United States/Soviet Military Balance

Congressional research reportJan 4, 1982

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UNITED STATES/SOVIET MILITARY BALANCE

(ARCHIVED--12/03/81)

ISSUE BRIEF NUMBER IB78029

AUTHOR:

C o l l i n s , J o h n M.

S e n i o r S p e c i a l i s t in N a t i o n a l D e f e n s e

S e v e r n s , E l i z a b e t h Ann

R e f e r e n c e A s s i s t a n t , Office of S e n i o r S p e c i a l i s t s

T H E L I B R A R Y OF C O N G R E S S

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE

KAJOR ISSUES SYSTEM

DATE ORIGINATED 03/20/78

D A T E .UPDATED 0 1 / 0 4 / 8 2

F O R A D C I T I G N A L I N F O R K A T I O N CALL 2 8 7 - 5 7 0 0

0406

CRS- 1

ISSUE DEFINITION

American military

competence

spanned a much larger functional

and

geographic sphere i n support of security interests than Soviet armed services

could cover for the Kremlin b e f o r e the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.

U.S.

forces have registered many improvements since that time, but their relative

decline has been dramatic when compared with Soviet counterparts.

President Kennedy told MOSCOW i n 1962 to remove i t s ballistic missiles

from C u b a or face U.S. military action.

S o v i e t Premier Khrushchev

complied.

President Carter, who flatly stated that "the status quo i s not acceptable,"

asked Moscow to remove its c o m b a t brigade i n October

1 9 7 9 , and Soviet

President Brezhnev

refused.

T h o s e confrontations, s f course, a r e not

strictly analogous, but the s h i f t i n strength since the first showdown has

clearly reinforced U.S. risks a r o u n d the world and reduced our room for

maneuver.

T h i s brief sketches the situation in 1 9 6 0 before the Soviet buildup began,

depicts the present balance, a n d identifies s o m e significant issues f o r U.S.

defense decisionmakers.

(See statistical tables a t the end of this text.)

BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS

BALANCE BEFORE T H E CUBAN MISSILE CRISPS

T h e U.S./Soviet military balance was not bad from our standpoint in 1960.

This country's deterrent threats and defensive contingents were credible in

most respects.

America's main a i m , called containment, accepted the status quo a t that

time.

We lacked means to retake lost territory, but U.S. military

services,

in concert with a l l i e s , were sufficient t o safeguard the Free World from

Soviet armed aggression.

Strategic Air Command (SAC) possessed unparalleled powers, when

ballistic

missiles on both s i d e s were neither numerous nor very accurate.

Its bombers

could burst through the pervious screen that protected o u r opponent, but the

small force of Soviet

Bears

and

Bisons

would

have

found

U-S.

defenses-in-depth much more difficult.

Medium-range

Badgers could strike

American targets on one-way s u i c i d e missions only if they f l e w high to

conserve fuel.

T h a t shortcoming k e p t them vulnerable, i n full view of U.S.

and Canadian surveillance systems.

Our

"short-legged"

B-47s, which were

forward-based o r programmed f o r in-flight refueling, could make fairly

lengthy low-level bomb runs beneath Soviet radar fans and below

the best

fields of fire for their surface-to-air missiles (SAMSs).

Nuclear supremacy also underpinned U.S. strategy in Europe.

No pressing

Soviet military threat was apparent in other theaters.

Moscow could not

employ medium- and

intermediate-range ballistic missiles

(MRBMs, IRBMs)

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against NATO's tempting center sector without

risking retaliatory strikes

against critical targets in Russia.

NATO, conversely, could tolerate

conventional inferiority in land formations, because theater nuclear weapons

still could take up the slack.

Inflexible Soviet forces were clearly outclassed i n every other category.

U.S. tactical air forces were far superior to Frontal Aviation, which

promised poor support for fast-moving offensive operations if Red Army

logistics failed to fold first.

Gorshkov's coastal navy could not yet

contest our control of the seas.

His submarines might have been able to cut

U.S. lines of communication to Europe, but with minor implications, because

NATO's reinforcement and resupply requirements reputedly were of reduced

moment.

Massive nuclear retaliation would conclude any conflict quickly,

according to U.S. concepts, without resort to costly attrition in the air or

on the ground.

In short, U.S. Armed Services, assisted by allies, held Soviet forces in

check across the conflict spectrum. Reserves were on tap to contend with

contingencies where the Kremlin could not reach.

BALANCE IN 1981

Few trends that typify the U.S./Soviet

military

balance

perspective have been positive for the past two decades.

from

America's

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR TRENDS

U.S. nuclear capabilities have passed through three distinct stages

1960. Each was less adaptable than its predecessor.

since

The current version features far fewer realistic options than its first

forerunner, largely because we now lack any Credible means of controlling

escalation and can no longer protect either the American people or our

production base.

U.S. threats of massive retaliation comprised a believable

brake when our side enjoyed nuclear superiority in almost every sense, but

whether we mean business is a big question today.

U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles

(ICBMs) and bombers are more

vulnerable to attack than ever before.

That condition erodes the stability

of our national security, even though no current combination of Soviet

assaults could smother the two systems simultaneously.

Soviet counterparts

are comparatively

secure,

because

our

second-strike

strategy.

Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) on both sides are still safe a t

sea, given the current state of the art in antisubmarine warfare

(ASW),

although that situation conceivably could change with little notice.

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

The present and projected balance between U.S. and Soviet ICBMs creates

two central consequences. One involves the pre-launch survival of undefended

American missiles.

The other concerns comparative capabilities to attack and

destroy land-based ICBMs.

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Pre-Launch Survival Prospects

Most authorities agree that Soviet ICBMs will pose substantial threats t o

Th e k e y questions a r e not whether

Tita n and Minu temen m issiles in th

wit h a first strike, o nly when they

the Soviet s co uld eve ntually crush

eri OUS ly that situatio n af feets U.S.

coul d achi eve t h a t c a pability, and

security.

