House Contested Election Cases: 1933 to 2005
Congressional research reportOct 26, 2006
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Order Code 98-194 A
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
House Contested Election
Cases: 1933 to 2005
Updated October 26, 2006
L. Paige Whitaker
Legislative Attorney
American Law Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
House Contested Election Cases: 1933 to 2005
Summary
This report provides a summary of contested election cases from the 73rd
Congress through the 109th Congress, 1933 to 2005. The descriptions primarily
provide information concerning the nature of the action and the disposition of the
case. The summary is limited to only those cases that were considered by the House
of Representatives; cases decided at the state level are beyond the scope of this
report.
In the period from 1933 to 2005, the House of Representatives considered 105
contested election cases. Many of these cases involved an allegation of fraud and
other election improprieties. Of these cases, a vast majority were resolved in favor
of the contestee (typically, the candidate who was originally declared the victor).
Since enactment of the Federal Contested Elections Act of 1969 (FCEA), most cases
have been dismissed because the contestant failed to sustain the burden of proof
necessary to overcome a motion to dismiss.
Contents
73rd Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Bowles v. Dingell (H.Rept. 695), 15th District of Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Shanahan v. Beck (H.Rept. 694), 2nd District of Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . 1
Reese v. Ellzey (H.Rept. 696), 8th District of Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Brewster v. Utterback (H.Rept. 1725), 3rd District of Maine . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Casey v. Turpin (H.Rept. 930), 12th District of Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Gormley v. Goss (H.Rept. 893), 5th District of Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Chandler v. Burnham (H.Rept. 1278), 20th District of California . . . . . . . . 3
Ellis v. Thurston (H.Rept. 1305), 5th District of Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Felix v. Muldowney (No report filed), 82nd District of Pennsylvania . . . . . . 5
Fox v. Higgins (H.Rept. 894), 2nd District of Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Estep v. Ellenbogen (H.Rept. 1341), 33rd District of Pennsylvania . . . . . . . 5
Sanders v. Kemp (H.Rept. 334), 6th District of Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
LaGuardia v. Lanzetta (No report filed), 20th District of New York . . . . . . 6
Lovette v. Reece (H.Rept. 1306), 1st District of Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
McAndrews v. Britten (H.Rept. 1298), 9th District of Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Weber v. Simpson (H.Rept. 1494), 10th District of Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Francis H. Shoemaker (No report filed), of Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
74th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Lanzetta v. Marcantonio (H.Rept. 3084), 20th District of New York . . . . . . 7
McCandless v. King (H.Rept. 2736), Delegate from Hawaii . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Miller v. Cooper (H.Rept. 2131), 19th District of Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
75th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Roy v. Jenks (H.Rept. 1521),1st District of New Hampshire . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Rutherford v. Taylor (No report filed), 2nd District of Tennessee . . . . . . . . 9
William v. Maas (No report filed),4th District of Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
76th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Smith v. Polk (No report filed), 6th District of Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Swanson v. Harrington (H.Rept. 1722), 9th District of Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Scott v. Eaton (H.Rept. 1783), 10th District of California . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Neal v. Kefauver (H.Rept. 2609), 3rd District of Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
77th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Miller v. Kirwan (No report filed), 19th District of Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
78th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Clark v. Nichols (H.Rept. 1120), 2nd District of Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Moreland v. Schuetz (H.Rept. 1158), 7th District of Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
McEvoy v. Peterson (H.Rept. 1423), 1st District of Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Schufer v. Wasielewski (H.Rept. 1300), 4th District of Wisconsin . . . . . . . 13
Thill v. McMurray (H.Rept. 1032), 5th District of Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . 13
Sullivan v. Miller (H.Rept. 180), 11th District of Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
79th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Hicks v. Dondero (H.Rept. 1404), 17th District of Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . 14
80th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Mankin v. Davis (H.Rept. 1822), 5th District of Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Lowe v. Davis (H.Rept. 1823), 5th District of Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Michael v. Smith (H.Rept. 1106), 8th District of Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Roberts v. Douglas (H.Rept. 1106), 14th District of California . . . . . . . . . 15
Woodward v. O’Brien (No report available), 6th District of Illinois . . . . . . 16
Wilson v. Granger (H.Rept. 2418), 1st District of Utah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
81st Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Thierry v. Feighan (H.Rept. 1252), 20th District of Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Stevens v. Blackney (H.Rept. 1735), 6th District of Michigan . . . . . . . . . . 16
Fuller v. Davies, (H.Rept. 1252), 35th District of New York . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Browner v. Cunningham (H.Rept. 1252), 5th District of Iowa . . . . . . . . . . 17
82nd Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Macy v. Greenwood (H.Rept. 1599), 1st District of New York . . . . . . . . . 17
Karst v. Curtis (H.Rept. 905), 12th District of Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Huber v. Ayres (H.Rept. 986), 14th District of Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Lowe v. Davis (H.Rept. 904), 5th District of Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Osser v. Scott (H.Rept. 1598), 3rd District of Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
83rd Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
84th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
85th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Dolliver v. Coad (Report not available), 6th District of Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Carter v. LeCompte (H.Rept. 1626), 4th District of Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Oliver v. Hale (H.Rept. 2482), 1st District of Maine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
86th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Dale Alford (H.Rept. 1172), 5th District of Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Maloney v. Smith (H.Rept. 1409), 6th District of Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Meyers v. Springer (Report unavailable), 22d District of Illinois . . . . . . . . 20
Ron Taylor (Report unavailable), 12th District of North Carolina . . . . . . . 20
87th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Morgan M. Moulder (Report unavailable), 11th District of Missouri . . . . . 21
Victor Wickersham (Report unavailable), 6th District of Oklahoma . . . . . . 21
Roush v. Chambers (H.Rept. 513), 5th District of Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
88th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Odegard v. Olson (Report unavailable), 6th District of Minnesota . . . . . . . 22
89th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Frankenberry v. Ottinger (Report not filed), 25th District of New York . . 22
Wheadon v. Abernethy (H.Rept. 1008), 1st District of Mississippi
Hamer v. Whitten (H.Rept. 1008), 2nd District of Mississippi
Cosey, Wilson, and Johnson v. Williams (H.Rept. 1008), 3rd District of Mississippi
Devine v. Walker (H.Rept. 1008), 4th District of Mississippi
Jackson v. Colmer (H.Rept. 1008), 5th District of Mississippi . . . . . . 23
Peter v. Gross (H.Rept. 1127), 3rd District of Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
90th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Mackay v. Blackburn (H.Rept. 366), 4th District of Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Lowe v. Thompson (H.Rept. 365), 5th District of Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
91st Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Lowe v. Thompson (H.Rept. 159), 5th District of Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
92nd Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Tunno v. Veysey (H.Rept. 627), 38th District of California . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
The Case of William Conover (H.Rept. 1091), 27th District of
Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
93rd Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
94th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Young v. Mikva (H.Rept. 759), 10th District of Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Kyros v. Emery (H.Rept. 760), 1st District of Maine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Wilson v. Hinsh (H.Rept. 761), 40th District of California . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Mack v. Stokes (H.Rept. 762), 21st District of Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Ziebarth v. Smith (H.Rept. 763), 3rd District of Nebraska . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
95th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Saunders v. Kelly (H.Rept. 242), 5th District of Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Paul v. Gammage (H.Rept. 243), 22nd District of Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Young v. Mikva (H.Rept. 244), 10th District of Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Pierce v. Pursell (H.Rept. 245), 2nd District of Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Dehr v. Leggett (H.Rept. 654), 4th District of California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Hill and Panasigui v. Clay (H.Rept. 723), 1st District of Missouri . . . . . . 33
Lowe v. Fowler (H.Rept. 724), 5th District of Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Moreau v. Tonry (No report filed - contestee resigned), 1st District of
Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
96th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Perkins v. Byron (H.Rept. 78), 6th District of Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Hanania-Freeman v. Mitchell (H.Rept. 226), 7th District of Maryland . . . 35
Rayner v. Stewart (H.Rept. 316), 1st District of Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Wilson v. Leach (H.Rept. 784), 4th District of Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Thorsness v. Daschle (H.Rept. 785), 1st District of South Dakota . . . . . . . 36
97th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
98th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Archer v. Packard (H.Rept. 452), 43rd District of California . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Hendon v. Clarke (H.Rept. 453), 11th District of North Carolina . . . . . . . . 37
99th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
McCloskey and McIntyre (H.Rept. 58), 8th District of Indiana . . . . . . . . . . 38
Won Pat v. Blaz (H.Rept. 220), Guam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Hansen v. Stallings (H.Rept. 290), 2nd District of Idaho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
100th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
101st Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
102nd Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
103rd Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
McCuen v. Dickey (H.Rept. 109), 4th District of Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
104th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Anderson v. Rose (H.Rept. 852), 7th District of North Carolina . . . . . . . . . 40
Haas v. Bass (H.Rept. 853), 2nd District of New Hampshire . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Munster v. Gejdenson (No report filed), 2nd District of Connecticut . . . . . 41
Brooks v. Harman (No report filed), 36th District of California . . . . . . . . . 41
105th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Dornan v. Sanchez (H.Rept. 416), 46th District of California . . . . . . . . . . . 41
106th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
107th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
108th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Tataii v. Case (H.Rept. 207), 2nd District of Hawaii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Lyons v. Gordon (H.Rept. 208), 6th District of Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
109th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Lyons v. Gordon (H.Rept. 57), 6th District of Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
House Contested Election Cases:
1933 to 2005
The following compilation provides a synopsis of House of Representatives’
contested election cases since March 1933, with particular reference to the nature of
the contest and the disposition of the case. The information herein solely represents
the findings of the reporting congressional committee. No independent analysis was
conducted by CRS to make any of the findings in this report.
73rd Congress
Bowles v. Dingell (H.Rept. 695), 15th District of Michigan
Nature of contest - Unknown. There was no notice of contest ever filed in this
matter and consequently the Committee on Elections dismissed it and recommended
(H.Rept. 695, February 9, 1934) H.Res. 260, that Charles Bowles, the contestant, was
not entitled to a seat and that John D. Dingell, the contestee, was.
Disposition of the contest - H.Res. 260, awarding the seat to Mr. Dingell was
introduced by Mr. Kerr and passed by the House, February 24, 1934 (see 78 Cong.
Rec. 2282, 2292, 3165).
Shanahan v. Beck (H.Rept. 694), 2nd District of Pennsylvania
Nature of contest - Unknown. While a notice of contest was filed, the
contestant failed to transmit the evidence taken in this matter to the Clerk of the
House. There was no evidence before the Committee on Elections and no briefs were
filed. The Committee dismissed the contest (H.Rept. 694, February 9, 1934) even
though its report noted that “the official returns in this contest disclose that the
contestant had more than a 14,000 majority of the votes cast in the General election
held November 8, 1932 . . . .”
Disposition of the contest - H.Res. 259, was reported from the Committee on
Elections recommending that John J. Shanahan, the contestant, was not entitled to
a seat and that James M. Beck, the contestee was. This was passed by the House,
February 24, 1934, (see, 78 Cong. Rec. 2282, 2292,3165).
Reese v. Ellzey (H.Rept. 696), 8th District of Mississippi
Nature of contest - Contestant, the regular Republican candidate for Congress
in the 8th District of Mississippi complained of infractions of the Mississippi election
laws, in that there had been a second candidate for Congress on the ballot in the
District who ran as a “Republican” but who had no connection with the regular,
national party, and that there had been a failure to appoint any Republican election
officers or judges in the District “as mandated by the laws of the State of Mississippi”
(see H.Rept. 696).
CRS-2
Disposition of the contest - The contestant, Reese, filed a letter with the House
Elections Committee on May 6, 1933, withdrawing from the contest (H.Rept. 696).
The Committee recommended the adoption of H.Res. 261, declaring that L.G. Reese
was not entitled to the seat and that Russell Ellzey was. On February 24, 1934, the
House adopted H.Res. 261 (see 78 Cong. Rec. 2282, 3165).
Brewster v. Utterback (H.Rept. 1725), 3rd District of Maine
Nature of the contest - Contestee, John C. Utterback, was returned by a
majority of 294 votes (34,520 to 34,226). Contestant, Ralph O. Brewster, charged:
(1) illegal or insufficient returns, (2) illegal and fraudulent registrations, (3) illegal
and fraudulent marking of ballots ( H.Rept. 1725). Also the Governor of Maine sent
the tabulation with a statement that Mr. Utterback was “apparently elected” (77
Cong. Rec. 71, March 9, 1933). The Elections Committee majority voted that there
had been some election irregularities in some of the precincts in the District, but
stated, “these irregularities, however, are of long standing and were no different in
the election under consideration than in preceding elections in which the contestant
was a successful candidate for office” (Id.).
The contest involved 16 precincts and had been submitted to the Supreme Court
of Maine, which could render advisory opinions to the Governor and council. The
Court advised that the returns from two of the precincts should be thrown out for
failure of the election officials to carry out certain statutory duties. With these
returns out, contestee had a majority of 74 votes. The Committee held hearings on
the returns from the 14 precincts and concluded that there “was no sufficient
evidence of legal fraud or intentional corruptness to justify the Committee to recount
the ballots of the precincts or to justify the Committee in sustaining the contestant’s
contentions.” (Id.)
A minority report was filed.
Disposition of the contest - The Committee recommended H.Res. 390,
denying that contestant Brewster was entitled to the seat and awarding it to contestee
Utterback. The resolution was adopted by the House on May 28, 1934, (see 78 Cong.
Rec. 3874, 9259, 9760).
Casey v. Turpin (H.Rept. 930), 12th District of Pennsylvania
Nature of the contest - Unknown. The contestant failed to transmit evidence
taken in the matter, to the Clerk of the House. The Elections Committee, having no
evidence before it, dismissed the case and recommended that John J. Casey, the
contestant, was not entitled to the seat and that C. Murray Turpin, the contestee, was
(H.Rept. 930).
Disposition of the contest - H.Res. 345, denying the seat to contestant Casey
and awarding it to contestee Turpin, was adopted by the House, April 20, 1934 (see
78 Cong. Rec. 137, 1854, 4359, 4360, 7002).
Gormley v. Goss (H.Rept. 893), 5th District of Connecticut
Nature of the contest - Contestee received 42,132 votes and contestant, 42,054,
a majority for the contestee of 78 votes. Contestant charged that through fraud,
CRS-3
irregularities, corruption, and deceit, contestant was deprived of sufficient votes
necessary to overcome contestee’s majority. The main issue centered around the
voting at one voting booth in one precinct in the city of Waterbury (H.Rept. 893).
The Elections Committee recognized that the allegations of the contestant were
general and were vague and uncertain as to necessary particulars, and, that while they
did not meet the statutory requirements, the Committee would, nevertheless, “pierce
the veil.” (Id.)
