Jordan: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues

Order Code IB93085

CRS Issue Brief for Congress

Received through the CRS Web

Jordan: U.S. Relations

and Bilateral Issues

Updated April 26, 2006

Alfred B. Prados

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

CONTENTS

SUMMARY

MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

Jordanian Issues of U.S. Interest

Stability of the Regime and Succession

Course of Domestic Reforms

Political

Economic

Recent Governmental Changes

Professional Associations

Jordan and the War on Terrorism

Murder of a U.S. Diplomat

Plot, 2004

Abortive Rocket Attack, 2005

Hotel Bombings

Jordan’s Role in the Peace Negotiations

Peace Agreements and Normalization

Opposition to Normalization

Further Arab-Israeli Negotiations

The West Bank and East Jerusalem

Hamas and Rejectionist Groups

Course of Jordanian-Iraqi Relations

Iraq: Jordanian Policy Toward the War and Its Aftermath

Iraq Training Support and Troop Support

Equipment

Suicide Bombing in Iraq, 2005

Sources of Oil Supply

Other Issues

Other Regional Relations

Relations with Iran

U.S. Aid and Trade Issues

Aid and Funding Levels

Previous and Recent Aid

FY2004 Assistance

FY2005 Assistance

FY2006 Assistance

FY2007 and Other Funds

Trade Issues

Free Trade Agreement

Qualifying Industrial Zones

Reform and Development Initiatives

Armed Forces Modernization

Military Equipment

Military Cooperation

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Jordan: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues

SUMMARY

$225 million in annual U.S. assistance. Jordan received $450 million in FY2003, plus

over a billion dollars in a supplemental to help

Jordan deal with added expenses resulting

from the war on terrorism and the war in Iraq.

Several issues in U.S.-Jordanian relations

are likely to figure in decisions by Congress

and the Administration on future aid to and

cooperation with Jordan. These include the

stability of the Jordanian regime, democratic

reform under way in Jordan, the role of Jordan

in the Arab-Israeli peace process, Jordan’s

concerns over the U.S.-led campaign against

Iraq in 2003, and its relations with other

regional states. Following the 9/11 attacks,

Jordan issued bans on banking operations

linked to terrorist activities and pursued individuals linked to Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda

organization. Jordan also sent military medical and mine clearing units to Afghanistan in

December 2001 to support the U.S.-led campaign against terrorism, and a field hospital to

Iraq in April 2003 during Operation Iraqi

Freedom. Jordan is also helping train Iraqi

police and military personnel in Iraq’s newly

organized security forces. Jordan has been

targeted on several occasions by Al Qaeda

affiliates, most recently on November 9, 2005,

when near simultaneous explosions at three

western-owned hotels in the Jordanian capital

of Amman killed 58 persons. A group allied

with bin Laden and known as “Al Qaeda in

Iraq”, headed by Jordanian-born Abu Musab

al-Zarqawi, claimed responsibility.

The Administration requested $250

million in economic assistance and $206

million in military assistance for Jordan in

FY2004 and FY2005. These amounts were

included in consolidated appropriations acts

for these two fiscal years (P.L. 108-199,

January 23, 2004, and P.L. 108-447, December 8, 2004). In addition, the Administration

requested $100 million in economic assistance

for Jordan in FY2004 supplemental funds and

$200 million (split evenly between economic

and military assistance) for Jordan in FY2005

supplemental funds. These amounts were

included in supplemental appropriations for

the two fiscal years (P.L. 108-106, November

6, 2003, and P.L. 109-13, May 11, 2005).

The Administration requested $250

million in economic and $206 million in

military aid for Jordan in FY2006. These

amounts were contained in both the House

and Senate versions of H.R. 3057, the Foreign

Operations Appropriations bill for FY2006.

Military aid was increased slightly to $210

million in the conference report (H.Rept. 109265), which the President signed on November 14, 2005 as P.L. 109-102. The Administration’s FY2007 request includes $245 million

in ESF and $206 million in FMF.

On October 24, 2000, the United States

and Jordan signed a free trade agreement. On

September 28, 2001, President Bush signed a

bill to implement the agreement (H.R. 2603)

as P.L. 107-43.

In each of the five fiscal years 1998

through 2002, Jordan received approximately

Congressional Research Service

˜

The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

On February 16, 2006, Jordanian Prime Minister Marouf al-Bakhit congratulated Hamas

on winning the January 2006 Palestinian legislative elections and said Jordan would

welcome a visit by a Hamas delegation. However, on April 20, 2006, the press reported that

Jordan cancelled a planned visit by the Palestinian Foreign Minister Mahmoud al-Zahar, who

is also a high-level Hamas official, on the grounds that Hamas had hidden weapons and

explosives in a cache in Jordan. Hamas denied the charge and claimed that Jordan was using

this allegation to justify cancelling the visit.

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

Although the United States and Jordan have never been linked by a formal treaty, they

have cooperated on a number of regional and international issues over the years. The

country’s small size and lack of major economic resources have made it dependent on aid

from Western and friendly Arab sources. U.S. support, in particular, has helped Jordan deal

with serious vulnerabilities, both internal and external. Jordan’s geographic position,

wedged between Israel, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, has made it vulnerable to the strategic

designs of its more powerful neighbors, but has also given Jordan an important role as a

buffer between these potential adversaries. In 1990, Jordan’s unwillingness to join the allied

coalition against Iraq disrupted its relations with the United States and the Persian Gulf

states; however, relations improved throughout the 1990s as Jordan played an increasing role

in the Arab-Israeli peace process and distanced itself from Iraq.

Jordanian Issues of U.S. Interest

Stability of the Regime and Succession

Jordan, created by colonial powers after World War I, initially consisted of desert or

semi-desert territory east of the Jordan River, inhabited largely by people of bedouin tribal

background. The establishment of the state of Israel brought large numbers of Palestinian

refugees to Jordan, which subsequently annexed a small Palestinian enclave west of the

Jordan River (the “West Bank” territory; see below). The original “East Bank” Jordanians,

through probably no longer a majority in Jordan, remain predominant in the country’s

political and military establishments and form the bedrock of support for the Jordanian

monarchy. Palestinians, who comprise an estimated 55% to 70% of the population, in many

cases tend to regard their stay in Jordan as temporary, and some are at most lukewarm in

their support for the Jordanian regime.1

1

A commentator recently estimated that 67% of the population is of Palestinian descent. Tom

Pepper, “Building a Safe Haven,” Middle East Economic Digest, July 22-28, 2005.

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Jordan is an hereditary constitutional

monarchy under the prestigious Hashemite

family, which claims descent from the

Prophet Muhammad. King Abdullah II has

ruled the country since 1999, when he

succeeded to the throne upon the death of

his father, the late King Hussein, upon the

latter’s death after a 47-year reign.

