Prayer and Religion in the Public Schools: What Is, and Is Not, Permitted

Report No. 30-156 A

PRAYER AND RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SCEOOLS: KHAT IS,

AND IS NOT, PERMITTED

David M. Ackerman

Legislative A t t o r n e y

American Law Division

J a n u a r y 2 8 , 1976

U ~ d a t e dS e ~ t e r n b e r 4, 1980

The Congressional Research Service works exclusively for

the Congress, conducting research, analyzing legislation, and

providing information at the request of committees, Members, and their staffs.

The Service makes such research available, without partisan bias, in many forms including studies, reports, compilations, digests, and background briefings. Upon request, CRS

assists committees in analyzing legislative proposals and

issues, and in assessing the possible effects of these proposals

and their alternatives. The Service's senior specialists and

subject analysts are also available for personal consultations

in their respective fields of expertise.

This report provides an overview of judicial decisions concerning

the constitutionality of State-sponsored religious activities in the

public schools. Particular attention is paid to the Supreme Court's

decisions regarding State-sponsored prayer and Bible reading and Statesponsored religious teaching in the public schools. The purpose of the

report is to clarify the distinction that has been established in the

courts between those State-sponsored activities regarding religion which

are constitutionally permissible and those which violate the First Amendment.

CONTENTS

ABSTRACT

........................................................... iii

INTRODUCTION......,.....,...

...................................... 1

SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

(a) STATE-SPONSORED PRAYER AND BIBLE READING............,....,..l

(b)

STATE-SPONSORED RET+IGTOUS TEACHING,....................

.....5

THE SCOPE OF THE DECISIONS

(a)

WHAT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMITTED.............,,...........8

(b) WHAT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY PROHIBITED

(c)

CONCLUSION

........................11

ISSUES NOT YET DEFINITIVELY RESOLVED..............,,.......13

...........................................................15

PRAYER ANT RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS:

WHAT IS, AND IS NOT, PERMITTED

Introduction

Few areas of constitutional law have proven to be as controversial

and as subject to misinterpretation as that concerning the constitutionality

of government-sponsored religious activities in the public schools.

In the

last three decades the Supreme Court in five decisions and the State arid lower

Federal courts in dozens of related decisions have attempted to articulate the

1/

meaning of the religion clauses of the First ~mendment- for a variety of such

activities, including State-sponsored prayer, Bible reading, and religious

teaching.

Notwithstanding continuing political controversy over many of these

decisions, they provide a fairly consistent interpretation and application of

the First Amendment.

The purpose of this report is to summarize the Supreme

Court's decisions in this area and their subsequent application in diverse

situations by State and lower Federal courts, to the end that a clear view may

be obtained regarding what government-sponsored activities regarding religion

are, and are not, constitutionally permissible in the public schools.

Supreme Court Decisions

(a)

State-Sponsored Prayer and Bible Reading:

In two decisions in 1962

and 1963 the Supreme Court held the establishment of religion clause of the

First Amendment to be violated by State sponsorship of such devotional activities

2/

as prayer and Bible reading in the public schools. In Engel v. Vitale

the

1/ The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting

an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.. " The

Court has held these restrictions to apply

- - - to the States as well through

- the due

process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.

296 (1941); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).

..

2/ 370 U.S. 421 (1962).

-

C o u r t was c o n f r o n t e d w i t h a r e q u i r e m e n t of a l o c a l board of e d u c a t i o n i n New

York t h a t s t u d e n t s r e c i t e a t t h e b e g i n n i n g of e a c h s c h o o l day t h e f o l l o w i n g

p r a y e r , which had been composed and recommended by t h e New York S t a t e Board

o f Regents:

Almighty God, we acknowledge o u r dependence upon Thee, and we

beg Thy b l e s s i n g s upon u s , o u r p a r e n t s , o u r t e a c h e r s and o u r

Country.

3/

The f o l l o w i n g y e a r i n Abington S c h o o l D i s t r i c t v. s c h e m p p (and i t s companion

c a s e of Murray v. C u r l e t t ) t h e C o u r t was c o n f r o n t e d w i t h S t a t e r e q u i r e m e n t s

t h a t e a c h s c h o o l day b e g i n w i t h r e a d i n g s from t h e B i b l e and t h e u n i s o n r e c i t a l

of t h e L o r d ' s P r a y e r .

