Record and brief — The Pewabic Mining Company, Johnson Vivian, Henry Billings, Thomas H. Perkins, Alden B. Buttrick, Daniel L. Demmon, and the Pewabic Copper Company, Defendants and Appellants, vs. Thomas H. Mason, William Hart Smith, and Sullivan Ballou, Complainants

Supreme Court brief1889

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Text

Supreme Court of the Cited States.

OCTOBER TERM, 1889.

Nos. 240, 168.

THe Pewasic MINING Company, JOHNSON VIVIAN, )°

Henry Birurecs, THoomas H. Perkins, ALDEN

B. Burrrick, Danie, L. DemMMon, and THe Pe-

WABIC CopPpER Company, Defendants and Appel- heen

lants, —

vs.

Tuomas H. Mason, Witt1aAm Hart SMIrH, and

SULLIVAN Bauiou, Complainants and Appellees, J

A. IN D

THomas H. Mason, Wittiam Harr Smita, and )

SULLIVAN Bauiou, Complainants and Appellants.

vs.

THe Pewapic MINING Company, JOHNSON VIVIAN, | Cross-

Henry Biiiuines, THomas H. Perkins, ALDEN { Appeal.

B. Burrrick, DaNtet L. DemMmMon, and THE PE-

WABIC Mintnc Company, Defendants and Appel-

lees.

BRIEF FOR COMPLAINANTS ON APPEAL AND CROSS-

APPEAL. :

DON M. DICKINSON,

ALFRED RUSSELL,

Of Counsel.

JUDD & DETWEILER, PRINTERS.

Seen eereeea saouemmeseanepetie eR * vac . aS Ses iaa Re

Supreme Court of the alnited States.

OCTOBER TERM, 1889.

Nos. 240, 168.

t

THE Pewabsic MINING COMPANY, JOHNSON VIVIAN,

Henry Bitnincs, THomas H. Perkins, ALDEN

B. Burrrick, Danie, L. DemMoyn, and THE Pr-

WABIC COPPER Company, Defendants and Appel- \ 4) a)

ants, —

Ss.

Tuomas H. Masox, Witntiam Harr Swirn. and

SULLIVAN BaLLou, Complainants and Appellees,

and

THomas H. Mason, Wittram Hart SMITH, and )

SULLIVAN BaLuovu, Complainants and Appellants.

US.

Tue Pewasic MINING CoMPANY, JOHNSON VIVIAN, | Cross-

Henry Birtrnas, Tuomas H. Perkins, ALDEN { Appeal.

B. Burrrick, Danie. L. DEMMonN, and THE PE-

WABIC MINING Company, Defendants and Appel- |

lees. .

BRIEF FOR COMPLAINANTS ON APPEAL AND CROSS-

APPEAL.

cee ee ee ee ne er ne

The decree below (Record, p. 923) gave substantially all

the relief prayed forin the bill, except that it denied to com-

plainant stockholders the right to a receiver and an ac-

counting from the board of directors of the Pewabic Mining

Company for the funds received by them after the expira-

2 tein A SS

ee ae ata

<iasianigentampenssmitaicaiingems mini asiialin i Naira eel =

~

tion of the charter of that company, or expended by them

In carrying on the ace of said company otherwise than

io

in and about and for the purpose of liquidation.

This is the only error we assign and is the sole ground of

our cross-appeal,

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

We can make no more concise presentation of the general

features of the case than Is found in the opinion of the learned

justice who heard and decided the case at circuit, as follows :

The Pewabic Mining Company was organized as a cor-

poration for mining a and other ores, under-the laws of

Michigan,on Ap Hil 4th, 1853, for thirty vears, With a capital

stock nitimately of 40,000 pe spa of S25 y each, investe dina

copper mine near Houghton. The coniplainants are owners

of 2.650 shares of the stock out of the whole amount, all of

which has been issued. Although the period for which the

comnmpany was incorporated expired on April 4, 1888, ‘the

directors elected in March of that year, in apparent igno-

rance of the fact, continued its ordinary business. On March

26th, 1884, the regular annual meeting of the stockholders

for the election of directors and for other purposes Was held

pursuant to notice duly given, at which the following reso-

lutions were adopted against the vote and protest of the

complainants:

‘ Resolved, That: the board of directors be authorized to

sell and dispose of the property of the company for a sum

not less than $50,000; that the president and secretary be

authorized to execute all conveyances necessary to carry out

the contract for the sale of the property of this company

made by the board of directors, and that board of directors

be, and hereby are, authorized to close up the business of

the company.

*:¢ eae lied, That it is the sense of this mee - of stock-

holders that the property of this company shall be sold toa

new corporation organized under the Jaws of M Ajeie on

the basis of forty thousand shares, and that the stock of such

new corporation shall be issued to and reecived by the stock-

holders of this company in payment for the same, stock-

holders to have the right to receive equal numbers of shares

il

’

,

in new company, if thev so elect, on surrendering certificates

of this company within thirty davs after April 12th, 1884.

and in ease stockholder does not take stock of new corpora-

tion he is to receive his pro rata share ‘in money.

‘The vote in favor of the adoption of these resolutions

was 27,919 shares against 6.754 shares in the negative.

“On the same day, March 26th, 1884, a certificate of iIn-

corporation was executed under the laws of Michigan to form

‘the Pewabic Copper Company,’ and filed March 28th. Its

capital stock, 40,000 shares of $25 each, was taken up by

these corporators, who with two others were named as the

first directors, being the same as those who controlled the

old company, and the third article of association declared

that ‘no eash Is actually paid in on the capital stock: the

cash value of the real and personal property conveved to

the company contemporancously with its organization is the

sum of fifty thousand dollars.’

“It was provided by a statute of Michigan, 1 Howell’s

Statutes, 1244, see. 4867, that ‘all corporations whose ehar-

ters shall expire by their own limitation or shall be annulled

by forfeiture or otherwise shall nevertheless continue to be

bodies corporate for the term of three years after the time

when they would have been so dissolved, for the purpose of

nrosecuting and defending suits by or against them and of

enabling them gradually to settle and close their concerns,

to dispose of and convey their property, and divide their

capital stock, but not for the purpose of continuing the busi-

ness for which such corporations have been or may be estab-

f

:

¢

;

i

;

‘

lished.’

“The present bill was filed March 51, 1854, its main object

being to prevent by injunction the proposed sale of the

property of the Pewabic Mining Company to the Pewabie

Copper Company, and to have the same sold under theorder

of the court at public auction to the highest bidder for cash,

and the proceeds, after payment of the debts of the corpora-

tion, divided equally among the stockholders. It also prays,

as against the officers and directors of the company, an ae-

eount of all monies received by them sinee April 4, 1883, in-

cluding assvssments on stoc ‘k alleged to have been made and

paid, and which, it is averred, were illegally used in the

proseeution of the business of the corporation a Ber its dis-

solution, and ata loss. The general grounds of the relie

prayed for are that the transactions complained of are lees

for want of power on the part of the defendants to under-

take them, and on the further ground that they are fraudu-

lent as against the complainants, particularly that the price

fixed upon the property of the companyas the consideration

of its sale and conveyance is grossly Inadequate.

“The answer insists upon the lawfulness of the proceed-

ings questioned, and that the proposed sale and conveyance

of the corporate property to the new company is in good

faith for its fair value, and is the best mode of disposing of

it for the benefit of the stockholders, and dentes all fraud

charged. 7

“Under the statute quoted above the Pewabic Mining

Company continued to be a body corporate after April 4,

1883, notwithstanding the expiration of the time limited in

its charter for the prosecution of its business, for the pur-

pose of winding upits affairs. Tor this prrpose it continued

to exist as a corporation, and could do all necessary corporate

acts suitable to that end, and it retained its corporate organ-

ization, acting through directors and_ oflicers elected and

appointed as has been customary, and its stockholders con-

tinued to be such, with all their rights and powers. The

directors in office at the time when the corporation was

dissolved as to future business did not cease to be sueh and

become ‘statutory trustees for winding up, nor were the

stockholders converted into cestuis gue trust. merely of the

assets of the company. The existence of the company as a

corporation was prolonged for three vears in order that it

might as a corperate body do the acts and things authorized

by the statute, to the end that it might gradually settle and

close its concerns by disposing of and conveying its prop-

erly and dividing its capital stock. Nevertheless the COrpo-

ration itself and the directors officially, for the purposes of

the statute, were trustees tor the creditors and stockholders,

and were bound to exert all their powers in the disposition

of the property for the equal benefit of those equally enti-

tled.

“Tt is a matter of much doubt, as it appears to me,

whether, in view of the language and purposes of the act as

against a dissenting stockholder, the corporation and its

directors have a discretion to sell the property of the com-

pany in liquidation otherwise than for cash; but, without

denying the power, it is very clear that they have no right

to reorganize the company and its business by the forma-

)

tion of a new corporation, to which its property is conveyed

in exchange for its stock, so as to compel dissenting stock-

holders to continue in the business which the statute has

declared shall be wound up; and, as they have no power to

compel all the stockholders to accept interests in the new

enterprise in exchange for their shares in the old, neither

can they impose arbitrary and unfair terms and conditions

upon them for refusing to do so.

“This ts the feature in the proposed plan of transferring

the assets of the Pewabie Mining Company to the Pewabic

Copper Company which presents to my mind the insupera-

ble objection to its confirmation. ‘The complainants are re-

quired to receive shares in the new company in exchange

for those they hold in the old Or, in the alternative, accept

their proportion of $50,000 as the value of the whole.

“This sum was arbitrarily fixed by the directors and ma-

jority of the stockholders, who were to take the property at

that sun; it made no difference to them what nominal val-

uation was adopted, as their relative interests were not

changed; but the valuation was adopted, not with reference

to a sale of property to others, but themselves, and is there-

fore no fair eriterion for estimating the value of the shares

of those whom they sought to compel, if they parted with

their interests, to do so only to their former associates.

