretary Gates’s letter contained any

explicit warning that President Obama might veto the defense bill over that issue. The

compromise final version of H.R. 3326 would add to the budget request $1.5 billion for 10 C-17s.

On the other hand, both OMB and Secretary Gates warned that the President’s senior advisers

would recommend that he veto the DOD appropriations bill if it included funds to continue

procurement of VH-71 helicopters, which were intended to transport the President and other

senior officials. The Administration cancelled the project because of cost overruns, but the House

version of the appropriations bill added $400 million to complete work on five of the aircraft that

already are under construction. The compromise final version of the appropriations bill added

$100 million to the VH-71 program. For details on the C-17 and VH-71 issues, see “Compromise

Version of Defense Appropriations Bill (H.R. 3326),” below.

Defense Authorization Conference

The conference report on H.R. 2647 authorizes a total of $680.2 billion for military activities of

DOD and defense-related activities of other federal agencies. The total authorization, which is

$14.9 million higher than the Obama Administration requested, includes $550.2 billion for the socalled “base budget”—all DOD activities other than combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan—

and $130.0 billion for “overseas contingency operations,” including operations in Iraq and

Afghanistan.

The House and Senate Armed Services Committees each had added to the versions of the

authorization bill they reported to their respective chambers authorization to continue production

of the F-22 and to continue development of an alternative engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

In a July 13 letter to Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin, President Obama

said he would veto any defense bill that continued F-22 procurement.2 But regarding other

programs that one or both chambers of Congress acted to fund over the Administration’s

objections, the Administration stated its objections in terms that were less unequivocal.

For example, in the SAPs regarding versions of the defense authorization bill drafted by the

House Armed Services Committee3 and by the Senate Armed Services Committee4, OMB said the

President’s senior advisors would recommend that he veto any bill that would “seriously disrupt”

the F-35 program.

The version of H.R. 2647 passed June 25 by the House authorized both procurement of additional

F-22s and development of the alternative F-35 engine. The Senate dropped both authorizations

before passing its version of the bill (S. 1390) on July 23. The conference report on the

authorization bill would terminate the F-22 but would allow the alternate engine program to

continue.

Letter from President Barack Obama to Senator Carl Levin, July 13, 2009, accessed at http://insidedefense.com/

secure/data_extra/pdf8/dplus2009_1826.pdf.

OMB Statement of Administration Policy regarding H.R. 2647, June 24, 2009, accessed at

http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/sap_111/saphr2647h_20090624.pdf.

OMB Statement of Administration Policy regarding S. 1390, July 15, 2009, accessed at http://www.whitehouse.gov/

omb/assets/sap_111/saps1390s_20090715.pdf

Congressional Research Service

Defense: FY2010 Authorization and Appropriations

The defense authorization conference report also incorporated, with some modifications, Senatepassed provisions that broaden federal jurisdiction over “hate crimes” to include crimes motivated

by the victim’s actual or perceived gender, sexual orientation or gender identity. Previously,

federal jurisdiction over hate crimes extended to crimes motivated by the victim’s real or

perceived race, color, national origin, or disability. For additional information, see “Hate Crimes

(Title XLVII),” below.

The conference report also included, with modifications, several provisions relating to the

treatment of detainees, including those currently held at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station. Among

these were provisions relating to the operation of military commissions established to adjudicate

the cases of detainees. For additional information, see “Military Commissions, Detainees and

Guantanamo Bay,” below.

(For additional highlights of H.R. 2647, see “National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2647, S.

1390),” below.)

Compromise Version of Defense Appropriations Bill (H.R. 3326)

In lieu of a conference report on the FY2010 defense appropriations bill (H.R. 3326), House and

Senate negotiators agreed on a compromise version of the bill, which they drafted as an

amendment to the version of the bill that the Senate had passed October 6. The compromise

version—which is, in effect, the equivalent of a conference report version—would appropriate

$497.7 billion for the DOD base budget and $128.2 billion for FY2010 war costs. The House

passed that compromise version of the bill December 16 by a vote of 395-34. The Senate passed

it on December 19 by a vote of 88-10 and the President signed the bill later that day (P.L. 111118).

The compromise version of H.R. 3326 includes $350 million to cover the cost of providing a

3.4% pay raise for military personnel in FY2010, as authorized, rather than the 2.9% raise

included in the Administration’s budget request.

The compromise bill, like the House-passed and Senate-passed versions of H.R. 3326, concurred

with most of the Obama Administration’s proposals to terminate or reduce funding for several

high-profile weapons programs, including production of the F-22 fighter and of the CSAR-X

search and rescue helicopter. However, the compromise version also included $465 million to

continue development of the alternate engine for the F-35 fighter and $1.5 billion to purchase 10

C-17 cargo jets, two additions to the budget request which the Administration had opposed.

The compromise bill also added $100 million to the amount requested for the effort to develop

the VH-71 helicopter, intended as a transport for the President and other senior officials. The

Administration had cancelled the program because of cost overruns, requesting in the FY2010

budget only funds to terminate the program. The House version of H.R. 3326 included $400

million to complete the manufacture of the first five VH-71s, an addition to which the

Administration objected. The compromise version of the bill would add $100 million to the

amount requested to close down the VH-71 project, with the additional funds to be used to

salvage for future use some of the technologies developed for the cancelled program.

The compromise bill would cut $900 million from the $7.46 billion requested to support the

training and equipping of Afghanistan’s army and police force while adding $900 million to the

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Defense: FY2010 Authorization and Appropriations

$5.46 billion requested for the purchase of Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicles.

(For additional highlights of H.R. 3326, see “FY2010 Defense Appropriations Bill,” below.)

Temporary Extensions of Non-Defense Programs

The compromise version of H.R. 3326 included provisions temporarily extending—in most cases

through February 28, 2010—current policies or expiring provisions of law relating to 10 nonDOD federal programs or activities:

•

Two temporary changes in Small Business Administration loan guarantee

programs intended to make loans more attractive to borrowers and lenders;5

•

The USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56);6

•

the National Flood Insurance Program;7

•

Medicare physicians payments (to defer, through February 28, 2010, a scheduled

21.2% reduction);8

•

Surface Transportation Authorization relating to highway, mass transit, highway

safety and motor carrier safety programs of the Department of Transportation;9

•

Unemployment insurance;10

•

COBRA health insurance premium subsidy;11

•

Satellite television copyright license;12

•

Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP);13

•

Poverty guidelines of the Department of Health and Human Services that

determine eligibility for certain means-tested assistance programs, including

Medicaid.14

For additional information, see CRS Report R40985, Small Business: Access to Capital and Job Creation, by (name r

edacted) and (name redacted).

For additional information, see CRS Report R40138, Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)

Set to Expire February 28, 2010, by (name redacted) and (name redacted).

For additional information, see CRS Report R40650, National Flood Insurance Program: Background, Challenges,

and Financial Status , by (name redacted).

For additional information, see CRS Report R40907, Medicare Physician Payment Updates and the Sustainable

Growth Rate (SGR) System, by (name redacted).

For additional information, see CRS Report R40780, Surface Transportation Reauthorization Legislation in the 111th

Congress: Summary of Selected Major Provisions, coordinated by (name redacted).

For additional information, see CRS Report RS22915, Temporary Extension of Unemployment Benefits: Emergency

Unemployment Compensation (EUC08), by (name redacted) and (name redacted).

For additional information, see CRS Report R40142, Health Insurance Continuation Coverage Under COBRA, by

(name redacted) and Meredith Peterson.

For additional information, see CRS Report R40624, Reauthorizing the Satellite Home Viewing Provisions in the

Communications Act and the Copyright Act: Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).

For additional information, see CRS Report R40721, Agriculture and Related Agencies: FY2010 Appropriations,

coordinated by (name redacted).

For additional information, see Department of Health and Human Services Poverty Guidelines at

http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/09poverty.shtml.

Congressional Research Service

Defense: FY2010 Authorization and Appropriations

Overview of the Administration’s FY2010 Request

The President’s FY2010 request of $533.7 billion for the DOD base budget is $20.4 billion higher

than the total of $513.3 billion the Obama Administration cites as the total appropriated for the

DOD base budget in the regular FY2009 appropriations process.15 In an April 6 press conference,

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said this nominal increase of 4% would amount to an increase

in real purchasing power of 2%, taking into account the cost of inflation.16 (See Table 1.)

Table 1. DOD Base Budget Request

Discretionary Budget Authority, FY2009-2010

(amounts in billions of dollars)

FY2009Enacted

(Excluding War

Funds)

FY2010 Requested

(Excluding War

Funds)

Percentage

Change

Military Personnel

124.9

136.0

+8.9%

Operations and Maintenance

179.1

185.7

+3.7%

Procurement

101.7

107.4

+5.6%

Research and Development

79.5

78.6

-1.1%

Military Construction

21.9

21.0

-4.1%

Family Housing

3.2

2.0

-38.0%

Other

3.2

3.1

-1.1%

Total

513.5

533.8

+4.0%

Source: Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Request, Budget Briefing, p. 16,

http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2010/fy2010_BudgetBriefing.pdf

The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, H.R. 1, P.L. 111-5), also known

as the “economic stimulus” package, provided an additional $7.5 billion in DOD appropriations

for FY2009, bringing the FY2009 discretionary appropriations for the Pentagon to a total of

$520.7 billion. Compared with this amount, the FY2010 request would amount to an increase of

$13.0 billion, a nominal increase of 2.5% (not adjusted for inflation).

Comparison of the FY2010 DOD base budget request with the corresponding appropriation for

FY2009 is complicated by the fact that the Administration is funding in the FY2010 base budget

several activities that were covered by war cost supplemental appropriations bills in FY2009 and

prior years. In an April 7 conference call with Internet defense reporters, Secretary Gates said the

total amount of funding shifted into the base budget was about $13 billion, which included

Office of Management and Budget, A New Era of Responsibility: Renewing America’s Promise, Feb. 26, 2009, Table

S-7, “Funding Levels for Appropriated (“Discretionary”) Programs by Agency,” p. 130. Based on data published by the

House Appropriations Committee summarizing amounts appropriated for FY2009 (Congressional Record, September

24, 2008, Part I, pp.H291-94) the total discretionary appropriation for DOD in FY2009 was $512.7 billion. The Obama

Administration’s February 26 FY2010 budget document, which provided only gross funding totals for Cabinet

agencies, did not contain sufficient information to account for the fact that the Administration’s total for the FY2009

DOD base budget is higher by some $600 million.

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, Budget Briefing , April 6, 2009 http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/

speech.aspx?speechid=1341.

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Defense: FY2010 Authorization and Appropriations

ongoing costs of expanding the Army and Marine Corps, increased funding for medical research

and quality-of-life improvements for military personnel.17 However, in testimony before the

Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee on June 9, after the Administration’s detailed

budget request had been released, Secretary Gates said the amount of funding shifted into the

base budget was $8 billion, rather than the $13 billion he had cited earlier.

Setting aside those funds allocated to costs that were not included in the FY2009 DOD base

budget (for the sake of an apples-to-apples comparison), President Obama’s FY2010 request for

the DOD base budget includes about $520.7 billion, which is roughly $7.4 billion more than was

appropriated for DOD in the regular appropriations process. If the $7.4 billion provided to DOD

in FY2009 by the economic stimulus package is added to the regular FY2009 appropriations, the

FY2009 appropriation and the FY2010 request are roughly the same.

Comparison of President Obama’s FY2010 DOD base budget request with the FY2010 budget

projected by the Bush Administration is uncertain because the budget outline made public on

February 26 listed only an aggregate total for the DOD base budget, without specifying whether

or not that sum included each of several elements of DOD funding that might or might not

reasonably be included and which could affect the total by several billions of dollars. In his April

7 conference call with reporters, Secretary Gates said that the comparable Bush Administration

projection of the FY2010 DOD base was $524 billion. By that standard, President Obama’s

FY2010 request is nearly $10 billion higher. However, since the Obama request includes about $8

billion for programs that the Bush Administration did not fund in the DOD base budget, the

Obama request is about $2 billion higher than the Bush projection, on an apples-to-apples basis.

In the fall of 2008, DOD reportedly drew up a projected FY2010 base budget request that was

$57 billion higher than the request the Bush Administration had projected in February 2008.18

That larger request, details of which were not published, was not subjected to the regular budget

review process within the executive branch.

Status of Legislation

Although the Administration’s detailed budget request was not transmitted to Congress until May

7, 2009, Congress began acting on the annual defense authorization bill only about a month later

than it typically does.

The House Armed Services Committee reported its version of the bill (H.R. 2647) on June 18,

2009 and it was passed by the House on June 25. The Senate Armed Services Committee reported

its version of the bill (S. 1390) on July 2 and the Senate passed the bill July 23. The conference

report on H.R. 2647 was filed October 7 and the House adopted it on October 8 by a vote of 281146.

Department of Defense Conference Call with Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and Gen. James Cartwright with

Internet Security Writers, April 7, 2009, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4398.

Tony Capaccio, “Pentagon Seeks $57 Billion More in 2010, says Jonas,” Bloomberg.com, October 2, 2008.

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Defense: FY2010 Authorization and Appropriations

Table 2. Status of FY2010 Defense Authorization Bills, H.R. 2647/S. 1390

Conference

Report

Approval

Committee Markup

House

Senate

6/17/09

6/25/09

House

Report

House

Passage

Senate

Report

Senate

Passage

Conf.

Report

House

H.Rept.

111-166

6/25/09

389-22

S.Rept.

111-35

7/23/09

87-7

H.Rept.

111-288

10/8/09 10/22/09

281-146

68-29

Senate

Public

Law

111-84

The House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee reported its version of the FY2010 defense

appropriations bill on July 16. The House Appropriations Committee reported the bill H.R. 3326

on July 24 and House passed it on July 30.The Senate Appropriations committee reported its

amended version of the bill on September 10 and the Senate passed the bill September 6 by a vote

of 93-7.

