Censure of the President by the Congress

Congressional research reportDec 8, 1998

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Censure of the President by the Congress

Updated December 8, 1998

(name redacted)

Legislative Attorney

American Law Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

ABSTRACT

Exploring a possible compromise between an impeachment and taking no congressional

action, certain Members of Congress and congressional commentators have suggested a

congressional “censure” of the President to express the Congress’ disapproval of the

President’s conduct which has been the subject of an ongoing independent counsel

investigation. This report provides an overview and discussion of the legal basis and

congressional precedents regarding a congressional “censure” of the President.

Censure of the President by the Congress

Summary

There is no express constitutional provision which authorizes Congress to

“censure” the President or any other executive branch official. A censure of the

President does not appear to be, and has not traditionally been, part of the

impeachment process, which involves an impeachment in the House and a trial and

conviction in the Senate. A censure of the President is clearly not part of Congress’

express authority to “punish” its own Members (Article I, Section 5, clause 2), nor

would it be in most cases within the inherent contempt powers of legislatures to

protect the dignity, privileges and proceedings of the institution and its Members.

Rather, a “censure” has been and would most likely be in the nature of “sense of the

Congress,” or sense of the Senate or House, resolutions which have developed in

congressional practice as vehicles to state opinions or facts in non-binding,

nonlegislative instruments. The House and Senate have, on infrequent occasions, and

mostly in the 19th Century, expressed their disapproval, reproof or censure of

executive officials, including the President, or certain of their actions in simple

resolutions. Precedents indicate that one action of the Senate (Andrew Jackson in

1834, although expunged in 1837) and two actions of the House (Tyler in 1842 and

Buchanan in 1860) may be categorized in a broad definition of a congressional

"censure" of a President.

Similar to a censure of the President, there is no express constitutional authority

to “fine” the President or any other individual outside of Congress, or to require

anyone outside of Congress to make a monetary restitution. However, unlike a

censure or other “sense of” the House or Senate resolution used to express an

opinion, a mandatory fine legislated by Congress against a particular individual may

run afoul of the “Bill of Attainder” Clause of the Constitution, as well as, if directed

at the President, raise issues concerning the constitutional prohibition on diminishing

the salary of the President. Also, unlike censure or other statement of disapproval

formally expressed by Congress, there have been found no precedents for the

Congress to legislate or formally adopt a resolution expressly directing a specified

individual, who is not a Member of Congress, to pay a fine or a restitution to the

Government.

It may at least be theoretically possible for an agreement to be reached between

the President and the Congress for the President to voluntarily “accept” a

congressional statement, suggestion and/or direction concerning particular restitution

or other act of contrition, and not to challenge the authority or constitutionality of any

such legislative statement or act. In such a case, as a practical matter, it may be

difficult for anyone other than the individual actually aggrieved or harmed (that is,

the President), to possess the requisite legal standing to challenge in court such an

arrangement on the basis of an alleged absence of legislative authority or violation

of constitutional precepts. Such legal questions of authority, power and standing

aside, however, there may be implications for policy and precedent which the

Congress may wish to consider and weigh in adopting a congressional response to

alleged wrongdoing by an executive official, particularly the President, when such

response is other than through impeachment, and is not provided for in the

Constitution.

Contents

Background/Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Censure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Censure Precedents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Fines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Constitutional Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Bills of Attainder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Diminution of Salary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Separation of Powers and Policy Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Censure of the President by the Congress

Exploring a possible compromise between an impeachment and taking no

congressional action, certain Members of Congress and congressional commentators

have suggested a congressional “censure” of the President to express the Congress’

disapproval of the President’s conduct which has been the subject of an ongoing

independent counsel investigation. This report provides an overview of the legal

basis and congressional precedents regarding a congressional “censure” of the

President.

Background/Summary

A “censure” is commonly defined in modern parlance to mean: “The formal

resolution of a legislative, administrative, or other body reprimanding a person,

normally one of its own members, for specified conduct.”1 In Congress, censures

are most typically known as simple resolutions of the House or Senate formally

adopted by a vote of that body, and expressing some form of disapproval or other

term of rebuke or condemnation concerning a Member’s conduct which bears

generally on a “breach of the rights and privileges” of the institution.2 These

censures of Members are implemented under the express authority in the

Constitution, at Article I, Section 5, clause 2, for each House of Congress to “punish”

one of its own Members.

A House, Senate or congressional “censure” of the President, unlike a

congressional punishment of one of its own Members, or an impeachment and trial

of the President in the legislature,3 does not have an express constitutional basis.

Although there is no express constitutional provision regarding censure of an

executive officer, there is also no express constitutional impediment for the

Congress, or either House of Congress, to adopt a resolution expressing its opinion,

reproval, disapprobation or censure of an individual in the Government, or of the

conduct of the individual, and, in fact, each House of Congress has on infrequent

occasions adopted such resolutions in the past. Resolutions expressing the House’s

or Senate’s disapproval, censure or reproof of an individual or of his or her conduct

have on occasion been adopted, for example, by the Senate (although later expunged)

Black’s Law Dictionary, at 224, 6th Edition (1990).

Deschler’s Precedents of the U.S. House of Representatives, Volume 3, Ch. 12, § 16;

Riddick & Fruman, Riddick’s Senate Procedure, 270-273 (1992).

United States Constitution, Article I, Section 2, clause 5; Article I, Section 3, clauses 6 and

7; Article II, Section 4. For a discussion of impeachment procedures and precedents, see

CRS Report 98-186, “Impeachment: An Overview of Constitutional Provisions, Procedure,

and Practice,” February 27, 1998.