“Tt ais true that the defendants in their answer state that

the sum named was a fair equivalent for the whole capital

stock at its market value, but that may not have been a

fair value for the property which that capital stock repre-

sented. It is imposs:ble for me, in deciding upon this point,

to ignore the finding of the special master appointed for the

very purpose of inquiring into the question of value, and

who reports, upon the testimony taken, that, in his opinion,

the property to be sold is worth nearly S500,000, and the

complainants themselves offer in their bill to bid $75,000

for it.

* Whatever power, therefore, the company, by its directors

anda majority of its stockholders, may be supposed to have

under the statute to sell the corporate assets for the purpose

of hquidation, the proposed convevance to the Pewabic Cop-

per Company, in consideration of its assumption of the debts

of the Pewabie Mining Company—which the answer alleges

to be part of the understanding—and the exchange of the

stock of the former for that of the latter, with the obliga-

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Se de Daehn uernhin adele. a

5)

tion of dissentients to aecept their proportion of $50,000 as

the estimated cash value of the whole, cannot be regarded

as a sale at all for purposes of liquidation. Its effect is

simply to exclude the minority from all further interest in

the property by compelling them without their consent

to part with their interests at the price fixed by them, to

whom they are to be transferred, and that price, as it now

is made to appear, far below the fair value of the property.”

The statement of facts in the opinion should be added to

and modified as follows:

The articles of association of the new company (Record,

p. 20) show that its entire capital stock was taken by Dan-

iel L.. Demmon, Thomas II. Perkins, and Alden B. Buttrick,

all directors of the old company in liquidation, and includ-

ing its president and secretary, who, by the resolution above

quoted, were to execute the necessary convevance of the

assets to the new company, of which they were thus the

sole stockholders as well as directors.

Notwithstanding the averment in the answer that the new

company was to pay the debts of the old, in addition to the

850,000, the avermen! was expressly negatived by the tes-

timony. Minutes of the meeting (Record, p. 44) show that

the resolution of Mr. Smith, providing for a sale for the

payment of debts, was voted down, and that Mr. Chandler's

resolution, providing for a sale at $50,000, was carried, with-

out any provision for the debts. The stenographer’s min-

utes of the meeting show that no statement was made in

connection with the proposed sale with reference to the

debts, and the articles of association of the new company

are conelusive on this point, showing that its entire lability

for all the property of the old company conveyed to 1t was

‘under-

+

but $50,000. Although Demmon says there was an

standing” that the debts should be paid, his own testimony

at page 544 shows that any possible presumption of even an

implied contract to pay them was rebutted by the trausac-

tion itself.

7

On filing the bill a restraining order was issued to pre-

vent the consummation of the sale at $50,000. On the

motion for injunction, heard on affidavits and bill and

answer April 23, 1884, the parties were in direct conflict as

to the value of the property, the appellant still contending

that $50,000 was a fair price. The court, being in doubt, re-

served decision until May 12, 1884, and of its own motion

appointed Hon. Matthew H. Maynard special master to exam-

ine and ascertain the description and fair value of the prop-

erty, and directed the parties to take proofs on that Issue be-

fore him. (Record, p. 64.)

- The mine proper is on what is known as the “ Pewabic

lode.” This is in the heart of the copper region of Michi-

gan, whose produet is seven-tenths of the entire copper

production of the United States. The lode is second in value

in the State; the first being the Calumet and Heela (Charles

Hf. Palmer’s testimony, page 59; the Quincy, situated next

to the Pewabic mine, stands second in point of quantity

and value of copper production. Across the Pewabie mine

from the Quincy,and next toit on the other side, is the Frank-

lin mine, another of the best on Lake Superior. The prop-

erty embraces the village of Pewabic, which is a suburb of

the town of Hancock, and is situated near the summit of an

adjacent hill,in plain sight of and but one mile from Hough-

ton, the county seat. It has a tramway, stamp-mill, water

front, and dock. The special master’s report (page 820)

shows the items of property, and the map at page 38 shows

the situation with reference to the contiguous mines.

By an amendment to their bill complainants aver that

their stock in the defendant mining company was all pur-

chased in 1882 and 18898, prior to the Ist of April, 1885, and

that their suit was not a collusive one to confer jurisdiction.

(Record, pp. 822-542.)

This averment as to-date of purchase of stock is sustained

by the proof. (Record, pp. 66, 483, and 898.)

@)

‘ ".)

After the expiration of the charter, as admitted on all

as before, prior

iowledge of the

hands, the business was carried on precisely

to, and subsequent to the admitted time of ki

expiration of charter. President Perkins savs (page $54):

“T did not know until February ” (1884), and he says he did

not know before because it was not thought by the counsel

best to be mentioned, and that then he learned that Mr.

Demmon had known of it three or four mouths before, and

he presumes they knew it at the time of the assessment of

LSS.

The report shows that during that vear, after the expira-

tion of the charter, the business of the surface-work, Ming,

aes ae ae Sia ae ar a a ite

exploring, sinking shafts, driving drifts, and all the othe

business Was earried on precisely as before, at an expense of

at least a quarter Of a tnlitlon of money, and toat nearly

»,? ° ° , °

SG6O0.000 of business was done. Among the receipts was

1 % . . +» Be } ] . * . } + . ra | . -

S$SS,000 for assessments on stoekhoiders, made after the ex-

* . . } ~ — - » | co f

piration of the charter. (Record, pp. o75, 580, and 582

oN, eytyita« as ‘ id Tr 4}. *s 7 ‘ id Dir vas! >* leary >? ‘ a } ,?

a t' retary cl il rea ire! clit SE CUCL Fg arg Fe rion Saves Liat

after he discovered the expiration of

‘| cf e+) 31) r° 7 : nductine th , .y a? +? Yr ? re

no change m the mMabner of condaucting the mining opera

- } ] ’ } } ] ana in ;

trons, and that lie proceeded To 1evy aussessmetkts |

‘

*

(Reeord, 1). se fs

POINTS,

We contend—

ree , ae : i : ? > Da” , i .

a That fhe atlempted transte fo thee Pewahi ( Api pred Campany

i

by fhe hoard cil (L2rEC Ors (ji t/ifé ery ue 4 dai Had f CORap lie y EET

. . . -

e: AOS ‘Repeat "y 5 aie oe a

void on two siuffteient grounds—the one that i was ultra vires,

* +

, ’

? ? P ° e J - :

tiie orher that rf fgets Praudwleiil.

rry } , * 7 BERS ? ° age y e : er ° .

Ae Phat all thie acts oF the Hoard of directors in Cai Weill? O8

; } 5 omnes oo 21a 2 . y j th aator oy } >.

the PMI NESS (tte) Lfi¢ erprration fii hie / f*igte ’ Ap imi ir. 18S<s.

- 4

, : * pe : + 2» i] gy ; ; , } + 4} 47

were uifra vires, and fhat even at they acted in good faith they

>

- . - ’ >? . a } 7 =e -

are responsible por losses dre Eu pendilures meecurred awd node tn

that business.

t

‘

eee EPS:

2 .

{)

III. That through the acts and conduct of the secretary and

freasu rer, Deimmon, t? whose hands the whole meanagenient of

..* ’ . . ;

the hoard was Sufye red fo ve st, tlie defe ndant aire elors are charge-

. . . 7 . , y* . , ;? }

ahle with bad faith in their dealinas with stockholders, and must

>? .

be held OR that ground foan accounting.

3

“THE ACTION OF THE OLD COMPANY CONVEYING ITS PROP-

ERTY WAS VOID.

Since the decree and appeal in this cause the supreme

eourt of Michigan has construed the laws of that State bear-

to <

nes ‘ cmaroew hea 3 iu 1914 dered ] ]; sR BED

1g on this controversy by a judgment rendered in January,

1889, and reported in 4ist N. W. Reporter, 426, Attorney

(rene ral VS, P. rhins.

These defendants, after this appeal, under an amendatory

aet of the State Legislature passed in isol. attempted to do

substantially what had been prevented by the proceedings

taken in thiscause. Quo warranto proceedings were taken in

the supreme court, and on a full review of the law and the

facts in this case it was decided that after 30 vears of life cor-

porate existence eould not be extended against dissentient

stockholders. If anything were needed in addition to the

language of the act quoted In the above opinion of Mr. Jus-

tice Matthews, which permits three vears’ additional time

for liquidation, this Judgment Is conclusive upon the point

that this statute is merely a method provided to administer

upon the affairs of a dead corporation. (See Chief Justice

Parker in Foster vs. Lssec Bonk, 10 Muss., 245.)

The provisions of the Michigan constitution are as follows:

Article 15, § 10. “No corporation except for municipal

purposes, or for the construction of rallroads, plank roads,

and cauals, shall be created for a longer time than thirty

years.”

Article 19, § 9. “The charters of the several mining cor-

porations may be modified by the Legislature in regard to

>

10)

the term limited for subscribing to stock and in relation to

the quantity of land whieh the corporation shall hold, but

the capital shall not be increased nor the time for existence

of charters extended.”

The Pewabie Mining Company was organized under the

general law permitting the formation of such corporations

by filing articles of association with the secretary of state

and county clerk, and limits the period of existence to thirty

years.

Although the following statute was not complied with by

the defendants in their new organization, and although it

is coinpletely disposed of for the purposes of these corpora-

tions by the decision of the Michigan supreme court above

cited, yet it cut a figure in construction at’.cireuit, and we

cite it to complete the statement of laws possibly affecting

the questions Involved. (Ilow. Comp., § 4904.)

“Seerron 1. The people of the State of Michigan enact

that it shall be lawful for any corporation organized under

the laws of this State for mining or manufacturing pur-

poses, whose corporate existence Is about to terminate by lim-

tation of law, at its annual meeting next preceding or at a

special meeting called for that purpose, to be held within

one year immediately preceding the date of such termina-

tion, by a vote of two-thirds of its capital stock, to direct the

coutinuance of its corporate existence for such further term,

not exceeding thirty years, as may be expressed in a resolu-

tion for that purpose. Upon the adoption of such resolution

by the stockholders it shall be the duty of the president and

secretary to make, sign, and acknowledge duplicate articles

of association (as In the case of a new corporation), to which

shall be appended a copy of the proceedings of such stock-

holders’ meeting, certified by the secretary and verified by

his oath, whieh articles of association shall be filed with the

secretary of state and with the county clerk of the county

where the corporation carries on its business, and be by them

recorded in. their respective othees at the expense of said

corporation, and the coples =O filed, the record there of, Or a

certified copy of either of such reeords, shall be prima faci

evidence of the tacts therein recited.