Installing more U - S . ICBMs would prove impractical, because

the Soviets

could add hard target warheads much faster than w e could build silos and f i l l

them with missiles, a t a fraction of the cost.

Reinforcing U.S. silos f a c e s

finite limitations, such a s the ultimate compressive strength of concrete,

Launch-on-warning would

jmprove survivability only if our alert system

remained intact.

Should i t f a i l for any reason, including Soviet a c t i o n ,

chances a r e slim that any decision to launch could be m a d e , much l e s s

implemented, in t h e f e w minutes available.

Substituting s o m e sort of semi-mobile land-based missile system for a l l o r

part of our stationary

ICMBs, therefore, is under active considerationCosts would be Considerable but, because mobile missiles a r e more difficult

to hit than those in silos, t h e r e would be no need to replace Minutemen o n a

one-for-one basis.

Deterrent properties of a l l concepts under consideration depend o n

proliferating,

rather than removing., aim points.

Rivals, faced

with

prospects of expending huge numbers of nuclear weapons without assurance of

preventing U.S.

response, presumably would find risk-versus-gain ratios

poor.

Should that assumption, however, prove f a l s e , the s i d e effects o f

saturation a t t a c k s , especially fallout, could create more problems than they

solve.

The search for a faster, cheaper, more effective fix thus may

remain i n

the offing.

Fresh looks a t free mobility models, l a n d , sea, and air, could

be among the options.

See Issue Brief 77046 for detailed discussion.

Countersilo Capabilities

America's I C B M s , constrained by our second-strike strategy, would n o t

likely match Moscow's countersilo capabilities, even if w e deployed bigger

missiles, more multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles

(MIRVs),

and greater accuracy, a l l of which a r e properties of MX.

Should the S o v i e t s , after conducting a first strike, choose to launch

reserve ICBMs on warning, our warheads could destroy superhard silos, but n o t

before the missiles in them took flight.

Such action actually

could i n v i t e

additional devastation in the United States.

Catching a f e w Soviet reserves

in their silos and preventing refirings from "cold launch" facilities would

afford slight comfort in such circumstances.

"Essential e q u i v a l e n c e r n i s

short, would remain elusive even if U.S.

and Soviet ICBM holdings w e r e

precisely the same in quantities and technical characteristics.

Strategic Air Power

The U.S. accent on strategic air power- i s still strong. Soviet stress h a s

been slight since the Cuban missile

crisis, although supersonic Backfire

bombers, which began to deploy i n 1 9 7 5 , cause increasing ContrGVerSy.

The

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present bomber balance affects U.S. force requirements in two

ways:

one concerns perceptions; the other concerns security.

Backfire Bombers Related to U.S.

significant

Bombers

Soviet Backfire bombers may have some bearing o n U.S. needs for improved

air defense, but are unrelated to our offensive force requirements.

Backfire

squadrons, which

currently contribute less to Soviet strategic nuclear

capabilities than forward-based fighters add to o u r s , could double in number

or disappear without diluting any advantages that accrue from Strategic Air

Command's aircraft. Manned bombers may indeed be a legitimate leg of the

U.S. triad, but maintaining superiority, essential equivalence, or any other

balance with Backfires wquld serve some symbolic purpose, nothing more.

Bombers Replaced by Cruise Missiles

President Carter on June 30, 1 9 7 7 , disclosed

his decision to cancel

prospective production of B-1 bombers, which were scheduled to strengthen our

triad in the 1980s. The Pentagon anticipates converting 151 B-52Gs to carry

20 air-launched cruise missiles (A.LCMs) apiece, for a total of 3,020 weapons.

Only about 7 5 B-52s will be modernized to improve penetration

probabilities

against future Soviet surface-to-air missiles

(SAMs)

and

interceptor

aircraft.

Implications of that determination are subject to debate.

Cruise missile

technology tactics are still uncertain.

Proposed B-52 modification programs

pfesent many problems.

Most important, abilities of U.S. ALCMS to penetrate

Soviet defenses-in-depth is in dispute.

In the final analysis, therefore, U.S. security will be well served by

substituting ALCMs for aircraft only if satisfactory capabilities can be

deployed at acceptable costs in time to support stated strategy.

If not, our

deterrent could suffer.

STRATEGIC DEFENSE PROBLEMS

CONUS (Continental United States) defense plays almost no part in U.S.

nuclear strategy. Deterrence depends almost entirely on powers to survive

preemptive strikes, then savage the aggressor.

The Soviets conversely seek

to develop credible safeguards.

"vulnerability

gap"

disputed

proportions consequently grows.

Analysts a t one end of the spectrum contend

that Soviet air and civil

defense abilities, abetted by detailed plans, psychological conditioning, and

physical preparations, already degrade U.S. deterrence and place this country

in peril.

Some noted U.S.

specialists speculate that crisis relocation

general war,

procedures would limit Soviet fatalities to 4 or 5% during a

under Worst-case Conditions.

Official estimates indicate that almost half

require medical

the American people would die, and another 35 million would

attention.

If those casualty ratios were even close to correct, U.S.

capability to deter attack would indeed be "a myth," as some claim, since

U.S. deterrence is predicated on an "assured destructionw capability, meaning

the ability to inflict unacceptable damage on an aggressor.

draw less

drastic conclusions.

Most concede that the

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Skeptics d r a w less drastic conclusions. Most concede that the Kremlin

stresses city defense, but doubt that U.S.

deterrence i s i n danger.

One

I t s f o l l o w e r s believe

faction, f o r example, sees this a s a spurious issue.

t h a t nuclear blasts can break through the best protection.

O t h e r s , whose

opinions a r e widely shared, suspect that Soviet defensive capabilities, while

significant, a r e overstated.

U.S. over-reaction, they contend, could be just

a s ruinous a s complacency.

Nevertheless, students of the subject seem to agree that S o v i e t active a n d

to create a

survivability

passive defenses in combination ape beginning

imbalance t h a t f a v o r s t h e Soviets.

