U.S. Strategic Nuclear Force Options

Congressional research reportDec 3, 1981

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U.S.

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCE OPTIONS

ISSUE BZIEF NUMBER IB77046

AUTHOR:

C o l l i n s , J o h n M.

Senior Specialist in International Affairs (National Defense)

S e v e r n s , Elizabeth Ann

Research Assistant, Office o f Senior Specialists

THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE

MAJOR ISSUES SYSTEM

DATE ORIGINATED 05/01/77

' D A T E UPDATED 12/03/81

FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL 287-5700

1 207

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ISSUE DEFINITION

Ample security at acceptable cost is the aim of U.S. strategic retaliatory

f o r c e s , which are assigned primary

responsibility

for deterring a t o m i c

attacks against the United States. That aim stays c o n s t a n t , but essential

f o r c e requirements do not.

Nuclear systems needed in one context are surplus

in others.

Congress, in reviewing proposals, therefore needs s o m e effective way

relate retaliatory force requirements With U.S. deterrent strategy before

can accurately assess the adequacy of present and projected postures.

T h i s brief, which provides no definitive "answers" and supports no special

position, addresses three connected issues:

-- How many U.S. weapon systems are compulsory?

- - Which combination would be most suitable?

-- What f o r c e level for each system would serve best?

Assessments stress fundamental differences between

functional classes.

Bombers accomplish strategic nuclear missions in ways completely . f o r e i g n t o

intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), Which duplicate f e w strengths

and weaknesses of submarine-launched counterparts

(SLBMs), and so on.

than

Improved products within each

class

perform

missions

better

predecessors, but in much the same way.

Piston-powered aircraft and jets,

for example, both fly from point A to point B.

It is f r u i t l e s s , therefore,

to a r g u e about relative merits of B-1 bombers and MX missiles before the need

Particular makes and models a r e

for any bomber or ICBM has been established.

mentioned only for exemplary purposes.

NOTE:

Tables that support this text a r e not retrievable on the C R T ,

may be obtained by requesting hard copies.

but

BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS

HOW MANY U.S.

SYSTEMS?

T h e United S t a t e s , committed to a second-strike

strategy, requires

retaliatory a r m s that could accomplish assigned missions after absorbing a

large-scale attack.

In addition, the force should afford flexibility, a n d

forestall technological surprise.

Manned bombers fulfilled those functions until the late 1950s.

The

Defense Department deployed fixed-site

ICBMs i n 1 9 5 9 f o r a variety o f

reasons. A triad developed the following y e a r , when P o l a r i s submarines f i r s t

.went t o sea.

It i s important to note, however, that strategic requirements

did not dominate decisions to construct a triad. Service politics shaped the

structure a s much a s military missions.

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How many systems are really mandatory?

Most students of the subject a g r e e that n o monad, however

could fill the bill for long under f a s t - c h a n g ~ n g conditions.

impressive,

T w o systems theoretically could suffice, if pre-launch

survivability and

penetration prospects of both were superlative.

Soviet p o w e r , for example,

still depends primarily on two types of ballistic missile, even though

Sackfire bombers have assumed a significant role.

U.S.

second-strike

systems deployed o r

constraints, h o w e v e r , create doubts that any two U.S.

under development could safely underpin long-term s e c u r i t y , as the next

section indicates.

Three systems have served well for the last two decades, but present

p.roclivities a r e to reinforce, not reduce, our traditional triad.

Seven

prospects have Seen tested to s o m e extent.

Air- and submarine-launched

cruise missiles (ALCMs, SLCMs), together with semi-mobile ICBMs

(SM ICBMs),

a r e under active consideration a t this time.

Freely mobile ICBMs (FM ICBMs),

a-ir-launched ballistic missiles

(ALBMs), baiiistic missiles fired from

surface ships

(SSBMs), and Hydra are waiting in the wings.

Shallow

Underwater Missiles (SUM) on coastal submarines, sometimes called the Shallow

Undersea Mobile F o r c e , differ in detail from deep water S L B M s , but not enough

to define a discrete functional category.

Airmobile missiles on aircraft

that land before launch are lumped with ALBMs.

T h e Department of Defense considers a l l experimental systems a s possible

supplements t o , rather than replacements f o r , present components.

T h e r e is

no p r o o f , however, that additions would provide a more cost-effective

deterrent f o r c e than three dependable components, which have been sufficient

so f a r , The L a w of Diminishing Returns would cause the value of dollar

investments to decline with each new l a y e r , diverting funds unnecessarily

from other defense and domestic programs, unless budgets were given big

boosts.

Plans to expand the U.S. triad to four or more systems seem

support when put in that context.

difficult

WHAT SYSTEMS IN COMBISATION?

What change, if a n y , i n the present mix would serve America's

needs

completely is more a matter of portents than present capabilities.

most

CURRENT TRIAD CONNECTED WITH TRENDS

T h e existing U.S. triad seems temporarily sound.

Complicated scheduling

problems make i t almost impossible for a n y f o e to compromise S A C bombers a n d

silo-based

ICBMs simultaneously.

Soviet anti-submarine

warfare

(ASW)

capabilities a r e so slim a t this stage that U.S. submarines on station a t sea

would escape largely unscathed.

U.S. retaliatory forces, once committed, seem to have strengths needed

accomplish essential missions.

Ballistic missile warheads

would

"home

free."

The

few

primitive

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defenses they face could be quickly overcome.

U.S.

bombers would have to

breach the world's most sophisticated and comprehensive air d e f e n s e s , which

are deployed in great d e p t h , but planners a r e Confident that about 75% of our

9-52s would reach their targets.

Projected Soviet capabilities, however, suggest that U.S. deterrent powers

predicated on the present triad may S e perishable.

The Soviets already have more than four times as many ICSM warheads a s S A C

has missile silos, which a r e static targets. Most of Moscow's weapons a r e in

che megaton range. Power and precision a r e being improved.

Emerging hard

fixed-site ICBMs

target capabilities consequently make the security of U.S.

a n increasingly serious source of concern, since they are undefended.

B-52 bombers, along with supporting t a n k e r s , depend in part o n dispersion

t o - e n s u r e pre-launch s u r v i v a l , but runway and parking restrictions limit the

choice of airstrips.

Soviet SLBMs mounting MIRVs, which numbered

1 9 2 tubes

i n January 1 9 8 1 , could cover dispersal s i t e s and saturate escape routes much

more effectively than single-shot missiles, if they choose to shoot from

short range.

Moreover, intelligence analysts indicate that Soviet air and

manned penetrators

civil defenses could deny many crucial targets t d U.S.

(especially 3-52s) during this decade.

Straight-line projections of those trends could cause U.S.

deterrence in

to depend mainly cn a monad of S L B M s , whose survivability could

be significantly degraded by Soviet A S W . o r ABM breakthroughs

t h a t are not

expected but not impossible.

Some corrective steps already a r e underway, but

a structured approach to posture improvement still i s worth reviewing.

t h e mid-1980s

OPTIONAL ALTERATIONS OF T H E TRIAD

Exclusive

reliance on systems with

similar characteristics, however

strong, would reduce U.S.

security, not strengthen it.

T h e pre-launch

survival prospects of air-launched c r u i s e missiles a n d ALBMs a r e similar to

those of manned bombers.

SiBMs (including SUM) and sub-launched S L C M s would

be endangered by a Soviet ASW breakthrough.

An effective Soviet ABM

shield

any ballistic missile.

would drastically reduce deterrent properties of Diversification thus i s i n demand, but only within

loosely defined limits.

No r u l e , for example, states that l a n d - , sea-, o r air-launched

systems a l l

must be represented.

Two of the three triad legs could be a l o f t , a s h o r e , or

afloat if the resultant combination satisfied U.S. security requirements more

completely than any other amalgam.

Which weapon systems would best satisfy U.S. f o r c e requirements depends on

survivability, performance, and total program costs of the c o m p l e t e package.

High-priced manpower and scarce energy supplies should be taken i n t o account.

No solution would seem acceptable i f i t risked g r e a t instability o r a n

all-out arms race.

Ten systems that could f i t into our triad a r e prospective competitors.