I n e a c h c a s e t h e S t a t e s made p r o v i s i o n f o r t h e e x c u s a l

o r n o n p a r t i c i p a t i o n of s t u d e n t s , a t t h e i r r e q u e s t o r t h e r e q u e s t of a p a r e n t

o r guardian.

4/

N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e a p p a r e n t l y " v o l u n t a r y " n a t u r e of t h e e x e r c i s e s , t h e

5/

6/

C o u r t , by a 6-1 m a j o r i t y i n ~ n ~ e land

- a n 8-1 m a j o r i t y i n Schempp,

s t r u c k them

down a s v i o l a t i v e of t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t c l a u s e of t h e F i r s t Amendment.

31

-

374 U.S.

I n Engel

203 ( 1 9 6 3 ) .

4 1 It s h o u l d be n o t e d t h a t i n n e i t h e r c a s e d i d t h e Court make any f i n d i n g

w i t h r e s p e c t t o w h e t h e r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e e x e r c i s e s was i n f a c t v o l u n t a r y ,

b e c a u s e t h a t i s s u e was n o t m a t e r i a l t o i t s d e c i s i o n s . I t s u g g e s t e d , i n f a c t ,

t h a t b e c a u s e of compulsory s c h o o l i n g , p e e r p r e s s u r e , and t h e o f f i c i a l s a n c t i o n

g i v e n t h e e x e r c i s e s , " v o l u n t a r y " p a r t i c i p a t i o n might be a n i m p o s s i b i l i t y .

E n g e l v. V i t a l e , s u p r a , a t 431 and Abington School D i s t r i c t v. Schempp, s u p r a , a t

223.

See

5 1 J o i n i n g i n J u s t i c e B l a c k ' s o p i n i o n f o r t h e Court were Chief J u s t i c e Warren

a n d ~ C s t i c e 'Douglas,

s

C l a r k , H a r l a n , and Brennan, w i t h J u s t i c e Douglas a u t h o r i z i n g

J u s t i c e Stewart authored a d i s s e n t i n g opinion.

a concuring opinion a s well.

J u s t i c e s F r a n k f u r t e r and White d i d n o t p a r t i c i p a t e .

6 / J o i n i n g i n J u s t i c e C l a r k ' s o p i n i o n f o r t h e Court were Chief J u s t i c e Warren

and ~ z s t i c e sB l a c k , Douglas, H a r l a n , Brennan, White, and Goldberg, w i t h J u s t i c e s

D o u g l a s , Brennan, and G o l d b e r g e a c h a u t h o r i n g a c o n c u r r i n g o p i n i o n a s w e l l . J u s t i c e

Stewart, a s i n Engel, submitted a d i s s e n t i n g opinion.

J u s t i c e Black concluded f o r t h e Court:

...

t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o h i b i t i o n a g a i n s t laws r e s p e c t i n g an

e s t a b l i s h m e n t of r e l i g i o n must a t l e a s t mean t h a t i n t h i s

c o u n t r y i t i s no p a r t o f t h e b u s i n e s s of government t o compose

o f f i c i a l p r a y e r s f o r a n y g r o u p o f t h e American p e o p l e t o r e c i t e

a s a p a r t o f a r e l i g i o u s program c a r r i e d on by government.

..

.(G)overnment i n t h i s c o u n t r y , be i t s t a t e o r f e ? r r a l , i s

w i t h o u t power t o p r e s c r i b e by l a w a n y p a r t i c u l a r form o f p r a y e r

w h i c h i s t o be u s e d a s a n o f f i c i a l p r a y e r i n c a r r y i n g on a n y

program o f g o v e r n m e n t a l l y s p o n s o r e d r e l i g i o u s a c t i v i t y . 3 7 0

U.S. a t 425 and 4 3 0 .

S i m i l a r l y , i n Schempp J u s t i c e C l a r k c o n c l u d e d f o r t h e C o u r t :

[The B i h l e - r e a d i n g e x e r c i s e s ] a r e r e l i g i o u s e x e r c i s e s ,

r e q u i r e d by t h e S t a t e s i n v i o l a t i o n of t h e command o f

t h e F i r s t Amendment t h a t t h e Government m a i n t a i n s t r i c t

n e u t r a l i t y , n e i t h e r a i d i n g nor opposing r e l i g i o n .