~ s s e r t i o n sthat they soon could survive a

general war a p p e a r premature, but long-term consequences could be severe if

t h e trend proceeds too far.

Civil defense would a s s u m e a completely

different connotation,

accompanied

Soviet

breakthroughs

antisubmarine o r antiballistic missile (ASW, ABM) warfare.

Active defense i n

that case would provide the primary shield.

Civil d e f e n s e , a s part of a

strategic d e f e n s i v e triad, would simply serve a s a backstop.

Any amalgam that allowed the Soviets t o evade "assured destruction," while

America s t i l l could not, would, in f a c t , a l l o w them to satisfy t h e true aim

of strategy, which i s "not s o much to seek battle a s to seek a...situation s o

advantageous t h a t if i t d o e s not of itself produce the

desired

decision,

i t s continuation by a battle i s sure t o a c h i e v e this."

Stated s u c c i n c t l y , the side that solves defensive equations first would

attain true nuclear superiority, expressed in terms of s u r v i v a l prospects

despite the rival's r a w destructive power.

Supremacy without d e f e n s e a p p e a r s

to be unattainable regardless of offensive numbers, a s long a s each side c a n

devastate o r destroy the other.

GENERAL PURPOSE FORCE T R E N D S

U.S. g e n e r a l purpose f o r c e s have developed quite differently

counterparts.

than

Soviet

Soviet l e a d e r s , w h o implicitly prefer a P r i n c i p l e of War called "Mass,"

rarely r e d u c e f o r c e levels, and winnow o u t stocks only when they cease to

s e r v e useful purposes.

U.S. defense decisionmakers a r e partial t o "Economy

o f Force." Q u a l i t y , not quantity, i s considered essential.

America's armed

services consequently a r e cut severely a f t e r every war.

Outmoded weapons

customarily r e t i r e when n e w ones enter t h e inventory.

Soviet strength thus dilates, even when o u r s declines.

U.S.

this stage c a n no longer compensate completely for t h e lack of

caused by quantitative inferiority.

quality a t

flexibility

GROUND F O R C E P R O B L E M S

Huge conscript ground forces a r e t h e traditional source of Soviet general

purpose f o r c e strength. Other services a r e subsidiary, despite the emergence

of a modern a i r f o r c e and navy.

The much smaller U.S. Army a n d Marine Corps

currently consist of volunteers.

Quantitative gaps that f a v o r the S o v i e t

Union a r e g r e a t i n nearly every category.

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U.S.

Strengths

Our Army has access to firepower unprecedented

stabilized turrets and night sights can attack

daylight or darkness.

What they see, they can

antitank weapons not only exceed

the range of

possess penetration powers that outpaced opposing

in the past.

Tanks with

targets on the move, in

generally

stop.

Our TOW

Soviet tank cannons, but

armor by the mid-1970s.

Improved artillery ammunition can cause up to four times as many personnel

casualties per round a s conventional high explosives could i n past conflicts.

Projectiles with time-delay submunitions extend suppression capabilities for

protracted periods after impact. Laser range finders for forward observers

reduce target estimation errors from 400 meters

to about 1 0 , hugely

increasing probabilities of first-round hits.

Response times have been

cut

from minutes to seconds.

Precision-guided

artillery projectiles, when

perfected, should cause a quantum

jump in destructive power.

Land mine

lethality has increased dramatically in this decade.

U.S.

Shortcomings

There are points, however, beyond which mass matters more than excellence.

The U.S. Army has just 16 active divisions.

The Marine Corps has three.

fourth of our Army divisions lack one regular brigade.

Others lack one or

more active maneuver battalions.

Readiness is reduced, even though reserve

component "roundouts" train part time with Regular Army

divisions.

Only a

few of those 19 divisions are free 'for contingency purposes without slighting

commitments and spreading the force very thin.

Eight Army National Guard and one Marine Corps Reserve divisions complete

the U.S.

complement of major maneuver units.

Nine o r ten weeks of

post-mobilization training would be needed to bring armored and mechanized

divisions up to minimum combat standards, after they were called to active

duty following the declaration of a national emergency, which can be

designated only by the President or Congress. Consequently, they are poorly

prepared to participate in any

"come as you are party," such as those

contemplated by our Rapid Deployment Force (RDF).

Soviet ground

forces, in contrast, retain a comfortable cushion of

reserves that could create multiple contingencies on call.

Seven airborne

divisions in

first-class

shape

afford

special

flexibility.

U.S.

decisionmakers would

find it difficult to determine priorities if the

Politburo brought things to a boil around Berlin, encouraged a crisis in

Korea, and simultaneously made military motions toward the Middle East.

Successful feints could spoil U.S. plans to suppor-t friends under fire, or

forestall U.S. action until too late, if we feared premature

commitment of

our few divisions in strategic reserve would

expose the true point of

decision.

The Doctrinal Dilemma

Few forces, coupled with seccnd-strike, selective containment policies,

dictate a defensive doctrine for our Army at the onset of any conflict

against numerically

superior Soviet forces or the Warsaw Pact.

U.S.

times

commanders are advised to Concentrate winning combinations at proper

and places, "using reserves from the rearw and forces "from less threatened

CRS-

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the

f l a n k s , " which remain l i g h t l y covered.

Should concentration occur

Delaying

wrong s p o t , t h e m i s s i o n i s t o r e d i r e c t m o b i l e e l e m e n t s i m m e d i a t e l y .

combat o p e r a t i o n s ,

would

be i n

a c t i o n s , t h e most d i f f i c u l t of a l l ground

demand.

C r i t i c s , who d e p l o r e d o c t r i n a l a C ~ 0 m ~ O d a t i Oonf ~ t h a t s o r t ,

suggest that

U.S. d e c i s i o n m a k e r s w o u l d d o w e l l t o " r e d e s i g n . . - o u r m i l i t a r y f o r c e p o s t u r e

encourage a "can-don

a n d p o s s i b l y o u r d i p l o m a t i c c o m m i t m e n t s , " r a t h e r thaw

a t t i t u d e i n t h e Army t h a t r i s k s a l m o s t c e r t a i n d e f e a t

committed a g a i n s t

massed S o v i e t f o r c e s i n Europe o r t h e Middle E a s t .

