The Kurds in Iraq : Status, Protection, and Prospects

Congressional research reportMay 12, 1994

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The Kurds in Iraq :

Status, Protection, and Prospects

Alfred B . Prados

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division

May 12, 1994

I IIIII! IlIII IIE IIIIII IIIII IIIII IIII IIII

TILE KURDS IN IRAQ :

STATUS, PROTECTION, AND PROSPECTS

SUMMARY

The Kurds of Iraq continue to pursue a campaign to achieve long-held

national aspirations . For some Kurds, this means gaining full rights and

meaningful autonomy within the existing state of Iraq . Other Iraqi Kurds seek

a separate state which ultimately might include the Kurdish regions of neighboring

countries as well . Since 1991, the Kurdish enclave in northeastern Iraq has

enjoyed a de facto independence from Baghdad under U .N. and allied protection,

but its future remains uncertain .

The protected status of the Kurdish enclave in Iraq is based primarily on

the provisions of U .N. Security Council Resolution 688 of April 1, 1991, which

demanded that Iraq cease repression of its citizens and called for an international

relief program for the Iraqi civilian population . The resolution made specific

mention of the plight of the Iraqi Kurds, and has been supplemented by two

parallel mechanisms : a U .N.-sponsored relief and security program covered by

a memorandum of understanding with the Iraqi Government ; and a ban on Iraqi

air operations over northern Iraq enforced by U.S., British, and French aircraft

overflights with the cooperation of Turkey . (There is another no-fly zone in

southern Iraq .)

Under this protective umbrella, the Iraqi Kurds held elections for a

provisional government in 1992 and have been able to administer their affairs

in their northern enclave . They continue to suffer significant privations resulting

from a dual embargo : the U .N. economic sanctions against Iraq, which apply to

all parts of the country (including the Kurdish-inhabited areas) ; and an economic

blockade imposed by the Government of Iraq against the Kurdish region as well .

Iraq has also massed approximately 100,000 troops and some 900 tanks along

the frontier with the Kurdish enclave, and the attitudes of neighboring states

(Turkey, Iran, and Syria) toward the Iraqi Kurds are ambivalent, since these

countries are concerned over any manifestation of Kurdish separatism that might

spread to their own Kurdish populations .

Officials of U .S . Administrations and Members of Congress have tended to

sympathize with Iraqi Kurds, both as victims of oppression by the central

government and as potential allies against the regime of Iraqi President Saddam

Hussein. Congress, in particular, has been interested in financial assistance to

the Kurds ; violations of their human rights ; the possibility of relaxing economic

sanctions selectively to alleviate the economic plight of the Iraqi Kurds ; and

support for the democratic institutions they are trying to build in northern Iraq .

Both the Bush and Clinton Administrations have been sympathetic to the Iraqi

Kurds, but are sensitive to other regional considerations in formulating policies

toward this group . Future contingencies--such as further challenges from Iraq,

withdrawal of Turkish cooperation, an agreement between the Iraqi Kurds and

the central government, or the loss of allied consensus in supporting the Kurds-could require further review of U .S. policies toward the Iraqi Kurdish question .

TABLE OF CONTENTS

OVERVIEW

KURDS IN IRAQ: A CAPSULE

HUMANITARIAN AND PROTECTIVE MEASURES

U.N . SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 688

U .N . RELIEF AND SECURITY PROGRAMS

THE NORTHERN NO-FLY ZONE

IRAQI REACTIONS

THE KURDISH ENCLAVE AND PROVISIONAL REGIME

FACTIONS AND LEADERSHIP

THE 1992 ELECTIONS AND PROVISIONAL ADMINISTRATION . . 8

PRESSURES FROM IRAQ

Political Pressure

Military Pressure

Economic Pressure

EXTERNAL PLAYERS AND RELATIONSHIPS

The Iraqi Opposition

Non-Iraqi Kurdish Groups

Foreign Countries

CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST IN THE IRAQI KURDISH QUESTION .

FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES

RELAXING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

DEALING WITH KURDISH LEADERSHIP

POSSIBLE CONTINGENCIES

CHALLENGE BY IRAQ

WITHDRAWAL OF TURKISH SUPPORT

A KURDISH-IRAQI DEAL

LOSS OF WIDER CONSENSUS

APPENDIX

TILE KURDS IN IRAQ :

STATUS, PROTECTION, AND PROSPECTS

OVERVIEW

The Kurds of Iraq continue to pursue a campaign to achieve long-held

national aspirations . For some Kurds, this means gaining full rights and

meaningful autonomy within the existing state of Iraq . Other Iraqi Kurds seek

a separate state which ultimately might include the Kurdish regions of neighboring

countries as well . Since 1991, the Kurdish enclave in northeastern Iraq has

enjoyed a de facto independence from Baghdad under U .N . and allied protection,

but its future remains uncertain . Officials of U .S. Administrations and Members

of Congress have tended to sympathize with Iraqi Kurds, both as victims of

oppression by the central government and as potential allies against the regime

of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein ; however, there are different views within

U.S . Government circles over the scope and terms of assistance to the Kurds of

Iraq.

This study summarizes the development of an internationally protected

Kurdish enclave in Iraq, describes the provisional Kurdish administration in that

area, examines Iraqi Kurdish relations with neighboring states and groups, and

covers issues of U .S. congressional interest . [For a more detailed discussion of

the historical development of the Kurds in Iraq, see Alfred B . Prados, Kurdish

Separatism in Iraq : Developments and Implications for the United States, CRS

Report 91-397F, May 6, 1991 .]

KURDS IN IRAQ: A CAPSULE

Kurds constitute a distinct ethnic group that has lived in the Middle East

since ancient times . Estimates of their numbers vary from 15 to 25 million .'

Their social organization is tribal, although an urban class has developed during

the past century . With rare exceptions they are Sunni Muslims . At present, they

inhabit a roughly crescent shaped area, variously estimated from less than 100,000

to almost 200,000 square miles and covering eastern Turkey, northeastern Syria,

northeastern Iraq, northwestern Iran, and small portions of the former Soviet

Union. Though predominantly Kurdish, this area contains other ethnic and

A recent estimate of 20 million was cited by Murphy, Caryle and Thomas

Lippman . It's Important Work . The Washington Post, April 15, 1994, p . Al.

Some estimates are higher . Kurdish sources in 1990 claimed a total Kurdish

population or 27 .4 million . See Olsen, Robert. The Kurdish Question in the

aftermath of the Gulf War : Geopolitical and Geostrategic Changes in the Middle

East. Third World Quarterly, Vol . 13, No . 3, 1992 . p. 475.

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religious minorities including Assyrian Christians, Armenians (also Christian),

and scattered groups of Turkish origin .

Kurds in Iraq

number between 3

BLACK SEA

and 4 million,

comprising between

15 and 20 percent

of the population .

In strictly legal

terms, Kurds have

enjoyed more

national rights in

Iraq than in any

other host country .

Successive Iraqi

governments have

issued a series of

statements, decrees,

and laws that have

authorized limited

use of the Kurdish

language in local

schooling and

administration

since 1931, have

recognized a

"Kurdish nationality" theoretically co-equal with an "Arab nationality" since 1958,

and have endorsed the principle of autonomy for Kurdish areas since 1970 . A

limited autonomy for the Kurdish region was implemented by the Iraqi

Government in 1974 . By contrast, no neighboring state has endorsed autonomy

for its Kurdish population . Moreover, Iran and Syria have long banned the use

of the Kurdish language, while Turkey banned not only the Kurdish language

but the term "Kurd" itself until early 1991 . [For more information on the Kurdish

situation in Turkey, see Carol Migdalovitz, Turkey's Kurdish Imbroglio and U .S.

Policy, CRS Report 94-267F, Mar . 18, 1994 .1

Intvrnationai Boundary

Kurdish Areas

In practice, Iraqi concessions to the Kurdish minority have been more seeming

than real, and Kurds have long complained of discrimination under the Arabdominated regime in Baghdad . They maintain that only compliant Kurds willing

to accept direction from Baghdad have been permitted to participate in the

previous government-sponsored autonomy program . For more than three decades,

an intermittent insurgency by Kurdish activist groups has been met with

increasingly harsh suppression by successive Iraqi regimes . During two notable

periods--followingthe collapse of a major Kurdish insurrection in 1975 and during

the final phases and aftermath of the Iraq-Iran war in the late 1980s--government

reprisals included widespread imprisonment, deportation, torture, and execution

of large numbers of Kurds . There is considerable evidence that Iraqi forces

launched gas attacks against the Kurds on two occasions in 1988 .