The Committee set forth certain guiding postulates:
“(1) The official returns are the prima facie evidence of the regularity and
correctness of official action.
(2) election officials are presumed to have performed their duties loyally and
honestly.
(3) The burden of coming forward with evidence to meet or resist these
presumptions rests with the contestant.” (Id.)
The Committee held hearings and ascertained that while confusion existed at the
polling place as to voting for repeal of the 18th Amendment, “in no instance was a
single complaint made to anyone at the polling place as to irregularity, interference,
or fraud, and this, in spite of the fact that the election board was nonpartisan.” (Id).
The Committee consequently held that the contestant failed to establish his case
by a “fair preponderance of the evidence,” and that the contestee, Goss (a
Republican) was duly elected (Id.)
Disposition of the contest - H.Res. 346, awarding the seat to contestee, Goss,
was adopted by the House, April 20, 1934 (see 78 Cong. Rec. 4035, 7087).
Chandler v. Burnham (H.Rept. 1278), 20th District of
California
Nature of the contest - Contestee received a plurality of 518 votes in the
official returns. Contestant charged that he had received a majority of the lawful
votes cast; that in many of the election districts he was deprived of the rightful count
by reason of the fact that many of the election officers rejected ballots in favor of him
on the ground of their being void, spoiled, mutilated, or marked; that in many of the
election districts, the unused ballots, together with the stubs of the used ballots,
exceeded the number of ballots delivered to the precincts; that in many of the election
precincts the unused ballots together with the stubs of the used ballots, were less than
the number of ballots delivered; that, in many of the election precincts many used
ballots were missing from the ballot boxes and were unaccounted for (H.Rept. 1278).
The Elections Committee again reiterated its warning about vague charges and
pointed out that the statute required the notice of contest to contain particulars (Id.)
The Committee, in addition to the three general guidelines for judging contested
elections cases which it set forth in Gormley v. Goss, supra, prescribed two more:
“(4) That fraud is never presumed, but must be proven.
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(5) That the mere closeness of the result of an election raises no presumption
of fraud, irregularities or dishonesty.” (Id.)
The Committee declared that the record disclosed no evidence of fraud or
deception and that a private recount taken by the contestant without the knowledge
of the contestee, and which supposedly showed a decided gain for the contestant, was
inadmissible as uncorroborated and self-serving.
In respect to the contestant’s charge that not all election board members signed
the returns in some precincts and that none did in others, the Committee stated (p. 4):
The Constitutional and statutory provisions relating to suffrage may be divided into
two classes: First, mandatory, which defines the right of suffrage; second, directory,
which directs the manner of its exercise. The first confers the right, and the last
throws safeguards around that right. The laws enacted for the purpose of conserving
the right of the elector to exercise his franchise are mandatory or directory depending
upon whether the statutes make them so. If the statute provides that unless a certain
procedure is followed the election is void, then the law is mandatory. If, however,
it prescribes for the doing or not doing of a certain thing in a certain manner by the
election officers and fixes a penalty for the disobedience of the law, but does not
provide that such violation shall void the election, then it is directory.
The rules prescribed by law for conducting an election are designed chiefly to accord
an opportunity for the free and fair exercise of the elective franchise to prevent illegal
voting, and to ascertain with certainty the result. A departure from the mode
prescribed will not vitiate an election, if the irregularities do not deprive any legal
voter of his vote, or admit an illegal vote, or cast uncertainty on the result, and has
not been occasioned by the agency of a party seeking to derive benefit from them.”
(Supra, p. 4)
Holding that the contestant’s claims that votes from certain precincts should be
rejected because the boards were not sworn in would not vitiate an election, since
such boards were acting under color of office, the Committee concluded that the
contestant had failed to establish his allegations of fraud, etc. (Id.)
Disposition of the contest - H.Res. 386, declaring the contestee, Burnham, to
have been duly elected, was passed by the House on May 15, 1934, (see 78 Cong.
Rec. 6971, 8921).
Ellis v. Thurston (H.Rept. 1305), 5th District of Iowa
Nature of the contest - Contestee, Thurston, received a majority of 177 votes,
and on a recount agreed to by the parties a 619 majority, and on a split of disputed
ballots a majority of 194 (H.Rept. 1305). The main question was whether ballots
voted for the presidential nominees of the parties but not for the congressional
candidates should be counted as straight party tickets, even though the laws of Iowa
provided a separate space for a straight party vote. The Committee decided against
such an assumption and found that the contestee, Thurston, had been duly elected
(supra).
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Disposition of the contest - H.Res. 359, denying the election of the contestant
Ellis, and awarding the seat to the contestee, Thurston, was passed by the House,
April 25, 1934 (see 78 Cong. Rec. 2769, 7186, 7190, 7371).
Felix v. Muldowney (No report filed), 82nd District of
Pennsylvania
Nature of the contest - Unknown. A letter from the Clerk of the House
submitting the papers in the case can be found in 78 Cong. Rec. 4500 (March 14,
1934), but there was no further action after that.
Fox v. Higgins (H.Rept. 894), 2nd District of Connecticut
Nature of the contest - Contestant, Fox claimed that contestee, Higgins,
induced a person named Rollo to run as a “Wet” Party candidate for Congress in the
District; that 624 voters voted either a straight Republican or Democratic ticket plus
a straight “Wet” Party ticket under the impression that they were voting for the repeal
of the 18th Amendment; that such ballots were not counted; that they should be
counted as Democratic or Republican ballots and if so counted would produce a
majority for the contestant (H.Rept. 894). The Elections Committee found no
evidence of any collusion between the contestee, Higgins, and Rollo, nor any
evidence of confusion because of the make-up of the ballot, nor any evidence as to
the intention of the 624 voters who voted for two parties. There was no reason to
change the result of the election (Id.)
Disposition of the contest - H.Res. 296, declining to seat Mr. Fox and awarding
the seat to the contestee, Mr. Higgins, was passed by the House, May 28, 1934 (see
78 Cong. Rec. 4185, 4223, 9760).
Estep v. Ellenbogen (H.Rept. 1341), 33rd District of
Pennsylvania
Nature of the contest - Contestant, Estep, was not a candidate, but a former
member who challenged the qualifications of contestee Ellenbogen on the ground
that he had not been a citizen for 7 years at the date of election (6 years and 8½
months). Ellenbogen stood aside on the opening of the House session on March 9,
1933, and did not present himself until January 3, 1934, when he had been a citizen
for 7½ years. He was sworn and took his seat (78 Cong. Rec. II). The Committee
held that he qualified at the time of the administration of the oath, and equated the
citizenship requirement with the age requirement, holding that both could be met
subsequent to the election (H.Rept. 1431). It also equated the situation with that of
Members-elect holding incompatible offices at the time of election who later divest
themselves thereof.
Disposition of the contest - H.Res. 370 stating that Representative Ellenbogen
was qualified when he took the oath of office on January 3, 1934, and that he was
entitled to the seat, was passed by the House, June 16, 1934, (see 78 Cong. Rec.
7873, 7876, 12193).
Sanders v. Kemp (H.Rept. 334), 6th District of Louisiana
Nature of the contest - The elected Congressman, Honorable Bolivar Kemp,
died on June 19, 1933. On December 5, 1933, a special election at the call of the
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Governor was held to fill the vacancy. The Governor, however, only gave eight days’
notice of the election, which was not in conformity with Louisiana law. Mrs. Kemp,
the contestee was elected. On December 27, 1933, another special election was held,
called pursuant to a mass meeting of the citizens of the District. At this election, Mr.
Sanders was elected, (H.Rept. 334). The Committee held that both elections were
void under Louisiana law, the first because the party committee had not been given
“at least ten days” to select a candidate, and the second because there was no
provision in the Louisiana law for holding an election in such a fashion (Id).
Disposition of the contest - H.Res. 202, under which neither party would be
seated until the Elections Committee could investigate and report and the House
decide, was agreed to on January 3, 1934 (78 Cong. Rec. 12). The resolution was
presented at the request of the Louisiana delegation to Congress. On January 29,
1934, H.Res. 231, declaring both elections to be null and void and that neither Mrs.
Kemp nor Mr. Sanders was entitled to the seat, was passed by the House after some
debate (78 Cong. Rec. 1513-1521; see also pp. 1513-1521; see also pp. 1108, 1034,
1035, 1107, 1206, 1208, 1510).
LaGuardia v. Lanzetta (No report filed), 20th District of New
York
Nature of the contest - Unknown. The letter of the Clerk of the House to the
Speaker about the case, on January 2, 1934, (78 Cong. Rec. 137), indicated that the
time for taking testimony had long since expired and that the case had abated.
Disposition of the contest - The case was not referred to the Committee. The
contestee was seated by the House.
Lovette v. Reece (H.Rept. 1306), 1st District of Tennessee
Nature of the contest - Of six candidates in the race, the election was won by
contestee, B. Carroll Reece. Contestant, Lovette, alleged general charges of fraud.
However, he offered no specific evidence at hearings held by the Committee.
Amended charges by the contestant, Lovette, also alleged general charges of fraud
and at hearings no specific evidence was ascertained. Furthermore, amended charges
by the contestant provided no additional evidence (H.Rept. 1306). The Committee
concluded that the evidence failed “utterly” to substantiate the charges (Id.)
Disposition of the contest - H.Res. 358, declining the seat to contestant
Lovette, and awarding it to contestee Reece, was passed by the House, April 25, 1934
(78 Cong. Rec. 136, 7186, 7190, 7371).
McAndrews v. Britten (H.Rept. 1298), 9th District of Illinois
Nature of the contest - Contestant, McAndrews, charged violations of the
Corrupt Practices Act, which the Election Committee concluded were
unsubstantiated (H.Rept. 1298). Contestant also attempted to show corruption
because the split votes cast for the contestee, Britten, were disproportionate to the
straight votes cast for him. The Committee found this inconclusive (Id.)
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Disposition of the contest - H.Res. 362, declaring that McAndrews was not
elected and that the contestee, Britten was elected, was adopted by the House, after
debate, on April 26, 1934 (see 78 Cong. Rec. 136, 7165, 7371, 7456-7462).
Weber v. Simpson (H.Rept. 1494), 10th District of Illinois
Nature of the contest - Contestee, Simpson, was elected by 1,222 votes out of
some 201,500. Contestant, after an examination of the tally sheets in all the precincts
in the District revealed mistakes in 128 precincts which lowered contestee’s majority
to 920 votes, asked for a recount (H.Rept. 1494). The Elections Committee
concluded there was no evidence of fraud or irregularities, and that the contestant had
failed to overcome the prime facie case for the contestee. It declined to undertake the
recount (Id.)
Disposition of the contest - H.Res. 374, awarding the seat to contestee,
Simpson, was reported from the Elections Committee on May 4, 1934 (see 78 Cong.
Rec. 760-61, 8085, 8122). No record of its being called up for passage was found.
Francis H. Shoemaker (No report filed), of Minnesota
Nature of contest - On opening day, March 9, 1933, Mr. Shoemaker was asked
to stand aside at the general swearing in (77 Cong. Rec. 71). House Resolution 6,
was introduced, alleging that he was ineligible, that he had not been sworn in, and
directing that the question of his prima facie right, as well as his permanent right, be
examined by the Elections Committee. It was asserted that he had been indicted and
convicted in 1930 and had served a sentence for a felony, mailing libelous matter.
Debate began on the resolution and was continued on March 10, 1933, when a
substitute resolution was offered authorizing the Speaker to administer the oath to
Mr. Shoemaker and have the question of the permanent right referred to the Elections
Committee (77 Cong. Rec. 132). After extended debate (77 Cong. Rec. 131-139),
the substitute resolution was agreed to, and the preamble of the original resolution
alleging Mr. Shoemaker’s ineligibility was stricken (77 Cong. Rec. 139).
Disposition of the contest - There is no indication that the matter was
considered by the Committee.
74th Congress
Lanzetta v. Marcantonio (H.Rept. 3084), 20th District of New
York
Nature of contest - Contestee was elected by a majority of 246. Contestant
charged “the violation of nearly all of the election laws including intimidation of
voters, violation of the Corrupt Practices Act, illegal and excessive expenditure of
money, failure to account for various contributions, inciting and leading riots as well
as many other law violations.” (H.Rept. 3084). The Committee concluded that none
of the charges were sufficiently proven despite the fact that more than 4,000 pages
of testimony and exhibits were taken. Although the election had been held on
November 6, 1934, the record was not filed with the Clerk of the House until the
early part of 1936. The Committee, however, still considered it, finding that the
volume was such that it could not properly decide the contest without taking further
testimony, which, because of the nearness of adjournment, was impossible. (Id.).
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Disposition of the contest - H.Res. 560, declaring that Lanzetta, the contestant,
was not entitled to the seat and that Marcantonio, the contestee, was (80 Cong. Rec.
18615, June 20, 1936), was passed by the House.
McCandless v. King (H.Rept. 2736), Delegate from Hawaii
Nature of the contest - Contestee, King, won by a majority of 1,857 votes.
Contestant charged (1) intimidation and coercion of the voters by the contestee, and
(2) excessive campaign expenditures and other violations of the Corrupt Practices
Act (H.Rept. 2736). Contestee charged lack of timely notice by the contestant (Id.).
The Elections Committee concluded that all of the charges should be dismissed: the
first, because it was concluded that such acts did not occur; the second, because the
peculiar circumstances of the case influenced the Committee’s decision. The
contestee had failed to fully file, and the Committee stated that it might “feel
constrained to hold that the contestee’s failure to comply with the Corrupt Practices
Act was sufficient grounds to recommend the forfeiture of his seat,” (supra, p.3) but
the contestee’s full disclosure to the Committee plus lack of evidence that funds were
used improperly or illegally to influence the election, and that contestee’s failure in
no way affected the rights of the contestant, were mitigating factors. (Id.). A third
contention by the contestant was dismissed upon an examination of the laws of
Hawaii. (Id.).
Disposition of the contest - H.Res. 521, declaring that McCandless, the
contestant, was not elected, and that King, the contestee, was, was passed by the
House on June 2, 1936 (80 Cong. Rec. 7765, 8705).
Miller v. Cooper (H.Rept. 2131), 19th District of Ohio
Nature of the contest - The contestee, Cooper, received a plurality of 4,177
votes, from three counties in the District. Contestant charged irregularities in one
county, and the Committee, after investigation, concluded that although there was
some evidence of destruction of ballots and vote tabulations in one county, there was
no connection of these acts to the contestee. Furthermore, if the votes of the one
county were to be excluded, contestee would still win by 2,000 votes (H.Rept. 2131).
Disposition of the contest - H.Res. 438, declaring Miller, the contestant, not
entitled to the seat, and Cooper, that contestee, elected to the seat, was passed by the
House on March 11, 1936, (see 88 Cong. Rec. 98, 3337, 3740).