374 U.S. 2 0 3 .

I n b o t h o p i n i o n s t h e C o u r t l o o k e d beyond t h e i m m e d i a t e words of t h e est a b l i s h m e n t c l a u s e t o d e t e r m i n e i t s meaning.

c o l o n i a l and p r e - c o n s t i t u t i o n a l

I n Engel J u s t i c e Black, canvassing

h i s t o r y , found two b r o a d p u r p o s e s b e h i n d r h e

establishment clause:

I t s f i r s t and most i-mmediate p u r p o s e r e s t e d on t h e b e l i e f

t h a t a u n i o n o f govc-rnment and r e l i g i o n t e n d s t o d e s t r o y

government and t o dtagrade r e l i g i o n . . .The E s t a b l i s h m e n t

C l a u s e t h u s s t a n d s i ~ sa s e x p r e s s i o n of p r i n c i p l e on t h e

p a r t o f t h e F o u n d e r s of o u r C o n s t i t u t i o n t h a t r e l i g i o n

i s too personal, t o o s a c r e d , too holy, t o permit i t s

" u n h a l l o w e d p e r v e r s i o n " by a c i v i l m a g i s t r a t e .

370 U.S.

431-32.

The s e c o n d p u r p o s e , J u s t i c e B l a c k s a i d , " r e s t e d upon a n a w a r e n e s s o f t h e

h i s t o r i c a l f a c t t h a t g o v e r n m e n t a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d r e l i g i o n s and r e l i g i o u s p e r s e c u -

t i o n s g o h a n d i n hand":

I t was i n l a r g e p a r t t o g e t c o m p l e t e l y away f r o m

systematic religious persecution that the

F o u n d e r s b r o u g h t i n t o b e i n g o u r N a t i o n , o u r Const i t u t i o n , and o u r B i l l of R i g h t s w i t h i t s p r o h i b i t i o n

a g a i n s t any governmental e s t a b l i s h m e n t of r e l i g i o n .

Id . , a t 433.

...

Justice Clark in Schempp, agreeing with these conclusions, examined

the previous decisions of the Court concerning the establishment clause

and concluded that those decisions "rejected unequivocally the contention

that the Establishment Clause forbids only governmental preference of one

religion over another."

374 U.S. at 216.

Taken together with the free exer-

cise clause, he said, the establishment clause imposes on government a "wholesome neutr.alityW toward religion.

It can neither favor one sect over all others,

nor religion generally over non-religion, nor non-religion over religion.

Cyrstallizing the Court's decisions in this area into tests that can be applied

to particular legislative enactments, Justice C1,ark said:

The test m y be stated as follows: What are the

purpose and the primary effect of the enactment?

If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution.

That is to say that to withstand the strictures of

the ~stablishmentClause there must be a secular

legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither

advances nor inhibits relieion. 7 1 374 U.S. at 222.

In both cases the Court rejected the argument that the "voluntary" nature

of the prayer and Bible-reading exercises freed them from the strictures of

the establishment clause:

The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise

Clause, does not depend upon any showing of direct

governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion

whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or not. Engel v. Vitale,

supra, at 421.

71 In subsequent cases, the Court has continued to use the tests articulated

by ~usticeClark and has added a third test: whether the legislative enactment

leads to excessive government entanglement with religion. & v. Tax Commission of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).

CRS- 5

It rejected as well the arguments that to deny States the power to prescribe

8/

religious activities in the public schools indicates hostility toward religion,

that the encroachments on the First Amendment made by state-prescribed prayer

and Bible reading in the public schools are so minor and insignificant as to

9

- ,1

be de minimis,

and that the exercises should be permitted as the free exercise

lo/

of religion by the majority.

In sum, then, by decisive majorities the Court in Engel and Schempp found

State sponsorship of prayer and Bible-reading in the public schools to constitute an establishment of religion and thus to be beyond government's constitutional power.