Readers should be a w a r e that one salient strength may outweigh many

weaknesses, and vice versa.

Calculations invariably involve subjective

values.

Every combination suffers some shortcomings. The goal i s a suitable

compromise.

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The selection process would be the sane if

systems were to f i t in the final structure.

two,

three,

four,

One hundred twenty triads, for example, are mathematically possible, with

1 0 systems to choose from (see Table

I).

Almost

90% exhibit

distinctly

undesirable traits:

~ w e n c y - n i n e sets overstress "airbreathingv systems.

contain nothing but ballistic missiles.

- - Nine put too many eggs in the land-based basket.

-- Six rely too much on submarine-launched inissiles.

-- Nineteen change the current triad completely.

-- Nine include "sitting duck" ICBMs in silos.

The remaining 13 possibilities a r e somewhat more attractive.

All

mingle

two classes of ballistic missile with a

single "air-breather."

Eight

incorporate one airmobile component, with others aloft or afloat.

All depend

on mobility and/or deception to preserve pre-launch survival prospects.

Every one of those 13 options, however, involves tough tradeoffs:

-- Four sets embrace semi-mobile ICBMs, which attract the

attention of Soviet marksmen to known aiminq points in

the Continental United States (CONUS).

- - Four s o r e with freely mobile ICSMs a l s o present targets

on the American land mass.

-- Four of those eight possibilities abandon S L B M s , the

most survivable system presently deployed.

-- T h e final five, which feature two dissimilar sea-launched

systems, lack complete diversity, because they dispense

with any land-based model.

U.S. decisionmakers therefore must

compare relative

combinations to ascertain the most suitable mix.

merits

various

SLBMs As the Constant Component

All options selected for serious study probably

should

preserve

SLBMs,

which are vulnerable in port, but survivable o n station.

T h a t stable system

discourages enemy proclivities to preempt.

If armed conflict should d e v e l o p ,

despite our deterrent, SLBMs would draw few nuclear

fires on

the United

States.

U.S. responses, triggered a t times of our choice, would presently be

unsuppressible.

Counterforce target coverage could be expanded by installing

warheads with improved accuracies and yields, if U.S. decisionmakers desired.

Those strengths will remain unshaken until enemy ASW f o r c e s acquire high

confidence that they can locate most U.S. strategic submarines at sea and

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sink them simultaneously before they launch their missiles, o r

AaMs can stop U.S. warheads enroute.

until

Soviet

Replace Fixed-Site ICBMs

The reduced deterrent value of U.S. fixed-site ICBKs declines a t a r a t e

that relates directly to the rapid deployment of Soviet counterparts with

-c a n n o t

impeded

credible hard target capabilities.

That process

effectively for long by

improving any second-strike

system installed i n

silos.

Silo hardness already is approaching its practical limitation.

Even n e w

bases i n bedrock, prepared at prodigious price, could be destroyed by big

enough blasts.

Expanding the force would be f r u i t l e s s , for t h e Soviets could

add warheads much faster than we could build

silos and fill them with

missiles, a t a fraction of the cost. Replacing Minuteman missiles with MX

would m-erely provide Soviet marksmen

with

lucrative

targets.

Launch-on-warning policies (sometimes called launch-under-confirmed-attack)

could strengthen deterrence by increasing uncertainty in the Soviet c a m p , but

could be prudently implemented only if the Kremlin promised t o leave the U.S.

alert apparatus intact. Otherwise, our P r e s i d e n t , lacking proper i n p u t ,

might opt f o r a response completely out of proportion to the provocation,

with ruinous results.

The long-term utility of fixed-site systems might be extended by

early

deployment of ballistic missile defense, but the SALT I ABM

Treaty allows

just 1 0 0 launchers, a n d suitable technology i s still immature.

Such a small ,

force would leave eight of our nine ICBM fields uncovered.

Many political

and economic impediments oppose rescinding that pact, if Moscow refused to

renegotiate.

Pressures to supplement or partly supplant our silo-based f o r c e thus a r e

powerful.

F o u r options perhaps should take t o p priority

(sequence numbers

1 0 8 , 1 1 2 , 1 1 6 , and 1 1 7 from the smorgasbord o f possibilities

in Table I).

Each changes a single constituent in the current U.S.

triad:

SM ICBM

F M ICBM

SSBM

Hydra

SLBM

Bomber

SLBM

Bomber

SLBM

Bomber

SLBM

Bomber

Option 1:

Substitute Semi-Mobile ICBMs

Semi-mobile ICBM systems (SM ICBMs) constitute large-scale "shell games."

Each MX transport, according to some current c o n c e p t s , could rotate randomly

structures along a linear route o r closed

loop

among 23 reinforced

"racetrackw 15-20 miles l o n g , then dash to a n e w destination a t the l a s t

moment.

Other basing modes might include covered t r e n c h e s , hardened open

trenches, pinwheels, a n d multiple vertical structures, to c i t e a f e w samples.

ICBMs,

however,

compromise

between

hardness

and

mobility,

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Maneuverability

strictly

limited and

associated

shelters a r e

less

protective than silos.

The system i s more

survivable than its fixed-site

f.orerunner only if true target locations remain secret and the number of

shelters exceed the Soviet stock of weapons with

sufficient lethality.

ICBXs could therefore be smothered by a f i r s t strike, unless

some

sort of

S.ALT ceiling controls the quantity of large Soviet launchers and

the

legal

load of independently targetable warheads ?er missile to such an extent

that

K.S. shelters exceed the stock o f sufficienzly lethal weapons the Soviets

semi-mobile

missile

could allocate to destroy

them.

Failing t h a c , U.S.

deployments would have to be expanded far beyond

present

C O n t e m p l a t i ~ n , be

defended, or both.

in any event, the prOliferaZlOn o f known aiming points

on American

soil

than

the

Soviets

could invite Saturation attacks of much greater magnitude

would now need to swamp our 1 , 0 5 4 silos if deterrence failed for any

reason.

Critics al-so complain about construction costs and. completion

t i m e s , plus

societal and environmental implications.

Option 2:

Substitute Freely Mobiie ICBMs

Freely mobile ICBM systems (FM ICBMs) mountea o n trucks, trains, tracked

vehicles, ground

effects machines,

river barges, and

even

lake-based

submarines are essentially separate from semi-mobile models i n one

important

military respect:

they eliminate a known number of precisely located targets

for enemy marksmen to hit.

Backers believe thac even a very

large

Soviet

f-orce would lack ample means to cripple the freely mobile

land-launched

leg

of our triad with a full-scale a s s a u l t , unless equipped

with

supersensitive

surveillance devices and "smart" weapons

that 1oc.k onto moving

objects.

Acquisition costs a r e cheap compared with

semi-mobile models

(although

operating costs are more expensive).

FM I C B M s , however, are saddled with shortfalls of their own.

B a r r a g e s of

enemy MIRVs might blanket suspected

hiding

places

the United

States.

Protection against sabotage would pose special problems for missiles

in the

o p e n , either stopped or in transit.

Political opposition to nuclear weapons

roaming public roads and rail lines is particularly strong.

Arms controllers

lament inabilities to verify how many mobile launchers a r e deployed.

Option 3:

Substitute Surface Ship Ballistic Missiles

Some strategists prefer to remove a s many targets a s possible

f r o m the

American

land mass.

One school therefore

suggests that

surface

ship

ballistic missiles (SSBMs) would

make

better

replacements for fixed-site

ICBMs than any semi-mobile or freely mobile land-based model, although

SALT

I1 a s presently prescribed prohibits this option.

The concept calls for transport ship hulls

to be

modified

special

purpose launch platforms.

Tests with Polaris SLBMs proved practical

i n the

early 1960s.

Such vessels could fool satellite sensors, but not close visual

verification.

Prelaunch survival would depend primarily on mingling

missile

carriers with legitimate merchantmen on crowded shipping lanes.

It would

easier to pick up the trail of surface ships than submarines when they

leave

port, a n d easier to track them thereafter, but crisscrossing paths and decoys

still would make i t difficult to differentiate false leads from true targets.