In lieu of a conference report on the FY2010 defense appropriations bill, House and Senate

negotiators agreed on an amendment to the Senate-passed version of H.R. 3326 that would

appropriate $497.7 billion for the DOD base budget and $128.2 billion for war costs.

The House passed that compromise version of the bill December 16 by a vote of 395-34. The

Senate passed it December 19 by a vote of 88-10 and the President signed the bill later on

December 19 (P.L. 111-118).

Table 3. Status of FY2010 Defense Appropriations Bills (H.R. 3326)

Subcommittee

Markup

House

Senate

7/16/09

9/9/09

Conference Report

Approval

House

Report

House

Passage

Senate

Report

Senate

Passage

Conf.

Report

H.Rept.

111-230

7/30/09

400-30

S.Rept.

111-74

10/6/09

93-7

Cong. Record

pp. H15042H15370

House

Senate

Public

Law

12/16/09

395-34

12/19/09

88-10

P.L. 111118

War Costs and Issues19

The Obama Administration’s request for $130 billion for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan

during FY2010 was submitted to Congress with the FY2010 base budget request on May 7, 2009

and has been considered as part of DOD’s overall request for the year. That request reflected the

Administration’s review of U.S. strategy for both wars that was completed in March 2009, but not

the new debate about President Obama’s December 1, 2009 announcement that he intended to

deploy about 30,000 additional troops to Afghanistan in the first half of 2010.

Although President Obama said in his December 1 speech that the additional deployments are

“likely to cost us roughly $30 billion for the military this year,” some press reports have

Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget.

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Defense: FY2010 Authorization and Appropriations

suggested the cost could run as high as $35 billion.20 DOD is in the process of developing its

supplemental request to cover additional costs in FY2010 according to testimony by Secretary of

Defense Gates.21 While there was some speculation that the Administration would propose that

additional war funding be included in the still-pending FY2010 DOD Appropriations Act, both

Congressman Murtha and Senator Inouye, chairs of the House and Senate Appropriations

Committee, respectively, reportedly objected. The Administration is likely to submit a FY2010

Supplemental to Congress in early February 2010 along with DOD’s regular and war requests for

FY2011.22

It is not clear whether DOD will assume in its war funding request for FY2011 any decrease in

the number of troops in Afghanistan. The President said in his December 1 speech that the United

States would “begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011” as part of

handing over responsibility to Afghan forces but did not specify any timeline, which may be

decided after the Administration conducts a full-scale evaluation in December 2010.23

Debate About Potential Troop Increases in Afghanistan

The current debate about potential increases in troop levels in Afghanistan began with the

appointment of General Stanley McChrystal to the position of overall U.S. and NATO

Commander in Afghanistan on June 15, 2009 after the dismissal of his predecessor General David

McKiernan, reportedly because of concerns about rising levels of violence in Afghanistan.

Tasked to re-assess U.S. military strategy, General McChrystal submitted his report to Secretary

of Defense Gates on August 31, 2009, which Secretary Gates passed along to the President.

Citing worse-than-anticipated conditions in Afghanistan, the report said that additional resources

would be necessary to carry out a full-fledged counterinsurgency strategy focusing on population

protection. In addition, the report argued that the “eventual success” of this proposed new strategy

would require “capable Afghan governance capabilities and security forces.”24 At the direction of

the Secretary of Defense, this assessment did not include a specific request for additional

resources.

In response to the McChrystal report, the White House began its own wide-ranging strategy

review, which reportedly included not only General McChrystal’s approach but may have also

included a counter-terrorism approach focusing more on Pakistan where most al Qaeda are

located, along with training of more Afghan Security Forces, an option that Vice President Biden

The White House, “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and

Pakistan,” p. 7; delivered at West Point, December 1, 2009; http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarkspresident-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan. For the $35 billion cost estimate, see, for example,

Reuters, “Q+A: Understanding Obama’s Afghan Strategy,” by Phil Stewart, December 8, 2009, accessed at

http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5B70QE20091208.

House Foreign Affairs Committee, Transcript, “Hearing on U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan,” December 2, 2009, p. 15.

The Hill, “House Likely to Move Defense Bill; Senate plans less clear,” by Roxanna Tiron, December 8, 2009, pp.

22, 26.

Ibid, p.5; Senate Armed Services Committee, Transcript, “ Hearing on Afghanistan Assessment,” p. December 2,

2009, p. 24.

Commander NATO International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan and U.S. Forces, Afghanistan,

“Commander’s Initial Assessment,” August 30, 2009, p. 2-3 to 2-4. Available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf.

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Defense: FY2010 Authorization and Appropriations

was said to favor.25 According to White House National Security Advisor, General Jim Jones, the

maximum al Qaeda presence in Afghanistan is “less than 100 operating in the country. No bases,

no ability to launch attacks on either us or our allies,” with the problem being “sanctuaries across

the border” in Pakistan.26 According to Afghan government and U.S. military estimates, there are

some 10,000 to 15,000 Taliban in Afghanistan plus an additional 2,000 Afghan insurgents from

other factions.27

On October 8, 2009, Secretary Gates passed along to the President General McChrystal’s troop

request, a document separate from the earlier strategy assessment. According to press reports, the

White House ultimately considered several options for Afghanistan ranging from a low option of

10,000 to 15,000 to train Afghan forces and possibly conduct more counter-terrorism operations

on the border to 40,000 to conduct counter-insurgency in the southern and eastern parts of the

country to a high option of 80,000 to conduct counter-insurgency operations throughout the

country.28 In all cases, high priority was placed on training and assisting Afghan Security Forces.

An October report by a UN monitoring commission found widespread fraudulent voting affecting

as much as one-third of the votes during the August 2009 presidential election in Afghanistan

which raised concerns about the legitimacy of the Karzai government. This played an important

part in the While House policy debate over the last three and a half months. White House Chief of

Staff Rahm Emanuel said that the main question is not “how many troops you send, but do you

have a credible Afghan partner.”29

On October 21, under heavy U.S. pressure, President Karzai agreed to a runoff election with his

chief rival Abdullah Abdullah to be conducted on November 7, 2009. The runoff was scheduled

for November 7, 2009, but asserting that fraud was likely in the runoff, Abdullah dropped out of

the race on November 1, and Afghanistan’s Independent Election Commission declared Karzai

the winner on November 2, 2009. Appearing to welcome a resolution of the issue, the United

States congratulated Karzai and praised Abdullah for diplomatic restraint. Karzai was inaugurated

on November 19, 2009 with Secretary of State Clinton in attendance.30

On December 1, 2009, President Obama announced his intention to deploy an additional 30,000

troops to Afghanistan in addition to the 68,000 already approved, almost all of which were incountry as of late November.31 In testimony, Secretary of Defense Gates stated that the President

had given him flexibility to deploy 10% more troops or a total of 33,000 to Afghanistan to

Wall Street Journal, “Gates Doubts U.S.’ Afghan Strategy,” October 1, 2009.

New York Times, “Afghan War Debate Now Leans to Focus on Al Qaeda,” October 8, 2009.CNN, “State of the

Union with John King,” Interview with General Jones, Senators Kyl and Barbara Boxer,” October 4, 2009, p. 2.

See Table 5 in CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by (name re

dacted).

New York Times, “How Obama Came to Plan for ‘Surge’ in Afghanistan,” December 6, 2009; New York Times,

“Obama Hears General’s Request for Afghanistan,” October 10, 2009. According to one expert, a strictly counterterrorism option focusing on border operations could allow the United States to reduce troop levels to about 13,000

over several years; see Foreign Policy, “What a CT mission in Afghanistan would actually look like,” by Austin Long;

http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/10/13/what_a_ct_mission_in_afghanistan_would_actually_look_like.

Reuters, “U.S. Decision Can’t Wait for Afghan Legitimacy: Gates,” October 20, 2009.

Wall Street Journal, “Security Fears Revive Ahead of Afghan Runoff,” October 22, 2009; Washington Post, “Karzai

Voiced Doubts About Runoff until Last Moment,” October 21, 2009.

DOD, “News Briefing with Press Secretary Geoff Morrell from the Pentagon,” November 24, 2009, p. 6.

http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4498.

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Defense: FY2010 Authorization and Appropriations

provide “enablers,” such as engineers, medevac, and road clearance teams.32 This could bring

total U.S. forces in Afghanistan to 101,000.

In addition, NATO announced a commitment to deploy an additional 5,000 to 7,000 troops to

Afghanistan, which could bring the total close to General McChrystal’s 40,000 request.33 As of

late October, 2009, NATO allies had about 36,000 troops in Afghanistan. The Afghan Army has

about 89,000 troops.34 That would bring the total number of troops in Afghanistan from the U.S.,

NATO allies, and the Afghan army to more than 190,000.

If 30,000 more U.S. troops are approved, plus NATO contributes an additional 5,000, that would

bring the total to almost 230,000 Afghan and foreign troops in-country, with an additional 81,000

in the Afghan police forces also contributing to security.

Some Members of Congress have raised concerns about deploying additional troops, and recent

public opinion polls suggest that a bare majority approve the President’s new plan with

Americans divided almost evenly about whether the buildup is too high or about right.35

Basis and Status of War Cost Request in Pending Legislation

The FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act enacted on October 28, 2009 (P.L. 111-84) and

the FY2010 DOD Appropriations Act signed by President Obama on December 19 (P.L. 111-118)

deal only with the $130 billion war cost estimate36 that was based on the Administration’s strategy

review in the spring of 2009 and was included in the FY2010 budget request sent to Congress on

May 7.

That request was based on the Administration’s adoption, last spring, of a withdrawal plan for

Iraq under which the number of troops in-country would be reduced from about 140,000 in

February 2009 to between 35,000 and 50,000 by August 31, 2010. Under that plan, all U.S. troops

are slated to be out of Iraq by December 31, 2011, to comply with the U.S.-Iraq Security

Agreement that went into effect on January 1, 2009.

At the same time, President Obama decided to increase the number of troops in Afghanistan by

21,000 above the total already approved by former President Bush before he left office. (Before

leaving office, President Bush approved an increase of about 13,000 troops in Afghanistan on top

Washington Post, Obama to Let Pentagon Deploy Even More Troops But Number Remains Murky,” December 3,

2009; New York Daily News, “ Make it 33,000 Troops – Gates,” December 4, 2009.

The 7,000 figures appears to include 2,000 troops expected to go home. New York Times, “NATO Pledges 7,000

troops but avoids details,” December 5, 2009.

For latest U.S. troop levels, see DOD, “News Briefing with Press Secretary Geoff Morrell from the Pentagon,”

October 14, 2009; http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4498. For Afghan troop levels,

see DOD, Report to Congress, Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Section 1230, P.L. 110-181

Report to Congress, June 2009, p. 26; http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/1230_June-2009Final.pdf. For non-U.S.

NATO troops, see International Security and Assistance Force, “Troop Contributing Nations, at http://www.nato.int/

isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf.

Washington Post, “U.S. Deeply Split On Troop Increase For Afghan War,” October 21, 2009.

The $130 billion total includes $1.4 billion for war-related construction that was funded in the Military Construction,

Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies appropriations bill, which was enacted as Part E of the Consolidated

Appropriations Act of 2010 (H.R. 3288).

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Defense: FY2010 Authorization and Appropriations

of the 33,000 in country as of September 2008.)37 With President Obama’s increase, the number

of troops in Afghanistan is slated to average 68,000 during FY2010, which represents a 68%

increase above the previous year.38

The $130 billion currently requested for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in FY2010 is $15.8

billion or 11% lower than the amount appropriated for FY2009 primarily because average troop

strength for both wars was expected to be about 19% lower than the previous year; the reduction

of troops deployed in Iraq was expected to more than offset the original plan to maintain troop

strength in Afghanistan at 68,000.39 War costs make up 21% of the $629.7 billion requested for

DOD, a share that is slightly lower than in FY2009.40

On August 13, 2009, the Administration submitted an amended war funding request that

reallocated $1 billion within the original $130 billion request to cover the cost of “temporarily”

adding 22,000 Army military personnel in FY2010 and FY2011.41 According to the

Administration, the additional troops were intended to “increase the number of troops available

to deploy while also helping the Army to end the practice of retaining soldiers beyond their

period of obligated service,” a practice often referred to as “stop-loss.”42

This budget amendment did not change the Administration’s plans for troop deployment levels to

Afghanistan or Iraq. To cover the cost of the additional personnel, the budget amendment reallocated $1 billion from procurement funds to military personnel and operation and maintenance

accounts. Of the additional 22,000 troops, 15,000 would be deployed in FY2010, and the

remaining 7,000 the following year.

House and Senate authorization action on H.R. 2647 and S. 1390, respectively, and House

appropriations action on H.R. 3326 were completed before this August 13 budget amendment was

submitted and therefore reflect the original request. The Senate’s version of the DOD

Appropriations Act did, however, reflect the amended request, and the conference is likely to do

so as well.

In a DOD press conference, spokesman Geoff Morrell cited an increase of 6,000 approved by President Bush before

leaving office who deployed in February 2009; see Transcript, “Briefing with Geoff Morrell at the Pentagon,” October

14, 2009; in addition, President Bush also approved an additional 7,000 troops for Afghanistan in the fall of 2009,

which deployed before he left office and brought the number in-country from 33,000 in October 2008 to 38,000 by

February 2009.

See CRS Report R40682, Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other Potential

Issues, by (name redacted).

Ibid., Table 1.

In FY2009, war costs made up 24% of DOD’s total appropriations; CRS calculations based on S.Rept. 111-74, p. 1.

4141

OMB, FY2010 Budget Amendment, “Estimate No. 6, Overseas Contingency Operations,” August 13, 2009;

http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/budget_amendments/amendment_08_13_09.pdf.

