Bomber Options for Replacing B52s

B O M B E R O P T I O N S F O R R E P L A C I N G B-52s

ISSUE BRIEF NUMBER IB81107

AUTHOR:

M i t c h e l l , D o u g l a s D.

Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division

T H E L I B R A R Y OF C O N G R E S S

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE

MAJOR I S S U E S S Y S T E M

'

D A T E O R I G I N A T E D 06/17/81

D A T E U P D A T E D 05/03/82

F O R A D D I T I O N A L I N F O R M A T I O N C A L L 287-5700

0528

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ISSUE DEFINITION

To deter a nuclear attack against this country and its allies, the United

States maintains a strategic force of

land-based

missiles

(ICBMs),

submarine-based missiles (SLBMs), and bombers.

The bomber leg of this

"triad" primarily

consists of about 343 B-52 bombers operated by the

Strategic Air Command

(SAC).

Many believe that by 1990, the B-52's

vulnerability to improving Soviet air defenses will imperil its effectiveness

as a penetrating bomber. There is strong sentiment in Congress and in the

Department of Defense to replace the B-52s before that time.

The FY81 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 96-342) directed the Secretary of

Defense to develop a "multi-role bomber" for initial deployment by 1987.

Candidate aircraft were to include the B-1, a derivative of the B-1, the

FB-111B/C, and a n advanced technology aircraft, which would incorporate

"Stealth.'' Months before the choice of aircraft was announced, the new

Reagan Administration added $2.4 billion to the FY82 defense budget, to

called

initiate a bomber procurement and research and development program

Long Range Combat Aircraft (LRCA).

In a long-awaited announcement on Oct.

2, 1981, President

Reagan

designated a modified B-1 -- also known as the B-1B -- a s the aircraft to be

built for LRCA.

This decision reverses the policy

of

the

Carter

Administration, which was to forego the B-1, initially in favor

of

Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCM), and then, during the 1980 campaign, i n

favor of a "Stealthw bomber in the future.

The Congress had a specific role in approving or disapproving President

Reagan's decision:

the bill that authorized funding for LRCA

(S. 8 1 5 , the

FY82 Defense Authorization bill) provided that money could not be obligated

for the B-1 until Nov. 1 8 , 1981.

If both Houses had agreed to resolutions sf

disapproval before that date, LRCA funding would have been blocked.

Technology

Opposition to the B-1 centers around support for an Advanced

Bomber (ATB) incorporating llStealth'ltechnologies more completely than the

modified B-1, and offering greater potential a s a penetrating bomber over the

long term.

However, the Reagan decision includes continued development of an

ATB "for the 1 9 9 0 s I W leaving a s primary issues the questions of affordability

and the need for both elements of the "two-bomber" program.

Even though the

funding questions for 1982 specifically have been resolved, these issues will

continue to underlie future debate over B-1 costs and its priority in

successive defense budgets.

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EXPLANATION OF TERMS

The following distinctions in terminology used i n this issue brief may

helpful :

be

Multi-Role Bomber (MRB) -- This term was used in P.L.

96-342.

The Act

authorized $300 million for development of a multi-role

bomber, and the

program

in FY81 bore the same title.

That

resulting Air Force R&D

identification does not appear in the FY82 budget, however, having been

replaced by LRCA.

--

Long-Range Combat Aircraft (LRCA)

Conceptually, MRB and LRCA envision

an aircraft t o perform the same range of conventional and strategic missions.

The Air Force prefers the latter term, and the Reagan Administration's FY82

budget request includes both procurement and R&D for the next bomber under

this term.

Rockwell International has used the term synonymously with their

B-1, even before their candidate had definitely been chosen for the LRCA

program.

B-1 -- Rockwell International's LRCA variant of the B-1 has basically

the

same design a s the earlier aircraft whose production was halted in 1977. B-1

herein refers to an aircraft of that basic design in any configuration being

considered today, recognizing that important questions may remain over what

configuration to choose.

While the House Armed Services Committee has

recommended a design with minimal changes, any B-1 derivative that meets the

criterion for timely deployment i s authorized a s a B-1, according to the

House version of S. 815, the DOD Authorization bill.

--

Highly classifies defense research projects have led to a

Stealth

technological advance formally announced on Aug. 22, 1980, called Stealth.

Advances reportedly have application to aircraft design, materials and

electronics, with the objective of drastically reducing the detectability of

future aircraft, manned and unmanned.

Accordingly, a "Stealth bombern is a

future bomber of unspecified

design, but presumed

to incorporate those

advances collectively known a s Stealth.

Some Stealth-related innovations may

be used in other aircraft before a n all-new Stealth fighter or bomber is

finally produced.

--

The Air Force uses this term to refer

Advanced Technology Bomber (ATB)

to an aircraft incorporating technological innovations that are not mature

enough to be exploited in current

production.

So-called

"Stealthw

of

such

technologies would presumably

constitute a large proportion

innovations.

Accordingly,

"Stealth

aircraftm

and

"ATB"

are

used

interchangeably.

An advanced technology bomber was one of the Multi-Role

Bomber candidates specified by P.L. 96-342; y e t the provision for an IOC by

1987 was widely perceived as effectively excluding an ATB a s a serious

Accordingly, ATB presently refers to a

candidate for MRB o r , likewise, LRCA.

longer-term R&D program.

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BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS

BOMBER ROLES

SAC now operates 3 4 3 B-52 long range strategic bombers,

(along with

66

medium-range FB-111A bombers).

Of that number, 168 " G W models and 96 " H w

models are used in the alert force for strategic retaliation. Models G and H

are the most modern B-52s produced, having entered service between 1 9 5 8 and

1962.

Another

79 " D m models are considered available primarily

for

non-strategic missions; D models are somewhat older.

Penetration Role

The United States nuclear deterrent force began with intercontinental

range bombers, and they have remained a prime delivery system.

Today,

alongside the other "legs" of the U.S.

strategic triad

(ICBMs and SLBMs),

bombers a r e allocated a share of nuclear weapons that accounts for about half

the destructive power (in megatonnage) of the total U.S. inventory.

Although some question the continued viability of manned aircraft in

high-threat environments of the future, others believe that penetrating

bombers will continue to offer unique attributes of value for strategic

deterrence:

(1) Bombers may be withheld from a n initial nuclear

exchange without added risk to their survival,

permitting their selective use to influence

enemy and allied actions in the post-strike

environment.

(2) Bombers can be recalled after dispatch,

contributing to strategic flexibility and

crisis stability.

(3) Bombers can engage mobile targets and destroy

them even if hardened.

(4)

Several other claims made for bombers seem

valid only under certain conditions:

-- Crews can conduct reliable and immediate

damage assessment (doubtful with nuclear

weapons) .

-- Bombers can attack a series of targets or

engage targets of opportunity (doubtful in

heavily defended areas).

These attributes alone may not justify the requirement for bombers, but

the capability of U.S.

bombers to penetrate Soviet defenses remains a

strategic requirement in current U.S. defense policy.

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Cruise Missile Role

Beginning in 1982, B-52s will assume a second, less demanding, strategic

role a s cruise missile launchers. All G models gradually will be withdrawn a s

Itpenetrating bombers" so that they will constitute strictly a stand-off force

by 1990. Currently, G models entering scheduled overhaul are being equipped

with internal and external carriage assemblies and new offensive avionics

systems to command the 1 2 or 20 ALCMs that will be carried on each aircraft.

H models are being equipped with the same offensive avionics systems, but the

necessary structural changes for carrying ALCMs await a future decision over

whether or when to withdraw H models from service a s penetrators.

Current plans call for deploying about 3000 ALCMs by 1990.

If the B-52s

carry nothing but ALCMs (at the maximum of 2 0 each), about 150 aircraft would

suffice. By choosing to use the entire inventory of G models and perhaps H

models, however, the Air Force can achieve the ALCM

force objective while

permitting ALCMs to be loaded in combination with bombs and Short-Range

Attack Missiles (SRAM).

On that basis, the Air Force will be able to use

converted B-52s in a "shoot and penetrate" role during the 1980's transition

period to an "all stand-off" role.