75th Congress
Roy v. Jenks (H.Rept. 1521),1st District of New Hampshire
Nature of the contest - Contestee, Jenks, received a plurality of 550 votes of
the official returns. Contestant, Roy, sought a recount by the New Hampshire
Secretary of State pursuant to New Hampshire law, and the result of this was a tie.
Both candidates appealed to the State ballot-law commission, which considered 108
controversial ballots. It decided that Mr. Roy, the contestant, had a majority of 17
votes. Before the Governor issued an election certificate to Mr. Roy, Mr. Jenks
disclosed 34 or 36 missing ballots in one precinct. The ballot-law commission held
hearings on the missing ballots and heard witnesses, and concluded that all 34 were
cast for Mr. Jenks, and that he was the final winner by 10 votes (H.Rept. 1521). A
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certificate of election was issued by the Secretary of State to Mr. Jenks. The issue
revolved around the missing 34 ballots and the probative force of the recounts and
determinations in view of the fact that the ballot boxes might have been tampered
with. (Id.).
Upon examination, the majority of the Committee concluded that the contestant,
Mr. Roy, was the winner by a majority of 20 votes and so recommended. (Id. ). A
minority report disagreed.
Disposition of the contest - The majority of the Committee reported H.Res.
309, declaring that the contestee, Jenks, was not entitled to the seat and that the
contestant, Roy, was. (81 Cong. Rec. 8842-8846, August 13, 1937). After further
debate, (pp. 9356-9347, August 19, 1937), the resolution was recommitted by a vote
of 231-129, and the Committee directed to take further testimony in the precinct of
the 34 missing ballots.
The length of the contest influenced a ruling by the Speaker, on August 13,
1937, that House Rule XI, requiring election cases to be reported within six months
from the convening of Congress, was directory rather than mandatory (81 Cong. Rec.
9501).
On August 21, 1937, H.Res. 339, authorizing the Committee on Elections to
hold hearings during the recess of the 75th Congress, was agreed to (81 Cong. Rec.
9627).
On April 28, 1938, the Committee, after hearings, reported H.Res. 482,
recommending that Mr. Roy be seated (83 Cong. Rec. 5960). The Committee
majority concluded that the ballots cast in the election had been preserved and that
the original recounts should be accepted; that the contestant, Mr. Roy, was the winner
by 20 votes (H.Rept. 2255).
On June 9, 1938, the House, after debate, on a division of H.Rept. 482, adopted
the first part of the resolution that Mr. Jenks was not entitled to the seat (214 - 122),
and then adopted the second part, that Mr. Roy, the contestant, was entitled to the
seat (227 - 109) (see 83 Cong. Rec. 5960-61, 8642-8660, 8661, and Appx, p. 2613).
Rutherford v. Taylor (No report filed), 2nd District of
Tennessee
Nature of the contest - Contestant charged that because of the “influence” of
contestee, Taylor, the boards of election commissioners in certain counties of the 2nd
Congressional District failed to place the name of contestant, as an independent, on
the November ballot; that such action was an infraction of the election laws of
Tennessee; and that through contestee’s “influence,” thousands of tax receipts were
distributed to voters prior to the election, thus corrupting them (H. Doc. 282). Notice
of contest was filed and testimony taken, but the latter was not filed with the Clerk
of the House of Representatives (81 Cong. Rec. 6630, 6643).
Disposition of the contest - Failure of the contestant to proceed apparently
abated the contest (see above).
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William v. Maas (No report filed),4th District of Minnesota
Nature of the contest - Unknown. Letter from Clerk of the House announcing
withdrawal of contestant placed in Congressional Record of March 30, 1937, (81
Cong. Rec. 2901).
76th Congress
Smith v. Polk (No report filed), 6th District of Ohio
Nature of the contest - Unknown. During pendency of the contest, a letter
from the Clerk of the House to the Speaker announcing the withdrawal of the
contestant was inserted in the Congressional Record on March 15, 1939 (8th Cong.
Rec. 2761, 2794).
Disposition of the contest - H.Res. 156, declaring the election of the contestee,
Polk, was passed by the House, April 10, 1939 (84 Cong. Rec. 4040).
Swanson v. Harrington (H.Rept. 1722), 9th District of Iowa
Nature of the contest - Contestee, Harrington, received a majority of 339
votes. Contestant alleged fraud, misconduct, and illegality, (H.Rept. 1722), claiming
more specifically that 70 votes cast by WPA workers temporarily in the District were
illegal, and, that the contestant gained through an informal recount in one county in
connection with a race for sheriff, sufficient votes, which, when added to the 70
illegal votes cast, would give him a plurality of 5 votes (Id.).
The Committee determined that contestant had not exhausted his remedy in the
courts of the State for a recount under State law (Id.). It concluded that the 70 WPA
workers’ votes were illegal and should be disregarded, although such action would
not affect the final result (Id.). It noted the informal recount taken in connection with
a recount for sheriff and another for a seat in the State Legislature, and concluded that
no evidence was produced to demonstrate fraud or irregularity. As for the
contestant’s application for a recount, the Committee stated, “It is a well settled
principle established by the precedents and accepted by Congress that an application
for a recount must be founded upon some proof sufficient at least to raise a
presumption of irregularity or fraud, and a recount will not be ordered upon the mere
suggestion of possible error.” (supra, p. 3).
Returns made by election officials regularly appointed by the laws of the State
where the election is held are presumed to be correct until they are impeached by
proof of irregularity and fraud (Id.)
Disposition of the contest - H.Res. 419, declaring that contestant Swanson was
not entitled to the seat and that contestee, Harrington, was, was passed by the House,
March 11, 1940 (see 86 Cong. Rec. 6, 15, 2662, 2689).
Scott v. Eaton (H.Rept. 1783), 10th District of California
Nature of the contest - Contestee Eaton received a majority of 342 votes.
Contestant raised questions as to violation of the Federal and State Corrupt Practices
Acts (H.Rept. 1783). The Elections Committee concluded that contestant had failed
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to meet the burden of proving by a fair preponderance of the evidence the issues
raised (Id.).
Disposition of the contest - H.Res. 427, declaring that contestant Scott was not
elected to the seat and that contestee Eaton was, was reported from the Elections
Committee on March 14, 1940 (86 Cong. Rec. 2885; see also 86 Cong. Rec. 6, 15).
There is no indication that any action was taken on the resolution.
Neal v. Kefauver (H.Rept. 2609), 3rd District of Tennessee
Nature of the contest - Unknown. The Elections Committee dismissed the
contest because the contestant had failed to take evidence as required by law and
there was no evidence or briefs for the Committee to consider (H.Rept. 2609).
Disposition of the contest - H.Res. 534, declaring the contestant, Neal, not
entitled to the seat and contestee, Kefauver, so entitled was reported from the
Elections Committee on June 18, 1940 (86 Cong. Rec. 8535; see also 86 Cong. Rec.
2202, 2246). There is no indication that any action was taken on the resolution.
77th Congress
Miller v. Kirwan (No report filed), 19th District of Ohio
Nature of the contest - Unknown.
Disposition of the contest - H.Res. 54 was reported to the House on January
18, 1941 as a privileged resolution and was immediately passed (87 Cong. Rec. 101).
It stated that contestant Miller had served notice of contest on contestee, Kirwan, but
that Miller was not a candidate for election at the general election of November,
1940. Rather, he had been a candidate at the Democratic primary. The resolution
concluded: “Resolved, that the House of Representatives does not regard the said
Locke Miller as a person competent to bring a contest for a seat in the House and his
notice of contest, served upon the sitting member, Michael J. Kirwan, is hereby
dismissed; and no petition or other paper relating to the subject matter contained in
this resolution shall be received by the House, or entertained in any way whatever.”
78th Congress
Clark v. Nichols (H.Rept. 1120), 2nd District of Oklahoma
Nature of the contest - Contestant charged fraud and irregularities, and
violations and disregard of the State election laws by election officials, to the extent
that he was deprived of votes that would have given him the election (H.Rept. 1120).
The Elections Committee concluded that no fraud was perpetrated on the contestant
by any election official so as to deprive him of votes; that the election officials saw
to it that every person entitled to vote was granted the opportunity; that no person not
entitled to vote was permitted to vote; and that the result of the balloting as certified
by the officials was correct (Id.).
Some irregularities did occur such as not keeping registration books in some of
the precincts as prescribed by Oklahoma law, but the Committee concluded, “It is not
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the business nor the province of this Committee to attempt indirectly to compel the
State of Oklahoma to enforce its laws with respect to certain provisions therein which
patently were not complied with, but grossly disregarded. The electors, the people,
of the district did choose between two candidates and they should not be deprived of
their rights by the failure to those responsible for the administration of the law to do
their duty” (supra, p. 2).
The guiding principle, as enunciated in earlier cases, is the application of the
mandatory or directory concept to the law alleged to have been violated (Id.). The
Committee concluded that while the constitution and laws of Oklahoma required
registration books to be kept in the precincts, that such requirement not complied
with, was not such an irregularity as to vitiate an election “unless the performance of
the act of keeping the book be declared by law to be essential to the validity of the
election” (supra, p. 2). Under Oklahoma law the maintenance of the registration
book was held to be directory. “It follows, therefore, that the provision is merely
directory and the final test as to legality of the election is whether or not the electors
have been given an opportunity to express and have fairly expressed their will”
(supra, p. 2).
The Committee concluded that the claim that there were irregularities sufficient
to constitute a claim of fraud was not sustained, and that the claim that the
irregularities were of such nature as to invalidate the election was not tenable since
the provisions of law governing the alleged irregularities were directory and not
mandatory (Id.).
Contestant had failed to sustain the burden of proof.
Disposition of the contest - H.Res. 440, dismissing the contest, was passed by
the House on February 16, 1944 (98 Cong. Rec. 1763; see also 89 Cong. Rec. 42434244, 10371; 90 Cong. Rec. 1675, 1718, 1761-1763).
Moreland v. Schuetz (H.Rept. 1158), 7th District of Illinois
Nature of the contest - Contestee received a plurality of 1,975 votes.
Contestant alleged fraud, mistake, miscounting, mistallying, illegalities “and other
wrongs” (H.Rept. 1158), but the question at issue was whether the Elections
Committee should conduct a full recount of the ballots. Contestant and contestee
entered into an agreement for a recount, which was commenced. It indicated some
irregularities in the ballots for both parties, and was suspended by the contestant after
about 42% of the ballots had been recounted with no substantial change in favor of
the contestant (Id.).
The Committee concluded that the results of the partial recount did not warrant
a full recount, and that the contestant had failed to sustain, by sufficient proof, his
allegations. It is the obligation of the contestant, not the Committee, to secure
evidence (Id.).
Disposition of the contest - On April 6, 1943, the House passed a resolution
extending the time for taking testimony in the case (see H.Rept. 345; 89 Cong. Rec.
2982; House Doc. 120, 89 Cong. Rec. 1456-57; House Doc. 357, 89 Cong. Rec.
9529, 9556).
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On February 17, 1944, the House adopted H.Res. 444, dismissing the contest
against Mr. Schuetz (90 Cong. Rec. 1834; see 90 Cong. Rec. 1833-34, 1871).
McEvoy v. Peterson (H.Rept. 1423), 1st District of Georgia
Nature of the contest - Unclear. The Contestant attempted to run as an
independent Republican though there was no such political party in Georgia, and that
his name did not appear on any ballots and that he received no votes whatsoever. The
Committee also concluded that the contestant failed to exhaust all legal remedies
available to him under the laws of Georgia, had not filed the election contest in good
faith, and had failed to make out a prima facie case (H.Rept. 1423).
Disposition of the contest - H.Res. 534, dismissing the contest against
contestee, Peterson, was passed by the House, May 5, 1944 (90 Cong. Rec. 4074,
4078; see also 89 Cong. Rec. 7682, H. Doc. 2881).
Schufer v. Wasielewski (H.Rept. 1300), 4th District of
Wisconsin
Nature of the contest - Contestee, Wasielewski, received a majority of 17,000
votes. Contestant charged that contestee made expenditures in excess of those
permitted under the laws of Wisconsin and the Federal Corrupt Practices Act; that
contestee failed to fill correct reports with the Secretary of State of Wisconsin and
the Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives; that contestee violated the laws of
Wisconsin by publishing false and improper statements about the contestant (H. Doc.
282; H.Rept. 1300). The Committee concluded that the amounts of expenditures
shown on the reports filed by contestee were in excess of the Wisconsin and Federal
limitations, but that most of such expenditures were by a campaign committee which
was not limited by the law of either jurisdiction in its expenditures (Id.). It also
concluded that the funds expended by the campaign committee were not disbursed
with contestee’s knowledge, consent, and approval (Id.). The Elections Committee
concluded that contestee had made mistakes in his filings resulting from negligence
which could not be condoned, but that there were no evidences of fraud. The
irregularity was not enough to thwart the will of the electorate and deny the contestee
his seat (Id).
Disposition of the contest - H.Res. 490, dismissing the contest against
contestee, Wasielewski, was passed by the House on March 29, 1944 (90 Cong. Rec.
3252; see also 89 Cong. Rec. 7682; 90 Cong. Rec. 3287).
Thill v. McMurray (H.Rept. 1032), 5th District of Wisconsin
Nature of the contest - Contestee received a majority of 6,000 votes.
Contestant charged violations of the Wisconsin and Federal Corrupt Practices laws
(H. Doc. 284; H.Rept. 1032). The Elections Committee concluded that while there
was spent on contestant’s behalf some $7,300, it was all spent by two campaign
committees and not by contestee. Consequently there was no violation of Wisconsin
or Federal law. (Id.). Furthermore, the Committee noted, that in line with its policy
that a contestant, where recourse is available under State laws, should first exhaust
such remedies, a supporter of the contestant had petitioned the Attorney General of
Wisconsin for leave to bring a special investigation and had been turned down (Id.).
No effort was made by contestee to conceal expenditures and no evidence of fraud
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was disclosed. The Committee concluded that the will of the electorate should not
be thwarted because of irregularities in accounting (Id.).
Disposition of the contest - H.Res. 426, dismissing the contest against
contestee McMurray was passed by the House, January 31, 1944 (90 Cong. Rec. 933)
(see also 89 Cong. Rec. 7683, 90 Cong. Rec. 962).