The White House, “Letter Transmitting Department of Defense Budget Amendment,” August 13, 2009;

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Letter-from-the-President-to-the-Speaker-of-the-House/. Under the

Administration’s proposal, the cost of these additional Army personnel was offset by reducing by a total of $1 billion

the amounts requested for procurement of certain items including High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles, or

HMMWVs, Hellfire missiles, and Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles, the requirements for which are being

reassessed. See DOD, Budget Amendment to the FY2010 President’s Budget Request for Overseas Contingency

Operations (OCO), Summary and Explanation of Changes, Exhibits for FY2010, Amended Justification Material,

August 2009, p. 3-5; http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2010/fy2010_oco.pdf.

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Defense: FY2010 Authorization and Appropriations

According to DOD, its request included $60.8 billion for Operation Iraqi Freedom and $65.4

billion for Afghanistan or Operation Enduring Freedom, and $3.9 billion for non-DOD classified

activities. DOD funding would be allocated 48% for Iraq and 51% for Afghanistan in FY2010,

compared to a split in FY2009 of 65% for Iraq and 35% for Afghanistan.43

In testimony, Secretary of Defense Gates stated that this war funding request did not include

about $8 billion for activities that are expected to persist beyond the Afghanistan and Iraq wars

but which had been included in earlier war-funding bills. According to the Secretary, DOD shifted

funding to the base budget for activities considered likely to persist, such as monies for increased

strength levels in the Army, recruiting and retention, more funds for Intelligence, Surveillance and

Reconnaissance, countering threats from Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), longer-term

medical care such as Traumatic Brain Injury and psychological health, and “Global Train and

Equip” funds for countries facing terrorist threats.44

If Secretary Gates had not transferred this $8 billion into the base budget in FY2010, on an

“apples-to-apples” basis, with no other changes, the FY2010 war request would be $8 billion

lower than in FY2009. In addition, CRS estimates that reductions in average monthly troop

strength from 186,000 in FY2009 to 152,000 in Iraq and Afghanistan could reduce war costs by

an additional $7.7 billion. Taking these two factors into account, CRS estimates that DOD’s

FY2010 request of $130 billion could be reduced by some $15.7 billion.45

In the FY2010 war funding request, total military personnel funding declined from the FY2009

level since planned decreases in troop strength for Iraq are expected to more than offset planned

increases in troop levels in Afghanistan. Operation and maintenance (O&M) funding, however,

remained at the same level in FY2010 as in FY2009 and FY2008 despite the planned decline in

overall troop levels in the coming year.

After remaining about the same in FY2008 and FY2009, overall troop strength for Iraq and

Afghanistan was expected to fall by almost 20% in FY2010. According to DOD’s final FY2009

war cost report, O&M average monthly obligations averaged $11.4 billion a month for both

operations in FY2009 compared to 13.4 billion in FY2008, a 15% overall decline. Average

monthly obligations for Iraq decrease by 30% from $10.9 billion to $7.5 billion while those for

Afghanistan increase by 44% from $2.7 billion to $3.9 billion.46

In the last month (September) of FY2009, DOD obligations spiked to $11.9 billion, substantially

above the $6.7 billion average for the rest of the year, a pattern similar to last year when DOD

obligated its remaining funds at the end of the fiscal year.47 Despite the fact that average monthly

See Table 5-9 in Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Request, Summary Justification, May 2009;

http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2010/fy2010_SSJ.pdf.

Senate Appropriations Committee, ”Statement by Secretary of Defense,” Robert M. Gates, June 9, 2009, p. 2. In an

earlier speech at the Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, Secretary Gates stated that $13 billion had been

transferred; see Transcript, “Remarks by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates at the Army War College, Carlisle, Pa,”

April 16, 2009, pp. 2-3; http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4404.

See CRS Report R40682, Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other Potential

Issues, by (name redacted), Table 3 and p. 18-p. 19. Average monthly troop strength takes into account increases and

decreases each month in the number of deployed troops. This figure compares the request with the adjusted amounts.

DOD, “Cost of War Card,” September 30, 2008 and September 30, 2009.

DOD, “Summary Cost of War Obligations by Component, Appropriations and Operation,” in FY2009 Cost of War

for FY2009 Appropriations as of September 30, 2009; monthly obligations in September 2008 were $12.9 billion

compared to an average for the rest of the year of $6.5 billion; see DOD, Supplemental & Cost of War Execution

(continued...)

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Defense: FY2010 Authorization and Appropriations

troop strength for both operations was slated to decrease by 20%, DOD requested almost identical

amounts for military personnel and operation and maintenance in FY2010.

The decline in FY2010 primarily reflects a lower DOD request for Mine Resistant Ambush

Protected (MRAP) vehicles that cost $16.8 billion in FY2009 to purchase the full requirement.

Instead, DOD is funding a lighter, cheaper version of the MRAP—an all-terrain fighting

vehicle—expected to be more effective in Afghanistan. Lower procurement spending also reflects

a decision by DOD to return to its traditional definition of reconstitution, repairing equipment and

funding as war costs only the replacement of equipment lost in combat rather than using war

funds to upgrade equipment.48

Table 4 summarizes congressional action on the Administration’s FY2010 war funding request.

For congressional action at the account level, see the Appendix.

Table 4. Congressional Action on DOD’s War FY2010 Budget Request

(in billions of dollars)

FY2010

Revised

Requesta

Housepassed

Authorization

H.R. 2647

Senatepassed

Authorization

S. 1390

Authorization

Conference

H.R. 2647

Title

Housepassed

Approps

Bill,

H.R. 3326

and H.R.

3082

SenateReported

Approps

Bill,

H.R. 3326

and S. 1407

Final

Approps.

H.R. 3326

Title IX and

H.R. 3288

Part E

Military Personnel

14.1

13.6

14.1

16.2

14.1

15.0

Operation and Maintenanceb

81.0

80.7

80.1

80.8

80.5

80.3

79.5

Procurementc

21.4

23.0

22.3

21.8

20.4

22.2

23.1

Research, Development,

Test and Evaluation

Revolving and Management

Funds

Other Department of

Defense Programsd

1.6

1.5

1.6

1.4

1.9

1.6

Special Fundse

9.8

9.0

9.7

9.6

9.0

8.6

8.3

Military Construction

1.4

General Provisions and

Rescissions

0.0

Cap on Transfer Authorityf

[4.0]

[4.5]

[4.0]

[3.0]

[4.0]

Total, Department of

Defense

130.0

129.3

130.0

129.6

(...continued)

Report As of September 30, 2008.

Ibid.

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Defense: FY2010 Authorization and Appropriations

Sources: Revised request from DOD, Budget Amendment to the FY 2010 President’s Budget Request for Overseas

Contingency Operations (OCO), August 2009; http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2010/

fy2010_oco.pdf. Congressional action from H.R. 2647 as passed by the House, S. 1390 as passed by the Senate,

H.Rept. 111-166, S.Rept. 111-35, H.Rept. 111-230, H.R. 3326 as passed by the House and the Senate

Appropriations Committee, H.Rept. 111-230, S.Rept. 111-74; and for FY2009, House Appropriations Committee

Table, Congressional Record, June 16, 2009, p. H6871.

Reflects amended budget request for war funding to cover adding 22,000 military personnel to the Army

temporarily in order to reduce stress on the force from deployments that is to be financed by shifting $800

million from procurement to military personnel and operation and maintenance within the $130 billion

original request. Authorization action and House appropriation action took place before this amendment,

and Senate appropriation action after the change.

Operations and Maintenance total excludes the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, Iraq Security Forces Fund,

and the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund, which are included under Special Funds.

Procurement total includes Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Transfer Fund, and excludes Joint Improvised

Explosive Device Fund, which is included under Special Funds.

Other Defense Department Programs includes Defense Health Program, Drug Interdiction, and the Office

of the Special Inspector General.

Special Funds includes Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, Iraq Security Forces Fund, Pakistan

Counterinsurgency Capability Fund, Iraq Freedom Fund, and Joint Improvised Explosive Device Fund.

Congress sets annual caps or ceilings on the amounts that DOD can transfer between accounts after

enactment.

Authorization Action on War Funding (H.R. 2647. P.L. 111-84)

The conference report on the FY2010 Authorization request (H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84) largely

supports DOD’s funding request as did both the House and Senate authorizing committees. (See

Table 7.)

Changes to DOD’s Request

Significant instances in which the conference report on the authorization bill changed DOD’s

funding request include:

•

reducing funding in procurement accounts by $625 million from the original

request to provide for the temporary 22,000 increase in Army end-strength

requested in a budget amendment;

•

reducing DOD’s $1.5 billion request for the Commanders’ Emergency Response

Program to $1.3 billion, following the Senate recommendation;

•

adding $600 million to DOD’s request for $5.5 billion (thus authorizing $6.1

billion) in funding for a new lighter-weight Mine Resistant Ambush Protected

Program (MRAP) vehicles for Afghanistan to meet DOD’s revised requirement;

together with an additional $600 million in DOD’s base budget, these funds

would purchase the requirement of 6,466 vehicles; and

•

funding almost all of the $1.4 billion in military construction for Afghanistan but

adding funds for several projects at Bagram Air Force Base the cost of which was

offset by reduced funding for troop or contingency housing at various bases in

Afghanistan.

Significant policy changes made in the authorization conference report include:

Congressional Research Service

Defense: FY2010 Authorization and Appropriations

•

deleting DOD funding requested for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability

Fund, but allowing transfers from funds appropriated to the State Department;

•

transferring the $600 million requested in DOD’s base budget for the Joint

Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Fund from DOD’s base budget, considered

to be an “enduring” requirement, to Title XV war funding, because the

authorizers consider the organization to be a temporary one; and

•

not providing $115 million for Guantanamo Bay detainee relocation because of

lack of a plan, which was the position taken by both the House and the Senate.

Extensions of Special War-Related Authorities

The authorization conference report also extends several war-related authorities and associated

reporting requirements created since the 9/11 attacks, including:

•

a one-year extension of the Commanders’ Emergency Response Progam

requiring 15-day advance notifications for expenditures, setting a $1.3 billion cap

on the program, and allowing funds to be used to reintegrate individuals

renouncing violence into Afghan society in section 1222 (a program similar to

the Sons of Iraq or Concerned Local Citizens groups in Iraq);

•

a one-year extension (and a $1.6 billion cap) on coalition support funds with an

expansion in the types of logistical support that can be provided to nations aiding

U.S. military operations to include specialized training, supplies, and equipment

as requested by the Administration; Section 1223 of the conference report

continues to require 15-day advance notifications of specific expenditures and

quarterly reports on the program; this authority appears similar to that in the

Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund;49

•

an expansion and modification of reporting requirements in Section 1202 for

DOD support for special operations support to foreign nations;

•

an extension in Section 1203 of reporting requirement for foreign-assistance

related programs carried out by DOD;

•

a requirement in Section 1204 for a report by March 1, 2010 on the relationship

between DOD authorities to train, equip and build the capacity of foreign nations

compared to Foreign Assistance Act authorities; and

•

a limitation in Section 1206 of funds that can be used to build the capacity of

foreign military forces to $75 million in FY2010 and $75 million in FY2011.

Extensions and Additional Reporting Requirements

Based on recommendations of both chambers, the authorization conference report extends and

adds various reporting requirements for Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan as described below.

Office of Management and Budget, Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Appendix, p. 350; http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/

budget/Appendix/.

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Defense: FY2010 Authorization and Appropriations

New Pakistan Reporting Requirements

The conference report on H.R. 2647 includes new reporting requirements (or extends current

requirements) relating to Pakistan including the following:

•

Section 1232 requires a new DOD report assessing Pakistan’s progress toward

long-term security and stability, including timelines for Pakistan to demonstrate

effectiveness in defeating, eliminating safe havens for, and preventing the return

of Al Qaeda in Pakistan. The report is to be submitted every 180 days

concurrently with the Afghanistan security report (originally required under

Section 1217, P.L. 110-417 and under Section 1230, P.L. 110-181, that was most

recently submitted in June 2009);

•

Section 1231 requires that DOD and State Department assess alternatives to

reimbursements to Pakistan for logistical, military and other support that would

encourage Pakistan to focus on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency

operations. The report is due 180 days after enactment; and

•

Section 1224 requires a quarterly report listing individual projects using funds

transferred to DOD from the State Department’s new Pakistan Counterinsurgency

Fund (which the Administration and both chambers agreed would be

appropriated to the State Department rather than DOD beginning in FY2010), as

well as an assessment by DOD of whether Pakistan is making “concerted efforts”

to confront the Al Qaeda, Taliban and insurgent threats.50

New Reports and Extensions of Reporting Requirements Regarding Afghanistan

The conference report on H.R. 2647 adds or extends existing requirements for the following

reports relating to Afghanistan:

•

Section 1236 expands and extends to FY2011 the semi-annual report, “Progress

Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan” and expands the scope of that

report to include new sections relating to NATO and non-NATO countries that

participate in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Those new

sections of the report are to cover (1) agreements or commitments by ISAF

participants on goals, strategies, resource and force requirements and pledges of

troops and resources, (2) progress in ending the ability of the insurgency to

establish safe havens in Afghanistan, and (3) coordination of reconstruction and

development activities;

•

Section 1235 requires that DOD contract for a study of force levels needed to

secure the southern and eastern regions of Afghanistan;

•

Section 1225 requires that DOD certify that it has established a program to

Afghanistan and Pakistan before making transfers although the requirement can

be waived for 120 days by the Secretary of Defense for vital U.S. interests; and

S.Rept. 111-35, p. 191 and 210 and H.Rept. 111-166, p. 415ff.

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•

Section 1228 requires an assessment and report on the scope, character, and DOD

funding of “community-based security programs” in Afghanistan within 120 days

of enactment.

New Reports and Extensions of Reporting Requirements Regarding Iraq

The conference report on H.R. 2647 requires the following reports on Iraq:

•

Section 1227 requires a report within 90 days of enactment or by December 31,

2009 that estimates within the following 90 days: personnel levels in Iraq, DOD

equipment remaining in the country, and the likelihood of completing transfer or

removal of equipment by the December 31, 2011 deadline, along with an

assessment of U.S. detainee operations, and a listing of factors used by DOD to

assess risks associated with the drawdown and any decisions to modify the pace;

and

•

Section 1230 requires a report within 180 days of enactment on the feasibility

and desirability of establishing uniform procedures to provide monetary

assistance to civilian foreign nationals for losses, injuries, or death related to U.S.

combat activities, as well as the types of guidelines that could be established and

the total amount disbursed thus far.

