Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress

Order Code IB97004

CRS Issue Brief for Congress

Received through the CRS Web

Japan-U.S. Relations:

Issues for Congress

Updated May 3, 2006

Emma Chanlett-Avery (Coordinator),

Mark E. Manyin,

William H. Cooper

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

CONTENTS

SUMMARY

MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

The Role of Congress in U.S.-Japan Relations

Major Diplomatic and Security Issues

Global Issues

Counterterrorism Cooperation

Support for U.S. Policy Toward Iraq

United Nations Security Council Reform

Kyoto Protocol and Climate Change

Regional and Historical Issues

Converging Korean Peninsula Priorities

Japan-China Rivalry

Historical Issues Divide Asian Powers

Claims of Former World War II POWs and Civilian Internees

Military Issues

Deepening Cooperation

Article 9 Restrictions

Proposed Command Structure Changes

U.S. Bases on Okinawa

Burden-Sharing Issues

Cooperation on Missile Defense

Economic Issues

Japan’s Ban on U.S. Beef

The Byrd Amendment

The Doha Development Agenda

Japanese Political Developments

Koizumi’s Sweeping Victory in September 2005 Elections

Koizumi’s Successor

The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)

Constitutional Revision

Conclusion — Japan’s Increased Assertiveness

LEGISLATION

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Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress

SUMMARY

The post-World War II U.S.-Japan alliance has long been an anchor of the U.S.

security role in East Asia. The alliance, with

its access to bases in Japan, where about

53,000 U.S. troops are stationed, facilitates the

forward deployment of U.S. military forces in

the Asia-Pacific, thereby undergirding U.S.

national security strategy. For Japan, the

alliance and the U.S. nuclear umbrella provide

maneuvering room in dealing with its neighbors, particularly China and North Korea.

gional and global security. The envisioned

changes are intended to complement the

broader Pentagon goal of deploying a more

streamlined and mobile force in Asia.

Most of these developments have been

viewed warily by South Korea and opposed

outright by China. Beijing and Seoul also

have expressed concern at the assertive foreign policy stance adopted by Koizumi, who

has been buoyed by a heightened sense of

nationalism and vulnerability (to North Korea

and China) among many Japanese. In addition

to pursuing closer relations with Washington,

Tokyo has accelerated its bid for a permanent

seat on the U.N. Security Council. Koizumi’s

party also has drafted a new constitution that

would eliminate most of the clauses prohibiting participation in collective security arrangements. The United States has supported both

moves. Sino-Japanese and Korean-Japanese

tensions also have risen due to competing

territorial claims and accusations that Japan is

attempting to whitewash its history of aggression during the first half of the 20th Century.

In 2005, Congress showed a renewed

interest in U.S.-Japan relations. In recent

months, Members have expressed particular

interest in Japan’s ban on imports of U.S.

beef, Japan’s deteriorating relations with

China and South Korea, and Japanese politics,

including the battle to succeed Prime Minister

Junichiro Koizumi, who says he will step

down in September 2006.

The Bush Administration has made

significant strides in its goals of broadening

U.S.-Japan strategic cooperation and encouraging Japan to assume a more active international role. Following the September 11, 2001

terrorist attacks, Japan made its first-ever

military deployments in noncombat support of

U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan.

Koizumi also was a prominent backer of the

U.S. invasion of Iraq and in 2004 Tokyo sent

noncombat troops to Iraq, despite considerable

domestic opposition. Japan generally has

supported the “hardline” U.S. position in the

Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s nuclear

program. Japan is participating in bilateral

missile defense research and development. In

2005 the U.S. and Japan announced a sweeping new agreement to strengthen military

cooperation. The plan calls for U.S. forces to

be realigned and Japan to take on a more

active (non-combat) role in maintaining re-

Congressional Research Service

Japan is one of the United States’ most

important economic partners. Outside of

North America, it is the United States’ largest

export market and second-largest source of

imports. Japanese firms are the U.S.’ secondlargest source of foreign direct investment,

and Japanese investors are by far the largest

foreign holders of U.S. treasuries, helping to

finance the U.S. deficit and reduce upward

pressure on U.S. interest rates. Bilateral trade

friction has decreased in recent years, partly

because U.S. concern about the trade deficit

with Japan has been replaced by concern

about a much larger deficit with China. The

exception was U.S. criticism over Japan’s

decision in 2003 to ban imports of U.S. beef.

˜

The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

On May 1, senior U.S. and Japanese officials announced agreement on how to realign

U.S. troops in Japan, breaking a months-long stall in negotiations. In line with the Security

Consultative Committee (SCC, also known as the 2+2 Talks) earlier report, the “United

States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” lays out the final agreement,

including the key provision that Japan will bear over $6 billion of the estimated $10.2 billion

cost for relocating 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to a facility in Guam by 2014. Plans for

relocating the Futenma air base to a less-congested area of Okinawa were also confirmed.

Opposition party politicians and local government officials in Japan criticized the plan as

either too expensive for Japan or as not going far enough to relieve the burden on local

residents. Despite the agreement, the Japanese government will likely face continued

obstacles to full implementation of the plan.

Japan’s ban on U.S. beef imports remains in place. However, in Geneva on May 2,

2006, U.S. Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns and USTR Robert Portman met with Japan’s

Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries Minister Shoichi Nakagawa, who told them that the

decision on lifting the ban could come in June, perhaps in time for the summit meeting

scheduled between President Bush and Prime Minister Koizumi. Both the United States and

Japan confirmed new cases of “mad-cow disease” in March and April.

Sakie Yokota, the mother of a young girl abducted by North Korean agents in 1977,

testified in front of Congress and met with President Bush in a bid for greater international

pressure on Pyongyang to fully resolve the abductee issue.

The trend of diplomatic discord because of Japan’s history of colonial rule in Asia

continued in April. A long-standing dispute between Japan and South Korea over the

ownership of a set of rocks (known as Dokdo in Korean and Takeshima in Japanese) in the

sea between the two countries re-ignited when Japan

announced plans to send survey ships to the area.

Japan Country Data

After South Korea sent gunboats to block the ships,

diplomats temporarily diffused the crisis. On April

Population: 127.4 million (July 2005 est.)

21, nearly 100 Diet members visited the

% of Population over 64: 19.5% (U.S. =

12.4%) (2005)

controversial Yasukuni Shrine, a move likely to

Area: 377,835 sq km (slightly smaller

spark criticism from Seoul and Beijing.