General-Purpose Role

A third role for B-52s i s conventional bombing, most recently exemplified

in operations during the Vietnam war.

SAC'S 7 9 D model B-52s are outfitted

for a maximum payload of non-nuclear gravity bombs (108, compared with 27 for

other models), and are considered available primarily

for general-purpose

use, such as wcounter-interventionw to defend U.S.

interests against armed

aggression i n Southwest Asia or Europe, for example.

Other possible missions for bombers add to the B-52s'

general-purpose

rationale.

They may be used in support of naval operations; mine-laying

has

been an accepted mission for B-52s in the past, as in the closing of Haiphong

Harbor.

Bomber advocates note several additional maritime roles that B-52s

or their successors should be able to perform in conventional warfare, e.g.,

attacking hostile surface ships and contributing to U.S.

fleet air defense

against Backfire bombers.

Need for Bombers i n Non-Strategic Roles

The need for bombers in conventional wartime roles follows from certain

assumptions about U.S. and Soviet strategies and force structures to be used

i n meeting possible contingencies.

In the case of a NATO contingency,

tactical air forces constitute the primary strike force for blunting a Warsaw

Pact advance, and U.S.

forward-based systems such a s F-111s pose the threat

of deeper interdiction and tactical nuclear strikes a s a n added deterrent t o

Soviet aggression.

The contribution of conventionally-armed bombers within

If

NATO's

"flexible responsem doctrine may be

open

to

question.

justification for bombers in this role is in terms of nsupplementing" the

tactical strike force, Congress might ask why supplements a r e needed, and how

responsibility for carrying out those missions is being shared, if both

SAC

and other commands are involved.

The scenario most mentioned to substantiate the need

for

a

conventional

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UPDATE-05/03/82

bomber force i s further Soviet intervention in Southwest Asia.

If vital U.S.

interests in the Persian Gulf region were threatened, it is argued,

long-range strike forces would be needed to slow the advance of Soviet or

proxy forces until U.S.

ground forces could be brought to bear in sufficient

number.

Bomber advocates note that the border area between the USSR and

Iran, for example, would be beyond the range of carrier-based interdiction

aircraft unless carriers exposed themselves dangerously by entering the

Persian Gulf.

B-52s and follow-on bombers would offer

the

desired

combination of range and payload for attacking distant and extended targets,

according to this view.

Strategic Projection Force

The FY82 budget request for the Strategic Projection Force (SPF) responds

to the Persian Gulf scenario, among others.

This program would upgrade

long-distance interdiction bombing capability a s a complement to Rapid

Deployment Forces (RDF). The SPF program would take 35 H model B-52s and

configure them for improved general purpose use, including an expanded

capacity for 500-lb bombs.

According to Air Force spokesmen, the plan to

convert H models instead of using D models, which already carry the maximum

conventional payload, is based on the greater range and reliability of the

newer aircraft.

REASONS ADVANCED FOR REPLACING B-52s

The Air Force's Long Range Combat Aircraft

(LRCA) concept for a new

strategic bomber responds to desires for an aircraft well-suited to a range

of conventional uses also.

Likewise, the "Multi-Role Bomberw concept

mandated by the 96th Congress envisions general-purpose missions as well a s

strategic potential.

Despite the great significance that non-nuclear power

projection roles have been given in the marketing and promotion

of certain

candidate aircraft, these arguments relate generally to why bombers are

useful, and not to why the U.S. needs new ones.

By contrast, most arguments

for replacing the B-52s are expressed in terms of the U.S.-Soviet

strategic

competition, and particularly

the U.S.

objective of penetrating future

strategic defenses being developed by the Soviet Union.

Serviceability of the B-52s

A commonly-heard complaint about B-52s is that they

will soon be older

than the pilots flying them.

While the B-52 represents a product of 1950's

technology, modifications to G and H models have helped adapt them to new

operating environments. Nevertheless, age imposes limits on the Suture

service that B-52s can reliably offer, and, hence, on the readiness of the

bomber force.

As strategic bombers, B-52s would fly the following mission profile in a

general war:

Take off from their dispersed bases before the impact of

attacking warheads, fly at high altitude intercontinentally toward assigned

targets, drop to low altitude to evade and defeat enemy air defenses, survive

to reach and destroy their objectives, and then escape to recovery bases.

Flight at low altitudes keeps a n aircraft hidden from defending ground radars

a s long a s possible, combines with speed to limit the engagement time of air

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UPDATE-05/03/82

defense weapons, and conceals an aircraft from non-discriminating

airborne

radar systems by mixing its radar image with other signals, known as "ground

clutter," reflected from the earth's surface.

Low flight combines with deception to permit penetration.

Accordingly,

B-52s rely on electronic countermeasures

(ECM) to suppress, distort, or

otherwise "jam" the radar echo that a hostile fire control system receives.

ECM masks the presence of attacking aircraft or deceives the defending

weapons about the number, size, location, speed, or other aspects of the

target, once detected.

ECM systems draw considerable amounts of power from

their aircraft, however, imposing limits on the capability an aircraft can

support.

The flight profile of an emergency take-off and a penetration mission

places considerable stress on an airframe and demands on avionics.

Although

the ability of an aircraft to withstand such use declines with age, recent

studies have confirmed that the B-52 airframe is still reliable; and by using

B-52s as cruise missile platforms, the Air Force expects the system to be

serviceable almost until 2000.

As the aircraft grows older, however,

incidents of failure may be expected to increase, lowering

aircraft

availability rates and adding to the costs of operating them.

Vulnerability to Soviet Air Defenses

Although the future reliability and maintainability

of B-52s are of

concern, the more critical reason for a new bomber, in the Air Force view, is

improving Soviet air defenses.

The Soviet Union already has deployed over

6,000 ground radars, 12,800 surface-to-air

missile launchers, and 2,550

interceptor aircraft.

General Ellis, Commander-in-Chief

of SAC, estimates

that 75% of an attacking B-52 force would be expected to survive Soviet

defenses around 1985.

The Soviet Union is constantly improving those

defenses, however, leading the Air Force to conclude that B-52s would be

highly vulnerable as a penetrating bomber force by 1990. Their utility until

then depends on the rate of Soviet progress in the following areas:

-- Deployment of a Soviet Union AWACS (Airborne

Warning and Control System) aircraft (termed

SUAWACS) that provides radar surveillance and

coordinates interceptors1 fire control over

extended ranges, similar to the U.S. AWACS.

With sophisticated "look-downw radar, i t will

be able to distinguish low-flying aircraft

from ground clutter.

- - Deployment of a new generation of

fighter/interceptor aircraft whose improved

radar and air-to-air missiles will provide

a "look down-shoot downw (LDSD) capability

similar to U.S. F-15s.

Although the Air Force is concerned about improved Soviet capabilities

represented in the new SA-10 air defense missiles and in a n integrated

communications and electonic warfare system a s well, it is the look-down

shoot-down (LDSD) prospect particularly that threatens to eliminate the

protection now afforded U.S.

aircraft by low-level flight.

The B-52's chances of survival might

be

extended

beyond

the

1980s

by

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UPDATE-05/03/82

adding new systems of defensive avionics.

Sentiment in the Congress,

however, favors a new bomber for the penetrating mission.

There i s concern

that the effectiveness of advanced "active defensesw like

electronic

countermeasures (ECM) cannot fully compensate for the limitations of the

B-52's less advanced "passive defenses," related to size, propulsion

system

and fabrication materials.

Such inherent characteristics largely determine

which

refers

to

the

an aircraft's

"radar cross

section"

(RCS) ,

identifiability of the radar image an aircraft reflects back.

Thus, the

requirement for a new bomber aircraft is widely discussed in terms of

improved design features to present a significantly lower RCS than existing

aircraft, thus reducing susceptibility to radar aetection and tracking.

Diversifying and Modernizing

Another major reason given for replacing B-52s a s penetrators is that they

have already been scheduled to retire from that role and t o serve as cruise

missile carriers.

By terms of the current rationale, cruise missiles carried

and launched by SAC aircraft would not alter the doctrinal "triad" of U.S.

strategic weapons.