Reports on Both Wars

The enacted authorization ( P.L. 111-84) also requires the following reports concerning Iraq,

Afghanistan, and Pakistan:

•

Section 1226 requires within 180 days of enactment a report by the Government

Accountability Office (GAO) assessing DOD’s campaign plans, which is to be

updated periodically through December 2011 for Iraq and through September 30,

2012 for Afghanistan; and

•

Section 1234 requires notification 15 days in advance of transferring U.S.

equipment to Iraq and Afghanistan, and a quarterly report describing the

equipment, requirement, and any potential impact on U.S. forces; the section also

limits to $750 million the total value of the equipment that can be transferred.

Defense Appropriations Bill (H.R. 3326, P.L. 111-118)

In lieu of a conference report on the FY2010 DOD appropriations bill (H.R. 3326), House and

Senate negotiators agreed on a compromise version of the bill which was drafted as an

amendment to version passed by the Senate. The compromise version of the bill, like the House

and Senate versions, would provide $128.2 billion for the war in FY2010, some $400 million less

than DOD requested.

In addition to war funds in H.R. 3326, the Administration requested an additional $1.4 billion for

war-related construction in the FY2010 Military Construction, Veterans Affairs and Related

Agencies appropriations bill. That request was approved in the versions of the bill passed by the

House (H.R. 3082) and the Senate (S. 1407) and in the conference report on the bill, which was

enacted as Part E of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010 (H.R. 3288).

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Assessing Uncertainties In Operations Funding

Concerned that the services “cannot accurately budget for Operations Enduring Freedom and

Operations Iraqi Freedom,” in light of the fact that the nature of military operations is likely to

change significantly,51 the House-passed version of H.R. 3326 put aside some $14.6 billion or

20% of DOD’s requested Operation and Maintenance funds in the Overseas Contingency

Operations Transfer Fund and required that DOD inform the four congressional defense

committees 15 days in advance of any transfers from the fund.52 The Senate version of H.R. 3326

does not transfer any funds to this account.

The compromise version would put $5 billion of the requested O&M funds into the transfer fund.

Funding for Force Protection Vehicles

The House and the Senate versions of H.R. 3326 also differed in their treatment of funding for

vehicles designed to improve force protection. The House cut $1.9 billion from DOD’s $5.44

billion request for a Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle Fund arguing that the FY2009

Supplemental included advance funding for MRAP vehicles. In the Senate version of H.R. 3326,

an additional $1.2 billion was added to the MRAP request to cover purchase of additional MRAP

All-Terrain vehicles (M-ATV) for use in Afghanistan based on a recently identified “urgent

unfunded need.”53 The compromise version of the bill would provide a total of $6.28 billion,

including an additional $825 million for M-ATVs.

Transfers from Funding in the Base Budget

Both the House and Senate versions of the bill would have transferred funds from the base budget

to Title IX’s war funding. In the case of the House, there was a largely undistributed transfer of

$2.6 billion from military personnel funding in DOD’s base budget to Title IX’s war funding to

reflect the “significant Military Personnel costs of U.S. Overseas Contingency Operations.”54

The Senate version, on the other hand, would have transferred about $250 million in O&M funds

from activities for supporting soldiers and their families (e.g., Wounded Warrior, childcare

centers, family services) and from the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Fund (JIEDDF) into

Title IX, which would reverse DOD’s proposal to transfer funds to the base budget for activities

expected to continue for the long-term.

The compromise bill transferred $850 million in military personnel funding from the base budget

to Title IX, while rejecting the Senate’s proposal to transfer certain O&M funds from the base

budget to Title IX.

H.Rept. 111-230, p. 327; House Rules Committee, http://www.rules.house.gov/111/CommJurRpt/

111_defenseapprops_rpt.pdf.

Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund, H.R. 3326 as reported; House Rules Committee,

http://www.rules.house.gov/111/CommJurRpt/111_defenseapprops_rpt.pdf.

S.Rept. 111-74, p.253, p. 264.

H.Rept. 111-230, p. 328; House Rules Committee, http://www.rules.house.gov/111/CommJurRpt/

111_defenseapprops_rpt.pdf.

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Commanders Emergency Response Program Funding

Both the House and Senate Appropriations Committee reports cited concerns about management

and oversight of the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP), from which

commanding officers can distribute funds for small reconstruction projects. Both versions of the

bill cut DOD’s $1.5 billion CERP request. The House cut the request by $200 million and the

Senate by $300 million. The compromise version of the bill would provide $1.2 billion for CERP

and would required DOD to submit to Congress additional reports on the use of the funds.55

Like the defense authorizing committees, the House and Senate Appropriations Committees did

not provide in their FY2010 defense funding bill funds for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency

Capability Fund, assuming this program would be funded in the State Department.

Funding for Training Afghan Security Forces and for Guantanamo Bay

While the House version of H.R. 3326 approved the Administration’s request for an additional

$7.5 billion to train Afghan Security Forces, the Senate version cut that request by $900 million,

transferring the funds to purchase additional MRAP All Terrain vehicles. The Senate argued that

these funds are not needed now because they would not be spent in FY2010.56 The compromise

version of the bill incorporated the Senate bill’s reduction to the request.

Both the House and the Senate Appropriations Committees had denied the request for funding to

transfer detainees from Guantanamo Bay on the grounds that the Administration has not

identified a plan for the future of the detention facility. DOD had included these funds in the Iraq

Freedom Fund.57

War Funding

For congressional action on the Administration’s FY2009 supplemental appropriations request for war costs, see CRS

Report R40531, FY2009 Spring Supplemental Appropriations for Overseas Contingency Operations, coordinated by (name re

dacted) and (name redacted). Congressional action on authorization of the FY2009 supplemental funds and on both

authorization and appropriation of the FY2010 war cost request is covered in this report. For an analysis of the

relationship between war costs and troop levels, see CRS Report R40682, Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars,

FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other Potential Issues, by (name redacted). For further information on war costs, see CRS Report

RL33110, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, by (name redacted).

Base Budget: Comparison and Context58

In recent years, some senior military officers59, as well as research groups and advocacy

organizations, have argued that defense spending needs to be substantially higher in the next few

H.Rept. 111-230, p. 348 and S.Rept. 111-74, p. 244.

H.Rept. 111-230, p. 346, and S.Rept. 111-74, p. 252.

H.Rept. 111-230, p. 349 and S.Rept. 111-74, p. 251.

Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget.

During a Pentagon press briefing on November 17, 2008, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Michael Mullen

said he thought that spending 4% of GDP on defense was, “about right.” See DOD News Transcript, “Department of

Defense News Briefing with Admiral Michael Mullen at the Pentagon, Arlington, VA,” November 17, 2008,

http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4318.

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years to avoid drastic cuts in major weapons programs or in the size of the force. Many have

called for a baseline defense budget, not including war-related costs, pegged to about 4% of

Gross Domestic Product (GDP)—an amount that would be anywhere from $62 to $169 billion

per year higher over the next few years than the Administration plan.

Table 5. Actual and Projected DOD Base Budgets Compared with

4% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

(amounts in billions of dollars)

FY2009

FY2010

FY2011

FY2012

FY2013

FY2014

actual/projected DOD base

budget

513.3

533.7

541.8

550.7

561.1

574.5

Gross Domestic Product

14,291

14,902

15,728

16,731

17,739

18,588

DOD base budget as

percentage of GDP

3.59%

3.58%

3.44%

3.29%

3.16%

3.09%

4% of GDP

571.6

596.1

629.1

669.2

709.6

743.5

amount by which 4% of GDP

exceeds actual/projected

DOD base budget

58,3

62.4

87.3

118.5

148.5

169.0

Source: Actual/projected DOD base budget figures from Office of Management and Budget, A New Era of

Responsibility: Renewing America’s Promise, February 26, 2009, Table S-7. “Funding Levels for Appropriated

(‘Discretionary’) Programs by Agency,” p. 130; Gross Domestic Product estimates from Ibid., Table S-8,

“Comparison of Economic Assumptions,” p. 132.

Senator James M. Inhofe and Representative Trent Franks—members, respectively, of the Senate

and House Armed Services committees—summarized the case for such an increase in identical

joint resolutions (S.J.Res. 10 and H.J.Res. 3) introduced on Feb. 12, 2009 which call for a base

defense budget equal to at least 4% of GDP. The fundamental case for meeting the 4% target is

that, since the end of the Cold War, DOD’s budget and force structure have declined significantly

while the tempo of operations has increased—to include sustained combat operations—and the

geographic scope of operations has broadened.60

These arguments for a substantial increase in the defense budget, however, come at a time when,

by historical standards, military spending seems very robust. Between FY1998, when the postCold War decline in defense spending hit bottom, and FY2009, the baseline Department of

Defense budget, not including war costs, increased by almost 40% above inflation (see Table 5).

Adjusting for inflation, the FY2009 baseline DOD budget was more than $100 billion, or about

20%, greater than the average during the Cold War (measured from the end of the Korean War in

FY1954 through FY1990). Funding for weapons acquisition (procurement plus R&D) in FY2009

was more than $45 billion—or about one-third—higher than the annual Cold War average.

Senator Inhofe elaborated on this argument in a Senate floor speech on February 12, 2009. See Congressional

Record, February 12, 2009, pp. S-2246-48.

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Table 6. DOD Discretionary Budget Authority, FY1998-FY2009

(amounts in billions of current year and constant FY2009 dollars)

Constant FY2009 Dollars

Current Year Dollars

Total DOD

Base DOD

Supplemental

Total DOD

Base DOD

Supplemental

FY1998

260

257

359

355

FY1999

275

266

370

358

FY2000

287

279

377

366

FY2001

316

297

403

379

FY2002

345

328

428

407

FY2003

437

365

526

439

FY2004

468

377

544

438

106

FY2005

479

400

535

447

FY2006

535

411

124

579

445

134

FY2007

601

432

169

633

455

178

FY2008

667

480

187

683

491

191

FY2009

662

510

152

662

510

152

Source: FY2001-FY2009 current year dollar figures from Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2009 Supplemental

Request: Summary Justification, April 2009, Figure 1, p. 1. FY1998-FY2000 total DOD from Office of Management,

Budget Public Budget Database, supplemental amounts by CRS. Deflators from Department of Defense, National

Defense Budget Estimates Fiscal Year 2009, March 2008; Data thru FY2007 are actual amounts. Figures for FY2009

include requested additional FY2009 supplemental appropriations and rescissions.

The apparent disconnect between the size of the budget and the appeals for more money appears

even more striking when amounts that have been appropriated for war costs are added to the

equation. On top of a baseline DOD budget that grew from $255 billion in FY1998, in FY2009

prices not adjusted for inflation, to $528 billion in FY2009, supplemental appropriations for warrelated costs climbed from $19.4 billion in FY2001, as an initial response to the 9/11 attacks, to

$63 billion in FY2003, the year of the Iraq invasion, to an estimated $189 billion in FY2008.

While large portions of the supplementals have been consumed by war-related operating costs,

substantial amounts have also been devoted to buying new equipment, particularly for the Army

and the Marine Corps. Although the bulk of this acquisition has been for force protection,

communications, and transportation, the effect has been to modernize much of the basic

equipment stock of both services, in effect augmenting their baseline budgets. The fact that so

large a level of spending appears to the military services to be so inadequate has several

explanations—and the policy implications are, accordingly, matters of varying interpretation.

Following are some of the contributing factors.61

These issues were discussed in testimony before the House Budget Committee by Stephen A. Daggett, CRS

Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget, on February 4, 2009. See prepared testimony on the House Budget

Committee website at http://budget.house.gov/hearings/2009/02.04.2009_Daggett_Testimony.pdf with supporting

charts at http://budget.house.gov/hearings/2009/02.04.2009_Daggett_charts.pdf. Daggett’s analysis was summarized in

the April 2009 edition of Air Force magazine, “The Cost of the Force,” Air Force, April 2009, pp. 37-39,

http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Documents/2009/April%202009/0409cost.pdf.

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•

Future baseline budgets are widely expected to decline: The Administration plan

to cut the deficit in half by the end of President Obama’s first term includes limits

on defense as well as non-defense spending. White House budget projections

accommodate an increase of about 5% above inflation in the FY2009 DOD

budget, but project a cumulative decline of about 3% between FY2009 and

FY2012. Many unofficial projections of the deficit situation are less sanguine

than the Administration’s, so many analysts expect, at best, a flat baseline

defense budget for the foreseeable future. Increased costs in part of the budget,

therefore, will necessarily come at the expense of resources available in other

areas.

•

Supplemental appropriations are expected to decline: Although plans to withdraw

from Iraq are uncertain, the military services expect that supplemental

appropriations will come down within a few years. Costs for training and

equipment maintenance that have been covered in supplementals would, then,

migrate back into the baseline budget at the expense of other programs, and

money to further upgrade ground forces would have to be found elsewhere.

•

Costs of military personnel have grown dramatically in recent years: Since the

end of the 1990s, Congress has approved substantial increases in military pay and

benefits, including pay increases of ½ percent above civilian pay indices in seven

of the past eight years, three rounds of “pay table reform” that gave larger raises

to personnel in the middle grades, increased housing allowances to eliminate on

base and off-base disparities, DOD-provided health insurance for Medicareeligible military retirees (known as Tricare for Life), concurrent receipt of

military retired pay and veterans disability benefits that had earlier been offset,

elimination of a reduction in retiree survivor benefits that had occurred at age 62,

and large increases in enlistment and reenlistment bonuses and special pays.

Although bonuses and some other payments may decline in the future, most of

the past increases in pay and benefits have been built into the basic cost of

personnel. CRS calculates that uniformed personnel now cost 40% more, per

capita, after adjusting for inflation, than in FY1999.