Educated largely in Britain and the United

States, King Abdullah had earlier pursued a

military career, ultimately serving as

commander of Jordan’s Special Operations

Forces with the rank of Major General.

There is currently no designated Crown

Prince; however, under Article 28 of the

Jordanian constitution, the King’s 11-yearold son Prince Hussein is next in line of

succession to the throne. King Abdullah

has won approval for his energetic and

hands-on style of governing; however,

some Jordanians, notably Palestinians and

Islamic fundamentalists, are opposed to his

policies of cooperating with the United

States on issues such as Iraq and the ArabIsraeli peace process.

Jordan in Brief

Population

(July 2005):

Area:

Ethnic

Groups:

Religion:

Literacy

(2003):

GDP (2004):

Inflation

(2004):

Unemployment (2004):

5,906,760; growth rate: 2.49%

89,213 sq. km. (34,445 sq. mi.,

slightly smaller than Indiana)

Arabs 98%; Circassians 1%;

Armenians 1%

Sunni Muslim 92%; Christian 6%;

small Muslim sects 2% (2001

est.)

91% (male 96%, female 86%)

$11.1 billion; real growth 5.4%

3.2%

12.5% (official estimate); ca. 30%

according to some unofficial

estimates

Armed

personnel 100,500; tanks 952;

Forces

combat aircraft 101

(2004):

External

$8.4 billion

Debt (2004):

Sources: U.S. Dept. of State; Central Bank of Jordan;

other U.S. and Jordanian government departments;

The Economist Intelligence Unit (London)

Course of Domestic Reforms

Political. Jordan’s bicameral legislature is composed of an elected 110-member lower

house and an appointed 55-member upper house. Building on his father’s legacy, King

Abdullah has supported a limited parliamentary democracy, while periodically curtailing

dissent when it threatened economic reforms or normalization of relations with Israel. The

most recent parliamentary elections, held on June 17, 2003, gave 62 seats in the 110-member

lower house to conservative, independent, and tribal allies of King Abdullah. However, the

moderately fundamentalist Islamic Action Front (IAF), which had boycotted the previous

elections in 1997, won 22% of the vote, thereby gaining 18 seats in the lower house, plus six

sympathizers. Six seats in the lower house were reserved for women, one of whom is a

member of the IAF. The IAF also participated in municipal elections for the capital city of

Amman, held on July 26-27, 2003, but boycotted elections in other municipalities in protest

against what IAF spokesmen called undemocratic electoral procedures. The U.S. State

Department, in its most recent annual report on human rights (covering the year 2004),

credits the Jordanian government with respecting citizens’ rights in some areas but notes

some abuses, particularly by police and security forces. Recent changes to press and penal

laws have broadened freedom of the press, but some restrictions remain.

Economic. Jordan, with few natural resources and a small industrial base, has

undertaken various measures in the last few years to improve its economy. Since April 2000,

when Jordan joined the World Trade Organization, the country has carried out various

legislative and regulatory reforms. Among the longstanding problems Jordan faces are slow

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economic growth, declining living standards, and high levels of unemployment, nominally

around 15% but thought by many analysts to be in the 25%-30% range. After sluggish

economic growth during much of the 1990s, Jordan’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew

by 4% to 5% during the 2000-2002 timeframe; GDP growth subsequently dropped to 3.2%

in 2003, due in part to the effect of the Iraq war on tourism and other sectors of Jordan’s

economy, but rose to an estimated 5.4% in 2004. The London-based Economic Intelligence

Unit forecasts GDP growth of 5.5% in 2005 and 2006. Jordan’s external debt was $8.4

billion in 2004 (up from $7.6 billion in 2003), representing about 75.7% of GDP in 2004

(down from 81.3% in 2003).2 In recent unpopular measures dictated by budgetary pressures,

the government has cut subsidies on fuels twice, in July and September 2005, effectively

raising the price of various fuels by increments ranging from 8% to 59%, in an effort to

correct the impact of burgeoning oil prices.

Recent Governmental Changes. On November 15, 2005, in the aftermath of

suicide bombings at three Jordanian hotels (discussed below), the King accepted the

resignations of the chief of the royal court (a position roughly similar to the White House

chief of staff), the national security advisor, and nine other special advisors to the King. The

official announcement of these changes did not mention the bombings and press reports

indicate that some of the changes had been expected for several months as part of a plan to

restructure the royal court. An unnamed senior Jordanian official told Reuters news agency

that these moves “may have been speeded up by the tragic events [i.e., the hotel bombings]

but the decision itself has nothing to do with it.”

In further changes apparently linked to the hotel bombings, on November 27 King

Abdullah swore in a new cabinet under veteran soldier-turned-diplomat Marouf al-Bakhit,

with a mandate to launch an all-out war on terrorism. Bakhit, who had recently served as

ambassador to Turkey and Israel and briefly after the hotel bombings as director of national

security, expressed a commitment to reform, commenting that “reform and security are

compatible.” On December 20 the cabinet won a vote of confidence from the 110-member

Jordanian lower house of parliament by 86 to 20, with one abstention and three absentees.

Professional Associations. Jordan’s 14 professional associations consisting of

approximately 130,000 members have traditionally been dominated by Islamist and

nationalist groups opposed to normalizing relations with Israel or cooperating with U.S.

policies on Iraq. The Jordanian government has periodically curtailed the activities of these

associations, periodically arresting leaders and curtailing demonstrations. More recently, the

government has circulated a draft law which alters the electoral procedures for professional

associations in a way that would dilute the influence of Islamist candidates and prohibit ties

to association branches in the Palestinian territories.3 The law was debated in parliament but

not enacted during the summer of 2005. On August 24, Prime Minister Badran told reporters

that the government would not withdraw the controversial bill but that the bill would include

some unspecified amendments.

2

These data come from the Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report, Jordan, September 2005;

and the CIA World Factbook 2005.

3

“Restrictive Jordanian Bill on Professional Associations,” Arab Reform Bulletin, March 2005,

Volume 3, Issue 2.

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Jordan and the War on Terrorism

Jordan has taken various steps to support the U.S. campaign against terrorism. On

October 9, 2001, after the terrorist attacks on the United States, the Jordanian government

issued an amendment to terrorism laws banning any banking operations “linked to terrorism

activities,” along with banning border infiltration and attacks on industry, shipping,

telecommunications, and computer systems.4 In December 2001, during the U.S.-led

Operation Enduring Freedom, Jordan sent approximately 200 military medical personnel to

Afghanistan to set up a 50-bed field hospital in the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif (see

below). A Jordanian Army mine-clearing unit, also deployed to Afghanistan during

December, helped clear 70,000 square meters of territory including a key air base of anti-tank

and anti-personnel mines. According to the State Department’s most recent annual report

on terrorism (published April 27, 2005), “Jordan continued its strong support for the global

war on terrorism in 2004.” In particular, Jordanian authorities have arrested and prosecuted

individuals linked to Saudi exile Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda organization and to a

bin Laden associate, the fugitive Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who has been

associated with several terrorist acts in Jordan.