T A C T I C A L A I R FORCE PROBLEMS

America's t a c t i c a l air combat a s s e t s f u r n i s h f l e x i b i l i t y n o t a v a i l a b l e t o

t h e S o v i e t Union, whose F r o n t a l A v i a t i o n ( r o u g h l y e q u i v a l e n t t o o u r Tactical

A i r Command, U.S. A i r

Force Europe,

and

Pacific A i r

Force)

is largely

c o n f i n e d t o t h e E u r a s i a n l a n d mass.

Our c l e a r q u a l i t a t i v e e d g e i s

still

e v i d e n t i n most r e s p e c t s , a l t h o u g h t h e gap i s c l o s i n g .

Small s i z e , however, c r e a t e s a n " A c h i l l e s h e e l w f o r America.

fairly

small p r o p o r t i o n of

our a c t i v e forces remain unfettered.

Reserves

can

air

r e s p o n d i n most c a s e s o n l y a f t e r C o n g r e s s i o n a P a p p r o v a l .

U.S.

tactical

combat power c o n s e q u e n t l y c o u l d c o p e w i t h

a single large-scale

conflict

a g a i n s t any non-Soviet f o e , b u t t h i s Country's c r i t i c a l

i n t e r e s t s elsewhere

c o u l d s t a r t t o come u n c o v e r e d .

Soviet

Q u a n t i t a t i v e s h o r t a g e s c o u l d p r o v e c r i t i c a l i n a showdown w i t h t h e

U n i o n , s i n c e "many-on-onew s e e m s t o b e Moscow's r u l e .

T h e f e w U.S. a i r c r a f t ,

compared with F r o n t a l Aviation, w i l l f i n d i t i n c r e a s i n g l y p e r i l d u s t o compete

i f current trends continue.

Soviet mobile air defenses f u r t h e r undercut

our

capabilities.

P r o j e c t e C U.S.

procurement programs do l i t t l e t o b r i g h t e n t h e p i c t u r e .

G E N E R A L PURPOSE N A V Y PROBLEMS

S e a power i s a n e c e s s i t y f o r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s .

and l a r g e , a r e l e s s compelling.

Soviet

naval

needs,

C o m m e r c e , a l w a y s a U.S. t r a d i t i o n , a s s u m e s a s a l i e n t

r o l e as d w i n d l i n g

n a t u r a l r e s o u r c e s i n c r e a s e o u r dependence on

other

countries for

critical

supplies.

P e t r o l e u m p r o d u c t s a r e most p u b l i c i z e d , b u t f o r e i g n m i n e r a l s a r e

a l s o i m p o r t a n t t o America.

R o u t e s must t h e r e f o r e be

secured f o r

friendly

merchant

ships under adverse

conditions.

Essential

sea

lines

communication must a l s o be k e p t open i n wartime t o e n s u r e t h e f r e e f l o w of

m i l i t a r y f o r c e s and l o g i s t i c s u p p o r t between

America,

its allies,

and/or

contested areas.

T h e S o v i e t U n i o n , w i t h f a r f e w e r r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r f o r e i g n raw m a t e r i a l s

a n d i n t r i n s i c i n t e r e s t s t h a t c e n t e r on t h e

Eurasian

l a n d mass,

has

only

r e c e n t l y begun t o b r e a k o u t of i t s c o n t i n e n t a l cocoon.

Its

Navy

still

c a s t as a s p o i l e r t h a t e m p h a s i z e s n e g a t i v e s e a d e n i a l , r a t h e r

than

positive

sea assertion capabilities.

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The "Neww Soviet Navy

The modern Soviet Navy is an innovative Service consciously designed to

serve Soviet purposes rather than match its U.S.

counterpart.

Its focus

since the early 1960s has shifted from coastal defense to sea-based

deterrence in peacetime and power projection in event of nuclear,war. Such a

transformation in such a short space of time is close to unprecedented.

The "new9' Soviet Navy suffers from several chronic shortcomings that it

shares with the "oldw. All Soviet surface ships, for example, would have to

contend with lack of air cover if they swept far from friendly shores.

and-based

bombers

for

area

defense

are

poor

substitutes

for

defenses-in-depth that feature carrier-based fighters.

Soviet naval forces are also short on stamina, except for late-model ships

such as K i e v , Kara, and Krivak.

Small surface combatants, lacking large fuel

capacities or nuclear power, have limited ranges.

Restricted

space for

rations, ammunition, and other stores prohibit prolonged operations without

resupply.

Merchant

tankers routinely refuel' Soviet ships a t sea, and

trawlers serve some logistic purposes, but underway replenishment procedures

are substandard compared with U.S. skills.

Lengthy, large-scale operations

would be next to impossible in sea areas remote from friendly port

facilities.

Strengths, however, may well outweigh those weaknesses.

Tactical strike capabilities of the new Soviet Navy

Center on cruise

missiles, which Fleet Admiral

Sergei G. Gorshkov feels are llpractically

unstoppable1' against floating targets.

sees

it,

not

even

well-screened, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers could withstand assaults

"delivered by a group of ships armed with cruise missiles."

Soviet attack submarines outnumber U.S.

contingents by more than 3:l.

Most are diesel-powered, and many are well past their prime, but 76 were

fitted to fire anti-ship cruise missiles in January 1981.

Tubes totalled

432. Papa and Charlie classes can shoot from submerged positions.

All

Classes carry torpedoes for close combat.

Thirty-three U.S.

submarines

mounted 1 3 2 Harpoon launchers.

They are substantially outranged.

Cruise Missile Threat to U.S.

Surface Navy

More than f i f t e e n - sorts of Soviet surface warships, submarines, and

aircraft carry at least one kind of cruise missile.

