Congressional Veto of Executive Actions
Congressional research reportNov 5, 1982
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CONGRESSIONAL VET@
OF EXECUTIVE ACTIONS
ISSUE BRIEF NUMBER IB76006
AUTHOR:
Thomas J. Nicola
American Law Division
Clark F. Norton
Government DivisiDn
THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
MAJOR ISSUES SYSTEM
DATE ORIGINATED 02/03/76
DATE UPDATED 11/05/82
FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL 287-5700
1105
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ISSUE DEFINIT1,ON
Statutory provisions by which Congress authorizes a Federal program to be
administered by the Executive but retains the legal authority to disapprove
all or part of
the program
before final implementation have
become
increasingly frequent in recent years.
These statutory provisions which
subject a variety of proposed executive actions to congressional
review are
common1 y
known
as
"congressional
veto"
devices.
Although
the
Constitutionality of the congressional veto has yet to be finally resolved by
the Supreme Court, it has been the object of considerable discussion since
the beginning of its use in the 1930s.
BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS
Some cases challenging the constitutionality of the CongreSsional Vet0
device have been decided.
Clark v. Valeo, 559 F.2d
642
(D.C. Cir.
19771,
involved a challenge against a
"one House" CongressiOnal veto
(2 U.S.C.
438(c); 26 U.S.C. 9009(c) and 9039(c)) in the Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendments of 1976. The case was dismissed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit on Jan. 2 1 , 1 9 7 7 , on the ground that it was
not ripe for judicial decision.
On June 6 , 1 9 7 7 , the Supreme Court, without
hearing the case or issuing an opinion, affirmed the action of the Court of
Appeals.
In Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1 0 2 8 (Ct. C1. 1977), the Court
of Claims by a vote of 4-3 held that the congressional veto provision
contained in the Federal Salary Act
(2 U.S.C.
351,
et
seq.)
was
C O n ~ t i t U t i O n a l . On July 26, 1977, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th
Circuit, affirming a district court dismissal, declined to reach the
C O n ~ t i t U t i O n a lallegation that the "one-House" veto provision of the Federal
Salary Act, 2 U.S.C.
359(1) (B), was a n unconstitutional delegation of
legislative authority in McCorkle v. United States, 559 F.2d 1251
(4th Cir.
1977).
The Supreme Court on Jan.
9 , 1 9 7 8 , denied petitions for review of
Atkins and McCorkle.
On Dec. 2 2 , 1980, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit unanimously held that the "one House" congressional veto provision in
(2))
was
the Immigration and Nationality Act
(8 U.S.C.
sec.
1254
unconstitutional i n Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service, 6 3 4
F.2d. 4 0 8 (9th Cir. 1980).
This provision authorized either
House of
Congress to disapprove a decision to suspend deportation of a n alien.
Although the Supreme Court heard arguments on this case in the last term, it
did not reach a decision. The Court is scheduled to rehear the case on Dec.
7, 1982.
(c)
On Dec. 1 6 , 1 9 8 2 , the U.S. District Court in Montana
in Pacific Legal
Foundation v. Watt, 50 U.S.L.W.
2394
(Jan. 1 2 , 19821, held that section
204(e) of the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act
(43 U.S.C.
sec.
1714(e)0, authorizing a congressional committee to notify the Secretary of
the Interior of a n "emergency situation" regarding public lands and to direct
him "immediately" to withdraw such lands from mineral leasing activities, is
constitutional only if it is construed to allow the Secretary of the Interior
to establish the scope and dureation of such emergency withdrawals.
On Jan.
2 9 , 1 9 8 2 , the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in
Consumer Energy Council of America v. =Federal Energy Commission, 673 F. 2d
425 (1982),, unanimously held unconstitutional the "one-House" congressional
veto provision, section 202(c) of the National Gas Policy Act o f , 1978
(15
U.S.C. sec. 3342 (c)). This section authorized either House to disapprove
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UPDATE-ll/C5/82
incrementai pricing rules issued by the Commission. A petition f o r review by
the Supreme Court has been filed.
U.S. Senate v. Consumer Energy Council of
America and =U.S. House of Representatives v. Consumer Energy
Council o f
America=, 51 U.S.L.W. 3212 (Nos. 82-177 and 82-209) (Aug. 2 and 6 , 1982).
On Oet. 2 2 , 1 9 8 2 , the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the District o f
unanimously
held
unconstitutional
the
"$wo--Hou~e~'
Columbia Circuit
c o n g r e s s i ~ n a lveto provision, section 21(a) of the Federal Trade Commission
Improvements Act of 1980 (15 U.S.C, sec.
2881(c)) in Consumers Union of the
United S t a t e s , Inc. et al. v. Federal T r a d e Commission, et -dl.,
(D.C. Civ.
Action. No.
82-1737).
T h i s provision authorized both Houses to disapprove
rules promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission.
T h e congressional veto was first employed in the Legislative Appropriation
Act of 1 9 3 2 (47 Stat.
413) to grant President Hoover the authority
to
recrganize executive departments and a g e n c i e s subject to a congressional veto
provision allowing either House t o disapprove any r e o r g a n ~ z a t i o n proposal
before
it goes i n t o effect.
When
President
Hoover
submitted
his
reorganization o r d e r , it was disapproved by a House resolution
(H.Res.
334,
72d Congress, 2d session).
Although t h e congressional veto was originally
most widely employed in executive reorganization legislation, it has i n
recent years been increasingly used in a great variety of o t h e r areas a s
well.
The congressional veto device was employed in the War P o w e r s Act
(P.L.
93-148) to restrict the authority of t h e President to utilize American troops
i n combat operations i n foreign nations.
It was also used to subject t h e
rulemaking authority granted to t h e administrator i n such a r e a s a s petroleum
allocation (P.L. 93-159); a c c e s s to P r e s i d e n t i a l - materials
(P.L.
93-526);
campaign reform practices
(P.L.
93-443); a n d education standards
(P.L.
93-380) to congressional review of such proposed rules before
they become
legally effective.
The congressional veto was a l s o employed
in
the
(P.L.
93-344) t o
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1 9 7 4
restrict t h e President's deferral, rescission, and reservation o f budgetary
authority.
T h e extension o f the congressional veto device to these n e w
uncharted areas h a s raised additional l e g a l and practical o b j e c t i o n s to i t s
use.
T h e recent case of Buckley v. Valeo, 4 2 4 U.S. 1 (1976), presented perhaps
the first opportunity for a Federal Court to pass upon the constitutionality
of the congressional veto device.
H o w e v e r , t h e Court in Buckley
expressly
disclaimed deciding this issue, stating in i t s per curiam o p i n i o n t h a t
"[blecause of our holding that the manner of appointment of
the members
of
the Commission precluded them from exercising the rule-making
powers
in
q u e s t i o n , we have n o occasion to a d d r e s s this separate c h a l l e n g e here."
(Buckley, 4 2 4 U.S., a t 1 4 0 , fn. 176.)