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The defeat of Iraq by the allied coalition in February 1991 offered the Iraqi

Kurds another opportunity to challenge the central government . Almost

immediately after the cease fire, the Kurds (and also the Shi'ite Muslims in

southern Iraq) launched short-lived insurrections which Iraqi forces succeeded

in suppressing by early April . Over 1 .8 million refugees mainly from the Kurdish

community fled to the Turkish and Iranian border areas under destitute

conditions, creating a massive burden on the resources of both countries .

Beginning in April 1991, relief and protective operations initiated by the United

Nations and by the United States in cooperation with major European powers

alleviated the humanitarian crisis and subsequently enabled the Kurdish refugees

to return to northeastern Iraq with at least a temporary guarantee of protection

from reprisals by the Iraqi regime .

HUMANITARIAN AND PROTECTIVE MEASURES

The protected status of the Kurdish region in northeastern Iraq evolved from

several interlockingmeasures by the U .N. Security Council and the major powers .

Initially, these actions were primarily humanitarian and concentrated on delivery

of emergency supplies to Kurdish refugees stranded on the Turkish and Iranian

borders . As it became clear that the refugees could not be accommodated within

neighboring countries and that the regime of Saddam Hussein was not on the

point of imminent collapse, humanitarian operations were expanded to include

the creation of a safe haven for the Kurds within Iraq itself . Humanitarian and

protective activities on behalf of the Iraqi Kurds are closely related and tend to

overlap . Both types of activity have their origins in the same resolution enacted

by the U.N. Security Council in the spring of 1991 . [For further discussion, see

U.S. Library of Congress . Congressional Research Service . Iraqi Compliance with

Cease-fire Agreements, by Kenneth Katzman . CRS Issue Brief IB92117, updated

regularly .]

U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 688

On April 1, 1991, the Security Council passed Resolution 688, in response

to the humanitarian crisis brought on by the wholesale flight of refugees from

northern and southern Iraq . Resolution 688 (1) condemned the repression of the

Iraqi civilian population "including most recently in the Kurdish populated areas" ;

(2) demanded that Iraq end repression of its citizens ; (3) insisted that Iraq allow

immediate access by international humanitarian organizations to all persons in

need of assistance ; (4) requested the U .N. Secretary General to pursue

humanitarian efforts in Iraq and report on the plight of the civilian population ;

(5) requested the Secretary General to use all resources to meet critical needs

of refugees and other displaced Iraqis ; and (6) appealed to all member states and

to humanitarian organizations to contribute to relief efforts . Resolution 688 forms

the basis for actions by the international community to provide relief and

protection for Kurds, Shi'ite Muslims, and other victims of oppression or

destitution in Iraq . It has been supplemented by two parallel mechanisms

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negotiated, respectively, by the United Nations and the United States, and these

are summarized below.

U.N . RELIEF AND SECURITY PROGRAMS

On April 18, 1991, the U .N. Coordinator in Iraq and the Iraqi Government

negotiated a memorandum of understanding to carry out the terms of Resolution

688. Under the memorandum, the Iraqi Government agreed to cooperate with

U .N. representatives engaged in relief activities in Iraq and assure safe passage

of humanitarian supplies to all citizens in need of them . In an annex, the parties

agreed on the deployment of a U .N . Guards Contingent to consist of not more

than 500 security guards ; other side agreements authorized up to 600 U .N. relief

workers, for a total U .N. presence in Iraq of 1,100 . This memorandum was

extended most recently on October 22, 1992, with validity through March 31, 1993,

and the number of authorized security guards was reduced from 500 to 300 . Since

then, there has been no formal renewal of the memorandum . The United Nations

takes the position that the most recent memorandum remains legally in force

as the basis for continuing cooperation with Iraq in humanitarian fields. The

Government of Iraq has neither accepted nor rejected this position, but has

continued to grant visas to U.N. staff and volunteer organizations, albeit for only

a month at a time . As of April 15, 1994, the U .N. presence in Iraq consisted of

344 U.N. staff, 157 representatives of volunteer organizations working on U .N.

relief programs, and 276 security guards . Of the latter, all but seven, or a total

of 269, were located in the Kurdish region?

THE NORTHERN NO-FLY ZONE

In April 1991, President George Bush, in conjunction with several European

allies, ordered U.S. forces to airlift humanitarian supplies to Kurdish refugees

encamped in the Turkish border area in an operation designated Provide Comfort .

Subsequently, he dispatched troops into northern Iraq to establish camps and

provide security for Kurds in a designated 36 by 63 mile enclave on Iraqi territory

just inside the northern border. At its height, Operation Provide Comfort involved

20,000 troops from 13 nations . In July 1991, allied forces were withdrawn to

southeastern Turkey except for a small allied military liaison team that remained

in the northern Kurdish town of Zakho, and U .N. relief workers and security

guards took over humanitarian and security functions in the enclave . During

the same period, returning Kurdish militias were able to extend their control over

additional Kurdish areas south and east of the original enclave, and by late

September the expanded enclave included most (but not all) of the Kurdish areas

in Iraq . By October, most of the refugees had returned to Iraq, although some

remained homeless .

At the outset of Operation Provide Comfort, Iraq was warned not to fly either

fixed wing or rotary aircraft north of the 36th parallel or to move forces into the

2 Data provided by the U .N. Mission i Geneva, Switzerland .

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Kurdish enclave .' An allied force, initially including ground troops but later

limited to air units, remained in Turkey to provide support to relief and security

operations . The present force, based at Incirlik Air Base in Turkey, comprises

U.S., U.K., and French air force units which conduct daily overflights of Iraq north

of the 36th parallel to enforce the no-fly zone . Its presence is authorized by a

U.S.-Turkish agreement that has been renewed every six months since it was

initially concluded in the summer of 1991 . Turkish cooperation with allied

enforcement of the no-fly zone is not popular domestically, but the Turkish

parliament has consistently approved the semi-annual extension of the agreement,

albeit by shrinking majorities .' In December 1992, a reservation stating Turkey's

sovereign right to cancel the operation at any time was included in the agreement

at the request of the Turkish Government'

IRAQI REACTIONS

Iraqi cooperation with the provisions of Resolution 688 has been limited and

reluctant, particularly with regard to the Kurdish enclave . In June 1992, Iraq

allowed the semiannual memorandum of understandingthat permitted U.N. relief

operations to lapse for almost four months before finally agreeing to its renewal

in October, in return for a reduction in the number of relief workers and security

guards in country . On several occasions, U .N. relief convoys have been bombed

and some relief workers in the Kurdish areas have been killed by suspected Iraqi

agents . In the spring of 1994, spokesmen from both the United Nations and the

U.S. State Department cited an increase in the number of attacks on U .N.

personnel and journalists in northern Iraq . According to some reports, Iraq has

The military cease-fire agreements concluded on March 3, 1991, at the end

of the Gulf war, banned flights of Iraqi fixed wing aircraft to avoid threats to

allied coalition forces still in southern Iraq, but permitted limited helicopter flights .

Both fixed wing and rotary aircraft flights were banned north of the 36th parallel

when Provide Comfort was launched in April . According to Administration

officials, when coalition troops left southern Iraq in May 1991, the coalition

concluded that the ban on fixed wing aircraft was no longer in force, but did not

immediately inform Iraq of the relaxation . The coalition has never relaxed the

ban on flights north of the 36th parallel .

' On December 28, 1993, Turkish media reported that the Turkish Grand

National Assembly approved extension of the Provide Comfort deployments for

another six months by a vote of 196 to 160 . Foreign Broadcast Information

Service (FBIS), Western Europe (WEU), December 29, 1993 . p. 23.

s U.S. Congress . House. Committee on Foreign Affairs . Subcommittee on

Europe and the Middle East . Developments in the Middle East, March 1993 .

Hearings, 103d Cong., 1st sess. March 9, 1993. Washington, U .S. Government

Printing Office, 1993. p. 63.

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offered a bounty of $10,000 to anyone who murders U .N. workers or other

foreigners in the Kurdish region .' An Iraqi spokesman has denied this charge .