Even if a l l could be detected a t any given t i m e , the Soviets still would

taxed to attack the total SSBM f l e e t simultaneously, together with two

other

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National Command Authorities could maintain radio

legs of our triad. U.S.

contact with SSBMs and transmit emergency orders more

surely than with

submerged submarines.

Option 4:

Substitute H y d r a

Hydra is the most revolutionary sea-launched missile

system.

Submarines

(including SUM) and/or

surface ships in any combination desired mount

ballistic missiles internally or externally, either in canisters or modified

to waterproof and improve bare missile buoyancy.

Crews release those packets

to float f r e e in times of crises, far from the carriers and each other.

Firings a r e triggered on call from remote positions at s e a or ashore.

All

components could be recovered if Z h r e a t s recede and requirements to launch

disappear, according to the c o n c e p t , which Navy personnel tested in

part in

the early 1960s.

Hydra missiles theoretically could be affixed to a l l sorts of carriers

with collateral functions (some ships, for example, might also transport

cargo).

Serious conflicts between main a n d secondary missions, however,

would likely occur.

Special purpose platforms, purchased a t increased c o s t ,

would be more appropriate.

Releasing weapons in response to strategic warning would violate present

nuclear safety regulations.

T h a t act also could catalyze Soviet strikes

instead of reducing tension.

Hostile surveillance s h i p s might

find and

confiscate o r destroy free-floating U.S. missiles, unless steps were taken to

prevent detection.

Such problems seem solvable, but some champions of the Hydra system prefer

tighter control.

Their alternative concept calls for spontaneous launch to

start as soon a s missiles hit the water. H y d r a i n such c a s e would

lose its

unique prelaunch survival properties. Costs, however, would still be less and

carrying capacities greater than for submarines and surface ships designed to'

launch ballistic missiles from batteries on board.

Option 5:

Substitute SUM

A fifth o p t i o n , which does not show on Table I , considers Shallow

Underwater Missiles

(SUM) o n small

coastal

submarines

possible

replacements for fixed-site ICBMs.

The original intent was to operate SUM from submerged positions on the

U.S. continental s h e l f , where submarines might even remain motionless on the

bottom for prolonged periods.

Communication links would be simple.

Soviet

seekers would find i t difficult to separate true signals from background

clutter c l o s e t o U.S. shores.

That concept, however, proved impractical, since SUM vessels apparently

A single Soviet nuclear

weapon

would be vulnerable to the Van Dorn effect.

detonated i n deep water near our continental shelf would sweep the shallows

for 100-200 miles with waves perhaps exceeding 1 0 0 f e e t i n height.

Even a

few such blasts would be ruinous.

S U M , confronted with

those c o n d i t i o n s ,

must move to deeper patrol stations that reduce many o f its advantages.

Bottom-sitting, for example, i s not possible o n steep continental slopes o r

a t sites submerged much more t h a n 1 , 0 0 0 feet.

The f a c t that SUM remains

within range of shore-based ASW support i s not directly important. T h e U.S.

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UPDATE-12/03/81

Navy exerts no control over international waters in peacetime, and thus would

be in poor position to protect SUM prior to a Soviet first strike. At best,

Soviet ASW concentrations near the United States would ring alarm

bells and

allow our retaliatory forces to improve their routine readiness posture.

SUM and deep water SLBMs consequently compete for primacy within a single

functicnal c i a s s , just as one of many basing modes would

best serve mobile

ICBMs. The integrity of our triad would remain inzact if one suS-launched

ballistic missile system replaced the o t h e r , but switching missiles in silos

for S U M , while s t i c k i n g , say, with Trident, would create a strategic nuclear

dyad instead of strengthening a three-iegged strum'-ur=e.

Replace 3ombers with ALCMs

Bombers are advertised as the most flexible of a l l strategic delivery

systems. They can satisfy requirements a c r o s s the conflict spectrum, from

shows of force to nuclear combat. They can function a s manned

penetrators

carrying diversified payloads, or as standoff missile

carriers.

Heavy

bombers also h a v e the hypothetical ability to engage

series

widely-separated targets; to locate, track a n d destroy moving objects; and to

crack the hardest known structures. Crews can assess post-strike damage and

enemy activities (such a s the rapid reloading of missile launch facilities),

then take acticn on their o w n or recommend responses to responsible

headquarters.

On examination, however, a t least two of those claims seem extravagant.

Time-sensitive hard targets, for instance, are mainly immune to attacks by

the fastest bombers, whose reflexes simply a r e too slow to engage enemy alert

fcrces. The competence of aircraft to strike several successive targets with

Sombs is also dubious -- survival prospects could drop sharply when intruders

proceed from one heavily defended objective to another, despite "black b o x v

support and defense supression support from other triad components.

Converting sophisticated strategic aircraft for tactical roles in regional

c o m b a t , however b r i e f , does not bolster nuclear deterrence. On the contrary,

committing them t o secondary missions can detracc.

As a result of 3 - 5 2

drawdowns during operations in Southeast Asia, the size of the SAC alert

force slumped by 15%. Capabilities of a Smaller force would be degraded even

f u r t h e r , and combat losses like those SAC suffered over the Red River Delta

in December 1 9 7 2 could prove unsupportable.

(The original B-1 buy was to be

just 244 aircraft).

In short, heavy bombers seem less attractive tactically than advocates

a s s e r t , and a r e rather rigid strategically, being better suited f o r "assured

destruction" purposes than for countersilo options.

Beyond t h a t , t h e deterrent value o f U.S.

strategic nuclear bombers

continues to decline a t a rate inversely proportionate

to the a g e of our

B-52s, which already ar'e older than most o f their crews.

Modernization,

however, faces no insurmountable impediments.

Replacing B-52s with B-1s or

some advanced system that incorporates "Stealth" technology would reduce

dangers to U.S.

bombers.

Pre-launch survivability would improve because

alert aircraft not only could "scrambleu more quickly, but could disperse to

many strips with short runways.

(Tankers, however, will be denied that

advantage until superior substitutes for KC-135s deploy in strength).

Faster

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UPDATE-12/03/81

speeCs and Setter "black box" support should also make it possible to

Soviet air defenses that could defeat B-52s.

breach

A key q u e s t i o n , therefore, follows:

Would

it be cost-effective to

refurbish S A C ' S bomber force to foster betcer capabilities within its rather

restricted

scope, or would

some other airbreathing

system

satisfactory?

There is no way to accommodate SLCMs or ALBMs without accepting structural

defects, such as excessive stress on submarine-launched

s y s t e m s , total

reliance on ballistic missiles, or adopting a quadrad a t extra expense.

Four options therefore seem to take t o p priority, if decisions are made to

They are the

switch (sequence numbers 1 1 1 , 1 1 5 , 1 1 8 , and 1 1 9 in Table I).

same as Options 1 - 4 already discussed, but change two legs of the triad

instead of one by

substituting air-launched

cruise m-issiles for manned

bombers:

SM ICBM

FM ICBM

SSBM

Hydra

SLBM

ALCM

SLBM

ALCM

SLBM

ALCM

SLBM

ALCM

Pre-launch survival problems for ALCM carriers a r e similar to those of

strategic bombers.

They could be launched o n warning in the s a m e w a y , under

positive control, subject to recall if required. Wile-bodied transports a r e

less responsive than high-performance a i r c r a f t , because they need more time

to taxi a n d take off.

Vertical/short

take-off

and landing

(V/STOL)

characteristics would alleviate that problem, but lift capabilities a r e

limited.

Once a l o f t , security would improve temporarily.

O p p o n e n t s , however,

almost certainly would hope to destroy U.S. carriers before the crews could

launch any missiles.

Otherwise, anti-aircraft units would have to hit a

horde of separate projectiles, instead of one compact target.

Barrage

attacks against flight corridors over U.S. soil could be expected.

Cruise missiles a r e less adaptable than

manned

aircraft.

Range

restrictions are set i n c o n c r e t e , since in-flight refueling i s impossible

(although auxiliary tanks can be mounted in some cases).

Once a current

generation missile has been f i r e d , it can neither be recalled nor recovered.

After separating from delivery vehicles, cruise missiles depend heavily o n

compact radar cross-sections, low infrared signatures, a n d terrain-hugging

capabilities to assist in breaching defenses.