Murder of a U.S. Diplomat. Zarqawi has been linked to the murder on October 28,

2002, of Lawrence Foley, a U.S. diplomat assigned to the U.S. Agency for International

Development (USAID) program in Jordan, who was shot and killed by an unknown assailant

as Foley was leaving for work. Press reports on May 12, 2003, indicated that a Jordanian

military prosecutor charged 11 men with “plotting to carry out terrorist activities leading to

the death of an individual” [presumably referring to Mr. Foley]. Five of the accused pleaded

innocent in court proceedings on July 8, 2003; the other six were tried in absentia.

According to press reports (New York Times, April 6 and 7, 2004) a Jordanian military court

convicted and sentenced to death eight Islamic militants linked to Al Qaeda and presumably

involved in the Foley murder; the court sentenced two others to jail terms and acquitted one

defendant. Six of the eight sentenced to death were tried in absentia, including Zarqawi, and

two more were executed on March 11, 2006, according to an Associated Press report..

Plot, 2004. Zarqawi has also been linked to a reported plot by a terrorist cell to launch

a chemical attack in the Jordanian capital of Amman, with large-scale casualties. According

to press reports, in January 2004, one of the would-be perpetrators visited Iraq, where he

obtained $170,000, which Zarqawi had collected from Syrian donors to pay for the attack.

The plot was reportedly foiled by Jordanian police and elite special forces units in a series

of operations mounted in late April 2004.

Abortive Rocket Attack, 2005. On August 19, 2005, rockets apparently aimed at

two U.S. amphibious warfare ships visiting the Jordanian port of Aqaba narrowly missed

their targets, one hitting a nearby warehouse and another landing near a hospital; a third

4

Some U.S.-Jordanian tension arose in early 2005 over restrictions imposed by the U.S. Office of

the Comptroller of the Currency on the New York offices of the Jordan-based Arab Bank, which

allegedly allowed diversion of funds to families of Palestinians involved in attacks against Israelis.

Glenn R. Simpson, “U.S. Crackdown On Arab Bank Tangles Policy,” Wall Street Journal, Feb. 28,

2005. According to press reports and other sources, an extraordinary session of parliament

adjourned on August 21 without passing legislation designed to establish further controls on

financing; a new session will convene on December 1.

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rocket struck near the airport at the neighboring Israeli port of Eilat. A Jordanian soldier was

killed and another injured in the attack. There were two claims of responsibility, both from

groups believed to be affiliated with bin Laden or his associate Zarqawi: the Brigades of the

Martyr Abdullah Azzam and the terrorist group Al Qaeda in Iraq, headed by Zarqawi.5 On

August 22, Jordanian television reported the arrest of a Syrian suspect, noting that three other

suspects had escaped to Iraq. Some analysts have speculated that this attack is an indication

that Zarqawi may be expanding his operations to target Arab regimes with close relations to

the United States.

Hotel Bombings. On November 9, 2005, near simultaneous explosions at three

western-owned hotels in Amman (the Radisson, Grand Hyatt, and Days Inn) killed 58

persons and seriously wounded approximately 100 others. The terrorist organization AlQaeda in Iraq headed by Zarqawi claimed responsibility for the act, according to a statement

on a website often used by Zarqawi’s organization. The statement alleged that four Iraqis

including a married couple, whom it described as “martyrdom seekers,” carried out the

planning and implementation of the bombing. Jordanian authorities arrested the woman,

Sajida Mubarak al-Rishawi, who survived when her explosive belt failed to detonate. Ms.

Rishawi, whose videotaped confession was broadcast on Jordan’s state-run television on

November 13, was the sister of three Iraqi insurgents who were killed in previous encounters

with U.S. forces in Iraq; one of them was a top deputy to Zarqawi. Jordanian officials

blamed Zarqawi’s organization but have not formally identified the nationality of the

perpetrators. In a CNN interview on November 12, King Abdullah speculated that the

perpetrators might have crossed into Jordan from Syria or Iraq.

Some commentators believe Zarqawi, though allied with bin Laden, has established his

organization as a competitive force to Al-Qaeda and is seeking to expand the range of his

organization’s operations beyond Iraq to target regional governments that support the U.S.led campaign in Iraq and mount attacks on Israel as well.6 However, many Jordanians, even

some who disagree with their government’s support for U.S. Middle East policies, have

condemned the hotel bombings, which killed many Jordanians, and have denounced

Zarqawi’s actions. King Abdullah has said the attacks were aimed at ordinary Jordanians,

not foreigners, noting that the hotels, though western owned, were frequented by local

citizens. On November 15, Jordan’s Minister of the Interior announced new security

regulations designed to keep foreign militants from operating covertly in Jordan, including

a requirement for Jordanians to notify authorities within 48 hours of renting an apartment or

a house to foreigners. An official of the Interior Ministry also said Jordan had already begun

drafting new and tougher anti-terrorism laws which will probably be ready for parliamentary

debate early in 2006.

5

A Jordanian security source said “interrogations have proven beyond doubt” that the perpetrators

had been in touch with Zarqawi. “Suleiman al-Khalidi, “Jordan says Iraqi-based group behind rocket

attack,” Reuters, Aug. 22, 2005.

6

Craig Whitlock, “Amman Bombings Reflect Zarqawi’s Growing Reach,” Washington Post, Nov.

13, 2005.

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Jordan’s Role in the Peace Negotiations

Peace Agreements and Normalization. Jordan and Israel signed a peace treaty

on October 26, 1994. Subsequently, the two countries exchanged ambassadors; Israel

returned approximately 131 square miles of territory near the Rift Valley to Jordan; the

Jordanian Parliament repealed laws banning contacts with Israel; and the two countries

signed a number of bilateral agreements between 1994 and 1996 to normalize economic and

cultural links. Water sharing, a recurring problem, was partially resolved in May 1997 when

the two countries reached an interim arrangement under which Israel began pumping 72,000

cubic meters of water from Lake Tiberias (the Sea of Galilee) to Jordan per day (equivalent

to 26.3 million cubic meters per year — a little over half the target amount envisioned in an

annex to the peace treaty).

Opposition to Normalization. King Abdullah’s efforts to normalize relations with

Israel have faced significant resistance within Jordan, particularly among Islamic

fundamentalist groups, parts of the Palestinian community, and influential trade and

professional organizations (see above). Among many mainstream Jordanians, there is some

disappointment that peace with Israel has not brought more tangible economic benefits to

them so far. Opponents of normalization have repeatedly called on Jordanians to boycott

contacts with Israel, and activists among them have compiled two “black lists” of Jordanian

individuals and companies that deal with Israel. The Jordanian government has arrested

organizers of these lists, but courts have upheld their right to publish them.