•

Operating costs continue to grow above base inflation: Historically, military

operation and maintenance budgets, which pay for everything from personnel

training, to weapons repairs, to facility operations, to health care, have increased

relative to the size of the force by about 2.7% per year above inflation. These

increases are not as large as in some areas of the civilian economy, such as health

care, but they do not reflect gains in productivity that are common in other

sectors of the economy. Continued growth in operating costs, which is now

widely seen as a fact of life in defense planning, erodes the availability of

resources for weapons modernization and other priorities.

•

Increasing generational cost growth in major weapons programs: It is generally

expected that new generations of weapons will be more expensive than the

systems they replace as weapons technology advances. The rate of generational

cost growth, however, is becoming a matter of increasing concern within the

Defense Department. New stealthy aircraft, multi-mission ships, advanced space

systems, and networked missiles, guns, and vehicles appear to be getting more

expensive than their predecessors at a greater rate than in the past. Unless

budgets increase more rapidly than costs, trade-offs between the costs of new

weapons and the size of the force may be required.

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•

Poor cost estimates: The difficulties engendered by accelerating intergenerational

weapons cost growth are exacerbated by poor cost estimation. The Government

Accountability Office has documented frequent, substantial increases in costs of

major defense systems compared to original development estimates. A side-effect

of inaccurate cost projections is an increased instability in the overall defense

budget, which entails inefficient production rates for major weapons programs

and increased costs due to changing production plans.62

•

New requirements based on the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan: The wars in Iraq

and Afghanistan have led to very large increases in equipment requirements for

ground forces, particularly for force protection, communications, and

transportation. National Guard combat units that earlier were equipped with older

systems cascaded from active units are now seen as part of the rotation base that

require equally modern equipment. Full sets of current equipment are expected to

be available not only for next-to-deploy units, but also for units as they begin to

reset from overseas rotations. A key lesson of the war is that what used to be

called “minor procurement” for ground forces was substantially undercapitalized.

•

A broader range of national security challenges: A common presumption before

9/11 was that forces trained and equipped for traditional conflicts between

national armies would be able to cope with what were seen as less demanding

other challenges such as stability operations. Now Secretary Gates and other

prominent defense leaders maintain that forces must be designed not only for

traditional conflicts, but for insurgencies and other irregular wars, support of

allies, threats of catastrophic attacks by non-state actors with weapons of mass

destruction, and entirely new kinds of disruptive attacks on specific U.S. and

allied vulnerabilities. The effect has been to broaden requirements without,

necessarily, an attendant offsetting reduction in older force goals. When these

factors are taken as a whole, it is not so surprising that military planners discover

some shortfalls.

For Congress, it may not be so certain that the principal answer to all these problems is to provide

more money for defense. More money is one alternative. Other alternatives may include backing

away from plans to add 92,000 active duty troops to the Army and Marine Corps; shifting

resources among the military services to reflect new challenges rather than allocating them

roughly the same proportions every year; reviewing requirements for expensive new technologies

in view of the presence or absence of technologically peer or near peer competitors; and shifting

resources from military responses to global threats toward non-military means of prevention.

Defense Priorities: Budget and Strategy

Secretary Gates stated that the budget decisions that he announced on April 6, 2009, were

intended to “reshape the priorities of America’s defense establishment.”63 Those decisions

focused almost exclusively on “means,” rather than on desired “ends” based on policy decisions,

For GAO’s more recent annual overview of defense acquisition cost growth, see U.S. Government Accountability

Office, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-09-326SP, March 30, 2009.

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Defense Budget Recommendation Statement, April 6, 2009, available at

http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1341.

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or “ways” designed to utilize given means to achieve desired ends. That emphasis on resources,

together with the relatively broad scope of the announced programmatic decisions, raises key

questions about the relative weight of strategy and budget in driving defense priorities.

Background: Strategic Direction

Secretary Gates stressed that the April 6 announcement reflected a line of strategic thinking

dating back 18 months, and captured in the June 2008 National Defense Strategy, other

Department of Defense official documents, and speeches and statements.64 This continuum of

strategic thought appears to be based on several major premises:

•

The “wars we’re in”—Iraq and Afghanistan—are broadly indicative of the kinds

of challenges that the United States is most likely to face in the future. Those

challenges include preparing for “hybrid warfare,” in which both state and nonstate actors blend cutting-edge technologies (usually associated with state-based

militaries) with irregular approaches and/or non-conventional approaches usually

associated with guerrilla groups. Recent examples of hybrid warfare cited by

DOD officials include Hezbollah’s operations against Israel in 2006 and the use

of sophisticated Explosively-Formed Penetrators by insurgents in Iraq.65

•

DOD should enhance and better institutionalize the capabilities required to meet

these sorts of challenges by adjusting investments and by rebalancing the force

accordingly.66

•

While conventional challenges persist, the nation’s current and projected

advantages allow room for assuming greater risk in that area. On April 6,

Secretary Gates echoed the 2008 National Defense Strategy: “Although U.S.

predominance in conventional warfare is not unchallenged, it is sustainable for

the medium term given current trends.”67

See for example Department of Defense Conference Call with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Gen. James

Cartwright with Internet Security Writers, April 7, 2009, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/

transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4398. Key sources include Department of Defense, National

Defense Strategy, June 2008; Department of Defense Directive 3000.07, “Irregular Warfare (IW),” December 1, 2008;

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, speech at Kansas State University, “Landon Lecture,” November 26, 2007,

available at http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199; Secretary of

Defense Robert M. Gates, remarks to U.S. Global Leadership Campaign, July 15, 2008, available at

http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1262; Robert M. Gates, “A Balanced

Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age,” Foreign Affairs, January 2009, pp. 28-40.

See for example Media Roundtable with Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and General James Cartwright, Vice

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 7, 2009, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/

transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4399. On “hybrid warfare,” see for example Frank Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st

Century: the Rise of Hybrid Wars, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, December 2007.

For example, see Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Defense Budget Recommendation Statement, April 6,

2009, http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=134: “We must rebalance this

department’s programs in order to institutionalize and enhance our capabilities to fight the wars we are in today and the

scenarios we are most likely to face in the years ahead…”

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Defense Budget Recommendation Statement, April 6, 2009,

http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1341; and DoD, National Defense

Strategy, June 2008, p.21.

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•

DOD is operating in a resource-constrained environment, in which “running up

the score” in one area—maintaining unnecessary redundancy—requires a

decision not to do something else.

•

Partnerships—with other U.S. Government agencies and with international

friends and allies—will play an increasingly important role in the preparation for,

and execution of, future operations.

Strategic Processes

The decisions Secretary Gates announced April 6, timed to inform the FY 2010 budget request,

were somewhat off cycle with Congressionally-mandated defense strategic review processes. This

lack of synchronization raises some questions about the extent to which the decisions were

strategically informed.

In theory, national security strategy issued by the White House sets the parameters for the

national defense strategy issued by DOD as part of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)

process, and defense strategy in turn shapes budget choices. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986

established the permanent requirement for the President to submit a national security strategy

report to Congress annually. That report is ordinarily due on the date the President submits the

budget for the following fiscal year, but in the first year of a new Administration, it is due 150

days after the President takes office.68 The due date this year fell on June 19, 2009. In turn,

legislation requires that DOD conduct a QDR during the first year of every Administration, with a

requirement to submit a report based on that review to Congress in the year following the year in

which the review is conducted, but not later than the President submits the budget for the next

fiscal year.69 The due date for this QDR would fall in early February 2010. The QDR is intended

to be a rigorous, inclusive review process that weighs assessments of the strategic environment,

requirements, and gaps and overlaps in current capabilities. Further, by law, the QDR report must

include “a comprehensive discussion of the national defense strategy of the United States.” That

defense strategy, in turn, is required to be “consistent with the most recent national security

strategy.”70

In practice, the Obama Administration appears to be broadly on track with the prescribed strategy

cycle. However, that cycle may not be well-adapted for informing budget priorities in the first

year of a new Administration. The most recent National Security Strategy (NSS) was issued by the

Bush Administration in March 2006. Senior Administration officials have noted that the Obama

Administration is unlikely to publish a new NSS in time to help shape the 2010 QDR. However,

officials have indicated that an ongoing national security review process—led by the National

Security Council and intended to establish priorities and produce classified, internal guidance to

departments and agencies—would likely set parameters for the QDR process.71 DOD issued the

See Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, P.L. 99-433, §603.

The permanent requirement to conduct a QDR was introduced by the National Defense Authorization Act for

FY2000, October 5, 1999, P.L. 106-65, which amended Title 10 of U.S. Code. See Title 10, U.S. Code, Subtitle A, Part

I, Chapter 2, §118. Subsequent legislation amended parts of the mandate, see the NDAA for FY2002, December 28,

2001, P.L. 107-107, §921; and the Bob Stump NDAA for FY2003, December 2, 2002, P.L. 107-314, §922 and 923.

See Title 10, U.S. Code, Subtitle A, Part I, Chapter 2, §118 (b) (1).

See Christopher J. Castelli, “Senior Official: QDR Will Take Cues from NSC Review,” Inside Defense, April 23,

2009; and Christopher J. Castelli, “NSC Crafting Classified, National Security Planning Guidance, Inside Defense,

March 19, 2009.

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most recent National Defense Strategy in June 2008, under the signature of Secretary Gates, as a

stand-alone document, separately from a QDR process.72 Secretary Gates has stressed repeatedly

that the 2008 NDS will undergird the 2010 QDR process, the findings of which would be used to

inform budget decision-making for FY2011.73

DOD officials have stated that, despite the absence of a concurrent QDR or NDS process, the

budget decisions announced on April 6 were developed over the course of three months, in a

rigorous, inclusive way that included “not only the chiefs and secretaries of the Services, but also

the [Combatant] Commanders.”74 DOD has reportedly continued the practice launched under the

previous Administration, following the 2006 QDR, of holding frequent, inclusive sessions with

senior DOD civilian and military leaders, chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the

Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to consider strategic priorities, specific programs and

initiatives, and Departmental processes.

Senior DOD leaders have also stated that the scope of the April 6 decisions was not

comprehensive, and that several categories of issues were deferred to the forthcoming QDR

process. Secretary Gates indicated that he had deferred consideration of some specific issues—

including amphibious capabilities, a follow-on bomber, and strategic (nuclear) requirements—for

which sufficient “analysis and understanding” had not yet been available. Vice Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff General James Cartwright added that some broader and more fundamental

issues had also been deferred to the QDR—including “how to shift and manage risk,” including,

for example, how to think about potential trade-offs between very different sets of capabilities.”75

Issues for Congress: Secretary Gates’s Proposals

On April 6, 2009, roughly a month before the details of the FY2010 budget were released,

Secretary Gates announced several key recommendations all of which were incorporated into the

Administration’s FY2010 budget request released May 7. Gates said this “unorthodox” procedure

was warranted by the scope and significance of the decisions and by his desire to publicize them

as elements of his effort to change DOD’s strategic direction.

Quality of Life Issues

To improve the quality of life for military personnel and their families, Gates announced four

recommendations which, in sum, required $13 billion in the FY2010 base budget for activities

that previously had been funded in supplemental appropriations bills.

DOD had established a precedent for such separation by issuing the previous NDS in 2005, at the beginning of the

QDR process that yielded the February 2006 QDR Report.

Christopher J. Castelli, “Gates Poised to Sign Key Guidance for QDR, NPR,” Inside Defense, April 23, 2009.

See Department of Defense Conference Call with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Gen. James Cartwright

with Internet Security Writers, April 7, 2009, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?

transcriptid=4398; Media Roundtable with Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and General James Cartwright, Vice

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 7, 2009, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?

transcriptid=4399; and Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Defense Budget Recommendation Statement, April 6,

2009, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1341.

See Media Roundtable with Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and General James Cartwright, Vice Chairman,

Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 7, 2009, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=

4399.

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End-Strength Increase76

Secretary Gates recommended that the FY2010 budget complete the ongoing expansion of the

Army and Marine Corps, halt further personnel reductions in the Air Force and Navy (possibly at

end-strength levels of 330,000 and 329,000 respectively), and fund these end strength levels at a

cost of $11 billion.

Until recently, the Army had a permanent active component end strength of 482,400 while the

active component Marine Corps had a permanent end strength of 175,000. As recently as the

2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), DOD maintained that these strengths were adequate.

However, the reality of fighting a multi-front war for more than five years with an all volunteer

force eventually compelled the administration to reexamine its end strength position. Having

resisted previous congressional calls to permanently increase the end strength for the Army and

the Marine Corps, on January 19, 2007 DOD announced that it would seek approval to increase

the permanent end strength of both services.

As reflected in both the FY2008 President’s budget request and the FY2008 National Defense

Authorization Act (NDAA), the Army’s revised authorization cap is 547,400 by 2012, an increase

of 65,000 over the previous baseline of 482,400. The Marine Corps’ revised authorization cap is

202,000 by 2011, an increase of 27,000 over the previous baseline of 175,000. It was anticipated

that both services might achieve their higher authorization levels by the end of FY2009, three

years earlier than required for the Army and two years earlier than required for the Marine Corps.

The Air Force has been drawing down personnel for the past several years to fund equipment

modernization programs. At the end of FY2004, the Air Force had a personnel strength of

376,600 with a plan to reduce by 60,000 personnel and achieve an end strength of 316,600 by the

end of FY2009. However, on June 8, 2008, the Secretary of Defense announced the end of the Air

Force drawdown. While the FY2009 NDAA authorized and funded the Air Force at 317,050,

DOD is committed to stabilizing the Service at a strength of approximately 330,000.77

The Navy, on the other hand, has been downsizing by 8,000 to 10,000 personnel a year for the

past six to seven years, attempting to reach a goal of 329,000, the number required to sustain 313

ships and approximately 3,800 aircraft. The Navy ended FY2008 with a personnel strength of

332,228 and projects achieving the goal of 329,000 by the end of FY2009.78

Health Care and Family Support79

Secretary Gates stated his intention to provide increased funding for troops and their families by

requesting increases of:

•

$400 million above the FY2009 level for medical research and development;

Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in Military Manpower Policy.

