Antisatellites (Killer Satellites)
Congressional research reportMar 21, 1983
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ANTISATELLITES
(KILLER SATELLITES)
ISSUE BRIEF NUEBE4 IB81123
AL'THOR:
Karcia S. Snitk
Science Policy Research Di17ision
THZ LIBXARP OF CONGRESS
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCE SERVICE
MAJOR ISSUES SYSTEM
DATE ORIGINATED 08/25/81
DATE UPDATED 03/21/83
FOR AD3ITiCNAL INFORMATION CALL 287-5700
0321
CRS-
1
ISSUE DEFIKITIOh'
A c c o r d i n g t o t h e U . S . D e p a r t m e ~ t of
Defense,
t h e S o v i e t Union h a s
an
using a
operational c a p a b i l i t y t o destroy s a t e l l i t e s i n near Earth o r b i t by
t y p e o f a n t i s a t e l l i t e (ASAT) t e r m e d a " k i l l e r s a t e l l i t e . "
The U n i t e d
States
haC a n o p e r a t i o n a l ASAT s y s t e m u s i n ? g r o u n d - b a s e d
missiles,
but
it
was
d e a c t i v a t e e i n 1 9 7 5 ; a new ASAT d e v i c e u s i n g m i n i a t u r e h o m i n g v e h i c l e s
l a u n c h e d f r o m F - 1 5 a i r c r a f t i s now b e i n g d e v e l o p e d .
Both t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s
and t h e S o v i e t 8 n i o n a r e p e r f o r R i n g
research
on
l a s e r and
particle
beam
w e a p o n s w h i c h n a y u l t i m a t e l y h a v e ASAT a p p l i c a t i o n s .
During 1976 and 1979,
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d S o v i e t U n i o n h e l d ASAT l i m i t a t i o n t a l k s , b u t n o f u r t h e r
t a l k s have been s c h e d u l e d .
I n t h e f a l l of 1 9 8 1 ,
the Soviets introduced a
d r a f t t r e a t y a t t h e U n i t e d K a t i c n s t o ban weapons
frorc s p a c e ,
although
it
a p p a r e n t l y woulC n o t i n c l u d e t h e g r o u n d - o r a i r - b a s e d s y s t e m s now i n u s e
or
development.
The S o v i e t s c o n t i n u e t o t e s t t h e i r A S A T s y s t e m ,
and P r e s i d e n t
S e a g a r , h a s r e a i f i r m e e t h e U . S . c o m m i t m e n t t o d e v e l o p i n g ar o p e r a t i o n a l A S b T
syste~.
S h o u l d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s d e v e l o p a n o p e r a t i o n a l ASAT c a p a b i l i t y , o r s h o u l d
t h e f o c u s i n s t e a d b e on r e n e w i n g t h e s t a l l e d ASAT l i m i t a t i o n t a l k s , o r s h o u l d
t h e r e b e some c o m b i r i a t i o n o f
t h e two a p p r o a c h e s ?
If
the
United
States
p u r s u e s a n ASbT
system,
i s the
current
effort relaced
t o air-lannched
m i s s i l e s s u f f i c i e n t , o r should a
ground-based
o p t i o n be
pursued?
Should
r e s e a r c h i n t o l a s e r a n d p a r t i c l e beam w e a p o n s b e a c c e l e r a t e d ? I n t h e a b s e n c e
o f a n A S A T l i ~ i t a t i o nt r e a t y , s h o c l d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s p l a c e more e m p h a s i s on
n e a n s t c e n s u r e t h e s u r v i v a b i l i t y of c r i t i c a l m i l i t a r y s a t e l l i t e s a n d z h e i r
a s s o c i a t e d g r c c n c s t a t i o n s and d a t a l i n k s ?
B A C K G R O U N D A N D POLICY AKALYSIS
Numbers i n
p a r e n t h e s e s and d e s i g n a t e d
"#"
refer
to
footnotes.
The
of t h e i s s u e b r i e f i s d i v i d e d i n t o t h e f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n s :
BACKGROUKD p o r t i o n
INTRODUCTION
TYPES O F ANTISATELLITES
SOVIET A N D U.S. ASAT PROGRAMS
S o v i e t Union
United S t a t e s
H I G H FRONTIER STUDY
ASAT LIMITATION TALKS
SURVIVABILITY OF CRITICAL U.S. K I L I T A R Y SATELLITE SYSTEMS
ISSUES F O R CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION
FOOTNOTES
INTRODUCTION
S e r v i c e s p r o v i d e d by E a r t h - o r b i t i n g s a t e l l i t e s a r e u s e d b y m o s t n a t i o n s o f
the
world f o r purposes
such a s communications,
remote
sensing,
and
meteorological observations.
I n a d d i t i o n , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d S o v i e t Union
make e x t e n s i v e u s e o f s p a c e - b a s e d i n t e l l i g e n c e s y s t e m s .
F i v e c o u n t r i e s and
Japan,
S o v i e t Union,
United
o n e i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n (C.hina, I n d i a ,
S t a t e s , anC t h e E u r o p e a n S p a c e A g e n c y ) now h a v e
indigenous
capabilities
to
CRS-
2
laLncr s a t e l l i c e s l c z c orSit.
The U n i t e d S t a c e s a n 8 S o v i e t Unlon a r e by
far
t h e n c s t i r e q x e c c i s ~ n c h e r scf s a t e l l r z e s , e i t r ~ e rf 3 r t h e ~ row~ s eo r
for
ozker ccuncrles.
( T ? e S o v i e : Ur.;or, l a u n c h e s m a z y n o r e
s a t e l l ~ t e s per
year
our
1E
:,-.an t ! i e 3z:teC
S z a z e s -- L C 1 5 6 1 t h e y had 96 l a c n c k e s ccmparee w r t h
- - m o s t : o r ~ . ; : : t a r y z c r p c s e s . Tk;s s t a t l s t ~ cmay S e s o m e w h a t r ~ l s l e a d l n g ~ n
c o r p a r l n 9 c a p a 2 l l l t l e s , t h o u g h , S e c a u s e S o v l e t r e c o n n a l s s a n c e satellites h a v e
C o n s i d e r a b l y s h o r t e r O p e r a t i o n a l l i f e t i m e s t h a n t h e l r U.S.
coucterparts
and
n u s t be r e p l a c e 6 more f r e q u e n t l y . )
Of t h e a p p r o x l m a t e l y 2 , 2 0 0 s u c c e s s f u l e a r t h - o r b l t a l l a u n c h e s c o n d u c t e d
~y
t h e U n l t e d S t a t e s a n d S o v l e t Unlon
between
1957 and
1981,
approxlmately
two-thirds
h a v e " beerr
for
m l l ~ t a r y purposes
such
as
commuc~catlons,
reconnaissance
( r n c l u C i n g photographic,
ocean
s u r v e ~ l l a n c e , electronic
~ n t e i l i q e n c e , e a r l y w a r n l n g , a n d n u c l e a r explosion
d e t e c t ~ o n ) , meteorology,
A t t h e p r e s e n t t l m e , a p p r o x l m a c e l y 7 0 % o f U.S.
g e o d e s y , and n a v i g a z i o r ( 4 1 ) .
o v e r s e a s m l l l c a r y ccnmcnlca:lons
a r e routed through space ($2).
The
Scvlets
a l s o r e l y h e a v l l y on s p a c e s y s t e m s f o r t h e i r
mllltary
network.
The
other
laurich
c a p a b l l ~ t l e s have
1nC2cated
lnterest
in
us;ng
countries wlth
s a z e l l r t e s f o r r ~ l l c a r yp ~ r p o s e s , a n d CF.:ns
a r d 1nC;a h a v e
alreaCy
laLnche8
cf a
reccrnalssance
satellites
thcu9ht
t o ke
related
to
eevelcpment
CZ?&Z>iiZy.
operational
A n t l s a t e l l i t e (ASAT) d e v i c e s
a r e deslgned
to
destroy the
c a p a b r l i t y o f Satellites. T h e U n l t e d S t a t e s b a d a n o p e r a t l o n a :
ASAT
system
1975,
and
1 s now
developing
a
new
syster.
i r o r , a ~ p r o x l m a t e i y1962 t o
b c c o r d ~ n gt o a 1 5 7 7 s t a t e m e n t by t h e c S e c r e t a r y o f D e f e n s e H a r o l d B r o w n ,
the
S c v l e t U n l o ~ h a s a n o p e r a t l c n a l ASAT c a p a b l l l t y .
In 1577,
P r e s ~ d e c t Carter
a n n o u n c e d p l a n s t c n e g o z i a t e a ? ASAT 1 ~ r ~ ; t a t l o nt r e a t y w i t h t h e S o v l e t U n l c n ;
1379,
but
further
Ciscusslons
:p.ree r o u n d s c f c a l k s w e r e h e l d i ~ L.3 7 8 a n d
lit
b e z w e e n = h e t w o c o u ~ t r ~ eh as v e S e e n
~ n d e f l n l t e l y postponed.
On
Aug.
19E1, however, t h e S o v l e t Union
sub~ltted a
craft
treaty
to
the
Unlted
h a z ~ o n sw h l c h w o u l d b a n a l l w e a p o n s f r o m s p a c e .
TYPES
ANTISATELLITES
T h e t e r m " a n t i s a t e l l i t e " (ASAT) i s g e n e r i c a l l y u s e d t o d e s c r i b e a n y d e v i c e
t h a t can be used t o d e s t r o y t h e o p e r a t i o n a l c a p a b i l i t y of s a t e l l i t e s I n E a r t h
orbit.
T h e s e d e v i c e s c a n b e b a s e d on t h e g r o u n d , i n a i r p l a n e s , o r i n
space.
G r o u n d - a n d a i r - b a s e d s y s t e m s c a n i n v o l v e (1) t h e d i r e c t a s c e n t l a u n c h
of
a
missile carrying either a nuclear
or
non-nuclear
warhead;
(2)
co-orbital
such
d e v i c e s w i t h e x p l o s i v e w a r h e a d s ; o r ( 3 ) u s e o f a d i r e c t e d - e n e r g y weapon
a s a l a s e r beam.
Space-based systems could i n v o l v e e x p l o s i v e "space
mines,"
c o n v e n t i o n a l i n t e r c e p t o r s , o r d i r e c t e d - e n e r g y weapons.
Variations
of
these
systems might be used a g a i n s t b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s e n r o u t e t o t h e i r t a r g e t s
as
w e l l (see I s s u e Brief 81003, A n t i b a l l i s t i c K i S S i l e s ) .
large k i l l
radius,
which
i s
an
Nuclear warheads
have a r e l a t i v e l y
a
advantage i n terms of n o t r e q u i r i n g h i g h l y a c c u r a t e t a r g e t i n g systems, b u t
a i s a d v a n t a g e i n t h a t t h e r e s u l t i n g r a d i a t i o n would a f f e c t b o t h
friendly
and
nuclear
weapons
enemy s a t e l l i t e s .
Another c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s t h a t t h e u s e of
i n s p a c e i s p r o h i b i t e d b y t r e a t y , a l t h o u g h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s d i d h a v e a n ASAT
c a p a b i l i t y u s i n g n u c l e a r warheads from approximately
1953 t o
1975.
(Some
a similar
capability
w e s t e r n e x p e r t s b e l i e v e t h a t t h e S o v i e t Union h a s had
s i n c e t h e early 1960s.)
Non-nuclear
w a r h e a d s f o r ASATs c o u l C i n v o l v e e x p l o s i v e d e v i c e s
or
impact
CRS- 3
v e h ~ c l e s . E x p l c s i v e d e v l c e s a r e t h e o r b i t a l t y p e now b e l n g
~ e s t e C by
che
S c v i e t 3c;on.
T h e ~ n t e r c e p t o r m ~ s zm a n e u v e r c l o s e e n c u g k t o
:he
target
so
by
= h e ~ n t e r c e p t c r ' s exFlcs:or.
wil:
Cestroy the
tr.ar s k r a p n e l proCuceC
z a r g e r ' s c p e r a ~ ~ ns gy s c e r s .
TF.e ~ ~ t e r c e p c cc ro u l d S e l a u c c h e d t o a t t a c k
E
s a t e l l l t e a t a s p e c l i ~ ct l m e , c r l t c o u l d De p l a c e d i n o r b l t
l n a dormant
s z a z e a n d a c t i v a t e d when n e e d e d ( a " s p a c e m ; n e w ) .
Impacz v e h i c l e s a r e t h e
In t h l s system,
highly accurate
type being developed by t h e Unlted S t a t e s .
targeting mechanisms a r e r e q u i r e d t o b r l n g
the interceptor
into a dlrect
cclllslon with the target satelllte.