Sullivan v. Miller (H.Rept. 180), 11th District of Missouri
Nature of the contest - Both contestant and contestee alleged that the ballots
had been miscounted at the November, 1942 election. They made a joint application
to the Elections Committee for permission to have a recount made through their own
offices and not through the Committee on the grounds that there was no provision in
Missouri law for a recount in a federal election. The Committee denied the request
(H. Doc. 58, H.Rept. 180) on the ground that it would set a precedent for the House
to intervene in an election contest that had been initiated but not brought officially
to the House simply for this purpose of procuring evidence for the use of the parties
to the contest (H.Rept. 180). The Committee concluded that jurisdiction of an
alleged contested election case cannot be conferred on the House or one of its
committees by any joint agreement of the parties unofficially or otherwise submitted.
Consequently, the House, on February 23, 1943 passed H.Res. 137 denying the joint
application (89 Cong. Rec. 1324).
The parties then proceeded to file in accordance with law and requested an
extension of time for taking testimony (H. Doc. 122, 89 Cong. Rec. 1473, 1499,
March 2, 1943). H.Res. 240, granting the request was passed by the House, May 17,
1943 (H.Rept. 454, 89 Cong. Rec. 4529).
Meanwhile, during the time that elapsed between the passage of H.Res. 137 and
H.Res. 240, the parties entered into an agreement for a recount which was conducted
on May 4, 1943. The recount did not substantially change the final result and on
June 5, 1943, the parties entered into a stipulation in which both parties agreed to
dismiss their claims (H.Rept. 887).
Disposition of the contest - H.Res. 368, dismissing the contest against
contestee Miller, was passed by the House, November 24, 1943 (89 Cong. Rec. 9974,
9975; see also H. Doc. 331, 89 Cong. Rec. 8173).
79th Congress
Hicks v. Dondero (H.Rept. 1404), 17th District of Michigan
Nature of the contest - Contestee received a majority of 29,000 votes.
Contestant filed “various and sundry general allegations” (H.Rept. 1404). Contestant
filed no evidence except two transcripts of proceedings before the Wayne County,
Michigan canvassing board taken on November 10 and 11, 1944, before the contest
was initiated. The Committee on Elections concluded that such evidence was ex
parte as respects the contestee and was “incompetent as proof of any issues urged by
the contestant”. (Id.).
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Disposition of the contest - H.Res. 455, dismissing the contest and declaring
that contestee Dondero was entitled to the seat, was passed by the House, December
12, 1945 (91 Cong. Rec. 11922, 11931; see also 91 Cong. Rec. 7877).
80th Congress
Mankin v. Davis (H.Rept. 1822), 5th District of Georgia
Nature of the contest - Unknown. H.Rept. 1822, merely states that, “the
aforementioned contest be dismissed as lacking in merit.”
Disposition of the contest - H.Res. 552, dismissing the contest against
contestee Davis and declaring that he was entitled to the seat, was passed by the
House, April 27, 1948 (94 Cong. Rec. 4902, 4922).
Lowe v. Davis (H.Rept. 1823), 5th District of Georgia
Nature of the contest - Unknown. H.Rept. 1823 merely states that “the
aforementioned contest be dismissed as lacking in merit.”
Disposition of the contest - H.Res. 553, dismissing the contest against
contestee Davis and declaring that he was entitled to the seat, was passed by the
House, April 27, 1948 (94 Cong. Rec. 4902, 4922; see also 93 Cong. Rec. 10613).
Michael v. Smith (H.Rept. 1106), 8th District of Virginia
Nature of the contest - Unknown. H.Rept. 1106 stated that the period for taking
testimony had expired and no evidence had been received by the Committee on
House Administration. It recommended that the contest be dismissed for “failure to
comply with the rules” (Id.).
Disposition of the contest - The contestee, Mr. Smith, filed a motion to dismiss
(see, H. Doc. 418; 93 Cong. Rec. 10268, 10522; see also, H. Doc. 213, 93 Cong. Rec.
3827, 3000).
H.Res. 345, dismissing the contest against contestee Smith and declaring Mr.
Smith to be entitled to the seat, was passed by the House, July 26, 1947 (93 Cong.
Rec. 10445, 10523).
Roberts v. Douglas (H.Rept. 1106), 14th District of California
Nature of the contest - Unknown. See H.Rept. 1106, Michael v.
Smith, supra.
Disposition of the contest - The contestee, Mrs. Douglas, filed a motion to
dismiss the contest, on July 24, 1947 (H. Doc. 416, 93 Cong. Rec. 10211, 10203).
H.Res. 345, dismissing the contest and declaring the contestee, Mrs. Douglas,
entitled to the seat, was passed by the House on July 26, 1947 (93 Cong. Rec. 10445,
10523).
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Woodward v. O’Brien (No report available), 6th District of
Illinois
Nature of the contest - No information.
Disposition of the contest - On July 26, 1947, the House adopted H.Res. 345,
80th Congress, dismissing the contest of Mr. Woodward and declaring that Mr.
O’Brien was entitled to his seat (93 Congressional Rec. 10445).
Wilson v. Granger (H.Rept. 2418), 1st District of Utah
Nature of the contest - It was alleged that the laws of Utah relating to the
registration of voters had been violated in numerous ways, such as illegal
appointment of registration officers, the manner of registration, the failure to enter
all required information upon the official register, etc.
Disposition of the contest - The Committee on House Administration found,
H.Rept. 2418, 80th Congress, that there had been numerous and widespread
irregularities and errors which revealed lack of knowledge and failure to enforce the
statutes relating to registration but that the true results of the election had not been
affected by such practices. The House adopted H.Res. 692, 80th Congress on June
19, 1948 to dismiss the contest and seat Mr. Granger. (94 Cong. Rec. 9184).
81st Congress
Thierry v. Feighan (H.Rept. 1252), 20th District of Ohio
Nature of the contest - Unknown.
Disposition of the contest - After more than 90 days had elapsed since the
filing of the notice of contest, with no testimony having been received in support of
the allegations, the Committee on House Administration, by H.Rept. 1252, 81st
Congress, recommended adoption of H.Res. 324, 81st Congress, declaring Mr.
Feighan to be entitled to his seat. This resolution was passed on August 11, 1949 (95
Congressional Rec. 11294).
Stevens v. Blackney (H.Rept. 1735), 6th District of Michigan
Nature of contest - Contestant sought a recount under supervision of the House
Committee, on the ground that there had been irregularities in the counting of ballots.
Disposition of the contest - The Committee on House Administration reported,
H.Rept. 1735, 81st Congress, that the evidence had not established the allegations in
the notice of contest. It recommended, and the House adopted, on May 23, 1950,
H.Res. 503, 81st Congress, declaring Mr. Blackney elected. (96 Congressional Rec.
7544).
Fuller v. Davies, (H.Rept. 1252), 35th District of New York
Nature of the contest - Unknown.
Disposition of the contest - After more than 90 days had elapsed since the
filing of the notice of contest, with no testimony having been received in support of
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the allegations, the Committee on House Administration, by H.Rept. 1252, 81st
Congress, recommended adoption of H.Res. 324, 81st Congress, declaring Mr.
Feighan to be entitled to his seat. This resolution was passed on August 11, 1949 (95
Congressional Rec. 11294).
Browner v. Cunningham (H.Rept. 1252), 5th District of Iowa
Nature of the contest - No information.
Disposition of the contest - After more than 90 days had elapsed since the
filing of the notice of contest, with no testimony having been received in support of
the allegations, the Committee on House Administration, By H.Rept. 1252, 81st
Congress, recommended adoption of H.Res. 324, 81st Congress, declaring Mr.
Cunningham to be entitled to his seat. This resolution was passed on August 11,
1949 (95 Congressional Rec. 11294).
82nd Congress
Macy v. Greenwood (H.Rept. 1599), 1st District of New York
Nature of contest - W. Kingsley Macy charged registration of electors not
qualified to vote because of failure to meet residence requirements of the state
constitution, registration of voters after expiration of time allowed by law for
registration and miscellaneous irregularities in registration and voting.
The Committee on House Administration reported in H. Report 1599, 82nd
Congress, that the evidence was insufficient to support the contestant’s charges, and
recommended the adoption of H.Res. 580, 82nd Congress, declaring Mr. Greenwood
elected. This resolution passed the House March 19, 1952 (98 Congressional Rec.
2517).
Karst v. Curtis (H.Rept. 905), 12th District of Missouri
Nature of the contest - Not disclosed by record.
Disposition of the contest - No testimony was taken in support of the contest
and, on June 4, 1951, Mr. Karst requested that it be dismissed. (H.Rept. No. 905,
82nd Congress). On August 21, 1951, the House passed H.Res. 399, 82nd Congress,
dismissing the contest (97 Congressional Rec. 18479).
Huber v. Ayres (H.Rept. 986), 14th District of Ohio
Nature of the contest - Mr. Huber contested the election of Wm. H. Ayres on
the ground that the county boards of election had failed to rotate the names of the
candidates on the ballots in the manner required by the Ohio constitution.
Disposition of the contest - The Committee on House Administration found
that the names had not been rotated as required but that Mr. Huber had an adequate
remedy under State law prior to election, and that the results of the election should
not be overturned because of such a pre-election irregularity. (H.Rept. No. 986, 82d
Congress). The House adopted H.Res. 400, 82d Congress, declaring Mr. Ayres
legally elected on August 21, 1951 (97 Cong. Rec. 18479).
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Lowe v. Davis (H.Rept. 904), 5th District of Georgia
Nature of the contest - M. Lowe had been a candidate in the Democratic
primary, but his name did not appear on the ballot in the general election. The nature
of his charges were not set forth in the report of the Committee on House
Administration.
Disposition of the contest - The Committee on House Administration
recommended that the contest be dismissed. It reported that nothing in the record
indicated that the contestee was guilty of any acts in the primary which would
disqualify him for the office of Representative in Congress and that contestant had
not complied with the statutory requirements for conducting a contest, specifically
the taking of testimony pursuant to 2 U.S.C. 203 (H.Rept. No. 904, 82d Congress).
The House passed H.Res. 398, 82d Congress, dismissing the contest on August 21,
1951 (97 Cong. Rec. 10479).
Osser v. Scott (H.Rept. 1598), 3rd District of Pennsylvania
Nature of the contest - Mr. Osser charged fraud and irregularities in allowing
numerous persons to register or remain registered despite the fact that they were
disqualified by reason of absence or removal from the Congressional District, by
permitting unregistered persons to vote on election day and other irregularities.
Disposition of the contest - H.Rept. 1598, 82d Congress declared that the
contestant had not presented satisfactory evidence clearly showing that he had
received a majority of the votes legally cast or that the election was so tainted with
fraud, or with the misconduct of election officers, that the true result cannot be
determined. It declared that the Committee was of the opinion that Mr. Scott had
been duly elected. The House adopted H.Res. 579, 82d Congress, declaring Mr.
Scott elected on March 19, 1952 (98 Cong. Rec. 2517).
83rd Congress
No election contests.
84th Congress
No election contests.
85th Congress
Dolliver v. Coad (Report not available), 6th District of Iowa
Nature of the contest - Not disclosed by record. On January 15, 1957, Mr.
Coad addressed a letter to the Clerk of the House of Representatives stating that he
had received information that Mr. Dolliver intended to contest his election but that
the notice of contest required by the statute had not been served upon him, and
requested a resolution stating whether there was any notice of contest he was required
by law to answer.
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Disposition of the contest - After a hearing, the Committee on House
Administration reported that the purported notice of contest served by Mr. Dolliver
was not a sufficient notice under the statute because it did not bear the written
signature of Mr. Dolliver or that of his counsel. (H. Doc. No. 343, 85th Congress
(1957)). On April 11, 1957 the House adopted H.Res. 230, 85th Congress declaring
that the unsigned paper was not the notice required by statute (103 Congressional
Rec. 5502).
Carter v. LeCompte (H.Rept. 1626), 4th District of Iowa
Nature of the contest - Mr. Carter alleged that numerous absentee ballots had
been illegally cast and illegally counted; that ballots on certain voting machines had
been improperly printed, and other irregularities.
Disposition of the contest - The Committee on House Administration reported,
H.Rept. No. 1626, 85th Congress, page 22, that there were apparent violations of the
duties imposed by law upon the election officials, but that the contestant had not
shown that he had exhausted his state remedies either to prevent such infractions or
to punish those responsible. It also found that fraud had not been proved, nor had it
been proved that the result of the election would have been different if the alleged
and proven irregularities had not occurred. It expressed the opinion that Mr.
LeCompte had been elected. The House adopted H.Res. 353, 85th Congress,
declaring Mr. LeCompte elected on June 17, 1958 (104 Congressional Rec. 1151211517).
Oliver v. Hale (H.Rept. 2482), 1st District of Maine
Nature of the contest - Mr Oliver challenged many of the absentee ballots cast
in the district and a few of the regular ballots. He alleged that certain regular ballots
had been improperly marked or counted. The absentee ballots were challenged on
the ground of various violations of law in the handling of the ballots and the failure
of the voter to comply with the law in preparing his absentee voting material.
Disposition of the contest - A subcommittee of the Committee on House
Administration examined the challenged ballots. It found that the violations by
election officials were of directory, rather than of mandatory, provisions of state law,
and, consequently,did not invalidate the ballots affected. After making a deduction
for ballots of voters who had failed to comply with the statute, it found that Mr. Hale
had been elected by a plurality of the votes cast. (H.Rept. No. 2482, 85th Congress).
It recommended and the House adopted, on August 12, 1958, H.Res. 676, 95th
Congress, declaring Mr. Hale to have been duly elected (104 Congressional Rec.
17119).
86th Congress
Dale Alford (H.Rept. 1172), 5th District of Arkansas
Nature of the contest - The defeated candidate did not institute a contest.
However, a Member of the House objected to the seating of Mr. Alford. The House
then directed the Committee on House Administration to investigate his right to his
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seat. Various irregularities and violations of law relating to the use of unsigned
circulars, campaign expenditures, write-in ballots, etc., had been charged.
Disposition of the contest - After recounting the ballots and investigating all
complaints, the Committee found that Mr. Alford had been duly elected. (H.Rept.
No. 1172, 86th Congress). The House adopted H.Res. 380, 86th Congress, declaring
Mr. Alford to have been duly elected on September 8, 1959 (105 Congressional Rec.
18610-18611).
Maloney v. Smith (H.Rept. 1409), 6th District of Kansas
Nature of the contest - Miscellaneous irregularities in the conduct of the
election and the counting of ballots, and the casting of absentee ballots by persons
who were not entitled to cast such ballots, were charged by the contestant.
Disposition of the contest - The Committee on House Administration
concluded that the evidence did not support the charges made and recommended a
resolution declaring Mr. Smith to have been duly elected. (H.Rept. 1409, 86th
Congress). A resolution to this effect, H.Res. 482, 86th Congress was passed on
March 24, 1960 (106 Congressional Rec. 6523).