J u s t i c e White, concurring i n this part of the Court's holding, a g r e e d t h a t
since the Commission itself was unconstitutional because of i t s manner o f
a p p o i n t m e n t , rules a n d regulations issued by the Commission w e r e invalid
without regard to t h e congressional v e t o mechanism.
However, J u s t i c e White
indicated
i n strongly worded
dicta
that
if
the
Commission
were
constitutionally appointed, the congressional
veto
device
would
be
constitutional.
(424 U.S., a t 284-286.)
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3
Although there a r e many
types of
congressional veto provisions, t h e y
typically r e q u i r e t h e Executive t o submit proposed a c t i o n s in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h
the enabling statute to both o r either House of Congress or to o n e o r m o r e o f
i t s c o m m i t t e e s within a specified period of t i m e , usually 3 0 , 6 0 , o r 90 d a y s
before t h o s e a c t i o n s become legally effective.
T h e proposed a c t i o n b e c o m e s
legally e f f e c r i v e a t the end of the specified period
unless t h e C o n g r e s s
either disapproves the proposed a c t i o n by "vetoing" i t (the usual situation)
(a l e s s c o m m o n
o r a p p r o v e s t h e e p r o p o s e d action by affirmative a c t i o n
occurrence).
If c o n g r e s s i o n a l consideration of the proposed action takes t h e form of a
c o n c u r r e n t r e s o l u t i o n , which must b e passed by both Houses of C o n g r e s s , t h e
If t h e
measure
c a n be defined a s a
n t w o - H o u s e w c o n g r e s s i o n a l Veto.
c o n g r e s s i o n a l consideration takes t h e form of a s i m p l e resolution passed
by
either H o u s e , t h e measure c a n be termed a "one-House*' congressional veto.
If
t h e proposed a c t i o n i s submitted t~ o n e or more congressional committees f o r
their C o n s i d e r a t i o n , then t h e d e v i c e c a n be defined a s a cornnittee veto.
Under t h e s e d e f i n i t i o n s , congressional vetoes include only those statutory
provisions which
enable t h e Congress to legally a p p r o v e or d i s a p p r o v e
proposed
executive a c t i o n s without
requiring t h a t
such
approval
or
d i s a p p r o v a l be submitted to the P r e s i d e n t f o r his
signature.
Thus this
definition would not include many
similar provisions
such a s r e p o r t i n g
provisions o r conditional legislation which a r e sometimes characterized a s
c o n g r e s s i o n a l v e t o e s but
do n o t legally preveni Executive a c t i o n
if
c o n g r e s s i o n a l a p p r o v a l or disapproval i s not given d u r i n g t h e period of t i m e
specified by t h e statute. Congress c o u l d , of c o u r s e , e n a c t legislation t o
r e p e a l o r alter a c t i o n s taken by t h e E x e c u t i v e , but
such legislation w o u l d
r e q u i r e submission to the P r e s i d e n t f o r his signature.
Should the P r e s i d e n t
v e t o t h e e n a c t m e n t , a two-thirds o v e r r i d e vote by
both H o u s e s of C o n g r e s s
would b e required f o r the enactment to becoae law.
Many
c o n g r e s s i o n a l veto provisions
enacted in recent y e a r s c o n t a i n
p r o c e d u r e s f o r expedited treatment
s o that a n y Member
can i n s u r e f u l l
c o n g r e s s i o n a l consideration on t h e proposed
a c t i o n , s u b j e c t t o the v e t o
within t h e t i m e l i m i t specified by t h e statute.
V a r i o u s a r g u m e n t s have been raised attacking t h e constitutionality o f
c o n g r e s s i o n a l v e t o device.
the
T h e f i r s t a r g u m e n t is that the u s e o f the congressional v e t o v i o l a t e s t h e
" P r e s e n t a t i o n n c l a u s e of t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , which r e q u i r e s t h a t e v e r y o r d e r ,
r e s o l u t i o n , o r v o t e t o which t h e concurrence of the H o u s e and S e n a t e may
be
necessary shall be presented to the President f o r his signature
(Article I ,
The use of a congressional veto d e v i c e permits
the
section 7, c l a u s e 3).
C o n g r e s s t o d i s a p p r o v e executive a c t i o n taken pursuant to a
s t a t u t e by
passing a concurrent o r s i m p l e resolution o r , i n t h e c a s e o f a c o m m i t t e e
v e t o , by a c o m m i t t e e vote without t h e necessity of presenting that c o n c u r r e n t
o r s i m p l e r e s o l u t i o n or committee vote to
the
President
for
his
consideration.
T h e second a r g u m e n t i s that t h e congressional v e t 0 infringes upon t h e
g e n e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l responsibilities granted t o t h e President u n d e r
A r t i c l e I 1 a n d especially t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s responsibility
to " f a i t h f u l l y
e x e c u t e t h e laws."
Opponents of t h e congressional veto d e v i c e w o u l d
particularly o b j e c t t o the u s e of a general c o n g r e s s i o n a l veto to r e v i e w a l l
proposed r u l e s and regulations promulgated by t h e E x e c u t i v e on t h e ground
t h a t such a blanket
review i n f r i n g e s upon i n h e r e n t e x e c u t i v e functions.
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4
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UPDATE-11/05/82
Although t h e Supreme C o u r t h a s
never
explicitly
defined
the boundaries
between
l e g i s l a t i v e and e x e c u t i v e f u n c t i o n s ,
the
e a s e of
Springer
v.
in
support
of
P h i l i p p i n e I s l a n d s , 2 7 7 U,S. 1 8 9 ( 1 9 2 8 1 , i s f r e q u e n t l y C i t e d
t h i s view.
I n S p r i n g e r , t h e Supreme C o u r t h e l d
that
the Philippine
Territorial
L e g i s l a t u r e i l l e g a l l y usurped an
executive fanczion
i n v i o l a t i o n of
the
P h i l i p p i n e O r g a n i c Act b y p r o v i d i n g
c h a t members
of
the
territorial
corporation
owned b y
the
legislature
vote
the
stock
i n a commercial
t e r r i t o r i a l government.
The C o u r t h e l d t h a t
the voting
of
s t o c k was a n
executive function.
Opponents of t h e c o n g r e s s i o n a l v e t o would a r g u e t h a t
p r o p o s e d w i d e s p r e a d c o n g r e s s i o n a l r e v i e w of e x e c u t i v e r u l e s a n d
regulations
c o n s t i t u t e s an analagous l e g i s l a t i v e
intrusion
into inherently
executive
f u n c t i o n s and t h u s v i o l a t e s t h e s e p a r a t i o n of powers d o c t r i n e .