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

The Role of Congress in U.S.Japan Relations

Congressional powers, actions, and oversight

form a backdrop against which both the

Administration and the Japanese government must

CRS-1

than California)

Life Expectancy: 81.15 years (2005)

Per Capita GDP: $29,400 (2004 est.)

purchasing power parity

Primary Export Partners: US 22.7%,

China 13.1%, South Korea 7.8%,

Taiwan 7.4% (2004)

Primary Import Partners: China 20.7%,

US 14%, South Korea 4.9%,

Australia 4.3% (2004)

Yen:Dollar Exchange Rate: 117.3

(2005), 108.3 (2004), 115.93

(2003), 125.39 (2002)

Foreign Exchange Reserves: $828.8

billion (2005)

Source: CIA World Factbook, July 2005,

IMF, US Treasury Department

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formulate their policies. In 2005, Congress showed a renewed interest in U.S.-Japan

relations. After holding two Japan-specific public hearings from 2001 through 2004,

Congress held three in 2005. In 2004 and 2005, Members of Congress were particularly

critical of Japan’s two-year ban on imports of U.S. beef — which was partially lifted in

December 2005 — and of the Bush Administration’s handling of the beef dispute. On

security issues, Members have expressed concern that steps taken by the Japanese

government are harming U.S. interests in East Asia by worsening Sino-Japanese and South

Korean-Japanese relations. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s continued visits to Yasukuni

Shrine, which enshrines the names of several Class A war criminals from World War II, has

come under particular criticism. Relatedly, some Members have called attention to signs that

revisionist views of World War II and the U.S. Occupation of Japan (1945-52) increasingly

are seeping into the mainstream in Japan. The Bush Administration’s reaction to and role

in fostering these developments also have begun to come under greater congressional

scrutiny. Congressional attention also has focused on Japan’s increased diplomatic and

military assertiveness, as well as dramatic political developments in Japan in 2005 and 2006.

(See also the “Legislation” section.)

Major Diplomatic and Security Issues1

The dominant theme in U.S.-Japan relations for the past five years has been deepened

alliance cooperation across a range of issues since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.

Prior to traveling to Asia in November 2005, President Bush described Prime Minister

Junichiro Koizumi as “one of the best friends that I have in the international arena.” During

the one-day summit between the two leaders in Kyoto in November 2005, Prime Minister

Koizumi said that the closer U.S.-Japan relations are, the “easier for us [Japan] to behave and

establish better relations with China, with South Korea and other nations in Asia.”

Global Issues

Counterterrorism Cooperation. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11,

2001, the Koizumi government initiated a series of unprecedented measures to protect

American facilities in Japan and provide non-lethal, “rear area” logistical support to U.S.

military operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. The latter mainly took

the form of at-sea replenishment of fuel oil and water to U.S., British, French, and other

allied warships operating in the Indian Ocean. The dispatch of Japan’s Maritime SelfDefense Forces (MSDF) was the first such deployment since World War II. From late 2001

through March 2005, a small flotilla of Japanese transport ships, oilers, and destroyers

provided about 30% of the fuel used by U.S. and allied warships, and Japan’s Air SelfDefense Force (ASDF) conducted hundreds of airlift support missions for U.S. forces. On

June 10, 2005, the Japanese government decided to extend its anti-terrorism law for two

years but to reduce its Indian Ocean deployment to only one escort ship. This effectively

brought to an end the post-9/11 role of the MSDF operations in the Indian Ocean and Persian

Gulf. After the United States, Japan also has been the leading donor country for Afghan relief

and reconstruction.

1

This section was written by Emma Chanlett-Avery.

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Support for U.S. Policy Toward Iraq. While strongly preferring a clear United

Nations role in resolving the U.S./British confrontation with Iraq, Japan nonetheless gave

almost unqualified support to the Bush Administration’s position. During an open debate in

the U.N. Security Council, Japan was one of only two out of 27 participating countries (the

other being Australia) to support the U.S. contention that even if the U.N. inspections were

strengthened and expanded, they were unlikely to lead to the elimination of Iraq’s weapons

of mass destruction. Since 2003, Japan has provided $1.5 billion in grant assistance to Iraq,

has pledged to provide $3.5 billion in yen loans, and has agreed to a phased cancellation of

80% of the approximately $7.5 billion in debt Iraq owed Japan. In addition, the Koizumi

government has deployed about 600 military personnel — mainly ground troops — to carry

out humanitarian aid and reconstruction activities in Iraq. In December 2005, the Japanese

Cabinet extended Japan’s deployment of troops to the southern Iraqi city of Samawah for one

year. When discussing the announcement, Prime Minister Koizumi hinted that Japan would

likely withdraw its troops if Australian and British troops withdraw in 2006. Australian

troops, along with the Dutch, have provided military protection for the Japanese deployment.

Although not confirmed by Japanese officials, anonymous U.S. officials have said that Japan

has expressed interest in heading up a “provincial reconstruction team,” or PRT, a program

proposed by the State Department to rebuild the country through locally-directed efforts. If

participating, Japan would be expected to provide its own airlift and other logistical needs.

United Nations Security Council Reform. In 2004, Japan accelerated its

longstanding efforts to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council

by forming a coalition with Germany, India, and Brazil (the so-called “G-4”) to achieve nonveto membership for all four countries. Though the Bush Administration has backed Japan’s

bid,2 it did not support the G-4 proposal and opposed taking a vote on expanding the Security

Council until a “broader consensus” on reforming the entire organization can be reached.

After the G-4 bid failed in the run-up to the U.N.’s Millennium Summit in September 2005,

Prime Minister Koizumi reportedly told Secretary General Kofi Annan that in the future

Japan would have to coordinate more closely with the United States to achieve its goal. To

become a new member, Japan needs to obtain support from two-thirds (128 countries) of all

the U.N. member countries. Japan is the second-largest contributor to the U.N. regular

budget, paying more than 20% of the total, more than twice the percentage paid by the thirdlargest contributor. After investigations revealed that mismanagement had allowed millions

of dollars to be lost to corruption in the oil-for-food program for Iraq, Japan threatened to

withhold part of its funding if drastic reforms were not adopted.

Kyoto Protocol and Climate Change. Japan is the fourth-leading producer of socalled greenhouse gases after the United States, the Russian Federation, and China. Under

the Kyoto Protocol, which Tokyo ratified in 2002, Japan is obligated to reduce its emissions

to 6% below its 1990 levels by 2010. Japanese industry shares many of the concerns of U.S.

industry about the cost and feasibility of achieving these reductions, but the Japanese

government, which places a high value on its support of the protocol, has expressed dismay

over the Bush Administration’s decision to back away from the protocol. In 2005, Japan

2

China and South Korea have criticized the Bush Administration for its support for Japan’s bid for

permanent U.N. Security Council membership.