Rather, i t i s held that ALCMs will preserve the viability

of the "air-breathing" leg more effectively than bombers alone, because

"diversification" of this leg compels Soviet air defenses to contend with two

kinds of attacking systems. Thus, the objectives of deploying ALCMs and

simultaneously replacing B-52s a s penetrators serve the goal of diversifying

and modernizing bomber forces. The Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for

Research and Development, General Kelly Burke, argues that any investment in

a new bomber i s worthwhile if i t successfully induces the Soviet Union t o

spend a disproportionately greater amount of its resources in preparing

defenses against it.

Pursuing two objectives simultaneously concentrates the costs in a f e w

years, and critics of this approach argue that deployment of new ALCMs makes

it unnecessary to keep a large number of penetrating bombers.

They feel that

H model B-52s a1on.e would constitute a n adequate force of penetrators over

the period while ALCMs are being phased in on G models.

By deferring bomber

modernization until around 1990, however, such a solution would have to

cruise missile

provide not only a new penetrator, but a second-generation

carrier a s well, since B-52s in any capacity will be retired before 2000;

(Air Force spokesmen estimate between 1993 and 1998).

Thus, the two elements

of diversification must be confronted simultaneously, whether now or later,

because of the finite service life of the B-52s.

CONGRESSIONAL POSITIONS

Congressional viewpoints on the bomber issue a r e reflected in current

versions of the FY82 Defense Authorization Bill and in provisions of last

year's Defense Authorization bill (P.L. 96-342).

Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1981 (P.L. 96-342)

Section 204(a) directs the Secretary of Defense to develop "a strategic

multi-role bomber which maximizes range, payload, and ability to perform

the

missions of conventional bomber, cruise missile launch platform, and nuclear

weapons delivery system in both the tactical and strategic role."

This law

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UPDATE-05/03/82

reflects Congressional intent to provide a replacement for the B-52 in each

of its roles.

Air Force plans for LRCA now make it clear, however, that the

aircraft will assume its cruise missile-launching role only around the middle

of its service life, when its effectiveness a s a penetrator will have

declined; 1995 i s the suggested date.

The "multi-role bomber," therefore,

capability beyond that

will not be used to provide a strategic penetration

time.

P.L.

96-342 directed the Secretary of Defense to consider several

candidates for the new multi-role bomber, t o include the B-1, the FB-111B/C,

and an "advanced technology bomberw (ATB), which would exploit innovations in

a variety of emerging technologies, collectively known. a s "Stealth."

Another

provision states that development of the bomber must be guided by an Initial

Operating Capability (IOC-the deployment of the first squadron of aircraft)

not later than 1987. Realistically, an ATB candidate could not meet that

requirement, although some supporters of that language may have thought

otherwise a t the time.

House of Representatives

Reporting the FY82 Defense Authorization bill (H.Rept. 97-71) , the House

Armed Services Committee affirmed the 1987 deadline for a multi-role bomber,

specifying July 1 , 1987. Moreover, the Committee recommended that the Air

Force procure B-1s in a configuration a s near as possible to the prototype

B-1s

purchased

before President Carter's 1977 decision

to

terminate

production.

This recommendation i s apparently based on desires to deploy the

aircraft in a s short a time and with a s little unnecessary expense as

A selection on that basis

would probably provide a relatively

possible.

high-performance variant, including a supersonic capability.

As reported and subsequently passed, the bill also authorizes Research,

Development, Test and Evaluption (RDTFiE). funding for a n advanced technology

aircraft. This authorization supports the Air Force's position that a B-1

should be acquired in the near-term as a multi-role

bomber, and a more

advanced penetrator should be acquired over the longer-term.

Thus, the House

(LRCA),

bill supports a "two-bomber programw of a Long Range Combat Aircraft

and a future advanced technology bomber (ATB).

Senate

Defense bills passed by the Senate in the 96th Congress were not

supportive of a revived B-1 program.

T h e llmulti-role bomberH language passed

in P.L. 96-342 represented a compromise between a stretched F/FB-111, favored

by the Senate Armed Services Committee, and a B-1 derivative Strategic

Weapons Launcher (SWL), regarded by some a s a first step toward a full B-1

program.

By its adoption in conference, the Senate's language not only

averted a SWL program, but it also undercut a competing strategy to produce a

compromise in conference that would

settle on a B-1.

Thus, while the

"multi-rolew terminology has been perceived a s favoring the B-1, i t actually

dampened the B-1's

immediate prospects in 1980.

The prevalent Senate

position in the 96th Congress sought to leave open the options presented

by

emerging technologies.

If a two-bomber approach were to be necessary, the

Senate favored the FB-111B/C

a s an "interim bomberw; that program was

originally approved in the Senate version of the FY81 Defense Authorization

bill.

CRS- 9

The FY82 Defense Authorization Bill

(S. 8151, reported by the Armed

Services Committee (S.Rept. 97-58), and passed May 1 4 , 1 9 8 1 , approves the

Administration's request for bomber funding. The Senate version does not

specify a choice, but it makes the obligation of funds contingent upon a

recommendation by the President, and open t o a concurrent resolution of

disapproval by Congress.

The Armed Services committee noted that a new

bomber is needed not only for the strategic role, but for demanding

conventional missions a s well, and that a follow-on cruise missile carrier

would hedge against degraded reliability o r pre-launch survivability of B-52

carriers.

From this language, it appears that Senate support for a B-l

program may have grown in the 97th Congress; but Senator Tower, Chairman of

the Senate Armed Services Committee, has expressed reservations about the

affordability of B-1s with an ATB.

OPTIONS AND ARGUMENTS

The Need for a "Two-Bomberw Program

While sharing the ultimate objective of deploying an ATB, many bomber

advocates would prefer to precede it with a n aircraft of more predictable

capability, cost, and availability.

This group believes that Stealth

technology can be applied to future aircraft more completely and more

effectively if development i s not rushed. Accordingly, many have concluded

that a "two-bomber programw i s needed, o n the assumption that Soviet air

defenses effectively will have "closed the doorw on B-52 penetrators by 1990,

and that ALCMs alone should not be relied upon to maintain the strategic

balance in the interim between generations of penetrators.

The issues which

follow from these conclusions are:

(1) How much of an investment to make,

(2) how much capability to build, and ( 3 ) how many years' use t o expect in an

aircraft short of an ATB.

These questions will remain relevant a s Congress

monitors the progress of the LRCA program.

The B-1 Alternative:

"Near-Termw or Long-Term?

financially

B-1 proponents view the ATB a s a high risk alternative, both

and technically.

Past experience with previous programs to replace the B-52

(AMSA, B-70, B-1) leads many to fear the same fate for Stealth; and they

discourage waiting for Stealth because that would commit the country to

developing an all-new aircraft by around 1990, whatever the cost.

That could

place the Department of Defense in a less favorable bargaining position for

dealing with aircraft manufacturers, some assert, whereas a B-1 program and

an ATB program would introduce competition and offer the Air Force more

flexibility.

While some B-1 backers foresee its long-term role a s a penetrator, the Air

Force requested 100 B-1s as "near-term1' penetrators, preferring an ATB a s the

ultimate replacement for the B-52 in that role.

Illustrative plans would

phase the B-1 in as a penetrator from 1987 to 1990, then phase i t in a s a

cruise missile carrier beginning around 1995.

Its place as a penetrator

would then be taken by an ATB, (of which the Air Force hopes to build 132).

Given fiscal constraints, some B-l backers suspect that LRCA, once begun,

Will be the only new bomber program

for the remainder of this century.

Accordingly, they feel the B-1 should be acquired in the full number needed

t o replace the B-52s a s they retire from service in all roles.

B-1 advocates

note that the synergistic effects of its new design features with its ALQ-161

ECM system should reduce its previous RCS by a factor of 1 0 , and assure its

effectiveness as a penetrator "well into the 1990s."

They suggest that if

technological advances offer increased advantages for penetrating aircraft,

they can be added t o the B-1 LRCA.

For example, development of laser

defenses against surface-to-air

missiles

would

permit

high-altitude

penetration, as suggested by former Air Force Secretary Hans Mark.