P r o p o n e n t s o f t h e C O n ~ t i t U t i O n a l i t yo f t h e c o n g r e s s i o n a l v e ~ o a r g u e t h a t
t h e " P r e s e n t a t i o n N c l a u s e has been
complied with
in
that
the underlying
The r e t e n t i o n o f a c o n g r e s s i o n a l v e t o
statute i s presented to the President.
o v e r t h e e x e r c i s e of a u t h o r i t y g r a n t e d t o t h e P r e s i d e n t i s , p r o p o n e n t s would
a r g u e , a c o n d i t i o n s u b s e q u e n t which must be s a t i s f i e d i n o r d e r f o r t h e
terms
of t h e e n a b l i n g S t a t u t e t o become l e g a l l y e f f e c t i v e .
The C o n s t i t u t i o n g r a n t s
Congress c o n s i d e r a b l e enumerated powers and t h e a u t h o r i t y t o e n a c t
a l l
laws
"necessary and proper* t o e f f e c t u a t e these
powers.
The r e t e n t i o n
of
a
congressional
"vetow t o review executive action
taken
pursuant
to
a
d e l e q a t ~ o no f l e g i s l a t i v e p o w e r s t o
the
Executive
is,
proponents
of
the
device argue, merely conditional l e g i s l a t i o n well within
the
conscitutional
powers of Congress t o e n a c t .
Proponents of
t h e c o n g r e s s i o n a l v e t o would
argue that
the Springer
decision i s not controlling.
While proponents of
the congressional
veto
might concede t h a t t h e r e a r e c e r t a i n l n h e r e n t e x e c u t i v e f u n c t i o n s g r a n t e d
to
a
t h e P r e s i d e n t b y A r t i c l e 11, t h e y w o u l d a l s o a r g u e t h a t i n t h e a b s e n c e o f
clear
constitutional directive,
the division
between
legislative
and
e x e c u t i v e powers i s n e c e s s a r i l y f l e x i b l e .
A s s t a t e d by J u s t i c e J a c k s o n , i n a
c o n c u r r i n g o p i n i o n , Youngstown Co. v . S a w y e r ,
343
U.S.
579
(1952), which
d e a l t w i t h , among o t h e r t h i n g s , t h e p o w e r s v e s t e d i n t h e P r e s i d e n t by A r t i c l e
11:
" T h e a c t u a l a r t of g o v e r n i n g u n d e r o u r C o n s t i t u t i o n
does n o t and cannot conform t o j u d i c i a l d e f i n i t i o n s
o f t h e power o f a n y o f i t s b r a n c h e s b a s e d on i s o l a t e d
c l a u s e s o r even s i n g l e A r t i c l e s t o r n from c o n t e x t .
While t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n d i f f u s e s power t h e b e t t e r t o
secure l i b e r t y , it a l s o contemplates t h a t practice
w i l l i n t e g r a t e t h e d i s p e r s e d powers i n t o workable
government.
I t e n j o i n s upon i t s b r a n c h e s s e p a r a t e n e s s
b u t i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e , autonomy b u t r e c i p r o c i t y . "
Lower c o u r t s h a v e d i s p o s e d o f some c a s e s c n a l l e n g i n g t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y
of t h e c o n g r e s s i o n a l veto.
The f i r s t c a s e was C l a r k v. V a l e o , 5 5 9 F.2d
642
(D.C.
C i r . 1977).
A l t h o u g h t h e s u i t was o r i g i n a l l y b r o u g h t b y R a m s e y
Clark,
a c a n d i d a t e f o r t h e Democratic s e n a t o r i a l nomination i n New York, t h e J u s t i c e
D e p a r t m e n t i n t e r v e n e d on b e h a l f o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ,
also challenging
the
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of t h e s e
same p r o v i s i o n s .
Defendants were F r a n c i s R.
V a l e o , S e c r e t a r y o f t h e S e n a t e , a n d Edmund H e n s h a w , C l e r k
of
the
House o f
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , who h a d m i n i s t e r i a l
duties
in
regard
to
the
challenged
p r o v i s i o n s , and t h e F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n Commission, which had t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
Appeals
of a d m i n i s t e r i n g them.
The f i v e q u e s t i o n s c e r t i f i e d t o t h e C o u r t o f
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a r e summarized a s foliows:
(1) D o e s t h i s action challenging the constitutionality of
various
congressional veto provisions contained in the Federal Election Campaign Act
present a justiciable c a s e or controversy?
(2) D o t h e congressional veto provisions i n the Act which
permit a
"One
H o u s e " congressional veto of rules a n d regulations promulgated by the Federal
Election Commission violate the Constitution i n that they
(a) violate the
doctrine of separation of powers, (b) i n f r i n g e upon the F r e s i d e n t ' s veto
authority o r , (c) are i n excess of t h e g r a n t of legislative powers enumerated
in the Constitution?
( 3 ) D o c h e challenged provisions
violate d u e process
under
the Fifth
Amendment of the Constitution in that a candidate for F e d e r a l o f f i c e i s
(a)
deprived of t h e right to have l a w s affecting h i s candidacy enacted by
the
f u i l l e g i s l a t i v e process, including passage by both Houses of C o n g r e s s , with
a n opportunity for Presidential v e t o , (b) invidiously discriminated against
by allowing i n c u m b e n t congressmen, but not challengers, t o veto rules and
regulations which affect the conduct of their campaigns?
(4) D o t h e challenged provisions v i o l a t e t h e Constitution
in
delegation o f t h e right to veto rules a n d regulations by
one
Congress i s n o t accompanied by sufficient standards a n d criteria
their exercise of discretion?
that t h e
House of
to guide
(5) D o t h e challenged provisions which permit a s i n g l e House of Congress
to v e t o r u l e s and regulations, o r selected parts o f
such rules and
regulations, promulgated by
the Federal Election Commission violate t h e
Constitution i n that they create a n extra-Constitutional l e g i s l a t i v e process
in violation o f Article I of ths Constitution?
T h e plaintiffs in the Clark suit raised a l l of t h e traditional arguments
challenging t h e constitutionality of t h e congressional V e t 0 d e v i c e outlined
above.
Both plaintiffs raised specific a r g u m e n t s challenging t h e "one-Housew
veto provision o n t h e ground that it violates the conception of a bicameral
Congress which i s required f o r legislative activity.
Plaintiff Clark also
made t h e a r g u m e n t that t h e right o f incumbent CongressiOnal c a n d i d a t e s to
v e t o rules a n d regulations which a f f e c t their campaigns violates d u e process
of law i f s u c h a right i s denied to non-incumbent candidates.
T h e d e f e n d e n t s i n the case, Secretary Vale0 a n d t h e F e d e r a l Election
Commission, f i l e d briefs challenging t h e a c t i o n on the ground t h a t the suit
d o e s not present a
"case o r c o n t r o v e r s y w because o f lack of
standing,
mootness, r i p e n e s s , the prohibition a g a i n s t advisory o p i n i o n s , and the
political q u e s t i o n doctrine.
T h e defendants' briefs did n o t a d d r e s s the
merits of t h e plaintiffs' contentions.
On Jan. 2 1 , 1 9 7 7 , t h e Court of Appeals dismissed t h e a c t i o n in a 6-2
decision.