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joined with the United States, China, India, South Korea, and Australia in a new, nonbinding, agreement. The Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate calls

on the six nations to cooperate on the development and diffusion of technology to combat

climate change, reduce pollution, and promote energy security. The group is designed to

“complement, but not replace, the Kyoto Protocol.” Some environmentalists have criticized

the arrangement for its absence of mandates — particularly on greenhouse gas emissions —

and for being a part of a suspected U.S. strategy to prevent the Kyoto Protocol from being

renewed after it expires in 2012.

Regional and Historical Issues

Converging Korean Peninsula Priorities. Japan’s policy toward North Korea has

hardened in recent years, drawing it closer to the U.S. position in the ongoing Six-Party Talks

on Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program. Japan has insisted on North Korea abandoning

its nuclear weapons, promising substantial aid in return; has taken steps to squeeze North

Korea economically; and participates in the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

Several prominent Japanese have called for Tokyo to impose sanctions against North Korea,

a step opposed by Koizumi and the Bush Administration. The issue of Japanese citizens

kidnapped in the 1970s and 1980s by North Korean agents has largely driven Tokyo’s harder

position. The Bush Administration and Congress have supported Japan’s insistence on a full

accounting of the fate of those abducted. The North Korean Human Rights Act (P.L.

108-333), passed by the 108th Congress and signed by President Bush in October 2004,

requires that U.S. nonhumanitarian assistance to North Korea depend on “substantial

progress” toward fully disclosing information on the abductees.

At the same time, Japan has reportedly encouraged the United States to adopt a more

flexible position; after a Koizumi-Bush meeting at the June 2004 G-8 Summit, the Bush

Administration submitted its first and only detailed negotiating position at the Six-Party

Talks. Additionally, outside the framework of the Talks, Koizumi has pursued an

independent channel of diplomacy with North Korea, holding summits with North Korean

leader Kim Jong-il in September 2002 and May 2004. Koizumi has not ruled out

normalizing relations between the two countries, which have never had official relations,

though he has made this contingent upon the settlement of the nuclear and abduction issues.

Normalization talks restarted in late 2005.3

Japan-China Rivalry. Despite extensive economic ties, relations between China and

Japan, always uneasy, have become increasingly strained. Political tensions are high on a

variety of sovereignty-related issues, and many observers see a potentially destabilizing spike

in nationalist animosity toward Japan among Chinese. In April 2005, large-scale antiJapanese demonstrations broke out in at least nine Chinese cities, including a violent protest

in Shanghai that damaged the Japanese consulate as well as shops that catered to the large

Japanese expatriate community. Many observers noted that the Chinese authorities were

unusually passive in allowing the protesters to organize, fueling speculation that Beijing

quietly encouraged the demonstrations.

3

For more, see CRS Issue Brief IB91141, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program, by Larry

Niksch.

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Beijing and Tokyo have faced a series of confrontations over the territorial rights of

areas in the East China Sea, which is potentially rich in oil and gas reserves. Japan considers

the area surrounding the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands to be part of its Exclusive Economic Zone

(EEZ). The Japanese Self Defense Force has detected periodic Chinese military activities

in the area, including a submarine incursion close to Okinawa and a fleet of warships near

a disputed gas field. Beijing has criticized the strengthening U.S.-Japan security relationship

and Japan’s increasingly public concern for Taiwan’s security. In another indication of

shifting relations, Japan has cut its assistance to China in half since 2000.

Historical Issues Divide Asian Powers. Historical grievances, particularly those

centered around Japan’s behavior during and preceding World War II, continue to aggravate

Japan’s relationships with its neighbors. The most consistently divisive issue involves the

visits of Japanese politicians to the Yasukuni Shrine, a Shinto shrine that honors Japanese

soldiers who died in war. Those enshrined include several Class A war criminals. Chinese

leaders have emphasized repeatedly that Prime Minister Koizumi’s Yasukuni visits constitute

a huge stumbling block in moving political relations forward. Koizumi’s fifth annual visit

to Yasukuni, in October 2005, again drew angry protests from Asian leaders: both Beijing

and Seoul cancelled upcoming bilateral meetings with the Japanese, but no widespread

demonstrations occurred in China. In a sign that the debate over Yasukuni is intensifying

among the Japanese elite, two of Japan’s most influential newspapers, the Yomiuri Shimbun

and the Asahi Shimbun, called for the establishment of a non-political alternative shrine that

excludes the Class A war criminals.

In a related vein, Japan has come under fire for some of its history textbooks for school

children. China insists that the texts misrepresent Japan’s past by downplaying the atrocities

committed by Japanese soldiers against civilian populations. South Korea also has

complained about Japanese history textbooks, the Yasukuni visits, and a perceived failure

by Japan to compensate Korean “comfort women” who were recruited to provide sexual

services for Japanese troops during World War II. Although the Japan-South Korean

disputes generally are regarded as more manageable than Sino-Japan tensions, the

disagreements over history are a major obstacle to improved Japan-South Korean ties, often

referred to as the “weak link” in the U.S. triangle of alliances in Northeast Asia.

Furthermore, the question of Japan’s historical legacy also has affected Korean and Chinese

views of the United States. Both countries have criticized the Bush Administration for its

silence regarding the controversy over the Yasukuni shrine and Japan’s record in accounting

for its past history of aggression. In November 2005, President Bush discussed rising

regional tensions during his bilateral summits with Koizumi and the leaders of China and

South Korea. During a trip to Japan and China in January 2006, Deputy Secretary of State

Robert Zoellick suggested that Chinese, Japan, and U.S. historians engage in “track two”

efforts to examine the history of World War II.

In a move that could open the door to disagreements between Japanese nationalists and

members of the U.S. Congress, in July 2005 the U.S. House of Representatives passed

H.Con.Res. 191, which commemorated the 60th anniversary of the end of the Pacific War.

The resolution stated that Congress reaffirmed the judgments rendered by the international

war crimes tribunal in Tokyo after World War II, including the conviction of Japanese

leaders for “crimes against humanity.”