D i r e c t e d - e n e r g y weapons ( l a s e r s o r p a r t i c l e b e a m s ) ,
which
would a l s o
researchee
in
r e q u i r e h i g h l y Z c c u r a t e t a r g e t i n g m e c h a n i s m s , a r e now b e i n g
that
Soch t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and S o v i e t Union.
Some w e s t e r n a n a l y s t s b e l i e v e
t h e S c v i e t s a l r e a d y h a v e a n o p e r a t i o r ~ a l g r o u n d - b a s e d l a s e r ASAT s y s t e m .
The
U n i t e d S t a t e s i s c u r r e n t l y c o n d u c t i n g a i r b o r n e t e s t s of a l a s e r
systen,
the
t e c h n o l o g y f o r w h i c h may h a v e ASAT a p p l i c a t i o n s i n t h e f u t u r e .
Lasers can be
u s e d t o " b l i n d " t h e s e n s o r s on a
satellite,
or i f
s u f f i c i e n t power
is
available, t o destroy the s a t e l l i t e through heating.
P a r t i c l e beams ( c L a r g e d
o r n e u z r a i a t o m i c p a r t i c l e s -- e l e c t r o n s , p r o t o n s , o r n e u t r o n s ) c o u l d C e s t r o y
a s a t e i l i t e t h r o r g ? h e a t i n g o r by d i s r u p t i n g i t s e l e c t r c n i c s .
h major a d v a n t a g e of d i r e c t e d - e n e r g y weapons
is that
their
Cestructive
e n e r g y t r a v e l s a t t h e s p e e d of l i g h t , d e n y i n g t h e t a r g e t s u f f i c i e n t t i m e f o r
any p o s s i b l e e v a s i v e maneuvers.
Also,
several targets
could
be enqaoed
c o n s e c u t i v e l y i n v e r y s h o r t p e r i o d s of t i m e .
The m a j o r d i s a d v z n t a g e i s
that
t h e systems r e q c i r e g r e a t amoucts of energy and l a r g e a s s o c i a t e d
structures,
making them d i f f i c u l t and e x p e n s i v e t o c o n s t r u c t i n s p a c e .
The a l t e r n a t i v e ,
Zarth and aiming then
up i n t c s p a c e ,
presents
b a s i n g l a s e r s y s t e r c s on
e-f f ic u l t i e s because t h e E a r t h ' s atmcsphere t e n d s t o d i s p e r s e t h e bear), and
c r ~ l pa s n a i l f r a c t i o n c f
energy reaches the
target.
For
particle
beam
weapons, Earth-basing
would p r e s e n t
the possibility
of
the
paih
being
d e f l e c t e d by t h e E a r t h ' s m a g n e t i c l i n e s .
Laser
weapons
have
been
t e s t e d within t h e atmosphere
s u p p o r t e r s of such e f f o r t s maintain t h a t space-based l a s e r s f o r
might be a v a i l a b l e w i t h i n t h i s d e c a d e , a l t h o u g h c r i t i c s s u g g e s t
20-30 y e a r s i n t h e f u t u r e .
Particle
beam w e a p o n
technology
c o n s i d e r e d t o b e much f u r t h e r b e h i n d l a s e r s .
SOVIET A N D U . S .
already,
and
ASAT p u r p o s e s
t h e y may b e
i s generally
ASAT PROGRAXS
S o v i e t Union
Ground-Based
Systems
a
T h e S o v i e t U n i o n m a y h a v e s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t ASAT s y s t e m s , b u t o n l y o n e ,
g r o u n d - b a s e d c o - o r b i t a l s y s t e m , h a s b e e n p u b l i c l y t e r m e d " o p e r a t i o n a l v by t h e
a
U.S. D e p a r t m e n t o f D e f e n s e .
R u m o r s o f a d i r e c t - a s c e n t n u c l e a r ASAT a n d o f
ground-based l a s e r have never
been
c o n f i r m e d b y e i t h e r U.S.
or Soviet
officials.
Co-orbital.
The s y s t e m a t t r a c t i n g t h e most a t t e n t i o n i s a g r o u n d - b a s e d ,
e x p l o s i v e t y p e o f ASAT s y s t e m i n w h i c h
an interceptor
i s launched by a
v a r i a n t of t h e SS-9/Scarp launch v e h i c l e .
The i n t e r c e p t o r ' s
o r b i t can be
it
intercepts
the
target
e i t h e r a t apogee
(highest
elliptical so that
a l t i t u d e ) o r perigee (lowest a l t i t u d e ) ;
co-planar
(co-orbiting)
with
the
z381123
CRS- 4
targec;
or
m.-omC- L s : o z )
::.s
:arce:
UPDATE-03/21/83
from a
Lower
orbit
using
or.-board
v a r ~ a b l e ("po~:p:ng-up"
O ~ c e~ i t n l ?r a n p e , t h e ~ n t e r c e p t c rc a s e u v e r s v e r y c l o s e
to
-sa:e,-;te
a7,d e x p l o 3 e s , ~ r p a c t i z g:he t a r g e t w:th
s.-.rapnel.
1+3).
Tr,e S o v i e t Z ~ i o nh a s c c z e u c z e d 2 C r e s t s o f t h i s a n t i s a t e l l i t e s y s t e m ( + 4 ) .
tests
were made.
A
four-year,
From O c t o b e r 1 3 6 8 L O D e c e m S e r 1 9 7 i , s e v e n
t2ree-month h i a t u s fol;owed, w i t h t e s t s
resuming
again
in
February
1376.
What prompted t h e resumption
in
ASAT t e s t i n g i s u n k n o w n ,
although
some
Warning
w e s t e r n a n a l y s t s have s p e c c l a t e d t h a t i t might have been meant as a
t c
the
Chinese,
who
iaunched
their
first
reconnaissance
sateilite in
September 1975.
( T h e t e s t a l s o came w i t h i n a y e a r o f t h e d e a c t i v a t i o n o f t h e
at
U . S . ASAT s y s t e * . )
K i n e m o r e S o v i e t ASAT t e s t s w e r e made f r o m
1976-1978,
w h i c h t i m e t e s t i n g was a g a i n
suspended during
t h e ASAT
limitation
talks
b e t u e e c t h e S o v i e t Union and U n i t e d S t a t e s ( s e e b e l o w ) .
In April 1980, a f t e r
i t became c l e a r t h a t t h e UniteC S t a t e s would p o s t p o n e
both
ratification
of
testing
was
resumed,
t h e SALT 1 1 t r e a t y a n d f u r t h e r ASAT l i m i t a t i o n t a l k s ,
w i t h o n e t e s t c o n d u c t e d t h a t month.
Two m o r e t e s t s w e r e m a d e i n 1 9 8 1 .
i
P
'
,..e
A n bSA? t a r q e c w a s l a ~ n c h e dor. J u c e 6 , 1 9 8 2 , c h e d a y S e f o r e t h e c p e r . l n g o f
T.N.
S e c o ~ ZS p e c i a l S e s s i o z o z D ~ s a r r n a r ~ e n t . T k e : ~ t e r c e p ~ o wr a s l a u n c n e d
or
J L E ~1 E ,
;XE; press reports
were
r,ixed
as
=c
wcetner
the
=es=
Kaz
successful or not.
LS d i f f i c u l t ,
s ~ n c e
A s s e s s ~ n g how many o f t k e t e s t s h a v e b e e n " s u c c e s s f u : "
According t o
the
media,
onzy
t h e ~ n t e n t l o n so f t h e S o v i e t s a r e n o t k n o w n .
Sut
o n e c a r g e t h a s a c t u a l l y b e e r destroyed by a n BSAT ( t h e K a r c h 1 9 8 1 t e s : ) ,
t h i s h a s b e e c d ~ s p u t e db y o t h e r
western
observers.
IT!
a l l
other
cases,
has
€:=her
been
corrnanded
to
reenter
the
apparently
=r.e interceptor
after
mov:cg
away
iror
cne
a t m o s p n e r e , o r ~t h a s S e e n e x p l o G e C ~ n o r b l t
targec.
Some w e s t e r n a n a ; y s c s r ~ a v e e v e n s u g g e s t e d c h a r c h e r e
are
two hShT
serve
p r o g r a r e s : o n e L O i n s p e c t a t a r g e t b u t n a t d e s t r o y ~ t a n, d t h e o t R e r t o
measuring
success
i s
to
the destruct function.
One p o s s l b l e
method
of
c o n s l C e r a t e s t I n w h i c h t h e l ~ t e r c e p t o rm a n e u v e r s t o w l t h l n 1 k ~ l o m e t e r o f
inspected
the
target,
or
t o have
t h e t a r g e t a s being s u f f l c l e n t t o have
U s ~ n gt h ~ sm e a s u r e a n d m e d i a
d e s t r o y e d lt i f t h a t a c t l o n had been d e s l r e d .
a c c o u n t s o f t h e t e s t s , 1 3 o f t h e 2 0 S o v l e t ASAT t e s t s h a v e b e e n s u c c e s s f u l .
This system s o f a r
i s
limited
t o a l t i t u d e s and
orbital
inclinations
pads.
P.11
ASAT
a c h i e v a b l e w i t h t h e SS-9 r o c k e t a n d i t s a s s o c i a t e d l a u n c h
interceptors to
date
have
operated
between
62 degrees
and
66 degrees
i n c l i n a t i o n and have been launched from t h e S o v i e t f a c i i i t y a t Tyuratam.
The
i s approximately 2,300
test
highest altitude reached
in
a
S o v i e t ASAT
k i l o m e t e r s (1,40C m i l e s )
(t:5), Within
the
range
used
by
U.S.
military
reconnaissance, meteorology, and Transit navigational s a t e l l i t e s .
The
U.S.
military
satellites
space s h u t t l e a l s o f l i e s within t h i s range.
Other U.S.
(the
DSCS a n d
PLTSATCOM
communication
satellites
and
early-warning
satellites, for
example) a r e placed
in
geosynchronous o r b i t a t
35,800
kilometers (22,300 miles) over
the
equator.
S t i l l others,
such a s
the
NAVSTAR n a v i g a t i o n s a t e l l i t e s , a r e p l a c e d a t a l t i t u d e s b e t w e e n
these ranges
a t 20,000
kilometers).
The S o v i e t s
have
not
yet
(NAVSTAR o p e r a t e s
demonstrated a capability t o destroy these higher
altitude satellites.
C o n c e i v a b l y , much l a r g e r l a u n c h
vehicles
could
be used
t o
reach
higher
a l t i t u d e s , although t h i s c a p a b i l i t y has n o t been demonstrated.
1962,
i n t e r v i e w with American
newspaper
Direct-Ascent. I n a July 16,
a
e d i t o r s , S o v i e t P r e m i e r N i k i t a Khruschev s t a t e d t h a t t h e S o v i e t Union
had
missile that
could
" h i t
a
fly
in
outer
space."
Some w e s t e r n
experts
interpreted that
statement
as
indicating a
S o v i e t hSAT
capability ane
CRS-
13ELl23
5
UPDATE-C?/Z1/E?
s ? e c c l a t e d t h a t ; t coc;C r e f e r t c a G a l o s h r r , r s s r i e a r r e d w ; t k
a ntclear
( s l c l l a r t o t h e U.S.
grocnd-Sased
ASAT
s f s t e n ~ : ~ c u s s e dS e l c w ) ,
p3ss;t:y
E a s e d r i e a r Koscow e r i t t h e S a r y S h a g a n
6 e v e l c ~ r r e r t fac2L:ty
near
:he C h ~ n e s eS o r a e r .
? h e existence of s u c k a n A S R T
s y s t e m aEd
lcs
cdrrent
s t a t x s c a n n o t s e c c r f ; r n e d f r o r t h e p u b l ~ cr e c c r c i .
..barheaC
Directed-Energy.
Rumors h a v e a l s o p e r s i s t e d f o r s e v e r a l y e a r s
that
che
S o v i e t s h a v e a n o p e r a t i o n a l g r o u n d - b a s e d ASAT s y s t e m u s i n g a l a s e r
t o blind
t h e s e n s o r s on enemy s a t e l l i t e s .
These r e p o r t s
have never
been
confirmed
e i t h e r b y t h e S o v i e t s o r b y o f f i c i a l U.S. s o u r c e s .
In 1975, f o r example,
an
A m e r i c a n e a r l y w a r n i n g s a t e l l i t e a n d two o t h e r A i r
F o r c e s a t e l l i t e s were
" i l l u m i n a t e d " by a s t r o n g i n f r a r e d r a d i a t i o n s o u r c e from t h e S o v i e t Union.