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regarding President Jackson in 1834, and by the House in 1860 with regard to

President Buchanan. Although not a resolution, a statement of very strong criticism

finding abuse of power by President Tyler was issued by a select House Committee

in the form of a report, which was then formally adopted by the full House of

Representatives in 1842. Simple or concurrent resolutions disapproving of conduct

or censuring the President or other executive official, like similar “sense of the

Congress” resolutions, or sense of the House or Senate resolutions, would have no

particular legal or constitutional consequence,4 but may have political and/or

historical import.

In discussing a potential “censure” or other statement of disapproval directed at

the President by the Congress, some have also suggested a “fine” of the President, or

a requirement for the President to make monetary restitution for the costs of the

independent counsel investigation since January of 1998. Like a censure of the

President, there is no express constitutional authority to fine the President or any

other individual outside of Congress. However, unlike a censure or other sense of

the House or Senate resolution used to express an opinion, a mandatory fine

legislated by Congress against a particular individual may run afoul of the “Bill of

Attainder” Clause of the Constitution, and in the case of the President may raise

concerns under the diminution of salary provision in the Constitution. It is at least

theoretically possible that an agreement might be arranged between the President and

the Congress for the President to voluntarily “accept” a congressional statement,

suggestion and/or direction concerning particular restitution or other act of contrition,

and not to challenge the authority of any such legislative statement or act. In such a

case, as a practical matter, and regardless of the potentially significant implications

for policy or precedent, it may be difficult for anyone, other than the individual

actually aggrieved or harmed (that is, the President), to possess the requisite legal

standing to challenge in court such an arrangement on the basis of an alleged absence

of legislative authority or violation of constitutional precepts.

Censure

The issue of the propriety and the authority of the Congress or of either House

of Congress to censure or otherwise formally reprimand an executive official,

including the President, in the form of a simple resolution has been debated and

questioned from time to time in the House and the Senate.5 In early congressional

considerations some Members of Congress, in their opposition to resolutions which

declared either an opinion of praise or disapproval of the executive, cited the lack of

express constitutional grant of authority for the House or the Senate to state an

opinion on the conduct or propriety of an executive officer in the form of a formal

Deschler’s Precedents, supra at Volume 7, § 5 (Concurrent Resolutions), and § 6 (Simple

Resolutions); Brown, House Practice, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. at 161 (1996).

II Hinds’ Precedents of the House of Representatives, §1569, p. 1029: "While the House

in some cases has bestowed praise or censure on the President or a member of his Cabinet,

such action has at other times been held to be improper."

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resolution of censure or disapproval.6 Others argued that impeachment was the

proper, and exclusive, constitutional response for the Congress to entertain when the

conduct of federal civil officers is called into question, rather than a resolution of

censure.7 Concerning judicial officers, precedents indicate that the House has on

occasion either rejected or not dealt with attempts to consider a “censure” motion of

federal judges offered by the Judiciary Committee as an alternative to articles of

impeachment, and parliamentarians have noted an apparent disinclination of the

House to consider censure as part of the impeachment procedure.8

Both the House and the Senate have, however, in fact adopted resolutions or

statements in the past expressing their opinion, disapproval, or censure of a

Government official other than a Member of Congress. Such an expression of

censure of a federal officer by the House, the Senate or the Congress is not an

“impeachment” of that civil officer under Article I, Section 2, clause 5 and Section

3, clause 6 of the Constitution;9 nor is it a “punishment” of one of the House’s or

Senate’s own Members under Article I, Section 5, clause 2. Furthermore, a censure

would also not, in most cases, be within those inherent or implicit authorities, in the

nature of contempt, typically imputed to democratic legislative assemblies to protect

the dignity and integrity of the institution, its members and proceedings.10

II Hinds’ Precedents, supra at §1569, pp. 1029-1030: “It was objected that the Constitution

did not include such expressions of opinion among the duties of the House ....” (Citing

debate and vote on a resolution of approval of the President’s conduct, which was laid on

the table, 20 Annals of the Congress, 11th Cong., 2nd Sess., at 92 -118, 134-151, 156-161,

164-182, 187-217, 219 (1809)).

Note discussion of House resolution in 1867 expressing opinion on the unfitness for the

office of Mr. Henry Smyth (II Hinds’ Precedents, supra at §1581, pp. 1035-1036), and 1924

Senate resolution indicating its sense that the President “immediately request the

resignation” of the Secretary of Navy. 65 Congressional Record, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 22232245 (1924). Both of these resolutions were objected to by some Members as interfering

with the President’s prerogatives in appointments and removals of executive officials, and

the latter action as labeling with a “brand of shame” an individual in the Government

without conducting impeachment proceedings. See discussion in Fisher, “Congress and the

Removal Power,” in Congress & the Presidency, Volume 10, at 67-68 (1983).

The censure of U.S. District Court Judge Harold Louderback, recommended in a Judiciary

Committee report in 1933 instead of impeachment, was objected to, for example, by Rep.

Earl Michener of Michigan, who explained: “I do not believe that the constitutional power

of impeachment includes censure.” The recommendation was not approved, and the House

adopted as a substitute an amendment impeaching the judge. 3 Deschler’s Precedents,

supra at Ch. 14, §1.3, p. 400. In other instances recommendations of censure of judges, as

alternatives to impeachment, were made by the Judiciary Committee, but not acted on by

the House. Id. at 400-401; III Hind’s Precedents, supra at §§ 2519, 2520.

See 3 Deschler’s Precedents, supra at Ch. 14, § 1.

As to inherent contempt authority, see Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204 (1821). Note,

generally, Cushing, Elements of the Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies in the

United States of America, 245-255, 255-272 (1856). Since such action does not bear upon

the proceedings and privileges of the House, and is not part of impeachment, such a

resolution would generally not be considered to be a privileged resolution. See 3 Deschler’s

Precedents, supra at Chapter 14, § 1, p. 401.