T h e court held
that t h e c a s e w a s n o t r i p e f o r
judicial
intervention with respect to plaintiff Clark o r to t h e plaintiff
Department
of J u s t i c e s u i n g in the name of t h e United States.
T h e court indicated that
even i f the a c t i o n were r i p e , i t would r e f u s e to reach t h e m e r i t s of t h e
dispute b e c a u s e o f t h e doctrine of judicial restraint.
T h i s decision was
affirmed by t h e Supreme C o u r t , without a hearing or o p i n i o n , on J u n e 6 , 1 9 7 7
(Clark v. K i m m e t t , 4 3 1 U.S. 950).
Atkins v. United S t a t e s , 556 F.2d
1028
(Ct.Cl.
1977),
involved
a
suit
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IB76006
UPDATE-11/05/82
140 members
of t h e Federal
judiciary which
c h a l l e n g e d the
brought by
eonstitutionalaty
o f various
salary payments made to them in a l l e g e d
derogation of the compensation guarantees contained in Art. 1 1 1 , Sec.
1 , of
the Constitution.
Part
of
the
plaintiff's
case
turned
on
the
constitutionalicy of t h e congressional V e t 0 provision i n t h e F e d e r a l S a i a r y
P l a i n t i f f s raised
the t r a d i t i o n a l a r g u m e n t s
Act ( 2 U.S.C. 351, e c seq.).
that have been advanced agaanst the c o n g r e s s i o n a l veto device.
In a 4-3 per curiam opinion decided o n May 1 8 , 1 9 7 7 , t h e C o u r t of C l a i m s
held constitutional this "one House" congressional veto.
Confining its
analysis to the c o n g r e s ~ i ~ n aveto
l
provision of that A c t , a n d stating t h a t it
would not attempt to suggest or forecast the f a t e of o t h e r
s i t u a t i o n s or
statutes, the court helC that this device i s a Valid
e x e r c i s e of t h e
authority of Congress to make a l l l a w s necessary
and
proper
f o r executing
6 of
the Constitution).
The
legislative powers (Art. I , Sec.
1 , cl.
conclusions of the majority a r e summarized below.
T h i s provision does not violate t h e p r i n c i p l e of bicameralism e m b o d i e d i n
Art. I , Sec. 1 , which vests a l l legislative powers in a C o n g r e s s consisting
of a Senate and House.
Rejecting presidential r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s t o i n c r e a s e or
decrease salaries 1 s a form of legislative a c t i v i t y which
does not require
the affirmative concurrence of both H o u s e s because
the effect of
that
activity i s not to m a k e law but rather t o preserve the s t a t u s quo.
As used in this A c t , the congressional v e t o d o e s not v i o l a t e Art. I , Sec.
cl. 3 , which mandates that every o r d e r , r e s o l u t ~ o n ,or v o t e to which
the
concurrence of each House may b e necessary must be presented to t h e P r e s i d e n t
for a p p r o v a l or disapproval. T h i s constitutional c l a u s e i s n o t a p p l i c a b l e
because the concurrence of both Houses i s n o t necessary
to d i s a p p r o v e a
presidential recommendation.
7,
T h e doctrine of separation of powers, specifically Art. 11, Sec. 1 , which
vests executive power i n a President, i s not infringed by t h i s c o n g r e s s i o n a l
veto because the pay-setting
function i s Dasically
legislative.
The
delegation of authority to the P r e s i d e n t to recommend a d j u s t m e n t s m a k e s him
a n a g e n t of Congress f o r this purpose.
T h e d e v i c e permits
either H o u s e to
supervise his exercise of this delegated authority.
T h r e e dissenting judges rejected each o f t h e s e f i n d i n g s , h o l d i n g t h a t t h e
congressional veto violates the principle o f b i c a m e r a l i s m , t h e " P r e s e n t a t i o n "
clause, a n d the doctrine of separation o f powers.
McCorkle v. United States, 5 5 9 F.2d
1258
(4th Cir.
1978),
affirmed a
district court dismissal of a suit brought by a high l e v e l c i v i l
s e r v a n t on
behalf of Federal employees in grades 1 5 t h r o u g h 1 8 of t h e G e n e r a l Schedule.
T h e appellants had been denied a salary i n c r e a s e recommended by t h e P r e s i d e n t
because the Senate i n March 1 9 7 4 exercised a l e g i s l a t i v e veto.
McCorkle
asked t h e court to d e c l a r e unconstitutional t h e " o n e House" v e t o p r o v i s i o n , 2
U.S.C. 3 5 9 , (1)( B ) , of the Federal Salary Act of 1 9 6 7 o n t h e g r o u n d t h a t it
abridged bicameralism, separation of powers, and t h e p r e s i d e n t i a l veto.
He
a l s o a s k e d the court to declare that t h e G e n e r a l S c h e d u l e e m p l o y e e s were
entitled to damages based on the salary i n c r e a s e they would h a v e r e c e i v e d if
the recommendation had become effective.
T h e court refused to reach the question of
constitutionality
o f the
provision because it found that Congress would
n o t h a v e passed t h e Act
without retaining authority to v e t o presidential
recommendations.
"Voiding
t h e one-house veto a s unconstitutional w h i l e l e a v i n g p r e s i d e n t i a l a u t h o r i t y
CRS- 7
IB76006
U P D A T E - ~ ~ / C ~
intact would i n c r e a s e the President's power
over salaries far beyond
the
intention of Congress."
(McCorkle, p. 1262.)
T h e court concluded t h a t the
"one-House" v e t o w a s inseparable from p a r t s of the statute which
empowered
t h e President to m a k e potentially binding recommendations and t h a t provisions
for the recommendations t o become e f f e c t i v e could n o t stand in isolation.
Accordingly, McCorkle and the other e m p l o y e e s were not entitled to damages
based on the recommendation.
As noted previously, the Supreme C o u r t denied petitions
to r e v i e w both
cases on Jan. 9 , 1 9 9 8 (Atkins v. United S t a t e s (434 U.S. 1009), and McCorkle
v. United States ( 4 3 4 U.S. 1Q11)).
T h e effect of t h i s d e n i a l was
to let
stand the l o w e r court dispositions.
On Dec. 2 2 , 1 9 8 0 , a 3-judge panel of t h e Court of Appeals
for t h e Ninth
of the
Circuit unanimously voided as unconstitutional
section 244(c) ( 2 )
S e e C h a d h a v.
Immigration a n d Nationality Act ( 8 U.S.C. sec. 1 2 5 4 (c) (2)) .
Immigration and Naturalization S e r v i c e , 6 3 4 F.
2d 408
(9th C
i
1990).
Under this p r o v i s i o n , either House c o u l d disapprove a decision of the
Attorney General to suspend deportation t h a t would c a u s e of hardship t o an
alien. T h e H o u s e had disapproved suspension of deportation of a n a l i e n whose
r a c e would have m a d e his return to his n a t i v e country extremely d i f f i c u l t , if
n o t impossible.
T h e court f o u n d that t h e statutory
scheme Violated
the d o c t r i n e of
separation o f powers.