A t t h a t time, the question
a r o s e a s t o whether
t h i s was a
test
of
a
g r o u n d - b a s e d l a s e r d e v i c e , b u t t h e U.S. D e p a r t m e n t
of
Defense
(DOD)
later
s t a t e d t h a t t h e e f f e c t was c a u s e d b y a h i g h i n t e n s i t y f i r e r e s u l t i n g
from a
DOD o f f i c i a l s
have
estimated that
the
rupture i n a n a t u r a l gas pipeline.
S o v i e t s a r e s p e n d i n g t h r e e t o f i v e t i m e s more t h a n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s on h i g h
energy l a s e r research.
Space-baseC
systems
In i t s Oct.
26,
l9E1 i s s u e ,
t h e m a g a z i n e A v i a t i o n Week a n d S p a c e
T e c h n o l o g y r e p o r t e d t h a t t h e " S o v i e t Union i s o p e r a t i n g i n low e a r t h o r b i t a n
a n t i s a t e l l i t e b a t t l e s t a t i o n e q u l p p e d w i t h c l u s t e r s of i n f r a r e d - h o m i n g g u i d e C
i n t e r c e p t o r s t h a t c o u l d d e s t r o y m u l t i p l e U.S.
spacecraft."
In
subsequent
the
Satellite
i s s u e s , A v i a t i o n Week c l a i m e d t h a t :he " b a t t l e s t a t i o n " was
Kosrnos 1 2 6 7 , w h i c h i s docker2 w i t h t h e s p a c e s t a c i o n S a l y U t 6 .
The S o v i e t s
had p r e v i o u s l y i d e n t i f i e 8 t h i s
satellite as a
t e s t vehicle related t c
c o n s t r u c t i n g m o d u l a r s p a c e s t a t i o n s ( a s p a r t o f t h e i r g o a l of e s t a b l i s h i n c a
p e r m a n e n t e a r t k - o r b i t i n g s p a c e s t a t i o n ) . The U . S . D e p a r t m e n t of D e f e n s e
ha8
no comment on t h e A . v i a t i o n Week a l l e g a t i o n s .
Speculation has existed
for
several years
that
the Soviet
Union i s
d e v e l o p i n g s p a c e - b a s e d l a s e r a n d p a r t i c l e beam w e a p o n s .
Aviation
Week a n d
S p a c e T e c h n o l o g y r e p o r t e d i n O c t o b e r 1 9 7 8 ( s e e REFERENCES) t h a t
the Soviets
had
conducted e i g h t
successful
e l e c t r o n beam
atmospheric
propagation
e x p e r i m e n t s u s i n g unmanned Cosmos s p a c e c r a f t , t h e manned S o y u z s p a c e c r a f t ,
a n d t h e manned S a l y u t s p a c e s t a t i o n .
There have a l s o been
reports
t h a t
space-based l a s e r s have been t e s t e d .
Xone o f t h e s e r e p o r t s h a s
been
openly
c o n f i r m e d b y e i t h e r S o v i e t o r o f f i c i a l U.S. s o u r c e s , a l t h o u g h t h e h e a d o f t h e
d i r e c t e d - e n e r g y o f f i c e a t t h e U.S. D e f e n s e A d v a n c e d R e s e a r c h P r o j e c t s Agency
( D A R P A ) , Douglas Tanimoto, h a s comme~ted t h a t
the
Soviets
" a p p e a r t o be
u n d e r t a k i n g m a j o r a c t i v i t i e s t o e x p l o r e t h e f e a s i b i l i t y of
developing
p a r t i c l e - b e a m weapons f o r v a r i o u s
military applications.
Apparently
the
Soviet leadership i s giving high-level
policy attention t o the rapid
d e v e l o p m e n t of d i r e c t e d - e n e r g y t e c h n o l o g y
...."
I n March 1 9 8 2 , p o r t i o n s o f a c l a s s i f i e d D O D a s s e s s m e n t o f t h e S o v i e t l a s e r
e f f o r t w e r e i n a d v e r t e n t l y r e a d i n t o t h e r e c o r d by a Member o f
Congress a t
the Soviets
hearings.
T h a t p a r t of t h e r e p o r t s u g g e s t e d t h a t DOD b e l i e v e s
a r e c a p a b l e of p l a c i n g a s p a c e - b a s e d l s s e r i n o r b i t i n 1 9 8 3 .
After
further
c l a r i f i c a t i o n b y U n d e r s e c r e t a r y of D e f e n s e f o r R e s e a r c h a n d E n g i n e e r i n g ,
Dr.
R i c h a r d DeLauer, i t a p p e a r s t h a t 1983 i s t h e bottom
r a n g e of
possibilities
which DOD c o n s i d e r s l i k e l y .
DeLauer l a t e r
stated that
he believes
the
S o v i e t s have about a 5-year l e a d i n space-based
laser
technology over t h e
U n i t e d S t a t e s , a n d t h a t s i n c e we c o u l d p l a c e s u c h a weapon i n o r b i t p o s s i b l y
i n 1 0 y e a r s , t h e n t h e S o v i e t s may d o s o 5 y e a r s f r o m now.
Althocqh s e v e r a l syszems were d i s c u s s e d i n
the
early
1 9 6 0 ' ~ t~h e
only
o p e r a r i o n a l g r o u n d - b a s e d ASAT s y s t e n d e v e l o p e d
by
t h e Ucited
S t a t e s used
c u c l e a r w a r h e a d s l a u n c h e d by A i r F o r c e T h o r m i s s i l e s f r o m J o h n s t o n I s l a n d a n d
Tests
ci
Army K i k e - Z e c s m i s s i l e s f r o m K w a j a l e i n A t o l l , 3 0 t h i n t h e P a c i f i c .
t h e Army s y s c e n w e r e c o n C u c t e d b e g i n c i n g i n Kay
1963,
bur
the
s y s t e m was
d e a c t i v a t e d i n 1964.
The A i r F o r c e t e s t e d i t s s y s t e m b e g i n n i n g i n
Kay
1964
and i t remained % p e r z t i o n a l n z t i l 1975 ( # 6 ) .
b new ASAT s y s t e ~r s now b e ~ n gd e v e l o p e d
by
DOD
ln
Which
a
mrnlature
(#7)
would
be
launched
from a two-stage
rocket
homlng
v e h ~ c l e (MHV)
( c c n s : s t ~ n g of a s h o r t - r a n q e a t t a c k
r ~ s s r l e (SRAK)
and an Rltalr
stage)
An ~ n e r z ~ ag ui l d a n c e s y s r e r i o c a t e d l n ~ r . e
c a r r i e l b y a n F - 1 5 a a l c r a f t (=E).
*.,=a:r
s t a g e w s 2 l C c2:ae
t h e 5 e v ; c e z o t k e p r o p e r I o c a r l o n ;n
space.
Lis;sc
-- ..-=,--,. - - = , e C s e r . s o r s , trie K H V u o , l e l o c a t e t h e t a r q e t s a t e ; ; ~ t e , a f t e r w;l:ch
LZ
w o ~ l ds e p a r a r e f r o r t h e b l t a ~ r , t r a c k t h e T a r g e t , a n d p r o c e e d t o
~ r p a c t che
~ h ; s alr-launched
approach
would
provrde
t a r g e t w l t h destructive f o r c e .
ccns:derably
greater flex~Br1:ty than the
s y s t e m now
used
by
:he
Sovlet
Cr;on.
A l t h o u g h l t 1 s b e i n g d e s ~ g n e df o r u s e a g a l n s t satellites r n l o w E a r t h
system
cot18 be
adapted
for
use
acainst
sateL1rte.s
In
c r b l t , t h e KEV
q e o s y ~ c h r o n o u so r b l t a s w e l l ( ~ w
n hlch c a s e l t would p r c b a b l y b e l a u n c h e d
by
a gro~nd-basedrocket).
T k e z r l r e t a r g e t f o r a U.S.
ASAT
s y s ~ e m has
been
r e p o r t e d t o be S c v l e t ocean s2rve:llazce
satel;:tes
(f9).
.
:n A p r l l 1 9 8 2 , D r .
Robert
Cooper,
Dlrector
of
DARPb,
announced
that
a i r - b a s e e t e s t s of t h e s y s t e m were p l a n n e d f o r l a t e r ~ n 1982.
He a l s o s t a t e d
t h a t 1 5 a i r c r a f t w o u l d b e e q u i p p e d f o r t h e ASAT r o l e .
for
F o r FYB2, D O D was p r o v i d e d w i t h t h e $ 1 4 8 . 8 m i l l i o n i t r e q u e s t e d
development.
T h e FYE3 a p p r o p r i a t i o n f o r t h i s a c t i v i t y i s $ 2 1 8 m i l l i o n .
Space-Based
ASAT
System
From 1 9 6 0 - 1 9 6 2 , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s h a d a p r o g r a m
t o develop a
satellite
C a l l e d SAINT,
c a p a b l e o f r e n d e z v o u s i n g w i t h enemy s a t e l l i t e s i n E a r t h o r b i t .
t h e program never reached t h e f l i g h t t e s t s t a g e .
(The A e r o n a u t i c s and
Space
Reports of t h e P r e s i d e n t f o r t h e t i m e p e r i o d involved h e r e i n d i c a t e t h a t
the
a c r o n y m SAINT s t o o d f o r S a t e l l i t e I n s p e c t o r .
Other r e f e r e n c e
sources
state
t h a t i t meant S a t e l l i t e I n t e r c e p t o r , o r S a t e l l i t e I n s p e c t i o n and Negation.)
T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s now h a s a n a c t i v e p r o g r a m f o r d e v e l o p i n g t h e
technology
f o r s p a c e l a s e r weapons t h a t could
h a v e ASAT a p p l i c a t i o n s .
Tests
of
an
a i r b o r n e g a s dynamic l a s e r
for
use
against
tactical
missiles
have
been
A s s t a t e d i n 1 9 8 1 by t h e n
A i r
Force
Secretary
conducted by t h e A i r Force.
solution
of
problems
Hans Mark: " T h e s e e f f o r t s w i l l l e a d n a t u r a l l y t o t h e
t h a t w i l l b e f a c e d w h e n we a r e r e a d y t o p u t h i g h - e n e r g y l a s e r s i n s p a c e . "
developing
space-based
laser
t e c h n o l o g y which
DARPA h a s a p r o g r a m f o r
"space l a s e r
triadw
i n v o l v e s t h r e e t e c h n o l o g i e s , and i s r e f e r r e d t o as t h e
1 1 . The f i r s t t e c h n o l o g y , f o r a c q u i s i t i o n , p o i n t i n g and t r a c k i n g
of
the
space
t a r g e t , i s code-named T a l o n Gold; i t w i l l b e t e s t e d i n 1985 a b o a r d t h e
Force
Space Tesr
Program.
The
Talon
Gold
s h u t t l e a s p a r t of
the A i r
CRS-
7
e x p e r ~ m e n : v;;l
t e s t a Icw pcwer l a s e r a g z l n s t
sot^
hrq>-<tude
alrcraft
a n d s c a c e t a r g e t s ( + i 2 ) . Y , e s e c o n C t e c h n o ; o g y a r e a , h ~ q he f f l c ~ e n c y~ ~ f r a r e C
c k e r r ~ c a l l a s e r s , :s S e ~ r 1 5d e v e l o p e d ~ n d e r t r e riame P r c l e c t
blcha;
~t
2s
a
; ~ O L T . ~t e s t 3 r o ; r a r
t o e s t a S 1 ; s h t n e f e a s i k l i l t y o f a l a s e r s u ~ t a b l ef c r
~ s e
lr, space.
C h e r ~ c a ll a s e r s a r e c o n s ~ d e r e d S e c c e r t h a n g a s d y n a m l c l a s e r s
for
space purposes because they a r e
smaller,
reqblre
low t e r p e r a t u r e s
and
a
toxlc
wastes
would
VacuuIr ( t h e c o n d l t l o n s l n s p a c e ) f o r operation, a n d t h e
n o t p r e s e n t a d l s p o s a l problem.
A l p h a was o r l g l n a l l y d e s l g n e d t o
produce
5
m e g a w a t t s o f p o w e r , b u t r e c e n t d e v e l o p m e n t s may e n a b l e d o u b l l n g
that
power
1s b e l n q
l e v e l ( f 1 3 ) . T h e t h i r d t e c h n o l o g y , m l r r o r a n d beam c o n t r o l o p t l c s ,
experiment);
it
1s
s t u d l e e u n d e r t h e n a m e L o d e ( l a r g e o p t l c s demonstration
designed t o e s t a % l l s h
t h e i e a s l b l l l t y of
l a r g e a p e r t u r e beam
control
ln
space.
