Climate and Security in the Middle East and North Africa

Updated September 13, 2023

Climate and Security in the Middle East and North Africa

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is

among the world’s most water-stressed and vulnerable to

climate change impacts. Policymakers’ concerns about a

changing MENA climate include not only physical and

economic impacts but also the potential implications for

political stability and security in a volatile region.

A Region Under Stress

Projections of various effects of climate change on the

largely arid and semi-arid MENA region are available,

although regional analyses are often constrained by limited

data for MENA and downscaling from global models.

Given MENA’s geographic span—from Morocco to Iran—

and topographic variation (e.g., mountains, deserts, and

deltas), local effects may differ from regional trends.

Average Temperatures and Hottest Days. Temperatures

in the MENA region have increased for decades and are

projected to continue increasing through the end of the

century. Figure 1 shows one projection of hottest day

temperature increases by 2040. Some research suggests

intensification of warm-season heat extremes in the region

(e.g., Zittis et al. in Climate and Atmospheric Science,

2021). Hotter conditions generally increase energy demand

for cooling and may negatively affect health, labor, and

agricultural productivity.

Figure 1. 2040 Projections for MENA: Hottest Day

Temperatures and Longest Annual Drought Days

Source: CRS adapted from U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC),

Global Trends 2040, March 2021.

Notes: The projections used the Representative Concentration

Pathway 4.5. NIC’s data source was Schwingshackl, Sillman, and the

Centre for International Climate and Environmental Research. NIC’s

graphic source was Pardee Center, University of Denver.

Water and Storms. Both droughts and floods occur in

MENA, with variability over time and place. Several

studies project increasingly lengthy droughts in some parts

of MENA, including annual dry spells projected to last

longer by 2040 (Figure 1). Many (but not all) studies

project less precipitation along MENA’s Mediterranean

coast through this century; less agreement exists regarding

whether precipitation may increase or decrease in other

parts of the MENA region (e.g., Arabian Peninsula, Sahara

portion of various North Africa countries). Regarding

precipitation extremes, some studies (e.g., Ozturk et al. in

Atmosphere, 2021) project an increase in precipitation

amounts on very wet days for the end of this century for

much of the region, which may contribute to flooding.

In September 2023, Storm Daniel (a medicane—a

Mediterranean Sea storm with hurricane-type

characteristics) led to torrential rains over eastern Libya,

with flooding and dam failures affecting the city of Derna.

Many thousands were displaced, and the loss of life may

exceed 5,000. Some research indicates that with a warmer

climate, medicanes with the strongest winds may become

stronger while medicanes overall may decrease in

frequency (e.g., Flaounas et al. in Weather and Climate

Dynamics, 2022). Future trends in the development of

medicanes may depend on competing climate-related

variables (e.g., higher sea surface temperatures enhancing

medicane strength versus higher air temperatures leading to

less frequent medicanes).

Rising sea levels are encroaching on MENA coastlines and

communities, thereby contributing to more frequent

flooding and more extensive coastal storm flooding.

According to some researchers, by 2050, portions of Iraq’s

second-largest city of Basra and other southern Iraqi areas

could experience chronic coastal flooding. Alexandria,

Egypt, one of the most populous coastal cities in the Middle

East, also could be regularly flooded by rising sea levels.

Agriculture and Food. Much of MENA’s agriculture and

food production is rain-fed or consists of livestock.

Production and many rural agricultural livelihoods are

sensitive to changes in heat, drought, and precipitation

patterns. Additionally, some production in the region relies

on irrigation, which can be sensitive to surface water

availability and can contribute to overuse of aquifers.

Limited arable land, water scarcity, and other resource and

environmental constraints limit regional agricultural

production. The region has coped with population growth

and urbanization by importing food. Reliance on food

imports is anticipated to persist, with demographic and diet

trends and changing agricultural growing conditions (e.g.,

effects of heat and drought on agricultural productivity) as

contributing factors.

How Climate May Interact with Security

U.S. national security assessments have described climate

change as a threat multiplier that may exacerbate existing

tensions in regions facing other challenges, such as

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Climate and Security in the Middle East and North Africa

intrastate conflict, rapid population growth, urbanization, or

poor governance. The linkages from climate and weather

events to political stability are complex, with intervening

critical factors such as social schisms and governance. In

the MENA region, where several countries (e.g., Syria,

Iraq, and Lebanon) are divided along ethnic/sectarian lines,

armed substate actors and terrorist groups could broaden

their appeal to sectors of the population disaffected by

hardships wrought by climate change.

Examples illustrate how climate conditions and weather

events could affect MENA’s future in terms of political

unrest, violent conflicts, and the well-being of its people.