1]

“Sec. 2. Upon the expiration of the time limited for the

existence of such old corporation a new corporation shall be

deemed to be formed by such articles of association, which

shall at onee succeed to all the property and rights of action

of the old corporation, and shall be li: ible for all of its debts

or other obligations, and the officers of the old corporation

shail sueceed in like offices in the new corporation, and

every stockholder in the old corporation shall be to a like

extent a stockholderin the new ecorporation.’—Acet of 1882.

The scheme attempted to be put through presents these

features :

((.) It proposed to sel] property of the value of S500,000

for 3. 0,000 In the stock of the new company : it forbade com-

petition, and its theory was to prevent realization for liqui-

dation.

(4) [t offered to the dissentient stoekholders who had paid

theirsteck indebtedness, petsenmegemmacsitiede: So0 000

Is to $1,000 000—c. ¢., at $1.25 per share paid by the convey-

ance of property, bat indebted $25.75 per share.

The alternative proposition to dissentient stockholders

was to take their a ratain cash of the arbitrary valuation

of $50,000—/. ¢., $1.25 per share.

(7.) With all the assets conveyed to the new company, it

left the old corporation in liquidation as to ereditors, and

stockhoiders liable for assessments to pay its debts.

(e.) It proposed a convevahce by the direetors who had

managed its affairs for five vears and upwards to themselves,

to be formally executed and to be formally received by them-

seives,

(f) That the charter exnired a vear a ei i Re eS

\ J.) fiat the charte} CxAPIPed a year previousiy, aud this

fact, after it was admittedly known and when it was be-

¥ é

12

lieved that the stockholders were ignorant of it, was kept

from the stockholders until shortly before the meeting at

which the attempt was made (Record, pp. 890, 918; Presi-

dent Perkins, 854), and that the stock voted at the meeting

in favor of it by prexies held by the directors to whom the

property was to be conveyed. (Page 895.)

We submit that the relation of the stockholder in cor-

porations of this nature is in contract. He agrees with his

fellows that he will join the venture, to be carried on for not

longer than thirty years, and that then the assets shall be

sold for the best obtainable price, the debts be paid and net

proceeds divided, and that they shall part company.

There is no case holding that such a stockholder ean be

forced into a new enterprise, or that he can be compelled to

receive anything else than his honest pro rafa as a distrib-

utee of the fair value of the assets In cash. There is no

differenee between his position in this regard and that of a

creditor of a dend man’s estate or of an Insulvent estate of a

partner whose firm is in liquidation. To force him itfto: a

hew company.and a new contract is even bevond legislative

power. No ease ean be found of the enforeed renewal of a

corporation not engaged in business affecting the public in-

terests. |

The law does not fix the term of the corporation. The

corporators alone can do that.

In Utley vs. Donaldson, 94 US, 47, the Court says :

“There can be no contract without the mutual assent of

the parties. This is vital to its existence. ‘There can be

none where itis wanting. [tis as indispensable to the modi-

heation of a contract already made as it was to making it

originally.”

ln Clearwater vs. Meredith, lst Wall, pp. 2, on, 1, 4

where a consolidation of railroad companies autherized |

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the statute was attempted against a dissenting stockholder

this Court says:

There was no power to force him to join the new cor-

poration and to receive stock In it.

“If the majerity of stockholders of the corporation of

which he was a member had undertaken to transfer his in-

terest against his wish, they would have been enjoined.

‘But in conferring authority the Legislature never in-

tended to compel a dissenting stockholder to transfer his

Interest because a majority of the stockholders consented to

the consolidation. Even if the Legislature had manifested

an obvious purpose LO do SO, the act u riled have heen NAL gal,

for af would heave Linp rived the abl igi ut ie aT of the contract.’

Morawitz, 1, § 415, correetly states the rule as follows: “On

the winding up of the business of a corporation the proceeds

must be distributed in cash.” The business cannot be dis-

posed of in any other manner except by unanimous consent.

(McCauley vs. Mvers, 44 Pa. St.,555; Black vs. Delaware Co.

24N.J.hq., 455; Re Co. L. R., 4 Eq., 341; Clineh vs. Finan-

cial Co, L. R. 4, 117; Frothingham vs. Barney, 6 Hun.,

306,5. CC. 15 N. Y.; Gregory vs. Patchet, 53 Beaven, 506)

In Tuttle vs. Michigan R. £2.35 Mich., 249, and also a con-

olidation ease, the court says that a stockholder cannot “ be

brought into any other contract relations In any way not

contemplated by the contractitself. * * * Nochangein

the corporation which violated any of the statutory condi-

tions could bind a dissenting stockholder or compel him to

submit to the new order of things against his will.”

In Mowrey vs. RR. Ath Bissel, 1886, the court says, regard-

Ing a consolidation: * Evervbody knows that if several men

enter Into a Valid contract It cannot be fundamentally

altered except by unanimous consent. Why should a differ-

. . } . > a7 ] ‘ : " . *<\ * . } ??

ent rule prevall between trneorporators :

[t Is a famlllar prine)| that no amendment LO articles

of association affecting a igndaumental « hange in the enter-

?

prise or business is within thi power of the parties or of the

14

Legislature to authorize as against a non-assenting stock-

holder, although the majority may accept. (Jov vs. Plank

Road Co.,11 Mich., page 171; Detroit vs. Detroit Co., 438

Mich., 140, and Black on Constitutional Prohibition, page

46, note; page o4, note.)

“Corporations like this are in truth little more than pri-

vate partnerships,” says the vice-chancellor in Foss vs. Har-

bottle, 2 Hair, 491.

The defendants rely upon the case of Tredwell vs. The

Salisbury Co., 7 Gray, 365. So far as that case lays down

any principle,it makes for our contention (pp. 393, 397, and

405). It may be distinguished from this case as follows:

There the bill was filed by an executor to obtain the in-

struction of the court as to accepting shares In the new com-

pany,and was not to set a conveyance aside.

There was no dissenting stockholder. The selling com-

pany was a live corporation. 7

The sale was shown conclusively to have been for a fair

price. 3 :

Provision was made for any stockholder who desired to

receive eash.

The sale, as appeared by the evidence, was not by the di-

rectors to themselves, but to another and also a live com-

pany. by the law of its constitution the corporation had

authority to sell and transfer its property or franchises.

In the ease of Lfowe vs. The Boston Carpet Co., 16 Gray,

193, referring to the Tredwell ease, the court says that “the

legality of the transaction could not have depended upon

the intention of the corporation to wind up its atfairs im-

mediately. Ifit had taken the stock in payment for goods

or for the sale of the building or land or water power which

it did not want or desire to sell while it still carried on its

business, the act must have been equally legal; so that we

say that the Tredwell case simply holds that a living cor-

. poration may sell property for stock in another corpora-

tion with a view to distributing the same and not perma-

nently holding it; this 1s familiar doctrine.

|

j

!

‘

+

Lo

The directors become trustees at the expiration of the

charter. (Bliss vs. Mattison, 45 N. Y., 22: Butts vs. Woods,

ot N. Y., 317: Thornton vs. Marginal Co., 123 Mass., 34 ;

Foster vs. Essex Bank, 16 Mass.; Simmons vs. Hanover, 25

Pick., 194: Crease vs. Babcock, Jd. 334, and see § Pet., 251.

Greenwood vs. Freight Co., 105 U.S., 18; National Bank vs.

Colby, 21 Wall., 609, 615.) Civilly dead, the property of an

insolvent corporation is administered as a trust fund (Mel-

len vs. Tron Works, 181 U.S., 352) and a case where the char-

ter was taken away, See Linn vs. Robertson, 6 Wall., 277.

And it was their duty to convert assets Into money, pay

debts, and distribute the net proceeds.

In addition to eases heretofore, see Marion vs. Butler, 2

Barb. Ch., 362; Blatehford vs. Ross, 54 Barb., 42; H. and N.

H. R. vs. Crisute, 5 Hill, 885, 586; Simpson vs. Directors, 8

H. L. Cas., 711; Lynde vs. Eastin, 36 Beavan, 19; E. R. C.

vs. Vanderbilt, 12. N. Y. 8. C. (5. Hun.), 124; McCary vs.

Junction, 9 Ind., 858; State vs. Bailey, 16 Ind., 46; Kerr on

Injunctions, d08; Campbell's case, L. R., 9 Ch, 1 (S. C., 8

bne., G25i: 2 Perry on Trusts, 2d ed., S 8 10S, (69: Rin-

gold vs. /d., 1 Harris and Gill., 11, 25; Russell vs. Id, 36 N.

., O81; Ion vs. Davenport, 5 Hill, 873; Taylor vs. Earle, 15

N. ¥. 8S. C., 8 Hun., 1; Davis’ Appeal, 14 Pa. St., 371.

It makes no difference that the trustees act in pertect good

faith, and actually for the interest of all the stockholders.

(Gardner vs. Ogden, 22 N. Y., 327; Swayze's Appeal, 5 Pa. St.,

of¢: Huntes. Perkins, 1 Harris and Gill., $1; Frothingham

vs. Barnev, 13 N. Y.S. C., 6 Hun., 366.)

A dissenting stockholder may have a receiver to dispose

of the property, and may recover the value of his stock.

In the last case above, Frothingham vs. Barney, Wells,

Fargo & Co. dissolved and sold to a new corporation of the

‘same name for stock, in a verv advantageous and _ profitable

attempt to perpetuate the old company in a new one, but a

receiver was appointed at the instance of a small stock-

holder. (See also Palmer vs. Williams, 24 Mich., 328; M. C.

ea ae

ts teetellandidcetieemtaati en oe gen ete

etna aie ia eda en ae ae

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ee

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16

on

>

and I. M. vs. Drinker, 30 Mich., 124; Bradley vs. Tyson, 3:

Mich., 537.)