DARFk's h l g h e n e r g y l a s e r p r o g r a m 1 s f u n d e d a t a b o u t $ 1 0 0 m l l l l o n p e r
year.
have
thelr
own
The l n f i l v l d u a l s e r v l c e s (Army, k l r F o r c e , a n d Navy) e a c h
total
of
h l g h e n e r g y l a s e r p r o g r a m s , a n d , t o g e t h e r v l t h DARPA, h a v e s p e n t a
Estimates v a r y
as
a p p r o x ~ m a t e l y $ 1 . 6 b ~ l l l o no n h l g h e n e r g y l a s e r r e s e a r c h .
t o h ' h e ~ t h e C n L t e C S t a t e s right h a v e
space-base8
lasers
operational,
with
a d v o c a t e s say;nc t h e y coulC S e
ava~lable w~tkln ~
h d~e c as d e a n d
crit;cs
s r g s e s t l n g 1: x a y b e 2 0 t o 3C y e a r s .
D u r i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e FY83 r e q u e s t f o r s p a c e - b a s e d l a s e r r e s e a r c h , a
existing
research
program
d e S a t e emerged over whether t o c o n t i n u e w i t h t h e
laser
f o r developing chemical l a s e r s , o r t o proceed w i t h a s h o r t wavelength
technclogy e f f o r t .
The l a t t e r i s e x p e c t e d t o t a k e
longer
to
8evelop,
bct
authorization
b i l l ,
the
would b e a more e f f e c t i v e weapon.
I n t h e FP83 DOD
H o u s e Armed S e r v i c e s C o m a i t t e e d e l e t e e a l l i u n C i n g
for
the
chemical
laser
(H.Rept.
37-462).
procran and aaded $50 m i l l i o r f o r s h o r t wavelength l a s e r s
The S e n a t e ( S . 3 e p t . 3 7 - 3 3 0 ) s u p p o r t e d t h e
existing
program,
however.
In
conference, agreement
was
reached
whereby
both
types
of
research
were
Force
was
supported.
The $ 4 1 m i l l i o n t h a t h a d . b e e n r e q u e s t e d by
the A i r
The
conferees
added
$20
d e n i e d , b u t a l l t h e D A R P A f u n d i n g was a p p r o v e d .
m i i l i o n f o r s h o r t wavelength l a s e r technology t o t h e $27.6 m i l l i o n
that
had
to
produce
an
been r e q u e s t e d .
The S e n a t e had a d d e d l a n g u a g e d i r e c t i n g DOD
this
o n - o r b i t l a s e r weapons system a s q u i c k l y as t e c h n o l o g y would a l l o w , b u t
1982
(P.L.
was removed d u r i n g c o n f e r e n c e .
The b i l l was e n a c t e d o n S e p t . 8 ,
the
FY83 F u r t h e r
97-252).
T h e FY83 D O D a p p r o p r i a t i o n b i l l w a s i n c l u d e d i n
C o n t i n u i n g A p p r o p r i a t i o n Act ( P . L . 9 7 - 3 7 7 ) , and a c t i o n s i n i t w e r e c o n s i s t e n t
w i t h t h e a u t h o r i z a t i o n b i l l ( a l t h o u g h t h e S e n a t e h a d t r i e d t o r e s t o r e some o f
t h e A i r F o r c e f u n d i n g t h a t had been d e l e t e d ) .
The G e n e r a l A c c o u n t i n g O f f i c e r e l e a s e d a
report
on
DOD's
space laser
should be a c c e l e r a t e d .
Although
the report
program, concluding t h a t i t
four-page
unclassified
digest
is available
(see
itself is classified, a
REFERENCES).
a DARPA
T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s b e g a n p a r t i c l e beam
research
in
1958 under
p r o g r a m c a l l e d SEESAW.
A l t h o u g h SEESAW w a s
terminated
in
1972,
the
Navy
e s t a b l i s h e d a p a r t i c l e beam r e s e a r c h p r o g r a m i n 1 9 7 4 c a l l e d
Chair
Heritage;
i t was t r a n s f e r r e d t o DAPPA i n 1 9 7 9 .
A year l a t e r ,
t h e Army's
program
in
p a r t i c l e beam r e s e a r c h , c a l l e d S i p a p u o r W h i t e H o r s e , was a l s o t r a n s f e r r e d t o
DARPA.
I t i s g e n e r a l l y a g r e e d t h a t p a r t i c l e beam d e v e l o p m e n t i s
many
years
behind t h a t of l a s e r s .
F o r %Y83, C o n g r e s s a u t h o r i z e d a n d a p p r o p r i a t e d $ 3 3 m i l l i o n
beam r e s e a r c h , a n i n c r e a s e o f $ 2 m i l l i o n o v e r t h e r e q u e s t .
for
particle
S p a c e S h c t i l e 2 c l e ~c b S h ? P r o g r a r r s
T t e S c v ; e c U r r o r F.as ; r Z : c a = e d
t h a : i = c s c s ~ d e r sc t e
C.S.
space
shuttle
( s e e :ssLe rr;ef
E11-5, S c a c e S F . u c ~ l e )as ASAT-relaced veF.lcle cn
:he
Dasls
*- .+l a
- *,
~t z a r n a n e c v e r c l o s e t o s a t e l l i t e s , f r i e z C l y o r
enemy.
A c c c r 2 ~ n g =o
i h e S o v l e t s , =he s h u z t l e ' s
Remote
Kan1pula:or
System
(RMS), G e s i g n e d
to
deploy and/or r e t r i e v e s a t e l l r c e s i n o r b l t , could be used e i t h e r
to
destroy
mechanisms
on
them.
Soviet
satellites
directly
or
emplace
destructive
S l r r i i a r c n a r g e s c o u l e be r a l s e d a b o u t t h e
remotely
controlled Teleoperator
R e t r i e v a l System.
T h e s h u t t i e w i l l b e u s e d t o t e s t s y s t e ~ ~wsh l c h r ~ ~ g h ht a v e
ASAT a p p l i c a t i o n s ( s u c h a s T a l o n G o l d ) , a n d c o c l d b e u s e d t o c a r r y c o m p o n e n t s
c f s p a c e - b a s e d W e a p o n s i n t o O r S i t f o r a ~ s e m b l y ,b u t
the
shuttle
1s not
a
weapcr ~ t s e l f .
C o c v e r s e l y , s o m e c o n c e r n k z s S e e n e x p r e s s e C by
U.S.
sources
about
the
v ~ l n e r a b ~ l i toyf t h e s p a c e s h u t t l e t o a p o t e n t ~ a lS o v l e t ASAT a t t a c k , r a l s l n g
witn a defensive
t h e p o s s i b l l ~ t yt h a t t h e s h u t t l e may s o m e d a y b e
equlpped
i a s e r s y s t e m (which c o c l e b e useC f o r o f f e R s l v e p u r p o s e s a s w e l i ) .
(IG)
The Reagan A d m i c i s t r a t i o n
established
an
Intergovernmental
Group
W i t k l c t h e E x e c u t ~ v eB r a n c h t o r e v l e w a n d
s t u C y ASAT p o l l c y .
The
I G
i s
c o - c l - . a ~ r e d by R i c k a r d B c r t of t h e S t a t e Department and R i c h a r d P e r l e of
DCD.
TF.e Arms C o n t r o l a a d C i s e r m a m e n t A g e n c y ( A C C h ) , t h e J o ~ n t C h i e f s
of
Staff,
.
h'ational
Security
Conncll,
the
Katicnal
Aeronautics
and
Space
b d r r l ~ ~ s t r a t l c rt h, e O f i ; c € o f S c l e n c e a n d T e c h n o l o q y P o l ~ c y , a n d t h e
Central
Ir.te::gence
A g e n c y a r e a l s o represented o n t h e I G .
The U r . i t e l S z a t e s h a s C e v e l o p e d a n e i g h t - p o i n t i c t e r i m d e c l a r a t c r y
pclicy
(1) w h i l e t h e Unite:! S t a t e s h a s s u p p o r t e C a t t e m p t s
o n arms C o n t r o l i n s p a c e :
concerned about
the
scope
of
the
t o control a r m s i n s p a c e , i t i s d e e p l y
property
Sovie: o f f e n s i v e program i n s p a c e ; ( 2 ) s p a c e systems a r e n a t i o n a l
of
f r e e passage and
operation
in
space
without
and
have t h e
right
pursue
policies
in
s p a c e which
interference; (3) t h e United S t a t e s w i l l
p r o t e c t a n d e n h a n c e U.S. n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t s ; ( 4 ) U.S. u s e
of
space
i s w e l l known a n d
f o r m i l i t a r y purposes has been non-aggressive,
and it
a c c e p t e d t h a t s a t e l l i t e s c o n t r i b u t e t o monitoring arms agreements and
hence
(5)
U.S.
military
t o t h e maintenance of peace and s t a b i l i t y i n t h e world;
a c t i v i t i e s i n space have e x h i b i t e d r e s t r a i n t ,
but
t h e United
S t a t e s must
o u r d e v e l o p m e n t o f a n ASAT
respond t o t h e Soviet m i l i t a r y t h r e a t i n space
system i s i n p a r t a response t o
that
threat;
( 6 ) we
must
not
count
on
i m m e d i a t e p r o g r e s s i n t h e a r e a of s p a c e a r m s c o n t r o l b e c a u s e t h e
issues
are
(7)
compiex an6 p r e s e n t d i f f i c u l t o b s t a c l e s t o
international
negotiations;
arms c o n t r o l i n s p a c e i s i n s e p a r a b l e from broad arms c o n t r o l i s s u e s ; and
(8)
t h e U.S.
G o v e r n m e n t i s now s c u d y i n g t h e i s s u e o f s p a c e arms C O I I Z r G l
policy,
a n d t h i s s t u d y m u s t b e c o m p l e t e d b e f o r e q u e s t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g U.S.
intentions
United
States
t o r e s u m e ASAT n e g o t i a t i o n s c a n b e a n s w e r e d - - m e a n w h i l e , t h e
wants t o emphasize t h e h y p o c r i s y of t h e S o v i e t p o s i t i o n i n l a b e l i n g t h e space
s h u t t l e a n ASAT w h i l e m a i n t a i n i n g t h e w o r l d ' s o n l y o p e r a t i o n a l ASAT s y s t e m .
--
operational
P r e s i d e n t R e a g a n r e a f f i r m e d t h e U.S. c o m m i t m e n t t o p u r s u e a n
ASAT s y s t e m i n h i s O c t . 2 ,
1982 pronouncement
o n U.S.
strategic defense
s y s t e m s ( i n c l u d i n g t h e M-X m i s s i l e a n d t h e B - 1 b o m b e r ) .
In h i s space policy
d i r e c t i v e i s s u e d on J u l y 4 ,
1982,
the President
f u r t h e r emphasized h i s
The
c o m m i t m e n t t o t h e ASAT p r o g r a m " w i t h o p e r a t i o n a l d e p l o y m e n t a s a g o a l . "
p o l i c y s t a t e m e n t a l s o s t a t e s t h a t t h e p r i m a r y p u r p o s e o f t h e ASAT
system. i s
t o d e t e r t h r e a t s t o space systems an8 t o
"deny any a e v e r s a r y t h e
use
of
space-Sased
s p s ~ e n st h a t p r o v i d e s a p p o r t t c k o s t i l e r r i l i t a r y f o r c e s . "
Ii. A ~ g c s t 1 3 E 2 , C 3 C r e l e a s e 6
ar c n c 1 a s s i f : e C
fact
steet
( b a s e C on a
c l a s s ~ f ~ es dt u d y ) o u t l i n ~ n qi t s s p a c e p o i ~ c y : Z e g a r C i n g ASATs,
t h e pc;;cy
lmpcsed
by
C l r e C ~ st h e continued 5 e v e l o p ! r e 2 t c f ar. ASbT " w i t k ~ nsuet. l i n i t s
i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w , " a d C ~ n gt h a t D O C p l a n n l n g
"errphaslzes adl-,erence t o t h e
e X i s t l n 9 l n t e r n a t ~ o n a ll e g a l r e g l m e w h l c h p e r t a i n s t o
space"
and
t h a t DOD
w o u l d " C o n s i d e r verifiable a n d equitable arms c o n t r o l m e a s u r e s t h a t w o u l d b a n
o r o t h e r w i s e : l m l t t h e deployment c f s p e c l f l c weapons
systems should
those
m e a s u r e s b e compatible w ~ t hU n l t e d S t a t e s n a t i o n a l s e c u r ~ t y . "
EIGH
F R O N T I E R STUDY
I n March 1 9 8 2 , t h e H i g h F r o n t i e r P r o j e c t o f
the Heritage Foundation,
a
c o n s e r v a t i v e t h i n k - t a n k , r e l e a s e d a r e p o r t e n t i t l e d "High
Frontier:
A
New
National Strategy."
The r e p o r t , p r e p a r e d u n d e r t h e d i r e c t i o n
of
Lt.