They currently lack a c t i v e

penetration aids and elaborate electronic countermeasure (ECM) packets, a r e

unable to take evasive action, and c a n n o t cope

with

contingencies.

Supersonic speeds would h e l p , but U.S.

systems n o w i n development a r e

subsonic. L o w , slow a p p r o a c h e s , h o w e v e r , encourage accuracies that a s y e t

are unattainable by ballistic missiles.

An inertial guidance s y s t e m ,

periodically updated e n r o u t e , can reduce errors to a f e w feet.

If the

missiles a r e fitted with warheads of sufficient y i e l d , they can crush very

hard structures, but most time-sensitive a n d mobile targets could a v o i d

destruction.

Aside from the launch platforms, ALCMs c o m e a t "cut-ratew prices, compared

with other systems.

T h e l r g r e a t e s t s t r e n g t h , t h e r e f o r e , m i g h t b e r e a l i z e d by

d e p l o y i n g s u f f i c ~ e n tn u m b e r s t o

overload

opposing defenses.

Electing

d e p l o y ALCMs i n s t e a d o f m a n n e d p e n e t r a t i n g b o m S e r s ,

however,

would

swap a

p r o v e n s y s t e m f o r new t e c h n o l o g y t h a t s k i l l c o n t a i n s

WHAT U.S.

FOXCE LEVELS?

Successive S e c r e t a r i e s of Defense concede t h a t none of

the

triad's

legs

need t o s t a n d a l o n e .

Cumulative c a p a b i l i t i e s shoulC simply be s u f f i c i e n t

w i t h s t a n d a s t r o n g a t t a c k , t h e n r e t a l i a z e e f f e c t i v e l y i n w a y s t h a ~s e r v e U . S .

interests.

U.S.

triad

c o n t i n g e n t s were

installed

in the

1960s t o

suppcrt

c o u n t e r v a l u e s t r a t e g y c a l l e d " a s s u r e d d e s t r u c t i o n w . The main

mission

then

was m e r e l y t o c o v e r 2 0 0 - o d d u r b a n t a r g e t s w i t h a h i g h d e g r e e

confidence,

a f t e r accounting f o b a b o r t s , a t t r i t i o n , and d e l i v e r y e r r o r s t h a t could reduce

U.S. r e t a l i a t o r y c a p a b i l i t i e s .

D e f e n s e S e c r e t a r y McNamara,

the principal

a r c h i t e c t , assumed t h a t

resources. able

eradicate

"say,

one-fifth

one-fourth of

t h e Soviet population and

one-half

Soviet

industrial

c a p a c i t y would s e r v e as an e f f e c t i v e d e t e r r e n t . "

suit

One x h o u s a n d M i n u t e m e n , e a c h w i t h a s i n g l e w a r h e a d , w e r e d e p l o y e d t o

were never

t h a t purpose.

F o r c e l e v e l s f o r SL3Ms, w h i c h a c t a s c o m p l e m e n t s ,

T h e o r i g i n a l r e q u e s t f o r 45 SuSmarines

wlth

720

c z l c u l a t e d as o b j e c t i v e l y .

m i s s i l e s was a r b i t r a r i l y c u t t o 4 1 b o a t s ( t o t a l 6 5 6 t u b e s , e a c h c o n t a i n i n g a

one-warhead

missile)

without

any

apparent

abridgement

essential

capabilities.

M o r e t h a n 6 0 0 8 - 5 2 b o m b e r s w e r e a s s i g n e d t o SAC.

S o v i e t power s i n c e t h a t t l m e

has

i n c r e a s e d immensely i n a b s o l u t e and

r e l a t i v e terms, reducing pre-launch survival and penetration

prospects

for

U . S . strategy, w h i c h now s z r e s s e s a r a n g e

nuclear

p a r t s of o u r t r i a d .

options

in addition

"assured

destructionv, calls

for

far

greater

firepower.

A m e r i c a ' s ICBM a n d SLBM l a u n c h e r l e v e l s , h o w e v e r , h a v e s t a y e d s t a t i c s i n c e

1967.

The l a t t e r r e c e n t l y d r o p p e d f r o m 6 5 6 t u b e s c o 5 7 6 , b e c a u s e two P o l a r i s

b o a t s a r e b e i n g decommissioned a n d t h r e e more a r e b e i n g c o n v e r t e d

to attack

Trident

class

submarines.

SLBM s t r e n g t h s w i l l n o t i n c r e a s e u n t i l t h e f i r s t

suSmarine deploys l a t e i n 1981 o r e a r l y i n 1982.

Heavy bomber

holdings a r e

s c a r c e l y half t h e i r peak s t r e n g t h .

Many b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s now a r e MIRVed ( 5 5 0 M i n u t e m a n I I I s , n o r m a l l y w i t h

t h r e e warheads a p i e c e ; 496 Poseidon and T r i d e n t I SiBMs, which

average

10).

B-52s c a r r y b i g g e r l o a d s .

Even s o , t a r g e t c o v e r a g e r e p o r t e d l y f a l l s s h o r t of

r e q u i r e m e n t s e s t a b l i s h e d b y P r e s i d e n t i a l D i r e c t i v e 5 9 (PD 5 9 ) .

How w e l l e n d s a n d m e a n s

r e a l l y match

could

ascertained

o n l y by

comparing s u r v i v a b l e f o r c e l e v e l s w i t h

classified

target

lists,

which

beyond t h e s c o p e o f t h i s b r i e f .

Suffice it t o say t h a t t h e necessary

number

calculated for

each

o f U.S. d e l i v e r y v e h i c l e s a n d n u c l e a r w e a p o n s c o u l d b e

l e g of our t r i a d with

much

greater objectivity

than

previously,

whether

systems and Soviet t h r e a t s remain constant o r change.

Accurate

counts a r e

c r i t i c a l , b e c a u s e s h o r t a g e s u n d e r c u t U.S. s e c u r i t y a n d e x c e s s e s f r i t t e r a w a y

f und.s.

TZNTATIVE FINDINGS

T h e r e i s n o way t o i d e n t i f y

the vices

and v i r t u e s

systems

such a s

Minuteman v e r s u s MX, T r i d e n t v e r s u s P o s e i d o n , o r

B-52s

versus

B-l

without

hard

analyzing combinations i n context w i t h s p e c i f i c system c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,

cost data, authoritative threat estimations, target

distribution

number

and t y p e , and arms c o n t r o l g o a l s .

Third party threats,

civil

defense,

air

d e f e n s e , A B M , a n d ASW a l l s h o u l d b e c o n s i d e r e d . .

few t e n t a t i v e f i n d i n g s n e v e r t h e l e s s e m e r g e .

Any

f o r t h c o m i n g U.S. . f o r c e p o s t u r e

not

accompanied

j u s t i f i c a t i o n should be viewed with c a u t i o n i f i t p l a n s t o :

convincing

-- E x p a n d o r c o n t r a c t t h e U . S . t r i a d b y a d d i n g o r s u b s t r a c t i n g

systems.

-- Expand e x i s t i n g f o r c e l e v e l s .

-- C o n t a i n two o r more l a n d - , a i r - ,

o r submarine-launched

systems.

-- C o n t a i n t w o o r m o r e a i r b r e a t h i n g s y s t e m s .

-- E x c l u d e a i r b r e a t h i n g s y s t e m s .

-- R e t a i n f i x e d - s i t e ICBMs.

-- I n c l u d e u n d e f e n d e d s e m i - m o b i l e ICBMs, u n l e s s SALT

l i m i t s S o v i e t warheads s u f f i c i e n t l y .

-- R e p l a c e a l l t h r e e c o m p o n e n t s i n o u r p r e s e n t t r i a d .

D e c i s i o n m a k e r s a l s o would do w e l l t o b a l a n c e b e n e f i t s a g a i n s t

liabilities

b e f o r e approving any o p t i o n t h a t r e t a i n s p a r t of a p r e s e n t system a f c e r

the

r e s t i s r e p l a c e d ( s u c h a s a mix o f manned p e n e t r a t i n g b o m b e r s w i t h ALCMs

f i x e d - s i t e w i t h m o b i l e ICBMs).

LEGISLATION

P.L.