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Claims of Former World War II POWs and Civilian Internees. Congress has

indicated interest in another issue in which the U.S. and Japanese governments have been in

essential agreement. A number of surviving American World War II Prisoners of War

(POWs) and civilian internees who were forced to work for Japanese companies — including

Mitsui, Nippon Steel, and Mitsubishi — during the war have filed suits in Japan and

California seeking compensation of $20,000 for each POW or internee for forced labor and

torture. Former POWs and civilian internees were paid about $1.00-2.50 for each day of

internment from a fund of seized Japanese assets administered by a War Claims Commission

(WCC) established by Congress in 1948. Thus far, the Japanese courts and the U.S. Court

of Claims have dismissed the suits on grounds that Japan’s obligations to pay compensation

were eliminated by Article 14 of the 1951 Multilateral Peace Treaty with Japan. The

Departments of State and Justice support the position of the Japanese government, but some

Members of Congress have sided with the plaintiffs. The core issue is whether the Peace

Treaty with Japan relieved only the Japanese government from future claims or whether it

covered private companies as well. A number of bills and amendments introduced in

Congress sought to block the executive branch from upholding the supremacy of the Peace

Treaty in civil suits. None have been enacted, in part due to opposition from the Bush

Administration.4

Military Issues5

Deepening Cooperation. Japan and the United States are military allies under a

security treaty concluded in 1951 and revised in 1960. Under the treaty, Japan grants the

United States military base rights on its territory in return for a U.S. pledge to protect Japan’s

security. In October 2005, at a Security Consultative Committee meeting (SCC, also known

as the 2+2 meeting) of the Japanese and U.S. foreign and defense ministers, the two sides

released an interim report, Transformation and Realignment for the Future, announcing

several significant steps that will expand the alliance beyond its existing framework. A

follow-up implementation plan was announced in May 2006. As U.S. personnel and

facilities in Japan are realigned as part of the broader Pentagon strategy of deploying a more

streamlined and mobile force, Japan is to take a more active role in contributing to global

stability, primarily through increased coordination with the U.S. military. Key features of

the new arrangement include a reduction in the number of U.S. Marines in Japan, the

relocation of a problematic air base in Okinawa, the deployment of a an X-Band radar system

in Japan as part of a missile defense system, expanded bilateral cooperation in training and

intelligence sharing, and Japan’s acceptance of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier in the

Yokosuka Naval Base. Many of the agreement’s most controversial elements are likely to

face continued obstacles, particularly from local Japanese politicians in the areas identified

to host new facilities and troops. In March 2006, 89% of voters in Yamaguchi prefecture

voted against expanding the Iwakuni base to accommodate more U.S. troops in a nonbinding referendum, and scheduled talks on the realignment were postponed.

4

See CRS Report RL30606, U.S. Prisoners of War and Civilian American Citizens Captured and

Interned by Japan in World War II, archived but available by request from the coordinator.

5

This section written by Emma Chanlett-Avery.

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The most recent overhaul builds upon the 1997 revised defense cooperation guidelines

that grant the U.S. military greater use of Japanese installations in time of crisis and refer to

a possible, limited Japanese military role in “situations in areas surrounding Japan.” At the

“2 + 2” meeting in February 2005, Secretaries Rice and Rumsfeld, along with their Japanese

counterparts, outlined a more global and integrated vision of the alliance, specifically

mentioning issues related to the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Straits as “common

strategic objectives” for “peaceful resolution.” Defense officials continue to stress, however,

that the Japanese military will not be involved in combat missions but instead limit its

contributions to logistical support for counterterrorism operations or to humanitarian and

reconstruction efforts.

In recent years Japan has edged closer to a more independent self-defense posture in

both practice and in published security strategies. Japan’s National Defense Program

Guidelines (NDPG) approved in December 2004 call on Japan to become more engaged

militarily in the Indian Ocean region from the Middle East to Southeast Asia, permit military

exports to the United States for development of joint missile defense, mention China as a

security problem (the first such mention in a five-year plan), and increase the size of rapid

reaction forces, whose main mission is to prevent infiltration from North Korea.

Article 9 Restrictions. In general, Japan’s U.S.-drafted constitution remains a major

obstacle to closer U.S.-Japan defense cooperation because of a prevailing constitutional

interpretation of Article 9 that forbids engaging in “collective defense”; that is, combat

cooperation with the United States against a third country. Article 9 outlaws war as a

“sovereign right” of Japan and prohibits “the right of belligerency.” It provides that “land,

sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential will never be maintained.” Whereas in the

past, Japanese public opinion strongly supported the limitations placed on the Self-Defense

Force (SDF), this opposition has softened considerably in recent years. (See “Constitutional

Revision”). Since 1991, Japan has allowed the SDF to participate in non-combat roles in a

number of United Nations peacekeeping missions and in the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq.

Japan’s agreement in 2005 to house a new, nuclear-powered carrier in Yokosuka beginning

in 2008 after the existing carrier is decommissioned has sparked local protests.

Proposed Command Structure Changes. The October 2005 interim report

outlines major command changes agreed to by Japanese and U.S. officials. One would shift

300 soldiers from the 1st Army Corps headquarters from Washington State to Camp Zama

to establish a deployable headquarters. The Ground Self Defense Forces would also base a

rapid-response headquarters at Camp Zama. A bilateral and joint operations center is to be

built at Yokota Air Base (about 23 miles northwest of Tokyo) to enhance coordination

between the Japanese and U.S. air and missile defense command elements. The headquarters

of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force, meanwhile, would be moved from Okinawa to Guam,

reducing the number of marines in Okinawa by about 8,000.

U.S. Bases on Okinawa. The reduction of marines on Okinawa seeks to quell the

political controversy that has surrounded the presence of U.S. forces on the island for years.

Public outcry against the bases has continued since the 1995 rape of a Japanese schoolgirl

by American servicemen, which galvanized underlying resentments. Though constituting

less than 1% of Japan’s land mass, Okinawa currently hosts 65% of the total U.S. forces in

Japan. Okinawan politicians have called for a renegotiation of the Japan-U.S. Status of

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Forces Agreement (SOFA) and a reduction in U.S. troop strength. The U.S. and Japanese

governments oppose revising the SOFA, but have acknowledged the political demand to

alleviate the burden of military presence in Okinawa.

As part of the realignment of U.S. bases, U.S. officials agreed to move most aircraft and

crews constituting the marine air station at Futenma to expanded facilities at Camp Schwab,

located in Nago, a less-congested area of Okinawa. Campaigns for Nago’s January mayoral

election indicated resistance to the relocation, as all candidates criticized the plan.

Disagreements over the relocation of the Futenma air station had stalled the implementation

of a 1996 U.S.-Japanese Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) agreement under

which the U.S. military would relinquish some bases and land on Okinawa (21% of the total

land in the bases) over seven years.