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It has, however, become accepted congressional practice to employ a simple

resolution of one House of Congress, or a concurrent resolution by both Houses, for

certain nonlegislative matters, such as to express the opinion or the sense of the

Congress or of one House of Congress on a public matter, and a resolution of censure

as a concurrent or simple resolution would appear to be in the nature of such a “sense

of Congress” or sense of the House or Senate resolution.11 The absence of express

constitutional language that the Congress, or the House or the Senate individually,

may state its opinion on matters of public import in a resolution of praise or censure

is not necessarily indicative of a lack of capacity to do so, or that such practice is per

se unconstitutional. It is recognized in both constitutional law and governmental

theory that there are, of course, a number of functions and activities of Congress

which are not expressly stated or provided in the Constitution, but which are

nonetheless valid as either inherent or implied components of the legislative process

or of other express provisions in the Constitution, or are considered to be within the

internal authority of democratic legislative institutions and elective deliberative

bodies generally.12 The practice of the House, Senate, or Congress to express facts

or opinion in simple or concurrent resolutions has been recognized since its earliest

days as an inherent authority of the Congress and of democratic legislative

institutions generally, and the adoption of "sense of" the House or Senate resolutions

is practiced with some frequency in every Congress.13 A censure of the President, of

course, may raise issues additional to and different from those concerning

congressional capacity to state opinions in resolutions on other matters.

Censure Precedents

Periodically during the nineteenth century Congress debated and considered the

censure of a President of the United States. In the instances reviewed, the

considerations have been in one House of Congress only, rather than concurrently in

“Simple resolutions are used in dealing with nonlegislative matters such as expressing

opinions or facts .... Except as specifically provided by law, they have no legal effect, and

require no action by the other House. Containing no legislative provisions, they are not

presented to the President of the United States for his approval, as in the case of bills and

joint resolutions.” Deschler’s Precedents, Volume 7, § 6. “[Concurrent resolutions] are not

used in the adoption of general legislation. ... [They] are used in ... expressing the sense of

Congress on propositions .... A concurrent resolution does not involve an exercise of the

legislative power under article I of the Constitution in which the President must participate.”

Id. at § 5. Brown, House Practice, supra at 161: “Simple or concurrent resolutions are used

... to express facts or opinions, or to dispose of some other nonlegislative matter.” See also

Riddick & Fruman, Riddick’s Senate Procedure, 1202 (1992).

The most common example of inherent or implied authority of Congress is the oversight

and investigatory authority of either House, including the power to compel attendance of

witnesses and production of documents. Such authority is not expressly provided in the

Constitution, but the ability to collect facts and opinions, and to publish such opinions and

facts, are considered inherent in the authority to legislate. McGrain v. Daugherty, 272 U.S.

135 (1927); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187, 200 (1957).

See note 11, supra; Cushing, supra at 314. In the 105th Congress, for example, the House

unanimously adopted a resolution to "condemn" as a "racist act" the alleged actions of three

expressly named individuals in Texas who were arrested in connection with what is reported

as a racially motivated homicide (H.Res. 105-466, 105th Cong ).

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both the House and Senate. The Senate adopted a resolution in 1834 stating that

certain conduct of President Andrew Jackson, involving a policy dispute concerning

the removal of the Secretary of the Treasury and the question of the availability of

certain documents, was “in derogation” of the Constitution or the laws of the

nation.14 President Jackson issued and sent to the Senate a strong protestation of the

censure concerning both the prerogatives of his office and the powers of the Senate

to censure.15 The President's protest concerning a vote and a proceeding in the Senate

was found by the Senate, in formal resolutions adopted by the body, to be

"inconsistent with the just authority of the two Houses of Congress," a "breach of the

privileges of the Senate," and was not allowed to be entered on the Journal.16 Three

years later, however, upon the President’s political allies regaining control of the

Senate, the Senate expunged the original censure resolution.17 The Senate resolution

concerning President Jackson did not expressly contain the word “censure” or other

specific word of condemnation, and some critics of Congress’ authority to adopt such

resolutions of censure have categorized the 1834 resolution as one other than a

“censure” of the executive.18

In 1860, the House of Representatives adopted a resolution stating that the

President’s conduct was deserving of its “reproof,” in a matter concerning the

conduct of President Buchanan and his Secretary of the Navy in allowing political

considerations and alleged campaign contribution “kickbacks” to influence the letting

of Government contracts to political supporters, rather than the lowest bidder.19 After

debating both the substance of the charges and the authority of the House to adopt

such a resolution, characterized by one Member as “censur[ing] indiscriminately the

The resolution of March 28, 1834, read as follows: “Resolved, That the President, in the

late executive proceedings in relation to the public revenue, has assumed upon himself

authority and power not conferred by the Constitution and laws, but in derogation of both.”

Note II Hinds’ Precedents, supra at §1591, p. 1040.

supra at §1591.

Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts Between Congress and the President, 54-55 (4th ed.1997).

Congressional Globe, 36th Congress, 1st Session, 2938-2939, June 13, 1860. Referring to

the Senate resolution concerning President Jackson, Representative Bobock noted: “You

will observe that in this resolution there is no direct declaration of censure, and no

impeachment of the motives of the President. It was simply a declaration that his act was

not in conformity with the Constitution and the laws of the land.”

“Resolved, That the President and Secretary of the Navy, by receiving and considering the

party relations of bidders for contracts with the United States, and the effect of awarding

contracts upon pending elections, have set an example dangerous to the public safety, and

deserving the reproof of this House.” Congressional Globe, 36th Congress, 1st Sess., 2951,

June 13, 1860.