Soviet strategy seems

a single killing salvo.

designed to seize and secure initiative with

Missile-carrying surface ships, submarines, and aircraft, moving without

tactical formation, could trigger surprise, preemptive

strikes on signal,

converging on targets from many

directions, and perhaps

from point-blank

range.

U.S. sea control tactics traditionally try to destroy enemy weapons before

they endanger our ships. First strike assaults by Soviet cruise missiles,

launched a t close range, could make that approach obsolete.

Our Navy as yet has no satisfactory solution. Current ship-launched

SAMs

would be essentially ineffective against concerted attacks.

The time from

detection to target engagement is excessive and coordination among missile

batteries on different ships is poor.

These difficulties are compounded by

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UPDATE-01/04/82

SAM vulnerability to electronic counter-measures.

Even Phoenix-armed

F-14s'

which can engage six targets simultaneously, a r e subject to easy s a t u r a t i o n

if large-scale a t t a c k s box t h e compass.

Threats to Merchant Shipping

Successful A S W operations depend on a b i l i t i e s to f i n d , f i x , a n d f i n i s h

enemy undersea raiders before they can wreak

heavy damage.

Prospects for

U.S. success a r e more favorable than they w e r e a f e w y e a r s a g o , b u t

breakthroughs i n detection a r e still i n t h e blueprint stage.

Beyond

that,

the small size of America's specialized f o r c e causes concern.

ASW i s mainly

a time-consuming matter of a t t r i t i o n , in which numbers c o u n t m o r e and m o r e a s

friendly losses mount.

Some authorities conclude that A m e r i c a a t most m i g h t

sink 20% of a l l opposing submarines before

t h e Soviets took

serious t o l l

a m o n g merchantmec.

Consequently, Soviet capacities t o i n t e r f e r e with U.S.

lifelines a t s e a could prove to be low-cost, low-risk

o p e r a t i o n s under

certain c i r c u m s t a n c e s , a t least a s long a s a "Mexican s t a n d o f f w persists a t

strategic nuclear levels.

T h e Upshot

America's

Navy,

which

matches

three-ocean

mission

with

one-and-a-half-ocean capability, i s marginally capable o f c a r r y i n g o u t i t s

mission i n s u p p o r t of national strategy.

Its forces are stretched so thin

that further peacetime forward deployments could be a t t a i n e d o n l y a t g r e a t

expense to personnel and equipment by drawing down reserves t o a d a n g e r o u s

extent o r uncovering existing commitments.

Wartime a t t r i t i o n

unpropitious prospect.

Serious s t u d e n t s of naval strategy sum u p t h e current situation with

succinct statement:

the U.S. Navy n o w enters a n era of r e d u c e d o p t i o n s

reinforced risk.

one

and

AMPHIBIOUS ABILITIES

T h e U.S. Marine Corps, with a total personnel strength s l i g h t l y exceeding

1 8 8 , 0 0 0 , comprises three active and o n e r e s e r v e d i v i s i o n s , together w i t h

associated a i r wings and combat/service

support.

Six naval

infantry

regiments, the closest Soviet counterpart, contain fewer than 2,000 men e a c h ,

with minimum f i r e support.

Comparative power projection possibilities,

lopsided a s t h a t picture seems to paint.

however,

are

not

quite

U.S. a m p h i b i o u s assault abilities a r e strictly abridged by t h e s h o r t a g e o f

15%

specialized sealift. Current a s s e t s a r e confined to 61 s h i p s , of which

a r e normally in overhaul.

T h a t level i s sufficient for short-notice l a n d i n g s

team would

by battalions a n d brigades, but a single Marine division/wing

a b s o r b all but f o u r operational ships, which a r e scattered from Manila to t h e

Mediterranean.

Lead times for assembly would be long, and

combat losses

irreplaceable.

Prepositioned supplies o n ships alleviate

lift requirements

to some extent, but a r e no substitute for amphibious a s s a u l t capabilities.

Amphibious sealift for Soviet naval infantry features coastal landing

craft, along with the Ivan Rogov (an LPD) and 25 LSTs.

That shortcoming

makes long-distance operations infeasible for the full force, but t h e

combination is well-suited for commando-style raids and amphibious assaults

close to Soviet flanks.

Reinforcements, if required, could arrive o n

merchant ships.

MOBILITY TRENDS

Intercontinental lift over open oceans is a U.S.

essential.

Russian

requirements thus far have been more regional.

Dissimilar demands, coupled

with policy peculiarities and geographic circumstance, consequently foster

mobility force structures that are quite different in size as well a s

composition,

U.S. AIRLIFT PROBLEMS

America's air mobility means are still peerless, in large part because our

Defense Department has accented "airlift enhancementw programs

since the

early 1960s. Soviet counterparts are improving, but present capabilities a r e

comparable only along that country's periphery.

Still, 70 C-5s, the only aircraft that can carry outsize cargo, constrain

our abilities to meet NATO reinforcement/resupply

schedules or to support

rapid deployment forces, say, in the Middle East.

They are complemented by

234 C-141s.

No more of either type are being manufactureb.

Losses from

combat attrition or maintenance failures thus are irreplaceable.

U.S.

tactical airlift assets, long the world's best, a r e showing signs of age.

U.S. SEALIFT PROBLEMS

U.S. sealift consistently

gets short shrift.

Interest i n the 1960s

Centered on quick reaction instead of sustained support, but f e w funds were

forthcoming for forces afloat, even for that purpose.

Assets, which

reached

their apogee during World War 1 1 , consequently have been on a for three

decades.

The conversion has been from many ships to few; from military

ships to

civilian carriers; from U.S. ships to foreign flags; from general cargo to

container ships; from small, adaptable ships to large ones whose applications

are limited.

Our "mothball" fleet, which served well d u r i n g - t h e Vietnam War',

is seriously depleted. Those trends in combination make

it infeasible f o r

Military Sealift Command (MSC) and the U.S.

Merchant Marine to satisfy

large-scale contingency requirements without massive aid

from

allies.

Sealift "dehancement" continues as a long-term trend.

The balance between Soviet strategic airlift and sealift is precisely

opposite.