Burden-Sharing Issues. The United States has pressed Japan to increase its share

of the costs of American troops and bases. According to a Pentagon report, in 2004, Japan

provided $4.4 billion in direct and indirect Host Nation Support (HNS), which is 75% of the

total cost of maintaining troops in Japan. In 2004, Japanese officials reportedly suggested

that HNS be reduced on grounds that Japan is now making a greater direct contribution to

the alliance. In January, Japan renewed its pledge to provide $1.2 billion in direct support

for each of the next two years to U.S. forces amid controversy over how much of the cost of

relocating forces will be shouldered by Japan. In May 2006, Japan agreed to shoulder 59%

(over $6 billion) of the estimated cost of relocating forces from Okinawa to Guam.

Cooperation on Missile Defense. A U.S.-Japan program of cooperative research

and development of anti-ballistic missiles began in 1999. Proponents of missile defense

justify it on the basis of North Korea’s missile program, but China opposes the program.

Prime Minister Koizumi announced in December 2003 that Japan would acquire the groundbased U.S. Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) system and the ship-based U.S. Standard

Missile-3 system. The Defense Agency reportedly plans to begin deploying the missile

defense system around major Japanese cities by March 2007. In December 2005, the Agency

announced that Japan will pay over $1 billion for the project over nine years.

Economic Issues6

Despite Japan’s long economic slump, trade and other economic ties with Japan remain

highly important to U.S. national interests and, therefore, to the U.S. Congress.7 By the most

conventional method of measurement, the United States and Japan are the world’s two

largest economies,8 accounting for around 40% of world gross domestic product (GDP), and

their mutual relationship not only has an impact on each other but on the world as a whole.

6

This section was written by William Cooper.

7

For a more complete treatment of U.S.-Japan economic ties, see CRS Report RL32649, U.S.-Japan

Economic Relations: Significance, Prospects, and Policy Options, by William H. Cooper.

8

China’s economy is now larger than Japan’s by another method of measurement: purchasing power

parity.

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Furthermore, their economies are intertwined by merchandise trade, trade in services, and

foreign investments.

Although Japan remains important economically to the United States, its importance

has slid as it has been edged out by other trade partners. Japan is the United States’s thirdlargest merchandise export market (behind Canada and Mexico) and the fourth-largest source

for U.S. merchandise imports (behind Canada, Mexico, and China) as of the first six months

of 2005. At one time Japan was the largest source of foreign direct investment in the United

States, but, as of the end of 2004, it was the second largest source (behind the United

Kingdom). It was the fifth-largest target for U.S. foreign direct investment abroad as of the

end of 2004. The United States remains Japan’s largest export market and second-largest

source of imports as of the end of July 2005.

Japan’s domestic economic conditions have influenced the U.S.-Japan economic

agenda. Except for some brief periods, Japan had incurred stagnant or negative economic

growth in the 1990s and the first few years of this decade. However, Japan recently has

shown signs of achieving sustained economic recovery.

Some long-standing trade disputes continue to irritate the relationship. The U.S.

bilateral trade deficit with Japan reached $81.3 billion in 2000. However, in 2001, the U.S.

trade deficit declined 15%, primarily because of the slowdown in the U.S. economy, but

increased moderately to $70.1 billion in 2002. The trade deficit decreased slightly to $66.0

billion in 2003 but increased to $75.2 billion in 2004 and to $82.7 billion in 2005, breaking

the record set in 2000. (See Table 1.)

There have been complaints from U.S. industry and certain Members of Congress about

the Japanese government’s massive intervention in currency markets in 2003 and early 2004

to slow the Japanese yen’s appreciation against the U.S. dollar. Some legislation has been

introduced regarding the alleged currency manipulation. While many of the bills target

China’s exchange rate practice, some do refer to Japan. For example, S. 377 (Lieberman),

The Fair Currency Enforcement Act of 2005, lists Japan as a country, among others, that has

implemented exchange rate policies that give its exports an unfair competitive advantage in

the U.S. market, and the bill states that experts have estimated that the yen is undervalued

by about at least 20%. The bill would authorize the President to take actions under U.S.

trade laws to retaliate, if a country is found to be manipulating its currency values.9

In addition, the recent announcement by the Ford Corporation of factory closings and

the layoff of some 30,000 auto employees exemplified growing problems of the U.S.-based

auto industry. In a November 22, 2005 speech he delivered at the National Press Club, Ford

Chairman Bill Ford stated among other things that U.S. auto manufacturers face the financial

burdens of pension costs and health care benefits that Japanese auto companies, such as

Toyota, do not face because the Japanese government finances these costs, thereby placing

the burden on the whole society and not just on Japanese business. While Ford’s argument

for his company’s problems is subject to debate, his remarks may signify the re-emergence

of Japanese industrial policy as a point of contention in the bilateral relationship.

9

For more, see CRS Report RL33178, Japan’s Currency Intervention, by Dick K. Nanto.

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Table 1. U.S. Trade with Japan, Selected Years

($ billions)

Year

1995

2000

2003

2004

2005

Exports

64.3

65.3

52.1

54.4

55.4

Imports

123.5

146.6

118.0

129.6

138.1

Balances

- 59.1

- 81.3

-66.0

-75.2

-82.7

Source: U.S. Commerce Department, Census Bureau. FT900. Exports are total exports valued

on a free alongside ship (f.a.s.) basis. Imports are general imports valued on a customs basis.

Japan’s Ban on U.S. Beef.10 On January 20, 2006, Japan reimposed a ban on beef

imports from the United States after having lifted it on December 12, 2005. Japan re-imposed

the ban after government inspectors found bone material in beef shipments from the United

States, among the first shipments to have arrived after the ban was lifted. The presence of

the bone material violated the procedures U.S. and Japanese officials reached that allowed

the resumption of the U.S. beef shipments. U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Johanns expressed

regret that the prohibited material had entered the shipments. It is not clear when U.S. beef

shipments to Japan can resume. On May 2, 2006, in Geneva, U.S. Agriculture Secretary

Mike Johanns and USTR Robert Portman met with Japan’s Agriculture, Forestry, and

Fisheries Minister Shoichi Nakagawa, who told them that the decision on lifting the ban

could be made by June, perhaps in time for the summit meeting between President Bush and

Prime Minister Koizumi.