Iraq has been more direct in mounting periodic challenges to the no-fly zones

(both the northern no-fly zone that protects the Kurds and another no-fly zone

south of the 32nd parallel proclaimed by the allies in August 1992 to protect

Shi'ite Muslims in southern Iraq) . Iraqi officials have refused to recognize the

no-fly zones on the grounds that they were not authorized by the United Nations

but imposed unilaterally by the allies .' Iraqi aircraft have occasionally violated

the no-fly zones and Iraqi surface-to-air missiles have been deployed in a manner

that appeared to threaten allied air operations over the zones . Such provocations

have led to confrontations with allied aircraft and helped precipitate the airstrikes

launched by allied forces against Iraqi targets in January 1993 . In addition,

although Iraq has not directly attacked the Kurdish enclave, it has applied both

economic and military pressures against the Kurds, as discussed below .

U.S. officials cite two legal bases for enforcing the no-fly zones : (1) U .N.

Security Council Resolution 688, which calls on Iraq to cease repression of its

civilian population; and (2) the military cease-fire agreements concluded at Safwan

at the end of the Gulf war, which prevent Iraq from interfering with allied air

operations . According to the U .S . interpretation, the air exclusion zones are

necessary to prevent Iraqi interference with allied overflights, which monitor

compliance with the provisions of Resolution 688 . Since Resolution 688 was not

adopted under Chapter VII of the U .N. Charter (which deals with aggression,

international peace, and security) and does not specifically authorize military

action to compel compliance, some observers believe further action by the Security

Council is needed to enforce the provisions of this resolution when they are

challenged by Iraq .'

'Associated Press . Attacks in Iraq Condemned, The Washington Post, April

6, 1994, p. A9; Goodman, Anthony . U.N. Concerned over Attacks on Foreigners

in N. Iraq, Reuters, April 6, 1994, 2 :05PET ; Murphy, Caryle, Saddam Said to Be

Behind Attacks on Westerners in Kurdish Iraq, The Washington Post, May 12,

1994, p . A20 .

' Iraq's Ambassador to the United Nations has stated that the no-fly zones

have "nothing to do with any U .N. resolutions" and "nothing to do with

international legality . It is merely the decision of the Western powers ." Anthony

Goodman, Iraq Hit with 48-Hour Ultimatum to Remove Missiles, Reuters, January

7, 1993, 00:30AET.

'In congressional testimony on July 29, 1992, the Principal Deputy Assistant

Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs noted that "Resolution

688 does not have the same status as Resolution 687 . .. [which] was concluded

under Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter" and expressed the view that

further action to compel Iraqi compliance "would require further discussion with

the coalition, with our colleagues on the Security Council, also ."

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THE KURDISH ENCLAVE AND PROVISIONAL REGIME

The northern

no-fly zone and the

Kurdish enclave

overlap but are not

coterminous. The

no-fly zone covers

all Iraqi territory

north of the 36th

parallel of latitude

(a straight eastwest boundary) .

The eastern part of

this zone contains

part of the Kurdish

enclave ; the

western part is

Arab inhabited and

under Iraqi

G o v e r n m e n t

control . Iraqi air

operations are

forbidden over the

entire zone, but

Iraqi ground forces

are stationed in the western part of the zone outside the Kurdish enclave .

The Kurdish enclave began as a small allied-protected safe haven located

entirely within the no-fly zone, but subsequently expanded south of the zone to

include about 80 percent of the formerly Kurdish inhabited areas of northeastern

Iraq. Estimates of its size vary considerably, but it may cover as much as 36,000

square miles .' In practice, Iraqi ground forces have refrained from entering the

Kurdish enclave, even those portions that lie outside the no-fly zone .

FACTIONS AND LEADERSHIP

In the vacuum created by the exclusion of Iraqi Government forces from the

northeast, a local Iraqi Kurdish leadership has emerged in at least temporary

control . There are two principal political factions among the Kurds of Iraq, based

to some extent on tribal and geographic identification : the Kurdish Democratic

Party (KDP) led by Massud Barzani and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)

'Prince, James M . A Kurdish State in Iraq? Current History, January 1993 .

p. 17 . Other estimates : 55,000 square kilometers (21,235 .5 square miles) : Kinsley,

Susan. Kurdistranded, The Washington Post, June 6, 1993, p . Cl; 50,000 square

kilometers (19,305 square miles) : Smyth, Gareth. Kurds Enjoy Taste of Freedom

under Cloud of Dual Embargo, London Financial Times, April 2, 1993 . p. 3.

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led by Jalal Talabani. The KDP, generally more tribal and traditional in

orientation, is strongest in the mountainous northern Kurdish areas ." The

PUK, originally an offshoot of the KDP, is somewhat more urban in outlook, and

predominates in the southern Kurdish areas . There are a number of other parties,

ranging from socialist to Islamic fundamentalist, most of them quite small . In

May 1988, eight Iraqi Kurdish parties, including the KDP and the PUK, formed

a loose political grouping called the Iraq Kurdistan Front (IKF), to represent

Kurdish interests . Although the two principal leaders have worked together in

recent years, some friction exists between Barzani, leader of a prestigious Kurdish

tribe and son of a legendary Kurdish nationalist figure, and Talabani, who has

been more active in international circles. Clashes over an issue of land ownership

occurred between the KDP and the PUK early in May 1994 .

Kurdish political groups differ somewhat in their ultimate goals as reflected

in their official statements . Three smaller parties within the IKF have demanded

an independent Kurdish state . The two principal parties--the KDP and the PUK-publicly support a federated Iraq and downplay talk of independence . At a session

of a provisional Kurdish parliament dominated by the KDP and the PUK (see

below) held on October 4, 1992, delegates called for "the creation of a Federated

state of Kurdistan in the liberated part of the territory" but added that "this

federated state does not question the territorial integrity of Iraq

1 Iraqi

Government officials, however, have long believed the Kurdish demands for

autonomy or a federal system mask a quest for full independence, and this concern

is shared by adjacent states with Kurdish populations like Turkey, Iran, and Syria .

THE 1992 ELECTIONS AND PROVISIONAL ADMINISTRATION

Freed temporarily from central governmental control, the Kurds of Iraq have

set up a rudimentary administration in their enclave . On May 19, 1992, about

one million voters held elections for a 105-member regional parliament and an

executive authority in Kurdish-controlled areas . Despite primitive electoral

facilities and a few reported irregularities, international observers from 13

countries described the elections as relatively free and fair . Only two parties

qualified for representation by polling over 7 percent of the vote . The KDP with

45.3 percent slightly outpolled the PUK with 43 .8 percent, but the two agreed

in a "spirit of fraternity" to an even division of 50 parliamentary seats each, with

5 additional seats assigned to Christian minorities . Six women were elected . A

KDP member became Speaker of parliament ; with the appointment of a 16-person

cabinet, a PUK member was given the post of Prime Minister . The Kurdish

cabinet does not have either a Foreign Minister or a Defense Minister, to avoid

accusations of secession .

At the 11th Congress of the KDP in April 1993, the KDP and four other

smaller parties reportedly agreed to form an expanded party to be called the

Unified Democratic Party of Kurdistan . Institut Kurde de Paris, Information

and Liaison Bulletin, No . 101-102, August-September 1993 . p. 6.

11 Institut Kurde de Paris, No . 91-92, October-November 1992, p . 1 .

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No candidate received a clear majority in the presidential election (Barzani

won 47.5 percent of the votes, Talabani 44.9 percent, the rest splintered), and

a planned run-off election has yet to be held . Kurdish leaders subsequently agreed

to establish an 8-member presidential council comprising members of both major

parties : KDP leader Barzani ; PUK leader Talabani ; Prime Minister Kosrat

Rassoul (PUK) ; Parliamentary Speaker Jawhar Namiq (KDP) ; two other members

from the political bureau of the KDP and two from the PUK . Given the nearly

even support enjoyed by Barzani and Talabani and the reluctance of Kurdish

leaders to establish what might resemble a permanent government apparatus,

this temporary power sharing formula may continue for some time ."

PRESSURES FROM IRAQ

Iraq has used political, military, and economic pressures against the Kurds

in an effort to bring them back under governmental control . After the collapse

of the short-lived Kurdish rebellion that followed the Gulf war in 1991, Kurdish

representatives entered into exploratory negotiations with the Iraqi regime, but

the two sides failed to agree on fundamental principles of autonomy and the talks

broke down . Since the fall of 1991, the Iraqi regime has adopted increasingly

confrontational policies toward the Kurds .