This difference of approach among those who support a B-1 alternative

leads to disagreement over how to configure the aircraft, now that i t has

been chosen for the LRCA program.

For example, should the B-1s be

constructed initially with the features needed only later to carry cruise

missiles?

And should a supersonic dash capability be included? Neither was

initially provided for within the funding requested by

the Administration,

but October budget revisions added about $800 million in modifications for

cruise missile carriage.

The "Baseline Variant"

The precise configuration of the new B-1 for LRCA has not been publicized,

but it builds on the "core aircraft" Which would be common to any variant,

reportedly keeping 85% of the design features from the original B-1.

Any

number of combinations could be conceived to constitute many different

variants, both for adding to the capability of the original and for

economizing somewhat.

Much of the Work over recent months by both the Air

Force Bomber Office and the O S D Bomber Study Group has involved defining

competing configurations and developing cost estimates for each, then

conducting cost-effectiveness analyses for each variant i n relation to each

other and to notional advanced technology candidates.

International would be

The baseline variant being promoted by Rockwell

designed to fly farther than the original B-1, and would have a n increased

payload.

The requirement for a multi-role configuration a s well a s for

penetrating improved defenses calls for other changes, andb the added costs

which result are to be offset in part by reductions in the maximum speed and

altitude attainable by the aircraft

(from 70,000 feet to 42,000 feet).

Accordingly, the following modifications to the earlier aircraft may be

expected in the B-1 LRCA:

-- Reduction in supersonic performance from Mach

1.6 to Mach 1.2 (attainable only a t high

altitudes).

Low-level supersonic "dashw capability will

be abandoned.

-- Changes in the engine nacelles to reduce radar

cross section.

-- Redesign of the weapons bay to include a movable

forward bulkhead for a larger number of ordnance

(and fuel) loading options, including cruise

missiles.

-- Provisions for external stores (fuel or weapons)

under the fuselage.

-- Use of the new offensive avionics syst.em being

installed in B-52s.

-- Improvements in defensive avionics capabilities

(ECM)

.

The resulting aircraft, powered by four General Electric FlOl engines,

could take off weighing as much as 477,000 l b ,

(compared to 395,000 lb

previously) with a maximum ordnance load of 38 nuclear gravity bombs and

SRAMs or, in later years, 3 0 cruise missiles.

The maximum

range a t that

payload has not been publicized, but Air Force spokesmen claim that in

unrefueled operational flight profiles, the B-1 variant could out-distance a

B-52 H by a couple of percentage points.

Rockwell International adds that,

without refueling, the LRCA should be able t o perform the strategic mission

that the original B-1 could accomplish with one refueling.

Schedule

Air Force Systems Division has issued a n estimate of the B-1 variant's

By adjusting that

availability, based on a go-ahead around July 1 , 1981.

starting date to Nov. 1 , the first delivery would be made in June 1985 and

the last delivery in October 1988; IOC would occur in December 1986.

I n B u s t r y q s estimates tend to be more optimistic than the Air Force's, because

of different assumptions about the work force's learning curve.

Costs

Procurement costs for B-1 derivative aircraft depend on the variant

chosen; accordingly, reports of findings by the Bomber Study Group a s high a s

$24.6 billion contrast with the initial Air Force estimate of $19.7

billion

(in FY81 terms).

Based on current Administration projections of inflation

over the years of a LRCA procurement program, the "baseline9' cost goal of

$20.5 billion will actually amount to $27.9 billion by the time of program

completion.

Critics of the B-1 proposal argue that even an equivalent projection based

on more realistic inflation factors would still underestimate the total cost

of LRCA aquisition. While Air Force spokesmen insist their estimates are

firm, especially with the prospect of multi-year contracting for much of the

program, doubters point to the absence of contracts a t present, and note that

the baseline cost estimate excludes likely expenses for a simulator program

($300 million), a second inertial guidance system

($220 million),

or a

"permissive action Pink" to provide for disarming nuclear weapons a s a safety

measure ($50 million).

In October, the Air Force's $19.7 billion target was

revised to $20.5

billion in FY81

terms,

reflecting

primarily

the

Administration's decision t o proceed a t the outset with provisions for cruise

missile carriage, both internally and externally.

The

$800

million

difference also includes a new radio system. Some other costs for complete

cruise missile integration may be expected a t the

time

operational

C O n V e r s i O n ~ of LRCAs are actually made (in the 1990s); but in FY82 terms, the

program to acquire the 100 aircraft with a n IOC of late 1986 i s estimated to

cost $22 billion.

A draft GAO critique of the B-1 estimates, reported in the Washington Post

(Oct. 29, 1981), found false economies in the omission of likely program

expenses; one example was the requirement to match planned avionics systems

t o new Air Force specifications, perhaps costing an added $86 million, and

The Air Force and DOD

delaying the schedule of production by 6 t o 1 2 months.

had not been given their customary opportunity to review or comment on the

A CBO estimate, based on their inflation figures and the assumptions

draft.

of the GAO study, projected a "then-year" cost of almost $40 billion.

The opportunity for the U.S. to redeem much of the $5 to $6 billion in

research and development costs already invested in the original B-1 program,

and for industries to regain work that was lost a s a result of the 1977

decision, has remained an important consideration, economically as well a s

politically, in support for the B-1.

Affordability of the "Two-Bomber" Program

Among those committed to deploying a new bomber, the greatest concern with

the B-1 has been expressed by William Perry: "Spending billions on the B-1

Although outlays in the current

would rule out a Stealth follow-on."

five-year plan would be higher in the case of a two-bomber ( B - ~ / A T B ) program

than for an all-Stealth program, the few cost estimates for total program

costs have been in the same broad range both for 250 ATBs and for a mix of

B-1s and ATBs totalling the same number. Thus, the case has not been made

for the argument that the two-bomber approach per se is more costly. Rather,

the primary argument i s that sufficient funding will not be provided over the

period needed to complete a $40-$60 billion program, regardless of what kind.

The bomber's ultimate share of defense resources, in other words, i s expected

to be considerably less, but with different consequences for the two

approaches: An all-ATB program would be slowed or reduced somewhat; in the

case of a two-bomber program, however, the near-term B-1 would be deployed,

and the longer-term ATB might not.

Stealth proponents decry that prospect,

insisting that an ATB can be available soon enough to alleviate the need for

another aircraft, and that a B-1 could not

satisfy

the

long-term

requirements.

Early in the 97th Congress, prospects for a "two-bomber" approach were

enhanced by perceptions that new support for defense spending would make such

a choice politically more attractive than in the past.

The durability of

that support is coming into question, however; a n d , a s defense spending

levels are held short of the Administration's

initial projections, the

two-bomber approach may prove particularly vulnerable to future budget cuts.

Strategic initiatives for a new bomber and the MX were specifically insulated

FY82

from the $2 billion in defense cuts made during the Administration's

budget revisions in October, however.

Once the B-1 program has started, cuts could not easily be made there,

especially since that could appear to duplicate the Carter Administration's

controversial decision in 1977.

Thus, for

Stealth

proponents,

the

significance of the President's choice, while endorsing the goal of a n ATB,

i s that the Stealth program has been placed a t some greater risk, since i t

becomes hostage to the fortunes of the Reagan economic program a s a whole and

the level of Support for defense spending.

Defense officials concede, in any

event, that funding for the development of a n ATB will be less now than if

the decision had been made to proceed directly with a Stealth bomber.

Replacing B-52s Directly With a Stealth Penetrator

On Aug. 22, 1980, former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown revealed that

the United States had been developing so-called "Stealthw technology

"which

alters the military balance significantly."

It is widely believed that only

an ATB with Stealth technology could penetrate Soviet air defenses throughout

the 1990s and possibly for sometime thereafter.

Some even argue that Soviet

defenses have already incorporated advances that responded specifically to

the prospect of a B-1 threat. Consequently, Stealth supporters argue that

the B-52 should be replaced with nothing short of an ATB.

Illustrative plans

for an all-ATB replacement program envision about 250 new aircraft.

