Global Climate Change: Adequacy of Commitments Under the U.N. Framework Convention and the Berlin Mandate

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Global Climate Change: Adequacy of

Commitments Under the U.N. Framework

Convention and the Berlin Mandate

October 25, 1996

Wayne A. Morrissey

Science and Technology Information Analyst

Science, Technology, and Medicine Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Global Climate Change: Adequacy of Commitments Under

the U.N. Framework Convention and the Berlin Mandate

Summary

The second session of the Conference of Parties (COP-2) to the United Nations

Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) convened July 8-19, 1996, in

Geneva, Switzerland. On July 18, 1996, the Ministers and other heads of delegations

present at COP-2 crafted and released a Ministerial Declaration, also called The

Geneva Declaration. It was based on a U.S. policy statement delivered July 17th at

COP-2 which: 1) recognized and endorsed the Second Assessment Report of the

Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change (IPCC) as currently the most

comprehensive and authoritative assessment of the science of climate change, 2)

called for parties to set “legally binding, medium-term targets” for limitations and

significant overall reductions of their emissions of greenhouse gases, and 3) rejected

commitments for developed country parties regarding “common or harmonized”

policies and measures in favor of flexibility in applying policies and measures to

achieve emissions limitations and reductions. The Chairman of COP-2 called for

FCCC parties to “take note” of the Ministerial Declaration, and to agree as a body to

consider a “future decision [containing these elements] which would be legally binding

on all parties under the FCCC.”

Some in the U.S. Congress have voiced concerns about the principles of

common but differentiated commitments and responsibilities, as well as respective

capabilities, under FCCC for developed versus developing countries. Specifically,

questions have been raised about whether continued adherence to these principles in

any protocol or other legal instrument negotiated for the post-2000 period could

disadvantage the United States economically and competitively in world markets.

Among some Members and the committees of relevant jurisdiction in the House and

Senate, a need has been expressed to be better informed about what exactly the

United States potentially may be agreeing to during the current Analysis and

Assessment Phase called for in the Framework Convention’s 1995 Berlin Mandate,

as well as what the economic impact would be of future decisions the United States

might make vis a vis other FCCC parties in future climate protection negotiations.

Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

A U.S. Response to the Ministerial Declaration and Future Directions . . . . 1

Continuation of Assessment and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Joint Implementation (Activities Implemented Jointly) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Congressional Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Differential Commitments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

U.S. Analysis and Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Next Steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Appendix I: Review of the Implementation of the Convention and of Decisions of the

First Session of the Conference of Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Appendix II: The Berlin Mandate: Review of the adequacy of Article 4, paragraph

2 (a) and (b), of the Convention, including proposals related to a protocol and

decisions on follow-up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

I. Decisions Adopted by the Conference of the Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Appendix III: Parties to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change . 13

Global Climate Change: Adequacy of

Commitments Under the U.N. Framework

Convention and the Berlin Mandate

Introduction

The Ministerial Declaration of the Second Conference of Parties (COP-2) to the

UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), adopted July 18, 1995,1

arose out of consideration of two draft decision options for future negotiations to

protect Earth’s climate. One was presented by the United States2 and the other by the

European Union (EU). The Declaration is predominantly influenced by the U.S.

position which 1) accepts the science of climate change proffered by the

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2) rejects uniform “harmonized

policies” in favor of flexibility and, 3) calls for “legally-binding medium-term targets,”

which many COP-2 parties claim symbolizes an earnest commitment to protect

“dangerous anthropogenic interference with Earth’s climate system,” in the post-year

2000 period.

In essence, the Declaration represents a request by the Chairman of COP-2,

Chen Chimutengwende of Zimbabwe, for FCCC parties to “take note” of these

proposals and, as such, by agreeing to it expresses the sense of ministerial participants

at COP-2 that, as a body, they do not object to a “future decision which would be

binding on all parties under the FCCC,” even though some parties expressed their

reservations which were included for the record. The details of that “decision,”

however, have yet to be determined, and will be the subject of negotiations over the

coming months to culminate at the Third Meeting of COP, scheduled for December

1997, in Kyoto, Japan.

A U.S. Response to the Ministerial Declaration and Future Directions

Some have described the U.S. position which, in large part, forms the basis for

the Ministerial Declaration, as being evident of its taking a leadership role in the postyear 2000 period. State Department officials have also commented that U.S.

leadership has encouraged future movement toward a concerted international policy

UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Conference of Parties, Second

session, Geneva, 8-19 July 1996 (agenda item 5) [see appendix I]. Review of the

implementation of the convention and of Decisions of the First session of the Conference of

Parties: Ministerial Declaration (FCCC/CP/1996/L.17, July 19, 1996).