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President of the United States and the Secretary of Navy,”20 the House adopted the

resolution 106-61.21

It may also be noted that, although not a resolution of censure, the House in

1842 adopted a report from a select committee, to which the President’s veto

message had been referred, which strongly criticized the actions of President Tyler

for “gross abuse of constitutional power and bold assumption of powers never vested

in him by any law”; for having “assumed ... the whole Legislative power to himself,

and ... levying millions of money upon the people, without any authority of law”; and

for the “abusive exercise of the constitutional power of the President to arrest the

action of Congress upon measures vital to the welfare of the people ...”22 Similar to

the instances in the Jackson censure, President Tyler sent a protestation of the

House's action to the House, which then adopted three resolutions of similar wording

and import as the Senate's resolutions in the Jackson case, stating that the President's

protest would not be accepted and was in derogation of the rights and privileges of

the House.23

Other resolutions of disapproval or censure of a President have been debated on

the floor of the House or Senate. The House debated the issue of a resolution

criticizing President John Adams in 1800 because of a communication from the

President to a judge, which the President’s critics deemed to be a “dangerous

interference of the Executive with Judicial decisions,” concerning a celebrated

deportation case.24 A resolution which originally would have congratulated General

Zachery Taylor for his conduct in the Mexican War was amended, in a procedural

motion on the House floor to refer the resolution to the Committee on Military

Affairs, to include as an amendment to an amendment of the referral a disapprobation

of President Polk's waging of an "unnecessarily and unconstitutionally begun war."25

Although the amendment to the referral was adopted, research has not indicated that

the underlying resolution was ever passed by the House after referral to the

committee. The Senate in 1862 also debated, and tabled a motion for censure of

James Buchanan, who had recently been President of the United States, for alleged

failures while President to take the necessary action to prevent the secession from the

Union of several southern states.26 More recently, a censure resolution concerning

Id. at 2951, Mr. Clark of Missouri.

Id. at 2951.

Journal of the House of Representatives, 27th Cong., 2d Sess., 1343, 1346-1352, August

17, 1842.

II Hinds' Precedents, supra at §1590, pp. 1039-1040.

10 Annals of Congress 532-33, 542-578, 584-619 (1800), discussed in Neuman, “Habeas

Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens,” 98 Columbia Law Review 961,

995-996 (1998).

Congressional Globe, 30th Congress, 1st Session 95, January 3, 1848.

II Hinds’ Precedents, supra at §1571, p. 1030, citing Congressional Globe, 37th Congress,

3 Sess. pp. 101-102, December 16, 1862.

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President Richard Nixon was introduced in the House in 1974 but received no floor

consideration.27

The House or the Senate has also from time to time censured or expressed its

disapprobation of other executive officers, or of their conduct, in the form of a

resolution adopted by the body.28 The earliest attempt found thus far concerned a

series of resolutions proposing the censure and disapproval of Secretary Alexander

Hamilton in 1793, the texts of which were considered by historians to have been

drafted by Thomas Jefferson for introduction by Representative William Branch

Giles of Virginia.29 Some congressional resolutions over the years have merely found

misconduct on the part of an executive officer and urged the President to seek the

officer’s resignation, without expressing a specific term of censure of condemnation.

For example, after having conducted investigations into the conduct of the

administration of the New York custom-house by Mr. Henry Smyth, and finding that

“there is not sufficient time prior” to adjournment to finish the matter, the House

expressed in a resolution “Henry A. Smyth’s unfitness to hold the office,” and

recommended that he “should be removed from the office of collector.”30 Similarly,

the Senate in 1924, during the Teapot Dome investigation passed a resolution

indicating its sense that the President “immediately request the resignation” of the

Secretary of Navy.31

The Senate adopted a resolution in 1886 in which it expressed its

“condemnation” of President’s Cleveland’s Attorney General A.H. Garland

See H.Res.93-1288, 93rd Congress, 2d Session. See discussion at 120 Congressional

Record 26820, August 5, 1974. The resolution stated:

Whereas the people have the right to expect from the President of the United

States high moral standards and personal example, as well as great diligence in the

exercise of official responsibilities and obligations;

And whereas, Richard M. Nixon, in his conduct of the office of President despite great achievements in foreign policy which are highly beneficial to every

citizen and indeed to all people of the world - (1) has shown insensitivity to the moral

demands, lofty purpose and ideals of the high office he holds in trust, and (2) has,

through negligence and maladministration, failed to prevent his close subordinates and

agents from committing acts of grave misconduct obstruction and impairment of

justice, abuse and undue concentration of power, and contravention of the laws

governing agencies of the Executive Branch;

Now, therefore, be it resolved by the House of Representatives that Richard M.

Nixon should be and he is hereby censured for said moral insensitivity, negligence and

maladministration.

The precedents and incidents provided are intended to be examples of congressional

actions, and are not designed to be a definitive list of all resolutions of disapproval of

executive officials that may have been adopted or considered by either House.

Sheridan, Eugene R., "Thomas Jefferson and the Giles Resolutions," William and Mary

Quarterly, Third Series, Volume 49, Issue 4, at 589-608 (Oct. 1992). The resolutions did

not pass.

Congressional Globe, 40th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 255-256, 282-285, 394-395 (1867).

65 Congressional Record, 68 th Cong., 1 st Sess., 2223-2245, February 11, 1924. See

discussion in footnote 7, supra.