Since ATB proponents see a multi-role B-1 as the primary threat to early

Stealth deployment, they argue that perceptions of the B-1 inevitably have

been tainted by its previous cancellation, and that selection now of a

previous "losern would not serve the goals of the Congress or the new

Administration.

Proponents argue that H model B-52s will retain sufficient

penetrating capability over the time of transition, and that ALCMs should be

fully deployed by 1990, while MX deployment will have strengthened the ICBM

force, thus compensating for a reduced number of penetrating

bombers during

the ATB building period.

A particularly strong argument in closing weeks of the debate was the

assertion -- a t one point supported by Secretary Weinberger, but then

that B-1s would fail a s penetrators by 1990.

retracted

--

Stealth technologies combine aircraft design features and defensive

countermeasures t o reduce the radar reflection (radar cross section or RCS)

and mask energy emissions of aircraft, thus improving their abilities to

elude Soviet defenses.

Innovations for this purpose reported in the past

have involved reducing the weight of the aircraft, and the size of the tail

section in particular, using non-metallic

and radar absorbing materials,

keeping flat or angular surfaces and "resonantw cavities to a minimum,

limiting the number of engines, modifying the shape and placement of engine

air intakes, reducing engine exhaust temperatures, and treating fuels to

reduce infrared emissions in the spectral bands used by Soviet detectors.

Since Secretary Brown's announcement, however, little has been said about the

program in open sources to identify the specifics of current Stealth research

and development.

Schedule

Because of uncertainties about how far Stealth technology has evolved and

how much it will cost in application t o a bomber, a deployment schedule for

an ATB cannot be specified. These unknowns form a part of the debate over

options for replacing the B-52s.

General Ellis, former SAC Commander,

estimated that a prototype ATB could be flown in 1985 and a n IOC, achieved by

1990. This prediction appears to rest on fully funding a one-bomber

program

for an ATB, however.

The views of former Undersecretary of Defense

for

Research

and

Engineering, William Perry, reflect the difficulties in judging the potential

of Stealth:

he testified last year that he has "unbounded confidencen in

Stealth technology, but that "it has not yet reached a state of maturity

for

application to bombers in the near future."

Nevertheless, testifying this

year, he stated his opposition to an interim program, based on his estimate

that production of a Stealth aircraft could begin as early a s 1988. The Air

Force Scientific Advisory Board has concluded that 1992 would be the earliest

possible IOC for a n ATB.

Even if the early projections of Stealth availability are not realized,

the need for an interim penetrator is not accepted by hold-outs for a n ATB.

They argue that H model B-52s will retain sufficient penetrating capability

over the time of transition, and that ALCMs should be fully deployed by 1990,

while MX deployment will have strengthened the ICBM force, thus compensating

for a reduced number of penetrating bombers during the ATB building period.

It is widely assumed that the ATB would

serve solely a s a penetrator,

since its size and design would be optimized for that mission.

If an all-ATB

program were chosen on that basis, some other aircraft would be needed to

replace cruise missile-carrying B-52s.

On the other hand, if plans exist to

adapt the Stealth bomber for Cruise missile carriage, that would alleviate

the requirement not only for a follow-on cruise missile platform for the long

term, but also for the LRCA a s a cruise missile carrier in the 1990s.

costs

The Northrop Corporation has been chosen a s the prime contractor to

develop a Stealth bomber, but until a definite aircraft design can be

evaluated, cost estimates for an ATB will have limited reliability.

Also, in

weighing cost estimates, the distinction must be made between an all-ATB

replacement program (about 250 aircraft) and a wfollow-onw program to produce

100 to 150 Stealth bombers after LRCA have been acquired.

In the case of an

all-ATB approach, the Stealth program would be directed toward the earliest

achievable IOC, and some argue that R&D

costs would be minimized

if the

program were fully funded on that basis.

An added drawback to the smaller

program, some point out, i s that the price per aircraft would be higher,

since R & D costs would be recouped over a lesser number of aircraft.

Regardless of whether a n all-ATB program a follow-on program were chosen,

there will probably be little difference in outlays for Stealth during the

next five years, since procurement cannot begin in any event until the

Accordingly, the cost difference between

necessary R&D has been completed.

(FYDP)

is

the two over the period of the current Five-Year Defense Plan

essentially the amount of the B-1 program.

Estimates reported t o date for a program of 250 ATB range from $41 billion

to $56 billion.

Estimates for the Stealth portion of a two-bomber program

range from $22 billion to $35 billion.

By adding the cost of the B-1 program

to the latter set of figures, rough estimates thus suggest a n equivalent cost

over the acquisition of either an all-ATB program or a two-bomber

program.

On that basis, the primary cost advantage of a n all-stealth program i s that

i t defers the major expenditures for bomber modernization for several years.

This may also represent a vulverability, however, in that the program could

be affected by intervening changes before production finally begins.

Finally, some Stealth proponents argue that an all-ATB program would cost

less than a mix o f B-1s and Stealth totalling the same number; this implies

that Stealth bombers per unit may cost less than B-1s.

Cost estimates have

not yet been published to substantiate that claim; and at this point, they

would be viewed with skepticism anyway.

In addition, i t i s not clear that

B-1s and ATBs should be treated as equivalent capabilities, one for one.

Thus, the primary cost argument in favor of the Stealth bomber

remains the

claim that B-1s can be dispensed with.

The Air Force counters that claim by its estimates that i t would cost less

to buy B-1s in the interim than to modernize the B-52s

and FB-111s

a

sufficiently to continue relying on them.

The specifics of such

modification program have not been discussed; but even excluding normal

operations and maintenance expenses, extending the life of B-52s and today's

FB-111s a s strategic penetrators reportedly could cost $20 to $28 billion.

It is unclear how much of that expense, if any, would be incurred anyway

modifying the B-52s for cruise missile carriage in the 1980s and 1990s.

in

The Evolving Role of the Bomber

Preferences in how to modernize the bomber force follow from assumptions

about the future role of bombers and about how the candidate aircraft will

serve those roles. To date, the Stealth bomber has been discussed almost

exclusively a s a strategic penetrator.

The LRCA by contrast, has been

justified largely in terms of its capacity for collateral a s well as

strategic missions.

There is concern that an aircraft chosen on that basis

with the

may not serve in the strategic role -- or i n any single role

greatest effectiveness. Conceptually, the B-1 LRCA is said to be suited to

the following conventional or tactical nuclear missions; others may be added:

--

(1) Counter-intervention force in western Europe,

supplementing other strike forces;

(2) power projection and counter-intervention

force in Southwest Asia;

( 3 ) mining operations to protect the sea lines of

communication;

(4) maritime support in the form of anti-surface

ship operations;

(5) fleet air defense, using air-to-air missiles

against Soviet naval Backfire bombers.

The list of collateral missions for Which the LRCA might prove useful,

although arguably essential, was capped by retiring Air Force General Alton

Slay, when he added, "dropping hay to stranded yaks in Katmandu."

For many, past events in the Persian Gulf region have underlined the need

for the United States to have a power projection capability that can be

brought to bear world-wide.

While long-range bombers may offer a unique

combination of range and payload needed for some cases, existing naval and

amphibious forces, sea-based aviation, or land-based tactical air forces may

adequately meet the needs of other non-strategic circumstances.

Although Congress has endorsed the need for a new bomber with a

penetrating capability, some continue to regard the manned bomber a s an

obsolescent weapon system. Accordingly, they are opposed even t o an ATB,

arguing that resources will be better spent on more cost-effective cruise

missiles and future unmanned delivery vehicles.

They note that Stealth is

equally applicable to those systems, and could be used more effectively with

ALCMs.

Former CIA Director Turner has expressed the view that manned

aircraft in general will be overtaken not just by Soviet defenses, but by the

march of technology on all sides.

In his view, the United States will not

have the chance to receive back the deterrent value of its investment in any

new bomber.

Ultimately, improvements in air defenses may force a decline in the use of

costly aircraft against strategic targets.

Part of the five-point

strategic

program announced by President Reagan along with bomber modernization was the

plan to deploy nuclear cruise missiles aboard U.S.

attack submarines.

The

development of long-range sea-based cruise missiles for use against targets

ashore could soon overtake many advantages now perceived in manned aircraft,

including bombers.