The Honorable Timothy E. Wirth, Undersecretary of State for Global Affairs on behalf

of the United States of America. Presentation to the Second Conference of Parties,

Framework Convention on Climate Change, Geneva, Switzerland, July 17, 1996.

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to protect climate. However Russia, and the OPEC3 bloc of countries objected to the

Declaration outright, while Australia and New Zealand, noting the Declaration, voiced

concern that the term “legally-binding” in the Ministerial Declaration is not adequately

defined. U.S. State Department representatives characterized the Declaration’s

movement toward medium-term legally binding targets as getting away from

rhetorical, empty pledges which have been the hallmark, so far, of negotiations toward

climate change protection. They believe that legally binding targets force FCCC

parties to gain a realistic sense of what needs to be done, which in the long run can

help to equalize the differential interest and involvement among Annex I and other

FCCC parties.4 (See Appendix III)

An official U.S. response to the Geneva Declaration was issued on July 19, 1996,

to clarify how a legally binding medium range target might be achieved. Flexibility

in how one attains emissions-reduction targets, which is a key concept of the

Declaration, assumes a menu of policy options which U.S. negotiators believe would

make potential solutions affordable. This would be accomplished through

implementation of measures, including global emissions trading schemes, joint

implementation projects (see Joint Implementation below) and U.S. bilateral efforts,

such as the U.S. Country Studies program and environmental technology trade

initiatives sponsored by the Environmental Protection Agency jointly with the

Department of Energy. In this respect U.S. negotiators believe that such an approach

would not put OECD countries5 at an economic disadvantage, but perhaps allow them

to implement climate protection measures that may eventually pay for themselves or

provide a return on investment. A flexible approach, they claim, could also allow for

either rolling or cumulative targets based on periodic assessments of progress and the

state of climate science. They emphasized that any medium- or long-term goals that

the U.S. is likely to support would require the participation of all developed and

developing countries.

State Department officials also described the adoption of a standardized basis for

reporting of international sources and sinks of greenhouse gas emissions, which was

The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is made up of the

following members: Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria,

Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela.

Under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), Annex I Countries

include economically developed countries and “other parties” which are former centrallyplanned economies now in transition to market-based economies. Annex II Countries are

economically developed countries which have added responsibilities under FCCC such as

fiscal and technological assistance to economically developing countries which would to help

the latter meet Commitments incumbent upon all FCCC parties. All Annex II Countries are

also Annex I Countries. All remaining parties under the FCCC, not classified as either Annex

I or Annex II, are considered to be economically Developing Countries.

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) includes

Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany. Greece, Iceland,

Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain,

Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States, and currently represent

about three-fourths of total global emissions of greenhouse gases.

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agreed to by all parties at COP-2, an indication of further progress in bringing more

developing countries into and contributing to the FCCC process.

Continuation of Assessment and Analysis

U.S. negotiators believe that an analysis and assessment phase called for in the

April 1995 Berlin Mandate, at the First COP, has not yet yielded sufficient

information whereby they could confidently prescribe emissions levels or a staged

decrease in emissions to reach a near term emissions reduction target (by 2005).

Instead they call for a focus on medium-term goals, where medium-term is described

as occurring between 2010-2020. The levels of reduction would be negotiable. Such

goals, they believe, would better synchronize with developed countries’ economic and

environmental interests, and are sensitive to the life cycle/turnover rate of existing

capital stock and equipment in developed countries and with investment cycles that

govern replacement of that stock and equipment.

Undersecretary of State for Global Affairs Tim Wirth has noted that it is

unreasonable, at this time, to consider long-term goals before COP-3, when taking

into account the current partitioning of global emissions, the largest proportion of

which are currently produced by OECD countries. However, a State Department

spokesman has indicated that U.S. negotiators would probably concede the necessity

of including an acknowledgment of long-term goals and binding commitments as part

of any legally binding text (instrument) that might be opened for signature at COP-3.

Long-term goals look toward the next 50-100 years and are also sensitive to

corporate time tables for investment. State Department officials believe this will send

a positive signal to companies to invest in the future. Also, Undersecretary Wirth, in

his statement asserted that the U.S. would reject any rapid transition strategies

suggested in the European Union (EU) and Association of Small Island States

(AOSIS) proposals,6,7 which, he affirmed, would interrupt economic growth in the

United States or compromise economic interests of energy producing industries.