Meyers v. Springer (Report unavailable), 22d District of
Illinois
Nature of the contest - Mr. Meyers charged a violation of the Corrupt Practices
Act and the Hatch Political Activities Act. He alleged that the editor of a newspaper
had been appointed acting postmaster of a post office in the District and that this
newspaper failed to print his speeches. He also alleged that he had been approached
and asked how much money he would take to get out of the country until after the
election (H. Doc. 123, 86th Congress).
Disposition of the contest - A subcommittee of the House Committee on
Administration held a hearing on May 18, 1959 and on that date denied the petition
to inaugurate a contest (Final Calendar, 86th Congress, House Committee on
Administration, page 30 (1960)).
Ron Taylor (Report unavailable), 12th District of North
Carolina
Nature of the contest - Not disclosed by record. On August 18, 1960, Mr.
Taylor addressed a letter to the Clerk of the House stating that he had received a letter
from Heinz Rollman, who was not a candidate in the special election, stating that he
might contest the election but that no valid notice of contest had been served within
the time prescribed by statute. Mr. Taylor requested a resolution stating whether
there was any notice of contest he was required by law to answer (H. Doc. No. 450,
86th Congress).
Disposition of the contest - A subcommittee of the Committee on House
Administration held a hearing on the matter on August 25, 1960 and on August 30,
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1960 found that no valid notice of contest had been give (Final Calendar, 86th
Congress, Committee on House Administration, page 31 (1960)).
87th Congress
Morgan M. Moulder (Report unavailable), 11th District of
Missouri
Nature of the contest - Not available.
Disposition of the contest - See below.
Victor Wickersham (Report unavailable), 6th District of
Oklahoma
See above, re: Representative Moulder. After having been asked to stand aside,
Mr. Wickersham took the oath subsequent to the adoption of H.Res. 3, permitting
him to do so (107 Cong. Rec. 23, 25).
Roush v. Chambers (H.Rept. 513), 5th District of Indiana
Nature of the contest - Contestee received a plurality of 3 votes from the tallies
as filed by the county clerks with the Secretary of State (H.Rept. 513). The Secretary
of State, on the basis of corrected returns to November 15, 1960, certified that
contestee Chambers had a plurality of 12 votes over contestant Roush (supra, p.3).
The issue involved a recount by the Committee on House Administration since the
laws of Indiana do not provide for recounts for a legislative office (supra, p.4). The
question revolved around the rules to be applied by the Committee in the
determination of which ballots were correctly marked and were to be counted and
which were not. The Committee adopted a set of rules for determining the validity
or invalidity of questionable ballots (supra, pp. 21-23). At the conclusion of the
recount, the Committee determined that contestant Roush was the winner by 99 votes
(supra, p. 2).
Disposition of the contest - On opening day, January 23, 1961, Representative
Davis of Tennessee objected to the administration of the oath to Mr. Chambers (107
Cong. Rec. 23). Representative Davis offered a resolution (H.Res. 1) that the
question of the election be referred to the Committee on House Administration, and
that “until such committee shall report upon and the House decide the question of the
right of either J. Edward Roush or George O. Chambers to a seat in the 87th
Congress, neither shall be sworn” (107 Cong. Rec. 24). The resolution passed by a
vote of 205-95 (107 Cong. Rec. 24).
A dissent, in part, was filed to H.Rept. 513, wherein issue was taken at the
failure to follow precedent and to swear in a Member-elect for whom credentials had
been received by the Clerk of the House with a later investigation by a House
Committee (supra, pp. 66-67).
On June 14, 1961, the House passed, after considerable debate, H.Res. 339,
declaring that the contestant Roush was duly elected (107 Cong. Rec. 10377-10391,
10160, 10186). Debate discussed the failure to swear in Mr. Chambers as entitled
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to a prima facie right to the seat, as well as the method of conducting the recount and
the making of an unofficial tally of the votes by the House.
88th Congress
Odegard v. Olson (Report unavailable), 6th District of
Minnesota
Nature of the contest - Contestant alleged failures of certain election officials
to properly fulfill their functions in checking voter registrations, the improper
counting of votes, and the denial of access to polling places to Republican poll
watchers. Contestant apparently failed to file evidence with the House Committee
on Administration (H. Doc. 62), and contestee Olson asked that the contest be
dismissed (Id). The House Committee held a hearing on February 26, 1963
(Committee on House Administration, Calendar of Business, 88th Congress, 1st
Session, December 30, 1963, p. 28).
Disposition of the contest - The Committee dismissed the case on November
20, 1963 (Committee Calendar, supra, p. 28).
89th Congress
Frankenberry v. Ottinger (Report not filed), 25th District of
New York
Nature of contest - This case involved a question of the standing to proceed
under the House contested election statute (2 U.S.C. §§ 201-226) by a person who
had not been a candidate for the House seat at the general election.
Contestant, head of a campaign committee for the defeated incumbent,
Representative Robert L. Barry, filed a notice of contest under the statute on
December 19, 1964. The contestant alleged that some $187,000 had been spent on
the campaign by the contestee, of which some $167,000 had been contributed by the
contestee’s mother and sister. Contestant alleged that this activity violated 18
U.S.C., § 608(a) which limits a contribution by an individual during a calendar year
to a candidate for election to federal office, to $5,000. Contestant also alleged that
the laws of New York State had been violated in that some 34 campaign committees
had been created, only one of which had been registered in accordance with New
York requirements, to which the contributions from contestee’s mother and sister had
been donated. Contestant alleged that the purpose of the creation of the committees
was so that the contributions from contestee’s mother and sister could be so
distributed as to enable them superficially to be within individual contribution
limitations, and gift tax limitations.
Contestant further alleged that the same person was listed as assistant treasurer
of almost all of the campaign committees (111 Congressional Rec. 41-45, January
4, 1965).
Disposition of the contest - The Committee on House Administration issued
no report on the contest, but reported out H.Res. 126, on January 19, 1965, which
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provided that the contest be dismissed on the ground that the contestant had not been
a candidate from the district in the election and that the House did not regard the
contestant as a person competent to bring a contest for a seat in the House: under the
statute, he would not be able, if he were successful, to establish his right to a seat in
the House. After debate in the House as to whether the statutory procedure for
contesting elections to the House applied only to candidates (as adoption of the
resolution would have determined) or whether non-candidates had to file petitions
asking for consideration of a contest rather than utilize the statutory notice of contest
route, the resolution dismissing the contest was adopted, 245-102 (111 Congressional
Rec., 951-957; see also, letter from the Assistant Clerk of the House to the Speaker,
on procedures for initiating contested elections in the House, 111 Congressional Rec.
810-811).
It was argued that precedent supported limiting the use of statutory procedure
to candidates alone, and that to permit non-candidates to use would enable those
without a serious interest in the actual determination of the election to carry on
numerous, spurious contests (see Congressional Rec., supra).
Wheadon v. Abernethy (H.Rept. 1008), 1st District of
Mississippi
Hamer v. Whitten (H.Rept. 1008), 2nd District of Mississippi
Cosey, Wilson, and Johnson v. Williams (H.Rept. 1008), 3rd
District of Mississippi
Devine v. Walker (H.Rept. 1008), 4th District of Mississippi
Jackson v. Colmer (H.Rept. 1008), 5th District of Mississippi
Nature of Contests - All these contests were considered simultaneously. The
questions involved failure of the contestants to avail themselves of the legal steps (1)
to challenge alleged discrimination among voters prior to the election and (2) to
challenge the issuance of the certificates of election to the contestees after the
elections were held; the denial of seats to Members-elect because of alleged
discriminatory practices involving disenfranchised groups of voters; and, the standing
of contestants to proceed under the contested elections statute (2 U.S.C. §§ 201-226).
The contestees had been elected at the November, 1964, general election. The
contestants had been selected at an unofficial “election” held by persons in
Mississippi from October 30 through November 2, 1964, in which it was alleged, “all
citizens qualified were permitted to vote.” The latter “election” was held without any
authority of law in the State. The contestants were all citizens, none of whom had
been candidates in the November elections. They alleged that disenfranchisement of
Negroes in Mississippi violated the Constitution and laws of the United States and
that the House had the authority to consider the contests and unseat the contestees;
that the House had a duty to guarantee that the election of its Members be in
accordance with the requirements of the Constitution; and that where large numbers
of Negroes had been excluded from the electoral process, where intimidation and
violence had been utilized to further such exclusion, and where the free will of the
voters had been prevented from being expressed, the House should unseat the
contestees, vacate the elections and order new elections.
CRS-24
Hearings were held by the Subcommittee on Elections of the Committee on
House Administration, on September 13 and 14, 1965. The Committee issued a
report, H.Rept. 1008, 89th Congress, 1st Session, on September 15, 1965.
The report noted that the contestees had been sworn in by vote of the House on
January 4, 1965, after they had been asked to step aside. This established the prima
facie right of each contestee to his seat.
The report noted that the contestants had not availed themselves of legal steps
to challenge, in the courts, the alleged exclusion of Negroes from the ballot nor the
issuance of the certificates of election to the contestees.
It noted that the contestants had not been candidates at the election and thus,
under House precedents, had no standing to invoke the House contested election
statute.
It noted (1) that there had been an election in Mississippi, in November, 1964,
for Members of the U.S. House of Representatives, under statutes which had not been
set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction; and (2) that at the same election,
presidential electors and a U.S. Senator had been elected without question.
It noted, however, that a case challenging the Mississippi registration and voter
laws was progressing through the United States Courts and that the question of the
constitutionality of the statutes was a proper one for the courts. The report noted also
that the House was the judge of the elections of its Members and it was doubtful that
any disenfranchisement, even if proven, would have actually affected the outcome
of the November, 1964, Mississippi congressional elections in any district.
The House, in following its rules and procedures, should dismiss the cases, the
report concluded, because the contestants did not qualify to utilize the House
contested elections statute, and because the contestees had been elected under laws
that had not been set aside at the time of the election.
The report did state, however, that in arriving at such conclusions the
Committee did not condone disenfranchisement of voters in the 1964 or previous
elections, nor was a precedent being established to the effect that the House would
not take action, in the future, to vacate seats of sitting members. It noted that the
Federal Voting Rights Act of 1965 had been enacted in the interim and that if
evidence of its violation were presented to the House in the future, appropriate action
would be taken.
The report recommended dismissing the cases.
A minority view recommended consideration of the cases on their merits rather
than on the grounds of status of the contestants because under the laws in the State
in 1964, the claimants could not have become candidates to avail themselves of the
contested elections act.
Disposition of the contest - The House considered H.Res. 585, dismissing the
contests and declaring the contestees to be entitled to their seats, on September 15,
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1965 (111 Congressional Rec. 24263-24292). An amendment was adopted striking
out the phraseology entitling the contestees to their seats, as language inappropriate
in a procedural matter (111 Congressional Rec. 24290). The resolution was adopted
by a vote of 228- 143 (111 Congressional Rec. 24291).
Peter v. Gross (H.Rept. 1127), 3rd District of Iowa
Nature of contest - This case involved alleged violations of State elections law.
Contestee was certified to have received 83,455 votes, and contestant, 83,036 votes
at the November, 1964, election. Contestant filed a notice of contest on December
31, 1964, alleging violations of the laws of Iowa, including burning of some ballots
the day after the election, the casting of more ballots than there were names listed on
the polls, the recording of absentee ballots in a back room by one person, and
disappearance of a tally sheet. Contestant requested a recount.
The Subcommittee on Elections of the Committee on House Administration
held hearings on the case on September 28, 1965. It issued a report, H.Rept. No.
1127, 89th Congress, 1st Session, on October 8, 1965. The Committee found that
the proof presented did not sustain the charges brought and recommended dismissal
of the contest.
The Committee found that although there may have been human errors
committed at the polls on election day there was no evidence of fraud or willful
misconduct. It found that the burned ballots were unused ballots and the practice of
burning such had been a uniform one for numerous years. The allegation of more
ballots cast than names listed on the polls was discharged by the conclusion that
some inadvertent errors had been made but the errors were insufficient to change the
result even if all the excess ballots were added to the total of the contestant. The
charge respecting the counting of absentee ballots was found to apply to one polling
place and the circumstances were such as to make it inadequate as a charge.
The disappearing tally sheet was located and involved technical operation of a
voting machine, not the counting of the results.
It was further disclosed by the contestant that the request for a recount was in
the nature of a “fishing expedition” and that he knew of no fraud by which to
substantiate it.
The Committee acknowledged that Iowa had no recount statute applicable to
a U.S. House election but held that the matter had no effect on the jurisdiction of the
Committee; that the Committee would proceed to a recount if some substantial
allegations of irregularity or fraud were alleged, and the likelihood existed that the
result of the election would be different were it not for such irregularity or fraud.
Under the circumstances of the case, it declared, the evidence did not justify a
recount since the contestant had not clearly presented proof sufficient to overcome
the presumption that the returns of the returning officers were correct.
Disposition of the contest - House Res. 602, dismissing the contest, was
reported by the Committee on House Administration, on October 8, 1965 (H.Rept.
CRS-26
1127). The resolution was considered in the House on October 11, 1965 (111
Congressional Rec. 26499-26504), and was adopted.
90th Congress
Mackay v. Blackburn (H.Rept. 366), 4th District of Georgia
Nature of contest - The issue involved the counting of so-called “overvotes”
on punch card voting machines during the November, 1966 election. Contestant
alleged that the computers that tallied the votes erroneously failed to count about
7,000 votes, and that the procedures for duplicating defective ballots were improper.
Election officials, acting in accordance with what they construed to be Georgia law,
had programmed the computing machines that counted the ballots to reject those
cards where a voter had punched a straight party ticket and had then also punched out
the scored block for the Congressional candidate of the opposing party. While the
contested election case was under consideration, a law suit was instituted in the
Georgia courts concerning the interpretation of the Georgia statutes relating to the
canvassing of punch card votes. The litigation was terminated on March 30, 1967,
by the Georgia Supreme Court’s denial of a writ of certiorari to the Georgia Court of
Appeals which, on January 25, 1967, had held in favor of the interpretation by the
election officials (Blackgurn v. Hall, et al., Georgia Court of Appeals, case No.
42505, decided January 25, 1967, rehearing denied February 17, 1967, certiorari
denied, Supreme Court of Georgia, March 30, 1967). The judicial decision, in effect,
sustained the election of the contestee.
On April 13, 1967, contestant notified the House of the withdrawal of his notice
of contest.
The Committee on House Administration issued a report on June 14, 1967
(H.Rept. No. 366, 90th Congress, 1st Session), in conjunction with H.Res. 542,
which provided that the contestee was the duly elected Representative from the 4th
Congressional District of Georgia and was entitled to his seat.