Aside from the question of power and aside from other

indicia of unfairness, the attempt of defendants was to sell

to themselves. In other words, the vendor, trustee, and

vendee are the same person. It is doubtful if there could

be a stronger case for the application of the principle than

this one, where the sale attempted was for an amount one-

tenth the value as reported by the master. Actual fraud,

however, need not be shown. The defendants were disabled

from promoting or becoming incorporators in the new cor-

poration to take the assets of their beneficiaries.

If the majority sell to themselves they must account for

the fair value. “They cannot bind the minority by fixing

their own price upon the assets.” (Ervin vs. Oregon R’w’y

Navigation Co., 20 F. R., 577.) This was a scheme sub-

stantially like the one under consideration. (Brewer vs.

Boston Theatre, 104, Mass., 578-395; TTodgkinson is. Na-

tional Bank, 26 Beavan, 473; Atwood vs. Merryweather,

L. Rk. 5 kq., 464, note.) In Gregory vs.. Patchett, 55

Beavan, 559, which was a conveyance to directors, the

conveyance was held void and the directors held lable.

(Wardell vs. R. R. (0 103 U. ».. 651 ‘ People rs. Township of

Overysel, 11 Mich., 222; F. and P. M. R. R. Co. vs. Dewey,

14 Mich., 477; 486; G. A. Sem vs. Keifer, £5 Mich., 100;

Great Luxemburg RK. W. vs. Magnay, 25 Beavan, 586;

5. ©.. ZS Beavan, 646. York aud N. MM. RK. KR. Co. va.

Hudson, 16 Beavan, 505; A. G. vs. Nelson, 1 Craig and

Phillips, 271; Benson vs. Hathorn, 1 Young and Collier,

025; Aberdeen R. W. Co. rs. Blakie, 1 MeQueen, 482; M.C.

Ass’n vs. Coleman, L. R., 6 WH. L. 189; Re Madrid Bank, L.

R., 2 Eq.. 216; Kochler vs. Iron Co., 2 Black, 710; James

vs. R. R. Co., 6 Wall., 752; Drury vs. Cross, 7 Wall., 299;

Coal and Jron Co. vs. Sherman, 30 Barb., 553; Abbott vs.

Amer. H. R. Co., 383 Barb., 586; Simmons vs. Vulean Oil

CC — ——————

17

Co., 61 Penn. St., 202; Kimmell vs. Gutney, 2 Grant’s cases,

125; Ashurst’s appeal, 60 Penn. St., 290; 1 Redfield R’y, 5

ed., 605 to 6138; Robinson vs. Smith, 5 Paige, Zea. Colquitt

vs. Howard, 11 Ga., 566; Hodges vs. N. E. Serew Co., 1 R.I.,

312; Port vs. Russell, 36 Ind., 360; Newby vs. OC. R. R.,

1 Sawyer, 63; Michand vs. Girod, 4 How., 503; C. R. vs.

Clough, 49 N. H., 257; Heath vs. Erie R. R., 8 Blatchford

C. C., 347; Wright vs. Orville M. Co., 40 Colo., 20; E. & N.

R. R. vs. Poor, 59 Maine, 277; Paine vs. L. KE. R. R., 33 Ind.;

203; Goodwin vs. Cinn. Canal Co., 18 Ohio, 126; Story Kq.,

§§ 1255 to 1257 and 1265; G. C. & S.R.R.. vs. Kelly, 77 Ill,

426 and 435, cas. eit.;: Butler vs. Watkins, 138 Wallace:

Green’s Brice’s Ultra Vires, chap. VII.)

JURISDICTION TO APPOINT RECEIVER.

Of the jurisdiction and frequent application of the power

of the Court there is no question.

While it is entirely true that the receiver will not be

appointed during the life of a corporation to deprive the

directors of their discretionary powers in respect of the COor-

porate business, vet, as we have seen, they are no longer a

corporate board, but are trustees who have failed in, neg-

lected, and mismanaged their trust. Their duties as trustees

are imperative, and cannot be varied or added to or escaped.

As such they and the funds in their hands are subject to the

control of the court of equity.

Formerly the power in Michigan was statutory. The

court, upon the application of any creditor, stockholder, or

member, might appoint a receiver or trustee to wind up the

business (as in New York; see Bank vs. Alpina, 39 Mich.,

706). A law still stands (2d Howell, see. 8208, 39 Mich.,

107) providing that suits may be proceeded with in the cor-

porate name or in the name of receivers or trustees as sub-

stituted plaintiffs.

Jurisdiction in chancery is also expressly conferred (2d

o

ov)

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CAPAA I Hs A gem

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aetiaiieihsietineaaniamteebeeetee

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Ifowell, see. $150), and this statutory jurisdiction may be

exercised by United States courts. (Ellis vs. Davis, 109

U.S., 485-498; Dodge vs. Woolsey, 18 How., 331-341; Ze-

briskie vs. C. C. & C., 25 How., pp. 381, 595, 400.) It is

sald in the last case, “ but the bill is framed not to obtain

relief from error or fraud in the administration of the pow-

ers of the company by their trustees, but against the exer-

cise of powers that do not belong to the corporation and

which the body could not confirm except by unanimous

consent.”

Now, in such cases all English and American authorities

are to the effeet that a single stockholder may maintain a

bill for an injunetion and receiver even during the existence

of the corporation, and without first requesting the board of

directors to bring the suit. In Heath vs. Erie R. R. Co., §

slatehford, 347-493 down to 407, the cases are exhaustively

analyzed by the learned court.

The eases like Foss vs. Harbottle, 2d Hair, 461, are not now

followed, even in England. (See Gray vs. Linn, L. f., $8 Eq.

Cas., 541; Atwood vs. Merryweather, 5 eq. Cas., 444—a ease

much resembling this one; MeDougal vs. Gladwin, 1 Chan.

Div., 21; Mason vs. Harris, 11 id., 97. See Thompson on

Liability of Directors, 582 to S94 and cas., Perry on Trusts,

sec. 242; 2 Story Eq. Jur., §§ 1232,1252; Peabody vs. Flint,

6 Allen, 52: Mumma ves. P. Co.,8 Pet.,285: Curran vs. State,

15 How., 311; Bacon vs. Robertson, 18 How., 480; Linn vs.

Roberts, 6 Wall., 277; Briggs vs. Penniman, 8 Cow., 387;

MeLaren vs. Pennington, 1 Paige, 111; Heath vs. Barmore,

58 N. Y., 305; Pond vs. Vermont R. R., 12 Blatchford, 280,

287: Foster rs. Essex Bank, 16 Mass., 245.) ;

It being true that courts of equity will interfere in the

internal management of affairs of a corporation at the in-

stance of stockholders, where the matter complained of is

ultra vires, it seems to us clear that after dissolution and after

the ultimate geverning bedy of the stockholders have ceased

to have power to carry on business and nothing remains but

PRE OPTED oN

19

to hold administration upon the assets of the dead corpora-

tion, a court of equity in the circumstances of this case will

lay hold of those who are in actual possession of the assets

and administer them by its own officers, upon the same

principle upon which courts of equity act in administering

assets of a deceased natural person, upon the principle that

it is the duty of the court to enforce the execution of trusts.

While rule 94 in equity, 104 U.S., TX, has no application

to the present case, nor the case of Hawes vs. Oakland, in the

same volume, page 451, the decision (pages 454 down to

459) is valuable upon the general doctrine and its limita-

tions, as cited above, and which is discussed by the learned

court in the 8th Blatchford, 347 to 407, above cited.

Boone on Corporations, sec. 207, cas., note 8; see. 206,

cas., note o.

lield on Corporations, pp. 420-425.

LT.

THE ACTS OF THE BOARD IN THE EXPENDITURE OF THE MONEY

IN CARRYING ON BUSINESS AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF THE

CHARTER @e@ APRIL 4, 1885, WERE BEYOND THEIR POWERS,

AND THEY ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL LOSSES AND EX PENDI-

TURES IN THAT BEHALF.

[rn Gray VS. National SS. y., Lid U. i 116, this Court

says of the steamship company in liquidation: “It could no

more own and manage a steamship than it could own or

manage any other property.”

It being true that the form of the corporation existed only

of liquidation, and that the directors were

for the purpose

purpose, we cannot see why all the liabilities

trustees for that

of trustees are not attached to them.

If a receiver, executor, or insolvent’s assignee should earry

on the former business of the estate being administered, h

would be chargeable with every dollar lost and liable for

eRe Nt AE ti lls senamsnne

attested.

EE PINE gem = ati a alone. shaman aaliieeditea Rl - 7 Oe mer er ce

20)

every dollar made. If a liquidating partner in merchan-

dising should buy goods for sale again and a loss should

accrue, or If he took any venture whatever with the funds

of the firm, he would be chargeable, and this no matter how

good his intention and that his honest object was to In-

crease the fund.

The risks of mining business are in keeping up the equip-

ment when no ore is in sight and in drifting, stoping, and

sinking in such circumstances. In this case it is clear that

about S250900 was expended after the expiration of the

charter in all the risks of the business. Whatever portion

of this was expended in keeping the mine in proper condi-

tion, pumping water or preparing the property for sale,

would be an ultimate charge for the trustees to be de-

ducted; but, conceding their good faith, this can be no

exception to the universal rule of liability for the money

lost. :

Hill on Trustees, Am. notes, p. 030.

It is well settled that officers are hable for losses occurring

by acts ultra vires even during the corporate life.

Thompson on Liability of Officers of Corporations,

) le a .

}). Viv.

Field Corporation, see. 178.

Parrish vs. Wheeler, 22 N. Y., 508.

ven if it were true, ignorance of the expiration of the

charter would be no defense. While the law is different as

to by-laws, there never has been a question that every one

Is conclusively presumed to know the provisions of the

charter or articles of association of the corporation with

which he deals.

Angell and Ames on Corporations, sec. 299.