Lt. Gen. Richard Y. Newton, III, Deputy Chief of Staff, Manpower and Personnel, United States Air Force,

“Presentation to the Subcommittee on Military Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, United States House of

Representatives,” March 3, 2009.

Gary J. Gilmore, “Navy Stabilizes Force as it Nears End-Strength Goal,” Armed Forces Press Service, March 20,

2009.

Prepared by (name redacted), Analyst in Military Health Care Policy.

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Defense: FY2010 Authorization and Appropriations

•

$300 million above the FY2009 level for programs addressing the wounded, ill

and injured, traumatic brain injury, and psychological health; and

•

$200 million above the FY2009 level for improvements in child care, spousal

support, lodging, and education.

Existing programs that previously had been funded through supplementals would be funded in the

base defense budget in FY2010. Secretary Gates stated that the department would spend over $47

billion on healthcare in FY2010.

In his April 6 statement, Secretary Gates did not mention any proposals to include cost saving

proposals in the FY10 budget submission. The earlier pre-decisional budget document released

by the White House on March 6, 2009 did not reference any such proposal either. However, in an

April 7 press conference, Secretary Gates stated that the Defense Health Program request would

be fully funded in the FY2010 budget request, unlike previous years in which legislative

proposals for cost savings had been included in the budget as offsets to budgetary needs.

Secretary Gates further stated his intention to work with Congress to enact legislation to better

control health care spending.

In its FY2007, FY2008, and FY2009 budget submissions, the DOD proposed increases in Tricare

enrollment fees, deductibles, and pharmacy co-payments for retired beneficiaries not yet eligible

for Medicare. These actions were justified by DOD as necessary to constrain the growth of health

care spending as an increasing proportion of the overall defense budget in the next decade.

Congress has passed legislation each year to prohibit the proposed fee increases.80

Study Groups Recommend Various Benefit Reforms

Congress sought advice on how to constrain military health care cost growth in crafting the FY

2007 John Warner National Defense Authorization Act. The FY2007 national defense

authorization81 required the establishment of a DOD Task Force on the Future of Military Health

Care, composed of military and civilian officials with experience in health-care budget issues, to

examine and report on efforts to improve and sustain defense health care over the long term

including the “beneficiary and Government cost sharing structure required to sustain military

health benefits.” Another provision of the same act (section 713) required the Government

Accountability Office (GAO) in cooperation with the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to

prepare an audit of the costs of health care to both DOD and beneficiaries between 1995 and

2005.

The Task Force on the Future of Military Health Care submitted its final report in December

2007.82 It found that existing cost-sharing provisions jeopardize long-term taxpayer support and

recommended phased-in changes in enrollment fees and deductibles that would restore costsharing relationships that existed when Tricare was created. For instance, this would mean that

For additional information, see CRS Report RS 22402, Increases in Tricare Costs: Background and Options for

Congress, by (name redacted).

Section 711 of P.L. 109-364.

Task Force on the Future of Military Health Care Final Report, December 2007 (available at http://www.health.mil/

dhb/downloads/103-06-2-Home-Task_Force_FINAL_REPORT_122007.pdf).

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average enrollment fees for the average under-65 retiree family would gradually rise from $460

per year to $1,100 per year.

In July, 2008, the Presidentially directed Tenth Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation

(QRMC) issued its report on deferred and noncash compensation for members of the uniformed

services. The QRMC recommended that Tricare Prime83 premiums for single retirees under age

65 be set at 40% of Medicare Part B premiums (which vary by the enrollee’s adjusted gross

income). Tricare Standard/Extra84 premiums for single retirees would be set at 15% of Part B

premiums. Family rates would be set at twice the single rate regardless of family size. Tricare

deductibles would be linked to Medicare rates with copayments waived for preventative care and

prescription drug payments limited to no more than two thirds of the average copayment faced by

civilians at retail pharmacies. In addition, the QRMC recommended that health care for retirees

under age 65 be financed through accrual accounting in order to illuminate how current staffing

decisions will affect future costs.

In January, 2009, DOD’s Military Health System Senior Oversight Committee (SOC) issued a

report responding to the recommendations of the Task Force on the Future of Military Health

Care. The SOC response rejected some of the Task Force’s specific cost-sharing

recommendations, but did state that “DOD will continue to ask for congressional authority to

charge fees and copays in an effort to maintain both a generous health care benefit and a fair and

reasonable cost-sharing arrangement between beneficiaries and DOD.”85 If the Obama

Administration decides to pursue this option, details might be included in the official budget

submission expected in May or in the DOD’s national defense authorization legislative package.

Preparing for “The Wars We’re In”

Asserting that DOD is culturally conditioned to focus on preparation for conventional combat

against forces similar to those fielded by the United States, Secretary Gates said a second set of

his recommendations were intended to institutionalize within the defense establishment

capabilities that are vital to waging irregular warfare, as U.S. forces currently are doing in Iraq

and Afghanistan.

Intelligence, Reconnaissance, and Surveillance (ISR)86

Secretary Gates, himself a former Director of Central Intelligence, has indicated his intention to

increase intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support to the warfighter by some $2

billion within the base budget. This initiative reflects the expanding use of ISR systems,

especially unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), in Iraq and Afghanistan to locate targets that can be

attacked with minimal damage to innocent civilians or property. DOD notes that “the number of

deployed UAS [unmanned aerial systems] has increased from approximately 167 aircraft in 2002

Tricare Prime is DOD’s HMO-like health plan option.

Tricare Standard and Tricare Extra are DOD’s fee-for-service and preferred provider type health plan options.

Department of Defense Military Health System Senior Oversight Committee, “Response to the Recommendations of

the Task Force on the Future of Military Health Care,” January 2009, p. 103.

Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in National Defense, (name redacted), Specialist in Military

Aviation, and (name redacted), National Defense Fellow.

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Defense: FY2010 Authorization and Appropriations

to over 6,000 in 2008, while defense investment in UAS capabilities has dramatically grown from

$284 million in Fiscal Year 2000 to $2.5 billion in Fiscal Year 2008.”87

Gates recommended funding to field and sustain 50 continuous orbits of Predator-class and the

more capable Reaper-class UAVs, along with manned ISR platforms, such as the turbo-prop

aircraft used by Army brigade-level commanders in Iraq (as part of Task Force Odin), to provide

situational awareness—locating adversaries and even IEDs. The Gates initiative is designed to

include the acquisition of key tactical ISR systems in the base budget rather than in

supplementals. Reliance on supplemental funding is seen as resulting in insufficient ISR

resources to meet ongoing operational demands in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere.

Gates also announced plans for more extensive R&D on ISR systems, with emphasis on systems

that provide links between warfighters and national systems. No details were provided.

The day after Gates set forth his ISR recommendations, the Director of National Intelligence

(DNI), Dennis Blair, announced that his office and DOD have agreed on a plan to deploy new

imagery satellites whose design will evolve from current satellites and increase the use of

commercially available imagery. Current satellites are approaching the end of their operational

lifespan; a previous replacement approach (known as Future Imagery Architecture) was cancelled

in 2005 as a result of technical difficulties and cost-overruns and thus new systems are required.

Media reports indicate, however, that some Members favor an alternative approach to the one

approved by the DNI, one based on new systems that the Administration currently judges to be

technologically immature. Although Blair’s announcement did not mention the cost of the

satellite program (which will be funded in the classified National Intelligence Program (NIP)),

some media accounts suggest that costs of the new systems will approach $10 billion.88

Developing Partner Capacity (Section 1206)89

In his April 6 statement, Secretary Gates said he was recommending an increase of $500 million

“to boost global capacity efforts.... training and equipping foreign militaries to undertake counter

terrorism and stability operations.” Such an increase in funding for building global partnership

capacity under “Section 1206” of the FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), P.L.

109-163, as amended, would require Congress to once again raise the authorized limit. The

current authorized amount is $350 million. Some expect that DOD may also propose extending

Section 1206 authority to allow support of a wider array of partner nation security forces than

currently is permitted.

Both the proposed increase in the Section 1206 authorized funding level and an expansion of the

types of foreign security personnel eligible for Section 1206 assistance would be consistent with

DOD’s original proposal for building global partnership capacity legislation in 2005. At that time,

DOD requested authority, beginning in FY2006, to spend up to $750 million per fiscal year to

assist foreign military and security forces, including armies, guard, border security, civil defense,

infrastructure protection, and police forces.

Department of Defense, Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report, January 2009, p. 25.

Andy Pasztor and Siobhan Gorman, “Satellite Proposals Gain Traction After North Korea’s Launch,” Wall Street

Journal, April 5, 2009.

Prepared by Nina Serafino, Specialist in International Security Affairs.

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Defense: FY2010 Authorization and Appropriations

From the start, Section 1206 authority has been highly controversial, with some policymakers

judging that the Secretary of State should retain authority over foreign military and security force

training. As a result of disagreements over bestowing a new, global “train and equip” authority on

DOD, Congress substantially scaled back DOD’s request in 2005 action. As originally enacted in

P.L. 109-163, Section 1206 spending authority was limited to $200 million per year and only

foreign military forces were eligible for assistance. The new Section 1206 authority also

contained several restrictions, making it subject to existing human rights and other restrictions

elsewhere in law.

Congress has amended Section 1206 authority twice. In the FY2007 NDAA (P.L. 109-364),

Congress raised the authorized spending limit to $300 million. P.L. 109-364 also amended

Section 1206 to require the concurrence of the Secretary of State for all expenditures.90 In action

on the FY2009 Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 110-417), Congress

extended Section 1206 authority through FY2011, raised the spending limit to $350 million, and

made those funds available across fiscal years, and included maritime security forces among

those eligible to receive assistance. It rejected the Bush Administration’s proposal to make

Section 1206 authority permanent, to extend eligibility to broad array of foreign police and other

security forces, and to increase the funding cap to $750 million.91

Army Brigade Combat Teams92

Secretary Gates proposed reducing from 48 to 45 the number of active duty Brigade Combat

Teams the Army will create as it reorganizes its combat force from 10 divisions (each numbering

between 10,000 and 18,000 soldiers) to a larger number of brigades, each comprising between

3,000 and 5,000 troops. Unlike older brigades, which typically have to borrow various specialists

from other units in order to deploy overseas, the new Brigade Combat Teams are intended to be

organizationally independent, including on their rosters all the personnel they would need for

deployment. By reorganizing its force into a larger number of smaller units, the Army hoped to

give soldiers more time at their home bases between deployments (called “dwell time”).

Moreover, since the new units are self-sufficient, the Army also hoped to eliminate the use of

Stop Loss orders, which require personnel to remain on active duty after the end of their

enlistment when their particular skills are needed.

The Army began restructuring from a division-centric organization to brigade-centric units

shortly after September 11, 2001. The original concept, as outlined in the FY2006 Quadrennial

Defense Review (QDR) was to transform the active Army into 42 Brigade Combat Teams and 75

Modular Support Brigades. In 2007, when a decision was made to add 65,000 soldiers to the

Army’s force structure (increasing active duty end strength from 482,400 to 547,400), six Brigade

Combat Teams and eight Modular Support Brigades were added to the planned brigade-centric

reorganization. At that point, the plan was to create 48 Brigade Combat Teams and 83 Modular

Support Brigades by 2013.

The original legislation called only for the Secretaries of Defense and State to jointly formulate any Section 1206

program and for the Secretary of Defense to coordinate program implementation with the Secretary of State. This

provision remains in current law.

For further information, see CRS Report RS22855, Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and

Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).

Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in Military Manpower Policy.

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Special Operations Forces93

Secretary Gates recommended increasing by 2,800 or 5% the number of personnel assigned to

Special Operations Forces, which are units trained to perform small-scale, often clandestine

military operations. How the proposed personnel increase will be spread among the Services and

a target date for completing the expansion were not announced. Gates also recommended

unspecified increases in the purchase of transport and aerial refueling aircraft that are adapted to

special operations missions.94

The FY2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) increased the number of active duty Special

Forces Battalions by one-third and established a 2,600-strong Marine Corps Special Operations

Command, a capability that did not previously exist in the Marine Corps.

The qualification and training requirements for special operations personnel are lengthy and have

a high failure rate. As a result, manning an enlarged force structure for special operations

personnel takes more time than manning conventional combat units.

Helicopter Crew Training

Secretary Gates recommended adding to the base budget $500 million to increase the number of

helicopters that could be deployed, with most of the funds intended to increase the number of

Army helicopter pilots recruited and trained.

Gen. Martin Dempsey, USA, chief of the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is

reported to have said the additional funds would address the complaints of U.S. commanders in

Afghanistan, who say they have the helicopters they need but not enough trained personnel to fly

and maintain them. Currently, the Army trains about 1,200 helicopter pilots annually, but it needs

nearly 1,500, Dempsey reportedly said, adding that an additional $500 million would allow him

to close the gap in two years.95

Shipbuilding—Request96

Navy shipbuilding plans have emerged in recent years as a matter of particular congressional

concern. The ship-procurement rate for the last 17 years has been well below the average annual

rate that would be needed over the long term to achieve and maintain the Navy’s planned 313ship fleet. Many observers believe the Navy’s long-term shipbuilding plan is unaffordable.

Certain Navy shipbuilding programs in recent years have experienced significant cost growth,

construction delays, and construction deficiencies. Some Members of Congress who track Navy

shipbuilding have expressed growing concern and frustration about the situation.

Secretary Gates linked various shipbuilding proposals to different aspects of his overall strategic

vision, justifying some of them in terms of conventional force modernization requirements, others

Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in Military Manpower Policy.

For additional information, see CRS Report RS21048, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and

Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).

Amy Butler, “Army Shifts Focus to Helo Pilot Training,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, April 20, 2009.

Prepared by Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs.