97-39,

694

Department of Defense Supplemental A u t h o r i z a t i o n Act,

1981.

Authorizes

the use

t h e armed

t h e a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f a d d i t i o n a l f u n d s f o r FY81 f o r

f o r c e s f o r procurement of a i r c r a f t , m i s s i l e s , naval v e s s e l s ,

tracked

combat

v e h i c l e s and f o r r e s e a r c h , development, t e s t , and e v a l u a t i o n .

Increases

the

a c t i v e d u t y p e r s o n n e l a n d s t r e n g t h s o f t h e Navy, M a r i n e C o r p s , a n d A i r F o r c e .

I n c r e a s e s t h e number o f r e s e r v e component

members

authorized

s e r v e on

f u l l - t i m e d u t y with t h e Marine Corps Reserve.

Increases

the

number

H.R.

2614

civilian personnel authorized for

t h e Department

Defense.

referred

t h e Committee

on Armed

Services.

i n t r o d u c e d Mar. 1 8 , 1 9 8 1 ;

CRS-12

I377046

UPCATE-12/03/81

2eported to the House (H.Rept.

97-20), with amendment, Apr.

694

introduced Mar. 1 2 , 1 9 8 1 ; referred

to the Committee on Armed Services.

Passed

Reported to the Senate (S.F!ept.

97-35), with amendment, Apr.

S e n a t e , a m e n d e d , May 7 , 1981. Passed the H o u s e , a m e n d e d , J u n e 2 3 , in lieu of

B.R. 2614.

Conferences held; conference report filed in the House

(H.?.ept.

97-204) July 2 7 , to which both Xouses agreed.

Signed into law Aug. 1 4 , 1981.

P.L. 9 7 - 8 6 , S. 815

Department of D e f e n s e Authorization Act, 1982. Authorizes

appropriations

for t3e armed forces f o r procurement of a i r c r a f t , missiles, naval v e s s e l s ,

tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other w e a p o n s , for

research,

development, test, and evaluation, and for operation and maintenance.

Prescribes authcrized end strengths for active C u t y , reserve, and civilian

personnel.

H.R. 2970 introduced Apr. 1 , 1 9 8 1 ; referred tc the Committee on

Armed Services.

Clean bill H.R.

3519 reported to the House (H.Rept. 97-71,

part l), with amendment, May 12. 2eferred to the Committeqs o n the Judiciary

and on Government Operations. introduced Mar.

2 6 , 1 9 8 1 ; referred to the

Committee on Armed Services. Reported to the Senate

(S.Rept. 97-58), with

the

amendment, May 6. Called up by unanimous consent in Senate; passed

S e n a t e , a m e n d e d , May 1 4 , 1981. Passed the H o u s e , a m e n d e d , July 1 6 , i n lieu

of H.R. 3519. Conferences held.

Conference report filed in the House

(H.Rept. 97-311) Nov. 3 , to which both Houses agreed. Signed into l a w Dec.

1 , 1981.

HEARINGS

U.S.

Congress.

House. Committee on Appropriations.

Subcommittee

on Defense. Department of Defense appropriations f o r FY80.

Part 3 , Strategic forces. Hearings, 96th Congress, 1st

session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979.

p. 1-768.

----- Department of Defense appropriations for 1981.

96th Congress, 2d session.

1980.

Hearings,

Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,

----- Department of Defense Appropriations for 1982.

Part 6 ,

Strategic bomber proposals.

Hearings, 97th Congress, 1st

session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1981. p. 1081-1135.

U.S.

Congress. House.

Committee on Appropriations.

Subcommittee

on Military Construction Appropriations.

Military construction

H e a r i n g s , 96th

appropriations for 1 9 8 1 -- strategic programs.

Congress, 2d session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1980.

P a r t 5 , 564 p.

----- Military construction appropriations for 1 9 8 0 -- MX missile

deployment, Hearings., 96th Congress, 1 s t session.

Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 210 p.

Nov. 5 , 1979.

U.S.

Congress. House.

Committee on Armed Services.

Status of

MX missile system. Hearings, 96th Congress, 2d session.

May 1 , 1980. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1980. 46 P.

U.S.

Congress.

house.

Select Committee o n Intelligence.

Subcommittee o n Oversight. Soviet strategic forces. Hearings,

9 6 t h C o n g r e s s , 2d session.

Off., 1980.

76 p.

W a s h i n g t o n , U.S.

Govt. Print.

U.S.

Congress.

House.

Committee on Interior and Insular/Affairs.

Subcommittee on Public Lands.

The MX missile system.

Oversight hearings, 9 6 t h C o n g r e s s , 1 s t and 2d sessions.

Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1980.

9 0 6 P.

U.S.

Congress.

Senate. Committee on Armed Services.

Department

of Defense authorization for appropriations for FY81.

H e a r i n g s , 9 6 t h Congress, 1 s t session. Part 2.

Washington,

U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1980.

REPORTS AND CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS

U.S.

Congress.

House.

Committee on Armed Services.

Subcommittee

on Intelligence and Military Application of Nuclear Energy.

Land-based ICBM forces vulnerability and options.

Oct. 5 ,

1978.

95th Congress, 2d session.

Washington, U.S. Govt.

Print. Off., 1978.

U.S.

Congress.

Senate.

Committee on Armed Services.

Military

inplications of the Treaty on the Limitation of S t r a t e g i c

Offensive Arms and Protocol Thereto (SALT I1 Treaty).

P a r t s 1-3.

Hearings, 9 6 t h Congress, 1 s t session.

Washington,

U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979.

U.S.

Congress.

Senate.

Committee on Foreign 2elations.

The

Parts 1-5.

Hearings, 96th C o n g r e s s ,

SALT I1 Treaty.

1st session.

Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979.

CHRCNOLOGY OF EVENTS

10/29/81

-- T h e Department of Defense attacked CIA testimony that

B-52s will have the capability to penetrate S o v i e t defefises

a l m o s t a s well a s the B-1.

DOD accused the CIA of testifying

without knowledge o f major changes that h a v e been planned

for t h e B-1.

10/28/81

-- T h e CIA testified that existing B-52s will be a b l e to

penetrate Soviet a i r defenses until 1 9 9 0 , a c c o r d i n g to

Senator Ted S t e v e n s , thus contradicting t h e

Administration's argument for the B-1.

S e n a t o r Stevens

said the B-1 is ''really nothing more than a h e d g e w until

Stealth is in production.

10/16/81

-- Northrop Corp. has been awarded the prime c o n t r a c t f o r

Stealth technology research a n d development.

is estimated that the new strategic bomber, which

allegedly will a b s o r b radar rather than r e f l e c t

i t a n d thus elude Soviet air defenses, will be

operational in the early 1990s.

10/07/81

-- chairman Price of the House Armed Services C o m m i t t e e

denounced President Reagan's plan to place MX i n

existing Titan silos.

In 3earings before that

Committee, Price stated, "No evidence available to

date indicates that hardening a limited number

of silos will provide any significant added

survivability in the face of the increasing accuracy

of Soviet strategic missiles."

10/06/81

-- General Jones, Chalrman of the Jolnt C h ~ e f sof

S t a f f , would not endorse che A d m l n ~ s t r a t ~ o nplan

for baslng the MX In testimony before the Senate

Armed Servlces Committee, a c d agaln expressed hls

support for the "shell game" plan prcposed by

President Carter.

10/02/81

-- President Reagan announced his plan to "close the

window of vulnerability," which called f o r placing

the first 3 6 of 1 0 0 MX missiles in existing Titan

silos and building 1 0 0 a-1 bombers.

09/09/81

-- None of the MX-basing possibilities being considered

by the Administration is " w i t h o u t serious r i s k s , high

c o s t s , important uncertainties, or significant

d r a w b a c k s w according to a study by the Congressional

Office of Technology Assissment.

The report suggested

that deploying the missiles o n small suSmarines i s

the most technically feasible solutio-n.

08/25/81

-- No land-based version of the MX can survive a

Soviet attack without an a n ~ i - b a l l i s t i c missile

s y s t e m , according to the Under Secretary of Defense

for Research and Development.

Richard Delauer said

i t i s likely the Pentagon will hasten development

of ballistic missile interceptors.