Green’s Brice’s Ultra Vires, p. 597 et seq.

general rule were otherwise 1t would in the nature

lt the

of things have its limitation before a director, an executive

eo tal

9]

limb of the corporation, could defend himself on the plea of

ignorance of the organle law creating the body. Ignorance

of law does not entitle a party to relief.

Perry on Trusts, see. 18-4.

The place for filing original articles was accessible to all

In public offices at the State capitol and within a short dis-

tance of the mining office.

The business carried on is shown by the statement of the

8, 582, and it appears

superintendent and treasurer, pp. 57

that after the expiration of the charter and after actual

knowledge of the expiration in the board the stockholders

were assessed and paid in over $80,000.00, and, as we have

seen, all the defendants admit the affairs of the concern were

carried on in every respect as during the life of the corpora-

tion.

On this ground alone there should be an accounting and

a recelver.

ITI.

THERE SHOULD BE AN ACCOUNTING AND A RECEIVER BECAUSE

OF THE BAD FAITH OF THE MANAGEMENT WITH WHICH ALL

OF THE DEFENDANTS DIRECTORS ARE CHARGEAB!LE AND BE-

CAUSE A DISCOVERY OF ASSETS IS REQUIRED.

It appears by the evidence that Mr. Demmon was _ per-

titted to have the sole Inanavement of the companys’ affairs,

and that no other of the board charged himself with any

duties or acquired any actual knowledge of the business or

of this inanaging director’s transactions.

President Perkins’ testimony, pp. 880, 882, and cross-

CX., P. $82.

t sufficiently interested to

The other directors were hn

notice or remember any dissent from the action of the meet-

ing which voted the transfer, although it appears by ad-

tne

Sa a et ee

99

mitted minutes (pp. 5, 6, 7, 8,45 to 45) to have been con-

tested vigorously.

Perkins, p. S80; Buttrick, p. 877.

Mr. Demmon held the same office in the Franklin (ad-

joining the Pewabic) as in the Pewabic, and also in several

other copper companies, and was engaged in no other busi-

ness than as such officer of these companies. (DP. 897.)

[lis acts and knowledge must be held to be the acts and

knowledge of the defendants’ board.

We select the following as some of the evidence tending to

show bad faith:

1. The attempted transfer of $500,000 in value of assets

for one-tenth of that sum, as heretofore detailed.

The consideration was less by nearly half than the amount

assessed and collected of stockholders within the past six

months; it was less by $25,000 than the amount of copper

alone shown to be on hand on January 1, 1884, less than

three months before; it was less than the value of the sup-

plies at the mine alone (Record, p. 582). It was less than

one-fifth of what had been paid out in eash of the stock-

holders’ money on one piece of additional land less than

five years before—p. 562.

Notice of the expiration of charter was confessedly with-

held from stockholders, and the majority vote was obtained

on proxies through circulars printing an alarming. state-

ment that the Quiney mine was endeavoring to wrest the

property from the company. (Pp. 909, 910.)

(The president of the Quiney Company was put on the

witness stand by defendants, but neither by his examination

nor by any other evidence was there any effort to show a

eround for this circular or to sustain the averment of the

answer in that regard.)

ica ocentaeedeataaianaemin nee ee ‘ . ee ee eee ee

ate tee oe

OO te li LEE LIL OEE A gy

2. No information had been given as required by law:

Howells Comp., § 4005, requires that annually a report

shall be made and sighed by a majority of the board of di-

rectors, containing, first, the amount of capital paid in ;

second, the amount invested in real estate; third, the amount

of their personal estate; fourth, the amounts of their debts

and credits; fifth, the name of each stockholder and the

number of shares held by hitn at the time of the report,”

and further provides that “ every such report shall be veri-

fied by the oath of the officer signing the same, and shall

be filed in the office of the secretary of state and with the

clerk of the county in which the mine is situated.” It fur-

ther provides for the pains and penalties of perjury for any

false statement. This requirement is preserved in the later

act, section 4107, adding other requirements for the report,

and providing that it shall be filed with the county clerk

and auditor general of the State,and providing that failure

to file it shall be a misdemeanor, as in the prior act.

This is clearly a provision for the benefit of all persons

interested in the corporation as stockholders or creditors, and

itis not a provision merely for the purpose of taxation, there

being a separate and independent provision for the filing

of a statement for that purpose. (Howell, sec. 1189.)

No such report had been filed for five years prior to the

meeting. (Pp. 899, 104).

The supreme court of Michigan terms this a beneficent

provision and one of the conditions of the grant of a cor-

porate franchise by the State. (Vannetten vs. Eaton, 19

Mich., 192.)

There was no equivalent for such a report furnished the

stockholders.

The so-called annual reports show nothing of the where-

abouts of the mine’s product or what is invested of money

derived from it or from assessments.

It is impossible to follow back balances or to get an un-

derstanding of expenditures for real estate, personal prop-

engine

alee apie anda daa ae ee

ibis

24

erty, or what has been received. Take, for instance, the

report for 1885, p. 582. There is no statement of the per-

sonal property beyond the items of “copper on band,” “cash,”

and “supplies.” The last does not include machinery, tools,

horses, cars, wagons, &c., but is a technical term covering

fuse, powder, and the like. Who can tell anything from the

item “cash paid loans” or “ mine agent's drafts?” If the

mine agent’s report of expenditures accompanying the state-

ment agreed. with his “drafts” it would be intelligible, but

there is a difference of $100,000. The balance-sheet of

assets and liabilities includes none of the live mine property.

In the search for information the managing director at

the mine was examined on this report, and certainly he did

not clear up matters. This is his testimony, page 255:

@. You attended the meeting in Boston on the 26th of

March, did you?

JA. TI did.

(J. Was it reported correctly that there was $05,828.42 on a

hand? —

A. T suppose it is correct.

Q. Was it correctly reported that you had in copper on

hand at 14% cents per pound worth $70,066.99 ?

A. I presume so. ;

(). Did it strike vou as correct ?

A. I eould not tell. It was the treasurer's report.

Q. You were there. Did you see the report?

A. I was there.

(). Does he make his figures from your reports—whio sends

the figures ?

A. The clerk.

@. Under whose direction ?

A. Indirectly IT give him

(. Indireetly you are responsible for it?

A. How could I tell whether he haa the copper or not?

Q. Did you have the amount of copper on hand?

A.. I do not know, sir. Nobody ean tell that.

Q. Do you mean to say thet your reports are made to the

board of directors, from which these printed reports are

made, and that the agent knows nothing about it ?

Or

av

A. We know that our figures are correct, but when they

get down there we know nothing about them.

(). Well, now I show you the report of the Pewabie Com-

pany of Jan. Ist, 1884, and ask vou whether or not the item

of copper on hand is correct, at 142 cents per pound,

$75,066.99.

A. I do not know.

@. You say you don’t know.

A. I don’t know.

[n the preceding year there are “mine agent’s drafts ” of

$250,000 and “cash paid loans” $350,000. There are no

assets shown except copper on hand, cash, and bills receiv-

able, making a total of $141,000. (Reeord, p. 571.)

Taking the average of annual copper production from the

evidence, since Mr. Demmon came into the directory, there

has been mined and sold of copper $2,000,000.00. There

has been collected from stockholders a large amount more,

and there is no connected account anywhere that has been

found.

The withholding of the books:

In their answer, the complainants having coinplained of

a refusal to show them and having asked for information as

to the business, defendants set up asa reason for not giving

the information that the answer is sworn to in Michigan,

and that the books containing the desired information are

in Boston.

ad made efforts to see the

,

books prior to the filing of the bi

} -

Demmon, pp. vob, 557.

On March 31, 1884, the bill was filed, and on May 12 fol

lowing - ecburt m: - the order appointing the special ex-

1

values, | Imiting both part 1es as to the time of

|

if”

-aminer as 9

taking testimony, complainants being given twenty-seven

days in chief and six a to rebut. Complainants were

residents of New York and were required to produce compe-

SRG RE ee i

WAR

tent evidence of the amount and description of the prop-

erty.

I’very effort was made to get access to the books and was

rendered futile by Mr. Deminon.

Complainant Smith’s testimony, p. 68.

Mr. Mussy’s testimony, pp. 74, 75.

Dickinson, p. 05S.

The direction of the counsel for defendants in this case

was disregarded.

Grant’s testimony, p. 390,in connection with Dem-

YO,

mon’s, pp. 836 and 332.

After complainants’ ease was closed Mr. Demmon, in his

Boston testimony, p, 879, staicd that in the previous June,

when examined at Hloughton, he had certain books with

him, and that he mentioned the fact in the presence of the

examiner. A reading of his Houghton testimony, p. 330,

discloses no intimation of the kind, although the contention

of the complainants that he had withheld books was pressed

vigorously upon him in his examination. Even in his Bos-

ton testimony he says that he brought no ledgers—nothing

but cash books and day books, which would be practically

useless In a limited examination before a master. |

Under the order of the court to submit testimony as to the

items of property a hearing was fixed at Houghton for June

10. Northrop, a stockholder of the Pewabie Company, p. 171,

Was requested by complainants’ attorney to look over the

personal property at the mine, that he might testify at the

hearing. Ile was refused access to the necessary informa-

tion. (Northrop’s testinony, p. 165 et sev.)

The history of these efforts to obtain testimony after the

order of the court in the premises stamps the conduct of the

directors in charge with bad faith.

L. The diamond-drill exploration of the Pewabie land and

the use made of it as bearing on the question of value :

The defendants’ theory was that the mining land situ-

ated on the Pewabie lode between the Quincey and the

Franklin was practically worthless.

To demonstrate this they had introduced a mass of testi-

mony tending to show extensive explorations by the dia-

mond drill, and in connection therewith putin the sched-

ule showing 23 borings (Record, p. 554), all purporting by

the testimony to have been of recent date, aggregating

1,846 feet. Of course, the value of this testimony as to the

presence or absenec of copper in the land depended upon its

having been lately done, for the reason that the levels and

drifts are soon carried to the point of any discovery made

by the drill; as, for instance, 1f all these borings had been

made one year previously, the report of the mining super-

intendent for 18838, at the close of the year, shows that the

“drifting on different levels for that year had been 2,546

feet.”