BOMBER COMPARISONS

B-52

B-1B

Stealth

350

132-250

1990s

2000+

N/A

N/A

Actual or planned inventory

IOC as penetrator

End of use a s penetrator

IOC as cruise missile platform

End of use a s ALCM platform

1990

1982

2000

100

1986

1995

1995

2000+

Procurement/modernization

program costs

( $ billions, FY 81)

20-28

20.5-22

-

Maximum loading per aircraft

Nuclear gravity bombs/SRAMs

12

20

ALCMs

Conventional bombs

27/108

38

22/30

128

Radar cross section (sq m)

Penetration speed (Mach)

Primary ECM system

1

.85

ALQ-161

90-100

.55

ALQ-122

22-35/

41-56

?

N/A

N/A

?

?

?

Note:

All candidate aircraft must meet SAC specifications for

dispersability to multiple airfields, safe escape time on

notice of attack, and protection ("hardness") against the

secondary effects of nuclear explosions, including

electromagnetic pulse (EMP)

.

LEGISLATION

P.L. 97-86, S. 8 1 5

Department of Defense Authorization Bill, 1982. Both bills provide $302

million for LRCA RDT&EI as requested by the Administration, and $1942 million

for procurement, also a s requested.

The Senate version includes $179 million

requested for procurement of spares; the House version does not.

Therefore,

H.R. 3519 approves $2.244 billion; S. 815 approves $2.423 billion

for LRCA.

The House version, reported by the Armed Services Committee on May 1 5 , 1981

(H.Rept. 97-71), approves procurement funding based on the choice of a B-1

LRCA, with the provision that the obligation of funds for a n advanced

technology bomber instead, if recommended in the national interest by

President Reagan, would require affirmative action by both houses within 60

days of that recommendation.

The Committee Report recommends a supersonic

B-1 with minimal changes to the original program.

The Senate version,

reported by the Armed Services Committee on May 6 , 1981 (S.Rept. 97-58), and

passed by a vote of 9 2 to 1 on May 1 4 , does not specify an alternative, but

makes the obligation of funds contingent upon a recommendation by the

President, and open to re solutions of disapproval in both Houses of Congress.

S. 815 passed the House, amended, July 1 6 , in lieu of H.R. 3519. Conferences

held.

Agreement by House and Senate conferees were announced Oct. 3 0 , 1981.

The conference report (H. Rept. 97-311), dated Nov. 3, 1981, recommends $2.1

billion in authorizations for development and procurement of the Long Range

Combat Aircraft in FY82. Authorizations will be available for obligation to

the B-1 bomber beginning Nov. 1 8 , 1981. The Senate agreed to the conference

report Nov. 5 ; the House agreed Nov. 17.

The bill was presented

to the

President Nov. 1 9 , and si.gned into law on Dec. 1 , 1981 (P.L. 97-86).

P.L. 97-114, H.R. 4995

Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 1982.

As reported by the

Committee on Appropriations (H.Rept. 97-933) on Nov.

1 6 , and subsequently

passed on Nov. 1 8 , 1981, $2,092.9 million is recommended for the LRCA

program, including $1,574 million for procurement, $227 million for advance

The total is about $330 million

procurement, and $291.9 million for RDT&E.

less than requested by the Administration; comparison with the Administration

request is complicated, however, by the Oct. 2 revision to the March 1981

budget request.

In both requests, funding for the LRCA totalled $2.423

billion; the Oct. 2 revision, however, redistributed that amount among the

Several activities:

procurement was increased slightly,

and

advance

procurement was increased slightly.

The request for initial spares

(which

had been deleted entirely i n the House version of the Defense authorization

bill) was reduced from $179 million to $51 million; the difference was then

made up in the requested increase to RDT&E from $302 million to $471 million.

(See chart below).

The House committee reported the bill with

cuts in

procurement spending and initial spares to match authorized levels that were

agreed to in conference after the Administration's revisions had been

submitted. On its own initiative, the committee also cut $179.1 million from

the revised RDT&E request, explaining that the amount was found to be

unobligated from FY81.

Appropriations to modernize B-52 aircraft were

increased over requested levels to a recommended $500.5 million.

About $62

~

million of the $162.1 million increase is directed for D-model B - 5 2 ~ which

the Administration has scheduled for early retirement.

In disagreeing with

that part of the President's strategic program, the Appropriations Committee

added about $18 million in Operations and Maintenance funds a s well, to keep

B-52Ds flying in FY82.

The House passed the 1982 Defense Appropriation Bill

on Nov. 1 8 , 1981, having first rejected amendments to delete funding for B-1

production and to revive the FB-111B/C

alternative for the LRCA program.

Conferences held.

Conference report was filed Dec. 1 5 , 1981 and passed

in

both Houses, 334-84, and 93-4, respectively.

House-passed

level

($2092.9

million total, including $1,801 million f o r procurement and $291.9 million

for RDT&E); and adoption of Senate-passed language (Nunn amendment) intended

to facilitate congressional monitoring of B-1 costs.

T h e bill was signed

into law (P.L. 97-114) on Dec. 29, 1981.

S. 1857 (Hatfield)

Department of Defense Appropriation

Bill, 1982.

As

Committee on Appropriations (S.Rept. 9 7-273) on Nov.

17,

passed on Dec. 4 , 1981, $2,439 million is recommended for th

including $1,724.2 million for procur ement, $233.8

milli

The total reflects

procurement, and $471 million for RDT&E

By disa

procurement funding in anticipation of cost growth.

spare parts, however, the Senate recomm endation exceeds the

request (discussed above for H.R. 4995) by only $16 million.

.

eported by the

nd sub sequently

LRCA program ,

n for advanced

a 3% a.dd-on to

lowing money for

Administ r a t i o n ' s

The Committee

recommended about $350 million more for LRCA than the House

reported the previous day. The Senate bill, as reported out

made no change to the Administration's request for B-52

including provisions for the early retirement of D-model

funding for Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs), however, was

the $69 million requested t o $104 million.

Committee had

of Committee,

modernization,

B-52s.

RDT&E

increased from

During extensive floor debate on the 1982 Defense Appropriation Bill, the

Senate adopted several amendments of significance for strategic bomber

modernization.

The first (offered by Mr. Nunn)

requires the President to

certify the costs of 100 B-1B aircraft before procurement funds will be made

available, and further requires quarterly DOD program

cost estimates to

include the LRCA program, based strictly on production of 1 0 0 aircraft.

The

second

(offered by Mr. Jackson) prohibits

the diversion of funds a s

appropriated for the advanced technology

bomber program, whose level of

funding remains classified.

A third (offered by Mr. Levin) adds $62 million

for continued modernization of D-model B-52s, consistent with House-passed

provisions. All were adopted by voice vote.

The Senate rejected several

amendments related to bomber programs:

Mr. Hollings, to delete B-1 funding

and increase funding accordingly for selected readiness-related

items

(28-66); Mr. Proxmire, to eliminate a 3% cost growth allowance for the B-1

and MX programs (46-47); Mr. Levin, to restore $220 million for 4 KC-1OA

aerial refueling tankers, cut in October budget revisions from 8 (38-55); and

Mr. R. Byrd, t o increase funding for Stealth RDT&E by $250 million

(tabled,

51-40).

The last two amendments, offered Dec. 1 , 1981, were characterized by

the Republican leadership a s efforts in a Democratic strategy to pre-empt

funding for the B-1.

The Senate version was passed on Dec.

4 , 1981, 84-5.

(S. 1857 was

indefinitely postponed on Dec. 8 , 1981.)

Conferees were appointed, and H.R.

4995 was passed on Dec. 15, 1981 (see above).

Procurement

Advance

Procurement

Initial

Spares RDT&E

1632

310

179

302

2423

House Authorization

1632

310

0

302

2244

Senate Authorization

1632

310

179

302

2423

Reagan Revisions (OCT)

1674

227

51

471

2423

Authorization Conference

1574

227

0

302

2103

Total

Carter Request

Reagan Request

(March)

House Appropriation

1574

Senate Appropriation

1724.2

Appropriation Conference

1574

[see Defense Budget

-- FY83 for further legislation.]