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concerning his refusal to provide certain records and papers to the Senate about the

removal from office of a district attorney by the President.32 In 1896, the House

adopted a resolution where it found that a United States Ambassador, by his speech

and conduct “has committed an offense against diplomatic propriety and an abuse of

the privileges of his exalted position,” and therefore, “as the immediate

representatives of the American people, and in their names, we condemn and censure

the said utterances of Thomas F. Bayard.”33

Fines

As a general proposition it may be stated that there is no authority for the

Congress, or either House of Congress, to levy a mandatory fine against an individual

(or to otherwise “punish” an individual or person) absent some recognized legislative

power, such as the express constitutional authority in Article I, Section 5, clause 2 of

the Constitution allowing either House of Congress to “punish” one if its own

Members.34 The noted parliamentary and legislative authority, Luther Stearns

Cushing, in discussing the general and traditional powers of legislative institutions

in the United States, explained in his 1856 treatise:

In England, both houses of parliament were anciently in the practice of

imposing the payment of a fine by way of punishment; and this is understood, at

the present day to be the practice of the lords; but the commons have appeared

to long since waived or abandoned this form of punishment, and it has even been

laid down that they now have no such power. In this country, with one or two

exceptions, in which there is a special constitutional provision to that effect, the

legislative assemblies are not authorized to impose a fine by way of

punishment.35

In addition to the general absence of authority and practice of a legislative

institution in the United States to fine persons who are not members of that

legislature, the levying of a fine or other such punishment, such as loss of pay,

17 Congressional Record, 49th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 1584-1591, 2784-2810, March 26,

1886: “Resolved, That the Senate hereby expresses its condemnation of the refusal of the

Attorney-General, under whatever influence, to send to the Senate copies of papers called

for by its resolution of the 25th of January, and set forth in the report of the Committee on

the Judiciary, is in violation of his official duty and subversive of the fundamental principles

of the Government and of a good administration thereof.”

28 Congressional Record, 54th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 3034, March 20, 1896.

“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for

disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.” Under

this authority each House of Congress has disciplined its own Members (in addition to

expulsion, censure, or [in the House] reprimand) by way of fines or the ordering of monetary

restitution. See, for example, S.Rept. 101-382, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., at 14-15 (1990);

H.Res. 91-2, 91st Cong. (1969), discussed in Deschler’s Precedents, supra, at Ch.12, § 17,

pp. 203-204; H.Rept. 96-351, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., at 20 (1979); H.Rept. 101-610, 101st

Cong., 2d Sess., at 55 (1990); H.Rept. 105-1, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., at 2-3 (1997). Note also

Rules, House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, Rule 25(e), 105th Cong. (1997).

Cushing, The Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies in the United States of America

[Lex Parliamentaria Americana], Section 676, at 266-267 (Boston 1856).

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pension or other remuneration or benefits, may directly implicate the Bill of

Attainder Clause of the Constitution, as discussed below.

Constitutional Issues

Bills of Attainder

No specific “penalty” or “punishment” necessarily follows the adoption of a

resolution which merely expresses a “censure” or states another term of disapproval

or condemnation of an individual, other than the statement itself and the potential

collateral or incidental political damage that might be incurred as a result of

Congress’ expression of its opinion. Furthermore, it is questionable under the Bill

of Attainder Clause of the Constitution (Article I, Section 9, clause 3), whether

Congress may, in any event, inflict a mandatory “penalty” or “punishment” upon the

President, or upon any other specified executive official, by means of a legislative

act, other than through impeachment.36 The provision of the Constitution forbidding

Congress from adopting “bills of attainder” is directed at what are generally

described as legislative punishments.37 It may be instructive to note that in

discussing the impeachment provisions of the Constitution at the Convention of

1787, George Mason had recommended expanding the grounds for impeachment

beyond merely “treason” and “bribery,” to “maladministration,” indicating that

without such broadening of the grounds for impeachment, the Bill of Attainder

Clause of the Constitution might otherwise bar Congress from dealing with many

In the case of impeachment and conviction, the Constitution provides that the punishment

of a civil officer by the Congress may extend to removal from office, and additionally, a

disqualification from holding federal office. Article I, Section 3, clause 7. (It may also be

worthy of note that removal of the President from office under the impeachment process has

collateral statutory consequences such as the loss of benefits under the Former Presidents

Act, 3 U.S.C. § 102 note.) In addition to impeachment (and discipline of its own Members),

there is a recognized, inherent authority for the Congress, like other democratic legislative

institutions, to take measures, such as in contempt proceedings, to protect the safety,

integrity and privileges of the institution, its Members and proceedings.

Article I, Section 9, clause 3: “No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.”

A bill of attainder is “a law that legislatively determines guilt and inflicts punishment upon

an identified individual without the provisions of the protections of a judicial trial.” Nixon

v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 468 (1977); Selective Service System

v. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 847 (1984); see discussion in

Constitution of the United States of America, Analysis and Interpretation, Senate Document

No. 103-6, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess., at 347-350 (1996). A law that is punitive, that is, intended

to punish an individual or specified individuals, rather than intended as a regulatory,

prophylactic measure to protect the public, falls within the bill of attainder prohibition. See

United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965), and discussion in SBC Communications, Inc.

et al. v. US West Communications Inc., No. 98-10140 (5th Cir., September 4, 1998). In

addition to bill of attainder issues, an additional or increased “penalty” or “punishment”

imposed by the legislature for an act which has already been committed might raise

questions under the ex post facto provision. See Hiss v. Hampton, 338 F. Supp. 1141, 1153

(D.D.C. 1972).