Further Arab-Israeli Negotiations. Jordan supports current Middle East peace

plans, including a land-for-peace initiative proposed by Saudi then-Crown Prince Abdullah

and adopted by the Arab League in March 2002; and the Road Map, a three-phase process

released by the so-called Quartet (the United States, the European Union, Russia, and the

United Nations) on April 30, 2003, in an effort to jump-start the Israeli-Palestinian peace

process. On June 4, 2003, King Abdullah hosted a summit conference at the Red Sea port

of Aqaba attended by President Bush and the Israeli and Palestinian Prime Ministers, where

attendees discussed steps to implement the Road Map. Despite the subsequent breakdown

of Israeli-Palestinian talks, King Abdullah continued to press for resumption of negotiations.

Jordan initially opposed an Israeli proposal to withdraw unilaterally from the Gaza Strip and

four West Bank towns, but later expressed support as long as the withdrawal was part of the

Road Map process.7 At a conference on February 8, 2005, hosted by Egyptian President

Mubarak and attended by the leaders of Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority,

Mubarak and King Abdullah issued a joint statement that hailed the spirit of cooperation

shown at the conference by Israeli and Palestinian leaders and expressed hopes for further

progress on the Israeli-Syrian and Israeli-Lebanese peace tracks as well. On February 20,

2005, Jordan sent a new ambassador, Marouf al-Bakhit, to Israel after a four-year vacancy

in the post during the Palestinian uprising (intifada) against Israeli occupation. (As noted

above, Bakhit was reassigned as director of national security after the hotel bombings and

appointed prime minister on November 27.) More recently, in an interview with Israel

Broadcasting Authority TV Channel One on September 9, 2005, shortly after the Israeli

7

According to press reports, President Bush gave King Abdullah a private letter in which he

reiterated support for the Road Map. Steven R. Weisman, “Bush and King of Jordan Ease Tensions

Between Them,” New York Times, May 7, 2004.

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withdrawal from Gaza and four small West settlements (see below), King Abdullah

commented that “Gaza has given us an opportunity, and Jordan is ready to step up to the

plate and work alongside the Israelis and the Palestinians to really think of tomorrow.” He

mentioned a previously discussed project to increase water supplies by a canal linking the

Red Sea with the Dead Sea (“the Red-Dead Canal”).

The West Bank and East Jerusalem. The Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty does not

address the status of the West Bank territory, which was annexed by Jordan in 1950 but

occupied by Israel in 1967, nor does it address the status of East Jerusalem (except as noted

below); both issues are subjects of Israeli-Palestinian rather than Israeli-Jordanian

negotiations. The late King Hussein decided in August 1988 “to disengage our legal and

administrative relations with the West Bank,” but he and King Abdullah remained involved

in Palestinian issues. Gaza never came under Jordanian control and has not figured

significantly in Israeli-Jordanian discussions until recently, as noted above.

Jerusalem. On a related issue, Palestinian leaders have taken exception to Article 9

of the 1994 Israeli-Jordanian treaty, which states that Israel “respects the historical role of

the Hashemite Kingdom [of Jordan] in the mosques of Jerusalem” and “will give high

priority to the Jordanian historic role in these shrines.” The late Palestinian leader Arafat

asserted that “sovereignty over Jerusalem and supervision of Jerusalem is for Palestinians.”

In a speech to a Washington, DC audience on May 13, 2002, King Abdullah said that under

a peace deal that he envisions, “[t]he Jerusalem question would be answered, by providing

for a shared city open to all faiths.”

Training and Deployments. During his comments to the press on May 6, 2004,

King Abdullah told President Bush that “Jordan is ready to do its part in assisting the

Palestinian Authority to rebuild its capability and assume full control of the security

situation.” Jordanian officials have suggested that Jordan would consider training Palestinian

police to maintain security in Gaza and parts of the West Bank if Israel continued efforts to

implement the Road Map. In an interview with Lally Weymouth published in the

Washington Post on May 22, 2005, the King commented that “[w]e in Jordan are trying to

assist in training Palestinian policemen,” as are the Americans and Egyptians. In addition,

according to Jordanian officials, Jordan has offered to deploy a group of 1,500 Palestinians

comprising the “Badr Brigade,” officially part of the Palestinian Liberation Organization but

trained by the Jordanian Armed Forces, to the West Bank to help with internal security.8

Hamas and Rejectionist Groups. On August 30, 1999, Jordanian security forces

closed offices used by the fundamentalist Palestinian organization Hamas, which the late

King Hussein had tolerated to some degree, on the grounds that the offices were registered

as businesses but were conducting illegal political activity. In November 1999, authorities

announced that the Hamas offices would be closed permanently. However, King Abdullah

condemned the Israeli missile strike that killed Hamas spiritual leader Ahmad Yasin in Gaza

on March 22, 2004, commenting that “[t]his crime will lead to more escalation, violence and

instability.” On February 16, 2006, Jordanian Prime Minister Marouf al-Bakhit

congratulated Hamas on winning the January 2006 Palestinian legislative elections and said

8

Communication from a Jordanian official, October 7, 2005. See also Joshua Mitnick, “West Bank

Plan Eyes Jordanians on Patrol,” Washington Times, July 5, 2005.

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Jordan would welcome a visit by a Hamas delegation (AFP Newswire, February 16, 2006).

However, on April 20, 2006, the press reported that Jordan cancelled a planned visit by the

Palestinian Foreign Minister Mahmoud al-Zahar, who is also a high-level Hamas official, on

the grounds that Hamas had hidden weapons and explosives in a cache in Jordan. Hamas

denied the charge and claimed that Jordan was using this allegation to justify cancelling the

visit. (New York Times, April 20, 2006.)

Course of Jordanian-Iraqi Relations

Iraq: Jordanian Policy Toward the War and Its Aftermath. Though not in

favor of military action against Iraq, Jordan informally provided logistical support to the

U.S.-led campaign to oust Saddam Hussein in the spring of 2003.9 Since mid-2003, Jordan

has broadened contacts with the U.S.-sponsored interim government in Iraq, assisted in the

reconstruction of Iraq, and conducted training at Jordanian installations for selected units of

a new Iraqi army and police force. Jordan strongly supported the elections held in Iraq on

January 30, 2005, for a Transitional National Assembly (TNA), under a timetable adopted

early in 2004. Jordanian leaders have been concerned, however, that the growing power of

Iraq’s Shi’ite Muslim majority could lead to a wider role for Iran in influencing Iraqi affairs.