Gen.
D a n i e l Graham ( R e t . ) , o u t l i n e s a
long term national
strategy
for
space
a c = i v i z ; e s , ~ ~ . i l i t a ra yn d c i v i l .
bmonc t h e r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s i s a
proposal
to
d e v e l o p a s p a c e - b a s e 5 b a l i i s c i c m i s s i l e 8 e f e n s e / a n r i s a t e l l i t e s y s t e m composed
of 432 s a t e l l i t e s , e a c h armed w i t h 40-50
homing
interceptors.
The r e p o r t
a l s o s u g g e s t s t h a t sometime i n t h e f u t u r e , t h e system might
i n v o l v e use of
space-based l a s e r s , b u t emphasized t h a t an e f f e c t i v e system can be b u i l t w i t h
tocay's technology.
ASAT
LIYITATION T A L K S
T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s r e l i e s h e a v i l y on s p a c e s y s t e m s
for
command,
control,
and
communication;
approximately
70%
of
U.S.
overseas
military
c o m m u n i c a t i o n s a r e now r o u t e d t h r o u g h s p a c e .
The m i l i t a r y u s e s
satellites
f o r reconnaissance, meteorology, geodesy, and navigation.
The S o v i e t Union
a l s o r e l i e s h e a v i l y on s p a c e s y s t e m s f o r m i l i t a r y p u r p o s e s .
T h u s , i t may b e
m u t u t a l l y advantageous t o have an agreement l i m i t i n g d e v i c e s t h a t
could
destroy t h e s e space systems.
Several e x i s t i n g t r e a t i e s a f f e c t operations i n space, b u t none p r o h i b i t s
d e v e l o p m e n t o r u s e o f n o n - n u c l e a r ASATs.
The 1 9 6 3 L i m i t e d T e s t
Ban T r e a t y
and t h e 1967 Outer Space T r e a t y p r o h i b i t p l a c i n g n u c l e a r weapons o r any o t h e r
w e a p o n s o f mass d e s t r u c t i o n i n s p a c e , a n d t h e 1 9 7 2 SALT I t r e a t y
( T r e a t y on
t h e L i m l t a t i o c of A n t i - B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e Systems) p r o h i b i t s i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h
" n a t i o n a l t e c h n i c a l means o f v e r i f i c a t i o c , "
a phrase
commonly t h o u g h t
to
refer t o reconnaissance s a t e l l i t e s .
Other t y p e s of
s a t e l l i t e s probably
would n o t be p r o t e c t e d
under
that
treaty,
however.
(Attacking another
c o u n t r y ' s s a t e l l i t e s m i g h t w e l l s i g n a l t h e b e g i n n i n g o f a m a j o r war, h o w e v e r ,
which would r e n d e r t r e a t y p r o v i s i o n s m e a n i n g l e s s . )
A t a Mar. 9 , 1 9 7 7 , p r e s s c o n f e r e n c e , P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r
announced
that he
had approached t h e S o v i e t .Union
about
the possibility
of
forgoing "the
o p p o r t u n i t y t o arm s a t e l l i t e b o d i e s a n d a l s o t o f o r g o t h e o p p o r t u n i t y
to
d e s t r o y o b s e r v a t i o n s a t e l l i t e s . " I n J u n e 1 9 7 8 , t h e White House i s s u e d a f a c t
s h e e t summarizing t h e u n c l a s s i f i e d
portions
of
President Carter's
policy
d i r e c t i v e on s p a c e ( P D - 3 7 ) .
R e g a r d i n g ASATs, t h e f a c t s h e e t e m p h a s i z e d t h a t
t h e two c o u n t r i e s were a t a p o i n t where " m u t u t a l r e s t r a i n t w c o u l d p r e v e n t v a n
unhealthy arms c o m p e t i t i o n i n space.''
The f a c t s h e e t n o t e d , h o w e v e r , t h a t i n
t h e a b s e n c e o f a n a g r e e m e n t l i m i t i n g ASAT a c t i v i t i e s , " t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w i l l
T r r e e r 2 c r . d ~ cf h S A 5 ; l r r ~ r a t i c nt a l k s w e r e
hflc:
Jrne
8-15,
i 9 7 E , :r,
E e l s ~ n k ~J a; n . L .: - F e b .
1 6 , 1 9 7 G , L?. E e r n ;
and
bpr.
23-Jcne
1 ,
1979,
in
V:cr.ca.
F n r t ? . e r t a l k s w e r e p l a n n e d , 52: fcl;ok-;r,g
the
Sovle:
i n V Z s ~ C n of
and
A f c h a n ; s t a n ~ n D e c e m ~ e r 1 P 7 S , t h e c i ~ m a t ef o r arms c o n t r o l t a l k s chilled
no f u r t h e r m e e t i n g s h a v e been s c h e d u l e a .
U.S. o 5 j e c t i v e s a t t h e t a l k s i n c l u d e d
developing
a
treaty
forcing
the
its
system,
c e s s a t i o n o f ASAT t e s t s , r e q u i r i n g t h e S o v e t U n i o n t o d i s m a n t l e
and p r c v i e i n g f o r v e r i f i c a t i o n ( # l 4 ) .
How
successful
the
talks
were i n
achieving theseUobjectives i s difficult t c assess.
The S o v i e t s , f o r e x a m p l e ,
AShT
and
therefore
should
be
c l a i m e d t h z t t h e U.S. s p a c e s t u t r l e i s a c
d i s c u s s e d i n t h e c o n t e x t of t h e l i R i t a t i o n t a l k s .
As
noted
earlier,
the
SF,uC
L- c- i e may b e u s e d t o c a r r y e x p e r i m e n t s w i t h
eventual
application t o
the
d e v e l o p m e n t o f ASATs, b u t i s n o t i t s e l f a w e a p o n , a n d t h e U . S .
rejected
the
Soviet position.
the
b ~ c c h e r0 b s t a c ; e ~ n a c h l e v z n g a r a g r e e n e n t n a y b e S o v ~ e tc o n c e r n o v e r
C!-.lrese s p a c e p r o q r a ~ . r:gFdt
C h l r e s e s a t e l l i t e s were Launched f r o r , 1970 t o
1 2 7 E , z f w?:ch
f c c r w e r e r e ~ o r t e c l yr e l a t e e t c r e c c n n a i s s a z c e .
Some a n a l y s t s
as
~ a v es p e c u l a t e d t h a c t h e 1 9 7 6 r e s u m p t ~ o n o f S o v l e t ASAT t e s t l n g was m e a n t
a w a r n i n g t o t h e C k l n e s e , who l a u n c h e d t h e i r f l r s t
reconnaissance
satellite
l n Se?tember 1975.
k c A p r i l 1 9 8 1 s t a t e m e n t Sy S o v l e t P r e s ~ d e n tB r e z h n e v w a s v ~ e w e d i n
some
q u a r z e r s a s s i g n a i l l n g a d e s l r e z o r e z u r n t o t h e ASAT t a l k s .
On A p r .
17,
space
shuttle
t h r e e d a y s a f t e r t k e s u c c e s s f u l c o n p l e t ~ o no f t h e f ~ r s tC . S .
-.c ,- ~ g c z , E r e z h r i e v p r e s e n t e d a w a r d s t o t w o c o s m o n a u t s r e t u r n ~ n g i r o n s p a c e
and
stateS:
"Kay t h e s h 0 r e ; e s s cosm;lc o c e a r . b e p u r e a n d f r e e o f w e a p o n s
of
any
to
kine.
We s t a n d f o r ) o l n t e f f o r t s t o r e a c h a g r e a t a n d h u m a n l t a r l a n a l m
p r e c l u d e t h e m l l ~ t a r l z a t l o no f o u t e r s p a c e . "
--
submitted
to
the
P o u r m o n t h s l a t e r , o n Aug. i l , 1 9 8 1 , t h e S o v i e t U n i o n
In
U n i t e d N a t i o n s a d r a f t t r e a t y b a n n i n g t h e s t a t i o n i n g of weapons i n s p a c e .
Soviet Foreign
Minister
a letter to the
Secretary-General
of
the U.N.,
Gromyko n o t e d t h a t e x i s t i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l a g r e e m e n t s " d o n o t
rule
out
the
p o s s i b i l i t y of t h e d e v e l o p m e n t i n o u t e r s p a c e o f s u c h t y p e s o f weapons
which
c a n n o t be d e f i n e d a s weapons of mass a n n i h i l a t i o n . "
According
t o Gromyko,
recently
has
" t h e r i s k of m i l i t a r i s a t i o n o f o u t e r s p a c e i s m a i n t a i n e d a n d
been i n c r e a s e d . "
T h i s i s an apparent r e f e r e n c e t o t h e A p r i l 1981 test f l i g h t
o f t h e U.S. s p a c e s h u t t l e .
The d r a f t t r e a t y r e f e r s t o b a n n i n g " p i l o t e d s p a c e
v e h i c l e s of m u l t i p l e u s e , " another apparent r e f e r e n c e t o t h e
shuttle.
The
the
S o v i e t U n i o n requested t h a t t h e d r a f t t r e a t y b e p l a c e d o n t h e a g e n d a o f
The d r a f t was
3 6 t h s e s s i o n of t h e U . N . G e n e r a l Assembly i n t h e f a l l of 1981.
s e n t t o t h e F i r s t Committee from t h e General Assembly.
Eleven
nations
(led
by t h e S o v i e t Union) f o r m a l l y i n t r o d u c e d a r e s o l u t i o n i n t h e F i r s t
Committee
on O c t . 2 1 p r o v i d i n g f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e t r e a t y .
The
First
Committee
subsequently
referred
the matter
to
the
Committee
on
Disarmament.
a proposal
C o n c u r r e n t l y a t t h e U . N . , 1 5 n a t i o n s ( l e d by
Italy)
introduced
c o n c e r n i n g p r e v e n t i o n o f a n a r m s r a c e i n s p a c e by n e g o t i a t i n g
effective
and
was
v e r i f i a b l e agreements, i n c l u d i n g p r o h i b i t i o n of
ASATs.
This
proposal
a l s o r e f e r r e d t o t h e Committee on Disarmament by t h e F i r s t Committee.
tBe
P r e s i d e n t R e a g a n l s p o s i t i o n o n ASAT l i m i t a t i o n t a l k s i s r e f l e c t e d i n
A u g u s t 1 9 8 2 DOD s t a t e m e n t on s p a c e p o l i c y w h i c h i n c l u d e s t h e comment t h a t t h e
and
e q u i t a b l e arms
p o l i c y p r o v i d e s g u i a a n c e t o DOD " t o c o n s i d e r v e r i f i a b l e
c o n t r o l m e a s u r e s " t o ban o r l i m i t t h e d e p l o y m e n t o f s p e c i f i c weapons s y s t e m s .
I? 1 9 6 1 , S e c a c c r ? r e s s l e r 1 ~ t r o C c c e da r e s o l ~ r l o n ( S - R e s . 1 2 9 ) c a l l l n g f o r
a resucpt:on
o f hSAT i l r ~ : t a t ; o n t a i k s .
The r e s o l u t l c n l l c t s objectives w h l c h
Hearlngs
a r e v e r y s l r r l l a r t c tF.ose p r o r r u l g a z e ? b y t h e C a r t e r A d m l n l s t r a t i o n .
w e r e he;d 1 3 t h e S e n a z e F o r e ~ g n Re;at;c?ns
Committee
on
Sect.
20,
1962.
F o l l o w i n g t h e hearings, S e n a c o r P r e s s l e r introduced a r e s o l u t ~ o n ( S . E x e c . R e s .
7 ) c a l l l n g f o r n e g o t l a t l o n of a p r o t o c o l
to
t h e 1967 Outer Space T r e a t y
p r o v l d l n g f o r a c o m p l e t e and v e r l f ~ a b l e ban
on t h e d e v e l o p m e n t ,
testlng,
to
d e p l o y m e n t , o r u s e of a n t l s a t e l l l t e weapons.
The resolution was r e f e r r e d
t h e S e n a t e F o r e i g n Relations Committee.
O n S e p t . 2 3 , 7 9 8 2 , R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Moakley and
29 c o - s p o n s o r s
introduced
H . J . R e s . 6 0 7 c a l l i n g f o r i m m e d i a t e n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r a b a n on w e a p o n s
of
any
kind i n space.
T h e r e s o l u t i o n was r e f e r r e d
t o t h e House F o r e i g n
Affairs
Committee.
S e n a t o r Matsunaga i n t r o d u c e d a r e s o l u t i o n
on
Sept.
29
(S.Res.