For instance, rising food prices or water shortages

previously have triggered urban unrest. Reliance on food

imports links MENA’s internal stability to agricultural

conditions in exporting nations. Poor conditions in

agricultural exporting countries contributed to reduced

MENA food imports and associated food shortages in 20102011. In the case of Syria, decades of land and groundwater

overuse in the nation’s breadbasket, combined with a 20062010 drought and periods of spiking global oil and food

prices, played a part in agricultural workers migrating to

cities, where many were unable to find employment. When

Syria’s uprising began in 2011, disaffected rural migrants

formed the base of opposition against the regime of

President Bashar al Asad. In North Africa, local protests

about water shortages reportedly occurred in 2017-2018. In

Iraq, observers identified droughts as undermining rural

Sunni livelihoods, which some argue may have helped fuel

Islamic State recruitment.

Some countries will be able to afford expensive, new

adaptations … but in many MENA countries,

governments’ inability to address water and heat

challenges will increase public frustration with government

performance and potentially spark new migration flows.

—U.S. National Intelligence Council, 2021 Five-Year Regional

Outlook: Middle East and North Africa

Climate change adaptation is anticipated to challenge the

capacities of poorer countries and politically unstable

governments. Variations across MENA in national wealth

and state capacity to respond to climate and weather events

may lead to different efforts toward adaptation, such as

improving regional drought monitoring, investing in water

infrastructure and efficiency (e.g., Israel’s water reuse), and

shifting to more heat-resilient crop varieties. Regional water

and energy cooperation also may expand. As of August

2023, Israel, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)

continued their efforts to finalize a deal for “Project

Prosperity.” The project proposes UAE financing the

construction of solar power capacity in Jordan and

subsequent electricity export from Jordan to Israel in

exchange for Israel supplying desalinated water to Jordan.

Energy and Emissions Policies

Some oil-rich members of the Gulf Cooperation Council

(GCC, composed of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait,

Oman, Qatar, and Bahrain) have undertaken efforts to

diversify their economies. In 2021, Saudi Crown Prince

Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud announced that Saudi

Arabia, the world’s second-largest oil producer, seeks to

generate half of its domestic energy from renewable sources

by 2030. However, these types of pledges have engendered

some skepticism. GCC state-owned oil companies may

increase production to meet rising energy demands from

China, India, and elsewhere.

Other MENA countries that are net hydrocarbon importers

are adjusting or may adjust their energy policies. Morocco

has attempted to reduce its dependence on fossil fuel

imports and aims to generate over half of its electricity from

renewable sources by 2030 (e.g., by building concentrated

solar power capacity). Morocco’s government announced in

2019 that renewable sources composed an estimated 35% of

its electricity production the prior year.

The November 2022 United Nations Framework

Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 27th

Conference of Parties (COP27) yielded a series of global

discussions and agreements focused on greenhouse-gas

(GHG) emissions reductions and other topics. Most

countries—including many MENA countries—updated

their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) prior to

COP26 in 2021. NDCs represent each country’s

commitment to meeting the objectives of the Paris

Agreement (PA), a UNFCCC agreement intended to reduce

the effects of climate change. For example, the UAE—the

host country for COP28 in 2023—submitted an updated

NDC in 2023, pledging to reduce its GHG emissions 19%

by 2030 (compared with 2019 levels). In addition to NDCs,

some countries, including Bahrain, Israel, Oman, Saudi

Arabia, and the UAE, have pledged to reach net-zero

emissions by mid-century. For the UAE, some observers

question the interplay between its pledges to reduce

emissions, its stated plans to achieve net-zero emissions by

2045 (e.g., adopting renewables and employing carbon

capture), and its plans to increase its overall fossil fuel

production.

Related Efforts and Policies

Various U.S. and MENA-related efforts to address climate

change mitigation and adaptation are underway. In April

2021, President Biden hosted a summit on climate for 40

world leaders, including some leaders from the MENA

region. At the summit, the Biden Administration committed

to exerting U.S. leadership in addressing climate change.

The Department of State and the U.S. Agency for

International Development are to coordinate “U.S.

government efforts to support countries around the world to

enhance and meet their climate goals in ways that further

their national development priorities.” The White House

also announced a Net-Zero Producers Forum; the forum,

composed of the United States, Canada, Norway, Qatar,

Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, is for developing ideas to

reduce energy-related emissions. Also, since COP26, the

United States and the UAE have led the Agriculture

Innovation Mission for Climate; the coalition of 50

countries supports innovation and research to enhance

climate resiliency and reduce emissions from agriculture. In

September 2023, at the Africa Climate Summit, the UAE

pledged $4.5 billion in clean energy investments in Africa.

Jeremy M. Sharp, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Nicole T. Carter, Specialist in Natural Resources Policy

Kezee Procita, Head Research and Library Services

Section

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IF11878

Climate and Security in the Middle East and North Africa

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