In December 2004, King Abdullah (a Sunni Muslim) expressed concern that Iran was trying

to manipulate Iraqi Shi’ite Muslims in an effort to bring about an Islamic republic similar to

the Iranian model in Iraq.10 He has also voiced concern over the possibility of Sunni-Shi’ite

conflict within the region.11 The King has been careful to point out that the leaders of Jordan

“do not have a problem with Shi’ites” and has emphasized that his concerns are political, not

religious. In a broader context, on April 25, 2006, Iraq’s new Prime Minister Jawad al-Maliki

expressed appreciation to Iraq’s neighbors for sheltering Iraqi dissidents during the former

Saddam Hussein regime but warned them not to interfere in Iraq; he named Iran, Syria,

Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.

Iraq Training Support and Troop Support. In a September 2003 interview, the

King said Jordan would train approximately 30,000 Iraqi police and military personnel in

Jordan, pointing out that he did not plan to send Jordanian trainers to Iraq in view of the

sensitivities involved. In a subsequent interview with Defense News published on February

9, 2004, King Abdullah explained that Iraqi army personnel are being trained by the

Jordanian Army, while Iraqi police training is a joint venture with private sector companies.

According another Defense News article on the same date, more than 35,000 military and

police personnel, slightly more than the earlier figure cited by King Abdullah, will undergo

9

In an interview with Reuters news wire on March 6, 2003, then Jordanian Foreign Minister Marwan

Muasher said “[w]e’ve made it clear Jordan is not going to participate in a war and will not be a

launching pad for war against Iraq.” For reports of Jordanian logistical assistance to the U.S.-led

coalition, see David Filipov, “U.S. Troops Deployed in Jordan,” Boston Globe, February 25, 2003;

Emily Wax, “Mubarak Warns of Rise in Militancy,” Washington Post, April 1, 2003. Jordan also

sent a 55-bed field hospital to Iraq.

10

Various news reports, for example, Robin Wright and Peter Baker, “Iraq, Jordan See Threat To

Election From Iran,” Washington Post, Dec. 8, 2004.

11

The King is also alleged to have spoken of a possible Shi’ite “crescent” extending from Iran

through Iraqi, Syria, and Lebanon. See text of an interview published in the Spring 2005 issue of

The Middle East Quarterly, pp. 75-76.

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training in Jordan. Training of Iraqi police cadets is being conducted at six police training

academies, five of which are in Iraq and one of which is at Muwaqqar, Jordan, east of

Amman. This center, known as the Jordan International Police Training Center, has

instructors from 15 countries, including Jordan.12 According to Jordanian officials, as of

October 7, 2005, a total of 35,000 Iraqi police cadets are undergoing six-week training

courses in Jordan; approximately two thirds have completed their training and returned to

Iraq.13 Earlier, as of January 2005, approximately 1,650 Iraqi soldiers, including 50 women,

had graduated from a training program at the Jordanian Military Academy at Zarqa, 17 miles

north of Amman. Previously, in an interview with Al-Arabiyya TV on August 3, 2004, King

Abdullah mentioned that Jordan had sent military equipment to the reconstituted Iraq army,

including more than 150 armored vehicles.

Equipment. According to allied coalition officials, Jordan has also donated military

and police equipment to Iraqi forces, including 250 Ukranian-built BTR-94 armored

personnel carriers (APCs), 100 British Spartan APCs, and U.S. M113A1 APCs, along with

2 C-130BHercules transport aircraft and 16 UH-1H utility helicopters. (American Force

Press Service, “Jordanian Military Helps Its Neighbors,” February 2, 2006.)

Suicide Bombing in Iraq, 2005. On February 28, 2005, a suicide bomber killed an

estimated 118 people in the southern Iraqi town of Hilla. Newspapers have identified the

perpetrator as Raed Mansour al-Banna, a Jordanian with alleged links to Zarqawi’s group.

Reports that Banna’s family and friends in Jordan had celebrated his action fueled antiJordan demonstrations in Iraq and protests by Iraqi officials, despite condemnations of the

bombing by Jordanian officials. Following mounting tensions, Iraq and Jordan briefly

withdrew their top diplomats from each other’s capitals on March 20. King Abdullah sent

his charge d’affaires, Dimai Haddad, back to Baghdad on the following day in an effort to

ease bilateral tensions. A visit by Iraq’s transitional President Jalal Talabani on May 7 eased

tensions further and resulted in the return of the Iraqi ambassador to Jordan. (Iraq is

represented by an ambassador in Amman, while at the time Jordan has been represented by

a charge d’affaires in Baghdad since 2003. On June 22, 2005, Jordan’s foreign minister

announced that Jordan will send an ambassador to Baghdad in the near future.)14 Some

frictions continue, as is evidenced by Iraqi spokesman Laith Kubbah’s allegation that

members of Saddam Hussein’s family and former Iraqi officials currently in exile in Jordan

are providing financial and media support to the insurgency in Iraq in an effort to revitalize

the banned Ba’th Party in Iraq.15 Also, Iraq has demanded that Jordan extradite former Iraqi

Defense Minister Hazim Sha’lan, whom Iraqi authorities accuse of embezzlement and who

is reportedly in Jordan. In a news conference on October 3, 2005, Jordanian Deputy Prime

12

“Over 1,400 Iraq Police Recruits Complete Jordan Training,” Dow Jones International News,

January 13, 2005.

13

Communication from a Jordanian official, October 7, 2005.

14

“Egypt Becomes First Arab Country to Name Ambassador to Iraq,” AFP, June 22, 2005, 9:52am.

Jordan, on its part, had earlier been a victim of terrorism in Iraq, when a car bomb exploded outside

the Jordanian Embassy in Baghdad on August 7, 2003, killing as many as 17 persons; authorities

have mentioned several extremist groups, including one with alleged ties to Al Qaeda known as

Ansar al-Islam, as possible perpetrators of the bombing.

15

Richard A. Oppel, Jr., “Iraq Accuses Jordan of Allowing Financing of Insurgency,” New York

Times, August 22, 2005.

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Minister Marwan Muasher disclaimed any Jordanian involvement in the Sha’lan case and

denied that Jordan has been asked to extradite him. After the triple bombings of Jordanian

hotels in November 2005 by terrorists from Iraq, Deputy Prime Minister Muasher told a news

conference that there is on-going cooperation between Jordan and Iraq on terrorism.

Sources of Oil Supply. During the decade preceding Operation Iraqi Freedom,

Jordan imported between 70,000 and 95,000 barrels per day of oil and oil products from Iraq.