Wirth’s statement goes further to reject the imposition of “harmonized” policies

and measures on developed countries, such as uniform Corporate Average Fuel

Efficiency (CAFE) standards and energy taxes, but rather would consider

implementing more flexible, market based approaches, such as an emissions trading

scheme similar to that found in the U.S. Clean Air Act.

Joint Implementation (Activities Implemented Jointly)

Joint Implementation (JI) is a keystone of what Undersecretary Wirth has called

a flexible approach to climate protection in the post-year 2000 period. The United

States, and some other nations have advocated an unrestricted policy of joint

implementation (JI), whereby any country, by merit of their ability to provide

The EU Proposal (German Proposal at COP-1) seeks to reduce emissions of Annex I

parties 10% below 1990 levels by 2005 and 15% to 20% below 1990 levels by 2010.

The Al

reduce their emissions 20% below 1990 levels by 2005.

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resources to any other country for the purposes of helping them to reduce their

greenhouse gas emissions, could concomitantly earn some credit toward their own

domestic greenhouse gas reduction goals. Joint Implementation (JI) was a leading

topic for debate at COP-1, in April 1995, and activities which occurred prior to and

at COP-1 were described by the U.S. delegation as being very fruitful. However, the

scope and nature of an international joint implementation initiative (activities

implemented jointly) under FCCC, i.e., has been contentiously debated, especially the

issue of assigning credits for emissions reductions.

The U.S. position on JI has been criticized by the “Group of 77” (actually about

130 developing countries) as a tactic by which rich, industrialized countries could

shirk their commitments to reduce emissions at home. Other FCCC parties, most

notably the European Union, claim that such a use of joint implementation runs

contrary to the original spirit of the terms of the climate convention. Many

developing countries have argued that it is more important for the industrialized

countries to pursue actions that would help to reduce their currently larger share of

global greenhouse gas emissions, at their source. However, not all developing

countries were on record as being opposed to JI; some anticipated its implementation

as a sole means for them to comply with their obligations under FCCC, to inventory

their sources and sinks of greenhouse gases and prepare national communications.

The United States is currently engaging both developing countries and those in

economic transition (in Central Europe) in its US Initiative on JI (USIJI) pilot

programs. However, at COP-1, a majority of parties agreed that emissions credits

would not be allotted during the international pilot phase. The German government,

however, suggested a possible ending date of 1999, for all pilot projects, and stated

that, companies investing in successful joint implementation projects will likely be able

to take credit thereafter. In March 1995, in Santiago Chile, U.S. negotiators,

developed new JI agreements with some Latin American countries. Consequently,

they were also somewhat satisfied that preliminary agreements on international JI,

forged at COP-1, provided for all FCCC parties to participate. Unlike, the provision

of the FCCC, the United States had considered offering business and industries

involved in activities under the U.S. Climate Change Action Plan (CCAP) credits

which they would be able to count towards domestic emissions reductions. The

United States has also been holding a series of outreach programs to involve the

business community, non-governmental organizations, and other private stakeholders

directly in future international climate negotiations to the extent that they occur.

Furthermore, the Clinton Administration is supporting development of an international

“Climate Technology Initiative,” which would help industrialized countries to

facilitate transfer and dissemination of environmental technologies to the developing

world.

Congressional Interest

Many Members in the U.S. Congress have expressed concerns about how

commitments under FCCC for developed and developing countries have been and

would continue to be applied differently. They also want to be better informed about

what the United States potentially may be agreeing to during the current Analysis and

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Assessment Phase called for in the Berlin Mandate. Furthermore, many are concerned

about what future direction the United States may take vis a vis other FCCC parties

in future climate protection negotiations, and what the potential implication for U.S.

economy of both possible medium-term and long-term actions may be.

Differential Commitments

Many have contended that the Berlin Mandate, issued in April 1995, at COP-18,

was flawed because it perpetuated different commitments for countries which are

economically developed, in economic transition, or developing countries. The Geneva

Declaration reaffirms and extends, after the year 2000, those commitments now

incumbent upon all FCCC parties. State Department officials have commented that

this differential approach has been consistent from the very beginning, as set forth in

Article 4 of the Framework Convention (Commitments), and has been recognized by

FCCC parties as a way Annex I countries could draw developing countries into the

system for inventory, reporting and complying with their express commitments under

FCCC. Many have pointed out that, to a certain extent, Annex I countries rely on

commitments currently incumbent upon developing countries, in order that the former

may be able to more realistically assess what their emission reduction goals might

need to be in the near term. This can only be accomplished with the help of an

accurate assessment of global sources and sinks of greenhouse gases.