Moscow's merchant fleet, already much

larger than our own, is

increasing capabilities at a rapid rate.

Ship characteristics are chosen

carefully to serve politico-military as well as economic purposes, especially

in areas where large, specialized vessels can not conveniently venture.

COM?ARATPVE FLEXIBILITY

Composite Soviet mobility forces are sufficient to influence a range of

low-key contingencies in widely-separated areas, from Angola to Afghanistan,

but airlift/sea%ift shortages are still strong limiting factors for major

military o'perations almost anywhere outside the home country o r contiguous

satellites.

airlift

Quickand

efficient logistic support for allies is a U.S.

specialty. M A C s s squadrons also afford laudable (although limited) means of

reinforcing forward deployed forces rapidly or shifting sizable combat power

anywhere in the world.

Apparent flexibility, however, is conditioned by the

dearth of merchant shipping, which makes

i t almost impossible to sustain

major efforts without allied assistance.

That combination calls for caution

under most conceivable circumstances, since aid is not assured.

OVERARCHING POLICY PROBLEMS

Two overarching policy problems inhibit

just described.

solutions

U.S.

shortcomings

BUDGETARY BREAKOUTS

The price tag for U.S. manpower dedicated to defense has been the dominant

budgetary factor influencing the configuration and flexibility of America's

conventional forces during the past decade, given fiscal constraints imposed

by official policy.

Inflation, coupled with attempts to compete with

domestic pay scales, caused most of the problem.

A retiree population

expanding exponentially also contributed.

The biggest budgetary

boost came

i n Nov. 1971, to start our All-Volunteer Force (AVF) off on the proper

foot.

Pay and allowances alone (including civilians) absorbed more than half of

DOD's money for several years, before that proportion

subsided somewhat.

Percentage expenses for manpower, including outlays devoted

to recruiting,

construction, and dependent care, have stabilized, but costs continue to

climb in response to periodic pay raises.

(Pay for an entry-level

enlisted

man or woman now is $501 a month, as opposed to $21 for counterparts in the

pre-World-War-I1 AVF.

Soviet recruits receive an amount roughly equivalent

to $5.50 a month.)

Cumulative consequences currently cause personnel to

consume about 5 0 cents of every defense dollar.

Inescapable

expenditures

for

non-manpower-related

operations

an8

maintenance (O&M) approximate 15 cents more, a percentage

that has proved

inadequate, given budgetary restrictuions i n recent years.

U.S. readiness to

implement contingency plans is subject to serious criticism a s a consequence.

The remaining third must be split between procurement

programs, which

shape our present posture, research and development

(R&D) which, in large

part, determines our strength tomorrow, and military

construction.

The

implications are inimical, because the Soviet Union devotes a much

smaller

proportion of its defense budget to manpower than the United States. Perhaps

20% is a fair approximation.

Moscow, therefore, could afford a larger force

and modernize a t more rapid rates if its total defense budget were exactly

the same as that of the United States, since a much greater

share of its

money can be spent on nachi3es.

DECLINING DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY

The United States starts with the world's richest reservoir of scientific

resources.

Constant feedback between civil and military markets encourages

entrepreneurism and technological chain reactions not remotely equalled by

our Russian rival.' As a result, options still closed to the Soviets are

completely open to us.

This country's predominance, however, shows signs of

makes many intellectuals lament our lack of momentum.

perishability

that

Causes include uncertain goals that make it troublesome to chart a sound

course for defense technology.

Insistence on practical

products

pronounced.

Fund requests for abstract research are frequently cut or

cancelled. Sharp fiscal caution extends to other R&D

sectors.

Consequent

tendencies to tolerate few failures sometimes impede rapid progress.

Basic Research

U.S. superiority in basic research still seems substantial.

Clearly excells in 2 4 bellweather programs, the Soviets in 14:

This

country

Present Status

United States Superior

Lead Solid

Lead Shaky

Total

Soviet Union Superior

Lead Solid

Lead Shaky

Total

America's temporary purchase, however, is no 'cause for complacency.

The

U.S. lead is solid in Only slightly more than half of those cases (13 out of

24).

Opposing scientists, who are closing the gap in 1 1 , protect Soviet

primacy in every instance.

Relative U.S./Soviet ranks would reverse if straight-line

those trends continued:

projections

Projected Status

United States Superior

Present Lead Solid 13

Subsequent Gain

Total

Soviet Union Superior

Present Lead Solid 1 4

Subsequent Gain

Total

Soviet enterprise would take the technological lead by 25 to 1 3 , where it

now lags by much that same margin.

Assuming

that six entries currently

carried as "parity" or "uncertainn shifted in U.S. favor, we still could not

reach Russia's level in basic research (19 to 25).

Applied Technology

It is sometimes difficult to distinguish findarnental superiority

function of creativity) from design philosophy and restraints imposed by

funds when assessing applied technology.

This study makes no attempt to

differentiate- It concentrates instead on practical products that are now,

or soon could, influence the U.S./Soviet military balance.

Supremacy that

might have been, has no practical value.

Each nation either applies

technology effectively, or it does not.

Soviet forces presently deploy a smorgasbord of brand-new systems based en

technology well known in the West, but

slightly exploited.

Significant

samples include intercontinental ballistic missiles

(ICBHs) with

"cold

launchw capabilities; mobile air defenses that can move with ground

troops;

satellite intercept and surveillance craft; armored vehicles and surface

ships engineered

expressly to operate in

chemical/biological

warfare

environments; rapid-fire rocket launchers; and fire-control systems unmatched

either by this country or other NATO members.

U.S. preeminence is undisputed in 35 signal instances, the Soviets in 28,

but the situation promises to become increasingly unstable as the 1980s

progress, given opposing prospects:

Present Status

United States Superior

Lead Solid

Lead Shaky

Total

Soviet Union Superior

Lead Solid

Lead Shaky

Total

America's present lead is solid in about 50% of the cases (18 out of 3 5 ) .