Political Pressure

Iraq repeatedly has condemned the de facto separate status of the Kurdish

enclave and has threatened reprisals . The Iraqi Government reacted strongly

against the May 1992 parliamentary elections and appointment of a Kurdish

cabinet . The government described these steps as "contrary to the constitution,"

and said that "all action and decisions of this council are non-binding ." 1S On

December 27, 1992, Saddam Hussein told a visiting Turkish politician that Iraq

hoped "to apply the rule of law in northern Iraq" when the western allies remove

their air umbrella over the region ." Saddam denied, however, that he planned

to launch offensive operations against the enclave and said he was ready for a

dialog with the Iraqi Kurds .

Military Pressure

Iraq has not attacked the Kurdish enclave directly but has positioned its

forces in a manner designed to create concern and tension among the Kurds.

12 For pertinent information, see Institut Kurde de Paris, Information and

Liaison Bulletin, No . 86, May 1992, p . 2; No. 87-88, June-July 1992, p . 1-2 ; also,

Report of Election Monitoring Delegation to Northern Iraq, May 15 to May 23,

1992, by Brian Brown, Richard Eisendorf, Michael O'Callaghan, and James Prince,

June 25, 1992 .

Reuters, July 13, 1992, 11 :43 AET.

Reuters, December 27, 1992 . 07:53 AET.

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Since 1991, the Iraqi Government has massed troops and weapons along the 200

mile front that separates the Kurdish enclave from the rest of Iraq, and rumors

of an impending Iraqi attack periodically emerge . Media reports in June 1993,

quoting U .S . Defense Department sources, estimated that Iraqi forces in the north

comprised over 100,000 personnel, organized in 16 divisions, with 900 tanks and

1,000 armored personnel carriers . 15 Iraqi artillery has shelled nearby Kurdish

areas, particularly those under cultivation, both to keep the Kurds off balance

and to disrupt farming and thus deprive the Kurds of badly needed agricultural

produce . Iraq has also refused to cooperate with the United Nations in identifying

and removing large numbers of land mines planted throughout the northeast

during previous Iraqi campaigns against the Kurds ." Terrorist incidents

including bombings and shootings continue to occur in Kurdish areas ; the U.N .

Special Rapporteur on Human Rights reports that "Some of these attacks have

allegedly been carried out by persons acting under the instructions of the Iraqi

authorities ." 17

Economic Pressure

The most serious form of Iraqi pressure on the Kurds has been a boycott

designed to stifle economic activity in the Kurdish region. On Oct . 26, 1991, the

Iraqi Government imposed a partial blockade, banning or severely curtailing

movement of major food items, medicines, fuel, and other critical supplies to the

Kurdish region, and ordered all Kurdish employees of the central government

to leave the Kurdish enclave or lose their government salaries . Other economic

reprisals have followed . On May 5,1993, the Government withdrew the 25 dinar

banknote from circulation and denied people in the Kurdish enclave the

opportunity to exchange these notes ; the U .N . Special Rapporteur on Human

Rights has estimated that Iraqi Kurds lost one half of their wealth in Iraqi

currency as a result of this step ." On August 5, 1993, electric power to the

Kurdish province of Dohuk was cut, with resulting disruption to water supply,

sewage treatment, sanitation facilities, and health care . The Iraqi Government

asserts that this breakdown resulted from problems with dams, but has refused

Kinsley, Susan . Kurdistranded, The Washington Post, June 6, 1993, p . Cl .

More recently, Kurdish officials reportedly estimated as many as 280,000 Iraqi

troops just south of the 36th parallel . North, Andrew . Saddam Gears Up, The

Middle East, May 1994 . p . 11 .

According to one estimate, "More than 10 million landmines have been

scattered in Iraqi Kurdistan since 1975 ." Ofteringer, Ronald and Ralf Baecker,

A Republic of Statelessness, Middle East Report, Special Double Issue, MarchApril/May-June, 1994 . p . 44 . See also United Nations, Economic and Social

Council, Report of the Situation of Human Rights in Iraq, E/CN .4/1994/58, 25

February 1994 [hereinafter, U .N . Rept . E/CN .4/1994/58], pp . 35-36 .

Ibid ., p . 34 .

United Nations, General Assembly, 48th Session, Situation of Human Rights

in Iraq, A/48/600, November 18, 1993 [hereinafter, U .N. Rept . A/48/600], p . 25 .

CRS- 11

to permit U .N. efforts to repair the damage . The United States has provided

temporary generators and spare parts to preserve supply of electricity since the

cutoff, 19 and Turkey is reportedly supplying additional electricity to Dohuk at

no cost as a humanitarian measure 20

The provisional Kurdish administration continues to face major challenges :

widespread destruction by previous Iraqi military campaigns ; numerous homeless

people including many without adequate food ;21 the need to pay an estimated

200,000 civil servants (who earn only the equivalent of $5 to $10 per month) 22

The Kurdish Prime Minister has voiced concern that his government will be unable

to obtain funds to defray 1994 expenses, reportedly budgeted at $23 .5 million 23

The economic hardships suffered by the Iraqi Kurds are exacerbated by the socalled dual embargo that affects the Kurdish region . Not only are the Iraqi Kurds

victims of a blockade imposed by the Iraqi regime, but U .N. sanctions against Iraq

also apply to the Kurdish region inasmuch as it is located on Iraqi territory . As

a result, Kurds find it difficult to obtain many of the basic elements of selfsufficiency such as seed, livestock, farm implements, and industrial machinery .

The issue of exempting the Kurdish enclave from U .N. sanctions applicable to

Iraq has been raised in U .S . congressional hearings [see below] .

EXTERNAL PLAYERS AND RELATIONSHIPS

In addition to internal differences and formidable problems with the Iraqi

Government, the Iraqi Kurds are involved in a complex web of cross relationships

with other Iraqi opposition groups, with Kurdish organizations outside Iraq, and

with neighboring countries . These relationships further circumscribe freedom

of maneuver on the part of the Iraqi Kurdish leadership .

19 U.S. Congress . House. Status of Iraq. Communication from the President

of the United States . February 1, 1994 . House Document 103-203 . 103d Cong.,

2d Sess . Washington, U .S . Government Printing Office, 1994 . p. 2.

2°

Reuters, April 6, 1994, 11 :41AET

U.N . representatives report 750,000 people in the three northern (Kurdish)

provinces of Iraq as targeted beneficiaries of food assistance programs . United

Nations, Office of the U .N. Coordinator in Iraq . U.N. Inter-Agency Humanitarian

Programme in Iraq : Progress Report (draft), January-March 1994, dated March

27, 1994 . p. 3 .

Waterbury, John . Strangling the Kurds, Middle East Insight, July-August

1993 . p. 33 .

"Murphy, Caryle, Economy Tests Kurds' Self-Rule, The Washington Post,

May 10, 1994, p. A10 .

CRS-12

The Iraqi Opposition

The Iraqi Kurdistan Front plays an important role in an umbrella

organization called the Iraqi National Congress (INC), which comprises a number

of organizations opposed to the Iraqi regime . The INC . founded in 1992, is headed

by a three-member Leadership Council composed of a Kurd (Massud Barzani),

a Sunni Muslim Arab, and a Shi'ite Muslim Arab . At a meeting of the INC's 300member general assembly on October 27-31,1992, delegates adopted "the principle

of a constitutional system that is parliamentary, democratic, federal and pluralist

after the fall of Saddam Hussein ."24 Despite the wording of this agreement, some

Shi'ite members of the INC have questioned the viability of federalism in Iraq,

and non-Kurdish members are not fully comfortable with Kurdish demands for

autonomy . [For more information on the INC, see U .S . Library of Congress .

Congressional Research Service . Iraq's Opposition, by Kenneth Katzman . CRS

Report 93-422F, April 19, 1993 .]