Jordan bought the oil at discounted prices, and actual payments were made in commodities

rather than cash, through shipments of humanitarian goods from Jordan to Iraq. These

transactions were outside the U.N.-approved oil-for-food program; however, the United

Nations “took note” of Jordan’s position that it had no other source of oil, and U.S.

administrations waived legislation that would have penalized Jordan for these transactions

on this basis. After Iraqi oil shipments ceased during Operation Iraqi Freedom, Jordan

received some oil from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on a

temporary basis. According to Jordan’s foreign minister, Saudi Arabia made a commitment

to supply Jordan with 50% of its oil needs (50,000 barrels per day) until March 2004. A

Jordanian spokesperson, quoted in the Jordanian press on May 6, 2004, said Saudi Arabia

had decided to extend the oil grant to Jordan for one year. Saudi Arabia terminated the

shipments (which had been gratis) in April 2005, and Jordan has been obtaining its oil needs

(100,000 barrels per day) from Saudi Arabia at international market prices. To ease the

financial burden on Jordan, Saudi Arabia is providing Jordan with $20 million per month in

direct support, but these payments will be terminated on April 30, 2006.

Other Issues. In his Washington Post interview of May 22, 2005, King Abdullah said

Jordan is reviewing the case of former Iraqi exile Ahmad Chalabi, now a deputy prime

minister of Iraq, who was convicted by a Jordanian military court in 1992 of embezzlement.

The King said he had been asked by Iraqi transitional President Jalal Talabani to look into

this matter.

Other Regional Relations

Relations with Iran. Jordan has had generally poor relations with Iran since the

establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979, due in part to Jordanian allegations that Iran

was promoting Islamic opposition in Jordan. There were indications of a warming trend

between the two countries during mid-2004, however, at least on the commercial level.

During a landmark visit by King Abdullah to Iran on September 3, 2004 — the first by a

Jordanian ruler in over 20 years — the two sides discussed bilateral trade and security. Also,

according to the Iranian news agency, the leaders “welcomed the establishment of the Iraqi

Governing Council, and described it as a step towards handing over the power to the Iraqi

people.” Asked about Iran’s nuclear program during his September 28, 2004 interview, then

Foreign Minister Muasher reiterated Jordan’s view that there should be a nuclear freeze in

the Middle East including “Israel, Iran, and the others.” Responding to another question,

concerning Iranian activity in Iraq, Muasher said “[w]e have always asked all neighboring

countries not to interfere in Iraq’s internal affairs....” (As noted above, Jordanian officials

have expressed concern about possible Iranian manipulation of the Iraqi political scene.)

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U.S. Aid and Trade Issues

Aid and Funding Levels

Previous and Recent Aid. The United States has provided economic and military

aid, respectively, to Jordan since 1951 and 1957. Total U.S. aid to Jordan through 2003

amounted to approximately $7 billion, including $4 billion in economic aid and $3 billion

in military aid. Levels of aid have fluctuated, increasing in response to threats faced by

Jordan and decreasing during periods of political differences or worldwide curbs on aid

funding. The United States has markedly increased its aid to Jordan since the mid-1990s to

help Jordan strengthen its economy, maintain domestic stability, and pursue normalization

with Israel. Between FY1998 and FY2002, annual U.S. economic and military aid levels to

Jordan were approximately $150 million and $75 million, respectively. In addition to annual

aid funds, at the request of the Clinton Administration, Jordan received $300 million as part

of a special package spread over FY1999 and FY2000 to support the Wye River agreement,

a U.S.-sponsored Israeli-Palestinian agreement that the late King Hussein had helped

negotiate in 1998. Also, at the request of the Bush Administration, Jordan received an

additional $125 million in a supplemental FY2002 appropriation for U.S. allies supporting

the U.S. campaign against terror in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. In FY2003, the aid to

Jordan was almost doubled, amounting to $250 million in economic and $198 million in

military assistance. In addition, Jordan received $700 million in economic and $406 million

in military assistance in supplemental funding, to help offset the effects of the war with Iraq

on Jordan’s economy and bolster its security. Table 1 shows U.S. levels of U.S. assistance

to Jordan since 1990.

FY2004 Assistance. In its budget request for FY2004, the Administration requested

$250 million in ESF and $206 million in FMF for Jordan. These amounts were included in

S. 1426, the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriation

Bill, 2004, which was reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee on July 17, 2003

(S.Rept. 108-106). The House version, H.R. 2800, reported by the House Appropriations

Committee on July 21, 2003 (H.Rept. 108-222) and passed on July 24 by 370-50 (Roll no.

429), contained the requested level of ESF, and it recommended the requested level of FMF

in report language. The Senate subsequently passed its own version of H.R. 2800 by voice

vote on October 30, 2003. Provisions of H.R. 2800 were incorporated into H.R. 2673, the

Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2004. The accompanying conference report (H.Rept.

108-401, November 25, 2003) contained the requested levels of ESF and FMF for Jordan.

The conference report was agreed to by the House on December 8, 2003, and the Senate on

January 22, 2004; the bill was signed into law as P.L. 108-199 on January 23, 2004.

Also, on November 6, 2003, the President signed H.R. 3289, the Emergency

Supplemental Appropriation for Defense and the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan,

2004, as P.L. 108-106. This act contains an additional $100 million for Jordan in ESF.

FY2005 Assistance. The Administration requested $250 million in ESF and $206

million in FMF for Jordan in FY2005, in addition to small amounts for IMET, de-mining

operations, and Peace Corps (see Table 1). H.R. 4818, the Foreign Operations

Appropriations bill for FY2005, passed by the House by 365-41 on July 15, 2004 (Roll no.

390), contains $250 million in ESF for Jordan. Meanwhile, the House Committee on

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Appropriations had recommended full funding of the Administration’s ESF and FMF

requests for Jordan in accompanying report language (H.Rept. 108-599, July 13, 2004). A

Senate bill, S. 2812, reported on September 16, 2004 (S.Rept. 108-346), provided the

amounts requested by the Administration. The Senate bill also stated that of the ESF funds

available to Jordan, $5,000,000, should be made available to a charitable institution, the

Rosary Sisters Hospital in Jordan. The Senate then passed its own version of H.R. 4818,

after substituting the language in S. 2812, on September 23, 2004, by voice vote. The

conference report (H.Rept. 108-792, November 20, 2004) contained the economic and

military aid amounts requested by the Administration; it dropped the $5 million earmark for

the Rosary Sisters Hospital because of Jordanian concerns over the impact this would have

on the overall assistance program for Jordan. The Foreign Operations Appropriations bill

was included as Division D of H.R. 4818, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2005,

which was signed by the President as P.L. 108-447 on December 8, 2004.

The Administration requested $100 million in ESF and $100 million in FMF for Jordan

as part of an emergency supplemental appropriation bill for FY2005, in recognition of

Jordan’s assistance in the war on terrorism and the rebuilding of the Iraqi security forces.

These amounts are contained in H.R. 1268, the emergency supplemental appropriations bill

for FY2005, which was signed by the President as P.L. 109-13 on May 11, 2005.