07/17/81

- - Marshal Ogarkov, Soviet armed forces chief o f

s t a f f , indicated the Soviet Union has begun a buildup

of strategic nuclear forces in response to "aggressive,

militant" U.S. behavior.

03/16/81

-- Defense Secretary Weinberger named a 15-member - p a n e l

The non-government

to reevaluate MX basing options.

experts are to r e p o r t their findings to Weinberger

July 1.

02/14/81

-- The U.S.

01/28/81

-- Chairman of the J o i n t Chiefs of Staff, General

Air F o r c e recommends that production of a B - l

bomber variant Segin production at an early date, a n d that

development of a "Stealth" bomber be expedited.

David Jones, stressed the need for a n e w

strategic bomber.

"Deploying a new manned penetrator

should be a top priority a m o n g the new strategic

initiatives that w e need to pursue," J o n e s

stated to the S e n a t e Armed Services Committee.

Secretary of Defense Weinberger has ordered a

study on the feasibility of sea-basing the MX

a s a n alternative to the racetrack mode favored b y

the Carter Administration.

01/18/81

-- MX "must be the n a t i o n ' s highest priority" in the

coming years to counter U.S. ICBM vulnerability,

according to Strategic Air Command (SAC) commander

General Richard Ellis.

He said the increased yield

and accuracy of Soviet ICSMs "have put our Minutemen

we could z o t respond

at risk to the point where

effectively ~n a coherent manner."

...

-01/06/81

-- Casper Weinberger, Secretary of Defense d e s i g n a t e ,

speaking a t confirmation hearings, said he "would want

to examine a wide number of options" before approving

a semi-mobile MX ICSM system.

11/10/80

-- Strategic nuclear weapons improvement is emphasized

in a draft Defense Department budget prepared by

advisors to President-elect Reagan.

Provisions include:

beginning immediate production of the B-1 bomber, with

an initial procurement of 1 0 0 a i r c r a f t , accelerating the

MX program, with full operational capability by F Y 8 6 ,

improving the Minuteman f o r c e , accelerating

conversion of 8-52s to cruise missile c a r r i e r s ,

accelerating Trident construction program to complete

three boats per year rather than the current rate of one.

11/03/80

-- The Soviet Union is pre-flight testing two new ICBMs,

Aviation Week & Space Technology reports.

Both are solid

fueled and "extremely accurate" according co U.S.

intelligenc,e officers. One is mobile.

08/22/80

-- "Technical problems" within the Department of Energy

have caused delays in the production of several nuclear

weapons, including ?lark 12A warheads, planned to

replace aging warheads on Minuteman I11 missiles. Also

affected are a n advanced nuclear warhead for the Army's

Lance missile, and a new bomb to be deployed o n B-52s.

- - Technology that can make U.S. aircraft "invisible" to

radar, thus enabling them to penetrate S o v i e t air defenses,

was announced by Secretary of Defense Brown.

H e asserted

that "stealthw technology, which allows the United States

to build undetectable manned a n d unmanned a i r c r a f t ,

"alters the military balance significantly."

08/21/80

-- The United States does not have enough strategic weapons

to implement PD-59, according to Strategic Air

Command (SAC) commander General Richard Ellis.

"The

principle of maintaining a countervailing strategy

cannot be supported i n the 1979-86 time period,"

Ellis wrote i n a letter to Secretary of Defense

Harold Brown.

07/25/80

-- A shift in strategic nuclear targeting policy, from

mutual assured destruction (MAD) toward o n e o f

"flexible response," w a s approved by President Carter.

PD-59, a s the revision is k n o w n , stresses a r a n g e of U.S.

retaliatory options against military targets, i n addition

to massive retaliation against cities.

04/30/80

-- T h e Pentagon has withdrawn plans to S a s e the M X

on a "race-track," citing cost as the primary

factor.

New plans call for deploying the mlssiles

in shelters in a straight l i n e , instead of the

previously planned closed-loop.

02/14/80

-- The Soviet Union has tested a new submarine-launched

ballistic missile chat can carry larger nuclear weapons

than presently deployed SLBKs.

Encrypted telemetry prevented U.S. experts from

gauging its accuracy.

02/08/80

-- Senators Howard W. Cannon and Paul D. Laxalt of N e v a d a ,

together with J a k e Garn and Orrin G . Hatch of U t a h ,

formally asked President Carter to reconsider the MX

racetrack basing mode.

They prefer a system that

"would be c h e a p e r , more effective, and come on l i n e

quicker

...."

G1/30/80

-- National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) i138-79

indicates that che Soviets could have 1 4 , 0 0 0 ICBM

and SLBM warheads by 1 9 8 9 if SALT I1 is not approved.

The level would otherwise be limited to about 6 , 0 0 0

i n 1 9 8 5 , when the pact, I f a p p r o v e d , would expire.

01/29/80

-- Defense Secretary Brown estimates that Soviet SS-18

and SS-19 ICBMs will place U.S. second-strike

minutemen in mortal peril by 1 9 8 1 or 1 9 8 2 , using "a

relatively small part of that force."

i1/09/79

-- The Senate authorized appropriations for MX, but

expressed reservations on the "racetrackt' deployment

recommended by the President.

09/07/79

-- President Carter announced that the MX will be

deployed in a "racetrackM configuration.

A projected

cost of $33 billion will deploy 200 MX ICBMs among

4 , 6 0 0 horizontal shelters, situated in clusters

connected by 23 closed loop roads.

08/03/79

-- CINCSAC estimates that better Soviet air defenses

will reduce B-52 penetration probaailities to about 75%

by 1 9 8 5 , even if all proposed U.S. improvements

bear fruit.

07/09/79

-- Defense Secretary Harold Brown told the Senate F o r e i g n

Relations Committee that the impending vulnerability

of America's Minuteman ICBMs in Silos would persist

even if the Soviets dismantled all of their SS-18

missiles.

06/01/78

-- Dr. William P e r r y , Under Secretary of Defense for

Research and Engineering, stated the United States'

cruise missile will be able to penetrate a n y Soviet

a i r defense.

"I believe w e will be a b l e to sustain

the penetrability o f the cruise missile in the

indefinite future under any set of defense responses

I am a b l e to conceive of."

08/02/78

-- Senator William Proxmire called the

proposed Multiple Aiming P o i n t (MAP) system

"a strategic error of mammoth proportions," claiming

that the Soviets could counter the MAP strategy a t a

fraction of the cost to the U.S.

Proxmire says that

advantage in throw weight and megatonnage could

easily be converted into numbers of warheads to

saturate U.S. sites.

07/25/78

-- In his first news conference a s Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of S t a f f , Air Force General David C. J o n e s

expressed his support for multiple aiming point (MAP)

basing for'mobile I C B M s , which he called essential to

reducing vulnerability of U.S. land-based missiles.

06/30/78

-- As a result of a n Air Force study reevaluating MX basing

mode o p t i o n s , DOD preference for underground trenches

has been replaced with the administration's preference

for a method known as Multiple Aiming Point (MAP) basing,

in which ICBM vulnerability would be reduced by deploying

each missile in a field of up to 25 vertical shelters.

Missiles would be shifted periodically and cove'rtly

among these soft silos a t dispersed positions.

The

plan could be applied to Minuteman a s well.

06/21/78

-- At the f i r s t public test of the Tomahawk air-launched

cruise missile a t White S a n d s , its performance against

simulated defenses was termed "letter perfect."

07/05/77

-- Department of Defense announced that the Minuteman I 1 1

productio'n line w i l l - b e shut down after the completion

of the l a s t ten missiles now under construction.

06/30/77

-- President Carter announced his decision to halt

production of the 3-1 bomber and to plan instead the

deployment of air-launched Cruise missiles with

modernized B-52s.

06/02/77

-- Pentagon spokesman Thomas Ross amended White H o u s e

contentions that Mark-12A warheads would give the

United States a "temporary a d v a n t a g e , " noting t h a t

even if they "were to work perfectly, we d o n ' t believe

w e would be a b l e to knock out most of their S o v i e t

silos because of our limited Minuteman force."