8 / Justice Black in Engel noted that those who led the fight for religious

freedom were themselves religious men and that the First Amendment grew out

of "an awareness that governments of the past had shackled men's tongues to

make them speak and to pray only to the God that government wanted them to

pray to." Thus, he concluded:

It is neither sacrilegious nor antireligious to say

that each separate government in this country should

stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning official prayers and leave that purely religious function

to the people themselves and to those the people choose

to look to for religious guidance. 370 U.S. at 421.

Justice Clark said:

The breach of neutrality that is today a trickling stream

may all too soon become a raging torrent and, in the

words of Madison, "it is proper to take alarm at the

first experiment on our liberties." 374 U.S. at 225.

Justice Clark said:

While the Free Exercise Clause clearly prohibits the

use of state action to deny the rights of free exercise

to anyone, it has never meant that a majority could

use the machinery of the State to practice its beliefs.

374 U.S. at 226.

(b)

State-Sponsored Religious Teaching:

In three decisions the Court

has also held that the First Amendment is violated by State sponsorship of

religious teaching in the public schools, in whatever form, but that

it is constitutionally permissible for the schools to accommodate private

programs of religious instruction given off the school grounds. In the

11 /

first case of McCollum v . Board of ducat ion- the Court held unconstitutional,

121

8-1,

a "shared time" program in which religion teachers employed by private

religious groups were permitted to come into the public schools each week to

teach religion to consenting students:

but cooperated closely with the program.

The schools did not employ the teachers

The teachers were subject to the

approval and supervision of the superintendent of schools; reports of students'

attendance at the classes were made to the school; non-participating students

were required to go elsewhere in the school building.

The Court found the

program to constitute "a utilization of the tax-established and tax-supported

public school system to aid religious groups to spread their faith."

such, the Court said, "...it

As

falls squarely under the ban of the First

Amendment" :

...

a state cannot consistently with the First and Fourteenth

Amendments utilize its public school system to aid any or all

religious faiths or sects in the dissemination of their doctrines and ideals....333 U.S. at 211.

14/

13 /

Five years later in Zorach v. Clausen,

the Court upheld, 6-3,

the

1 2 1 Justice Black authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief

~ustiz

Vinson and Justices Douglas, Murphy, Rutledge, and Burton joined.

Justices Frankfurter and Jackson authored concurring opinions, in the

former of which Justices Jackson, Rutledge, and Burton joined. Justice

Reed dissented.

131

-

343 U.S. 306 (1952).

141 Justice Douglas authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief

~ u s t i Vinson

z

and Justices Reed, Burton, Clark, and Minton joined. Justices

Black, Frankfurter, and Jackson each authored dissents.

constitutionality of "released" or "dismissed" time programs in which

public school students are permitted during the school day to leave

the school grounds in order to repair to nearby religious centers for

religious instruction or devotional exercises.

Writing for the Court,

Justice Douglas differentiated such programs from that struck down in

McCollum by stating:

In the McCollum case the classrooms were used for religious

instruction and the force of the public school was used to

promote that instruction. Here...the public schools do no

more than accommodate their schedules to a program of outside

religious instruction. 343 U.S. at 315.

The First Amendment, the Court stated, forbids any "concert or union or

dependency" between church and State, but it does not require that they

"be aliens to each other--hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly."

In

oft-quoted dicta the Court concluded:

We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a

Supreme Being. We guarantee the freedom to worship as one

chooses. We make room for as wide a variety of beliefs

and creeds as the spiritual needs of man deem necessary.

We sponsor an attitude on the part of government that shows

no partiality to any one group and that lets each flourish

according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeals of its

dogma. When the state encourages religious instruction or

cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule

of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of

our traditions. For it then respects the religious nature

of our people and accommodates the public service to their

spiritual needs. To hold that it may not would be to find

in the Constitution a requirement that the government show a

callous indifference to religious groups. 343 U.S. at 313-14.

15/

Finally, in Epperson v. ~ r k a n s a s t h eCourt unanimously held unconstitutional a State statute which forbade teachers, upon pain of criminal penalty,

from teaching the Darwinian theory of evolution.

The statute was a variation

16/

-

of the one involved in the famous Scopes trial in 1927,

and made it unlawful

151 393 U.S. 97 (1968).

161 Though Scopes' conviction was overturned by the Tennessee Supreme Court,

the statute was held constitutional. Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W.