T h e c o n g r e s s i o n a l veto f o l l o w i n g administrative
proceedings t o suspend deportation w a s deemed
to b e a n impermissible
intrusion on f u n c t i o n s constitutionally granted to t h e executive and judicial
branches.
T h e twin purposes of
separation of powers a r e to prevent
concentrations o f power and to promote g o v e r n m e n t a l efficiency by a s s i g n i n g
many functions t o designated authorities.
T h e court defined a violation
of
this doctrine a s r n assumption by one b r a n c h of powers that a r e c e n t r a l or
essential to t h e operation o f a c o o r d i n a t e branch, provided a l s o t h a t t h e
assumption disrupts the coordinate branch i n the performance o f i t s duties
a n d i s unnecessary t o implement a l e g i t i m a t e governmental policy.
T h e c o n g r e s s i o n a l veto of a suspension o f deportation could be viewed:
(1) a s a c o r r e c t i o n o f
judicial o r executive misapplication
of
the
(2)
as a
means
for
sharing
the
Immigration a n d Nationality
Act;
administration o f t h e statute .with t h e e x e c u t i v e branch o n a n o n g o i n g b a s i s ;
o r ( 3 ) a s a n e x e r c i s e of a residual l e g i s l a t i v e power to define substantive
r i g h t s under t h e l a w , a n exercise that f a l l s short o f statutory amendment.
By performing a corrective function, Congress would
encroach upon an
ordinarily judicial or internal a d m i n i s t r a t i v e function t h a t would in effect
render judicial interpretations i m p e r m i s s i b l e advisory opinions.
Sharing
administration o f a statute by addition o f more precise statutory criteria on
a n accretive, case-by case basis i s impermissible because i t i s l a w
To
enforcement, a f u n c t i o n the Constitution a s s i g n s to t h e executive branch.
a l t e r the a l i e n ' s right not to be d e p o r t e d , his status f o l l o w i n g a decision
t o suspend d e p o r t a t i o n , would require a c t i o n by both H o u s e s of C o n g r e s s and
presentation t o t h e President; disapproval of suspension by a s i n g l e House is
n o t sufficient under the Constitution.
T h e court concluded that the single H o u s e disapproval
scheme rendered
meaningless t h e executive's duty to f a i t h f u l l y execute t h e l a w and
rendered
equally nugatory t h e role of judicial r e v i e w in determining the procedural or
substantive f a i r n e s s of administrative action.
Despite i t s rejection of th.is particular
congressional
veto,
the
court
CRS-
8
l i m i t e d t h e a p p l i c a b i l i t y of i t s opinion.
The d e c i s i o n n o t e d t h a t t h e
court
was n o t a n a l y z i n g a
situation
i n which
the
"unforeseeability
of
future
c i r c u m s t a n c e s o r t h e b r o a d s c o p e and c o m p l e x i t y of t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r
of
an
agency's rulemaking authority preclude t h e a r t i c u l a t i o n of s p e c i f i c c r i t e r i a
i n t h e governing s t a t u t e i t s e l f , "
S u c h f a c t o r s may d i c t a t e a d i f f e r e n t
resule.
On O c t .
5 ,
1981, t h e Supreme
Comt
granted
a
petition
to
review
the
O r a l a r g u m e n t s w e r e h e a r d o n F e b . 2 2 , 1 9 8 2 , b u t a d e c i s i o n was n o t i s s u e d .
The c a s e h a s b e e n s c h e d u l e d f o r r e a r g u m e n t on Dec. 7 , 1 9 8 2 .
I n P a c i f i c L e g a l F o u n d a t i o n v . . W a t t , 5 0 U.S.L.W. 2 3 9 4 ( J a n . 1 2 , 1 9 8 2 ) , t h e
U.S. D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r M o n t a n a r e v i e w e d s e c t i o n 2 0 4 ( e ) o f t h e F e d e r a l L a n d
P o l i c y a n d M a n a g e m e n t A c t ( 4 3 U.S.C. s e c . 1 7 1 4 ( e ) ) i n l i g h t o f t h e r u l i n g
of
t h e Ninth C i r c u i t i n Chadha.
T h i s s e c t i o n p r o v i d e s t h a t t h e S e c r e t a r y of t h e
I n t e r i o r s h a l l i m m e d i a t e l y w i t h d r a w p u b l i c l a n d s f r o m l e a s i n g a c t i v i t i e s when
jurisdiction
over
he determines o r
t h e House o r
Senate committee with
i n t e r i o r matters n o t i f i e s h i m t h a t an emergency e x i s t s and t h a t e x t r a o r d i n a r y
The
measures must be t a k e n t o p r e s e r v e v a l u e s t h a t would o t h e r w i s e be l o s t .
S e c r e t a r y m a d e t h e w i t h d r a w a l o f l a n d s i n c e r t a i n w i l d e r n e s s a r e a s i n M-ontana
b e c a u s e a r e s o l u t i o n a d o p t e d by t h e House Committee on I n t e r i o r a n d
Insular
A f f a i r s d i r e c t e d h i m t o do s o .
B o t h t h e p l a i n t i f f s , who w e r e a p p l i c a n t s f o r o i l a n d g a s l e a s e s ,
and t h e
S e c r e t a r y a l l e g e d t h a t t h e c o n g r e s s i o n a l d i r e c t i v e was u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a s a
v i o l a t i o n of t h e d o c t r i n e of s e p a r a t i o n of powers.
The c o u r t a g r e e d u n d e r
c e r t a i n i n ' e r p r e t a t i o n s of t h e committee's a u t h o r i t y .
I f t h e p r o v i s i o n were
i n t e r p r e t e d as a d e v i c e f o r c o r r e c t i n g e x e c u t i v e m i s a p p l i c a t i o n o f a s t a t u t e ,
judicial
or
t h e c o m m i t t e e would be p e r f o r m i n g a r o l e t h a t i s o r d i n a r i l y a
internal administrative responsibility.
I f i t were viewed a s a means
for
sharing t h e administration of wilderness and public lands s t a t u t e s with
the
e x e c u t i v e b r a n c h on a n o n g o i n g b a s i s , t h e c o m m i t t e e would
be performing an
could be
executive function.
F i n a l l y , a n u n r e s t r i c t e d emergency withdrawal
s e e n a s a n e x e r c i s e of a r e s i d u a l l e g i s l a t i v e power t h a t would be s u b j e c t
to
t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of bicameralism.
To a v o i d t h e s e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n f i r m i t i e s ,
the court interpreted the provision t o authorize the
Secretary rather
than
t h e committee t o e s t a b l i s h t h e scope and d u r a t i o n of a n emergency withdrawal.
On J a n . 2 9 , 1 9 8 2 , a t h r e e - j u d g e p a n e l o f t h e
Court of
Appeals
for the
D i s t r i c t o f Columbia C i r c u i t , i n a broadly w r i t t e n o p i n i o n , unanimously h e l d
u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s e c t i o n 2 0 2 ( c ) o f t h e N a t i o n a l Gas P o l i c y A c t ( 1 5 U . S . C .
s e c . 3 3 4 2 ( c ) ) . S e e , Consumer E n e r g y C o u n c i l of America
v.