After the testimony and this schedule had gone in with

the eonelusion of the mining superintendent from such ex-

ploration that the land was poor, Thomas Whittle, the

mining captain, who had charge of all such work, was put

upon the stand. He had been mining captain for two years.

(Reeord, Pp. 201.)

Having in mind that the bill was filed March 31, 1884,

we beg to submit Whittle’s cross-examination asto how and

when the “explorations ” were made.

During the two previous vears the first of any diamond-

drill explorations had been in March, 1884, and it was

then used for twenty days, doing the last of it on the last

of March. (P. 290.)

Now, at what time did vou cease using it?

”

(). N 7 |

A. The first time ‘

).

.

Yes.

tiene te

MP NRG NR A AE ee.

28

A. The end of March.

Q. Was that when the news came of the commencement

of this suit?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. When did you commence to use the diamond drill

again ?

A. About the 21st of April.

(). What were your instructions when you commenced to

use it aAgall, on the 21st of April t

A. i9 proceed on thie long hole.

QM. What do vou call the long hele ?

A. We were drilling a hole forexploration from our main

workings back east and we ealled it the long hole, and we

ceased working when we had orders. That is the-s2d level.

(). When did you get vour orders to commence again”?

What were your instructions ?

A. ‘To continue our work.

() Whereabouts were you Instructed to continue your

A. At the 82d level.

). In the same long hote ?

A, Yes, sir.

(Q). Did you put the drill in the same place where it had

a: Yes, SH.

). iow tong did vou continue that ?

\. We continued that for two weeks.

). ‘Laen what did you do?

A. We stopped altogether.

». You haven't done anything since?

A. No, sir.

(). Ilow did you come to stop it?

A. According to orders from the agent (Vivian).

Q. [low many holes did you putin between the Ist of

April and the end of the two weeks’?

A. Only that one.

(). In the same old hole

A. Yes, Sir |

(). Llow many feet did you bore”?

A. About 2SO feet.

Q. Now, understand tliat you commenced another boring

after the 21st of April; that is clear?

A. That is clear, sir.

>}

20

(). Did you change the direction of the drill in any way?

A. No, sir.

(Q. Now, vou had been boring some 20 days before ordered

to stop, in Mareh, had you?

A. Yes, SIP.

@. How many holes did you put in during these 20 days?

A. We put in nine holes.

(). In what levels?

A. At the 30th level, north of the shaft, three holes—two

east and one west.

(. How deep?

A. The first hole, 98 feet; the second hole, 59 feet west :

third hole, 63 feet east: fourth hole, south of shaft at the

o0th level, S2 feet east; fourth hole, north of number six

shaft, 96 feet east.

. What level?

A. The 34th level (the lowest level). Fifth hole, 56 feet

west, north of number six shaft: sixth hole, south of num-

ber six shaft, east 91 feet: seventh hole, in the 3lst level,

97 feet; eighth hole, 52d level, east 412 feet, south of the

shaft.

. Do I understand that the drill-hole went across the

levels?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Through to ground that had been worked—where the

levels had been worked before?

A. In the same ground.

(). This long drill-hoie, then, ran or passed all the ground

that had been worked in the levels up to nearly the 19th ?

A. At the 21st level.

(Q). In what general direction lies the Quincy from the

point at which you started your levels ?

A. Here is the Quincy mine here (indicating on the map).

(). Have you at any time put ina drill-hole from the end

of any level or cross-cut towards the Quincy mine?

A. We have put one drill-hole through up here—not a

diamond drill-hole.

(). | am asking about your diamond drill-work ?

A. No, sir.

(). Have vou putin any drill-hole from the end of any

level or cross-cut in the direction of the Franklin mine?

A. Yes, sir—oh, no, sir; only a cross-section. (Pp. 291,

292.)

The explorations before suit, therefore. were made in

« * . 1 “a ; .

NIarch. gnc were wine tlistead olf twentv-three in nimabe o

and thie exploration qite] the bhivestigation as fo vaiue Was

: cap ie hig

commenced Was continueusliy in one hole, through Worthless

: } . . ] | }

ground, and not in the direetion of the contiguous rich lands

of the Quiney and Franklin

. é ; Ps

All the circumstances show the propriety Ol ahh InvVvesti-

, ’ - } ’ } y } :

gation both of the accounts and of the property, and they

certainiv show that the attitude and eonduet of those here

pee PERG TSE! OSes. es Myce eae weet * affairs of this eompan P

toiore In actual ehbarge of the affalrs of this company to-

}

y ‘ . ] s } " * i /? 7 é , sees ] a bo ly as

wards the stockholders are not in acecordanee With their duty

as trustees If these clreumstanees justily the want of eon-

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‘

Supreme Court of the United States,

OCTOBER TERM, 1889.

No. 240.

THE PEWABIC MINING COMPANY et al., APPELLANTS, |

THOMAS H. MASON et als.

No. 168.

THOMAS H. MASON et al., APPELLANTS,

THE PEWABIC MINING COMPANY et als.

Hrief for the Appellants in 240; for the Appellees in 168.

THOMAS H. TALBOT,

Counsel for Pewabic Mining Company et als.,

Defendants below.

BOSTON:

PRINTED BY NATHAN SAWYER & SON,

No. 70 STATE STREET.

1889.

| ae

) ° “cee

- .

a er

:

[Against the Sale Decreed, and for Ascertainment otherwise of the Velue

of Complainants’ Shares, which the Defendants are ready to pay. |

Supreme Court of the United States,

OCTOBER TERM, 1889.

No. 240.

THE PEWABIC MINING COMPANY et al., APPELLANTs.,

THOMAS H. MASON et als.

No. 168.

THOMAS H. MASON et al.. APPELLANTS.

~

. we

THE PEWABIC MINING COMPANY et als.

Hrief for the Appellants in 210; for the Appellees in 168.

HOW THESE CASES CAME HITHER.

The Pewabic Mining Company, the chief defendant in this

case, Was a corporation for mining purposes, chartered under

the laws of the State of Michigan. April 4. 1853, for a period of

thirty years, —that is, to April 4, 1883: its mine being situate

at Hancock, in the County of Houghton in that State, while its

office for general business, allowed by law to be outside the

limits of Michigan. was in the city of Boston, Mass. The pres-

ent management came into its control after the great fire in

Boston of 1872° and the only stockholders’ record, preserved

from that fire, began — apparently as of the origin—in March,

1859,* which commencement would imply a continuance until

1889.

* Record, pp. 333. 549-

9

That the charter period did continue till the last-named vear,

Was the impression of the managing officer. the defendant

Demmon, until November, — say 7. — 1883* (earlier statement

assigning August of that year being plainly incorrect).t Then

the question arose first in the mind of the counsel of the

company located at Houghton (J. H. Chandler, Esq., now of

Chicago), and he ascertained the fact from the county records

at Houghton. |

Up to that time the directors, the individual defendants, had

conducted the affairs of the corporation as though the corpora-

tion were still in full corporate life.

Upon ascertaining this fact of the expiration of the charter.

this counsel appears. to have gone forward of his own motion

towards a re-incorporation. Ife consulted able Michigan coun-

sel to be found at Detroit. The application for advice, and the

advice obtained, and the directions given, are fully stated by the

counsel.§ Meanwhile, in this matter, the directors did “ nothing

at all.” |

Upon the subject ot the renewal of corporate existence, the

then condition of Michigan law was this. in briet: From the be-

ginning it -had been open to such companies to extend their cor-

porate existence by the individual action of the shareholders of

the expiring or even expired corporation. That is, a portion of

them, — three were enough, — by filing the proper papers. could

constitute themselves into a new corporation; and when the

property of the old corporation should be transferred to the new

corporation, the renewal would be practically secured. The

shareholders in the old. of course. would guard their individual

rights in the’ conditions ,of their transfers. [t was a simple

matter: make the number of shares in the new corporation

exactly the same as in the old, and then give to each person

surrendering any number of shares in the old corporation, the

same number in the new: and the thing is accomplished: anew

period of corporate existence obtained for the old shareholders,

each with his old number ot shares: those being still shares in

the same property, real and personal, as betore. An instance

of such renewal is shown in this case, a splendid instance, —

pp. S§O. OFT. OL. t P- 334-

> Pp. ygl2-gig. especially gis. S pp. ygl2-gly. Pp. SYyo.

that of the “ Quincy ‘Mining Company: incorporated by special

charter of the State of Michigan, March 30, 1848: re-organized

under the mining law of the State of Michigan, March 6, 1878."*

It will readily occur to the Court that this method of renewal

—that is, by disintegrating the old corporation, and resorting

again to individual action — was too inconvenient to be the sole

method when corporations should become numerous and involve

large interests. And when the mines of Michigan had drawn

large amounts of capital into her corporations, her Legislature

proceeded to make more liberal provision in this respect. — to

allow corporations, like this defendant. to renew their corporate

existence by corporate action. This privilege was raised by an

Act of March 14, 1882. <A two-thirds vote was required: but.

as plainly appears, that made no difficulty against the renewal

of this corporation.

The difficulty —and that was insuperable —was, that the

renewal must be resolved, voted, during the continuance of the

charter period.t ‘The lapse of the charter period, in innocent

oversight, as before stated, made it impossible tor this corpora-

tion to comply with this condition, at any time after April 4.

1883.¢ But the legislation of 1882 had not taken away the old

inconvenient method ot renewal by individual action, for which

it had provided a more simple and easier substitute. And these

director defendants were. by skilled and able counsel, advised

to resort to this. then antiquated, method.§

This method, it will be seen, involved a torm of sale of the

corporate property. And if there was to be a form of sale, a

mere formal sale even, there must be a nominal price. Nothing

more than a nominal price was necessary, no real sale being

contemplated.

The stock market of Boston —and there is no other regular

afforded the

most obvious valuation of that corporate property. It had been,

market tor copper stocks in the United States:

for vears, daily bought and sold in the shares in its stock, and

had been bought o: sold in no other way. The price had been

published in the newspapers and in the stock reports, and was

matter of such record. What more natural, whether absolutely

* pb. god. + The Statute: and see Record, pp. 850, gig.