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“great and dangerous offenses” which do not rise to or constitute bribery or treason.38

Under the Bill of Attainder Clause, the Congress may generally not levy a legislative

punishment, such as a mandatory fine, upon a specified individual (who is not a

Member of Congress), nor adopt a punitive measure, for example, in the form of a

legislative prohibition on the payment of salaries to certain specified officials in the

Government.39

There may be some argument that a public rebuke, such as a censure, because

of the potential for damage to one’s reputation and possible political or other public

aspirations may, in itself, constitute a “punishment” by the Congress, and thus, since

not expressly authorized, would fall within those legislative punishments prohibited

by the Bill of Attainder Clause.40 It may be argued that the intent of such a censure

would appear to be clearly punitive and not remedial. However, it does not appear

that a censure adopted in its traditional form as a simple (or even a concurrent)

resolution, with no binding effect and stating only an opinion, qualifies as a “bill of

attainder,” - since it is not in the constitutional and congressional context a "bill," as

it does not becomes law nor is it a measure that has the force or effect of law.41

A censure which would take a less traditional form than a simple or concurrent

resolution and would be included, for example, in a joint resolution presented to the

President would, however, clearly be a "bill," since it is a vehicle which would

become a public law. As such, it would then raise the legal and constitutional issue

2 Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 550, September 8, 1787:

“Why is the provision restrained to Treason & bribery only? Treason as defined in the

Constitution will not reach many great and dangerous offenses. ... As bills of attainder which

have saved the British Constitution are forbidden, it is the more necessary to extend: the

power of impeachments.” The suggested language was opposed by James Madison, who

argued that the term “maladministration” was “so vague” that it would be “equivalent” to

the President having only “tenure during pleasure of the Senate.” Id. at 550. The

compromise language of “other high crimes & misdemeanors” was substituted by Col.

Mason, and adopted. Id. at 550.

In United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), an appropriations rider was struck down

by the Supreme Court as a bill of attainder where the legislative language forbade the use

of money to pay the salaries of three persons in an agency whom the House had wanted

removed from Government service because they were thought “subversive.”

See, for example, James Madison’s discussion of a legislative “denunciation” as a

punishment for constitutional purposes, 4 Annals of Congress 934, cited in US West

Communications Inc., supra , at note 17.

A "bill" as used in the constitutional context "refers to the chief vehicle employed by the

Congress in the enactment of laws under its legislative powers." Deschler, supra at Volume

7, Chapter 24, § 2. See Article I, Section 7, clauses 1-3 of the Constitution concerning the

requirements for "Bills." In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, supra at 468, the

Supreme Court described a bill of attainder as “a law that legislatively determines guilt and

inflicts punishment upon an identified individual ....” (emphasis added). In United States

v. Lovett, supra, the Supreme Court noted that bills of attainder are “legislative acts, no

matter what their form,” that inflict legislative punishments on individuals. 328 U.S. at 315

(emphasis added). The Court there made this point to explain that the Clause applies to

appropriations acts (passed by both Houses of Congress and signed by the President), as

well as to a permanent law. 328 U.S. at 315-316.

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of whether a formal, public expression of opinion and disapproval by the legislature

in that law directed at a specified individual is a legislative “punishment”

contemplated by the Bill of Attainder provision. The Supreme Court has explained

in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, supra, that there are three tests for

determining whether a law directed at a specific individual is a prohibited legislative

"punishment": the historical test, the functional test, and the motivational test.42 The

"historical" test looks to determine if the punishment inflicted is one which has been

traditionally considered a punishment as either a bill of attainder or bill of pains and

penalties. As succinctly summarized in a lower federal court, the historically

recognized "punishments" include: "the death sentence; imprisonment; banishment;

confiscation of property; and barring individuals and groups from participating in

specified employment or vocations."43 Since the Supreme Court recognized the

"possibility that new burdens and deprivations" might be legislatively fashioned in

the future, two further and additional tests were provided for any such "new burdens

and deprivations" created by the legislature.44 The "functional" test looks to

determine if there are non-punitive, regulatory or remedial legislative purposes that

are advanced by the new legislative "burdens imposed."45 The "motivational" test

inquires into "whether the legislative record evinces a congressional intent to

punish."46

A mere "censure" of the President or other executive official in a law enacted

by a joint resolution would not appear to meet the "historical" test as specified by the

Supreme Court, as it is neither a death sentence, imprisonment, banishment,

confiscation of property, nor barring of individuals and groups from participating in

specified employment or vocations. Although the "function" and "motivation" for

a censure might, in fact, be able to be convincingly argued to be punitive in nature,

it is clear from the Supreme Court's explanation that the act of the legislature must

as a threshold matter place some sort of "burden or deprivation" upon the subject of

the legislation. There is thus an issue as to whether an expression of censure or

condemnation in a law is, in itself and without further disabilities or penalties, a

Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, supra at 473-482.

Springfield Armory, Inc. v. City of Columbus, 805 F. Supp. 489, 494 (S.D. Ohio 1992),

reversed in part on other grounds, 29 F.3rd 250 (6th Cir. 1994), explaining Nixon v.

Administrator of General Services, supra at 473-474. Note historical judicial construction

of “punishment.” Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 (1866); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S.

277, 320 (1866): “the deprivation of any rights, civil or political, previously enjoyed ...”

Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, supra at 475. There might be some argument

made that since "censure" was a procedure known to and practiced by the Parliament, as

well as colonial legislatures and early Congresses, that it is not a "new" deprivation or

burden fashioned by the legislature, and thus since not considered part of the punishments

included in the bills of attainder or pains and penalty historically, there is no need to apply

the further functional or motivational tests.

Id. at 475-476; "Where such legitimate legislative purposes do not appear, it is reasonable

to conclude that punishment of individuals disadvantaged by the enactment was the purpose

of the decisionmakers."

Id. at 478.

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"burden or deprivation" in fact or in law upon the subject of the censure.47 As can be

seen by the foregoing analysis and discussion, enacting a censure in a non-traditional

(and unprecedented) format of a "bill" (such as a joint resolution) would provide at

the very least an opportunity for a constitutional argument of "bill of attainder" that

would not exist if a censure were adopted in a non-"bill" vehicle, that is, a simple or

concurrent "sense of" resolution.