On February 17, 2006, the U.S. Department of Agriculture released a report of its

investigation of how the prohibited material got shipped. Japanese officials stated that while

the report explained the incident in question it also revealed that there had been other

violations of the conditions for resumption of U.S. beef shipments, raising the possibility of

a further delay in the lifting of the ban.11 On March 10, 2006, U.S. Agriculture Secretary

Mike Johanns met with his Japanese counterpart, Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries

Minister Shoichi Nakagawa, in London, and discussed, among other things, the current

Japanese ban on imports of U.S. beef. He indicated that the United States was responding

to questions regarding the U.S. meat inspection procedures and how prohibited material got

into a shipment to Japan that caused Japan to impose the latest ban. The two officials did

not indicate a time when the ban could be lifted.

Japan imposed the original ban in December 2003, in response to the discovery of the

first U.S. case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE or “mad cow disease”) in

Washington state. In the months before the diagnosis in the United States, nearly a dozen

Japanese cows infected with BSE had been discovered, creating a scandal over the

Agricultural Ministry’s handling of the issue (several more Japanese BSE cases have since

emerged). Japan had retained the ban despite ongoing negotiations and public pressure from

10

For more information, see CRS Report RS21709, Mad Cow Disease and U.S. Beef Trade, by

Charles Hanrahan and Geoffrey Becker.

11

Inside U.S. Trade. February 24, 2006.

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Bush Administration officials, a reported framework agreement (issued jointly by both

governments) in October 2004 to end it, and periodic assurances afterward by Japanese

officials to their U.S. counterparts that it would be lifted soon.

House Agriculture Committee Chairman Bob Goodlatte stated on January 31, 2006,

urged Japan to re-open their market to U.S. beef quickly or face “a dramatic response from

the U.S. Congress.” Senator Saxby Chambliss, chair of the Agriculture, Nutrition, and

Forestry Committee stated on February 17 that both governments understand what caused

the “one lapse” in the U.S. resumption of beef shipments to Japan.

The Byrd Amendment. Japan, together with other major trading partners, has

challenged U.S. trade laws and actions in the World Trade Organization (WTO). For

example, Japan and others challenged the U.S. 1916 Antidumping Law and the so-called

Byrd Amendment (which allows revenues from countervailing duty and antidumping orders

to be distributed to those who had been injured). In both cases, the WTO ruled in Japan’s

favor. Legislation to repeal the 1916 law was passed by the 108th Congress. In November

2004, the WTO authorized Japan and the other countries to impose sanctions against the

United States. In September 2005, Japan imposed 15% tariffs on selected imports of U.S.

steel products as retaliation, joining the EU and Canada. It is the first time that Japan has

imposed punitive tariffs on U.S. products. In the meantime, a repeal of the Byrd Amendment

was included in the conference report for S. 1932, the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, that

received final congressional action on action February 1, 2006, and was signed by the

President into law (P.L. 109-171) on February 8, 2006. The measure phases out the program

over a period ending October 1, 2007.12 Although Japan has praised the repeal of the Byrd

Amendment, it has criticized the delayed termination of the program and has maintained the

sanctions on imports from the United States.

The Doha Development Agenda. Japan and the United States are major supporters

of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), the latest round of negotiations in the WTO. Yet,

the two have taken divergent positions in some critical areas of the agenda. For example, the

United States, Australia, and other major agricultural exporting countries have pressed for

the reduction or removal of barriers to agricultural imports and subsidies of agricultural

production, a position strongly resisted by Japan and the European Union. At the same time,

Japan and others have argued that national antidumping laws and actions that member

countries have taken should be examined during the DDA, with the possibility of changing

them, a position that the United States has opposed.

Despite some outstanding issues, tensions in the U.S.-Japan bilateral economic

relationship have been much lower than was the case in the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s.

A number of factors may be contributing to this trend: Japan’s economic problems in the

1990s and in the first few years of this decade changed the general U.S. perception of Japan

as an economic “threat” to one of a country with problems; the rise of China as an economic

power has caused U.S. policymakers to shift attention from Japan to China as a source of

12

For more information on the Byrd Amendment, see CRS Report RL33045, the Continued

Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (“The Byrd Amendment”), by Jeanne J. Grimmett and Vivian C.

Jones.

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concern; the increased use by both Japan and the United States of the WTO as a forum for

resolving trade disputes has de-politicized disputes and helped to reduce friction; and the

emphasis in the bilateral relationship has shifted from economic to security matters.

Japanese Political Developments13

In general, Japan’s political peculiarities both constrain and enhance U.S. influence over

Japanese policy. Compared to most industrialized democracies, the Japanese Diet

(parliament) is structurally weak, as is the office of the prime minister and his cabinet.

Though Koizumi and his immediate predecessors have increased politicians’ influence

relative to Japan’s bureaucrats, with important exceptions Japan’s policymaking process still

tends to be compartmentalized and bureaucratized, making it difficult to make trade-offs

among competing constituencies on divisive issues. The result is often paralysis or

incremental changes at the margins of policy. On some issues this can provide the United

States with an opening to use foreign pressure (gaiatsu) to break policy logjams.

On the other hand, the nature of Japan’s policymaking process makes it difficult for

Japanese leaders to reach controversial agreements with foreign countries. Japan’s structural

debilities also have tended to retard its ability to act decisively and proactively in the

international sphere — often to the frustration of the United States — though this

characteristic is less pronounced today than a decade ago. Because Prime Minister Koizumi

has centralized power to a greater extent than his predecessors, and because he has aligned

Japanese foreign policy so closely to the United States, his expected resignation in September

2006 could have a larger-than-usual impact on U.S.-Japan relations.

Koizumi’s Sweeping Victory in September 2005 Elections. Junichiro

Koizumi is Japan’s fourth-longest serving prime minister since 1945, and he has used his

popularity to bolster power in the prime minister’s office at the expense of the previously

powerful factions in his ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Koizumi’s influence

appears to have been greatly enhanced on September 11, 2005, when he led the LDP to a

landslide victory in nationwide elections for the Lower House of the Japanese parliament (the

Diet). The LDP won 296 of 480 seats, its largest total in nearly 20 years, and 84 seats higher

than its position before the election. The next Lower House elections are not required to be

held until September 2009.

Koizumi’s victory appears to have further weakened the LDP’s conservative “old

guard,” whose power Koizumi has gradually reduced since he came to power in 2001.

Koizumi exercised his right to call a snap Lower House election after many LDP members

helped engineer the defeat in the Upper House of his controversial proposal to privatize the

Japanese postal system.14 The LDP narrowly controls the Upper House only through a

coalition with a smaller party. During the campaign, Koizumi successfully made his postal

privatization plan the dominant issue. He expelled 37 “postal rebels” from the LDP,

13

This section was written by Mark Manyin.