Non-Iraqi Kurdish Groups

Iraqi Kurds face a chronic dilemma in dealing with Kurdish organizations

from neighboring states, notably the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) in Turkey

and the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) . Iraqi Kurdish leaders have

had to balance their basic sympathy for fellow Kurds with the need to avoid

antagonizing neighboring governments, who suppress their own Kurdish

populations and fear any manifestation of Kurdish separatism . This is particularly

true in the case of the PKK, which has been locked in conflict with the Turkish

Government since 1984 . Dependent on Turkish cooperation to maintain supply

lines and the allied protective umbrella over northern Iraq, the Iraqi Kurdish

leadership has had to curtail the activities of PKK guerrillas who have sought

safe haven in northern Iraq, clashing with them occasionally and tolerating

Turkish raids on PKK bases . Under an agreement between the Iraqi Kurdish

leadership and the PKK reached on October 5, 1992, PKK members are allowed

to remain in Kurdish areas of Iraq but not to use Iraqi Kurdish territory as a

base of military operations against Turkey .25 This agreement has not been fully

observed . Iran, too, has launched reprisal raids against KDPI groups seeking

shelter in the Iraqi Kurdish enclave.

Foreign Countries

Turkey, Iran, and Syria have substantial Kurdish minorities . and their

governments share a basic concern that steps toward Kurdish self-determination

2' Institute Kurde de Paris, Information and Liaison Bulletin, No . 91-92,

October-November 1992. p . 2.

Ibid ., p . 4 . At the height of tension between the PKK and Iraqi Kurdish

leadership in September 1992, PKK guerrillas interdicted supplies en route from

Turkey to northern Iraq, thereby subjecting the Iraqi Kurdish region to a "triple

embargo." Ibid ., p. 5 . In April 1994, the PKK reportedly cut electricity supplied

by Turkey to northern Iraq .

CRS- 13

in Iraq could fuel separatist movements among Kurds in their own countries .

Turkey and Iran, in particular, are anxious to forestall use of the Iraqi Kurdish

enclave as a safe haven or launching area for attacks by dissident Turkish or

Iranian Kurdish groups . During five tripartite meetings since 1991, foreign

ministers of the three neighboring countries have issued communiques opposing

any efforts to divide Iraq . At the fifth such meeting, held in Istanbul on February

5, 1994, the ministers agreed that "the statements and activities promoting

partition [of Iraq] in some Western states are unacceptable, and must be

halted ."" They did, however, urge the Iraqi Government to remove restrictions

against the population in the north and called for Iraqi compliance with terms

of cease-fire agreements concluded after the Gulf war . Moreover, all three

governments have entered into tactical alliances at one time or another with Iraqi

Kurdish factions to put pressure on the Government of Iraq .

Most other Middle East states, even those unfriendly to the present Iraq

regime, oppose any steps toward separatism or partition which they believe could

establish precedents elsewhere in the region . Although sympathy for the Kurds

on humanitarian grounds is strong in Western European countries, their support

is limited to varying degrees by Turkish and other Middle East sensitivities . Like

the United States, several European countries and some other donors have

contributed toward U.N. relief operations in Iraq . 7 Elsewhere in the

international community the Iraqi Kurdish issue has attracted less interest, and

some Third World countries are dubious over what they perceive as western

intervention in northern Iraq . In this connection, three members of the U .N.

Security Council (Cuba, Yemen, and Zimbabwe) voted against Resolution 688,

which condemned Iraqi repression of its civilian population including Kurds, and

two (China and India) abstained .

CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST IN IHE IRAQI KURDISH QUESTION

To a considerable extent, U .S . interest in the Iraqi Kurds is humanitarian

in nature and is a by-product of the war with Iraq . The Kurds of Iraq have

enjoyed some sympathy in the United States in the past because of their rugged

individualism, their perseverance in seeking national rights, and their struggle

against what is widely perceived as a series of oppressive regimes in Baghdad .

Increased U .S . interest in the Iraqi Kurds since the Gulf war seems due to the

suddenness and magnitude of the Kurdish refugee crisis in 1991, the perception

that it resulted indirectly from the U .S.-led campaign against Iraq, and the role

FBIS-Western Europe (WEU), February 7, 1994 . p. 42.

There is very little available information on amounts of aid provided to the

Iraqi Kurdish relief by other countries, except for the United States (see below) .

U .N . reports summarize aid to Iraq as a whole but do not disaggregate amounts

for the Kurdish region . For the period from April 1, 1993 to January 15, 1994,

approximately $202 .3 million was donated or pledged to U .N . operations in Iraq.

United Nations, Department of Humanitarian Affairs (Geneva), Humanitarian

Cooperation Programme for Iraq, January 15, 1994 .

CRS-14

of the Kurds in the Iraqi National Congress, which seeks to replace the regime

of Saddam Hussein.

For similar reasons, Congress has shown considerable interest in the Iraqi

Kurdish question in recent years . Since the Gulf war, Members of Congress and

key committees have been prominent in pressing for actions to alleviate the plight

of the Kurds and guarantee them protection . An amendment by Senator Pell

to the Defense authorization bill for 1991, enacted as Section 1096 ofP .L. 102-190,

supported the use of all necessary means to protect Iraq's Kurdish minority,

consistent with relevant U .N. resolutions and authorities contained in previous

legislation authorizing the Gulf war . The Pell amendment provided legislative

underpinning for a series of appropriations and measures to protect and assist

the Iraqi Kurds and other victims of the crisis (see below) . More recently, Section

508 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1994-1995 (P.L. 103-236,

April 30, 1994) calls on the President "to take steps to encourage the United

Nations Security Council to reaffirm support for the protection of all Iraqi Kurdish

and other minorities pursuant to Security Council Resolution 688 ."

Some differences have appeared periodically between congressional and

Administration approaches to the Iraqi Kurdish question . The two branches have

been in agreement on general principles : maintaining the territorial integrity

of Iraq, while assuring protection for the Kurdish region as long as Kurds remain

at risk of oppression by the central government . In the past, there was a feeling

in some congressional quarters that the Bush Administration was willing to

sacrifice the welfare of the Kurds to avert the fragmentation of Iraq and avoid

upsetting Turkey and other Middle East allies opposed to a Kurdish state .

Although such criticism has become more muted, some Members have sought to

prod the Clinton Administration as well into increasing U .S. support for the Iraqi

Kurds . Officials of both Administrations have emphasized their commitment to

protecting the Kurds and other Iraqi victims of government oppression, but point

out that U .S . Middle East policy must take additional factors into consideration :

limited financial and military assets, sensitivities of regional allies, and the

unpredictable consequences of any steps that might lead to the dismemberment

of Iraq .

Four issues in U .S . policy toward the Iraqi Kurdish question have been of

particular interest to Congress .

FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

Congress has continued to provide funds to support international relief and

protection for Kurds and other Iraqi citizens at risk . After the refugee crisis

erupted in the spring of 1991, Congress appropriated funds for a massive initial

aid package consisting of $320 .5 million for Defense costs and $251 .5 million for

additional costs incurred by the State Department and U .S . Agency for

International Development (USAID) in the relief effort . Since then, Congress

has appropriated smaller amounts to cover military operations to enforce the no-fly

zone, food delivery, health care, and water supply . A portion of the FY1993

CRS-15

appropriation was allocated to purchase part of the Kurdish grown wheat crop,

because Kurdish farmers were finding it necessary to sell their produce to the

Government of Iraq in the absence of other customers .

The appendix shows amounts of aid appropriated for Kurdish relief and

protective activities since 1991 . As the table indicates, most of these

appropriations have gone to the Department of Defense, because of the close

interrelationship between protective and humanitarian operations in northern

Iraq . The Department of Defense, in turn, has an agreement with the State

Department's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) to implement some

humanitarian phases of the aid program . (Defense Department funds cannot go

directly to the United Nations, although they can be used to accomplish project

objectives identified by United Nations .) The possibility of shifting those

appropriations that cover humanitarian assistance to the State Department and

USAID was raised during congressional hearings in April 1994 ."

Some of the impetus for U .S. aid to the Kurds of Iraq has come from

Congress . At the outset of the Kurdish relief operations in April 1991, Congress

began considering legislation to authorize aid even before the Administration

submitted its request to Congress for the requisite funding . More recently, in

discussions with Administration officials, Members have criticized the

Administration for not taking the initiative in seeking additional aid for the Kurds .