The Soviet side, gaining relative strength in the remaining 1 7 , safeguards

its top-flight ratings in all but five instances.

U.S./Soviet ranks would more than reverse if straight-line projections

those trends continued:

Projected Status

United States Superior

Present Lead Solid 1 8

Subsequent Gain

Total

Soviet Union Superior

Present Lead Solid 23

Subsequent Gain

Total

Moscow would take the technological lead by 4 0 to 2 3 , where it now lags by

much less than that margin.

Assuming four entries currently classified as

"parity" or "uncertainw crossed into U.S. columns, we still would be behind

by 4 0 to 27.

CAPSTONE

It is possible

to quibble about classifications in the

foregoing

assessment, contesting whether

proper

categories have

been

included.

Conclusions drawn are debatable at best, because one weakness may outweigh a

dozen strengths, or vice versa.

Some lags on each

side are deliberate,

caused a t least as much by different missions and developmental styles a s

asymmetries in competence or failures to foresee demands.

Still, if Soviet skills are overstated by, say, 25%, the day has passed

when the United States could be smugly sure of unquestioned

scientific and

technological superiority, which has sustained this country in the past and

is the key to future capabilities.

Positive steps will be required to retain the present

U.S.

stance, let

alone improve our posture. Gray matter is more important than money when it

comes to closing gaps.

Success depends on strategists who understand

the

competition working i n tandem with technologists to pick priorities that make

research and requirements match, while reducing blind leads that waste time

and resources. Perhaps most of a l l , the potential for superiority will prove

meaningless, if we fail to compete.

CULMINATING COMMENTS

changes since the Cuban missile crisis favor the Soviet

Union.

U.S. s a l i t a t i v e superiority, less pronounced than in the past, is

slipping away.

NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES

Two legs of our strategic nuclear triad are shaky.

SLBMs, according to

widespread b e l i e f , - m a y become the only secure mainstay

for some interim

period, a t least until air-launched cruise missiles enter the U.S.

inventory

in large numbers about the mid-1980s.

U.S.

nuclear strategy disregards defense.

The American people and

proauction base are exposea completely to ballistic missile attack.

Their

ability to survive a full-scale nuclear assault by the Soviet Union is nearly

nil.

Resultant vulnerabilities drastically

reduce the credibility of U.S.

promises to provide a nuclear vumbrellaw for allies.

We no longer could

unlease assured destruction strikes against the Soviet Union to defend NATO

or Asian friends without risking reciprocal devastation.

U.S. theater nuclear weapons were practical deterrent and defensive tools

two decades ago, when we could clamp a lid on local escalation by threatening

to level the Soviet Union if its leaders employed counterpart systems.

NATO

allies i n particular would have little to gain and a lot to lost today if we

turned loose the theater nuclear genie, since war would take place largely on

their home territory, where both people and possessions a r e unprotected.

Plans predicated on nuclear options in the absence of effective defense

for ourselves or affiliates thus fail to inspire desired degrees of

confidence at any employment level.

CHEMICAL/SIOLOGICAL WARFARE CAPABILITIES

America's

chemical/biological

warfare

(CB)

capabilities,

never

considerable, a r e now n e x t to nonexistent.

W e have n o o f f e n s i v e

that medium which might make the Kremlin f e a r starting a fray it

finish.

U.S. defense i s diffident.

forces i n

could n o t

CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES

Quantitative asymmetries a r e important when similar s y s t e m s o n each s i d e

(such a s divisions) c o m p e t e with each other i n combat.

Quality c o u n t s , b u t a

prudent statistical balance must be maintained,

because t h e r e a r e p o i n t s

beyond which mass matters m o r e than excellence.

Land, sea, and air forces

a l i k e l a c k flexibility i f numbers a r e t o o f e w compared with

competitors a n d

commitments.

Our All-Volunteer F o r c e

(AVF) i s too small to d i s p o s e of even o n e

extensive contingency without reducing t h e required C O N U S rotation b a s e

and/or uncovering c o m m i t m e n t s in other regions.

It c a n n o t a b s o r b many m o r e

tanks, s h i p s , and p l a n e s , because members a r e scarcely s u f f i c i e n t to maintain

and o p e r a t e machines n o w i n service.

T h e n u m b e r of U.S.

divisions, aircraft

squadrons, and carrier task forces would remain close to c o n s t a n t if the A V P

were f i l l e d to authorized capacity with high performance personnel.

Attrition could take i t s toll quickly i n a l l f o u r U.S- military

services

Planned

and the U.S. Merchant

Marine, which i s a l s o a t a l o w level.

employment of Army r e s e r v e components o r t h e National D e f e n s e Reserve F l e e t

to reinforce active strength and replace c o m b a t casualties early i n a n y

high-intensity conflict a p p e a r s impractical, given depleted r a n k s and r a t h e r

low s t a t e s of readiness.

COLLECTIVE IMPLICATIONS

I n s h o r t , current trends curtail U.S.

f r e e d o m of action.

The upshot

abridges abilities of U.S. armed services to deter a t t a c k s o n the U n i t e 6

States, defend this c o u n t r y effectively

i f deterrence

should f a i l , a n d

safeguard associates w h o s e security i s closely linked with our own.

T h o s e trends will b e hard to reverse because:

-- High manpower costs inhibit f o r c e modernization much m o r e in

the United S t a t e s than in the S o v i e t Union.

-- U.S.

technological supremacy shows signs of perishability that

results more from policies than potential.

Most corrective o p t i o n s a r e politically a n d economically unattractive, but

some c u r r e n t courses c o u l d prove unacceptable i n t h e a b s e n c e o f change.

S t e p O n e i n the process of obtaining a better balance between American a n d

Soviet military strength i s to ascertain o u r t r u e r e q u i r e m e n t s , based

imperative U.S. i n t e r e s t s , objectives, and

commitments.

S t e p T w o i s to

reshape U.S. interests, o b j e c t i v e s , and may

b e essential, but bolstering

budgets would produce f e w benefits unless coupled with sound strategy.