Federal
Energy
This section
provides
that natural
sas
C o m m i s s i o n , 6 7 3 F . 2d 4 2 5 ( 1 9 8 2 ) .
p r i c i n g r u l e s would become e f f e c t i v e o n l y i f n e i t h e r
House w i t h i n
30 d a y s
adopted a resolution disapproving the rule.
T h e House had d i s a p p r o v e d a r u l e
t h a t would h a v e e x t e n d e d i n c r e m e n t a l p r i c i n g of n a t u r a l g a s t o a l l
nonexempt
i n d u s t r i a l u s e r s of n a t u r a l g a s as a b o i l e r f u e l .
The c o u r t h e l d t h a t t h e one-House
v e t o of
agency r u l e s a b r i d g e s t h e
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o c e s s f o r lawmaking i n A r t i c l e I , S e c t i o n 7 and t h e d o c t r i n e
of s e p a r a t i o n of powers.
The c o u r t a s k e d w h e t h e r d i s a p p r o v a l o f a g e n c y r u l e s
w a s a f o r m o f l a w m a k i n g a c t i o n a n d , i f s o , w h e t h e r t h e r e was a n y
reason
to
for
conclude t h a t it d i d n o t need t o conform t o t h e t r a d i t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t s
CRS- 9
IB76006
UPDATE-11/05/82
l a w m a k i n g , the principle of bicameralism and presentation tc t h e P r e s i d e n t
for approval or disapproval.
Rejecting t h e contention that the r u l e was a
mere p r o p o s a l , t h e court held
that it changed t h e l a w with
respecz to
incremental pricing; disapproval of i t , therefore, must meet the requirements
for lawmaking. T h e court a l s o held that t h e veto violated the principle of
separation of powers
because
i t permitted
intrusion into a d m i n i s t r a t i v e
d e c i s i o n m a k i n g ; and that t h e function of agency r u l e m a k i n g , once properly
d e l e g a t e d , i s essentially o n e of administering and enforcing t h e law.
A
O n ~ - H o u s e veto represents a n unconstitutional attempt by Congress t o retain
direct c o n t r o l o v e r delegated administrative power and
insert o n e of i t s
houses a s a n effective decisionmaker.
Exercise of the v e t o was a l s o found to
be a n unconstitutional intrusion on exercise of
judicial power
t o review
agency action.
A petition for review by the Supreme Court has been
filed.
v. Consumer Energy Council of America
and U.S.
House of
U.S. S e n a t e Representatives v. Consumer Energy Council of America, 5 1 U.S.L.W. 3 2 1 2 (nos.
82-177 and 82-209) (Aug. 2 and 6 , 1982).
On Oct. 2 2 , 1 9 8 2 , the f u l l Court of Appeals for the D i s t r i c t of Columbia
Circuit unanimously held unconstitutional section 21(a) of the Federal T r a d e
See,
Commission
Improvements Act
of 1 9 8 0
(15 U.S.C.
sec.
2881 (c))
Consumers Union o f the United S t a t e s , Inc.,
e t al.
v.
Federal T r a d e
C o m m i s s i o n , et al., (D.C. Civ. Action No. 82-1737).
T h i s provision
provides
that f i n a l r u l e s promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission would become
effective after 9 0 days of continuous session unless both Houses of Congress
a d o p t a concurrent resolution disapproving it.
In May of 1 9 8 2 , t h e House and
Senate disapproved a r u l e r e l a t i n g to representations of warranty
coverage
and disclosures of accurate information i n connection with the sale of used
automobiles.
Stating only that i t was bas'ing i t s decision on reasons given
i n the C o n s u m e r s Energy C o u n c i l c a s e , the court held
that section
21(a)
violated t h e principles of separation of powers established
i n Articles
I,
11, 2nd I11 of the Constitution and procedures established by Article
I for
t h e exercise of legislative powers.
The court a l s o declined to express a n
opinion a s to whether
t h e section and S.Con.Res.
6 0 , the resolution
disapproving
i t , improperly delegated
administrative power
to Congress
without a n y standards for t h e exercise of that power.
.
Some
state
legislative
veto
provisions
have
been
declared
unconstitutional.
In State of Alaska v. A.L.I.V.E.
Voluntary, Inc., 606 P.2d
7 6 9 (1980), the Supreme C o u r t of Alaska by a three to t w o vote held that a
provision a l l o w i n g both Houses of the legislature to a n n u l regulations by
concurrent resolution violated t h e Constitution of Alaska.
Focusing o n t h e
fact t h a t t h e provisions allowed annulment of effective a s well a s proposed
rules a n d regulations, the majority held that i t did n o t comply with
the
procedure
f o r enactment of
laws explicitly
outlined
in
the
state
constitution. T h e Atkins c a s e was distinguished o n t h r e e grounds:
first,
that t h e C o u r t of Claims had limited i t s holding to a provision involving t h e
narrow r o l e of establishing judicial salaries; second, the f a c t t h a t t h e
procedure f o r legislative a c t i o n is n o t a s explicit in t h e United States
in
Constitution a s t h e Alaska Constitution; and finally, that a disapproval
Atkins did n o t change existing law.
In Barker v. Manchin, 5 0 L a w Week 2008 (June 1 5 , 1981), t h e Supreme C o u r t
of West Virginia declared a committee veto statute unconstitutional.
The
statute provided that no a g e n c y rule o r regulation could become effective
unless it had been presented
to and approved by
the
joint legislative
rulemaking review committee within six months after transmittal.
T h e joint
c o m m i t t e e , comprised of six members of each House of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e , was
empowered to a p p r o v e o r d i s a p p r o v e , in whole o r i n p a r t , proposed agency
r u l e s and regulations. T h e court conceded that the l e g i s l a t u r e could void or
amend administrative
rules
and
regulations
when
it
follows
the
constitutionally prescribed procedures for enactment of
legislation.
This
c o m m i t t e e veto provision, h o w e v e r , was held
to violate
the doctrine of
separation o f p o w e r s , because it permitted the legislature t o control a c t i o n s
o f t h e executive branch without f o l l o w i n g thzt procedure.
In a statement (see H - D o c . 95-35? o r t h e Congressional Record [ d a i l y e d , j
1 2 4 , J u n e 2 1 , 1978:
H5879-H5890),
President C a r t e r alleged
that
congressional v e t o e s which i n j e c t Congress into the d e t a i l s sf administering
s u b s t a n t i v e programs and l a w s a r e unconstitutional D e c a u s e they infringe o n
t h e President's duty to faithfully execute the laws a n d deny the C h i e f
E x e c u t i v e the opportunity t o e x e r c i s e his r o l e to veto legislation.