363 (1927).

for any teacher to teach or to use a textbook which taught "the theory

or doctrine that mankind ascended or descended from a lower order of

animals."

The Court found that "fundamentalist sectarian conviction was

and is the law's reason for existence," and because of that held the statute

to violate the First Amendment.

Writing for the Court, Justice Fortas stated:

Government in our democracy, state and national, must be

neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice.

It may not be hostile to any religion or to the advocacy of

no-religion; and it may not aid, foster, or promote one religion or religious theory against another or even against

the militant opposite. The First Amendment mandates governmemtal neutrality between religion and religion, and between

T)he First Amendment does not

religion and nonreligion

permit the State to require that teaching and learning must

be tailored to the principles or prohibitions of any religious

sect or dogma. 393 U.S. at 103-104, 106.

....(

The State might have acted in a religiously neutral manner, Justice Fortas

suggested, if it had simply excised from its curricula all discussion of

the origins of mankind.

But instead, he said, the State tried to blot out

a particular theory because of its "supposed conflict" with "a particular

interpretation of the Book of Genesis by a particular religious group."

That effort, he said, was "plainly" unconstitutional.

The Scope of the Decisions

(a)

What Is Constitutionally Permitted

The Supreme Court, despite several opportunities, has to date chosen to

review no further cases concerning the constitutionality of State-sponsored

religious activities in the public schools.

Nonetheless, the decisions sum-

marized above, coupled with dicta in the Court's opinions and related State

and lower Federal court decisions, make clear that not all State-sponsored

activities relating to religion in the public schools are constitutionally

forbidden.

The constitutional permissibility of "released" or "dismissed"

time programs, for instance, has in no way been diminished by subsequent

CRS- 9

171

-

developments in the law.

Similarly, dicta in Supreme Court opinions

and related State and lower Federal court decisions have consistently

affirmed the constitutionality of a State requiring a moment of silence

181

at the beginning of the school day.

The courts have also affirmed

the constitutionality of the State sponsoring objective teaching about

religion and about the Bible as part of a secular program

171 Zorach v. Clauson, supra; Smith v. Smith, 391 F. Supp. 443

cert.den. 423 U.S.

(w.D.F~.), reversed, 523 F. 2d 121 (4th Cir. 1975), - v. Thompson, 66 Wis. 2d 659, 225 N.W. 2d

1073 (1976); State ex rel. Holt

678 (1975); Lanner v. 9-Wimmer 463 F. Supp. 867 (D. Utah 1978).

181 The Supreme Court has considered no case raising the issue of the

const%utionality

of a State-mandated moment of silence at the beginning

of each school day, but Justice Brennan, in oft-quoted language from a

concurring opinion in Abington, perceived no constitutional objection:

The second justification (for prayer and Bible reading

exercises) assumes that religious exercises at the start

of the school day may directly serve solely secular ends-for example, by fostering harmony and tolerance among the

pupils, enhanding the authority of the teacher, and inspiring

better discipline. To the extent that such benefits result

not from the content of the readings and recitation, but

simply from the holding of such a solemn exercise at the

opening assembly or the first class of the day, it would seem

that less sensitive materials might equally well serve the

It has not been shown that reading from the

same purpose

speeches and messages of great Americans, for example, or

from the documents of our heritage

of liberty, daily recitation

of the Pledge of Allegiance, or even the observance of a moment

of reverent silence at the opening of class, may not adequately

serve the solely secular purposes of the devotional activities

without jeopardizing either the religious liberties of any

members of the community or the proper degree of separation

between the spheres of religion and government. Abington

School District v. Schempp, supra, at 280-81 (Bren~an,J.

concurring) (emphasis added).

....

See also Gaines v. Anderson, 421 F. Supp. 337 (D. Mass., 1976) (State statute

prescribing a moment of silence at the beginning of each school day for purposes of "meditation or prayer" held constitutional) and Opinion of the

Justices, 108 N.H. 97, 228 A. 2d 161 (1967) and Opinion of the Justices,

113 N.H. 297, 307 A. 2d 558 (1973) (advisory opinions affirming the constitutionality of proposed State statutes prescribing a period for silent

meditation).

CRS- 10

191'

-

of instruction.

The courts have also uniformly upheld the inclusion

20/

of invocations and benedictions in commencement ceremonies- and have

found constitutional objections to baccalaureate services to be insub21 /

stantial.