In October 1993, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Lee Hamilton

pointed out that the Administration had not requested funds for humanitarian

assistance to the Kurds and that FY1993 funds available for this purpose had

been put into the budget by Congress." Although the Administration did request

$15 million in humanitarian aid for the Kurds for FY1995, Rep . Hamilton noted

that the amount requested is significantly lower than previous annual

appropriations for this purpose . State Department witnesses took the position

that funds requested reflect some reduction in the needs of the people of northern

Iraq as estimated by the Administration ."

See comments by House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Lee Hamilton

during hearings before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East . Carried

by Reuters newswire, April 13, 1994, 4 :14PET .

U.S. Congress . House. Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on

Europe and the Middle East . Current Developments in the Middle East . S. Hrg .

103-307, October 15, 1993 . Hearings, 103d Cong., 1st Sess . Washington, U .S.

Government Printing Office . p. 28-29 .

so See comments by House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Lee Hamilton

duringhearings before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East . Carried

by Reuters newswire, April 13, 1994, 4 :14PET.

CRS- 16

HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES

Members of Congress have been influential in keeping the spotlight on

atrocities committed by the Iraqi Government against the Kurdish population

prior to the Gulf war . Estimates vary, but a body of evidence indicates that large

numbers ofIragi Kurds were deported, were killed, or "disappeared" during earlier

Iraqi campaigns to subdue the Kurdish inhabited areas . Government repression

was particularly brutal during a series of punitive government operations code

named "al-Anfal" carried out in the late 1980s, partly in retaliation for Kurdish

support for Iran during the Iraq-Iran war of 1980-1988 .3' Kurdish leaders

initially estimated the death toll of al-Anfal at between 50,000 and 182,000 ; 32

however, with the subsequent exploitation of captured documents, estimates have

moved toward the higher end of this scale . In 1992, Senator Pell estimated that

at least 180,000 people died in the al-Anfal campaign, noting that this represented

five percent of the population of Iraqi Kurdistan ."

Hearings held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March 1992

provided a forum for representatives of charitable and human rights organizations

who described torture and mass killing of Kurds and destruction of Kurdish

villages since 1988 . Meanwhile, on a previous trip to Iraqi Kurdistan, a member

of the Committee staff had learned of the existence of Iraqi secret police documents

The term "al-Anfal" is taken from a reference in the Koran which, according

to some interpretations, permits Muslim warriors to plunder the possessions and

dependents of infidels . The U.N. Special Rapporteur for Human Rights notes

that the Iraqi Government's general policy against the Kurds dates from 1985,

but the specific events of al-Anfal occurred between February 23 and September

6, 1988 . This period saw at least three chemical attacks, notably on March 16,

1988, against the Kurdish town of Halabja, which according to the Rapporteur's

estimates killed between 3,200 and 5,000 residents . U.N. Commission on Human

Rights, Fiftieth Session, Report on the situation of human rights in Iraq,

E/CN .4/1994/58, February 25, 1994, p . 37. (Media reports at the time noted that

Iran, to a lesser extent, had also carried out gas attacks against Halabja, and some

commentators believe the use of chemical weapons was not specifically aimed at

the Kurds.)

U.S . Congress . Senate . Committee on Foreign Relations . Kurdistan in

the Time of Saddam Hussein. S. Prt. 102-56, November 1991 . 102d Cong., 1st

Sess . Washington, U .S. Government Printing Office . p. 21 .

U.S. Congress . Senate . Committee on Foreign Relations . Mass Killings

in Iraq . S . Hearing 102-652, March 19, 1992 . 102d Cong ., 2d sess . Washington,

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992 . p. 1 . Also in 1992, a representative of

the human rights organization Middle East Watch described it as "an

incontrovertible fact that at least 100,000, and possibly 300,000 Kurdish men,

women and children disappeared during the past decade and remain to be

accounted for ." U.S. Congress . Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations .

Kurdistan in the Time of Saddam Hussein . S . Prt. 102-56, November 1991 . 102d

Cong ., 1st sess. Washington, U .S. Government Printing Office, 1991 . p. 21.

CRS-17

which had been obtained by Kurdish militia during their short-lived revolt in

March 1991 . Some Members of Congress, such as then Senator Albert Gore, felt

that the Administration did not respond with sufficient urgency to requests for

assistance in removing the documents from Iraq, where they remained at risk

from the elements and from Iraqi military action . By April 1992, however, the

Committee had acquired 14 tons of these documents, which provide detailed

descriptions of Iraqi atrocities against Kurds over the 1987-1990 period. The

Committee subsequently arranged for these documents to be stored in the National

Archives "as files of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and for official use

in possible criminal prosecutions ."'

RELAXING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

Members of Congress have been active in an ongoing debate over the issue

of lifting sanctions against Iraq selectively to permit trade with the Kurdish region .

Advocates of this position, including some Members, point out that the

combination of international sanctions against Iraq and the Iraqi Government's

economic blockade of the Kurdish enclave creates undue hardships which the U .N.

Security Council never intended to impose on the Kurdish population . Moreover,

they argue that this dual embargo increases the cost to the international

community of Kurdish relief operations. At hearings before the Subcommittee

on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee in

February 1994, Representative Robert G . Torricelli noted that the U .N. embargo

prevents the Kurds from obtaining spare parts and machinery they need to rebuild

their infrastructure and restore agriculture, and thus "prolongs dependence on

the United States and other sources of international aid ." 35 Administration

officials fear that creating exceptions for one part of Iraq could erode the entire

sanctions regime . They have emphasized the Administration's concern over the

hardships suffered by the people of northern Iraq and its continuing efforts to

provide relief consistent with pertinent U .N. resolutions 36

34 Congressional Quarterly, Vol . 50, No . 22, May 30,1992 . p. 1546. According

to a Senate report, "Ownership will be retained by the Kurdish political parties

providing the documents, and copies will be made for use by researchers . Until

the documents can be catalogued and copied, access will be limited ." U .S .

Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations . Saddam's Documents .

Senate Print 102-111, May 1992 . Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office,

1992. p . VI. See also Miller, Judith . Iraq Accused : A Case of Genocide, The New

York Times, January 3, 1993, p . 12 ff.

Testimony of Honorable Robert G . Torricelli before the House Foreign

Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, February 23,

1994.

U.S. Congress . House . Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee

on Europe and the Middle East . Developments in the Middle East, March 1993 .

Hearings, 103d Cong., 1st sess. March 9, 1993. Washington, U .S. Government

Printing Office, 1991 . p. 62.

CRS- 1 8

A Kurdish proposal to bring a mobile oil refinery to northern Iraq, allegedly

at a cost of $10 million, to help meet their fuel needs has aroused interest in

Congress . Members have questioned why the U .N. Sanctions Committee is willing

to consider oil sales by Iraq under certain circumstances while the Kurds are

unable to exploit oil in their own areas because they lack refineries . According

to Administration officials, no formal proposal for an oil refinery in northern Iraq

has been submitted to the U .N. Sanctions Committee . They have expressed

reservations, however, regarding the efficiency, environmental impact, and funding

of such a project and the ability of the Kurds to maintain it . They have suggested

that a refinery would be vulnerable to attack and might require large infusions

of foreign aid . According to a State Department official, a study commissioned

by the British Government cast doubt on the feasibility of obtaining a mobile

refinery for the Kurds . Also, they are concerned that such a project could

undermine the sanctions regime 3 7

Critics of U .S . unwillingness to relax sanctions to permit trade with the

Kurdish enclave believe current U .S . policy increases the cost of humanitarian

operations and actually contributes to other violations of the sanctions regime .

They cite the case of the mobile oil refinery as an example . In hearings on April

13,1994, Representative Hamilton alluded to a GAO report that the United States

is buying oil from Iraq and providing it to the northern Kurdish area . These

purchases from the Government of Iraq, he felt, are contrary to the sanctions

regime . At the same time, he noted, the Administration opposes permitting the

Kurds in northern Iraq to develop their own internal capabilities to meet their

fuel needs, although they could do it at a lower cost than the United States incurs

through the present arrangement . According to Administration officials, oil

purchases by the United States for northern Iraq are made through middlemen

rather than from the Government of Iraq, although these officials acknowledge

that there may be some trickle of dollars to Baghdad as a result of the current

oil transactions .

Section 507 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1994-1995 calls

on the President to encourage the U .N. Security Council "to consider lifting

selectively the United Nations embargo on the areas under the administration

of the democratically-elected leadership of Iraqi Kurdistan" subject to verifiable

conditions : that inhabitants of such areas do not trade with the Iraqi regime and

that partial lifting of the embargo will not materially assist the Iraqi regime .