The resolution was considered by the House on July 11, 1967, and adopted
Congressional Rec., daily ed., July 11, 1967, pp. H. 8465-H. 8466).
During the debate there was brought out the fact that some difficulties had
occurred in counting and handling the punch card ballots and in voter use of them in
the “automatic” voting machines.
They were not deemed, however, to be crucial turning points in the
determination of the case.
Disposition of the contest - At the swearing in of Members-elect to the 90th
Congress on January 10, 1967, the contestee had been asked to stand aside. The
House then proceeded to adopt a resolution (H.Res. 2) authorizing the oath to be
administered to the contestee and providing that the question of the final right of the
contest to the seat be referred to the Committee on House Administration
(Congressional Rec., daily ed., January 10, 1967, pp. H 16-17). The resolution
CRS-27
adopted on July 11, 1967 merely declared that the contestee had been duly elected
and was entitled to his seat.
Lowe v. Thompson (H.Rept. 365), 5th District of Georgia
Nature of contest - This case involved the question of contestant’s standing to
utilize the procedures of the House contested elections statute (2 U.S.C. §§201-226),
and the right of a primary loser in a party different from that of the contestee, to
challenge the contestee. Contestant had filed notice under the contested elections
statute and had subsequently filed a petition with the House requesting that
contestee’s seat be declared vacant on the grounds that the procedures for nomination
of the candidate of contestant’s party who ran in the general election in November
against the contestee and was defeated, were contrary to the Georgia election statutes.
The winner of the primary of contestant’s party, in which the contestant had been a
candidate, withdrew after the primary election and a successor nominee was
substituted for the primary winner by the local county party executive committee.
Contestant alleged that the Georgia statutes and the rules of the Democratic Party of
Georgia authorized a county executive committee to make a substitute nomination
only where the vacancy occurred after a nomination had been made by the State
Democratic Party Convention. He alleged that the substitute nomination in this case
had been made prior to the state convention and that in such circumstances there
should have been a special election to nominate a Democratic candidate for the
Congressional seat.
The Committee on House Administration issued H.Rept. No. 365, 90th
Congress, 1st Session, on the case, on June 14, 1967. The report declared that, based
on precedent, since the contestant had been an unsuccessful candidate in the
Democratic primary and did not claim any right to the seat, he had no standing to
proceed under the contested elections statute.
The Committee, however, acting pursuant to the authority granted to it by House
Rule XI, §9 (k) (House Rules Manual, 90th Congress; House Document No. 529,
89th Congress, 2d Session) to consider questions of the election of Members of
Congress, did consider the petition filed with the House by the “contestant”
concerning the case, on May 8, 1967. Precedents have authorized the Committee to
consider petitions by non-candidates (see Cannon’s Precedents of the House of
Representatives, Vol. VI, §78). The Committee noted that “contestant made no
charges of fraud or irregularities by the contestee in connection with the Republic
primary or the general election, and the contestee received the highest vote at the
general election. It then declared that assuming arguendo that the substitute
nomination of the Democratic candidate for Congress was contrary to Georgia law,
it did not follow from this that the House would unseat the Republican contestee.
The Committee stated that it was unaware of any precedent for depriving a Member
of his seat solely on the basis of the irregularity of the nomination of his opponent in
the general election. It pointed out that this was not a case where fraud or irregularity
in the returned Member’s nomination was charged. The Committee then pointed to
what it deemed the “potential danger” in declaring an election void because of a
finding of an unlawful nomination of losing candidate, since the door would be
opened for the party of a losing candidate in a general election to impeach the
election of the winning candidate by claiming that the election was invalid because
CRS-28
the losing candidate had not been nominated in accordance with election laws and
party rules.
The Committee also noted in passing that a suit in the Georgia Court brought
by the “contestant” seeking a special primary had been dismissed.
“Contestant” had been a write-in candidate in the general election, but his
candidacy had been of only a few days’ duration and he had publicly announced his
withdraw from the race several days prior to the general election. The Committee
declared that the “contestant” had not been a candidate on election day.
It recommended that the case be dismissed.
Disposition of the contest - On July 11, 1967, the House adopted H.Res. 541,
90th Congress, 1st Session, dismissing the contest and denying the petition of Mr.
Lowe (Congressional Rec., daily ed., July 11, 1967,8464-8465).
91st Congress
Lowe v. Thompson (H.Rept. 159), 5th District of Georgia
Nature of contest - The case involved allegations of malconduct, irregularity
and fraud by poll officers in some 40 precincts in the Democratic primary in which
the “contestant” had unsuccessfully sought the nomination, losing to Charles
Weltner. Mr. Thompson, the winner of the general election, was the candidate of the
Republican party. The major issue was whether a losing candidate in a primary had
standing to contest the election of a Member who was the candidate of another party
on the grounds that his opponent in the general election was improperly chosen. The
Committee on House Administration recommended dismissal, noting that none of
the irregularities alleged involved Mr. Thompson, nor did they directly involve his
opponent. Additionally, the Committee found that House precedents would deny
Lowe standing to contest under the statute since the “contestant” was not a candidate
in the general election (H.Rept. 159).
Disposition of the contest - On April 23, 1969, the House adopted H.Res. 364,
dismissing the contest (115 Cong. Rec. 10040-41).
92nd Congress
Tunno v. Veysey (H.Rept. 627), 38th District of California
Nature of Contest - Contestant alleged that the affidavits of registration of
some 11,137 voters in Riverside County, California, had been wrongfully and
illegally canceled, depriving approximately 10,616 qualified voters of the right to
vote. A motion to dismiss was filed by the contestant, based on the defense that the
notice failed to state grounds sufficient to change the result of the election. (Federal
Contested Election Act, P.L. 91-138, 83 Stat. 284, §4(b)(3) provides for a motion to
dismiss on this ground.) On May 11, 1971, the Subcommittee on Elections of the
Committee on House Administration held hearings on the motion. The Committee
recommended dismissal of the contest, noting that the contestant had not made a
substantial offer to prove that those whose names were stricken were qualified voters
CRS-29
of the district; that those stricken offered to vote and were not permitted to do so; that
of those who might have been improperly denied the vote of sufficient number would
have voted for contestant to change the results of the election (H.Rept. 627, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess.).
Disposition of the contest - On November 9, 1971, the House adopted H.Res.
507, dismissing the contest (117 Cong. Rec. 40017).
The Case of William Conover (H.Rept. 1091), 27th District of
Pennsylvania
Nature of contest - No notice was filed, but suit was brought protesting the
special election called to fill a vacancy, alleging large numbers of voters did not vote
in the election because of inconsistencies in the voting procedures. A preliminary
injunction was obtained in the state court restraining the Governor of Pennsylvania
from issuing a certificate of election. The Committee on House Administration
recommended administering the oath to the apparent winner, based on certified
returns, referring the question of final right to the Committee (H.Res. 936, H.Rept.
1091, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.). At a hearing held on the resolution the plaintiff in the
suit acknowledged that he was not claiming the seat or alleging fraud. (H.Rept.
1091).
Disposition of the case - The House adopted H.Res. 986 and the oath was
provisionally administered (118 Cong. Rec. 18654). Apparently, no further action
was taken in the matter, and Mr. Conover served the remainder of the term.
93rd Congress
No election contests.
94th Congress
Young v. Mikva (H.Rept. 759), 10th District of Illinois
Nature of the contest - On December 23, 1974, Mr. Samuel H. Young served
Mr. Abner J. Mikva and the Clerk of the House of Representatives with notice of his
intention to contest the election of Mr. Mikva. The contestant alleged that votes were
obtained by fraud and through widespread violations of the law. Specifically the
contestant alleged (1) that the contestant disseminated false information about the
contestee prior to the election, and (2) that the contestee accepted and failed to report
a campaign contribution in violation of Federal Elections Campaign Act of 1971.
(H.Rept. 94-759).
No specific evidence was offered to support the general allegations of
misrepresentation and failure to report contributions nor did the contestant sustain the
burden of proof to show misconduct influencing sufficient votes to change the result
of the election. The contestee moved to dismiss the contest for failure to state
grounds sufficient to change the results of the election. There is a full discussion in
H.Rept. 94-759 of the House precedents on (1) the contestant’s burden of proof, (2)
CRS-30
the assumption of regularity of the returns, and (3) the requirement that fraud be
proven.
As to the argument that a full recount would change the result, Illinois State
election law provides for a partial recount and leaves the decision of whether or not
further proceedings are warranted to the Houses of Congress. The contestant had a
partial recount conducted in 124 of 533 precincts selected by the contestant. The
House Administration Committee determined that there was an insufficient showing
that a full recount would change the outcome of the election, since the result of the
partial recount had been to reduce contestee’s 2,860 vote majority by only 471 votes.
Disposition of the contest - The Committee on House Administration decided
that the contestant had failed to sustain the burden of proof necessary to award the
contested seat to him. (H.Rept. 759). On December 19, 1975, the House passed
House Resolution 894 which dismissed the contest (121 Cong Rec.H 13055, daily
ed., December 19, 1975).
Kyros v. Emery (H.Rept. 760), 1st District of Maine
Nature of the contest - By Maine State law, a recount is permitted when more
than 100,000 votes are cast and the percentage difference of the vote between the two
candidates is half of 1% or less; the voting in the Emery/Kyros election fell within
those requirements. Mr. Kyros requested a State recount and in the recount, both
parties agreed that all questionable ballots would be set aside as disputed. Both
Kyros and Emery agreed and stipulated that only the U.S. House of Representatives
could determine the validity of the ballots. On December 27, 1974, the contestant
filed a Notice of Contest, sending copies to the Clerk of the House of Representatives
and the contestee, Mr. Emery.
The ballots under dispute were divided into three types, plus a fourth
miscellaneous category. The three categories were (1) Right Hand Ballots, (2) Apex
Ballots, and (3) Distinguishing or Irregular Marks. Where State law was uncertain,
the Subcommittee on Elections used the obvious voter intent to determine the validity
of ballots. Further, where State law was certain, the Subcommittee would have been
guided by those state laws only if it had found a legitimate State interest, such as the
safeguarding of the integrity of the electoral process. As it was, the Subcommittee
found no such interest in the interpretations of State law proposed, so the
Subcommittee was again guided by overriding considerations of equity and used the
obvious voter intent to evaluate ballots (House Rept. 760, 94th Congress, 1st
Session).
Disposition of the Case - The contestant withdrew from the case in the middle
of the Subcommittee’s review of the ballots, and the House dismissed the election
contest on December 19, 1975 (121 Congressional Rec. H. 13055, daily ed.,
December 19, 1975).
Wilson v. Hinsh (H.Rept. 761), 40th District of California
Nature of the contest - On January 6, 1975, Mr. Roderick J. Wilson delivered
a Notice of Intent to Contest to the Clerk of the House of Representatives. The
grounds of contest were numerous, such as, alleged violations of the Federal Election
CRS-31
Campaign Act of 1971 (P.L. 92-225) (receipt of contributions by Federal
Government contractors), campaign funds violation, misuse of the franking privilege,
and misconduct of the contestee.
Disposition of the Case - The Committee declared that insufficient evidence
had been presented to support the contestant’s allegations (H.Rept. 761, 94th
Congress, 1st Session). The Committee stated that evidence of wrongdoing in
election campaigns other than the one being contested is not relevant. The House
then adopted H.Res. 896, dismissing the contestant’s case (121 Congressional Rec.
H. 13055, daily ed., December 19, 1975).
Mack v. Stokes (H.Rept. 762), 21st District of Ohio
Nature of the contest - On December 10, 1974, Mr. William (Bill) Mack
delivered a Notice of Intention to Contest to the Clerk of the House of
Representatives. The ground of contest he stated questioned the qualifications of Mr.
Louis A. Stokes to be a Representative, rather than specific objections to the manner
in which the campaign was conducted. The Notice alleged generally that Mr. Stokes
was “not a bona fide inhabitant possessing the requisite qualifications set forth in
Article I, Section 2, clauses 1 and 2 of the U.S. Constitution.” Though the
Committee stated it would have been more appropriate to have had the case raised
by a petition or a memorial and presented to the House, the Committee retained the
case and decided it on its merits, saying that similar standards were applicable.
Under those standards the contestant “must state adequate grounds” for
disqualification “with sufficient particularity” to justify the continuance of the
proceeding and make a “substantial offer to prove that contestee is disqualified.”
Disposition of the Contest - The Committee found that the contestant had not
made any factual allegations sufficient to cast doubt upon contestee’s qualifications
and recommended dismissal. (H.Rept. 762, 94th Congress, 1st Session). On
December 19, 1975, the House dismissed Mack v. Stokes in House Resolution 897
(121 Congressional Rec. H 13056, daily ed., December 19, 1975).
Ziebarth v. Smith (H.Rept. 763), 3rd District of Nebraska
Nature of the Contest - On December 30, 1974, Mr. Wayne Ziebarth filed a
Notice of Intention to contest stating as grounds for the contest the closeness of the
election, the existence of overcounting and undercounting in precinct tallies, the
opinion of a statistical recount expert that a recount would change the results of the
election, and the fact that the State of Nebraska had no provisions for recounts.
In response the contestee filed a motion to dismiss based on a failure of the
notice of contest to state grounds sufficient to change the results of the election. The
subcommittee gave the contestant ten days to set forth a more definite statement, as
“the House has consistently refused to grant a request for a recount solely on the
grounds of a close vote and/or the absence of a state provision for recounting a
congressional election.” (H.Rept. 763, 94th Congress, 1st Session, p. 6).
The amended notice of the contestant did not provide the requested details of
the charge. The answer to the amended notice of contest attached an affidavit from
the Secretary of State of Nebraska refuting the general allegations of the overcount
CRS-32
and undercount. The contestant furnished no more particulars nor did he substantiate
any of his generalities.
Disposition of the Case - After carefully stating the reasons for rejecting a
recount request merely because of closeness and/or the lack of State recount
provisions, the Committee found that the contestant had not pled with sufficient
particularity nor had he offered preliminary proof of mistake in the original count and
recommended dismissal of the contest. (H.Rept. 763, 94th Congress, 1st Session).
The House, on December 19, 1975, adopted House Resolution 898 which dismissed
the Ziebarth v. Smith case (121 Cong. Rec. H 13056, daily ed., December 19, 1975).
95th Congress
Saunders v. Kelly (H.Rept. 242), 5th District of Florida
Nature of the Contest - Contestee, Kelly, received a majority of 42,111 votes.