As to fines and bills of attainder (and ex post facto laws), it may be noted that

in some instances the courts have found that certain civil fines and forfeitures were

“remedial” measures and not “punitive,” so as not to violate the ex post facto

provision or the Excessive Fines Clause.48 It may be possible under this analysis to

argue that certain fines or required “restitutions” of funds to the Government may

also not be punitive under the Bill of Attainder Clause, as long as they merely

“reimburse the government for investigative and prosecutorial cost.”49 Any argument

of this nature in the instance at hand, however, would also face the seemingly

difficult task of overcoming the "motivational" test, considering the express

statements by individual Members concerning the appropriate “punishment” in this

particular case, as well as the inference that a mandatory “fine” or required restitution

that accompanies or is coupled with an express “censure” or other explicit statement

of disapproval, directed at one specified individual, would appear in that context to

be indicative of a punitive legislative intent, rather than merely a remedial one.50

Justice Stevens, concurring in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, appeared to

suggest that humiliation or injury to one's reputation may implicate the Bill of Attainder

Clause. Legislation denying President Nixon custody of his papers "subjects a named

individual to this humiliating treatment [which] must raise serious questions under the Bill

of Attainder Clause. Bills of attainder were typically directed at once powerful leaders of

government. By special legislative Acts, Parliament deprived one statesman after another

of his reputation, his property, and his potential for future leadership." Id. at 484. The

humiliation and loss of reputation noted by Justice Stevens in both the Nixon and the

parliamentary Acts, however, were collateral results to the other deprivations of liberty or

property that such legislative acts inflicted, and not the sole penalty. It is not clear whether

mere publicity or publication is such a "burden or deprivation" as to raise bill of attainder

or ex post facto problems (note generally, EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 504 F. Supp. 241

(D.C. Ill. 1980) and discussion of "publication" as punishment in Artway v. Attorney

General of New Jersey, 876 F. Supp. 666, aff’d in part, vacated in part, 81 F.3d 1235, 12531263 (3rd Cir.), rehearing den., 83 F.3rd 594 (3rd Cir. 1996)). The question of whether any

"deprivation or burden" results from a censure may also particularly be raised in a case

where the facts are already widely and publicly known, and public admissions of

wrongdoing already made by the subject. Finally, it may be possible that the wording of any

resolution may be relevant as to whether it is a deprivation or burden upon one's reputation.

United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 445-446 (1989); Karpa v. C.I.R., 909 F.2d 784 (9th

Cir. 1990), noting the non-penal nature of fines which are not “overwhelmingly

disproportionate” to the damages caused to the Government and thus not so “divorced from

the Government’s damages and expenses to constitute punishment.” 909 F. 2d at 788, citing

Halper, supra; Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993); U.S. v. Certain Funds

Contained in Account Nos., 96 F.3rd 20 (2nd Cir. 1996), cert. den. 117 S.Ct. 954 (1997).

Karpa, supra at 788, citing Halper, supra at 445-446, n. 6.

See discussion of congressional intent and “intent of Members of Congress who voted its

(continued...)

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It would appear to be within the realm of possibility, although without apparent

precedent, that the President might voluntarily agree not to challenge the authority

and constitutionality of a particular legislative action or statement, and might

voluntarily agree to pay a “suggested” monetary amount as a fine or restitution along

with a “censure,” or to accept some other form of contrition or expiation suggested

by Congress in a sense of Congress resolution. If the payment of restitution or a fine

is merely incorporated into a legislative vehicle such as a simple or a concurrent

resolution, which is merely a statement of opinion by or “sense of” the Congress, and

which therefore is not binding and does not have force or effect of law, it may be

argued, as discussed above, that such a legislative measure would not be a “bill of

attainder,” since it is not a "bill," a law, nor is it mandatory or enforceable.51

In any event, if the President agrees to abide by the “suggestion” or opinion, or

even if such formulation were incorporated into a mandatory fine or other legislative

vehicle with the force and effect of law with the President’s agreement, the question

could still be ultimately raised as to who, if anyone, would have legal standing to

challenge the act as beyond the powers and authority of the legislature if the person

affected or aggrieved by the act does not challenge it. This is not to suggest that the

President, or any subject of a legislative act, has the ability to "waive" a constitutional

incapacity of the legislature to act, but rather it is a practical question to be raised if

such legislative act does in fact take place. Standing to challenge a congressional act

in the courts requires a showing that the plaintiff has an injury in fact as a result of

the challenged action.52 A Member of Congress does not necessarily have any

additional standing beyond a member of the public to challenge a legislative act

based merely on an arguable institutional injury or loss of political power, unless

there is some personal injury to the legislator, such as where a legislator’s vote would

be “completely nullified.”53

Diminution of Salary

(...continued)

passage,” in determining whether a measure is punitive or merely remedial or regulatory in

Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. supra at 473-484. Also in United

States v. Lovett, supra at 313, the Court looked not only to the “section’s language,” but “the

circumstances of its passage” as well, as indicative of Congress’ intent.

See footnote 41, supra.

Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970).

“In order to meet the standing element of the case-or-controversy requirement, appellees

must allege a personal injury that is particularized, concrete, and otherwise judicially

cognizable.” Raines v. Byrd, 117 S.Ct. 2312, 2313 (1997), citing Lujan v. Defenders of

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), and Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984). Standing does not

turn on the merits of complaint, but whether the plaintiff has a legal right to a judicial

determination of the issues raised. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).

In Raines v. Byrd, supra, plaintiff Senators alleged that the line-item veto alters the

“constitutional balance of powers” between the President and Congress, as well as altering

the “legal and practical effect” of their votes, and divests Members of their constitutional

role in the repeal of legislation. 117 S.Ct. at 2316. The Court found, however, that plaintiff

Senators did not have legal standing to challenge the legislation, as there was no personal

injury, but only a “loss of political power.” 117 S.Ct at 2318.

