U.S. Relations with Burma: Key Issues in 2020

Updated January 24, 2020

U.S. Relations with Burma: Key Issues in 2020

Some Members of Congress have been critical of the

Trump Administration’s Burma policy, particularly its

limited response to atrocities committed by the Burmese

military (Tatmadaw), the intensification of the nation’s

long-standing civil war, and rising concerns about political

repression. In December 2018, the 115th Congress passed

the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-409),

which prohibits funding for International Military

Education and Training (IMET) and the Foreign Military

Financing (FMF) Program in Burma for fiscal years 2019

through 2023. In December 2019, the 116th Congress

passed the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020

(P.L. 116-94), which places additional restrictions on

bilateral economic and international security assistance to

Burma in fiscal year 2020. Other legislation has been

introduced that would modify U.S. relations with Burma

(see “Pending Legislation”).

Escalating Civil War; Little Prospect for Peace

Burma has been embroiled in a low-grade civil war

between the Tatmadaw and over 20 ethnic armed

organizations (EAOs) as far back as 1962. Significant

portions of the nation are effectively under EAO control,

particularly in Kachin and Shan States. After the Tatmadaw

transferred power to a mixed civilian-military government

in 2011, fighting initially was limited to Kachin and Shan

States, with periodic skirmishes in Kayin State, but has

since spread to Chin, Kayah, Mon, and Rakhine State. The

government of former President Thein Sein and the current

government, led by State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi,

have attempted to negotiate a nationwide ceasefire

agreement, but these efforts have had limited success.

Figure 1. Map of Burma (Myanmar)

Source: CRS.

In December 2018, the Arakan Army (AA) launched

coordinated attacks on security outposts in northern

Rakhine State as part of its plan to establish an autonomous

region for the Arakan (Rakhine) people. Following the

December 2018 AA attack, Commander-in-Chief Senior

General Min Aung Hlaing announced a four-month

unilateral ceasefire in eastern (but not western) Burma,

which he later extended for two more months, and reversed

his objection to the inclusion of the AA and two other

EAOs in the ceasefire talks.

Aung San Suu Kyi has focused her efforts to end the civil

war on holding broad national conferences at which her

government, the Tatmadaw, the EAOs, and representatives

of civil society, seek to negotiate a nationwide ceasefire

agreement. Conferences were held in 2016, 2017, and 2018,

but not in 2019. Preliminary discussions about a possible

2020 conference are underway, but many EAOs are

skeptical of the Tatmadaw’s willingness to negotiate in

good faith.

Fighting between the AA and the Tatmadaw in Chin and

Rakhine State continued throughout 2019, with more than

482 skirmishes reported during the year, accounting for

10.6% of the recorded military confrontations in Burma

since 2011, according to the Armed Conflict Location and

Event Data Project (ACLED). In 2019, fighting also was

reported between the Tatmadaw and various EAOs, as well

as between EAOs, in Kachin, Kayin, Mon, and Shan States,

despite the existence of ceasefire agreements.

2020 Parliamentary Elections

Burma’s parliamentary elections are expected to take place

sometime in November. Aung San Suu Kyi’s domestic

popularity has waned over the years due to the escalation of

the civil war and the stalled peace process; her failure to

deliver on promised political reforms; and a slowdown in

economic growth. Some of the country’s ethnic-based

political parties are trying to form a united front to

challenge the NLD, seeking to win a majority of the

parliamentary seats for their respective ethnic states.

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U.S. Relations with Burma: Key Issues in 2020

The Rohingya Crises Continue

More than 700,000 Sunni Rohingya fled northern Rakhine

State to Bangladesh in late 2017, after Tatmadaw forces

destroyed almost 400 Rohingya villages and allegedly

killed thousands of Rohingya during so-called “clearance

operations.” According to the U.N. Office for the

Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) and

U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, as of January 7,

2020, approximately 915,000 Rohingya refugees were in

Bangladesh, including those who fled Burma prior to 2017.

The UNOCHA 2020 humanitarian appeal for Bangladesh

seeks $871 million to assist 1.3 million people. In addition,

an estimated 200,000 to 600,000 stateless Rohingya remain

in Rakhine State. Rohingya make up the vast majority of

more than 100,000 who are internally displaced and

confined to camps. UNOCHA’s 2020 humanitarian appeal

for Burma seeks $215 million to meet the needs of the

Rohingya in Rakhine State.

charged under section 66(d) of the 2013

Telecommunications Act for allegedly defaming or

threatening government officials. According to the

Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma), as

of December 2019, 631 people were either serving

sentences or awaiting trial for their political activities.