This
d e v i c e , the P r e s i d e n t maintained, i s a l s o objectionable f o r policy r e a s o n s
of regulaLions and prolongs t h e
b e c a u s e it d e l a y s the implementation
uncertainty over their effect.
Th,e statement announced
that congressional
v e t o e s of this t y p e i n existing l e g i s l a t i o n would be treated a s "report and
w a i t " provisions a n d that Congressional resolutions to v e t o executive a c t i o n s
would n o t be considered legally binCing.
v.
O n Mar. 1 8 , 1 9 8 1 , Attorney G e n e r a l William French Smith
stated that t h e
Reagan Administration
Views a s unconstitutional all congressional v e t o
d e v i c e s that i n t r u d e on the power o f t h e President to m a n a g e t h e e x e c u t i v e
branch.
Specific pieces of l e g i s l a t i o n will be considered o n a n i n d i v i d u a l
basis.
D e p a r t m e n t of Justice P r e s s R e l e a s e , "Statement of
Attorney G e n e r a l
William French S m i t h in R e s p o n s e to New York Times i n q u i r i e s , " Mar. 1 8 , 1981.
LEGISLATION
S e v e r a l proposals to subject a d m i n i s t r a t i v e rules to r e v i e w
h a v e been intraduced in t h e 9 7 t h Congress.
These proposals
following:
H.R.
by C o n g r e s s
include the
1 7 7 6 (Levitas)
P r o c e d u r e s f o r Congressional R e v i e w of Agency Rules.
P r o v i d e s that a n y
c o v e r e d r u l e or regulation must be transmitted to C o n g r e s s a n d c a n b e
disapproved by t h e adoption of a concurrent resolution of disapproval.
Such
r u l e s or r e g u l a t i o n s may
b e disapproved by adoption
of a c o n c u r r e n t
r e s o l u t i o n o f disapproval either by (1) both Houses within 9 0 calendar d a y s
o f c o n t i n u o u s s e s s i o n or by
(2) o n e House within 60 calendar d a y s of
30
c o n t i n u o u s session that i s n o t then disapproved by the o t h e r House within
caleridar days.
I f n o committee in either House reports o r i s discharged from
such a disapproval resolution by t h e end of 60 calendar d a y s of c o n t i n u o u s
s e s s i o n , a n d if n e i t h e r House w i t h i n that time adopts such a resolution, t h e
r u l e o r regulation c a n g o i n t o e f f e c t immediately thereafter. H o w e v e r , i f a
60
c o m m i t t e e reports o r if either H o u s e a d o p t s such a r e s o l u t i o n within
c a l e n d a r d a y s , t h e r u l e or r e g u l a t i o n cannot become e f f e c t i v e until after 90
calendar d a y s o f continuous session.
Special rules of p r o c e d u r e a r e a l s o
provided to e x p e d i t e consideration o f a disapproval resolution.
H.R.
1 (Moakley)
Regulation Reform
Act of
1981.
Provides that a g e n c y rules may
be
disapproved within 60 days a f t e r transmittal to Congress by adoption o f a
joint resolution t h a t requires a c t i o n by both Houses a n d
signature by
the
P r e s i d e n t or o v e r r i d e of h i s veto.
H.R. 9 7 (Ashbrook), H.R.
(Robinson)
3 1 4 (Hansen) , H.R.
363 (Moorhead), a n d
H.R.
458
Uniform P r o c e d u r e :or
Congressional R e v i e w of Agency Rules.
Permits
60
either House to disapprove agency r u l e s , except emergency
r u l e s , within
legislative days after transmittal to Congress.
H.R.
9 4 5 (White), H.R.
1 1 2 8 (Lagomarsino)
T o Prevent Adoptioc
o f Rules Contrary t o Law o r
Inconsistent with
Congressional Intent. P e r m i t s either House
to disapprove proposed
agency
r u l e s wlthin 60 legislative days after transmittal to C o n g r e s s ; h o w e v e r , s u c h
a r u l e may be given i m m e d i a t e effect a s soon a s b o t h H o u s e s a d o p t a
Concurrent resolution approving it.
H.R.
3 7 4 0 (Lott)
R e q u i r e s each a g e n c y semiannually t o
Regulatory Control Act of 1981.
s u b m i t to the Secretary of the Senate and Clerk of t h e H o u s e a n a g e n d a
l i s t i n g a l l subject a r e a s i n which the agency intends t o propose major o r
significant r u l e s within t h e next year.
No major or significant r u l e c o u l d
become effective for specified time periods after transmittal t o Congress.
D u r i n g this period, any major or significant rule proposed
by a n
executive
resolution a d o p t e d b y
a g e n c y would b e , s u b j e c t to disapproval by concurrent
both Houses if a n appropriate committee determines that i t i s contrary t o
l a w , inconsistent with
legislative i n t e n t , or
exceeds
jurisdictional
authority. Any such rule would be subject t o disapproval by joint r e s o l u t i o n
a d o p t e d by both Houses a n d signed by t h e President f o r a n y other reason.
Any
major or significant rule proposed by a n independent a g e n c y would b e s u b j e c t
to disapproval by concurrent resolution regardless of t h e reason.
S. 341 (Levin)
Agency Accountability A c t of 1981. Provides that an a g e n d a d e s c r i b i n g a l l
r u l e s under development must be transmitted semi-annually t o t h e chairmen o f
a p p r o p r i a t e S e n a t e and H o u s e legislative committees. F i n a l r u l e s proposed by
a n a g e n c y must be sent t o t h e appropriare committees a n d w i l l n o t become
e f f e c t i v e f o r a t least 2 0 days. During t h e 20-day d e f e r r a l p e r i o d , a n y s u c h
c o m m i t t e e may
r e p o r t o u t o r be discharged from a
joint
resolution
disapproving t h e r u l e , i n which case i t will not b e c o m e e f f e c t i v e u n t i l
continuous s e s s i o n ; o r
(2) 3 0
after: (1) 60 a d d i t i o n a l calendar days of
a d d i t i o n a l calendar days o f continuous session if the House t o which
the
c o m m i t t e e reported or was discharged from consideration should r e j e c t a joint
resolution of disapproval o r bill modifying the rule.
If s u c h a
joint
r e s o l u t i o n o r bill were adopted by o n e H o u s e , o r if i t w e r e s t i l l pending
in
t h e o t h e r H o u s e , the r u l e could not become effective u n t i l t h e end of the 60
day period.
S.
3 8 2 (Schmitt)
Regulatory Reduction a n d Congressional Control Act.
Provides
that
proposed rules a n d regulations must be transmitted to Congress.
They will
not become effective if either House within 6 0 days a d o p t s a r e s o l u t i o n o f
disapproval a n d t h e other House does n o t disapprove the r e s o l u t i o n of
the
f i r s t House within 3 0 d a y s thereafter. R e q u i r e s that proposed and e x i s t i n g
r u l e s be reviewed by appropriate committees to determine w h e t h e r they c o m p l y
A
resolution for r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f
with a number o f specific criteria.
existing rules may be adopted by either Xouse and will go into effect unless
the other House within 3 0 days adopts a resolution disapproving the action sf
she first House.
