Key Issues in Tax Reform: International Tax Issues
Congressional research reportDec 12, 2017
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Key Issues in Tax Reform: International Tax Issues
Issues surrounding the taxation of U.S. multinational
corporations have been a major impetus for tax reform and
are some of the main arguments for tax measures to lower
the statutory corporate tax rate of 35% and revise the
current system for taxing foreign source income.
Current Law
A territorial or source-based system taxes only income
earned in the country and excludes foreign source income.
A worldwide system taxes both income earned in the
country and foreign source income, but allows a credit for
income taxes paid to foreign jurisdictions. Most countries
have largely territorial systems.
The U.S. system has elements of both. While it taxes
worldwide income, earnings of foreign subsidiaries of U.S.
multinationals are not taxed until they are repatriated (paid
as dividends to the parent). Earnings of foreign branches
and royalties and interest payments are taxed currently. A
foreign tax credit is allowed, but limited to the total U.S. tax
due. This limit is applied separately to active and passive
income. This overall limit allows cross-crediting so that
firms can use excess credits from high-tax countries to
offset U.S. tax on earnings in low-tax countries. Deferral of
tax on earnings of foreign subsidiaries and cross-crediting
introduce elements of territorial taxation, and the United
States collects relatively little foreign source income.
In common with many other countries, the United States
taxes certain easily shifted income of foreign subsidiaries
on a current basis. These rules are called CFC rules (for
controlled foreign corporations) or Subpart F rules (for the
tax code section). Subpart F income includes passive
income of subsidiaries and certain other income such as
income from sales and services subsidiaries in foreign
countries where the production and consumption takes
place in other countries. The effectiveness of Subpart F has
been reduced by check-the-box regulations that allow
payments between subsidiaries to be disregarded.
Issues
Four issues are of concern: the effect on investment abroad,
revenue losses due to profit-shifting, repatriation, and
inversion.
Allocation of Investment
Broadly speaking, strong territorial elements of the U.S.
system provide an incentive to invest in countries with low
tax rates of their own and a disincentive to invest in hightax countries, including a disincentive to invest in the
domestic economy. According to traditional economic
analysis, world economic welfare is maximized by a system
that applies the same tax burden to prospective (marginal)
foreign and domestic investment so that taxes do not distort
investment decisions. National welfare is maximized,
however, by encouraging more investment in the United
States. (For a discussion of these principles, as well as other
international issues and details of various proposals, see
CRS Report RL34115, Reform of U.S. International
Taxation: Alternatives, by Jane G. Gravelle.) Some of the
arguments for lowering the U.S. statutory corporate tax
rate, which is the highest of almost all countries, relate to
the concern about domestic investment. The location of
investment, however, is driven by effective rather than
statutory tax rates; U.S. effective tax rates are more in line
with those in other countries (see CRS Report R41743,
International Corporate Tax Rate Comparisons and Policy
Implications, by Jane G. Gravelle).
Profit Shifting
Profit shifting involves the movement of profits without
real activities to countries with low tax rates, such as the
Cayman Islands and Bermuda. Considerable evidence
points to significant profit shifting by U.S. multinationals.
Profit shifting is driven by statutory tax rates.
Profit shifting primarily rests on two methods: leveraging
and transfer pricing of intangibles. Firms can shift profits
by borrowing in high-tax countries. Transfer pricing
involves the sale of intangible assets (such as drug
formulas, technological advances, and trademarks),
charging a low price to subsidiaries in low-tax countries.
Firms also use cost contribution arrangements where a lowtax subsidiary contributes to research in the United States
for a share of the rights to the intangible.
Repatriation
Deferral of tax causes a tax to be triggered when foreign
subsidiaries repatriate income. When there are no foreign
tax credits to offset U.S. tax, each dollar repatriated results
in a tax at the statutory rate. Estimates indicate that firms
have around $2.5 trillion of accumulated profits offshore.
This repatriation tax could be eliminated in a system that
taxed foreign source income currently (a worldwide tax
without deferral) or a territorial tax where foreign source
income is not taxed.
Inversions
Inversions occur when a U.S. firm moves its headquarters
abroad, currently by merging with a foreign firm. Mergers
where the U.S. firm maintains 80% or more ownership are
treated as U.S. firms, while 60% to 80% ownership triggers
other, less costly tax effects. Inversions grew rapidly in
2014 and 2015, but have declined somewhat in 2016
according to Commerce Department data. Some of the
decline in inversions may be due to a series of regulations
that made it more difficult to invert and limited some of the
potential benefits, such as indirect repatriations through
loans to the new parent and leveraging. (See CRS Report
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Key Issues in Tax Reform: International Tax Issues
R43568, Corporate Expatriation, Inversions, and Mergers:
Tax Issues, by Donald J. Marples and Jane G. Gravelle.)