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It is has also been postulated that a provision of law which fines, or requires

monetary restitution from the President might, in effect, be a diminution of the salary

of the President, in contravention of Article II, Section 1, clause 7, of the

Constitution.54 Proponents of this theory cite to the cases concerning the similar

constitutional limitations on the diminution of salary of federal judges during their

tenure in office, which have demonstrated that even some “indirect” lessening of

judicial compensation, such as by the imposition of a new tax after judges have taken

office, may work to diminish the over-all compensation of those federal judges as

contemplated by that provision of the Constitution.55 There is no precedent which

makes it clear or provides a definitive ruling as to whether a mandatory “fine” or

required “restitution” directed at a particular officer would be a diminution of salary

under the Constitution. It may be noted that the fine or restitution to the Government

could be paid out of funds other than the President’s salary or compensation (such

as from private contributions or loans); however, it would be a new financial

obligation to the United States Government placed by the Congress upon the funds

available to the President during his term (and not an application of a pre-existing

provision of law or regulation, or merely an increase in current, existing financial

obligations), and would be a reduction which is applied directly and solely to the

President by the Congress.

Separation of Powers and Policy Implications

Critics of a congressional "censure" of the President or of other executive

officials often argue that such congressional action violates the principles of

"separation of powers" within the constitutional framework of separated powers.

Many of the arguments forwarded, however, appear in their nature to be policy

arguments of why it would or would not be a good policy, practice or precedent for

the House, Senate or Congress to censure, or for the President to agree to a censure.

As important and significant as such policy arguments are, they do not necessarily

address the legal or constitutional capacity or incapacity, as interpreted by the

Supreme Court, of the House or Senate to adopt such resolutions. Very briefly, those

types of congressional actions which the Supreme Court has found to violate the

principles of "separation of powers" within the Constitution have been those which

aggrandize the powers of one branch at the expense of the powers of the other, or that

independently interfere with or impermissibly undermine the powers of another

branch, by preventing that branch from carrying out its constitutional duties.56 As

stated by the Supreme Court: "[I]n determining whether the Act disrupts the proper

“The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a Compensation, which

shall neither be increased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have been

elected ....”

Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920); Hatter v. United States, 64 F.3d 647 (Fed. Cir. 1995),

affirmed ,United States v. Hatter, 117 S.Ct. 39 (1996); on remand to the Federal Court of

Claims, the court found, as a factual matter, that subsequent increases in judicial salaries had

made up for any diminution of over-all compensation of federal judges caused by

application of new Social Security and Medicare taxes on salaries of sitting federal judges.

38 Fed.Cl. 166 (1997). As to the President, see 13 Ops. Atty. Gen. 161 (1869).

United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711-712 (1974); Commodity Futures Trading

Commission v. Shor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 695 (1988).

CRS-15

balance between the coordinate branches, the proper inquiry focuses on the extent to

which it prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally

assigned functions."57 The issue may thus need to be framed as to whether statements

of censure of the House or the Senate, or the Congress concurrently, would be found

to impermissibly undermine the authority of the President by interfering and

preventing the carrying out of the executive's constitutional duties and functions.

Legal and constitutional issues and questions of legal standing aside, there are

also potentially important policy implications which the Congress may wish to

consider. On the one hand, an agreement or deal where the President of the United

States voluntarily accepts a “censure” vote of the Congress (either through a simple

or concurrent resolution, or through a joint resolution which the President signs to

indicate his acceptance), or a censure “plus” some other act of contrition, might

arguably provide for an appropriate public consequence to the acts of a President

which, while found either highly offensive or even illegal, might not be considered

by Congress to constitute “treason,” “bribery” or other “high crimes or

misdemeanors.” It might be argued that a censure and/or other “punishment”

recommended and agreed to by the President would allow for a formal, public

statement by the representatives of the American people indicating strong disapproval

of such conduct, without subjecting the country to as wrenching and disruptive a

process as impeachment and an attempt to remove a democratically elected President.

If crimes were committed by the President, the President would be subject to criminal

indictment and prosecution in the normal judicial process after leaving office.

However, on the other hand, it might be argued that action of this nature, even

merely a “censure” of a President, is an extra-constitutional measure not

contemplated by the express provisions nor the design of the Constitution. The sole

method in the Constitution for dealing with serious Executive wrongdoing is the

impeachment provision. As to legislative “punishments” outside of impeachments,

it may be noted that the Bill of Attainder Clause was an intentional limitation on

congressional powers to punish specified individuals, based on due process and

separation of powers concerns. Additionally, the diminution of salary provision was

adopted within the Constitution’s separation of powers framework, and among its

checks and balances, to ensure the independence of the Executive from the

Congress.58 It has thus been argued that even if not technically a bill of attainder nor

a diminution of salary, and/or even if unchallenged by the subject of the fine or

similar congressional “punishment,” such action might establish a precedent for

future actions, threats of large monetary fines, or “agreements” (into which a

Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. supra at 443.

See Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, Vol 2, at §1486, pp.

311-312 (1873): “It is obvious that, without due attention to the proper support of the

President, the separation of the executive from the legislative department would be merely

nominal and nugatory. The legislature, with a discretionary power over his salary and

emolument, would soon render him obsequious to their will. ... The legislature, upon the

appointment of a President, is once for all to declare what shall be the compensation for his

services during the time for which he shall have been elected. This done, they will have no

power to alter it, either by increase or diminution.... They can neither weaken his fortitude

by operating upon his necessities, nor corrupt his integrity by appealing to his avarice.”

CRS-16

President may be pressured by the specter of impeachment proceedings) which could

tend to interfere with or upset to some degree the balance contemplated in the

Constitution in the relationship between the Executive and the Congress.

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