The contestant, Saunders, contested the election in accordance with the Federal
Contested Elections Act (FCEA), 2 U.S.C. §§ 381 et seq. The contestant claimed
that the Florida Ethics Commission conspired with the contestee to attack her
candidacy. She further claimed that this attack led to her decline in the polls and her
eventual defeat. The contestee filed a motion to dismiss. The Committee on House
Administration, concluding that the contestant failed to meet the burden of proof, by
particularized pleadings and evidence, that would warrant a conclusion that
continuation of the contest would result in the award of the seat to her, granted the
motion to dismiss.
Disposition of the contest - On April 28, 1977, the Committee unanimously
adopted a motion to report H.Res. 525. The House passed the measure on May 9,
1977.
Paul v. Gammage (H.Rept. 243), 22nd District of Texas
Nature of the contest - The result of the November 2, 1976 election gave the
contestee, Gammage, a 236-vote majority. A recount of the vote, based on Texas
law, resulted in a 268-vote majority for the contestee. While pursuing an election
contest in state court (these proceedings were later terminated by the court), the
contestant filed a notice of contest, pursuant to the FCEA, with the Committee. A
panel of the Committee met to consider a motion to dismiss. The panel concluded
that although the contestant’s pleadings were in proper form and alleged instances
of irregular and perhaps even illegal voting, he failed to demonstrate that any or all
of the allegations would have changed the result of the election. Therefore, the
Committee recommended that a resolution dismissing the contest be reported to the
House of Representatives.
Disposition of the contest - The Committee, by a 16 to 6 vote, adopted a
motion to report H.Res. 526. The House passed the measure on May 9, 1977.
Young v. Mikva (H.Rept. 244), 10th District of Illinois
Nature of the contest - The proclamation of the official canvass of the votes
cast showed that Mikva had received 106,804 votes and that Young had received
106,603 votes, for a difference of 201 votes. The contestant, Young, contended that
CRS-33
there were irregularities or errors involved in the election. Under Illinois law, the
contestant was granted a discovery recount. However, the contestant was unable to
secure a judicial recount. Subsequently, the contestant filed a notice of intention to
contest the election. The contestant responded with a motion to dismiss. An ad hoc
panel of the Committee convened to hear testimony on the motion. The panel
concluded, by a 2 to 1 vote, that the contestant failed to provide sufficient and
specific allegations, documents, affidavits of competent witnesses, or other materials
which would enable to committee to determine that there were grounds sufficient to
change the result of the election.
Disposition of the contest - The Committee, by a 16 to 6 vote, adopted a
motion to report H.Res. 527. The House passed the measure on May 9, 1977.
Pierce v. Pursell (H.Rept. 245), 2nd District of Michigan
Nature of the contest - The official canvass reported that the contestee, Pursell,
received 95,397 votes and the contestant, Pierce, received 95,053 votes. The
contestant’s majority was 344 votes. After failing to obtain an inspection and review
of the tally sheets or a recount, the contestant filed a notice of contest pursuant to the
FCEA. The contestant alleged that certain mistakes were committed in the election
and asked that a recount be made in certain precincts. In response, the contestee filed
a motion to dismiss. An ad hoc panel of the Committee convened to take testimony.
The panel found that the contestant did not meet its burden of proof to overcome a
motion to dismiss or to order a recount. As in earlier cases, the contestant failed to
show that but for specific irregularities or acts of fraud, the results of the election
would have been different.
Disposition of the contest - The Committee unanimously adopted a motion to
report H.Res. 528. The House passed the measure on May 9, 1977.
Dehr v. Leggett (H.Rept. 654), 4th District of California
Nature of the contest - The official returns showed that the contestee, Leggett,
received 75,866 votes and that the contestant, Dehr, received 75,202 votes. The
margin consisted of 664 votes. Upon conclusion of a recount, the tally gave the
contestee a total of 75,844 votes and the contestant a total of 75,190 votes. The
margin was reduced to 651 votes. The contestant filed a notice of contest, under
FCEA, claiming that 14 precincts were improperly counted. The ad hoc panel
examined the allegation and concluded that there were no errors involving the ballots
that would support the contestant’s claim. Thus, the ad hoc panel recommended that
the contest be dismissed.
Disposition of the contest - The Committee unanimously adopted a motion to
report H.Res. 770. The House passed the measure on October 27, 1977.
Hill and Panasigui v. Clay (H.Rept. 723), 1st District of
Missouri
Nature of the contest - In the primary election the contestee received 29,094
votes, contestant Hill received 574 votes and contestant Panasigui received 957
votes. This case was brought by the “Concerned Citizens Committee of the First
Congressional District” (CCC) on behalf of the named contestants. Initially, CCC
CRS-34
petitioned the board of election commissioners for a new primary election based on
its claim that voting irregularities and fraud had occurred. After an investigation, the
board of election commissioners found that the complaint was without merit. CCC
then filed suit in both State and Federal courts. These suits were both dismissed for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. CCC also filed a notice of complaint pursuant to
FCEA and requested a formal investigation by the Justice Department. The Justice
Department concluded that the complaint was without foundation. The Committee
also found that the allegations were without foundation and that there were
insufficient grounds to change the election results. Moreover, the Committee
concluded that the notice of contest and subsequent pleadings did not sustain the
contestants’ claim of a right to the contestee’s seat.
Disposition of the contest - The Committee recommended to the House the
adoption of H.Res. 822 dismissing the election contest. The House passed the
measure on October 27, 1977.
Lowe v. Fowler (H.Rept. 724), 5th District of Georgia
Nature of the contest - In a special election, the contestee, Fowler, received
29,898 votes and the contestant, Lowe, received 276 votes. In a runoff election,
which did not include the contestant, the contestee received 54,378 votes and Lewis,
a non-party to this action, received 32,732 votes. The contestant filed a notice of
contest under the FCEA which claimed that the contestee was ineligible to run for
elected office and that there was a presumption of fraud or irregularities. The
contestee filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the contestant lacked standing and
failed to state sufficient grounds to change the result of the election. An ad hoc panel
found that the contestee was not ineligible to run for congressional office because
he failed to resign from the City Council prior to seeking another elected office. The
panel also found that the disparity between the number of votes received by the
contestant in his 1970 (36,194 votes) and 1977 (276 votes) election bids do not raise
a presumption of fraud or irregularities. Moreover, the panel found that the minor
discrepancies in the number of unused ballots returned were either explicable or
normal. Thus, the ad hoc panel concluded that the allegations were unfounded and
that there was insufficient evidence to overcome the contestee’s motion to dismiss.
Disposition of the contest - The Committee unanimously recommended that
the House adopt H.Res. 825, dismissing the election contest. The House passed the
measure on October 27, 1977.
Moreau v. Tonry (No report filed - contestee resigned), 1st
District of Louisiana
96th Congress
Perkins v. Byron (H.Rept. 78), 6th District of Maryland
Nature of the contest - In the general election the contestee, Byron was elected
by a majority vote of 122,374 to 14,276. The contestant, Perkins, filed a notice of
contest under the FCEA claiming that the contestee was improperly selected to
replace her late husband, who had been nominated for reelection, as the Democratic
nominee. He also claimed that a special election should have been held to fill the
CRS-35
unexpired term. The contestee filed three separate motions to dismiss. The ad hoc
panel recommended that the first motion be granted based on the fact that the
contestant failed to provide documented proof of service of the notice of contest on
the contestee. The ad hoc panel also found that the contestant failed to provide any
documentary evidence supporting his allegations and that he failed to demonstrate
that the allegations, if true, would have changed the outcome of the election. The ad
hoc panel did not deem it necessary to reach the question of whether the contestant
failed to claim a right to the contestee’s seat.
Disposition of the contest - The Committee unanimously adopted a motion to
report H.Res. 189, dismissing the election contest. The House passed the measure
on March 29, 1979.
Hanania-Freeman v. Mitchell (H.Rept. 226), 7th District of
Maryland
Nature of the contest - The official canvass showed that the contestee,
Mitchell, received 51,996 votes and the contestant, Hanania-Freeman, received 6,626
votes. The contestant first filed a petition in the Superior Court of Baltimore City for
a writ of mandamus and a preliminary injunction. The court denied the contestant’s
petition based on its finding that no irregularity or fraud existed in the election.
Thereafter, the contestant filed a notice of intention to contest under the FCEA.
Here, the contestant alleged inadequate and insufficient police protection of voting
machines, conspiracy between the contestee and election officials, malfunction of
voting machines due to tampering, improper and illegal certification of the contestee,
and various acts of fraud, violence, intimidation, assault, theft, extortion, and “dirty
tricks.” The contestee made a motion to dismiss. The ad hoc panel determined that
the contestant had failed to demonstrate by documentary evidence or otherwise, that
the fraud, violence, intimidation, assault, theft, extortion, or “dirty tricks,” as alleged
to have been involved in the conduct of the election, would have changed the results
of the election. The panel further concluded that the contestant had failed to meet her
burden on a motion to dismiss. Thus, the panel unanimously voted to recommend
that the contest be dismissed.
Disposition of the contest - The Committee adopted by unanimous vote a
motion to report H.Res. 198, dismissing the election contest. The House passed the
measure on June 12, 1979.
Rayner v. Stewart (H.Rept. 316), 1st District of Illinois
Nature of the contest - The general election resulted in the contestee, Stewart,
being elected by a majority vote of 47,581 to 33,540, a margin of 14,041 votes. The
contestant, Rayner, originally filed a civil suit claiming that there had been errors,
irregularities, fraud and mistakes which impaired his right to vote and the right to
have his vote counted. The court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss based
on the fact that the House of Representatives has exclusive jurisdiction of the matter.
Thereafter, the contestant filed a complaint under the FCEA, making the same
allegations as in the civil suit and further alleging irregularities in the vote totals
displayed on the backs of the voting machines, instances of illegal assistance of
voters in casting their votes, the exclusion of the contestant’s vote-watchers from
polling places, numerous counting errors, and electioneering. The contestee filed a
CRS-36
motion to dismiss. The ad hoc panel recommended that the motion be granted since
the contestant failed to timely file the contest; failed to name the proper party to the
contest; failed to include a statement in the notice of contest that the contestee had
30 days in which to file an answer; failed to serve the contestee properly; and failed
to state grounds sufficient to change the results of the election.
Disposition of the contest - The Committee unanimously voted that H.Res.
344, dismissing the election contest, be adopted by the House. The House passed the
measure on June 28, 1979.
Wilson v. Leach (H.Rept. 784), 4th District of Louisiana
Nature of the contest - The official canvass showed that the contestee, Leach,
received 65,583 votes and the contestant, Wilson, received 65,317 votes. The
contestee’s majority was 266 votes. The contestant filed a notice of contest under the
FCEA. The contestee followed with a motion to dismiss. The ad hoc panel delayed
action on the motion to dismiss pending the outcome of a criminal investigation.
Pursuant to a Federal grand jury investigation, the contestee was indicted on one
count of conspiracy to pay voters in order to secure his election and ten counts of
paying voters. The contestee was later acquitted of these charges. The ad hoc panel,
after reviewing information collected by the Department of Justice, did find that
fraud and irregularities were involved in the election. However, there was no finding
of involvement by the contestee in any such activities. Moreover, the contestant
failed to demonstrate that the fraud was of sufficient magnitude to have changed the
result of the election. Based on this conclusion, the panel voted, 2 to 1, to
recommend dismissing the contest.
Disposition of the contest - The Committee adopted by a vote of 11 to 8, a
motion to report H.Res. 575, dismissing the election contest. The House passed the
measure on March 4, 1980.
Thorsness v. Daschle (H.Rept. 785), 1st District of South
Dakota
Nature of the contest - The results of the general election returned 64,661 votes
for the contestee, Daschle, and 64,647 votes for the contestant, Thorsness, a margin
of 14 votes. A recount increased the contestee’s election margin to 105 votes. The
contestant, followed by the contestee, filed writs with the state court. The court
conducted a post-election review of 1,084 contested ballots and determined that the
contestee won the election by 110 votes. Following this decision, the contestant filed
a notice of contest under the FCEA. The contestant alleged that a review of more
than 2,000 contested ballots would prove that he had received a plurality of the vote
and that representatives of the contestee fraudulently and illegally conducted training
sessions for members of the recount board. The contestee filed a motion to dismiss.
Upon stipulations by both parties the second charge was dismissed. The ad hoc
panel, upon unanimous vote, determined that the first count should also be dismissed
because it was satisfied with the recount performed by the South Dakota Supreme
Court. Moreover, the panel found that the contestant failed to state grounds
sufficient to change the result of the election.
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Disposition of the case - The Committee unanimously adopted a motion to
report H.Res. 576, dismissing the election contest. The House passed the measure
on March 4, 1980.
97th Congress
No election contests.
98th Congress
Archer v. Packard (H.Rept. 452), 43rd District of California
Nature of the contest - The election results showed that the contestee, Packard,
received 66,444 votes, the contestant, Archer, received 57,995 votes and another
candidate received 56,297 votes. This gave the contestee a plurality of 8,449 votes.
The contestant initiated an election contest in both state court and in the House of
Representatives, alleging a variety of inadequacies in the conduct of the election
itself and in the conduct of the officials charged with overseeing the election. He
also claimed that he obtained the highest number of legally cast votes. The court
dismissed the case after concluding that the evidence was insufficient to show
improprieties which would have changed the election (an investigation by the San
Diego District Attorney’s office concluded that no criminal prosecution should be
instituted in this case). The Committee found that the contestant did not demonstrate
with sufficient evidence that any of the alleged irregularities affected the outcome of
the election. The Committee also found that, with the exception of the defacement
of some voting machines, there were no criminal violations involved. The
Committee’s conclusion was based on the opinion of the superior court and the
district attorney’s report.
Disposition of the contest - The Committee adopted a motion to report H.Res.
305, dismissing the election contest. The House passed the measure on November
15, 1983.
Hendon v. Clarke (H.Rept. 453), 11th District of North
Carolina
Nature of the contest - The official vote count showed that the contestee,
Clarke, received 85,410 votes and the contestant, Hendon, received 84,085 votes.
The contestant filed a request for a recount with five county boards of elections and
the state board of elections, claiming that the ballots in these counties were
ambiguous and that certain laws governing the election were unconstitutional. This
request was denied. The contestant then filed suit in U.S. District Court for the
Western District of North Carolina requesting a recount. The court ruled against the
contestant. The U.S. Appeals Court for the Fourth Circuit, although agreeing that
parts of the law governing the election were unconstitutional, refused to order a
recount or invalidate the outcome of the election. The contestant then filed a notice
of contest under the FCEA, claiming that the program used to tabulate the computercounted ballots violated the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment of the
Constitution and that had not votes been erroneously counted for the contestee the
election result would have been different. The contestant sought either a recount or
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invalidation of the vote. The contestee filed a motion to dismiss. The Committee
recommended dismissal on two grounds. First, the contestant’s evidence was too
speculative to meet the burden of demonstrating that the outcome of the election was
affected by the manner in which the five counties counted ambiguously marked
ballots. Second, the Committee found that a recount was an unwarranted remedy.