DEALING WITH KURDISH LEADERSHIP

The debate over the application of economic sanctions to the Kurdish enclave

is related to a broader issue : what is the proper relationship between the U .S.

Government and the provisional leadership of the Iraqi Kurdish region? In

U.S . Congress . House . Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee

on Europe and the Middle East . Developments in the Middle East, October 1993 .

Hearings, 103d Cong ., 1st sess . October 21,1993 . Washington, U.S . Government

Printing Office, 1993 . p. 66.

CRS- 1 9

practice, the U .S . Government has dealt with the Kurdish leadership through

several channels since the refugee crisis erupted in 1991 . For example, U.S .

representatives assist in the U .N .-sponsored relief effort for the Kurds and other

inhabitants of northern Iraq . U.S . military personnel in the allied coalition's

Military Coordination Center based in the town of Zakho in the Kurdish enclave

maintain regular contact with Kurdish leaders on matters related to relief and

protection (and were on such a mission when their helicopters were shot down

in a tragic mistake by U .S . fighters enforcing the no-fly zone on April 14, 1994) .

Both the Bush and Clinton Administrations have met with leaders of the

opposition INC, in which Kurds have played an important and at times

predominant role 38

On the other hand, both Administrations have been committed to the

territorial integrity of Iraq and have avoided actions that could constitute

recognition of a separate regime in the northern part of that country .

Consequently, the Administrations have structured their dealings with the Kurds

not in terms of a U.S .-Kurdish interface but under an international umbrella or

in a broader context: for example, in the course of Provide Comfort activities or

within the framework of a dialog with the opposition INC group . In responding

to congressional queries regarding the Iraqi Kurdish situation, Administration

officials usually use ethnic-neutral terms : they speak of "northern Iraq" rather

than "the Kurdish enclave" or some similar formulation . By contrast, congressional

documents have gone so far as to use the term "Iraqi Kurdistan ." 39

Members of Congress have argued for a more direct relationship with the

Iraqi Kurdish leadership . At various times, they have questioned the reluctance

of the Administration to approve projects designed to help the Iraqi Kurds, such

as the mobile oil refinery mentioned above ; purchasing wheat directly from

Kurdish farmers instead of through middle men ; and a proposal by Freedom House

to establish a policy institute for democratic education at the university in the

provisional Kurdish capital of Irbil . Views of congressional advocates of closer

U.S : Kurdish contacts were summed up in the following interrogatory submitted

by the House Foreign Affairs Committee : "Given our stated interest in promoting

democracy in the region, why are we in a situation today where we meet directly

with Iraqi officials in the context of UNSCOM [the U .N . Special Commission on

destruction of Iraqi mass destruction weapons] and other efforts, but we are

Former Secretary of State James A . Baker met INC figures in July 1992,

and President Clinton praised INC goals in a recent report to Congress . U .S .

Congress . House . Status of Iraq . Communication from the President of the

United States . House Document 103-203, February 1, 1994 . 103d Cong., 2d sess .

Washington, U .S . Government Printing Office, 1994 . p . 3 .

This term is used several times in Section 507 of the Foreign Relations

Authorization Act for FY1994-1995 (P .L . 103-236, April 30, 1994) .

CRS-20

unwilling to deal directly with the democratically elected officials in northern

Iraq?""

State Department officials have responded that the Administration favors

democracy throughout Iraq, but does not favor Kurdish separatism or "projects

that show preference for a particular ethnic group ."" They have explained that

northern Iraq includes several ethnic or sectarian minorities besides the Kurds,

such as Turcomans, Assyrians, and Chaldeans, and have expressed the view that

projects in northern Iraq should reflect this diversity in the population . They

point out that, in addition to its leading role in humanitarian and protective

activities, the U .S . Government has approved other projects in northern Iraq,

including a support facility to document human rights abuses . They emphasize

that the "relief effort in northern Iraq is deliberately non-political . This is a

humanitarian mission carried out within the context of maintaining the territorial

integrity of Iraq .` 2

A noteworthy case that illustrated respective concerns of the Administration

and some Members of Congress involved the Kurdish elections in May 1992 .

Members of Congress from both parties hailed the step as a manifestation of

democracy and expressed the hope that the U .S . Government would encourage

Kurdish efforts to achieve self-determination ; the Administration "welcomed those

elections in the context of Kurdish statements that they did not challenge Iraqi

territorial unity."43 Representative Hamilton favored a positive response to a

Kurdish request for U .S . and other international observers to help assure that

elections took place in a democratic atmosphere without undue external

interference . The State Department opposed sending a U .S . delegation, citing

the ban imposed by the U .S . Government on travel to Iraq and the potential risk

to U.S . citizens visiting that country ." In the end, four private U.S . observers

participated under the auspices of the National Endowment for Democracy and

the Iraq Foundation in a larger British-sponsored group comprising 43 individuals

from 13 countries .

U .S . Congress . House. Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on

Europe and the Middle East . Developments in the Middle East, October 1993 .

October 21, 1993 . Hearings, 103d Cong ., 1st sess . Washington, U .S . Government

Printing Office, 1993 . p . 68 .

Ibid ., p . 69 .

Ibid ., p . 68 .

U.S . Congress . House . Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on

Europe and the Middle East . Developments in the Middle East . Hearings, 102d

Cong., 2d sess . June 24 and 30, 1992 . Washington, U.S . Government Printing

Office, 1992 . p . 18 .

See discussion and correspondence between Representative Hamilton and

the Department of State . Ibid ., p . 136-137 .

CRS-21

Representative Hamilton, n addressing the unwillingness of the U .S .

Government to send election monitors, raised the question : "What message are

we sending those who seek to promote democracy in difficult regions of the world

with this type of policy?" He commented that U .S. delegations had monitored

elections in other areas of instability, such as Panama, Nicaragua, Haiti, Armenia,

Namibia, and Albania . State Department officials maintained that intensified

allied military operations to enforce the no-fly zone over northern Iraq and U .S.

warnings to the Iraqi Government not to disturb the elections were significant

signals of U .S. support for the Kurdish electoral process 45

POSSIBLE CONTINGENCIES

Several questions may confront the Administration and Congress in

formulating and implementing future policies toward the Iraqi Kurds . Costs of

relief operations, risks to U .S . personnel, and attitudes of allies and other external

players could affect the U .S . role in northern Iraq . The accidental shoot-down

of two U .S. helicopters on a Provide Comfort mission by U .S . fighters enforcing

the no-fly zone on April 14, 1994, illustrated that the dangers inherent in these

operations are not all due to action by hostile forces . Mounting demands on U .S.

forces to participate in other peacekeeping missions will require trade-offs in force

commitments . The views of former members of the allied coalition in the Gulf

war may impose political, operational, and logistical limits on the extent of U .S.

support for the Kurds . Four contingencies, in particular, could create dilemmas

for U.S. policy makers .

CHALLENGE BY IRAQ

A decision by the regime of Saddam Hussein to mount a challenge to the

Provide Comfort force would face the United States with the choice of reducing

its commitment or risking renewal of hostilities . Although a large-scale Iraqi

attack on the enclave is possible, an Iraq challenge would be more likely to begin

with indirect or measured steps to disrupt on-going humanitarian and protective

activities: increased harassment of U .N. relief and security personnel ; abrogation

of the Iraq-U.N . memorandum of understanding that covers their presence in Iraq ;

deployment of air defense forces in a manner designed to threaten Provide Comfort

forces ; shelling of Kurdish areas ; and limited ground probes into the southern

part of the Kurdish enclave outside the no-fly zone . Friendly fire accidents like

the one in April 1994 could embolden Saddam to increase pressure on the allied

protective force on the assumption that U .S. responses would be restrained in

an effort to avoid a replay of the helicopter catastrophe .

U.S . policy makers may need to determine a threshold of actions by Iraq that

would trigger various levels of retaliation . For example, Iraqi ground action in

the southern part of the Kurdish enclave would not in itself challenge the alliedproclaimed no-fly zone, but it might be construed as a violation of the provisions

Ibid .