4 6 6 ) c a l l i n g f o r t a l k s w i t h t h e S o v i e t Union a n d o t h e r c o u n t r i e s w i t h a s p a c e
capability
concerning
the possibility
of
establishing
a
weapons-free
i n t e r n a t i o n a l space s t a t i o n a s an a l t e r n a t i v e
to
creating
c o m p e t i n g armed
s?ace s t a t i o n s .
The r e s o l u t i o n was r e f e r r e C t o t h e S e n a t e F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s
Comrr,iztee.
SURVIVABILITY OF CRITICAL U.S.
FILITARY SATELLITE SYSTEMS
has
I n t h e a b s e n c e of a n A S A T l i m i t a t L o n a g r e e m e n t , i n c r e a s i n g a t t e n t i o n
b e e n g i v e c t o t h e i s s u e of s a t e l l i t e s u r v i v a b i l i t y -- m e t h o C s o f
increasing
t h e c h a n c e s o f c r i t i c a l U.S. m i l i t a r y s a t e l l i t e s y s t e m s s u r v i v i n g a t t a c k s b y
S o v i e t AShTs.
S e v e r a l methoes t o i n c r e a s e s u r v i v a b i l i t y e x i s t .
For example,
most
U.S.
m i l i t a r y s a t e l l i t e s a r e p o w e r e d by s o l a r p a n e l s , w h i c h w o u l d b e v u l n e r a b l e t o
a shrapnel attack.
U s i n g r a d i o i s o t o p e t h e r m a l g e n e r a t o r s (RTGs) i n s t e a d o f
S o l a r c e l l s c o u l d a l l e v i a t e t h i s p r o b l e m , s i n c e RTGs c a n b e
located
inside
t h e s p a c e c r a f t r a t h e r t h a n p r o t r u d i n g from t h e o u t s i d e .
An ASAT w o u l d
have
t o have a h i g h l y a c c u r a t e t a r g e t i n g system i n o r d e r t o i m p a c t
the
satellite
i t s e l f , r a t h e r than j u s t exploding near-by.
A n o t h e r m e t h o d o f i n c r e a s i n g s u r v i v a b i l i t y now b e i n g p u r s u e d i s t o p r o v i d e
c r i t i c a l s a t e l l i t e s w i t h a m a n e u v e r i n g c a p a b i l i t y i n o r d e r t o move a w a y f r o m
a p o s s i b l e i n t e r c e p t o r ( # 1 5 ) . Adequate warning t i m e must be p r o v i d e d f o r t h e
s a t e l l i t e t o e s c a p e , a n d t h e A i r F o r c e i s a c q u i r i n g new
space surveillance
systems t o b e t t e r
monitor
a c t i v i t i e s of
satellites
in
orbit.
The
g r o u n d - b a s e d e l e c t r o - o p t i c a l d e e p s p a c e s u r v e i l l a n c e s y s t e m (GEODSS) i s
now
b e i n g p r o c u r e d and w i l l be o p e r a t i o n a l i n
t h e e a r l y 1960s.
Ground-based
r a d a r s y s t e m s now i n u s e a r e b e i n g u p g r a d e d
as well.
Technology
for a
space-based s u r v e i l l a n c e n e t w o r k , which m i g h t c o n s i s t of s a t e l l i t e s b o t h
in
g e o s y n c h r o n o u s o r b l t and low E a r t h o r b i t , i s a l s o b e i n g s t u d i e d .
Another approach t o s u r v i v a b i l i t y i s t o s t o r e s p a r e s a t e l l i t e s i n o r b i t
( p o s s i b l y a t v e r y h i g h a l t i t u d e s -- p e r h a p s 1 1 5 , 0 0 0 k i l o m e t e r s ) .
Specially
d e s i g n e d s o t h a t t h e y would n o t b e d e t e c t e d by r a d a r s y s t e m s , a n d m a i n t a i n e d
i n a p o w e r e d down mode s o i n f r a r e d s e n s o r s c o u l d n o t
detect
them,
these
s a t e l l i t e s would be a c t i v a t e d i n t h e e v e n t p r i m a r y
s y s t e m s were d e s t r o y e d .
Decoy s a t e l l i t e s c o u l d a l s o b e p l a c e d i n o r b i t .
S t i l l other options include hardening t h e s a t e l l i t e s a g a i n s t c e r t a i n types
of r a b i a t i o n , e q u i p p i n g s a t e l l i t e s w i t h d e f e n s i v e s y s t e m s , o r c o n s t r u c t i n g a
space-sased
l a s e r d e f e L s e s y s c e ~t c p r o t e c t s a r e 1 l ; t e s .
b r e l a c e 6 p r ~ z l e r r c o x c e r r s C ~ = e r c l r , ~ nh'her.
q
a s a t e l ; l t e h a s :L
fat:
oeen
A. sazeL1;:e
c a ~
c e a s e c p e r a z l o n f o r macy r e a s o n s ,
anC
c c n i ~ r ~ l n q
atracked.
& + - ;: 52s b e e c a t t a c k e d b y a n A S b T 1 s v e r y C ~ f f ; c u l t . T h e U n l t e C S t a t e s ; s
r.ow p;ac;ng
s e n s o r s o c b o a r d some satellites w h i c h h l l ; l S e a b l e t o d e c e r n i c e
surveillance
sysxems
whether t h e y have been a t t a c k e d ( $ i 6 ) .
Advanced s p a c e
m l g h t a l s o r e d c c e t h i s p r o b l e m by m o r e c l o s e l y m o n l t o r l n g
the
l o c a t l o n and
m a n e u v e r s o f n o n - U . S . satellites.
S u r v i v a b i l i t y of t h e grcunC s t a t i o n s and d a t a l i n k s r e q u i r e d
a n d c o n t r o l o f 3 a t e l l i t e s i s a n o t h e r a r e a b e i n g s t u c i e d by D O D .
for
command
The c o s t s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t e c h n i q u e s f o r i n c r e a s i n g s u r v i v a b i l i t y
can be
made
as
t o which
U.S.
satellites are
h i g ? , , 2nC d e c i s i o r . ~m u s t s t i l l b e
with
survivability
features,
a s well
as
c r i c i c a l enough t o be
equipped
d e t e r m i n i n g what l e v e i of c o n f l i c t
the
satellites
should
be
designed
to
survive.
ISSUES F O R CONGRESSIOXAL COKSIDERATION
T n e ASkT
scheduleC.
relating tc
been taKen.
a r z s e whlch
1.
U.S.
h7;th
no
further
sess2or.s
l ~ r r z t a t l o c t z l ~ s a r e now
stalleC,
?our resolntlons
have
been
introduced
ln
the
98th Ccngress
n e q o t l a t l o n of a t r e a t y t o ban s p a c e w e a p o n s , b u t no
actlon
has
of
quesz;or.s
I r , t h e a b s e n c e cf a b a n o n ASAT w e a p o n s , a n u m b e r
may b e o f c o n c e r n t o t h e C o n g r e s s .
ASAT F r o g r a m
W h a t i s U . S . p o l i c y c o n c e r n i n g t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s u n d e r w h i c h a U.S.
ASAT
system would be u s e d ?
Should t h e d e c i s i o n t o develop an
operational
U.S.
A S A h y s t e m be based purely
on
whether
the
United
S t a t e s needs .such a
arms r a c e w ?
If
a
c a p a b i l i t y , r e g a r d l e s s of t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s of a
"space
c l e a r n e e d f o r s u c h a s y s t e m c a n b e d e m o n s t r a t e d , s h o u l d t h e U.S. p r o g r a m
be
accelerated?
What i s t h e e a r l i e s t p o s s i b l e d a t e t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s c o u l d
h a v e a r o p e r a t i o n a l ASAT?
2.
ASAT L i m i t a t i o n T r e a t y
I f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s s t i l l w i s h e s t o n e g o t i a t e a n ASAT l i m i t a t i o n
treaty,
s h o u l d we d i s c o n t i n u e t h e c u r r e n t
U.S.
ASAT p r o g r a m
u s i n g F-15
launched
m i n i a t u r e homing v e h i c l e s
(MHVs)
to
demonstrate our
good
faith
towards
MHV
program
be
achieving
such a
treaty? Alternatively,
should
the
a c c e l e r a t e d , t h e r e b y p r o v i d i n g m o r e n e g o t i a t i n g l e v e r a g e w h e n a n d i f t h e ASAT
t a l k s r e s u m e , r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t i f we d e v e l o p a
superior
ASAT,
the
Soviets
might be l e s s w i l l i n g t o n e g o t i a t e ?
How c o u l d a n ASAT t r e a t y b e m a a e v e r i f i a b l e ?
For example, i f t h e
Soviets
a g r e e t o d i s m a n t l e t h e i r ASAT s y s t e m a n d a l l o w U.S.
inspectors
t o confirm
t h a t i t has been dismantled,
how
could t h e Uniced
S t a t e s determine
how
q u i c k l y i t m i g h t b e r e a s s e m b l e d ? C o u l d t h e U . S . ASAT c a p a b i l i t y a t J o h n s t o n
Island be reactivated,
and
if
so,
how q u i c k l y ?
Would
the ability t o
r e a c t i v a t e t h e U.S. s y s t e m c o u n t e r a c t c o n c e r n s a b o u t
potential
reactivation
ASP."
of t h e S o v i e t s y s t e m ?
Should t h e United S t a t e s develop a ground-based
..
K'Z;
2 r e ;he ~rrpl:cat:or.s
ci
the
S z v ~ e t Craft
zreaty
chat
has
been
actioc
~2bri:teC t o zke C ~ ~ t N
e ac ~ i o n s S a r . r i r . q v e a p o r s i r o n s p a c e ? W ~ l l=P,:s
cy :he S c v i e z s p r e c l u d e 5 : l a t e r a l
t a l k s w ~ t kt h e U n ~ z e d S t a t e s ?
3.
D i r e c t e d Energy Programs
I f a C e c i s i c n i s made t o
proceed
with
development of
a d v a n c e d ASATS,
s h o u l d t h e p r o g r a m f o r d i r e c t e d - e n e r g y w e a p o n s b e a c c e l e r a t e d ? Can a d d i t i o n a l
f u n d i n g b e p c t :B c o n s t r u c t i v e u s e i n t h e s e p r o g r a m s , o r i s t h e p a c e o f
the
p r o s r a m d i c t a t e d by t e c h n o l o g i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t s ? T h e c h a r g e h a s b e e n m a d e t h a t
of
p a r t of t h e proSlem i n s p e e d i n g up t h e space-based l a s e r program i s l a c k
If t h i s i s an accurate
assessment,
can
e r t h u s i a s m w i t h i n DOD a n d i n d u s t r y .
+
, . , a t attitude b e c h a n g e d ?
I f n o t , would a d d i t i o n a l f u n d i n g b e w a s t e d ?
).
I s t h e o v e r a l l naEagement of t h e s e programs a d e q u a t e a t = h e p r e s e n ~ t i r ~ e ,
c r S ~ O L ~a C r.eu c o o r l i n a t l n q m e c h a n i s n b e e s t a b l i s h e d I n t h e Executive a r a n c h
2 s p r o p c s e l by S e n a t c r H e f l ~ n ?S h o u l d t h e h i g h e n e r g y l a s e r p r o g r a m s
of
che
co~sol:dated,
as
has
been
cicne
with
A.rIrLY, A i r F o r c e , K a v y , a n d C A R P A b e
, c r t l c i e beam r e s e a r c h ?
h
-
4.
SaIellite Survivability
Is
adequate funding being
provided
in
the
areas
of
satellite
s c r v i v a b i l i t y , such a s hardening s a t e l i i t e s
to
laser
radiation,
providing
ri o r b i t ,
then. w i t h t h e c a p a j i l i t p t o n a n e u v e r , p l a c i n g
redundant
systems
etc.?
Are d e c i s i o n s on
which
satellites are
"critical"
progressing
as
the
survivability
q u i c k l y a s p o s s i b l e ? Which i s t h e m o s t c o s t e f f e c t i v e o f
o p t i o n s ? Are t h e programs f o r improving s p a c e s u r v e i l l a n c e moving a s r a p i d l y
as possible?
I s a d d i t i o n a l funding needed?
Would t h e s e s y s t e m s b e
required
w i t h o r w i t h o u t a n ASAT l i m i t a t i o n t r e a t y ?
5.
Space S h u t t l e
I n t h e a b s e n c e o f a n ASAT b a n , s h o u l d t h e s p a c e s h u t t l e b e
equipped with
d e f e n s i v e w e a p o n s t o c o u n t e r a S o v i e t ASAT a t t a c k , o r i s i t s m a n e u v e r a b i l i t y
considered sufficient t o escape
a
Soviet
interceptor?