Sound conclusions would allow the Congress a n d the executive branch

concert to chart a c o u r s e that assures America's ability t o deter a n d , if

need b e , defend successfully against any sort o f Soviet a r m e d aggression i n t o

the Twenty-first Century.

STATISTICAL SUMMARY

(1960)

U. S.

U.S.S.R.

U.S. Standing

MANPOWER

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR

Offense

Bombers

Long-Range

Medium-Range

Cruise Missiles (1)

Ballistic Missiles

ICBMs

SEBMs (2)

Warheads

160-190

lrOOO

A Few

Under

Under 100

Defense

ABM

Interceptor Aircraft (3)

Surface-to-Air Missiles(3)

THEATER NUCLEAR

MRBM/IRBM4

Other

LAND POWER

Manpower

Army/Ground Forces

Marines/Naval Infantry

Divisions

Army/Ground Forces

Marines/Naval Infantry

Tanks (5)

TACTICAL AIR FORCES

Fighter/Attack

Land Based (6)

Carrier-Based

Medium-Range Bombers (7)

NAVAL FORCES

Aircraft Carriers

Cruisers (8)

Destroyers

Frigates/Other Escorts

Attack Submarines

Amphibious Ships (9)

Land-Based Bombers(l0)

MOBILITY FORCES

Airlift (11)

Sealift

+350-380

+775

About +30

About -38

Par

About -40

Par

-2,300

-400

Many

200

A Few

873,000

170,600

2 ,250,000

A Few

-149

+ Many

S h o r t - r a n g e S o v i e t SS-N-1 c r u i s e m i s s i l e s d e p l o y e d o n K i l d e n a n d

Krupny d e s t r o y e r s were p r i m a r i l y a n t i - s h i p weapons, b u t a l s o

had a n u c l e a r c a p a b i l i t y a g a i n s t shore t a r g e t s .

U.S. c r u i s e

missiles were i n a Snark s q u a d r o n a t P r e s q u e I s l e , Haine.

Their

r a n g e was a b o u t 5 , 5 0 0 nm.

S i x S o v i e t Z u l u - V s u b m a r i n e s , w i t h t w o SS-N-4 SLBMs a p i e c e , w e r e

deployed i n t h e % a t e 1950s.

Ten G u l f - I a n d two Hotel-P c o m p a n i o n s ,

e a c h w i t h t h r e e SS-N-4 m i s s i l e s , h a d b e e n c o m m i s s i o n e d b y 1 9 6 0 .

A l l had t o s u r f a c e f o r f i r i n g .

U.S. f i g u r e s i n c l u d e i n t e r c e p t o r a i r c r a f t a n d S A M s y s t e m s i n Army

and A i r Force r e s e r v e components.

I n c l u d e s two J u p i t e r s q u q d r o n s i n I t a l y ( t o t a l 25 m i s s i l e s ) a n d

one i n Turkey (26 m i s s l e s ) .

Excludes Thor IRBMs, s e n t t o Great

B r i t a i n , because t h e y passed t o Royal AirForce (RAF) c o n t r o l a f t e r

becoming o p e r a t i o n a .

U.S. t a n k s i n c l u d e d 1 2 , 5 0 0 Army a n d 4 7 5 M a r i n e .

U.S. f i g h t e r a i r c r a f t i n c l u d e d 1 , 1 8 0 A i r F o r c e a n d 6 2 5 M a r i n e .

The same S o v i e t m e d i u m - r a n g e b o m b e r s show i n s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r

and t a c t i c a l a i r f o r c e c a t e g o r i e s . .

Khrushchev's p l a n t o s c r a p c r u i s e r s , r e s i s t e d by F l e e t A d m i r a l

G o r s h k o v , was s t i l l i n g e s t a t i o n when t h e 1 9 6 0 s s t a r t e d .

R e t i r e m e n t s r e d u c e d t h e t o t a l t o 1 9 by 1 9 6 4 .

S o v i e t n a v a l i n f a n t r y , w h i c h saw s e r v i c e d u r i n g W o r l d War 1 1 ,

were n o n e x i s t e n t i n 1960.

Small regiments were r e a c t i v e a t e d i n

1961-1962.

Landing C r a f t U t i l i t y (LCUs) were t h e l a r g e s t

av-ailable l i f t .

(10) S o v i e t l a n d - b a s e d n a v a l a i r c r a f t , which e x c e e d e d 1 , 0 0 0 i n t h e

% a t e l950s, reduced rapidly a f t e r f i g h t e r squadrons s h i f t e d

s u b o r d i n a t i o n t o t h e PVO ( a i r d e f e n s e ) .

T h o s e shown a b o v e a r e

a l l a n t i - s h i p bombers.

(11) E x c l u d e s U.S. C i v i l R e s e r v e A i r F l e e t (CRAF) a n d S o v i e t A e r o f l o t .

Includes a c t i v e , r e s e r v e , s t r a t e g i c , and t a c t i c a l a i r l i f t .

Soviet

a i r c r a f t a r e 1 4 0 AN-12 C u b s , 1 5 0 AN-8 C a m p s , a n d 7 7 5 L P - 2 s .

STATISTICAL SUMMARY

(January 1981)

Current Status

U.S.S.R.

U.S.

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR

Offensive/Retaliatory Systems

ICBMs

Ballistic Missile Submarines 1

SLBMS

Bombers 2

Total Launchers

Nuclear Weapons

ICBMs

SLBPis

Bombers 3

Total

Strategic Defensive Systems

A B M Launchers 4

SAM Launchers 4

Intercepter Aircraft 5

Total

LAND POWER

Armies/Ground Forces

Active Military Manpower 6

Deployable 7

Total 8

Divisions

U.S. Active, Soviet Cat. 1-11

Armor/Tank

Mechanized/Motor Rifle

Infantry

Air Assault

Airborne

Total

U.S. Natl. Gd., Soviet Cat. I11

Armor/Tank

Mechanized/Motor Rifle

Infantry

Airborne

Total

Grand Total

U.S.

Standing