; Above Statute: and see p- S50. S pp. SFO, QIg.

| pp. 66, 71, 422, 423.

+ .

correct or not,— what more natural and innocent, than that

these directors should look to that actual market value as the

value which should be used in this formal transfer. this assign-

ment from each shareholder to himself, as these directors con-

templated and intended? And without thought that there was

to be any actual sale or transfer of any of these shares, without

knowledge or expectation that any shares would be actually

sold, they valued them at the going market rate, $1.25,* which

gave an aggregate value tor the whole corporate property of

$50,000 over and above the debts, some $30,000 or $40.000

more.t —a gross value above $80.000.

But the complainants invoked the aid of a Court of Equity

against this transfer. alleging their unwillingness to enter the

corporation to be created, and that the price to be paid to them

for their shares on their withdrawal was inadequate : and finally,

to the end that the corporation should be brought to an absolute

end, and all‘the corporate property should be divided among all

the stockholders, they prayed that all the corporate property

~/

,

might be sold for cash. 7

The whole number of shares is 40,000. The complainants

own 2.650.} a litthe more than five-eightieths. one-sixteenth, of

the whole number.

‘To some extent, the Court below found the equity of the case

a constructive equity rather than

to be with the complainants

an actual: constructive so tar, at least. that it involved no

intentional iniquity, no wilful or even purposed want of equity.

whatever in any action of the defendants. And under condi-

tions which recognized and rested on the good faith of the

defendants, a sale was ordered. From the decree thus largely

in their favor, probably trom the recognition, by a portion,

or rather by the pervading spirit, of the decree, of the good

conduct and general good faith of the defendants. the

complainants appealed to this Court, as appears in Case

No. 1608.

The defendants also appealed, because they deemed their

action Wholiy justifiable in equity ; and they regarded the order

tor a compulsory sale, on the request merely of a very small

number of their tellow-shareholders. as a great injury and

grievous iniquity to themselves, unjustified by any actual neces-

.

* Pp. Sep. ee >. , + })- SSI. 54 Pp. 4-

sity of the case, even if the rights of the complainants be as the

Court below regarded them. Thus Case 240 is before the Court.

With this explanation of the presence of these cases in this

Court, other facts important to the discussion may be left for

statement when reached in order in the “Argument upon the

Merits.” to which this brief presently passes.

The whole controversy in these two cases is of the re-organi-

zation of the shareholders of a mining.company,. under the laws

of Michigan, after the expiration of the period of its earlier and

first incorporation. The complainants, as before stated. represent

one-sixteenth and a little more of the stock. . This number can-

not, for the purpose of this hearing, be increased by the state-

ment that other stockholders would have been complainant if

their presence as parties would not have endangered the juris-

diction of the Court below over this suit. The jurisdiction

invoked by this suit can be exercised only over those who have

been made subject to that jurisdiction by the Constitution of the

United States, and. further. only over persons who are actually

parties before the Court in the suit; not at all over those whom

the Constitution has torbidden to become such parties. The

detendants represent all the rest,—two-thirds of the shares by

active concurrence ‘and expressed approval and consent.* and

the rest by tacit assent.

These appellants do not here raise objection to this much of

the opinion which is the basis of the decree appealed from: to

wit, that they cannot “compel disputing stockholders to continue

in the business.” nor “compel all the stockholders to accept

interests in the new enterprise in exchange for their shares in

the old,” nor “impose arbitrary and unfair terms and conditions

upon them for refusing to do so.” +

If there is in the case an appearance of their having done so,

it is appearance merely .— a constructive, not an intentional. want

of equity,— as will immediately be shown, in the very opening

of the

ARGUMENT UPON THE MERITS.

Facts.

For the whole question, which the counsel for the defendants

here proposes to argue, is of the method of relief which is

to be afforded to these complainants. The defendants

? pp. 921, 922.

6

object to so much of the decree as directs the special master to

sell the property and assets of the Pewabic Mining Company

“at public vendue to the highest bidder in one body.” |

They object because (1) such sale is not necessary to the

securing to the defendants all their rights as dissentient share-

holders; (2) such sale will be very injurious to the rights

and interests of the defendants.

They turther object to the direction of a sale of the whole “in

one body.” This matter should be left open tor further consider-

ation by the Court below.

The defendants ask that the usual method ot relief granted to

such dissentient stockholders as these complainants may be

followed in this case: that they themselves being required by

the Court below to secure to the complainants the payment ot

the value of their shares when ascertained by that Court, they

shall, upon the giving of such security, be allowed to complete

the proposed transfer of said property: in other words, the

payment to the complainants of the value of their portion in

money, Which they pray for, being judicially secured to them,

that the control of the rest of the property should be left in its

owners, the defendants.

The complainants mav have their portion of the common

property. They may take the value of their shares. The

defendants ask only that the complainants shall be required to

take that value in the manner least injurious to the defendants.

This is the extent of the defendants’ contention in this Court.

And while nothing will be asked, in behalt of the majority ot

the stockholders, which this Court would not in eguity be

required to allow to them, even if their ofhcers— especially

without the collusion or Knowledge of their constituents — had

in some respects acted in bad faith towards the complainants.

the method of procedure which will be urged upon the Court

in behalf of these detendants and their constituents will tind

re-enforced support in the entire good faith, not only of the

constituents of these defendants. but also of the defendants them-

selves. Accordingly, our /7rst Proposition of tact is this : —

Tue DEFENDANTS ARE IN COURT WITH CLEAN HAnpbs.

The allegations of bad faith and misconduct which the com-

plainants make against the detendants, as directors of the cor-

-=<

=~ .

eT AT

~J

poration in fill activity,* are not sustained by any evidence,

and were not found true by the Court below. If true, they

would have sustained the request in support of which they were

made,— the request for the appointment of a receiver. And this

request the Court below denied,t declining even to hear the

counsel for the defendants argue the question of the good faith

of their clients.

The Court also, retusing to hold the defendant directors liable

tor money received or expended after the expiration of the

charter. denied the complainants’ prayer against them for an

account.t :

Further. the Court decreed costs against the complainants in

favor of these defendant directors.?

Besides thus recognizing the good taith of the defendants, the

Court further sanctioned their conduct by attempting to provide

for the complete execution of their plan of re-incorporation, if it

should clear itself from its apparent inadequacy of compensation

to the complainants. If, at the sale ordered, the highest bid

received should not exceed the valuation fixed by the detendants.,

then there was to be no sale under the decree; but the transter

proposed by the defendants, with its accompanying scheme of

-re-incorporation. was to be completed under the direction and

sanction of the Court.§ The record shows further evidence of

good taith. :

The manner in which the management was led into error as to

the expiration of the charter period is fully stated by the erring

officer.| and his statements have already been cited in this brief.

The discovery of the expiration of the charter by the corpora-

tion counsel. and his consultation of skilled counsel at Detroit.

are shown by the letters of consultation and advice themselves.

And right here comes the crowning fact. So far from then

planning or contriving any injurv to these complainants. the

defendants did not then know of the existence of these com-

plainants as parties in interest in the matter under consideration.

Here are the dates :-—

November 1, 1883, Chandler, at Houghton, ascertained the

date of the expiration of the charter of the Pewabic Mining

Companyv.** On that day he wrote to Ashley Pond. Esq., of

* Bill, par. ccd: Wes pp- $. {). + p. S46. + Pp. Gls. S pp. g22. 923: pp. G23. g24.

| pp. 333. 549. ; € pp. ygl2-yly. ** y. g12.

Detroit, stating the actual status of the company, and asking

direction as to how its corporate existence might be renewed.*

November 5, 1883, Chandler communicated the ascertained

fact of the expiration of the charter to Treasurer Demmon, and

in general indicated the plan of renewal afterwards adopted.t

November 8, Pond fully formulated the plan in a letter to the

law-firm at [loughton of which Chandler was the head;t and

thus Chandler was then entirely qualified to take charge of the

proceeding for re-organization.

It was February 8, 1884, and not before, that these complain-

ants became on the books of the company large stockholders in

the Pewabic Mining Company.§ and as such known to the

treasurer, and through him to the other directors. Prior to

that, only fifty. shares had stood in their names on those books. |

It was March 8 before the intended opposition of these com-

plainants was sufliciently developed to induce the executive

officer, Demmon, to call the attention of the stockholders

thereto ;{) and then clearly he did not understand what form that

opposition would take: there is not the slightest intimation that he

understood that the form would be of opposition to the price at

which the nominal transfer was proposed. It will be seen that

his tear was, that partics interested in the Quincy Company

would get control of the Pewabic: not at all that such parties

would cease to be shareholders in the Pewabic.

Is it to be supposed without evidence, or upon any evidence

to be tound in this case, that these defendant directors. prior to

February 8, 1884. formed a scheme to deprive these complain-

ants of so few as fiftv shares of this stock: Yet, down to that

day, that was the whole interest of the complainants in this

corporate property Known to the directors defendant. Is there

a particle of evidence that they changed their plan in any way

between February 8 and March 26, in that year?

But the fact that these directors took the market price of the

stock of this company is ot itself incompatible with bad faith

on their part. That is prara_ facie evidence of entire good faith

in their action. even fhough, upon further examination, such

market value may be shown to be not the true value.

* ».. o17- T pp. Of3, 917. + Pp. Qig.

S$ p. Sg2. my. S22, Fi. € p. go.

a

9

The market value of this property on February 6 and 9g, just

before and just after these complainants became known as

shareholders, was exactly $50,000 net.* On the day before the

meeting at which the scheme tor a re-organization was brought

forward, it had risen some: and later it had gone down to

$40,000 net.t Then (1) the price of copper was low; } and

(2) the indications in the mine were very unpromising, and had

been so for some time.§ The corporation was in debt $30,000

to $40,000,|| 75 cents to $1 per share. The first thing the com-

pany wouid have to do, as soon as it gained corporate existence

and legal authority to do any thing, would be to levy an assess-

ment. And the sum of that assessment would be made up sub-

stantially as tollows: (1) to pay off existing debts. Sz; (2) to

furnish capital for further operations, $1; in all, $2.