However, others have noted that the Declaration makes no provision for a

“transitioning” of developing countries into Annex I status, which would more

realistically reflect the latters’ changing economic developments and their potential

for growth of emissions. Nevertheless, U.S. representatives at COP-2 were

particularly encouraged that plans to compensate or provide exemptions for certain

developing countries were rejected. Undersecretary Wirth is on record as supporting

what he believes should be a developing nation’s “graduation to compliance,” which

is made possible through “implementing polices and measures,” such as those

mentioned above which justify developing country participation in the FCCC process.

U.S. Analysis and Assessment

Eileen Claussen, Assistant Secretary for Oceans and International Environmental

and Scientific Affairs at the State Department stressed that any future legally binding

agreement to which the United States would consider becoming a party would be

open to a wide spectrum of national interests for peer review, and all comments

would be taken into consideration. Toward this end, Undersecretary of Commerce,

Everett Ehrlich, is heading up a U.S. Government team of experts who will attempt

to analyze what constitutes reasonably achievable emissions-reduction targets and

over what time frame. This team will also assess for the business and industry

UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Conference of the Parties, First

session, Berlin, 28 March - April 7 1995 (Agenda item 6 (c)). Conclusion of outstanding

issues and adoption of decisions: Proposal on Agenda item 5 (a) (iii), submitted by the

President of the Conference: Review of the adequacy of article 4, paragraph 2 (a) and (b) of

the Convention, including proposals related to a protocol and decisions on follow-up (see

Appendix II)

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communities, and the Nation as a whole, the economic implications for the United

States of an agreement which would include legally binding emissions reductions

targets. A number of possible scenarios were presented in economic papers prepared

for a June 1996, Climate Change Analysis Workshop, hosted by the Departments of

Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, and State, and the Environmental Protection Agency

(EPA). EPA issued a notice of the beginning of a 90-day comment period on these

proceedings, which closed October 28, 1996.9

Next Steps

Still to be worked out, but not specifically addressed at COP-2, are possible

compliance enforcement measures, whether they would be “hard or soft,” and by

whom compliance would be enforced. Next steps after COP-2 will be pursued at two

upcoming meetings, one December 8-18, 1996, in Geneva, and one February 24March 7, 1997, in Bonn, Germany. During these meetings, U.S. representatives will

set out to:

! Establish specific greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets (“medium-term”

emissions and a long-term concentration goal);

! Set timetables for achieving targets;

! Craft rules for bringing developing countries into the climate treaty; and

! Define rules for an international emissions trading regime.10

At the February 1997 meeting, FCCC parties hope to have the final text of a

legally-binding agreement ready for international review which would then be opened

for signature at COP-3.

Notice of 90-Day Comment Period on the Proceedings of the Climate Change Analysis

Workshop. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Notice. Federal Register, v. 61, no.

146, July 29, 1996: 39453.

Personal Communication, The Business Council for Sustainable Energy. Washington,

DC, August 1, 1996.

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Appendix I11: Review of the Implementation of the

Convention and of Decisions of the First Session of the

Conference of Parties

Distr. LIMITED

FCCC/CP/1996/L.17

18 July 1996

Original: ENGLISH

CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES

Second session

Geneva, 8 - 19 July 1996

Agenda item 5

Ministerial Declaration

The Ministers and other heads of delegations present at the second session of the

Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate

Change,

Noting that this, our meeting at Ministerial level under the Convention, is a

demonstration of our intention to continue to take an active and constructive role in

addressing the threat of climate change,

Recall Article 2 of the Convention; the principles of equity and of common but

differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities in Article 3.1 of the

Convention; and the provisions of Article 3.3 concerning precautionary

measures; as well as the specific national and regional development priorities,

objectives and circumstances of the Parties to the Convention;

Recognize and endorse the Second Assessment Report of the IPCC as currently

the most comprehensive and authoritative assessment of the science of climate

change, its impacts and response options now available. Ministers believe that

the Second Assessment Report should provide a scientific basis for urgently

strengthening action at the global, regional and national levels, particularly action

by Annex I Parties to limit and reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, and for all

Parties to support the development of a Protocol or another legal instrument;

and note the findings of the IPCC, in particular the following:

The balance of evidence suggests a discernible human influence

on global climate. Without specific policies to mitigate climate

change, the global average surface temperature relative to 1990

is projected to increase by about 2C (between 1C and 3.5C) by

2100; average sea level is projected to rise by about

This text was introduced by the President at the 6th plenary meeting, on July 18, 1996.