Should the United
S t a t e s b e w i l l i n g t o ban a l l ASAT-related e x p e r i m e n t s from t h e s p a c e s h u t t l e
t o i n c r e a s e t h e l i k e l i h o o d o f n e g o t i a t i n g a n ASAT l i m i t a t i o n t r e a t y ?
Should
we r e q u i r e t h e S o v i e t s t o b a n
a l l
ASAT-related
experiments
from
their
Soyrz/Salyut program i n r e t u r n ?
FOOTNOTES
1.
Robinson, C l a r e n c e A.
Space-Based Systems S t r e s s e d .
A v i a t i o n Week a n d S p a c e T e c h n o l o g y , Mar. 3 , 1 9 8 0 :
25.
2.
Ibid.
3.
U.S. F u n d s K i l l e r S a t e l l i t e E f f o r t .
19.
and Space Technology, Feb. 6 , 1978:
A v i a t i o n Week
4.
I r f o r r n a t l c n or! S c v l e z b S h T T e s t c o r r p l l e C f r o m
1
Sov~e:s Test K l l i e r Spacecraft.
iol;cw:nc
soarces:
A v l a t ~ o n Week a n C S p a c e T e : t n s l o g y ,
Ocz. 3C, 1 2 ' & :
17.
Kew S o v l e t A n t i s a z e l l l t e Y ~ s s l o r .
(2) CovaLlt, Cralc.
3 o o s t s B a c k ~ n qf c r U . S . T e s t s .
A v l a z ~ s n wee^ e n d S p a c e
T e c h n o l o c y , Apr. 2 6 , 1 9 6 0 :
20.
( 3 ) soviet A S A T ~ l s c l o ~
J u d g e d C l o s e Enough F o r a K 1 1 1 .
Aerospace D a l l y , Feb. 4 ,
1981:
172.
(4) Sovxets T e s t Another Killer S a t e l l i t e .
A v z a t l c n Week a n d S p a c e F e c h n o l o g y , E a r . 2 3 , 1 9 8 1 :
22-23.
( 5 ) U.S. Congress.
Senate.
Commlttee on A e r o n a u t i c a l
a n d S p a c e Sciences.
S o v l e t Space Programs 1966-1970.
ComrnYttee P r l n t .
W a s h l n g t o r . , U . S . ~ o v t . Print. 3 f f . , 1 0 7 1 ; ( 6 )
U.S.
Congress.
Senate.
Comm:ttee
o n A e r o n a u t ~ c a la n d S p a c e
Sciences.
S o v ~ e tS p a c e P r o g r a m s 1 9 7 1 - 1 9 7 5 .
Commlttee
P r ~ n t . W a s n l n g t o n , U.S. G o v t . P r l n t . O f f . , 1 9 7 6 .
(7)
Sheldor, Charles.
U n l t e d S t a c e s a n d S o v l e t P r o g r e s s ;n
Space:
Summary D a t a T h r o u g h 1 9 8 0 a n d a F o r w a r d L o o k .
CRS R e p o r t Kc. 8 1 - 2 7 S . , J a n . 1 5 , 1 3 E 1 .
6.
I n f o r m a t i o n o n U . S . g r o u n d - b a s e d ASAT s y s t e m
compiled from t h e f o l l o w i n g s o u r c e s :
(1) A n t i - S a t e l l i t e
P c l a r i s Being Developed.
A v i a t i o n Week a n d S p a c e T e c h n c i o q y ,
Sept. 28, 1964:
i8-19.
(2) S a t e l l i t e Killers.
kvistior.
Week a n d Space T e c h n o l o g y , J u n e 2 1 , 1976:
13.
(3)
k n t i s a t e l i i t e E f f o r t Decision Awaited.
A v i a z i c n Week a n 6
Space Technology, Jan. 24, 1977:
i9.
( 4 ) Remarks
" -t P r e s i d e n r L y n d o n J o h n s o r . i n S a c r a m e n t o , C a l i f o r n i a ,
rn
Sept. i 7 ,
Book 11).
7.
Daily,
1964
(Public Papers
P e r r y Sees Technology
Mar. 4 , 1 9 6 1 :
18.
of
the Presidents,
Shifts t o Soviets.
Aerospace
8.
COVault, C r a i g .
A n t i s a t e l l i t e Weapon D e s i g n
Advances.
A v i a t i o n Week a n d S p a c e T e c h n o l o g y , J u n e 1 6 ,
1980:
242-7.
9.
P r i o r i t i e s S e t f o r A n t i s a t e l l i t e System.
Week a n d S p a c e T e c h n o l o g y , S e p t . 3 , 1 9 7 9 :
57.
Aviation
10. Robinson, Clarence A . ,
Jr.
S t r a t e g i c D e f e n s e Draws
Strong Focus.
A v i a t i o n Week a n d S p a c e T e c h n o l o g y , A p r . 1 3 ,
198::
70.
11. U l s a m e r ,
Force Magazine,
Edgar.
Advanced Technology i n S p a c e .
June 1981:
99.
Air
1 2 . D e f e n s e Advance6 R e s e a r c h P r o j e c t s Agency p l a n s t o
l a u n c h the Talon Gold laser p o i n t i n g an6 t r a c k i n g payload
on t h e s p a c e s h u t t l e i n 1 9 8 5 .
A v i a t i o n Week a n d S p a c e
23.
T e c h n o l o g y , Apr. 2 7 , 1981:
13. Senate Directs A i r Force t o Formulate Laser Plan.
A v i a t i o n W e e k a n d S p a c e T e c h n o l o g y , May 2 5 , 1 9 8 1 :
53.
14.
C h i n e s e S p a c e G a i n s Hamper
Antisatellite
L s m i t a t ~ o zT r e a t y . h v ~ a t i o n Week and S p a c e TecF,nolcgy,
J u l y 2 , 197s: 18-19.
16. P r i c r i t ~ e sSer for Antisatellite S y s t e m , op. cit.
LEGISLATIOX
97th Congress
+s
P.L. 9 7 - 2 5 2 , S. 2 2 4 8
Acthorlzes appropriations t o the Department of Defense for procurement,
r e s e a r c h , d e v e l o p m e n t , test, and e v a l u a t i o n , and f o r other purposes, f o r
13
(H-Rept.
FYE3. Reported from House Armed
Servzces Committee on Apr.
27-482); reported from Senate Armed
Servlces Committee on Apr.
13, 1982
(S.Rept. 97-330).
Passed Senate cc Kay 1 3 , 1 9 6 2 ; House passea ;t on Zuly 29.
(K.Rept.
97-4791, a r e passed
the
,=rference report was f ~ l e don Aug.
16
S e n a t e on Aug. 1 7 and = b e Kcuse or, A c g . 16. Slgned lnto l a w on Sept. 8.
P
P.L. 97-276, H.J.Res.
599
FYE3 Continuing Appropriation Act.
Includes funding for D O D activities
through Dec. 1 7 , 1982. Reported from House Appropriations Committee Sept. 16
( H - R e p t . 97-834); passed House Sept. 22. Reported from Senate Appropriations
Committee Sept. 23 ( S - R e p t . 97-56:);
passed
Senate Sept.
29.
Conference
r e p c r t was filed Sept. 3 0 (H.Rept. 97-911) and passed 3ouse and
Senace Cct.
1.
Signed i n t o law Cct. 2 , 1982.
P.L.
9 7 - 3 7 7 , H.J.Res.
631
FY83 Further Continuing Appropriations.
Includes funding
for
DOD
a c t i v i t i e s through Sept. 3 0 , 1983. Reported from H o u s e Appropriations Dec.
14.
Reportee
from
Senate
10
(H.Rept.
97-959); passed
House Dec.
Appropriations Dec. 1 5 (no written report); passed Senate Dec. 19.
Reported
from conference Dec. 2 0 (H.Rept.
97-980); passed H o u s e and S e n a t e Dec.
20.
S i g n e d i n t o l a w Dec. 2 1 , 1982.
98th Congress
H. J.Res.
8 7 (Kastenmeier)
J o i n t resolution calling for a verifiable
comprehensive treaty
s p a c e weapons.
Introduced Jan. 2 5 , 1 9 8 3 ; referred to Committee on
Affairs.
H.J.Res.
banning
Foreign
1 2 0 (Moakley et al.)
J o i n t resolution calling for i m m e d i a t e negotiations f o r a ban on weapons
of a n y kind i n space.
Introduced Feb. 2, 1 9 8 3 ; referred to Committee on
Foreign Affairs.
s . c o n . ~ e s . 1 6 (Matsunaga and Pell)
Resolution expressing t h e s e n s e of the Senate t h a t the President renew t h e
1972-1977 a g r e e m e n t with
the S o v i e t Union for cooperation
in
space
S.J.2es.
2E
("ongas
e~ a i . )
J o i n t r e s o l u t i o n c a l l i n g f o r immediate n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r a ban
on w e a p o n s
of any klnd i n space.
Introduced Feb. 3 ,
1983;
referred
t c Conmittee
on
Foreign Reiatlons.
S - R e s . 43
(?r'essler e t a l . )
R e s o i u t ~ o n expressing c h e s e n s e o f t h e S e c a t e : h a t
t h e President
should
n e g o t i a z e a t r e a t y w ~ t ht h e S o v l e t U n ~ o n b a n n l n g a n t ~ s a t e l l l t ew e a p o n s
as a
f ~ r s ts t e p t o w a r c p r o h l b ~ t l n ga:l
space-based
and
space-directed
vea?cns.
I f i t r o d u c e d F e b . 2 , 1 9 8 3 ; r e f e r r e d t o C o m m i t t e e o n F o r e l g n Relations.
U.S.
Congress.
Senate.
C c n m i t t e e on C o m m e r c e , S c i e n c e , a n d
Transportation.
S u b c o m m i t t e e on S c i e n c e , T e c h n o l o g y , a n d
Space.
Laser technology develcpment and a p p i i c a t i o n s .
Dec. 1 2
H e a r i n g s , 3 6 t h C o n g r e s s , 1 s t a n d 2nd s e s s i o n s .
a n d 14, 1 9 7 9 ; J a n . 8 a n d 1 2 , 1 9 8 0 .
Washington, U.S. Govt.
Pri~:.
off., 1 9 6 ~ .
U . S.
Congress.
Senate.
C o r n r c i z t e e on F o r e i g n R e l a t i o ~ ~ s .
S u S c o m R i t t e e on A r m s C o n r r o l , O c e a n s , : n t e r n a t i c n a l
Operations and Environment.
A r m s c o n t r o l and t h e
m i l i t a r i z a t i o n of space.
Hearings, 97th Congress, 2e
session.
S e p t . 20, 1982.
W a s h i n g t o n , U.S. G o v t . P r i n t .
O f f . , 1962.
REPORTS A N D CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS
U.S.
Congress.
House.
C o m r c i t t e e o n Arme6 S e r v i c e s .
D e p a r t m e n t of
Defense a u t h o r i z a t i o n a c t , 1983; r e p o r t t o accompany H.R.
6030.
A p r i l 1 3 , 1982.
W a s h i n g t o n , U.S. G o v t . P r i n t . O f f . , 1 9 8 2 .
(97th
C o n g r e s s , 2d s e s s i o n .
House.
R e p o r t No. 9 7 - 4 6 2 )
U.S.
Congress.
House.
C o m m i t t e e on F o r e i g n A f f a i r s a n d S e n a t e
Committee on F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s .
F i s c a l y e a r 1963 arms
control impact statements.
W a s h i n g t o n , U.S. G o v t . P r i n t .
O f f . , March 1 9 6 2 .
A t head of t i t l e :
9 7 t h C o n g r e s s , 2d s e s s i o n .
Joint
committee p r i n t .
U.S.
Congress.
Senate.
C o m m i t t e e o n Armed S e r v i c e s .
Department of
Defense a u t h o r i z a t i o n f o r a p p r o p r i a t i o n s f o r f i s c a l year 1983 and
supplemental authorization f o r appropriations f o r f i s c a l year 1982;
Apr. 1 3 , 1 9 8 2 .
W a s h i n g t o n , U.S. G o v t .
r e p o r t t o accompany S. 2248.
1982.
( 9 7 t h C o n g r e s s , 2d s e s s i o n .
Senate.
Report
Print. Off.,
No. 9 7 - 3 3 0 )
U.S.
Congress.
Senate.
C o m m i t t e e on Commerce,
Science, and
T r a n s p o r t a z ~ o n . Laser researct, ane a p p 1 ; c a t ~ o ~ s .
WzsP.ington, U.S. C o v t . P r i s t . O f f . , 1 3 8 0 .
b z heaC of t l c l e :
97th C o r y r e s s , 2n5 s e s s l o r .
,cs~:;tee pr2r.t.
?
CHRONOLOGY
OF EVEh'TS
03/10/63
-- S e n a t o r s M a t s u n a g a a n d P e l 1 i n t r o d u c e d S . C o n . i ? e s .