HEARINGS

U.S.

Congress.

House. Committee on Appropriations.

Department

of Defense appropriations for 1982. Hearings, 97th Congress,

1st session.

Part 6. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1981.

p. 1081-1135.

U.S.

Congress. House.

Committee on Appropriations.

Subcommittee on the Department of Defense. Department of Defense

appropriations for FY82. Hearings, 97th Congress, 1st session.

Part 2. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1981.

p. 138-144, 1 4 7 , 256-260, 266-219.

REPORTS AND CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS

Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1982. Congressional

record [daily ed.] Nov. 1 8 , 1981: H8462-H8501; Dec. 1 , 1981:

S14158-S14175; Dec. 3 , 1981: S14357;S14359;, S14370-S14444,

S14450-S14453; Dec. 4 , 1981: S94499-S14514.

Department of Defense Authorization, 1981. Congressional record

[daily ed.], July 1 , 1980:

S9097-9104, S9107-9121.

U.S.

Congress.

House.

Conference Committee, 1981. Department

of Defense Authorization Act, 1982; report to accompany

S. 815.

Nov. 3 , 1981.

(97th Congress, 1st session) Washington,

U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1981. 135 p.

U.S.

Congress.

House. Conference committee, 1981: Department of

Defense Appropriations, 1982; conference report on H.R. 4995.

Dec. 1 5 , 1981.

(97th Congress, 1st session) Washington, U.S.

Govt. Print. Off., 1981.

U.S.

Congress.

House. Committee on Appropria,tions. Department

of Defense appropriation bill, 1982; report to accompany

H.R. 4995. Nov. 1 6 , 1981.

(97th Congress, 1st session)

Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1981. 315 p.

U.S.

Congress.

House. Committee on Armed

Services.

Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1982;

report to accompany H.R. 3519.

May 1 9 , 1981.

(97th

Congress, 1st session) Washington, U.S. Govt. Print.

Off., 1981.

228 P.

U.S.

Congress.

Senate.

Committee on Appropriations.

Department

of Defense appropriation bill, 1982; report to accompany

S. 1857. Nov. 1 7 , 1981.

(97th Congress, 1st session)

Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1981. 137 p.

U.S.

Congress.

Senate.

Committee on Armed Services.

Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations

for Fiscal Year 1982; report to accompany S. 815. May 6,

1981.

(97th Congress, 1st session) Washington, U.S.

Govt. Print. Off., 1981. 1 9 7 p.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

01/25/82

-- Pursuant to P.L. 97-114, the FY82 Department of

Defense Appropriation Act, President Reagan

transmitted to Congress his certification of B-1

cost estimates (H.Doc. no. 97-127), stating that

acquisition of 100 B-1B aircraft i s feasible within

the $20.5 billion budget estimate by 1986. This

appears to correspond t o the Department of Defense

cost estimate in terms of FY81 constant dollars.

12/15/81

-- The conference report (H.Rept. 97-410) for Department of

Defense Appropriations, 1982 (H.R. 4995) was submitted and

passed in both Houses, providing LRCA funding of $2092.9

million.

According to a provision introduced in the Senate

version (an amendment by Mr. Nunn) and retained i n the final

bill, funds for B-1 procurement will not be made available

until the President certifies t o Congress the costs of the 1 0 0

B-1 aircraft.

To facilitate congressional monitoring of the

LRCA program, the Department of Defense is also required to

include B-1 cost estimates i n its quarterly reports to

Congress.

The bill provides that such reports must be

based on 1 0 0 aircraft, reflecting congressional concern

that the size of the program might later be cut if overly

optimistic cost goals were accepted now and enforced.

12/04/81

-- The Senate passed the 1 9 8 2 Defense Appropriation Bill (H.R.

4995), 84-5, after adopting a n amendment by Mr. Levin,

consistent with a House-passed provision, to add $62 million

for continued modernization of D-model B-52s, which the

Administration proposed to retire.

(The bill already

contained $18 million t o continue B-52D operations.)

12/03/81

-- Senate consideration of the 1 9 8 2 Defense Appropriation Bill

(H.R. 4995) was dominated on this date by debate over the

Administration's request for 1 0 0 B-1B aircraft.

Mr. Hollings'

proposed amendment to delete all B-1B funding and add

accordingly to other programs was defeated, 28-66.

The

Senate rejected a n amendment by Mr. Proxmire t o eliminate

a 3% cost growth allowance for the B-1 and MX programs,

46-47.

An amendment by Mr. Nunn, requiring the President

to certify B-1 costs now, and requiring quarterly DOD cost

estimates for the LRCA program of 1 0 0 B-ls, was passed

by voice vote.

Also passed by voice vote was a n amendment

by Mr. Jackson prohibiting the diversion of funds a s

appropriated for the advanced technology bomber.

12/01/81

-- During consideration of the 1982 Defense Appropriation

Bill (H.R. 4995), the Senate rejected two amendments

characterized by the Republican leadership as preliminary

moves to delete B-1 funding: Mr. Levin proposed to add

4 KC-1OA refueling tankers, restoring the Adminstrationls

October cut from 8 to 4 such tankers; Mr. R. Byrd proposed

an increase to Stealth RDT&E of $250 million.

Both were

understood to require offsetting reductions elsewhere in

the legislation, as opposed to lladd-ons.ll (The overall

level of funding for Stealth-related programs remains

classified.)

-- The President signed into law the 1982 Department of Defense

Authorization for Appropriations Act, P.L 97-86.

11/18/81

-- The House passed the FY82 Department of Defense

Appropriations Act (H.R. 4995) after rejecting

(142-263) an amendment by Mr. Addabbo to delete

funding for B-1 production, and rejecting (99-307)

an amendment by Mr. Murtha which would have had the

effect of substituting the FB-111B/C for the LRCA

program.

The bill passed by the House provides about

$12 billion less in new obligational authority than

the bill reported by the Senate Appropriations

Committee (S. 1857).

11/17/81

-- T h e Senate Committee on Appropriations voted 21-7

to recommend the FY82 Defense appropriations bill

(S. 1857), containing about $2.4 billion in funding

for the LRCA program, including about $2 billion for

production of B-1 aircraft and over $400 million for

research and development (S.Rept. 97-273).

Unlike

the House, the Senate Committee recommended the full

amount requested for RDT&E (raised in October

revisions to $471 million).

In addition, the Senate

Committee applied a 3% cost growth allowance t o raise

procurement funds slightly over requested levels.

Consequently, the Senate version provides about $350

million more for LRCA than the House bill (H.R. 4995).

11/16/81

-- The House Committee on Appropriations reported the

FY82 Defense appropriations bill (H.R. 4995),

containing about $2.1 billion in funding for the

LRCA program:

about $1.8 billion for production

of B-1B aircraft, and $300 million for research

In a departure from

and development (H.Rept. 97-933).

the President's strategic program, the Appropriations

Committee disapproved early retirement of D-model

B-52s, and restored about $60 million for their

continued modernization, a s well a s $19 million for

operations and maintenance in FY82. Total funding

for modernization of all B-52s was increased over the

Administration's request by $162 million, amounting

to about $500 million.

11/05/81

-- A resolution disapproving the President's announced

decision to build B-1 aircraft for the LRCA program,

S.Res.

10/30/81

240, was introduced by Sen. Levin.

-- The results of the conference on the FY82 Defense

Authorization bill (S. 815) were announced by

Senator Tower.

Conferees had agreed to LRCA funding

for F Y 8 2 in the amount of $2.1 billion, representing

cuts of $320 million in RDT&E, initial spares, and

procurement.

According to language adopted by the

conference, money authorized for LRCA will be

available for obligation to the B-1 bomber

beginning Nov. 1 8 , 1981, unless both Houses have

agreed t o resolutions of disapproval over LRCA

before that date.

10/29/81

-- In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee,

Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff Burke explained that the

Air Force's official estimate of $19.7 billion for

LRCA acquisition costs did not include full cruise

missile integration. The Administration's decision to

provide from the outset for internal and external

cruise missile carriage (and to include a new

new radio system) resulted in the revised estimate of

$20.5 billion (FY81 dollars) or $22 billion (FY82 dollars),

according to General Burke.