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50 centimetres (between 15 and 95 centimetres) above present

levels by 2100. Stabilization of atmospheric concentrations at

twice pre-industrial levels will eventually require global emissions

to be less than 50 per cent of current levels;

The projected changes in climate will result in significant, often

adverse, impacts on many ecological systems and

socio-economic sectors, including food supply and water

resources, and on human health. In some cases, the impacts are

potentially irreversible; developing countries and small island

countries are typically more vulnerable to climate change;

Significant reductions in net greenhouse gas emissions are

technically possible and economically feasible by utilizing an

array of technology policy measures that accelerate technology

development, diffusion and transfer; and significant no regrets

opportunities are available in most countries to reduce net

greenhouse gas emissions;

Believe that the findings of the Second Assessment Report indicate that the

continued rise of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere will lead to

dangerous interference with the climate system, given the serious risk of an

increase in temperature and particularly the very high rate of temperature

change;

Recognize also the need for continuing work by the IPCC to further reduce

scientific uncertainties, in particular regarding socio-economic and environmental

impacts on developing countries, including those vulnerable to drought,

decertification or sea-level rise;

Reaffirm the existing commitments under the Convention, including those

intended to demonstrate that Annex I Parties are taking the lead in modifying

longer-term trends in emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse

gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, and agree to strengthen the

process under the Convention for the regular review of the implementation of

present and future commitments;

Take note that Annex I Parties are fulfilling their commitments to implement

national policies and measures on the mitigation of climate change. Also take

note that this is not the only commitment that Annex I Parties have made and

that many of these Parties need to make additional efforts to overcome

difficulties that they face in achieving the aim of returning their emissions of

greenhouse gases to 1990 levels by 2000;

Acknowledge the considerable work done by the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin

Mandate (AGBM) since the first session of the Conference of the Parties,

including the substantive proposals presented by a number of Parties, and call

on all Parties to come forward with proposals to facilitate substantive

negotiations beginning at the fifth session of AGBM in December 1996;

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Instruct their representatives to accelerate negotiations on the text of a

legally-binding protocol or another legal instrument to be completed in due time

for adoption at the third session of the Conference of the Parties. The outcome

should fully encompass the remit of the Berlin Mandate, in particular:

commitments for Annex I Parties regarding:

policies and measures including, as appropriate, regarding energy,

transport, industry, agriculture, forestry, waste management, economic

instruments, institutions and mechanisms;

quantified legally-binding objectives for emission limitations and significant

overall reductions within specified time frames, such as 2005, 2010, 2020, with

respect to their anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of

greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol;

commitments for all Parties on continuing to advance the implementation of

existing commitments in Article 4.1;

a mechanism to allow the regular review and strengthening of the commitments

embodied in a Protocol or other legal instrument;

commitments to a global effort to speed up the development, application,

diffusion and transfer of climate-friendly technologies, practices and processes;

in this regard, further concrete action should be taken;

Welcome the efforts of developing country Parties to implement the Convention

and thus to address climate change and its adverse impacts and, to this end, to

make their initial national communications in accordance with guidelines adopted

by the Conference of the Parties at its second session; and call on the GEF to

provide expeditious and timely support to these Parties and initiate work

towards a full replenishment in 1997;

10. Recognize that the continuing advancement of existing commitments by

developing country Parties, in the context of their national priorities for

sustainable development, requires determined and timely action, in particular by

Annex II Parties. Access to financial resources and to environmentally-sound

technologies consistent with Articles 4.3, 4.4, 4.5 and 4.7 will be most critical;

11. Thank the Government of the Swiss Confederation for its contribution to the

work of the second session of the Conference of the Parties in Geneva and look

forward to meeting again at the third session in Kyoto, in 1997, thanks to the

generous offer of the Government of Japan.