Finally, the First Amendment has been consistently inter-

preted to pose no bar to States providing opportunities for students to

participate in ceremonial or patriotic exercises which incidentally involve

a profession of faith, such as the singing of the national anthem, the recital

19/

-

In Engel the Court noted:

...

it might well be said that one's education is not

complete without a study of comparative religion or the

history of religion and its relationship to the advancement of civilization. It certainly may be said that the

Bible is worthy of study for its literary and historic

qualities. Nothing we have said here indicates that such

study of the Bible or of religion, when presented objectively as part of a secular program of education, may not be

effected consistently with the First Amendment. 374 U.S.

203, 225.

In Epperson it reiterated:

...

study of religions and of the Bible from a literary and

historic viewpoint, presented objectively as part of a secular

program of education, need not collide with the First Amend393 U.S. 97, 106.

ment's prohibition

....

See also Florey v. Sioux Falls School District 49-5, 619 F. 2d 1311 (8th

Cir. 1980) (school board regulation permitting observance of holidays

having both a religious and secular basis upheld); Calvary Presbyterian

Church v. University of Washington, 72 Wash. 2d 912, 436 P. 2d 189 (1967)

(constitutionality of college-level course entitled "The Bible As Literature"

~ranklin,474 F. Supp. 525 (E.D. Tenn. 1979) (constituaffirmed); Wiley

tionality of Bible as literature course taught by teachers with bachelor's

degrees in Biblical literature upheld); Todd v. Rochester Community Schools,

41 Mich. App. 320 200 N.W. 2d 90 (1972) (constitutionality of using book

containing religious references in literature course upheld).

;.

-

20/ Wood v. Mt.Lebanon Tomship School District, 342 F. Supp. 1293 (W.D.Pa.

v. Deusebio, 380 F. Supp. 285 (E .D.Va. 1974);. Wiest v. Mt.

1972);~rossber~

cert.den. 419 U.S.

Lebanon School District, 457 Pa. 166, 320 A. 2d 362, 967 (1974).

211 Goodwin v. Cross County School District No. 7, 394 F. Supp. 417

(E.D.A~~.

1973); Chamberlin v. Dade County Board of Public Instruction, 171 So.

2d 535 (Fla. 1965).

CRS- 11

of the pledge of allegiance, and the reading of historical documents

22 /

such as the Declaration of Independence.

(b)

What Is Constitutionally Prohibited

Nevertheless, the scope .of the limitations imposed by the First Amendment

remains broad:

The First Amendment denies government any power to conduct or

sponsor or prescribe religious teaching or devotional exercises in the public

schools, even though participation therein may be "voluntary."

Government may

not tailor the public school curriculum to the principles or prohibitions of

22/

-

In Engel the Court noted:

There is of course nothing in the decision reached here that

is inconsistent with the fact that school children and

others are officially encouraged to express love for our

country by reciting historical documents such as the

Declaration of Independence which contain references to the

Deity or by singing officially espoused anthems which

include the composer's professions of faith in a Supreme

Being, or with the fact that there are many manifestations

in our public life of belief in God. Such patriotic or

ceremonial occasions bear no true resemblance to the unquestioned religious exercise that the State of New York

has sponsored in this instance. Engel v. Vitale, supra, at

421, ftnt. 21.

See also Sheldon v. 9-Fannin 221 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ariz. 1963) (singing of

national anthem in public schools held not to violate establishment clause);

Smith v. Denny, 280 F. Supp. 651 (E.D. Cal. 1968), appeal dism'd 417 F. 2d

614 (9th Cir. 1969) (requirement that students recite daily the pledge of

allegiance upheld); Opinion of the Justices, 113 N.H. 297, 307 A. 2d 558

(1973) (advisory opinion that statute empowering school districts to provide

for the voluntary daily recitation of pledge of allegiance would be constitutional).

It appears clear that student participation in exercises involving

incidental professions of faith or other affirmations of belief must be voluntary to comport with the First Amendment. West Virginia Board of Education v.

Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).

CRS- 12

23 /

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any particular sect or dogma.

It may not permit private teachers to

use the school premises for the purpose of giving religious instruction to

24 /

consenting students during the school day.