02/03/63
-- S e n a t o r T s o n g a s a n d t w o c o - s p o n s o r s
02/C2/63
-- R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Koakley and 7 6 c o - s p o n s o r s
16
e x p r e s s ~ n gt h e s e n s e o f t h e S e n a t e t h a t t h e
P r e s i d e n t renew t h e s p a c e c o o p e r a t i o n a g r e e m e n t w i t h
f i e S o v i e t U n i o n a n d e x p l o r e opportunities f o r
c o o p e r a t i v e v e n t u r e s i n s p a c e a s an a l t e r n a t i v e t o
a n arms r a c e i n s p a c e .
introduced
S . J . R e s . 2 8 , c a l l i n g f o r n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r a ban on
weapons of any k i n d i n s p a c e .
i~troduced
E . J . R e s . 1 2 3 , c a l i l n g f o r immeCiate n e g o t 2 a t ; o n s t c ban
weapons of any k i n d i n s p a c e .
-- S e n a t o r P r e s s l e r a n d 6 c o - s p o n s o r s i n t r o d u c e d S . R e s .
43,
e x p r e s s i n g t h e s e n s e of t h e S e n a t e t h a t t h e P r e s i d e n t
should seek t o negotiate an agreement w i t h t h e Soviet
Union bannlng a n t i s a t e l l i t e weapcns.
01/25/E3
- - R e p r e s e n t a t i v e K a s t e n ~ ~ e i ei rn t r o d u c e d E . J . R e s .
Calling
f o r a v e r i f i a b l e c o m p r e n e c s i v e ban
OR
67,
space
weapons.
09/29/82
-- S e n a t o r M a t s u n a g a i n t r o d u c e d S . R e s .
09/24/82
-- S e n a t o r P r e s s l e r i n t r o d u c e d S - E x e c - R e s . 7 , c a l l i n g f o r
488, c a l l i n g f o r t a l k s
aimed a t e s t a b l i s h i n g an i n t e r n a t i o n a l weapons-free space
s t a t i o n as an a l t e r n a t i v e t o t h e arms r a c e i n s p a c e .
n e g o t i a t i o n of a p r o t o c o l t o t h e 1967 O u t e r Space T r e a t y
t o p r o v i d e a c o m p l e t e a n d v e r i f i a b l e ban on
a n t i s a t e l l i t e weapons.
09/23/82
-- R e p r e s e n t a t i v e M o a k l e y a n d 2 9 c o - s p o n s o r s i n t r o d u c e d
H.J.Res. 607 c a l l i n g f o r immediate n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r
a ban on weapons o f a n y k i n d i n s p a c e .
09/20/82
-- S e n a t e F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s C o m m i t t e e h e l d h e a r i n g s
on weapons i n s p a c e .
07/04/82
-- P r e s i d e n t R e a g a n a n n o u n c e d . h i s new s p a c e p o l i c y ,
i n c l u d e d a r e a f f i r m a t i o n o f h i s commitment t o
d e v e l o p i n g a n ASAT s y s t e m .
06/18/82
-- S o v i e t s c o n d u c t e d t w e n t i e t h t e s t o f t h e i r ASAT
system.
05/13/82
-- S e n a t e p a s s e d t h e FY83 D O D a u t h o r i z a t i o n b i l l
(S. 2246) a f t e r a d o p t i n g a n amendment d i r e c t i n g
t h a t an o r b i t i n g l a s e r weapons s y s t e m be produced
which
a s quickly a s posslb'e.
l0/02/81
-- P r e s i d e n t R e a g a n r e a f f i r m e d t h e U . S .
commitment t o p u r s u e
a n c p e r a t i o n a l AS+T s y s t e m .
08/11/81
-- S o v i e t U n i o n s u b m i t t e d d r a f t ASAT t r e a t y t o t h e U n i t e d
hvations b a n n i n g t h e s t a t i o n i n g of weapons i n s p a c e .
05/06/81
-- S e n a t 0 . r P r e s s l e r i n t r o d u c e d a r e s o l u t i o n c a l l i n g
f o r a r e s u m p t i o n o f t h e ASAT l i m ~ t a t ~ ot an l k s .
04/17/61
-- S o v l e t P r e s l a e n t B r e z h n e v m a d e a s t a t e m e n t
~ n t e r p r e t e db y s o m e a s c a l l l n g f o r a r e n e w a l o f
t 3 e A S ~ T: ; r . ~ t a t ~ o n = z : k s .
:d/12/&;
-- -r ~ r s to r t ~ c a lt e s x i l i g k t o f :he
C3/14/61
-- S o v l e t s c o n d u c t e d n l n e t e e ~ t h t e s t o f t h e i r ASAT
U.S. s p a c e s k u z t l e ,
a manned r e u s a b l e s p a c e c r a f t w h l c h w l l l b e u s e d
f o r both c i v l l and m i l i t a r y space missions
t h r o u g h o u t =F.e 1 9 8 0 ' S .
system;
C2/2;/81
a success.
-- S o v l e t s c o n d n c : e d
system;
04/16/EO
considered
e i g h t e e ~ t ht e s t o f t h e i r A S A T
c0~s;dered a possible scccess.
-- S o v i e t s r e s u m e d t e s t i n g o f t h e i r ASAT s y s t e m a f t e r
a t w o y e a r h i a t u s d u r i n g ASAT l i m i t a t i o n t a l k s a n 8
SALT I 1 c o n s i d e r a t i o n .
The t e s t i s c o n s i d e r e d a
probable failure.
01/03/80
-- P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r a s k e d t h e S e n a t e t o d e f e r a c t i o n
o n SALT 11.
12/24/79
-- S o v i e t U n i o n i n v a d e d A f g h a n i s t a n , c o o l i n g A m e r i c a n
S e n t i m e n t s t o w a r d arms c o n t r o l a g r e e m e n t s .
06/18/79
-- P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r a n d S o v i e t P r e s i d e n t E r e z h n e v
s i g n e d t h e SALT 11 t r e a t y .
04/23/79
-- T h i r d s e s s i o n o f ASAT l i m i t a t i o n t a l k s b e g a n i n
Vienna, Austria.
Further t a l k s have been
postponed i n d e f i n i t e l y .
01/23/79
-- S e c o n d s e s s i o n o f ASAT l i m i t a t i o n t a l k s b e g a n i n
Bern,
06/19/78
Switzerland.
-- W h i t e H o u s e i s s u e d a f a c t s h e e t s u m m a r i z i n g t h e
p r o v i s i o n s of P r e s i d e n t Carter's P r e s i d e n t i a l
D i r e c t i v e 37 s t a t i n g t h a t t h e United S t a t e s wants
a n ASAT l i r L i t a t i o n t r e a t y , b u t t h a t i n i t s
a b s e n c e , w i l l v i g o r o u s l y p u r s u e development of an
ASAT c a p a b i l ~ t y .
C6/06/76
-- -f i r s t sessior of ASbTl~l,:;atior!
U.S. ar,d Soviet Unlon begar ;n
c5/1S/76
talks between z h e
H e l s l r ~ k l ,F l c l a n d .
-- Soviezs conaccted sixxeenxn test of their ASAT
s y s t e m , just three weeks prior to scheduled ASAT
limitation talks with the United States. L a s t
test until April 1980; considered a possible success.
02/16/76
-- Soviets resumed testing of their ASAT s y s t e m ,
following a four y e a r , three month hiatus. T h i s
y e s t , t h e eighth, i s considered a possible success.
0 ~ / C 0 / 7 5 -- U.S. deactivated its ground-based ASAT system.
11/03/72
-- SALT I 1 negotiations began between the United
States and Soviet Union.
10/03/72
-- SALT 1 agreements were signeC.
i2/03/7i
- - Soviets coneucted seventh test of their ASAT s y s t e m ,
the i a s t until December 1576.
a possible success.
;i/00/69
T e s t i s considered
-- SALT 1 negotiations between the United S t a t e s and
Soviet U n ~ o nbegan.
11/01/68
-- Soviets conducted a seconC ASAT t e s t , this time a
possible success, since the interceptor passed
within 1 kilometer of the target.
20/20/68
-- Soviets conducted t h e first test of their
space-based ASAT s y s t e m , which i s considered a
probable f a i l u r e , s i n c e the interceptor failed to
come within 1 kilometer of the target.
09/17/64
-- P r e s i d e n t Johnson announces that t h e United S t a t e s
has a n operational ASAT system.
05/23/63
-- F i r s t U.S. test of a n ASAT weapon -- using
ground-based missile carrying a nuclear warhead.
07/16/62
-- Soviet Premier Khruschev stated that the Soviet
Union had a missile capable cf "hitting a fly in
outer space," interpreteC by some western experts
a s a reference to a n ASAT capability.
ADDITIONAL REFERENCE SOURCES
Bell, Trudy.
America's other s p a c e program.
Dec. 1979: 6 - 1 3 , 32.
The Sciences,
Covault, Craig.
Antisatellite weapon design advances.
Aviation
week and space technology, J u n e 1 6 , 1980: 243-245, 247.
H a f n e r , Donald L. Averting a Brobdingnagian skeet shoot: a r m s
c o n t r o l measures for anti-satellite weapons.
International
security,
W i n t e r l 9 5 ~ / 8 1 : 41-6C.
Iien8ersocr Wallace D.
Space-based
A s t r o n a u t i c s and a e r o n a u t i c s ,
lasers:
uitimaze ABY
Kay 1 9 8 2 :
44-53.
system?
Eigh F r o n t i e r P r o j e c t .
High f r o r t l e r :
a new n a t i o n a l
strategy.
Washington, High F r o n t i e r , 1982.
--
a new d ~ m e n s l o co f
J a s a n i , El-.cpe%dra, e d .
Outer space
race.
London, T a y l o r & P r a n c ~ s ,1982.
= h e arms
L a s e r w e a p o n r y ~ e c h n o l o g ya d v a n c e s .
A v i a t i o n week a n 8 s p a c e
6 5 , 68-71.
t e c h n o l o g y , Kay 2 5 , 1 9 6 1 :
R o b i n s o n , C l a r e n c e A . , ;I-. Beam w e a p o n s t e c h n o l o g y e x p a n d i n g .
A v i a : i c ~ week a n d s p a c e t e C h n O l ~ g y , Kay 2 5 , 1 9 6 ; : 4 3 - 4 3 ,
45-47.
----- 3 . S .
p u s h e s d e v e l o p m e n t o f beam w e a p o n s .
Aviation
week a n d s p a c e t e c h n o l o g y , O c t o b e r 2 , 1 9 7 8 :
14-22.
S t r a t e g i c a n d a r m s c o n t r o i implications o f
S ~ . e r n o f f ,B a r r y J .
A l r Univers~ty
l a s e r w e a p c n s : a p r e l ~ m i n a r ya s s e s s m e n t .
R e v ~ e w ,J a n . - F e b . 1978: 38-50.
T a r . ~ ~ o t oD, o u q i a s E .
8irecteC-enerqy
0 p p o r ~ u r i ~ t : e sf c r s p a c e a p p l i c a t 1 o r . s o f
technoloqles.
S ~ g n a l ,F e b . 1 9 8 1 : 3 7 - 4 2 .
Tsipis, Kosta.
L a s e r weapons.
Toth, Robert.
War i n s p a c e .
Scientific a m e r i c a n ,
Science 60, Sept./Oct.
Dec.
1981:
1980:
74-80.
U.S.
DOD's space-based l a s e r
General Accountins Office.
program:
p o t e n t i a l progress and problems.
Washington,
C-MASAD-82-10
U . S . GAO, F e b . 2 0 , 1 9 8 2 .
U.S.
Library of Congress.
Congressional Research Service.
A n t i b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s [ b y ] Jonathan E. Medalia.
(Continuously updated)
I s s u e B r i e f 81063
----- S p a c e p o l i c y a n d f u n d i n g :
NASA a n d D O D [ b y ] K a r c i a S .
Smith.
(Continuously updated)
I s s u e B r i e f 78093
----- S p a c e s h u t t l e [ b y ] M a r c i a S. S m i t h .
updated)
Issue Brief
(Continuously
81175
----- U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d S o v i e t p r o g r e s s i n s p a c e : s u m m a r y d a t a
through 1980 and a forward look ( r e v i s e d January 1 5 ,
[ B Y ] C h a r l e s S.
S h e l d o n . CRS R e p o r t No. 8 1 - 2 7
1981).
U.S.
S.
N a t i o n a l Aeronautics and Space A d m i n i s t r a t i o n .
Aeronautics
and s p a c e r e p o r t of t h e P r e s i d e n t : 1979 a c t i v i t i e s .
51-57.
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