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in terms of acquisition reform, and still others in terms of his effort to institutionalize within DOD

thinking a higher priority for irregular warfare. His proposed actions concerning Navy ships did

not go as far as some observers had expected or speculated in terms of proposed reductions or

cutbacks. In particular, Secretary Gates did not propose a near-term and permanent reduction in

the size of the Navy’s aircraft carrier force from 11 ships to 10, and he did not propose the

cancellation of second and third Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers. Some of Secretary

Gates’s proposed actions simply confirmed existing Navy plans for certain shipbuilding

programs, or were consistent with recent press reports about emerging Navy plans for those

programs.

The following section discuss in more detail Secretary Gates’s recommendations concerning

various classes of vessels under development or under construction.

Aircraft Carriers

Instead of proposing a near-term and permanent reduction in the size of the carrier force from 11

ships to 10, Secretary Gates proposed that the schedule for procuring new carriers be stretched

out somewhat, to a rate of one carrier every five years. The previous schedule called for procuring

one carrier approximately every 4.5 years (a combination of four- and five-year intervals). The

stretching out of the carrier procurement schedule, Secretary Gates said, would place carrier

procurement “on a more fiscally sustainable path.” He stated that his proposed schedule would

permit the Navy to maintain an 11-carrier force through about 2040, after which the force would

decrease to 10 ships.97

In announcing the proposal to stretch out the carrier procurement schedule (and his proposals

regarding the CG(X) cruiser, the 11th LPD-17 amphibious ship, and the Mobile Landing Platform

ship), Secretary Gates stated, “The healthy margin of dominance at sea provided by America’s

existing battle fleet makes it possible and prudent to slow production of several major surface

combatants and other maritime programs.”98

Although the Navy under Secretary Gates’s proposed carrier-procurement schedule is generally to

maintain an 11-carrier force through 2040, the force is projected to temporarily drop to ten ships

for a 33-month period in 2012-2015. This temporary drop has been projected for years and is not

a result of Secretary Gates’s proposed carrier-procurement schedule. The drop would occur

because the aircraft carrier Enterprise (CVN-65) is scheduled to retire in 2012 at age 51, and its

replacement, the Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78), is not scheduled to enter service until 2015.

Secretary Gates’s proposal for shifting carrier procurement to one ship every five years would

defer the procurement of the next aircraft carrier, CVN-79, by one year, from FY2012 to FY2013.

Such a one-year deferral could increase the cost of both CVN-79 and Virginia-class submarines

under construction at that shipyard. A one-year deferral in the procurement date of CVN-79 could

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Defense Budget Recommendation Statement, April 6, 2009, available at

http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1341. Reducing the carrier force in the near term and

permanently from 11 ships to 10 could have involved cancelling the mid-life nuclear refueling overhaul scheduled in

FY2013 for the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72), and retiring the Lincoln in 2015, at about age 26, instead

of keeping the ship in operation to about age 50.

Ibid.

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also reduce the amount of advance procurement funding that is to be requested for the ship in

FY2010.99

DDG-1000 and DDG-51 Destroyers

The FY2010 budget request included funds to complete the third destroyer of the DDG-1000

class, which was authorized but only partially funded in FY2009, as well as funds to purchase an

additional destroyer of the DDG-51 class. In his April 6 press conference, Secretary Gates stated

that that the plan to fund both ships in FY2010 depended on, “being able to work out contracts to

allow the Navy to efficiently build all three DDG-1000 class ships at Bath Iron Works in Maine

and to smoothly restart the DDG-51 Aegis Destroyer program at Northrop Grumman’s Ingalls

shipyard in Mississippi. Even if these arrangements work out, the DDG-1000 program would end

with the third ship and the DDG-51 would continue to be built in both yards.” He added that “If

our efforts with industry are unsuccessful, the department will likely build only a single prototype

DDG-1000 at Bath and then review our options for restarting production of the DDG-51. If the

department is left to pursue this alternative, it would unfortunately reduce our overall

procurement of ships and cut workload in both shipyards.”100

Secretary Gates’s proposal regarding destroyer procurement was one of several program actions

that he cited after saying, of DOD’s acquisition and contracting processes: “The perennial

procurement and contracting cycle—going back many decades—of adding layer upon layer of

cost and complexity onto fewer and fewer platforms that take longer and longer to build must

come to an end,” he told reporters April 6. “There is broad agreement on the need for acquisition

and contracting reform in the Department of Defense. There have been enough studies. Enough

hand-wringing. Enough rhetoric. Now is the time for action.”101

Soon after Secretary Gates’s April 6 news conference, it was reported that the Navy had reached

an agreement with Bath Iron Works and Northrop to have Bath build all three DDG-1000s. Under

the agreement, Northrop would build the first two DDG-51s to be procured under the DDG-51

restart, and Bath would build the third DDG-51.102

CG(X) Cruiser

Secretary Gates proposed a delay in the start of the CG(X) cruiser program “to revisit both the

requirements and acquisition strategy” for the program. The Navy wants to procure CG(X)s to

replace its 22 Ticonderoga-class Aegis cruisers, which are projected to reach their retirement age

of 35 years between 2021 and 2029. In announcing this proposal (and his proposals on the aircraft

carrier procurement schedule and on delaying procurement of the 11th LPD-17 amphibious ship

and the Mobile Landing Platform ship), Secretary Gates said, “The healthy margin of dominance

Aircraft carrier procurement is discussed further in CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft

Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).

100

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Defense Budget Recommendation Statement, April 6, 2009, available at

http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1341.

101

Ibid.

102

Procurement of DDG-1000 and DDG-51 destroyers is discussed further in CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51

and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).

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at sea provided by America’s existing battle fleet makes it possible and prudent to slow

production of several major surface combatants and other maritime programs.”103

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)

Secretary Gates recommended continuation of the planned procurement of Littoral Combat Ships

(LCSs) which he described as, “a key capability for presence, stability, and counterinsurgency

operations in coastal regions.” This was one of several recommendations he made after stating:

“Our contemporary wartime needs must receive steady long-term funding and a bureaucratic

constituency similar to conventional modernization programs. I intend to use the FY10 budget to

begin this process.”104

The FY2010 budget requested funding for three more LCSs, consistent with prior Navy planning

and represent no change to the program: The LCS program was scheduled to increase from two

ships in FY2009 to three ships in FY2010 as part of a plan to ramp up the annual LCS

procurement rate to an eventual level of five or more ships per year, and the Navy has planned a

total of 55 LCSs since 2006.

The LCS program was restructured in 2007 following revelations of significant cost growth and

construction problems. The program continues to be a program of particular oversight focus for

Congress. The Seapower and Expeditionary Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services

Committee, for example, held a hearing on March 10, 2009, to review the status of the

program.105

On September 16, 2009, the Navy announced another restructuring of the LCS program,

cancelling its plan to build several ships to each of two competing designs before selecting one of

the two for further production. Under the Navy’s new plan, it would choose between the two

designs during FY2010 and would procure two LCS ships in FY2010 (instead of the three

included in the FY2010 budget request).106

LPD-17, Mobile Landing Platform (MLP), and Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV)

Laying the groundwork for a potentially dramatic change in DOD planning, Secretary Gates

proposed deferring from FY2010 to FY2011 the procurement of two ships intended to support

amphibious landings, saying he wanted to, “assess costs and analyze the amount of these

capabilities the nation needs.”107

Secretary Gates drew the point more sharply during a speech to the Naval War College on April

17, citing amphibious landings as one example of areas in which he wanted the QDR to be

103

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Defense Budget Recommendation Statement, April 6, 2009, available at

http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1341.

104

Ibid.

105

The LCS program is discussed further in CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program:

Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by (name redacted).

106

Department of Defense, News Release, “Littoral Combat Ship Down Select Accounced,” No. 722-09, September

16, 2009.

107

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Defense Budget Recommendation Statement, April 6, 2009, available at

http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1341.

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“realistic about the scenarios where direct U.S. military action would be needed.” As recently as

1991, he acknowledged, the threat of a large-scale amphibious assault by U.S. Marines on the

coast of Kuwait played a useful role in tying down Iraqi forces while the actual U.S.-led attack

came overland from Saudi Arabia. But he added: “We have to take a hard look at where it would

be necessary or sensible to launch another major amphibious action again. In the 21st century,

how much amphibious capability do we need?”108

Pending analysis of that issue by the QDR, Secretary Gates recommended deferring the planned

funding in FY2010 of an 11th San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ship and the first Mobile

Landing Platform—a ship intended to function as a pier on which cargo ships could transfer their

loads to amphibious landing craft. Procurement of LPD-17s has been a topic of congressional

interest in recent years. Secretary Gates’s proposal could increase the cost of the 11th LPD-17 and

the MLP in then-year dollars, if not also in real (inflation-adjusted) dollars.109

Secretary Gates did not recommend any change in planned procurement of Joint High Speed

Vessels (JHSVs), high-speed sealift ships the production of which is just beginning. He

announced that, “to improve our inter-theater lift capability,” pending delivery of the first JHSV,

DOD would charter two existing ships of this kind, in addition to two it currently has under

charter.110 The chartered ships of this type all have been foreign-built.

Aircraft—Request

As with his shipbuilding recommendations, Secretary Gates cited different rationales for his

various recommendations about aircraft programs, justifying some of them in terms of the need to

affordably modernize U.S. conventional forces and citing others as necessary steps toward

acquisition reform.

Tactical Combat Aircraft (F-35, F-22, F/A-18)

Secretary Gates basically reaffirmed the existing plan for fighter procurement, except for a slight

reduction in the number of F/A-18-type planes for the Navy to be funded in FY2010. He thus

rejected a vigorous campaign by proponents of the Air Force’s F-22 to continue production of that

aircraft which supporters maintain has a uniquely potent blend of speed and stealthiness. Instead,

Secretary Gates and Joint Chiefs of Staff Vice Chairman Gen. James E. Cartwright, called for a

force made up of the planned 187 F-22s, plus thousands of the cheaper and less stealthy F-35s,

and several hundred missile-armed Reaper and Predator UAVs. The UAVs would replace many

of the 250 older fighters, mostly F-16s, that Secretary Gates plans to retire.111 This marks the first

time that senior DOD officials have identified UAVs as major components of the U.S. combat

force rather than as support equipment.

108

DOD News transcript: “Remarks by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode

Island,” April 17, 2009 accessed at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4405.

109

LPD-17 procurement is discussed further in CRS Report RL34476, Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement:

Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by (name redacted).

110

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Defense Budget Recommendation Statement, April 6, 2009, available at

http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1341.

111

DOD News Transcript, “Media Roundtable of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and General James Cartwright,

Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Selected Reporters, April 7, 2009, accessed at http://www.defenselink.mil/

transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4399.

Congressional Research Service

Defense: FY2010 Authorization and Appropriations

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

Secretary Gates recommended buying 30 F-35s in FY2010, an increase from the 14 funded in

FY2009, with an increase in funding from $6.9 billion to $11.2 billion. He called for buying 523

F-35s in FY2010-14 and a total of 2,443 of the aircraft over the program’s life. This procurement

profile matches the current F-35 program of record for FY09 and FY10, although $11.2 billion is

higher than the $8.4 billion originally planned for FY2010. Purchasing 513 aircraft over the five

year defense plan is a slight increase (28 aircraft) over the current program, but the projected total

purchase of 2,443 remains the same as previously planned.112

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported in March that DOD sought to increase

the five-year purchase plan by 169, and criticized the $33 billion effort as creating “very

significant financial risk” in part due to a lack of flight testing prior to procuring large numbers of

the aircraft.113

F-22 Raptor

Secretary Gates recommended no further procurement of F-22s, thus ending the program at 187

planes—the 183 funded thus far plus four planes requested in the FY2009 supplemental

appropriation.

Ending production at 183 matches the program of record for the F-22 Raptor; the four additional

aircraft requested are intended to replace combat aircraft losses. In follow-on comments,

Secretary Gates stated that advice from Combatant Commanders and the Air Force indicated “no

military requirement for F-22s beyond.... 187.”114 Air Force Chief of Staff, General Norton

Schwartz, stated during his confirmation hearings in 2008, that his personal position was that the

right number of F-22 aircraft was greater than 183 but less than the 381 that the Air Force had

been arguing for. However, he subsequently avoided public statements on the matter.115 Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, said in December 2008 that the Air Force had

discussed with him a plan to purchase 60 additional aircraft, but deferred further discussions to

the new Presidential administration.116

On April 13, 2009 the Air Force’s civilian and military leadership, acknowledging the difficult

budget environment and new risk assessments by DOD, formally endorsed Secretary Gates’s

proposal to complete F-22 procurement at 187 aircraft.117 Congress has generally supported the F22 in the past. In FY2009, Congress added to the budget request $523 million that could be used

112

For further analysis on the F-35, see CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background

and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).

113

U.S. Government Accountability Office, Joint Strike Fighter: Accelerating Procurement before Completing

Development Increases the Government’s Financial Risk, GAO-09-303, March 12, 2009, http://www.gao.gov/

new.items/d09303.pdf.

114

DOD news transcript, DOD News Briefing with Secretary Gates from the Pentagon, April 6, 2009, accessed at

http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=4396.

115

U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Nomination Hearing, US Air Force Chief of Staff, 110th

Cong., 2nd sess., July 22, 2008.

116

U.S. Department of Defense, “DOD News Briefing with Adm. Mullen From the Pentagon,” press release, December

10, 2008, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4330.

117

Michael Donley and Norton Schwartz. “Moving Beyond the F-22.” Washington Post. April 13, 2009.

Congressional Research Service

Defense: FY2010 Authorization and Appropriations

for advanced procurement of an additional lot of F-22s should the administration choose to do

so.118

F/A-18s

Secretary Gates recommended buying 31 F/A-18 Super Hornets for the Navy in FY2010, without

specifying the mix of models. FY2009 Navy budget documents indicate a planned FY2010

request for 18 F/A-18E/F Super Hornets and 22 EA-18G Growlers—a version of the plane

modified for electronic warfare—in all, a total of 40 aircraft. If, as most observers believe,

Secretary Gates includes EA-18Gs in his recommendation for a revised FY-10 purchase, then 31

aircraft represent a reduction of nine Super Hornets and Growlers from the previous DOD

budget.119

Congress has generally funded the F/A-18 as requested, with some modification to the mix of

“E,” “F,” and “G” models to be procured.