In addition to providing mail delivery, Japan Post also functions as the country’s (and perhaps the

world’s) largest bank and life insurer, with about ¥350 trillion (approximately $3 trillion) in deposits.

14

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recruiting many younger, reform-minded “assassin” candidates — including many women

— to run against them. Claiming a mandate for postal reform, Koizumi reintroduced and

secured passage of his postal privatization bill.

The medium-term implications of Koizumi’s victory are uncertain because he

repeatedly has stated that he will step down from his position as LDP President when his

term expires in September 2006. (Traditionally, the LDP President assumes the

premiership.) A number of prominent LDP members have called for rewriting the party’s

rules to allow Koizumi to extend his term, but to date Koizumi repeatedly has resisted these

entreaties, saying only that he expects his successor to advance his reform agenda. This

includes shrinking the size of government, making the LDP more responsive to its president,

and devolving budget authority to Japan’s prefectures (states).

Koizumi’s Successor. After his election victory, Koizumi said that he wants his

successor to carry on his reforms and that he would reshuffle his Cabinet in order to give a

chance for potential successors to gain more experience. On October 31, 2005, he appointed

a new Cabinet, giving prominent positions to three individuals who are widely thought will

seek the LDP presidency in 2006. Shinzo Abe (51 years old) — known for his hawkish

views on North Korea, China, and history issues — was given the important position of

Chief Cabinet Secretary, a post gives him nearly daily exposure on the Japanese media, as

well as the power to allocate the LDP’s political funds to individual politicians. Another

hardliner, Taro Aso (65) — who is known as an advocate of closer relations with Taiwan —

was given the Foreign Ministry portfolio. Sadakazu Tanigaki (60) was reappointed as

Finance Minister. Notably, another would-be prime minister, Koizumi’s former Chief

Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda (69), was left out of the Cabinet altogether. Fukuda

reportedly has advocated a somewhat more conciliatory position toward China and South

Korea and was a chief architect of Koizumi’s policy of normalizing relations with North

Korea. Fukuda also is a member of a parliamentary league promoting the construction of a

secular national war memorial that ostensibly would allow Japanese politicians to pay their

respects to Japan’s war dead without visiting the controversial Yasukuni shrine.

Koizumi’s political authority generally is considered to have declined since the

September 2005 election, due to several factors, including the emergence of several political

and corruption scandals popularly associated with his reforms; the apparent stagnation of

many of Koizumi’s reformist measures (such as overhauling Japan’s road-building process);

the increased focus on potential successors; and the passage in March 2006 of his last budget,

which is his Cabinet’s last major piece of “must-pass” legislation.

The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). The election also appeared — at least for

the moment — to stall the emergence of a two-party system in Japan. The LDP has ruled

almost continuously since its formation in 1955. Over the past three years, Japan’s largest

opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), seemed to be emerging as a viable

candidate to defeat the LDP. In several elections in the early part of the decade, the DPJ

steadily increased its strength in the Diet by winning over reform-minded urban and

independent voters, who were attracted to the DPJ’s economic reform platform that in many

ways is more radical than Koizumi’s. In the September 2005 election, however, many of

these voters opted for Koizumi’s rebranded LDP. As a result, the DPJ lost more than one-

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third of its strength; the party now has 113 seats in the Lower House, down from 175 before

the election, and the party’s leader resigned to take responsibility for the defeat.

A week after the vote, the DPJ elected 43-year-old Seiji Maehara — known as a realist

on security and defense issues — to be the new party president. However, Maehara and the

entire DPJ leadership resigned in March 2006, in response to widespread criticism over their

handling of a political scandal. The following month, the party’s Diet members selected

longtime political leader Ichiro Ozawa (63), once a top LDP leader before he defected to the

DPJ in mid-1993 to press for sweeping reform in the Japanese political system. The DPJ

will hold a more traditional election for party president in September 2006. Since leaving

the LDP, Ozawa has pushed for reforming Japan’s political and economic systems, as well

as adopting a more assertive and independent foreign policy. Following his selection, Ozawa

stated that he would push for “a U.N.-centered national security policy” that has the

Japan-U.S. alliance “as a pivot, but emphasizes Asia.”15 He has criticized Prime Minister

Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni Shrine. In the past, Ozawa has been hampered by what many

see as his top-down management style and his political opportunism.

Constitutional Revision. Japan’s constitution was drafted in 1946 by the U.S.

Occupation authorities, who then imposed it on a reluctant Japanese legislature. Since the

early 1990s, previously strong public opposition to revising the constitution has gradually

weakened and public opinion polls now show widespread support for some sort of revision.

In October 2005, Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) released its long-awaited

draft revision of the Japanese constitution. The most notable changes reduce many —

though not all — of the provisions in the war-renouncing clause (Article 9) that set limits on

Japan’s military activities. After renouncing war and the “threat or use of force as a means

of settling international disputes,” the proposed revision explicitly states that Japan “shall

maintain armed forces for self-defense” that operate under the prime minister and are subject

to the Diet’s approval and direction. The explicit mention of a military force is designed to

rectify the disconnect between the current constitution — which says that “land, sea, and air

forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained” — and the reality that Japan

possesses a Self Defense Force. More importantly, the LDP’s draft appears to allow Japan

to participate in collective security arrangements by stating that the armed forces “may act

in international cooperation to ensure the international community’s peace and security.”

Both the LDP and the DPJ are split between relatively hawkish and pacifist wings that

appear to be sparring over the question of whether or not conditions (such as United Nations

backing) should be attached to the right to join collective security arrangements. In other

words, the issue is not whether, but how, Article 9 should be revised, a development that is

due in part to increased concerns about North Korea and China. In March 2005, Japan’s

House of Representatives Research Commission on the Constitution, composed of

representatives from various parties, released a report indicating that over two-thirds of

members generally favor constitutional provisions allowing Japan to join U.N. collective

security arrangements, stipulating the Self-Defense Forces’ existence, and maintaining some

portion of the war-renouncing clause of Article 9. A wide majority of the commission also

favored allowing women to serve as emperor, establishing stronger privacy and

15

Ozawa Elected as New President,” DPJ Press Release. April 7, 2006.

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environmental rights, creating a constitutional court, and revising Japan’s federalist system.

Constitutional amendments must be approved by two-thirds of each chamber, after which

they are to be “submitted to the people” for majority approval. LDP and the DPJ officials

have expressed their support, in principle, for Koizumi’s proposal to pass by the middle of

2006 legislation detailing how a national constitutional referendum would be conducted.