FY2006 Assistance. For FY2006, the Administration has requested for Jordan the

same amounts it requested in FY2005: $250 million in ESF and $206 million in FMF. Both

the House and Senate versions of H.R. 3057, the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill for

FY2006, contain the amounts requested by the Administration. The respective versions of

this bill were passed by the House on June 28, 2005 (by 393-32, Roll no. 335) and the Senate

on July 20, 2005 (98-1, Recorded Vote number 197). The conference report (H.Rept. 109265) increased FMF slightly to $210 million; the House agreed to the conference report on

November 4 (by 358-39, Roll no. 569) and the Senate agreed to it on November 10 (by 91-0,

Recorded Vote number 320). The President signed the bill on November 14 as P.L. 109-102.

FY2007 and Other Funds. For FY2007, the Administration is requesting $245

million in ESF and $206 million in FMF for Jordan. U.S. economic aid to Jordan is provided

partially to support USAID projects and partly as a cash transfer to service Jordan’s debt.

In addition to the preceding funds specifically earmarked for Jordan, the last three emergency

supplemental bills contain funds to reimburse Pakistan, Jordan, and other key cooperation

states for logistical expenses in support of U.S. military operations: $1.4 billion in FY2003;

$1.15 billion in FY2004; and $1.37 billion in FY2005. Also, the FY2005 supplemental

contains $99 million to assist Jordan in establishing a regional training center to help regional

military forces, security forces, and individuals in meeting existing and emerging threats.

Trade Issues

Jordan ranked 70th among U.S. trading partners in volume of trade with the United

States in 2005, about the same as its ranking of 69th in 2004. According to the U.S. Census

Bureau, Jordan’s imports from the United States increased from $317 million to $643 million

between 2000 and 2005, and Jordan’s exports to the United States increased even more

notably from $73 million to $1,267 million during the same period. Principal U.S.

commodities imported by Jordan consisted of aircraft parts, machinery and appliances,

vehicles, and cereals, while Jordan’s main exports to the United States included clothing and

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accessories, precious stones, and precious metals. Two recent measures, in particular, have

helped expand U.S.-Jordanian trade ties and could create more opportunities for U.S.

investment in Jordan.

Free Trade Agreement. On October 24, 2000, then President Clinton and King

Abdullah witnessed the signing of a U.S.-Jordanian Free Trade Agreement, which will

eliminate duties and commercial barriers to bilateral trade in goods and services originating

in the two countries. Earlier, in a report released on September 26, the U.S. International

Trade Commission concluded that a U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement would have no

measurable impact on total U.S. imports or exports, U.S. production, or U.S. employment.

Under the agreement, the two countries agreed to enforce existing laws concerning worker

rights and environmental protection. On January 6, 2001, then President Clinton transmitted

to the 107th Congress a proposal to implement the Free Trade Agreement. On July 23, then

U.S. Trade Representative Zoellick and then-Jordanian Ambassador Marwan Muasher

exchanged letters pledging that the two sides would “make every effort” to resolve disputes

without recourse to sanctions and other formal procedures. These letters were designed to

allay concerns on the part of some Republican Members over the possible use of sanctions

to enforce labor and environmental provisions of the treaty. President Bush signed H.R.

2603, which implemented the FTA as P.L. 107-43 on September 28, 2001, during King

Abdullah’s visit to Washington following the September 11, 2001, attacks. For additional

information, see CRS Report RL30652, U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, by Mary Jane

Bolle.

Qualifying Industrial Zones. An outgrowth of the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty

was the establishment of “Qualifying Industrial Zones” (QIZs), under which goods produced

with specified levels of Jordanian and Israeli input can enter the United States duty free,

under the provisions of P.L. 104-234. This act amended previous legislation so as to grant

the President authority to extend the U.S.-Israel free trade area to cover products from QIZs

between Israel and Jordan or between Israel and Egypt. QIZs were designed both to help the

Jordanian economy and to serve as a vehicle for expanding commercial ties between Jordan

and Israel. Since 1998, the U.S. Trade Representative has designated thirteen industrial

parks in Jordan as QIZs, of which three are publicly operated and ten are privately owned.

Seven of these QIZs are active; three are not yet active; and two are in the process of

becoming active, according to a fact sheet provided by the Jordanian Embassy in Washington

on August 21, 2003. A joint Israeli-Jordanian committee including an observer from the

United States approves products produced in the QIZs and certifies their eligibility for duty

free entry into the United States.16 According to the Jordanian Ministry of Finance, QIZ

exports amounted to $582 million in the year 2003.17 Even with the establishment of the

QIZs, however, there has been only a modest increase in Jordanian-Israeli trade. According

to recent estimates, Israeli annual exports to Jordan and imports from Jordan are running at

16

According to the U.S. State Department, the QIZs have created more than 40,000 new jobs in

Jordan, mainly for women. U.S. Dept. of State, International Information Programs, “U.S.-Jordan

Free Trade Agreement Spurs Jordan’s Economic Growth,” October 16, 2003. According to local

Jordanian press reports and international economists, approximately 40% to 50% of QIZ-related jobs

are filled by expatriate workers, mainly from southern Asia.

17

Interview with Mohammed Abu Hammour, Jordan Finance Minister, Middle East Economic

Digest, July 2-8, 2004, p. 8.

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approximately $31.7 million and $34.2 million respectively, while comparable figures a

decade ago were $20.5 million and $29.9 million respectively.18 For additional information,

see CRS Report RS22002, Qualifying Industrial Zones in Jordan: A Model for Promoting

Peace and Stability in the Middle East?, by Mary Jane Bolle, Alfred Prados, and Jeremy

Sharp.

Reform and Development Initiatives

King Abdullah and other senior Jordanian officials have repeatedly emphasized that

change is necessary for Jordan’s survival but that a reform process should be internally

driven. On March 11, 2004, then Foreign Minister Marwan Muasher told a Washington

audience at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars that “[w]e do not differ over the

content of this reform” but went on to say that such a program should not be “imposed, or

perceived to be imposed, in any way, from the outside.” The King subsequently formed a

National Agenda Committee headed by Dr. Muasher (now Deputy Prime Minister) to

develop a road map to reforming economic and political life. An article in the Beirut-based

Daily Star on November 16, 2005 indicates that the committee will shortly release a 10-year

plan for comprehensive reform of eight sectors: education, infrastructure, employment, social

welfare, finances, judiciary, investment, and political development. According to the article,

political development has been the most controversial, pitting liberal reformists against

conservative and traditional forces. Meanwhile, Jordan has also been the recipient of several

grants under the U.S.-sponsored Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) program for

projects in the political, economic, educational, and women’s fields.