It may not sponsor or prescribe devotional exercises such as prayer and Bible reading as a regular

251

part of the school curriculum.

Finally, it may not permit the public

schools to be used as the medium for the distribution of such sectarian

231 Epperson v. Arkansas, supra; Wright v. Houston Independent School

~ i s t r G t ,366 F. Supp. 1208 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd 486 F. 2d 137 (5th Cir.

1973), cert. den. -sub nom. Brown v. Houston Independent School District, 417

U.S. 969 (1974) (First Amendment held not to compel school districts to include

other theories regarding origins of man in addition to theory of evolution);

Daniel v. Waters, 515 F. 2d 485 (6th Cir.) -on remand, 399 F. Supp. 510

(M.D. Tenn. 1975) (statute prescribing inclusion of Genesis account in any

presentation of theories of the creation of man and the universe and exclusion

of all "occult or satanical" theories held unconstitutional); Smith v. State

of Mississippi, 242 So. 2d 692 (Miss. 1970) (same as Epperson); Malnak v. Yogi,

592 F. 2d 197 (2d Cir. 1979) (teaching Transcendental Meditation in public

schools held to violate establishment clause); Lanner v. Wimmer, 463 F. Supp.

867 (D. Utah 1978) (giving of course credit for Bible courses taught in "released"

time program held unconstitutional); Wiley v. Franklin, 468 F. Supp. 133

(E.D. Tenn. 1979) (public school Bible study course that was primarily religious

rather than of an historical, literary, or otherwise secular nature held

unconstitutional).

24/ McCollum v. Board of Education, supra.

251 State and lower Federal court cases subsequent to Engel and Schemp

have zvolved forms of State-sponsored prayer and/or Bible reading identicalEto

those in Engel and Schempp and numerous variants. None, with the exception of

State ~rescriotionof a moment for silent meditation, has survived constitutional

scrutiny. See, e.g., Alabama Civil Liberties Union v. Wallace, 331 F. Supp.

966 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd 456 F. 2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1972) (State statute prescribing

daily Bible reading held unconstitutional); Rent v. Commissioner of Education,

402 N.E. 2d 1340 (Mass. 1980) (State statute prescribing daily period of prayer

in public schools held unconstitutional); DeSpain v. DeKalb County School District,

225 F. Supp. 655 (N.D. Ill. 1966), reversed 384 F. 2d 936 (7th Cir. 1967),

cert. den. 390 U.S. 906 (1968) (teacher sponsorship of pre-snack verse of

thanks by kindergarten children held unconstitutional); State Board of Education

v. Board of Education of Netcong, New Jersey, 108 N.J. Sup. 564, 262 A. 2d 21

affirmed 57 N.J. 172, 270 A. 2d 412 (1970), cert.den. 401 U.S. 1013 (1971)

(school board sponsorship of daily "free exercise of religion" period during which

student read aloud prayers from the Congressional Record held unconstitutional);

Collins v. Chandler Unified School District, 470 F. Supp, 959 (D. Ariz. 1979)

(student council sponsorship of prayer by student at beginning of school assemblies

held unconstitutional).

CRS- 13

26 /

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literature as Gideon Bibles to consenting school children.

(c)

Issues Not Yet Definitively Resolved

Contrary decisions have been rendered by State and lower Federal courts

on two matters in this area, however--(l)

whether the First Amendment permits

school officials to accommodate students who at their own initiative wish to

join together for devotional prayer and Bible reading on school premises during

the school day, and (2) whether it permits school officials to post the Ten

Commandments or other religious statements on classroom walls.

With respect to

the first issue, the courts have consistently held that at the elementary and

secondary school level it is within the discretionary authority of school

officials to bar all use of school facilities for student-initiated religious

-

7

,

L/ /

-

activities.

In addition, two State appellate courts and one Federal district

court have gone further and held that the establishment clause requires that such

student-initiated activities on school property at the elementary and secondary

levels be barred, that is, that school officials are constitution all^ forbidden

28 /

from accommodating such student activities on school property.