Coordinating the legislation has proved difficult, however, leading some to speculate that a

measure will not be introduced before the LDP and DPJ presidential elections in September.

Conclusion — Japan’s Increased Assertiveness16

Since the late 1990s, Japan has displayed a more assertive foreign policy, a process that

Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi has accelerated since coming to power in 2001. The new

assertiveness has manifested itself in at least four notable ways. First, under Prime Minister

Koizumi, Japan has intensified its cooperation with the United States, and Koizumi has

developed a strong personal relationship with President Bush. Second, Tokyo has hardened

its policies toward Beijing, slashing its bilateral aid program, not backing down from

territorial and historical disputes, and reorienting the U.S.-Japan alliance to give both

countries more flexibility to respond to perceived and actual threats from China. Third,

Japan has attempted to exert more influence in Southeast Asia and on the global stage, as

evidenced by its pursuit of a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council and its negotiation

of free trade agreements (FTAs) with a number of Southeast Asian countries. Fourth,

Japanese leaders have sought to make Japan a more “normal” country by legitimizing the

military’s ability to participate in collective security arrangements and take actions — such

as firing at hostile foreign ships in Japanese waters — that most other nations take for

granted. Currently, Japan’s military role is highly conscribed by the constitution’s warrenouncing clause of Article 9.

The motivations for Japan’s increasing foreign policy assertiveness are both external

and internal. Domestically, Koizumi has found that breaking from Japan’s traditionally

passive foreign policy posture has played well with politically influential right-of-center —

not to mention right-wing — groups. Many elements of his policies also have resonated

among the population as a whole, as ordinary Japanese have become much more security

conscious since North Korea’s missile launch in 1998. In general, the negative implications

of China’s economic and military rise are viewed with deepening concern in Japan,

particularly when seen against the backdrop of Japan’s decade-long economic slump. Many

Japanese worry that they gradually are ceding leadership in East Asia to China, and that the

after-effects of this shift will harm Japanese interests. In the shorter term, anxieties have

been raised by the intensifying disputes with China and by North Korea’s nuclear weapons

and missile programs.

In general, the Bush Administration has encouraged Tokyo’s rising assertiveness, which

thus far has tended to dovetail with U.S. interests in the strategic realm. In the future,

however, it is likely that a more active Japan will be more willing to question U.S. policies

on a range of strategic issues where U.S. and Japanese interests do not coincide or where

16

This section was written by Mark Manyin.

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domestic factors push Japanese leaders to avoid being perceived as being too close to the

United States.

LEGISLATION

P.L. 109-5 (S. 384). Extends the existence of the Nazi War Crimes and Japanese

Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group for two years. Passed by both

houses and signed into law by President Bush in March 2005.

P.L. 109-97 (H.R. 2744). The Agriculture Appropriations Act of 2006. Signed into

law (P.L. 109-97) November 10, 2005. The Senate-passed version included two

amendments, adopted on September 20, 2005, that would have denied funds to implement

a rule to lift the U.S. ban on Japanese beef until Japan has lifted its ban on imports of U.S.

beef (S.Amdt. 1732 agreed to by a vote of 72-26); and that expressed the sense of the Senate

that the U.S. ban on imported Japanese beef should remain in place until Japan has lifted its

ban on imports of U.S. beef (S.Amdt. 1738, agreed to by voice vote). House and Senate

conferees did not include either amendment in the final bill, though the conference report

(H.Rept. 109-255) says Congress “clearly reserve[s] the right to impose restrictions similar

to those suggested by the Senate if there is not a swift resolution to this issue.”

P.L. 109-114 (H.R. 2528). Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act of 2006. Section 118

requires the Defense Department to report by February 15 on U.S. efforts to encourage Japan

and other allied countries to increase their share of the allied defense burden. Became public

law on November 30, 2005.

P.L. 109-171 (S. 1932). The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005. The conference report

includes a repeal of the Byrd Amendment. Received final congressional action on February

1, 2006, and was signed by the President into law on February 8, 2006. The measure phases

out the program over a period ending October 1, 2007.

H.Con.Res. 68 (Evans). Expresses the sense of Congress that the Government of Japan

should formally issue a clear and unambiguous apology for the sexual enslavement of

“comfort women” during the colonial occupation of Asia. Introduced March 17, 2005;

referred to House Asia Pacific Subcommittee.

H.Con.Res. 168 (Hyde). Condemns the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for

the abductions and continued captivity of citizens of the Republic of Korea and Japan.

Passed by the House (362-1) on July 11, 2005; referred to Senate Foreign Relations

Committee.

H.Con.Res. 191 (Hyde). Commemorates the 60th anniversary of the conclusion of the

War in the Pacific and reaffirms the judgments rendered by the International Military

Tribunal for the Far East of 1946-1948, including the conviction of certain individuals as war

criminals. Passed by the House (399-0) on July 14, 2005; referred to the Senate Committee

on Foreign Relations.

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H.Con.Res. 311 (Ramstad)/S.Con.Res. 67 (Coleman). Urges Japan to honor its

commitments under a 1986 bilateral agreement on medical equipment and pharmaceuticals.

House bill introduced December 7, 2005; referred to House Ways and Means Committee.

Senate bill introduced November 18, 2005; referred to Foreign Relations Committee.

H.Res. 137 (Moran)/S.Res. 87 (Thune). Express the sense of the respective Houses

of Congress that the U.S. government should impose economic sanctions against Japan, if

Japan does not lift its ban on U.S. beef. Neither resolution has seen committee action.

H.Res. 321 (Leach). Expresses support for a “regionally balanced expansion” of the

membership of the United Nations Security Council, which would include adding Japan,

India, Germany, Brazil, and an African country. Introduced June 15, 2005; referred to the

House Committee on International Relations.

H.R. 30 (Mica). To provide compensation for certain World War II veterans who

survived the Bataan Death March and were held as prisoners of war by the Japanese.

Introduced January 4, 2005; referred to House Committee on Armed Services. Similar

legislation in the 108th Congress (H.R. 595) did not see action outside of committee.

H.R. 4179 (Salazar) and S. 1922 (Conrad). Require the President to impose extra

tariffs on various Japanese products beginning on January 1, 2006, if Japan has not lifted its

ban on imports of U.S. beef. H.R. 4179 introduced October 28, 2005; referred to House

Ways and Means Committee. S. 1922 introduced October 26, 2005; referred to Senate

Finance Committee.

S. 377 (Lieberman). Requires negotiation and appropriate action with Japan, China,

and other countries that have engaged in currency manipulation. Introduced February 15,

2005; referred to Senate Finance Committee.

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