Moreover, invalidation of the election would be improper because the contestant
failed to challenge the ambiguities of the ballots in court prior to the election in
question. The Committee considered the rationale of the Court of Appeals in making
its determinations.
Disposition of the contest - The Committee adopted a motion to report H.Res.
304, dismissing the election contest. The House passed the measure on November
15, 1983.
99th Congress
McCloskey and McIntyre (H.Rept. 58), 8th District of Indiana
Nature of the contest - The election of November 6, 1984 in the eighth
congressional district of Indiana was between Democratic incumbent Frank
McCloskey and Republican challenger Richard D. McIntyre. The election ended
with McCloskey ahead by 72 votes. However, after a recount the Indiana Secretary
of State, on December 14, 1984, certified McIntyre the winner by 34 votes.1 On
February 6, 1985, the Committee on House Administration organized a Task Force
to investigate the election.2
The Task Force, after finding that Indiana’s election process and recount
procedure were unreliable, met to develop counting rules which would be applied in
a House recount.3 Pursuant to these rules the Task Force, with the assistance of the
General Accounting Office, recounted the votes from the November 6, 1984 election.
This recount gave McCloskey a four-vote margin of victory over McIntyre. On May
1, 1985, McCloskey was sworn in as a Member of the House of Representatives.
Disposition of the contest - The Committee adopted a motion to report H.Res.
146, dismissing the election contest. The House passed the measure on May 1, 1985.
Won Pat v. Blaz (H.Rept. 220), Guam
Nature of the contest - The Guam Election Commission (the “Commission”)
reported the results as 15,725 for the contestee, Blaz, and 15,402 for the contestant,
Won Pat. Due to a disparity in the vote total, the Commission ordered a recount
1
This vote margin was based on an ongoing recount. The final state recount gave McIntyre
a 418-vote margin of victory over McCloskey.
2
This is one of the rare instances in which the House initiated its own investigation into the
results of an election. In the last sixty years the House has only done so on three other
occasions: (1) Kemp v. Saunders, H.Rept. 334, 73rd Cong., 1934; (2) In re Dale Alford,
H.Rept. 1172, 86th Cong., 1959; and (3) Roush v. Chambers, H.Rept. 513, 87th Cong.,
1961.
3
The Task Force rejected the option of voiding the election. H.Rept. 58, 99th Cong., 1985.
CRS-39
which resulted in 15,839 votes for the contestee and 15,485 votes for the contestant.
A similar disparity caused another recount which gave the contestee 15,853 votes and
the contestant 15,498 votes. The contestant filed a notice of contest under the FCEA
claiming (1) that the contestee did not win the election because he did not receive a
majority of the votes cast as required by law and (2) that the election results should
be rejected because the Commission failed to comply with the requirements of the
Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act and the Federal Voting Assistance Act. The
Committee, agreeing with the Commission’s decision not to include blank ballots in
the vote total, found that the contestee did receive a majority of the votes cast. The
Committee also determined that the Commission did not violate either of the statutes
cited by the contestant.
Disposition of the contest - The Committee unanimously adopted a motion to
report H.Res. 229, dismissing the election contest. The House passed the measure
on June 24, 1985.
Hansen v. Stallings (H.Rept. 290), 2nd District of Idaho
Nature of the contest - The official canvass of votes showed that the contestee,
Stallings, received 101,266 votes and the contestant, Hansen, received 101,133 votes.
A recount of approximately 10% of the District was conducted in all the precincts
requested by the contestant. The official vote tally after the partial recount gave the
contestee 101,287 votes and the contestant 101,117 votes. The contestant then filed
a notice of contest under the FCEA, claiming that illegal votes had been cast by
persons not properly registered, which if removed would have changed the outcome
of the election, and that he was denied a full recount, which would have changed the
outcome of the election. The Committee found that voters were registered in
accordance with Idaho law. Moreover, the Committee relied the results of an
investigation by the Idaho Attorney General which concluded that there were no
instances in which an unqualified person voted. Consequently, the Committee
determined that there was no basis for finding that the election was tainted by illegal
votes. The Committee also found the second allegation to be without foundation.
In this respect, the Committee once again relied on decisions made by state officials.
Both the Idaho Attorney General and the Idaho Supreme Court denied the
contestant’s request for a full recount because the partial recount did not reveal
sufficient material differences in the result, when projected district-wide, to change
the result of the election.
Disposition of the contest - The Committee adopted by a vote of 12 to 1, a
motion to report H.Res. 272, dismissing the election contest. The House passed the
measure on October 2, 1985.
100th Congress
No election contests.
101st Congress
No election contests.
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102nd Congress
No election contests.
103rd Congress
McCuen v. Dickey (H.Rept. 109), 4th District of Arkansas
Nature of the contest - An unofficial canvass of votes showed that the
contestee, Dickey, received 113,004 votes and the contestant, McCuen, received
102,911 votes. The certifying credentials issued by the Governor gave the contestee
113,009 votes and the contestant 102,918 votes. Thereafter, the contestant filed a
complaint in the circuit court seeking a protective order regarding the voting
machines used in the election. The court granted the order and, subsequently,
ordered several inspections of these machines. The court later dismissed the
complaint, citing lack of jurisdiction, but retained jurisdiction over the voting
machines. The contestant then filed a notice of contest under the FCEA claiming that
the ballots and voting machines misled voters and that defective voting machines
produced inaccurate totals. The Committee dismissed the first allegation, finding
that no irregularity, sufficient to change the result of the election could reasonably be
inferred by the design of the voting apparatus. The Committee also heard testimony
concerning past problems with the programming of voting machines. However, the
expert that testified did not find that such problems existed in this election.
Consequently, the Committee found that there was no merit to the contestant’s
second allegation.
Disposition of the contest - The Committee adopted a motion to report H.Res.
182, dismissing the election contest. The House passed the measure on May 25,
1993.
104th Congress
Anderson v. Rose (H.Rept. 852), 7th District of North Carolina
Nature of the contest - The official election returns showed that the contestee,
Rose, received 62,670 votes and the contestant, Anderson, received 58,849 votes.
The contestant filed a complaint with the North Carolina State Board of Elections
and a notice of contest with the House of Representatives alleging election
irregularities and fraud. Moreover, the contestant claimed that the contestee was not
a resident of the 7th District of North Carolina (the Committee left this determination
to North Carolina authorities). Although the contestant presented credible allegations
that spotlighted serious and potentially criminal violations of election laws, they were
not sufficient to change the outcome of the election if proven true. Thus, the
contestant’s evidence was not able to overcome the motion to dismiss filed by the
contestee.
Disposition of the contest - The Committee adopted a motion to report H.Res.
538, dismissing the election contest. The House passed the measure on September
26, 1996.
CRS-41
Haas v. Bass (H.Rept. 853), 2nd District of New Hampshire
Nature of the contest - The contestant filed a notice of contest under the FCEA
claiming that the contestee failed to file an affidavit attesting to the fact that he was
not a subversive person as defined by New Hampshire law. The contestant further
claims right to the office since he was the only qualified candidate who submitted
such an affidavit. The Committee found that the law relied upon by the contestant
had been declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court and that it had been
repealed by the New Hampshire legislature prior to the election.
Disposition of the contest - The Committee adopted a motion to report H.Res.
539, dismissing the election contest. The House passed the measure on September
26, 1996.
Munster v. Gejdenson (No report filed), 2nd District of
Connecticut
Nature of the contest - After two recounts, the contestee, Gejdenson, was
declared the winner by 21 votes. The contestant filed a notice of contest claiming
that errors of judgment were made by the vote counters. However, without alleging
fraud, the contestant did claim that 1,200 residents had been added improperly to the
voting polls. The House Oversight Task Force voted 2 to 1 against dismissing the
contest. A month later the contestant withdrew his challenge.
Disposition of the contest - Challenge withdrawn by the contestant.
Brooks v. Harman (No report filed), 36th District of California
Nature of the contest - The contestant, Brooks, had been the apparent winner
on election night, with 82,415 to 82,322 votes. However, after mail-in votes were
counted, the result showed that the contestee, Harman, had won by 93,939 to 93,127
votes. The contestant then filed a notice of contest under the FCEA, claiming that
the 812-vote margin of victory was based on illegal ballots, including votes from
nonresidents, minors and voters illegally registered at abandoned buildings and
commercial addresses. The contestee filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the
contestant filed her notice of contest after the statutory period had expired. After
deciding that the challenge merited further investigation, the task force voted, 2 to 1,
to request for more information. The contestant withdrew her challenge two weeks
after the task force held a field hearing.
Disposition of the contest - Challenge withdrawn by the contestant.
105th Congress
Dornan v. Sanchez (H.Rept. 416), 46th District of California
Nature of the contest - On November 22, 1996 the Orange County Registrar
of Voters certified the contestee, Ms. Sanchez, the winner by 984 votes.
Subsequently, the contestant, Mr. Dornan, requested a recount. On December 9,
1997, as a result of the recount, Ms. Sanchez’s margin of victory was reduced to 979
votes. On December 26, 1996, the contestant filed a notice of contest. This notice,
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amended on April 19, 1997, alleged non-citizen voting and voting irregularities, such
as improper delivery of absentee ballots, double voting and phantom voting.
The Task Force on Elections made a comparison between the Orange County
voters’ registration files and INS databases. The Task Force reported its findings as
follows:
. . . the Task Force was able to clearly and convincingly document that 624
persons had illegally registered and thus were not eligible to cast ballots in
the November 1996 election. In addition, the Task Force discovered 196
instances where there was a circumstantial indication that a voter
registered illegally. Further, the Orange County Registrar of voters voided
124 improper absentee ballots. In total, the Task Force found clear and
convincing evidence that 748 invalid votes were cast in this election.
However, the number of ballots for which the Task Force and Committee
has clear and convincing evidence that they were cast improperly by
individuals not eligible to vote in the November 1996 election is less than
the 979-vote margin in this election.
Disposition of the contest - The Committee adopted a motion to report H.Res.
355, dismissing the election contest. The House passed the resolution on February
12, 1998.
106th Congress
No election contests.
107th Congress
No election contests.
108th Congress
Tataii v. Case (H.Rept. 207), 2nd District of Hawaii
Nature of the contest - The contestant filed a notice of contest under the FCEA
asserting that when the contestant challenged the late Representative Patsy Mink in
the 2002 Democrat primary, where he received 15% of the vote, Representative Mink
should have been disqualified as a primary candidate because she was seriously ill
at the time of the primary election and passed away one week later. Contestant
argued that he should have been declared the Democrat nominee by default and that
as the nominee, he therefore would have been the inevitable winner of the general
election. The Committee found that the FCEA does not contemplate considering
notices of contest that are based on the conduct of primary elections. Therefore, the
Committee concluded that the basis for the contestant’s notice of contest was outside
the scope of FCEA and voted to dismiss as a frivolous election contest.
Disposition of the contest — The Committee adopted a motion to report H.Res.
317, dismissing the election contest. The House passed the measure on July 15,
2003.
CRS-43
Lyons v. Gordon (H.Rept. 208), 6th District of Tennessee
Nature of the contest - The contestant filed a notice of contest under the FCEA
alleging that the contestee, Mr. Gordon, committed violations of the Constitution
amounting to acts of insurrection because contestee, as an incumbent Member of
Congress, did not resign his seat prior to seeking re-election and because as an
inactive member of the Tennessee Bar, contestee violated the separation of powers
principle in the U.S. Constitution by remaining a “Judicial Officer of the Courts of
Tennessee” while serving as a “Legislative Officer of the United States.” The
contestant made no allegations of irregularities, fraud, or wrongdoing with respect
to the election.
The Committee found that in order to have standing under the FCEA, a
contestant must have been a candidate for election to the House of Representatives
in the last preceding election and claim a right to the contestee’s seat. The
Committee found that the contestant met the first prong of the two-part test. With
regard to the second prong, the Committee found that by claiming a right to the
contestee’s seat because the contestee was ineligible/not qualified to appear on the
November 5, 2003 ballot, the contestant “fails to explain the logical connection
between the contestee’s alleged ineligibility and the contestant’s entitlement to the
contestee’s congressional seat.” However, the Committee chose not to resolve the
issue of whether failure to explain the nexus between the alleged election deficiencies
and the contestant’s right to the seat is sufficient to establish standing. Instead, the
Committee stated that as a threshold matter, it would proceed to consider a notice of
contest only if the notice states grounds sufficient to change the result of the election.
That is, the Committee found that a contestant must allege irregularities, fraud, or
wrongdoing that, if proven, would likely overturn the original election outcome.
Since the contestant did not advance allegations of irregularity or fraud or objections
to the accuracy of the vote totals, which showed him receiving 2% of the vote and
the contestee receiving 66%, the Committee voted to dismiss as a frivolous election
contest.
Disposition of the contest - The Committee adopted a motion to report H.Res.
318, dismissing the election contest. The House passed the measure on July 15,
2003.
109th Congress
Lyons v. Gordon (H.Rept. 57), 6th District of Tennessee
Nature of the contest - In a “virtually identical” notice of contest to the one filed
and dismissed during the 108th Congress, the contestant filed a notice of contest,
under the FCEA, asserting that the contestee, Mr. Gordon, committed violations of
the Constitution amounting to acts of insurrection because, as an incumbent Member
of Congress, the contestee did not resign his seat prior to seeking re-election and
because, as an inactive member of the Tennessee Bar, the contestee violated the
separation of powers principle in the U.S. Constitution by remaining a “Judicial
Officer of the Courts of Tennessee” while serving as a “Legislative Officer of the
United States.” The contestant made no allegations of irregularities, fraud, or
wrongdoing with respect to the election.
CRS-44
Similar to its finding during the 108th Congress contest, the Committee found
that it will proceed to consider a notice of contest only if the notice states grounds
sufficient to change the result of an election, that is, allegations of irregularities,
fraud, or wrongdoing with respect to an election that, if proven, would likely overturn
the original election outcome. Absent that, the Committee noted, it will recommend
dismissal of the contest. In this contest, the Committee determined that challenges
to the qualifications of a Member-elect to serve in the Congress generally fall outside
the purview of the FCEA, which was designed to consider allegations relating to the
actual conduct of an election. The Committee further noted that nothing in the
contestant’s notice persuaded the Committee to reconsider this established
interpretation of the statute.
Disposition of the contest - The Committee adopted a motion to report H.Res.
239, dismissing the election contest. The House passed the measure on April 27,
2005.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.