06/01/77

-- White House Press Secretary Powell stated that the

deployment of the Mark-12A nuclear warhead would give

the United States a "temporary a d v a n t a g e w over the

Soviet strategic arsenal.

05/16/77

-- Soviet n e w s weekly New T i m e s warned that the c r u i s e

missile "was not a monopoly product of the U S A , "

suggesting that U.S. deployment would be followed

by s o v i e t deployment of cruise missiles.

ADDITIONAL REFERENCE SOURCES

Strategic Weapons-General

Background statement from idhlize House on EX missile and B-1

bomber.

New York times, 3ct. 3 , 1981.

p . 12.

a u r t , Richard.

Reassessing the strategic Salance.

security, sunmer 1980.

p . 37-52.

International

Gray, Colin S.

The strategic forces triad:

end of t h e road?

Foreign a f f a i r s , July 1978. p. 771-789.

Luttwak, Edward N.

Strategic power:

military capabilities and

political utility.

Severly Hills, Sage Publications, 1976.

Modernizing strategic forces. Aviation Week

June 1 6 , 1980.' - (Entire issue.)

70 p.

Space Technology.

Polmar, Norman.

Strategic weapons:

an introduction.

Crane, Russak & Co., Inc., 1975. 1 6 4 p.

New Y o r k ,

Soviet views o n strategic nuclear weapons:

orthod.oxy and modernism.

p . 223-237.

Cooperation and conflict, v. 1 4 , 1979.

W h y stop a t a triad?

Turner, Stansfieid.

p. 31.

Sept. 1 5 , 1981.

U.S.

strategic security i n the 1980's.

52 p.

Hudson Institute, 1980.

New York times,

Croton-on-Hudson, New York.

U.S. Congressional SuCget Office.

U.S. strategic nuclear forces:

deterrence policies and procurement issaes, by G. Philip

Hughes, and C.R. Neu.

Washington, April 1977.

5 9 p.

----- Retaliatory issues for the U.S. strategic nuclear f o r c e s ,

by John B. Shewmaker and Mary R. T i e t z , Washington, J u n e 1978.

6 5 p.

----- Planning U.S.

strategic nuclear forces in the 1 9 8 0 ' ~by~ Robert R.

Soule, a n d John B. Shewmaker.

Washington, J u n e 1978.

52p.

----- Counterforce issues for the U.S.

Washington, January 1978.

U.S.

strategic nuclear forces.

7 9 p.

Library of Congress Congressional Research Service.

SALT 11:

major issues, by Zobert G. Bell and Mark M. Lowenthal.

Washington, Dec. 15. 1980.

1 3 7 p.

----- SALT I1 acceptance criteria:

a military appraisal, b y

John M. Collins.

Washington, 1979.

C R S Issue Brief 79005

----- Strategic nuclear delivery systems:

combination?

by John M.

Collins.

h o w many?

what

Washington, October 1974.

----- U.S.-Soviet

military b a l a n c e , book 1 1 , strategic nuclear

Washington, Zuly 1980.

143 p.

trends, by John M. Collins.

----- A comparison o f ' t h e hard target capabilities of the

Minuteman I11 and MX I C B M s , by A.A.

June 1 3 , 1979.

Tinajero.

Washington,

----- Projected strategic offensive weapons inventories of the U.S.

and U.S.S.R.:

1 8 0 p.

1977.

U.S.

an unclassified estimate.

Washington, Mar. 2 4 ,

strategic weapon developments and the implications of SALT.

Interdefense review, no. 3 , 1979: 367-371.

Bombers

Grambart, James.

p. 34-36.

T h e stealth secret.

?regressive, Dec.

1980.

Hoeber Francis P.

S l o w to take offense:

bombers, cruise missiles

and prudent deterrence.

W a s h i n g t o n , . C e n t e r f o r Strategic

and International Studies, 1977.

236 p.

Lake, Julian S.

Radar cross section.

November 1980.

p. 95-96.

Defense electronics,

Massing, Michael.

The invisible story. Columbia journalism

r e v i e w , NovernSer/December 1980.

p. 51-52.

McCarthy, John F., Jr.

The case for the B-1 bomber.

International security, fall 1976.

p. 78-97.

President Carter's comments on stealth leaks.

journal.

October 1980.

p. 23.

Armed F o r c e s

Quanbeck, Alton H., and Archie L. Wood.

Modernizing the

strategic bomber force:

why and how.

Washington,

The Brookings Institution, 1976.

1 1 6 p.

The stealth approach.

52.

Armada international, May 1980.

p. 5 0 ,

Cruise Missiles

Huisken, Ronald.

T h e origin of the strategic cruise missile.

New York, Praeger, 1981.

T h e Cruise

Pfaltzgraff, Robert L. Jr., and Jacquelyn K. Davis.

missile:

bargaining chip or defense bargain.

Cambridge,

Institute for Foreign Policy ~ n a l y s i s ,1977.

53 p.

The cruise missile and the strategic balance.

p . 49-61.

March 1978.

P a r a m e t e r s , v. 8 ,

T s i p i s , Kosta.

he long range cruise missile.

a t o m i c scientists, April 1975.

p. 15-26.

Bulletin of

Hydra

Chadwell, P a u l A.

Floating-launched ballistic missiles.

Journal

of the American Defense Preparedness Association, April 1980.

p. 24-27.

D r a i m , John E.

Xove MX m i s s ~ l e s out to sea.

Dec. 1 2 , 1980.

p. 1500-1501, 1525.

---- h floating U.S.

force of missiles.

National r e v i e w ,

Washington s t a r , Sept.

2 5 , 1980.

----- Floating missiles -- a new peril.

Asia w e e k , Feb. 1 , 1980.

p. 42.

Should our missile force go to sea?

L a i r d , Melvin R.

digest, September 1980.

p. 101-105.

Reader's

Robinson, Clarence A. Jr., Alternate MX basing concepts weighed.

p . 19-21.

Aviation Week & Space Technology, Oct. 2 7 , 19e0.

ICBMs

MX eeployment:

inadequacies of the air and

B a r l o w , Jeffrey G.

sea based options.

Washington.

Heritage f o u n d a t i o n ,

1981.

2 8 p.

a e n n e t t , Bruce W.

How to a s s e s s the survivability of U.S.

Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, 1980.

How to avoid monad and disaster.

D o w n e y , Thomas J.

policy, fall 1976. p. 172-201.

ICBMs.

Foreign

G r a y , Colin S.

T h e future of land-based missile forces.

Adelphi papers 140. L o n d o n , International Institute of

Strategic S t u d i e s , 1978.

36 p.

The case for the MX.

K o r b , Lawrence J .

July-August 1980.

p. 3-10.

MX:

T h e missile w e don't need.

1979.

Air University r e v i e w ,

The Defense monitor, October

8 p.

Office of Technolcgy Assessment.

3 3 5 p.

MX missile basing.

Sept. 1981.

Rummel, R.J.

Will the Soviet Union have a first-strike

capability? Orbis, fall 1976.

p. 579-594.

MX:

Maginot line of the 1980s. T h e Bulletin of

S n o w , Donald M.

atomic scientists, November 1980.

p. 22-25.

----- Arms control acd the alternatives to MX-MPS.

today, December 1980.

Arms control

p. 1 - 2 , 6-9.

Steinbruner, J o h n - D . , and Thomas M. Garwin.

Strategic

vulnerability:

the balance between prudence and paranoia.

International security, summer 1575.

p. 138-182.

T s i p i s , Kosta.

Physical and operational characteristics of the

missile.

New York, Institue of Aeronautics a n d ,

Astronautics, 1979.

5 p.

U.S. Library of Congress.

Congressional Research Service.

Minuteman 1x1: variables affecting time needed f o r

redeployment in a mobile basing m o d e , by Jonathan E.

Medalia.

Washington, July 2 0 , 1979.

3 6 p.

SLBMs

The Future

T s i p i s , K o s t a , Ann H. Cann, and Bernard T. F e l d , eds.

of the sea-based deterrent. CamSridge, MIT P r e s s , 1973.

266 p.

U.S. Congressional Budget Office. The U.S. sea-based strategic

force:

costs of the Trident submarine and missile programs

a n d alternatives. Washington, February 1980. 6 2 p.