Options for Reform
Fundamental options include eliminating deferral (tax
foreign source income currently) at one end of the spectrum
or moving to a territorial system (exempt that income) at
the other. A choice could also be made for an intermediate
approach where foreign source income is taxed currently,
but at a lower rate. These approaches would likely be
accompanied by a deemed repatriation of existing earnings,
possibly at a lower rate.
Any of these approaches would eliminate the incentive to
retain earnings abroad. Eliminating deferral would raise
revenue and eliminate incentives for profit shifting, but
would make inversions much more attractive. Thus, such an
approach might need to be accompanied by tighter rules on
inversions. A territorial tax would make inversions less
likely but might encourage more profit shifting because
profits shifted would never be taxed. For that reason,
moving to a territorial tax system might require stronger
anti-abuse rules, such as allocation of interest deductions
based on the worldwide share of profits and a minimum tax
on intangible income in low-tax jurisdictions. A system that
taxes foreign source income at a lower rate might represent
a compromise for dealing with profit shifting and
inversions.
Narrower revisions would restrict deferral and crosscrediting, profit shifting, and inversions in the context of
the current system.
The Current Tax Reform Proposals
The current tax reform proposals passed by the House (H.R.
1) and reported out of the Senate Finance Committee would
move to a largely territorial tax by exempting dividends
from 10% owned foreign subsidiaries. It would lower the
corporate tax rate to 20% and provide a deemed repatriation
of existing earnings abroad (at a rate of 14% on cash and
7% on other assets in the House and 10% and 5%,
respectively, in the Senate).
Both proposals have new anti-abuse provisions. First, the
House bill would tax 50% of the income of foreign
subsidiaries in excess of a return on tangible assets of 7%
plus the federal short-term rate. The objective is to tax
intangible income by exempting a normal return to tangible
assets. Since the new tax rate is 20%, the tax rate will be
10%. A foreign tax credit is allowed for 80% of foreign
taxes paid. The treatment is global and not per-country
(allowing cross-crediting between low- and high-tax
countries), but the income and credits are in a separate
basket to prevent cross-crediting with other income.
Second, the House bill provides an allocation of interest
rule for affiliated firms that limits the share deducted to
110% of the share based on the share of the affiliate’s
earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation. This
provision is aimed at profit-shifting through leveraging.
apply if the firm elects to treat the income as effectively
connected (and thus subject to the corporate tax at the same
rate), and firms that so elect can get a credit for 80% of
foreign taxes paid. The payments exclude interest, certain
other financial payments, and the cost of services with no
markup if the payor uses a services cost method under
Section 482 (transfer pricing rules). This rule is aimed in
part at profit shifting through transfer pricing of goods and
royalties.
The Senate has four major provisions, with some
corresponding in general intent to the House provisions.
First, it imposes a tax on foreign source income also on a
global basis, with an exclusion for a 10% return on tangible
assets. A deduction will be allowed for 50% of income
through 2025 and 37.5% thereafter. Thus, the tax rate will
begin at 10% and rise to 12.5%. A foreign tax credit will be
allowed for 80% of foreign taxes paid.
Second, a tax deduction is allowed for foreign derived
intangible income of domestic firms of 37.5% through 2025
and 21.875% thereafter. Thus the rates would be 12.5% and
then 15.625%. Foreign derived intangible income is total
intangible income of the domestic firm multiplied by the
ratio of its exports (sales of goods and services abroad) to
gross income. The purpose of this provision is to encourage
intangible assets to stay in or return to the United States.
(There is also a provision to treat the fair-market value of
intangible property transferred by a foreign subsidiary to a
U.S. firm as the adjusted basis so that it makes the transfer
tax free.)
Third, the bill contains an allocation-of-interest rule for
affiliate firms that limits the share deducted to 110%
(beginning at 130% in 2018 and phased down to 110% by
2022) of the share allowed if it were proportional to the
share of debt to equity.
Fourth, a base erosion minimum tax imposes a minimum
tax of 10% (12.5% after 2025) on the total of base erosion
plus taxable income.
Arguments have been made that some elements of these
provisions would violate World Trade Organization rules
against export subsidies or violate existing tax treaties. The
foreign derived intangible income deduction may be viewed
as an export subsidy, while the base erosion taxes may be
viewed as a tax on imports. The requirement in the House
bill to consider foreign income as effectively connected
U.S. income to receive the foreign tax credit for intangible
income may violate treaty agreements about the rules for
permanent establishments, and the base erosion taxes may
also violate treaties.
This In Focus is part of a series of short CRS products on
tax reform. For more information, visit the “Taxes, The
Budget, & the Economy” Issue Area page at www.crs.gov.
Jane G. Gravelle, Senior Specialist in Economic Policy
Third, a base erosion tax of 20% is imposed on payments
by U.S. firms to foreign affiliates. The excise tax does not
https://crsreports.congress.gov
IF10699
Key Issues in Tax Reform: International Tax Issues
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