CRS- 22

of U.N . Security Council Resolution 688, which enjoins Iraq not to oppress its

population . Decisions on responses to Iraqi provocations in the north may be

linked to broader questions involving long term disposition of the Kurdish areas

of Iraq. In an interview shortly after the April helicopter incident, House Foreign

Affairs Committee Chairman Hamilton said "I have detected in testimony before

my committee in very recent days some lack of precision, some confusion about

what our policy actually is ." He expressed the view the "the whole policy in Iraq

needs urgent review ."46

WITHDRAWAL OF TURKISH SUPPORT

Turkey plays a crucial role in enabling allied forces to carry out Provide

Comfort operations . Without a Turkish staging area, it would be impossible to

continue allied overflights over northern Iraq, and U .N. relief operations would

be impaired . Since the inception of Provide Comfort, there has been significant

public opposition within Turkey to hosting the allied protective force, and

mounting challenges by Turkey's own dissident Kurdish group, the PKK, have

fed this opposition . Although the Turkish leadership has been willing to brave

influential segments of public opinion so far, a more vocal and widespread

opposition could force Ankara to rethink its policies toward protection of the Iraqi

Kurds. On the other hand, some Turkish leaders probably recognize that

cooperation with Provide Comfort is a means of avoiding another influx of Iraqi

Kurdish refugees which overwhelmed Turkish security and logistical capabilities

in the spring of 1991 .

In the past, Congress has weighed in with the Administration to urge Turkey

to maintain its role in facilitating Provide Comfort operations . On one occasion,

both Houses passed a resolution (H .Con.Res . 299, June 1992) callingupon Turkey

to extend the time that bases can be used for overflight of the Kurdish area, and

Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee Robert C . Byrd expressed the

committee's hopes that "the Government of Turkey will renew, for as long as is

necessary, the authorization for the United States to conduct relief operations

from Turkey ."47 In the future, both the Administration and Congress may have

to consider added enticements to retain crucial Turkish support, possibly in the

form of U.S . support for international lending, greater support for Turkey's

counter-terrorist campaign ; and reduced criticism of excesses by Turkish security

forces.

McLaughlin Group interview, carried by Reuters newswire, April 18, 1994,

11:08AET .

U.S. Congress. Senate . Committee on Appropriations . Supplemental

Appropriations, Transfers, and Rescissions Bill, 1992 . September 10, 1992 . Report

102-395. Washington, U .S . Government Printing Office, 1992 . p. 20-21 .

CRS-2 3

A KURDISH-IRAQI DEAL

Continued economic privation, pressures from their discontented populace,

and fears that allied protection ultimately may terminate could impel Kurdish

leaders to abandon their present attempts to remain free from Saddam's clutches

and seek the best terms they can get from the central government . As noted

earlier, protracted negotiations between Baghdad and the Kurdish leadership

during the summer of 1991 ultimately collapsed when the two sides failed to agree .

(In a reversal of previous positions, Barzani, doubting the durability of western

commitments, was more anxious to reach agreement with Baghdad, while Talabani

was more skeptical that the Kurds could obtain any meaningful concessions from

the Iraqi Government .) Since then there have been periodic reports of feelers

on the part of Kurdish groups to ascertain the possibilities of a deal with Baghdad,

although it is unlikely that Kurdish leaders are under any illusions that they

would receive beneficent treatment from Saddam's regime 48

Such a development would bring about the collapse of the present allied

protective program, and without the allied umbrella, the U .N . security presence

would be ineffective in protecting the Kurds from likely governmental reprisals

and repression . Although this scenario does not seem imminent, a situation could

develop in which the Administration and Congress would have to consider

additional aid and assurances to the Iraqi Kurds to forestall a move on their part

to abandon their current experiment in democracy and a degree of selfdetermination .

LOSS OF WIDER CONSENSUS

Although the United States plays a paramount role, the protective and

humanitarian operations in support of the Iraqi Kurds represent a multilateral

effort . This effort is based on varying degrees of support or acquiescence within

the international community and is justified by U .N . Security Council resolutions

(notably 688) and other post-Gulf War arrangements . This limited consensus

has held up as long as the allied role in northern Iraq remains relative unobtrusive

and involves minimal use of force . Many countries, including several members

of the Security Council and key regional players, are dubious about the legal basis

for allied enforcement of Resolution 688 and are visibly uncomfortable with

periodic allied reprisals against Iraq .

Further confrontations with Iraq along the lines of the retaliatory raids in

January and June 1993 or mishaps like the April 1994 shoot-down of U .S .

helicopters (in which U .S ., French, British, Turkish, and Iraqi Kurdish lives were

lost) could erode international support for the U .S .-led campaign to protect the

Kurds . There are signs that even U .S . allies are beginning to question the

duration of current military commitments in northern Iraq . The United States

may have to consider its options in the event of a withdrawal of allied support

48 See Randal, Jonathan C . Desperate Kurds Consider Turning Once More

to Saddam, The Washington Post, June 23, 1993, p . A13 .

CRS-2 4

for these operations or an upsurge in international opposition : to continue an

apparently open-ended commitment with shrinking support from other nations,

or to terminate its role with the strong likelihood that the Iraqi Government

would quickly reestablish control over the Kurdish region .

CRS-25

APPENDIX

ALLOCATIONS FOR U.S. SUPPORT FOR KURDS OF IRAQ

Amount

(in million $)

Legislation

Expense

1991

572.0

Dire Emergency Supplemental

Appropriation, PL 102-55, 06/13/91

Initial relief operations incurred by

Dept. of Defense (DOD)--$320 .5

million and Dept. of State and

related agencies--$251 .5 million

1992

15.0

Sec. 105(b), Dire Emergency

Supplemental Appropriation, PL 102229, 12/12/91

Kurdish and other Iraq-related

humanitarian operations by DOD

19911993

100.0

Sec . 103, Dire Emergency

Supplemental Appropriation, PL 102229, 12/12/9149

Military operations in support of

protective regime for Kurds (no-fly

zone), initially appropriated for

FY1991-1992, but extended to

FY1992-1993 by Sec . 201, PL 102368

1993

40.0

Sec . 202, Appropriations, Transfers,

Rescissions, PL 102-368, 09/23/92

DOD relief activities including food

delivery, health care, water supply,

mine clearing

1993

3.0

Title II, PL 102-396, 10/06/92,

Defense Appropriation Act"

General DOD humanitarian aid

"See . 105(a), PL 102-229 provided that $15 million of this amount may be made available for prepositioning of

relief supplies to meet emergency Kurdish and other Iraq-related needs and related transportation costs .

so According to the conference committee report, $3 million from a total worldwide appropriation of $28 million

was to be made available for Kurdish relief operations .

CRS-26

ALLOCATIONS FOR U.S. SUPPORT FOR KURDS OF IRAQ

Fiscal

Year

Amount

(in million $)

1993

5 .0

Sec. 599F, PL 102-391, 10/06/92,

Foreign Assistance Appropriation Act

Urgent humanitarian aid

1993

23.0

Ch. III, PL 103-50, 07/02/93,

Supplemental Appropriation

General DOD humanitarian aid,

including $10 million to buy part of

Kurdish-grown wheat crop

1993

201 .2

Ch. III, PL 103-50 and other DOD

funds'

DOD activities related to Provide

Comfort

1994

30.0

Title II, PL 103-139, 11/11/93,

Defense Appropriation Act FY1994

General DOD humanitarian aid,

including $15 million in winter relief

1994

110.3

Sec . 302, PL 103-211, 02/12/94,

Supplemental Appropriation

Enforcement of northern no-fly zone

and related supply, maintenance, and

personnel costs

1995

15 .0

(Administration request, for inclusion

in Defense Appropriation bill for

FY1995)

General DOD humanitarian aid

Total

1,114.50

Legislation

Expense

(Some additional costs probably were absorbed by individual departments .)

According to the Office of Comptroller, Department of Defense (DOD), the Defense Department spent $201 .2

million on incremental costs of Provide Comfort during FY1993 . Of this amount, $24 million was covered under the

FY1993 supplemental appropriation (PL 103-50) . (The $24 million was derived as follows : Chapter III of PL 103-50

appropriated $266 .4 million for Air Force operations and maintenance, of which $100 million was allocated to operations

in Southwest Asia . Out of this $100 million, $24 million was pro-rated to Provide Comfort .) Remaining incremental

costs of $177 .2 million came from excess Desert Shield/Storm funds or were absorbed by the Air Force .

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.