Air Mobility (KC-X, C-17)

Secretary Gates recommended that the Air Force remain on its current schedule to develop a new

aerial refueling tanker (KC-X) to replace the KC-135, which is the Air Force’s top acquisition

priority. A contract to develop and build the KC-X was awarded to Northrop Grumman in

February 2008, but after the GAO upheld a formal protest by competitor Boeing, Secretary Gates

cancelled the competition and called for a “cooling off” period, deferring all program decisions to

a new presidential administration.120 The new competition began September 24, 2009, with the

issuance of a draft Request for Proposals, the final version of which is expected in January, 2010.

While some in Congress support a “split” buy, i.e., having both companies build new tankers,

Secretary Gates remains opposed, citing high costs and potential problems the Air Force might

encounter by maintaining two separate training programs and logistics operations for the tanker

fleet.121

Congress has expressed strong support for replacing the aging KC-135 fleet, but has disagreed

with DOD on how this might best be accomplished. Over the past three legislative sessions,

Congress urged DOD to increase the proposed rate of KC-X production and has created a Tanker

Replacement Transfer Fund to give DOD flexibility in using procurement, O&M, and R&D funds

to support KC-X acquisition.122

118

For further analysis on the F-22, see CRS Report RL31673, Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and

Issues for Congress, by (name redacted), and CRS Report RS22684, Potential F-22 Raptor Export to Japan, by

(name redacted) and (name redacted).

119

For further analysis on these aircraft, see CRS Report RL30624, Navy F/A-18E/F and EA-18G Aircraft Procurement

and Strike Fighter Shortfall: Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).

120

U.S. Department of Defense, “DOD Announces Termination of KC-X Tanker Solicitation,” press release,

September 10, 2008, http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=12195.

121

U.S. Department of Defense, “DOD News Briefing with Secretary Gates From the Pentagon,” press release, March

18, 2009, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4381.

122

For further analysis of this issue see CRS Report RL34398, Air Force KC-X Tanker Aircraft Program: Background

and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).

Congressional Research Service

Defense: FY2010 Authorization and Appropriations

Secretary Gates recommended ending procurement of the C-17 Globemaster III long-range cargo

jet after production of the 205 planes already in service or funded. Ending production at 205

aircraft matches the program of record for the C-17 Globemaster III. Potential questions may

arise over what analysis was used for this conclusion. In 2008, the incoming commander of

United States Transportation Command, General Duncan McNabb, stated that the strategic airlift

requirement (33.95 million ton miles/day (MTM/D)) set by mobility studies in 2005 could be met

with 205 C-17s, 52 modernized C-5Bs, and 59 C-5As.123

Acquisition Reform (VH-71, CSAR-X)

Secretary Gates recommended termination of two high-profile helicopter programs, justifying

both proposals as part of his effort to reform DOD’s acquisition process.

He recommended terminating the VH-71 helicopter, intended to transport the President and other

senior officials, on the basis of its troubled acquisition history and large cost overruns. While

post-9/11 security concerns gave the program a certain “urgency,” the long timelines for delivery

of fully capable helicopters (slated for initial deployment in 2017) work against that argument, he

said. He also decided against purchasing the first lot of less capable “Increment 1” aircraft, stating

they would only last five to ten years, although it is unclear why their useful life would be so

much less than other models of helicopters.124

Over the past three legislative sessions, Congress has expressed concern over noteworthy cost

increases, schedule delays, and foreign influence on the program. Over this time period, Congress

cut approximately $300 million of the $2 billion from the Navy’s R&D accounts for the VH71.125

Secretary Gates also recommended terminating the Air Force Combat Search and Rescue

helicopter (CSAR-X) and called for reviewing the requirement the aircraft was designed to meet.

His rationale for terminating the CSAR-X helicopter program jibes with a commonly held belief

that the process by which DOD defines the requirements a new weapon is supposed to meet does

not adequately force the military services to make hard decisions or trade off capabilities among

themselves. The debate over whether search and rescue (SAR) missions require a specialized

aircraft has been in progress for several years and was most recently raised by former Pentagon

Acquisition Chief John Young.126 In an interview in November 2008, Mr. Young stated that DOD

“... [has] a lot of assets that can be used in rescue missions with planning, so I don’t necessarily

just automatically rubber-stamp the CSAR-X requirement.” The Air Force countered that it has

twice won approval for a dedicated CSAR aircraft from the Joint Requirements Oversight

123

“Modernized” C-5s are those modified under the Reliability Enhancement Re-engining Program (RERP). For a

discussion of the RERP, see U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Advance Questions for General

McNabb, US Transportation Command, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., July 22, 2008. For further analysis of this program see

CRS Report RS22763, Air Force C-17 Aircraft Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, by (name red

acted).

124

U.S. Department of Defense, “DOD News Briefing with Secretary Gates From the Pentagon,” press release, March

18, 2009, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4381.

125

For background, see CRS Report RS22103, VH-71/VXX Presidential Helicopter Program: Background and Issues

for Congress, by (name redacted).

126

All references in this paragraph come from an investigation by the reporting staff of Aviation Week and Space

Technology, an aerospace trade journal. See Michael Fabey, “Young Opinion on CSAR Questioned,” Aerospace Daily

& Defense Report, January 28-30, 2009.

Congressional Research Service

Defense: FY2010 Authorization and Appropriations

Council (JROC), the high-level DOD panel that approves the requirements a new weapons

program is supposed to meet. The service argued that CSAR was a critical shortfall at the

beginning of combat operations in Afghanistan in 2001, that specially-trained CSAR forces were

used far more often than recognized, and that using non-specialized forces for CSAR missions

would result in increased U.S. casualties. Further statements by Secretary Gates indicate that

DOD might also consider making CSAR a joint capability, thereby changing the organization and

acquisition process for any dedicated assets.

Missile Defense—Request127

Secretary Gates recommended in his April 6 statement that DOD restructure the ballistic missile

defense (BMD) program to focus more on rogue-state and theater ballistic missile threats and

maintain and improve existing long-range BMD capabilities.128

These recommendations seem to align with Secretary Gates’s broader strategic thinking about the

types of foreign threats the United States is most likely to face (e.g., “hybrid warfare,” where U.S.

troops could be threatened by state and non-state actors armed with short-range ballistic missiles).

Additionally, Secretary Gates’s stated objective is to adjust DOD investments and rebalance the

overall force, especially in the resource constrained era he acknowledges. This seems to reflect

his argument that the United States should focus more attention on shorter range BMD

investments. He also wants to improve our existing U.S. long-range BMD system without

necessarily acquiring more of that same capability pending DOD review of the need for

additional interceptors and whether more future-oriented programs could better supplement the

overall BMD capability.129

Theater Defenses (THAAD, SM-3, Aegis)

To accelerate deployment of defenses against theater ballistic missiles—those without

intercontinental range—Secretary Gates recommended adding to the FY2010 budget $700

million to field more SM-3 (Standard Missile 3) and THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area

Defense) BMD interceptors, and about $200 million more to convert six additional Aegis ships to

provide BMD capabilities. He added that this would basically fund the maximum production

capacity of the production lines for the SM-3 and THAAD, which are coming out of the testing

phase and moving into full-rate production. The SM-3 is the anti-missile interceptor used by

Navy cruisers and destroyers equipped with the powerful Aegis radar and missile control

system.130

127

Prepared by Stephen A. Hildreth, Specialist in Missile Defense.

U.S. Department of Defense, “DOD News Briefing with Secretary Gates From the Pentagon,” press release, March

18, 2009, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4381.

129

For additional analysis of the missile defense issue see CRS Report RS22120, Ballistic Missile Defense: Historical

Overview, by (name redacted) and CRS Report RL33240, Kinetic Energy Kill for Ballistic Missile Defense: A Status

Overview, by (name redacted).

130

U.S. Department of Defense, “DOD News Briefing with Secretary Gates From the Pentagon,” press release, March

18, 2009, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4381.

128

Congressional Research Service

Defense: FY2010 Authorization and Appropriations

Ground-Based National Missile Defense

Secretary Gates recommended not increasing the current number of long-range ground-based

interceptors deployed in Alaska, as had been planned. Currently, there are slightly more than two

dozen of these interceptors deployed in Alaska and California in the event of missile attacks

against the United States from North Korea or Iran. Secretary Gates said it was important “to

robustly fund continued research and development to improve the capability we already have to

defend against long-range missile threats.” In response to questions about plans to construct a

third missile defense site in Europe, Joint Chiefs of Staff Vice Chairman Gen. James Cartwright,

USMC, said there are “sufficient funds in ’09 that can be carried forward to do all of the work

that we need to do at a pace that we’ll determine as we go through the program review, the

quadrennial defense review, and negotiations with those countries.”131 Further details were not

offered at that time.132

Secretary Gates also recommended cancelling the Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) program133

because of its significant technical challenges and the fresh need to look at the requirements for

that system. The MKV is seen by some as enhancing the capability of long-range interceptors for

mid-course BMD in the future.

On September 17, 2009, President Obama cancelled the plan to deploy a long-range missile

defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. Instead, DOD plans to acquire a network of

mobile radars and interceptor missiles, including the SM-3 intended to defend Europe against

Iranian missiles of short and medium range. The President said U.S. intelligence agencies had

concluded that Iran’s effort to develop long-range ballistic missiles was taking longer than had

been assumed while it was moving more quickly than had been forecast to develop missiles that

could fly far enough to hit Europe, but not far enough to hit U.S. territory.134

Boost-Phase Defenses (Airborne Laser and KEI)

Secretary Gates recommended on April 6 various program changes regarding boost-phase defense

(i.e., efforts aimed at destroying attacking ballistic missiles shortly after they launch). He

recommended cancelling the second ABL (Airborne Laser) prototype aircraft and shifting the

focus of that program to further research and development. He said the ABL program was not

ready for production, that it had “significant affordability and technology problems, and the

program’s proposed operational role is highly questionable.” Also, in response to a question about

whether there might be changes in the BMD acquisition process, Gen. Cartwright, said that “what

will change is we’re going to start to shift and understand in that first phase what the leverage and

potential opportunities are in the boost-phase, focus on the threats.... and start to reassess what it

is and what we can do in the boost-phase for long-range.”135

131

DOD transcript, “News Briefing With Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, April 6, 2009,

http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4396.

132

For further analysis of this issue, see CRS Report RL34051, Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe, by

(name redacted) and (name redacted).

133

The MKV program is an effort to equip a single interceptor missile to destroy several incoming warheads.

134

The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet on U.S. Missile Defense Policy; A “Phased, Adaptive

Approach” for Missile Defense in Europe.,” September 17, 2009.

135

DOD transcript, “News Briefing With Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, April 6, 2009,

http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4396.

Congressional Research Service

Defense: FY2010 Authorization and Appropriations

Congressional Perspectives

In response to Secretary Gates’s recommendations, several senators wrote to the Secretary

expressing their approval of the increases to THAAD and SM-3, but voicing concern about the

proposed cut to missile defense funding, stating that it could “undermine our emerging missile

defense capabilities to protect the United States against a growing threat.”136 At a media

roundtable on April 7, 2009, Secretary Gates said “perhaps we can persuade them that all is not as

bad as they seem to think” if he could show them the proposed changes to THAAD and SM-3,

the sustained work on long-range systems for mid-course BMD, and the continued funding of

R&D for boost-phase interception.

Ground Combat Systems (FCS and EFV)—Request137

On April 6, 2009, Secretary Gates announced that he intended to significantly restructure the

Army’s Future Combat Systems (FCS) program, the Army’s plan to modernize its entire suite of

combat equipment. Specifically, he said, DOD would accelerate the process of “spinning out” to

all brigade combat teams (BCTs) technologies developed in the FCS program that were ready for

deployment. However he said he would cancel the manned ground vehicle (MGV) component of

FCS, which was intended to field eight separate tracked combat vehicle variants built on a

common chassis that would eventually replace several existing combat vehicles, including the M1 Abrams tank, the M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, and the M-109 Paladin self-propelled

artillery system.138

Secretary Gates said he was concerned that there were significant unanswered questions in the

FCS vehicle design strategy and that despite some adjustments to the MGVs, that they did not

adequately reflect the lessons of counterinsurgency and close quarters combat in Iraq and

Afghanistan. Secretary Gates was also critical that the FCS program did not include a role for

Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicles that have been used successfully in current

conflicts.139

There are a number of policy implications flowing from Secretary of Defense Gate’s decision to

restructure the FCS program. In essence, the Army was told to “go back to the drawing board” on

this almost decade-old program once described as the “centerpiece” of Army modernization.

Because the Army has focused exclusively on FCS for well over a decade, there has probably

been little thought given to alternatives to the eight MGVs that were to be developed under the

FCS program. DOD officials expressed misgivings that the Army had neither taken into account

“the lessons learned of the operational realities in Iraq and Afghanistan” in the design of FCS

MGVs nor carefully considered whether “one class of vehicles could in fact cover the range of

operations that we envision are going to be the reality of the future.”140 Another point of

136

The April 6 letter, signed by Senators Joseph Lieberman, John Kyl, Lisa Murkowski, Mark Begich, Jeff Sessions,

and James Inhofe, can be viewed at http://lieberman.senate.gov/news-events/news/2009/april/bipartisan-group-ofsenators-oppose-cuts-in-missile-defense/index.html.

137

Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in Military Ground Forces.

138

For further analysis of FCS see CRS Report RL32888, Army Future Combat System (FCS) “Spin-Outs” and

Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV): Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted) and Nathan Jacob Lucas.

139

DOD transcript, “News Briefing With Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, April 6, 2009,

http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4396.

140

U.S. De

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