U.S. Library of Congress.

Congressional Research Service.

Trident program, by A.A. Tinajero and Edmund J. Gannon.

Washington, 1973.

Issue Brief 73001

An Evaluation of the Shallow Underwater Missile (SUM) concept.

Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense f o r

Research a n d Engineering.

Apr. 9 , 1980.

Drell, Sidney.

2 , 5-8.

Garn, E.J.

1980.

SUM.

Arms control t o d a y , September 1979.

SUM: i t doesn't add up.

----- R e m a r k s in the Senate.

ed.

U.S.

Air F o r c e times, January

H a t f i e l d , Mark 0 .

SUM: i t adds up.

February 1980. p. 66.

Nov. 9 , 1979:

Armed Forces journal,

Congressional record

S16348-S16354.

daily

Library of Congress.

Congressional Research Service.

Lake-basing and sea-basing alternatives for mobile

ICBMs:

background and i s s u e s , by A.A. Tinajero a n d

3 1 p.

Charlotte Phillips. Washington, Dec. 5 , 1979.

Surface S h i p Ballistic Missiles

P o l m a r , Norman.

p. 17-21.

T h e infinite silo.

p. I,

Seapower, March 1979.

Table I

COMPLETE LIST OF OPTIONAL TRIADS

One hundred t w e n t y t r i a d s a r e m a t h e m a t i c a l l y p o s s i b l e , w i t h 1 0 f u n c t i o n a l l y

d i f f e r e n t d e l i v e r y s y s t e m s t o c h o o s e from:

S t r a t e g i c bombers; a i r - l a u n c h e d

c r u i s e missiles ( ALCMs) ; submarine-launched

c r u i s e m i s s i l e s ( SLCMs) ; f i x e d - s i t e

i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s (ICBMs); semi-mobile I C B M s (SM ICBMs); f r e e l y m o b i l e I C B M s (FM ICBMs); a i r - l a u n c h e d b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s (ALBMs); submarinef a u n c h e d b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s ( SLBMs) , i n c l u d i n g s h a l l o w w a t e r m i s s i l e (SUM)

variants; free-floating

b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s l a u n c h e d from s u r f a c e s h i p s o r

s u b m a r i n e s ( H y d r a ) ; and b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s l a u n c h e d d i r e c t l y by s u r f a c e s h i p s

( SSBMs)

A l l 120 g r o u p s a r e l i s t e d below, a r r a n g e d by s t r u c t u r a l c a t e g o r i e s .

C o m b i n a t i o n s t h a t f i t i n more t h a n one c a t e g o r y a r e i n c l u d e d o n l y o n c e t o highl i g h t key c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .

UNDUE DEPENDENCE ON AIRBREATHERS

Bombers P l u s Air-Launched

Bomber

AL CM

SL CM

Bomber

ALCM

SSBM

Bomber

Nissiles

Bomber

ALCM

SM I C B N

Bomber

AL,CM

FY ICBM

AL CM

.aCM

ALBM

ICBM

Bomber

AL CM

SLBM

Bomber

AL BM

SLBM

Bomber

AL BM

SM ICBM

Bomber

AL BM

FM I C B M

Bomber

AL BM

Hydra

Bomber

AL B

SSBM

Bomber

SL CM

SLBM

Bomber

SL CM

SM I C B M

Bomber

SL CM

FM I C B M

Bomber

SL CM

Hydra

Bomber

SL CM

SSBM

Bomber

.LBM

ICBM

Bomber

ALCM

Hydra

Bombers P l u s SLCMs

Bomber

SL CM

ALBM

Bomber

SL CM

ICBM

A L C m P l u s ALBMs o r SLCMs

ALCM

AL BM

ICBM

AL CM

AL BM

SLBM

ALCM

S L CM

ICBM

ALCM

S L CM

SLBM

AL CM

S L CM

FM I C B M

ALCM

S L CM

SM ICBM

ALCM

S L CM

Hydra

ALCM

S L CM

SSBM

NOTHING BUT B A L L I S T I C M I S S I L E S

AL BM

ICBM

S L BM

XL BM

AL BM

ICBM

SM ICBM

ICBM

FM ICBM

AL BM

ICBM

Hydra

AL BM

ICBM

SSBM

ALBM

SLBM

SM ICBM

ALBM

SLBM

FM ICBM

AL BM

SLBM

Hydra

ilLBM

AL BM

SLBM

SSBM

SM I C B M

FM ICBM

AL BM

Hydra

S S BM

AL BM

FM I C B M

Hydra

AL BM

SM ICBM

SSBM

AL BM

SM ICBM

Hydra

AL BM

FM ICBM

S S BM

SL BM

SM I C B M

FM ICBM

SL BM

SM I C B M

Hydra

S L BM

SM ICBM

SSBM

SLBM

FM I C B M

Hydra

S L BM

FM I C B M

S S BM

SM I C B M

FM I C B M

Hydra

SM ICBM

FM ICBM

S S BM

SM I C B M

Hydra

SSBM

FM I C B M

Hydra

S S BM

ICBM

SLBM

SM ICBM

ICBM

SLBM

FM ICBM

ICBM

SLBM

SSBM

LC BM

SM ICBM

FM ICBM

ICBM

SM ICBM

Hydra

ICBM

SM ICBM

SSBM

ICBM

FM ICBM

Bomber

SM I C B M

FM ICBM

Bomber

ICBM

SM ICBM

AL CM

SM I C B M

FM ICBM

AL CM

ICBM

S L BM

Hydra

ICBM

FM I C B H

Hydra

ICBM

FM I C B M

SSBM

ICBM

Hydra

SSBM

UNDUE DEPENDENCE, LAND-LAUNCHED

ICBM

SM ICBM

Bomber

S L BM

Hydra

SSBM

MISSILES

ICBM

FM ICBM

ALCM

ICBM

SM ICBM

SLCM

SM I C B M

FM ICBM

S L CM

ICBM

FM ICBM

S L CM

UNDUE DEPENDENCE, SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED MISSILES

SL BM

SLCM

ICBM

SL BM

SL CM

SM ICBM

SL BM

SLCM

M ICBM

SL BM

SLCM

Hydra

SL BM

SLCM

SS BM

COMPLETE CHANGE TO PRESENT TRIAD

ALCM

AL BM

SM ICBM

ALCM

.4L BM

FM ICBM

ALCM

AL BM

Hydra

AL CM

AL BM

SSBM

AL CM

SM ICBM

SSBM

AL CM

EN ICBM

Hydra

AL CM

FM ICBM

S SBM

AL CM

Hydra

SSBM

ALCM

SM ICBM

Hydra

SLCM

AL BM

EM ICBM

SLCM

AL BM

Hydra

SLCM

AL BM

SSBM

SLCM

SM ICBM

Hydra

SLCM

SX ICBM

SSBM

ALCM

SL CM

ALBM

SLCM

FM ICBM

Hydra

SLCM

Hydra

SSBM

SLCM

FM ICBM

SSBM

SLCM

AL BM

SN ICBM

BEST BALANCED STRUCTURES

I n c l u d e Hard-Site

ICBMs

ICBM

SL BM

Bomber

100

ICBM

Hydra

Bomber

104

ICBM

SSBM

ALCX

1 01

ICBM

SSBM

Bomber

105

ICBM

SL CM

ALBM

102

ICBM

SL BM

ALCM

106

ICBM

SL CM

Hydra

103

ICBM

Hydra

AL CM

107

ICBM

SL m

SSBM

Include Semi-Mobile ICBMs

108

SM ICBM

SLBM

Bomber

109

SK ICBM

Hydra

Bomber

110

SM ICBM

SSBM

Bomber

111

SM ICBM

SLBM

AL CM

114

FM ICBM

SSBM

Bomber

115

FM ICBM

SLBM

AL CM

Include Freely-Mobile ICBMs

113

FM ICBM

Hydra

Bomber

112

FM ICBM

SLBM

Bomber

Eliminate Land-Launched Missiles

116

SLBM

Bomber

SSBM

117

SLBM

Bomber

Hydra

118

SLBM

ALCM

SSBM

119

SLBM

&CM

Hydra

120

Bomber

Hydra

SSBM

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.