At the college

level, however, contrary decisions have been rendered on this issue, one State

26/ Tudor v. Board of Education of Borough of Rutherford, 14 N.J. 31,

100 ~7-2d 857 (1953), cert.den. 348 U.S. 816 (1955); Brown v. Orange County

Board of Public Instruction, 128 So. 2d 181 (Fla. App. 1960), aff'd 155 So. 2d 371

(Fla. 1963); Goodwin v. Cross County School District No. 7, 394 F. Supp. 417

(E.D. Ark. 1973); Heltzer v. Board of Public Instruction of Orange County, Florida,

548 F. 2d 599 (5th Cir. 1977), on rehearing en banc, 577 F. 2d 311 (5th Cir. 1978),

cert. den. 439 U.S. 1089 (1979).

--

--

27/ Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F. 2d 999 (2d Cir.), cert. den. 382 U.S. 957

(1965x Hunt v. Board of Education of Kanawha County, West Virginia, 321 F. Supp.

1263 (S.D. W. Va. 1971); Trietley v. Board of Education of City of Buffalo, 65

App. Div. 2d 1, 409 N.Y.S. 2d 912 (1978).

-

28/ Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union High School District, 137 Cal.

Rptr. 43,68 Cal. App. 3d 1, cert.den. 434 U.S. 877 (1977); Trietley v.

Board of Education of City of Buffalo, supra; Brandon v. Board of Education

of Guilderland Central School, 487 F. Supp. 1219 (N.D.N.Y. 1980).

supreme court holding that an even-handed policy permitting the religious use

of university space is permitted by the establishment clause and, perhaps, required

29/

-

by the free exercise clause,

one Federal district court holding a university

policy forbidding the regular use of university space for worship by recognized

30I

student groups to be required by the establishment clause.

Thus, though

-

the trend and weight of decisional authority on this issue suggests that studentinitiated use of school facilities for religious purposes implicates the State

in religious activity in violation of the establishment clause, particularly at

the elementary and secondary level, it may be premature to deem this issue

to be definitively resolved.

With respect to the second issue, the split in judicial authority is less onesided:

Two State supreme courts have upheld the constitutionality of the

31 I

32 /

State posting the Ten commandments- or plaques with the phrase "In God We Trust"

on the classroom walls, while one Federal district court has held the posting

331

of the Ten Commandments to violate the establishment clause.

Thus, on this

issue no trend of judicial decision would as yet appear evident.

29/ Keegan v. University of Delaware, 349 A. 2d 14 (Del. 1975), cert. den.

934 (1976).

424 UZ.

301 Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907 (W.D. Mo. 1979).

311 Stone v. Graham, 599 S. W. 2d 157 (Ky. 1980).

321 Opinion of the Justices, 108 N.H. 97, 228 A. 2d 161 (1967).

331 Ring v. Grand Forks Public School District No. 1, 483 F. Supp. 272

(D.N.D.

1980).

-

CRS- 15

Conclusion

Because both the establishment and free exercise clauses are worded

as absolutes, it is sometimes ambiguous whether governmental involvement in

a given activity is a permissible accommodation of religion or a forbidden

establishment of religion.

But the essential meaning of this part of the

First Amendment that has been elaborated by the courts over the last three

decades would appear to be that government must be neutral regarding religious

faith, serving neither as its agent or advocate nor as its adversary.

Par

ticularly in its role as educator, government is required to be objective and

impartial about religion, not partisan.

The result of this interpretation of the First Amendment is that government

has been held to be constitutionally barred from using its authority to

inculcate or proselytize about, or to permit others to inculcate or proselytize

about, religious faith in the public school, whether by means of sponsorship of

prayer, Bible reading, sectarian instruction, or distribution of sectarian

literature.

On the other hand, governmental involvement in a number of activities

has been found to have neither the purpose nor a primary effect of advancing

religion and thus to be constitutionally permissible--teaching about religion

and religious literature as part of a secular program of instruction, sponsoring

religiously neutral moments of silence, prescribing ceremonial or patriotic

exercises which may incidentally involve professions of faith, and accommodating

private programs of religious instruction given off the school premises.

Whether accommodation of student-initiated religious groups on school

property or posting of wall plaques containing religious sentiments in class-

CRS- 1 6

rooms violates government's essential neutrality regarding religion has not yet

been definitively adjudicated.

But after three decades of litigation the general

thrust of the First Amendment in this area would appear to be clear:

In the

public schools government must be neutral and objective regarding religion.