-- T h e Washington Post reported findings of a draft GAO

report that false economies may have been made t o

substantiate initially low estimates of LRCA

acquisition costs.

The Post article reports that

expenses added later could include $220 million for

a second inertial navigation system, $50 million

for a Classified "nuclear feature," presumed to be a

safety device for disarming weapons, and $65 million

t o match planned avionics systems with new Air Force

specifications. The draft GAO report, not yet

circulated to DOD for comments a s customary, maintains

that "questionable reductionsn were made to lower the

basic cost goal from $22 billion (in FY81 dollars).

10/28/81

-- By a vote of 7 t o 5 , the Defense Subcommittee of the

House Committee on Appropriations agreed to recommend

appropriations i n FY82 for the LRCA program as requested

by the Administration.

The Defense Authorization Bill,

a s passed by the two Houses, was still being considered

in conference as of this date, with some differences over

strategic programs reported.

10/26/81

-- As the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense

began its consideration of the FY82 Defense Appropriations

Bill, Subcommittee Chairman Addabbo proposed elimination

of the B-1 program a s part of a n $11.2 billion reduction

from spending levels requested by the Administration.

10/16/81

-- T h e Air Force announced, without further comment, that

Northrop has been selected a s the prime contractor "to

proceed with initial research and development on

advanced bomber concepts."

10/12/81

-- Aviation Week & Space Technology magazine reported that

a Stealth bomber, as developed by Northrop, is

scheduled to fly for the first time in late 1984.

The advanced technology bomber program will cost

$21.9 billion, according to this report.

10/02/81

-- As part of a 5-point program to revitalize U.S.

strategic deterrent posture, President Reagan announced

his decision to build 100 long-range combat aircraft

(LRCA), based on the B-1 bomber, while continuing

the planned deployment of air-launched cruise

missiles on B-52s.

President Reagan pledged

to pursue development as well of an Advanced

Technology Bomber (ATB) "for the 1990s."

07/16/81

-- The House passed S. 815, the FY82 Defense Authorization

bill, in lieu of H.R. 3519.

The bill, a s amended,

incorporates the same provisions with respect to the

funding of strategic bomber programs as reported by the

Armed Services Committee.

07/09/81

-- In considering the FY82 Defense Authorization bill

(H.R. 3519), the House rejected two amendments

that would have weakened the Armed Services Committee's

pro-B-1 language. The first amendment, by Fowler

(153-254), sought to remove restrictions on bomber funding

The second amendment,

that specify the choice of B-1s.

by Harkin, would have adopted Senate language on

congressional approval or disapproval of the President's

choice.

05/21/81

-- Secretary of the Air Force Orr formally recommended to

Secretary of Defense Weinberger the procurement of 100

B-1 variants (estimated a t $19.7 billion), to be followed

by 110 Stealth bombers (estimated a t $30 billion).

05/14/81

-- By a vote of 9 2 to 1 , the Senate passed its

version of the FY82 DOD Authorization Bill

(S. 815), providing $2.4 billion for development

and procurement of a LRCA yet to be specified.

The measure includes the provision for

disapproving the President's choice by a majority

vote in both houses.

05/06/81

-- The House Armed Services Committee approved the

FY82 DOD Authorization Bill (H.R. 2970) after

adopting an amendment that specifies a B-1

derivative for LRCA development ($302 million)

and procurement ($1.9 billion) and affirms an IOC

not later than July 1 , 1987.

If the President

declares procurement of a n advanced technology

bomber instead to be in the greater national

interest, the obligation of funds requires

congressional approval within 60 days of that

recommendation.

04/28/81

-- In approving the FY82 DOD Authorization Bill

(s. 815), the Senate Armed Services Committee

provided $1.9 billion for procurement and $302

million for development of LRCA. Obligation of

funds for procurement was made contingent upon the

President's recommendation to Congress concerning

the aircraft selected.

In addition the bill

provides that, if both Houses pass resolutions of

disapproval, the obligation of funds for buying

LRCA a s recommended by the President would be

blocked.

04/07/81

-- The Armed Services Committees received a status

report on selection of a new manned bomber from

the Assistant Secretary of Defense, pending a full

recommendation from the Secretary of Defense,

originally due March 15.

In addition to assessing

the capabilities of the three main candidates, i t

reviews the rationale for a new bomber.

AF Gen.

Burke cited low confidence in contractorsf cost

figures a s a reason for the delay.

ADDITIONAL REFERENCE SOURCES

Boeing B-52.

D M S market intelligence report, military

aircraft, July 1980. p. 1-6.

Burke, Kelly H., Lt. Gen., USAF.

Future of the manned

bomber.

Aerospace, Spring 1980: 3-4.

Carroll, Robert.

Facing the manned bomber dilemma.

electronics, May 1981: 100-104.

Defense

Cockburn, Andrew.

Cruise: the missile that does not work.

statesman, Aug. 22, 1980: 10-11.

New

Corddry, Charles W.

Defense officials are considering

replacing B-52s With 2 aircraft.

Baltimore sun,

Nov. 18, 1980: 1.

-----

Sub, missile uncertainties giving boost to B-1 bomber.

Baltimore sun, Nov. 28, 1980: 1.

Harvey, David S.

Bomber: flying with S A C 1 s 20-year-old deterrent.

Defense and foreign affairs, Paris a i r show edition, 1981:

9-13, 42-43.

Lambert, Mark.

Why the manned bomber?

Interavia, April 1981: 297-301.

Edsall, Thomas B.

Bomber question looms a s major weapons

issue of Reagan term. Baltimore sun, Nov. 1 8 , 1980:

1F-2F.

General Dynamics F-111.

DMS market intelligence report,

military aircraft, June 1980. p. 1-5.

Gen. Ellis makes case for "two-bomber program."

daily, Feb. 1 9 , 1981: 250-251.

Aerospace

McCarthy, Mary.

The manned bomber:

a mystique in search of a mission.

In the Pentagon watchers, Leonard S. Rodberg and Devek Shearer,

eds.

New York, Doubleday, 1970:

267-288.

Polmar, Norman, ed.

Strategic Air Command. Annapolis, Nautical and

Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1979. 226 p .

Robinson, Clarence A., Jr.

Multipurpose bomber advances.

Aviation week & space technology, Aug. 4 , 1980: 16-18.

-----

-----

USAF recommends new combat aircraft.

space technology, May 1 1 , 1981: 18-20.

Aviation week

Bomber program choices near. Aviation week

technology, June 1 , 1981: 18-22.

&

&

space

DMS market intelligence report,

Rockwell International B - 1 .

military aircraft, October 1980.

p. 1-5.

Stratford P. Sherman. How Rockwell kept the B-1 alive.

Fortune, Nov. 2, 1981:

106-112.

U.S.

Department of Defense.

Office of the Assistant

Secretary of the Air Force.

Air Force policy letter for

commanders -- long-range combat aircraft (LRCA).

Feb. 1 , 1981. p. 1.

U.S.

General Accounting Office. Countervailing strategy

force acquisition plans.

Report to the Congress from the

Comptroller General, (MASAD-81-35.

Aug. 5 , 1981. Washington,

1981. 5 4 p .

U.S.

Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service.

The B-1 bomber and manned strategic bomber options, by Douglas

Mitchell.

Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division.

[ ~ a s h i n g t o n ]1981.

Apr. 3 , 1981.

CRS Issue Brief IB80100

---------

-----

B-1 strategic bomber program, by Richard D. Cronin and Michael

J.E. Dixon. Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division.

Aug. 1 8 , 1980.

[ ~ a s h i n g t o n ]1980.

CRS Issue Brief IB75040

Strategic nuclear delivery systems:

How many? What

combinations? by John M. Collins.

Oct. 7 , 1974.

[ ~ a s h i n g t o n ]1974. 123 p.

CRS Report 74-177F

U.S. strategic nuclear force options, by John M. Collins and

Elizabeth Ann Severns.

[Washington] 1981. Regularly updated.