An October 2018 repatriation agreement between Burma

and Bangladesh has stalled as the Burmese government was

unable or unwilling to create conditions that would allow

the voluntary, safe, dignified, and sustainable return of the

Rohingya. The Rohingya seek return to locations at or near

their original villages; recognition as an indigenous ethnic

minority; restoration of their full citizenship; accountability

for the alleged atrocities; and the termination of laws and

policies that discriminate against them.

The Trump Administration has condemned the violence

committed by all parties in Rakhine State. On September

24, 2018, the State Department released the findings of its

own study of the events in Rakhine, which were consistent

with those of the IIFFMM. The State Department report

stated “that the recent violence in northern Rakhine State

was extreme, large-scale, widespread, and seemingly

geared toward both terrorizing the population and driving

out the Rohingya residents,” and “(t)he scope and scale of

the military’s operations indicate they were well-planned

and coordinated.” The Trump Administration has declined

to characterize the human rights abuses as either genocide

or crimes against humanity, but it has placed sanctions on

nine Tatmadaw officers, including Commander-in-Chief

Min Aung Hlaing, and two military units. The Trump

Administration has also provided $359.5 million in

humanitarian assistance for the Rohingya in Burma and

Bangladesh (as of January 15, 2020).

On September 18, 2018, the U.N. Independent International

Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar (IIFFMM) determined

Burma’s security forces may have committed genocide,

crimes against humanity, and/or war crimes in Kachin,

Rakhine, and Shan States. The IIFFMM recommended the

U.N. Security Council “refer the situation to the

International Criminal Court (ICC) or create an ad hoc

international criminal tribunal.” In 2019, the ICC

authorized its Prosecutor to investigate the forced

deportation of the Rohingya and related crimes.

In November 2019, The Gambia filed a genocide case

against Burma in the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

On January 23, 2020, the ICJ ordered Burma to take

“provisional measures” to ensure that the Tatmadaw refrain

from carrying out any acts of genocide, and protect and

preserve any evidence of genocidal acts. Two days before

the order, a commission of enquiry appointed by President

Win Myint determined that while the Tatmadaw had no

“genocidal intent” in Rakhine, some troops may have

committed war crimes. Win Myint and the Tatmadaw have

said they will investigate the alleged war crimes. Burma’s

government continues to deny the United Nations, most

international humanitarian assistance organizations, and the

media unrestricted access to northern Rakhine State.

Violation of Human Rights and Civil Liberties

Burma’s mixed military/civilian government continues to

curtail freedom of speech and the press. Journalists have

been arrested for interviewing EAO leaders or for

publishing articles critical of the Tatmadaw. Peaceful

protesters have faced criminal charges for allegedly

violating the 2011 Peaceful Processions and Peaceful

Assembly Act. Several critics of the government have been

State of Political Reforms

Many observers expected Aung San Suu Kyi and the

National League for Democracy (NLD) to implement

political reforms following their parliamentary victory in

2015. A special commission set up by the NLD-led

government identified more than 140 laws that should be

abolished or amended; few have been addressed by the

Union Parliament. As indicate above, the mixed

military/civilian government at times uses various

restrictive laws to suppress political opposition.

Status of U.S. Policy Toward Burma

Pending Legislation

Several bills have been introduced in the 116th Congress

that would add new restrictions on relations with Burma or

require new types of assistance. The Burma Unified

through Rigorous Military Accountability (BURMA) Act of

2019 (H.R. 3190) and Burma Human Rights and Freedom

Act of 2019 (S. 1186) would place additional restrictions on

military and trade relations. The Burma Political Prisoners

Assistance Act (H.R. 2327 and S. 2069) would require the

Secretary of State to provide assistance to “current and

former prisoners of conscience and political prisoners in

Burma.” The Allowing for the Safe Return of Rohingyas to

Burma Act of 2019 (H.R. 4392) would require the President

to suspend Burma’s eligibility under the Generalized

Systems of Preference (GSP) program until Burma allowed

the “safe, voluntary, and dignified return of Rohingya

refugees.” Burma-related language may be included in the

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021

and the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and

Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2021.

Michael F. Martin, Specialist in Asian Affairs

Kirt Smith, Research Assistant

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IF11068

U.S. Relations with Burma: Key Issues in 2020

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