Armed Forces Modernization

Military Equipment. The United States is helping Jordan modernize its armed forces,

which have been the traditional mainstay of the regime. The Jordanian military forces,

though well trained and disciplined, are outnumbered and outgunned by each of Jordan’s

neighboring forces. In 1996, under Section 572, P.L. 104-107 (the FY1996 Foreign

Operations Appropriations Act), Congress approved a drawdown of $100 million, mainly in

ground force equipment from U.S. stocks (including 50 M60A3 tanks), to enhance Jordan’s

ability to maintain border security and implement terms of the peace treaty with Israel. Most

of this equipment was delivered in December 1996. In addition, during 1996, the United

States agreed to lease 16 refurbished F-16 fighter aircraft to Jordan at a cost of approximately

$220 million (most of which represents the cost of upgrading the aircraft), with title passing

to Jordan after five years. Deliveries of the aircraft were completed in early 1998. The

aircraft transfer was funded through a combination of foreign military financing (FMF)

allocations to Jordan over a four-year period ($150 million), plus $70 million in additional

FMF funds contained in the FY1996 omnibus continuing appropriations bill (P.L. 104-134).

More recently, with regard to the three Patriot anti-missile batteries delivered to Jordan

by the United States in early 2003, Jordan’s Prime Minister stated on February 25, 2003, that

Jordan requested these weapons from the United States after Russia was unable to deliver

S-300 surface-to-air missiles originally requested by Jordan. On November 19, 2004, the

U.S. Defense Department notified Congress of a potential sale of 50 U.S. Advanced Medium

18

“Jordan’s Peace Dividend,” Jerusalem Post, Oct. 26, 2004.

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Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAMs) and associated equipment to Jordan to enhance the

defense capability of Jordan’s F-16 fighter aircraft and provide for increased interoperability

with U.S. forces.

Military Cooperation. A U.S.-Jordanian Joint Military Commission has functioned

since 1974. Combined training exercises by U.S. and Jordanian military units continue to

take place in Jordan, at least on an annual basis and sometimes more often. The abovementioned courses conducted by Jordan for Iraqi military personnel are reportedly being

funded by the United States under a program called the New Iraqi Army Training Project.19

Under the provisions of Section 517 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended,

then President Clinton designated Jordan as a major non-NATO ally of the United States,

effective on November 13, 1996. According to a State Department spokesman, this status

“makes Jordan eligible for priority consideration for transfer of excess defense articles, the

use of already appropriated military assistance funds for procurement through commercial

leases, the stockpiling of U.S. military material, and the purchase of depleted uranium

munitions.”

According to U.S. and Jordanian officials, Jordan has deployed two military hospitals

to Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively, and has committed almost 600 health care

professionals to the two facilities. Both facilities provide critical health care to numerous

patients, including civilians. The hospital in Afghanistan cares for more than 650 patients

a day, having treated more than 500,000 since it was first deployed in December 2001. The

one in Iraq has treated more than four million people, and surgeons have performed 1,638

operations. (“Jordanian Military Helps Its Neighbors,” American Forces Press Service,”

February 2, 2006. No breakdown of patients was given; the above patient totals may include

one-time visits for purposes of health checks, diagnosis, or inoculations.)

Section 574(a) of P.L. 108-447, the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, FY2005,

bans ESF funds to governments that are party to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and

have not concluded an agreement with the United States preventing the ICC from proceeding

against U.S. personnel present in the country concerned. This act contains waiver authority

in the case of NATO or major non-NATO allies of the United States. A similar provision

is contained in Section 574(a) of P.L. 109-102, the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act,

FY2006. Jordan signed such an agreement with the United States on December 16, 2004;

however, the Jordanian lower house of parliament rejected the agreement during a special

session of parliament on July 14, 2005. Subsequently, on August 29, 2005, President Bush

issued Presidential Determination (PD) 2005-33 waiving the ban with respect to Jordan for

six months. (The President had issued an earlier six-month waiver on February 10, 2005,

though PD-2005-20.) On January 8, 2006, however, the lower house reversed its July 2005

vote and endorsed the measure granting immunity from ICC prosecution to U.S. personnel

and U.S. employees working in Jordan. The bill had already been endorsed by the upper

house, paving the way for the King’s signature.

19

Riad Kahwaji, “Forging a New Iraqi Army — in Jordan,” Defense News, Feb. 9, 2004, p. 8.

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Table 1. Annual U.S. Aid to Jordan Since the Gulf Crisis

($ in millions)

Economic Assistance

Fiscal

Year (FY)

EconSpt

1991

1992

1993c

1994d

1995

1996

1997f

1998f

1999

1999 (Wye)

2000

2000 (Wye)

2001

2002

2002 (Suppl.)

2003

2003 (Suppl.)

2004

2004 (Suppl.)

2005

2005 (Suppl.)

2006i

2007j

35.0a

30.0b

5.0

9.0

7.2

7.2

112.2

150.0

150.0

50.0

150.0

50.0

150.0

150.0

100.0

250.0

700.0

250.0

100.0

250.0

100.0

250.0

245.0

Food

0

20.0

30.0

15.0

15.0

21.0

2.6

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Military Assistance

Devel

PeaceCp

0

0

0

4.0

6.7

7.9

4.5

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1.1

1.2

1.4

0

1.7

0

1.7

1.6

0

1.0

0

2.3

0

1.6

0

1.6

0

FMF*

20.0a

20.0b

9.0

9.0

7.3

200.0e

30.0

75.0g

70.0g

50.0

75.0

150.0

75.0

75.0

25.0

198.0

406.0

206.0

0

206.0

100.0

210.0

206.0

IMET**

1.3

.6

.5

.8

1.0

1.2

1.7

1.6

1.6

0

1.6

0

1.7

2.0

0

2.4

0

2.9

0

3.0

0

3.0

3.1

Totals

56.30

70.60

44.50

37.80

37.20

237.30

152.10

227.80

223.00

100.00

228.30

200.00h

228.40

228.60

125.00

451.40

1,106.00

461.20

100.00

460.60

200.00

464.60

454.10

Note: These figures do not include debt relief subsidy appropriations or small amounts for de-mining

assistance. Nor do they include supplemental funding requested by the Clinton Administration in FY2001

(never acted upon by Congress).

*Foreign Military Financing

**International Military Education and Training Program

a. Suspended in April 1991 under P.L. 102-27; released in early 1993.

b. Released in late July 1993.

c. Restrictions on FY1993 funds waived by Presidential Determination (PD) 93-39, Sept. 17, 1993.

d. FY1994 funds released by PD 94-11, Jan. 13, 1994, waiving restrictions under P.L. 103-87.

e. Three components: $30 million (Administration’s original request); $70 million in additional FMF under

FY1996 appropriation (P.L. 104-134) to cover balance of F-16 aircraft package; and $100 million in

special drawdown authority (P.L. 104-107).

f. These figures include $100 million in economic assistance under the President’s Middle East Peace and

Stability Fund ($100 million in FY1997, $116 million in FY1998).

g. For each of these two years, FMF figure includes $25 million in drawdown authority.

h. Some of these funds were obligated in later years (FY2001or FY2002).

i. Administration’s request for FY2006, with FMF slightly increased by the conference report on P.L. 109-102.

j. Administration’s request.

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