A rule f o r whien a resolution of reconsideration
has been
adopted will l a p s e in 1 8 3 days unless it i s recommended again by tne a g e n c y ,
in which case i t can be subjeec to congressional review a s a proposed rule.
NOTE:
For a Comprehensive listing of bills considered the 97th
see IB81138 -- Congressional Veto Legislation: 97th Congress.
Congress,
HEARINGS
U.S.
Congress. House.
Committee on the Judiciary.
Subcommittee
on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations.
Congressional
review of administrative rulemaking.
Hearings, 94th Congress,
%st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1995.
" S e r i a l no. 30"
REPORTS AND CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS
Constitutionality of the committee veto.
In remarks of Sam
Ervin.
Congressional record [daily ed.] v. 1 1 3 , Oct.
a l , 1967:
28578-28589.
D r y , Murray.
T h e congressional veto, the Constitution, and
administrative oversight.
In remarks 0.f Lee H. Hamilton.
Congressional record [daily ed.] v. 1 2 4 , Apr. 6 , 1978:
H2587-H2594.
U.S.
Congress.
House.
Committee on Government Operations.
Extension of reorganization authority of the President.
[ ~ a s h i n g t o n ,U.S. Govt. Print. Off.] 1977.
(95th Congress,
1st session. House.
Report no. 95-105)
U.S.
Congress.
House.
Committee on the Judiciary.
Administrative
Rulemaking Reform Act of 1976. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print.
Off., 1976.
(94th Congress, 2d session. House.
Report
no. 94-1014)
U.S.
Congress. House.
Select Committee on Government Operations.
Reorganization Bill of 1939.
[washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.]
1939.
(76th Congress, 1st session.
House.
Report no. 120)
U.S.
Congress.
Senate.
Committee on Expenditures in the Executive
Departments. Reorganization Act of 1949.
[ ~ a s h i n g t o n ,U.S.
Govt. Print. Off.] 1949.
(8bst Congress, 1st session.
Senate.
Report no. 232)
U.S.
Congress.
Senate.
Committee on Governmental Affairs.
Reorganization Act of 1977.
[ ~ a s h i n g t o n ,U.S. Govt. Print.
Off.] 1 9 7 7 (95th Congress, 1st session.
Senate. Report no. 95-32)
ADDITIONAL REFERENCE SOURCES
A contemporary response
Abourezk, James.
T h e congressional veto:
t o executive encroachment on legislative prerogative.
Indiana law journal, v .
5 2 , no. 2 , winter i977:
323-344.
Bolton, John R.
The legislative veto:
Unseparating the powers.
Washington, American Enterprise Institute fo,r Public
Policy Research, 1977.
Bruff, Harold, and Ernest Gellhorn.
Congressional control
of administrative regulation: A study of legislative
vetoes.
Harvard law review, v. 9 0 , no. 7 , May 1977:
1369-1440.
Junior Members seek approval for wider use of
Cohen, Richard E.
the legislative veto.
Washington, Nationa; journal, Aug. 6 ,
1977: 1228-1232.
Congressional veto bill being pushed in House but faces
major hurdles.
Washington, Congressional quarterly,
575-576.
Mar. 4 , 1978:
C O n g r e ~ s i O n a lveto of administrative action:
response to a congressional challenge.
Duke law journal, May 1976:
285-300.
The probable
(Note.)
Cooper, Joseph and Ann.
The legislative veto a n 8 the Constitution.
George Washington law review, v. 3 0 , March 1962: 467-516.
Dixon, Robert G., Jr. The congressional veto and separation
of powers:
The Executive on a leash. North Carolina
law review, v. 56, January 1978: 423-496.
A political context for legislative vetoes.
Fisher, Louis.
Political science quarterly, v. 9 3 , Summer 1978:
241-254.
----- The Constitution between friends.
P r e s s , 1978.
New York, St. Martin's
274 p.
Ginnane, Robert W.
The control of Federal administration by
congressional resolutions and committees.
Harvard law r e v i e w ,
v. 6 6 , February 1953: 569-611.
Harris, Joseph P.
Institution.
Congressional control of administration.
[1964] p. 217-248.
Brookings
Javits, Jacob K., and Klein, Gary J. Congressional oversight
and the legislative veto:
A constitutional analysis.
New York University law review, v. 5 2 , no. 3 , June
1977: 455-497.
McGowan, Carl.
Congress, court, and control of delegated power.
Columbia law review, v. 7 7 , no. 8 , December 1977:
1119-1174.
The congressional veto:
Miller, Arthur S., and George M. Knapp.
Preserving the constitutional framework.
Indiana l a w journal,
367-396.
v. 5 2 , no. 2 , winter 1977:
Nathanson, Nathaniel L.
Separation of powers and administrative law:
delegation, the legislative veto, and the "independent"
agencies.
Northwestern University law review, v . 7 5 ,
Feb. 1981:
1054-1111.
0p;bnlsns of the A:torneys
General, v .
6 (1854) p. 6 8 0 ; v. 3 7
(1933) p. 56.
Record of th@ A s s o c ~ a t i o n of the Bar s f the City of New York.
Committee on Federal Legislation. T h e l e g ~ s l a t i v eveto.
v . 3 4 , no. 3 , Mar. 1979:
208'-218.
Rosenberg, Morton.
Congressional review of administrative action.
Federal bar n e w s , v. 2 8 , no. 3 , March 1981: 29-30, 36.
S t e w a r t , Geoffre? S.
Constitutionality of the legislative veto.
Harvard journal on legislation, v. 1 3 , no. 3 , April 1975:
593-619.
U.S.
Library of Congress.
Congressional Research Service.
Congressional r e v i e w , d e f e r r a l a n d disapproval of
A summary a n d a n inventory of
Executive actions:
Apr. 30, 1976.
statutory authority [ b y ] Clark F. Norton.
127 p .
Washington, 1976.
Multilith 76-88G
----- Congressional vets provisions a n d amendments:
[ b y ] Clark F. Norton.
96th Congress
[ w a s h i n g t o n ] (Updated regularly)
Issue Brief 7 9 0 4 4
----- T h e committee veto:
I t s current u s e and a p p r a i s a l s of
its validity [ b y ] Norman J. Small. Jan. 1 6 , 1967.
Washington, 1967. 1 0 2 p.
W a t s o n , H. Lee.
Congress steps o u t ; a look a t congressional c a n t r o l
of t h e Executive.
California l a w r e v i e w , v. 6 3 , J u l y 1975:
983-1094..
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents. Office of the F e d e r a l
R e g i s t e r , v. 1 1 , no. 2 2 (May 2 6 , 1 9 7 5 ) ; v. 1 1 , no. 3 3 (Aug. 1 1 ,
1975); v. 1 2 , no. 1 9 (May 7 , 1976); v. 1 2 , no. 2 0 (May 1 1 , 1976).
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.