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Appendix II: the Berlin Mandate: Review of the

Adequacy of Article 4, Paragraph 2 (A) and (B), of the

Convention, Including Proposals Related to a Protocol

and Decisions on Follow-up

I. Decisions Adopted by the Conference of the Parties

Decision 1/CP.1

The Conference of the Parties, at its first session, Having reviewed Article 4,

paragraph 2(a) and (b), of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate

Change, and Having concluded that these subparagraphs are not adequate, Agrees to

begin a process to enable it to take appropriate action for the period beyond 2000,

including the strengthening of the commitments of the Parties included in Annex I to

the Convention (Annex I Parties) in Article 4, paragraph 2(a) and (b), through the

adoption of a protocol or another legal instrument:

The process shall be guided, inter alia, by the following:

The provisions of the Convention, including Article 3, in particular the

principles in Article 3.1, which reads as follows: “The Parties should

protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations

of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common

but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly,

the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate

change and the adverse effects thereof;”

The specific needs and concerns of developing country Parties referred

to in Article 4.8; the specific needs and special situations of least developed

countries referred to in Article 4.9; and the situation of Parties, particularly

developing country Parties, referred to in Article 4.10 of the Convention;

The legitimate needs of the developing countries for the achievement

of sustained economic growth and the eradication of poverty, recognizing

also that all Parties have a right to, and should, promote sustainable

development;

The fact that the largest share of historical and current global

emissions of greenhouse gases has originated in developed countries, that

the per capita emissions in developing countries are still relatively low and

that the share of global emissions originating in developing countries will

grow to meet their social and development needs;

The fact that the global nature of climate change calls for the widest

possible cooperation by all countries and their participation in an effective

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and appropriate international response, in accordance with their common

but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and their social

and economic conditions;

Coverage of all greenhouse gases, their emissions by sources and

removals by sinks and all relevant sectors;

The need for all Parties to cooperate in good faith and to participate

in this process.

The process will, inter alia:

Aim, as the priority in the process of strengthening the commitments

in Article 4.2(a) and (b) of the Convention, for developed country/other

Parties included in Annex I, both

(1) to elaborate policies and measures, as well as

(2) to set quantified limitation and reduction objectives within

specified time-frames, such as 2005, 2010 and 2020, for their

anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of

greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol,

taking into account the differences in starting points and

approaches, economic structures and resource bases, the need to

maintain strong and sustainable economic growth, available

technologies and other individual circumstances, as well as the

need for equitable and appropriate contributions by each of these

Parties to the global effort, and also the process of analysis and

assessment referred to in section III, paragraph 4, below;

Not introduce any new commitments for Parties not included in Annex

I, but reaffirm existing commitments in Article 4.1 and continue to advance

the implementation of these commitments in order to achieve sustainable

development, taking into account Article 4.3, 4.5 and 4.7;

Take into account any result from the review referred to in Article

4.2(f), if available, and any notification referred to in Article 4.2(g);

Consider, as provided in Article 4.2(e), the coordination among Annex

I Parties, as appropriate, of relevant economic and administrative

instruments, taking into account Article 3.5;

Provide for the exchange of experience on national activities in areas

of interest, particularly those identified in the review and synthesis of

available national communications; and

Provide for a review mechanism.

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III

3. The process will be carried out in the light of the best available scientific

information and assessment on climate change and its impacts, as well as relevant

technical, social and economic information, including, inter alia, reports of the

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. It will also make use of other available

expertise.

4. The process will include in its early stages an analysis and assessment, to

identify possible policies and measures for Annex I Parties which could contribute to

limiting and reducing emissions by sources and protecting and enhancing sinks and

reservoirs of greenhouse gases. This process could identify environmental and

economic impacts and the results that could be achieved with regard to time horizons

such as 2005, 2010, and 2020.

5. The protocol proposal of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS),

which contains specific reduction targets and was formally submitted in accordance

with Article 17 of the Convention, along with other proposals and pertinent

documents, should be included for consideration in the process.

6. The process should begin without delay and be conducted as a matter of

urgency, in an open-ended ad hoc group of Parties hereby established, which will

report to the second session of the Conference of the Parties on the status of this

process. The sessions of this group should be scheduled to ensure completion of the

work as early as possible in 1997, with a view to adopting the results at the third

session of the Conference of the Parties.

9th plenary meeting April 1995.

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Appendix III: Parties to the U.N. Framework

Convention on Climate Change

Annex I Countries and Countries in

Economic Transition

Annex II Countries

Australia

Austria

Belarusa

Belgium

Bulgariaa

Canada

Czechoslovakiaa

Denmark

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Estoniaa

Finland

France

Germany

Greece

Hungarya

Iceland

Ireland

Italy

Japan

Latviaa

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Romaniaa

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Ukrainea

United Kingdom of Great Britain and

Northern Ireland

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