It is at once seen how strong the actual temptation to timid

shareholders to get rid of their shares, then was. In view of

the evidence now produced of the ultimate prospective value of

this property, and of the ultimate promise of this enterprise,

was there any plainer duty then pressing upon these detend-

ants than the duty not to increase this feeling of timidity

ov offering above the market value of their shares to share-

holders who should withdraw: Itis this very feeling of timidity

to which the managing officer, Demmon, addresses himself, in

his circular of March 8, 1884. He endeavors to counteract it.

[le urges the stockholders ** to hold on” **a little longer.” €

Whether the value thus fixed for shares to be withdrawn was

correct or incorrect for the purposes of a final decision, is there,

under the then existing circumstances, a particle of doubt that

the defendants acted fairly in fixing that value.— acted with

entire good faith: ** :

Furthermore, the valuation alleged by the complainants in

their bill of complaint is substantially the same as that set by

the defendants in their proposition for a transfer. The highest

value which these complainants name in their bill is $100,000. +t

The defendants’ valuation went well up to $90,000: that is,

$50.000 to the stockholders and $30.000 to $40.000 to the

creditors :${ total, at the lowest. over $80.000. In 18go it will

be all of $100,000.

* p. 811: see also p. 423. to. Bea. + p. 431

§ pp. 421, 422, 346. | Pp. 344. € p. gro.

** Lauman 7. The Lebanon V. R. R. Co.. 30 Pa. St. 4g. concluding order.

o? Par. X5.. p- 9. ++ PP. SQI, 552, 867, 923 twice

SR Ra mere ee eee te Rete ee ‘

See egal cea he eae ee eee

TO

The highest offer which the complainants would make in their

bill is $75,000, $75,000 gross: ‘* $75,000 for the assets of

said company,” * are their very words: not $75.000 for the

surplus of assets above the amount of liabilities. And they show

that that was what they intended, by their persistent effort to put

that same intention into the defendants’ valuation, with which

theirs was in competition. t

Neither, then, in the conduct of these directors as managers

of the active corporation, nor in their valuation of the corporate

property with a view to the renewal of corporate existence. Is

there any evidence of bad faith.

There is no more of such evidence to be tound as to their plan

and purpose for the future of the enterprise which was under

their direction. Their consideration here was not fraudulent

against any one of the stockholders: it was farthful and honest

to all. It was more than this: it was in the exercise of good

judgment, of skill, in the matter in hand; and it was wise.

If there were any doubt about this last proposition. this Court

might well refuse to make any effort, or to give any time to the

attempt, to solve that doubt. But when that fact appears undis-

puted, the Court nray consider it. They may consider it, as it

is now presented, in its bearing upon the good faith of these

defendants. And it will be worthy of consideration hereafter.

when the decree is to be settled in its details.

Now, upon this point there is the opinion of a very large

majority of the stockholders,} and beyond that an agreement of

evidence, —an overwhelming unanimity of testimony. The

witnesses tor the complainants are especially strong to this

effect. |

But the capital evidence upon this subject is certain action of

the old corporation itself, taken as long ago as 1879, and assented

to and sanctioned by every shareholder who kept or acquired

his shares atter that date.

That action was the purchase of a new depth of mining ground,

of the lode under a new quarter-section of land, which new

quarter-section the lode entered at the bottom ot the old mine,

that is. some thousand teet below the surtace ot the earth, —

the Edwards purchase.

. Par. XL. 1-4. F pp. 344- 345- >; /u re Niagara Ins. Co.. 1 Paige. 259.

I]

This is the quarter-section designated on the plan as “ New

Pewabic.”* The lode in this parcel was bought by the Pewabic

Mining Company in 1879, at the cost of $275,000.¢ which sum

was paid mainly out of an assessment upon the shares, paid

directly or indirectly by every present shareholder. t ,

The plan shows that the explorations, which went on into

1884, have little more than entered upon this purchase: and,

judging trom the Quincy mine, it would take more than thirty

vears now thoroughly to mine it out. ‘That is, if the work had

gone on from 18583 without interruption, it would have continued

at least to 1913. the whole period of a new charter.

Were not the officers of the corporation in duty bound by this

unanimous action of their stockholders. as soon as they learned

of the expiration of the charter. to take such steps as the laws of

Michigan authorized tor its renewal?

What was undertaken in 1879. must be pushed torward in

1884, unless meanwhile developments have changed the aspect

of the enterprise, making what was hopetul in the former year.

without hope in the latter. Such was not the fact.

yositive that this

The witnesses tor the complainants are !

undertaking to find copper in New Pewabic was full of hope

and encouragement after all the explorations made.

Their testimony goes to establish as follows: The vield per

cubic fathom increases with the increased depth.§ In the

Quincy mine —richest of all the Lake Superior mines, save

the Calumet and Hecla and its nest neighbor, the Tamarack ||-—

the copper “trends north,” “towards the Pewabic property.” 4

So generally is the rich lode from which the Quincy Company

draws its large dividends connected by common reputation with

the Pewabic property. that it is Known as “the Pewabic vein: ”

that “its general name is “the Pewabic lode:”tt “~ generally

known as the Pewabic. lode: "tt and “the Pewabic lode is the

second lode in value on Lake Superior.” §§

This lode, purchased in 1879, cuts “under the Franklin 1.900

feet.” If the Franklin people “live, they will have to have

this property. °%" It makes “ under the Quincy and Franklin,” ***

“under both properties.” *** “The Pewabic cuts out the

? 2m, 20, $52... 7 Deed, p. 873. + Ffooks 2. ». W.-Rwv. Co., 1 Sm. & G. 142 (168

Franklin and Quincy ;”* “ It will cut out both mines; ”t “It 1s

a key to the Franklin in particular, and, say, both mines; “} it

may “be the key to the whole situation.”’§

The Pewabic property, including the Edwards purchase,

is worth, according to the varying testimony of the many

witnesses for the complainants, $200,000, $230,000, $250,000,

$300,000, $400,000. $498,412.24 (reported by the master), and

$652,225.82. |

And the main element in this value 1s the copper reputed and

believed to be in the lode purchased in 1879, as these declara-

tions of those same witnesses show: “There is not a doubt but

that the lode extends through the Pewabic:” "| ~The chances are

as good in the Pewabic as in the Quincy ;”** “"

distant when the Pewabic mine will be the mine of thethree ; “tt

Che time is not tar

"There is just as much certainty of this copper being under the

Pewabic. as of the Quincy haying its existence, or of the Franklin

having its continued existence. ff

The evidence for the defendants contradicts this no farther

than to present the actual market value in 1883, and. including

March 26, 1884, along with the tacts—not disputable at all —

which made that market value what it was.

There is, indeed, no evidence on either. side. no expert.

opinion, to the effect that prudence forbids ‘the continuance of

this corporation tor the prosecution of the large enterprise

opened in 1879. On the other hand, besides the above expres-

sions from the witnesses for the complainants, bearing con-

clusively in that direction, there 1s weighty testimony. in express

terms, to the wisdom of the course which these defendants have

attempted to pursue.

There is evidence, and of a very high character, that the

action recommended by these defendants was wise and prudent.

Samuel L. Smith. sworn on behalf of defendants, qualifies

himself to give an opinion upon this question by stating that he

has ** been interested and occupied in managing copper interests

for twenty years, and | has] been connected with quite a number

of the copper mines of Lake Superior as a stockholder. director,

and general manager: ” that he is ** still so connected: ” that he

“p. 116. tp. 157. + P- 1y3-

S$ pp. 156, 157. pp. S1, 86, go. 110, 122, $21, S20.

@ * > $

ip. 160. Pp. £28. +t p. 114.

,

> + ee

- }?- ls7-

_—~

@

13

Is ** personally acquainted with that portion of the copper region

in which the Pewabic mine is situated;” that ‘the Quincy,

Pewabic, and Franklin are all on the same mineral tormation,

and [he has] been interested in all of them, from first to last,

about twenty years.” *

Ife shows that he has, not a disqualifying, but an impartial

and qualifying, interest in this cause, — that of a shareholder in

the Pewabic Mining Company. t

And thereafter he testifies that its property ‘* can be disposed

of to secure the greatest value to all of its stockholders without

any distinction, in this way: ‘‘in transferring it to a new com-

pany. letting them [the old stockholders] take shares in a new

company, and continue to develop it. with chances of the best

results ;” *‘one share of new to one share of old, practically

taking the same stock;” ** the same interest in the new com-

pany they have in the old.”}

Johnson Vivian, an expert in mining, superintendent of the

Pewabic mine, and of its successful neighbor the Franklin, and

other mines. engaged in mining in England and America about

thirtv-tive years,§ and in copper mining on Lake Superior

twenty-one years,) testifics to the same effect. as follows: + If

I owned the Pewabic mine, with the hope of obtaining some-

thing in the future I should be inclined to continue work and

spend money.” {And to this weighty declaration there is no

opposing testimony. No witness contradicts it.

There is even no counter-allegation in the pleadings. The

complainants nowhere, in their bill of complaint, allege that

the proposed practical renewal of corporate life is not for the

improvement of the corporate property. the promotion of the

original corporate enterprise, and the advancement of the

interest of all corporators as such.

On the contrary, the bill does make an allegation to the

opposite effect. It alleges against these defendants ‘* a system

of discouraging reports” and ‘‘a concealment of the true value

of the assets and condition of the company,” in depreciation of

the propertyv.**

* pp. 418, 419. tT p. 41g. + P- 431.

§ p. 123. Pp. 1246 T P- 259.

o Par 2.5 Pe 9

- = PERE GANS: Dae a a4 ——— oe

woos aon yt has ea oe a ck <4 Caan oe APR uh ets SLT eY tae oe

14

llere, then, is the allegation of the complainants themselves,

that the unexplored mineral ground of this defendant corporation

is probably valuable: that the enterprise of this expiring corpo-

ration is promising, 1s hopetul of success, and should be further

prosecuted.

Does there remain a particle ot doubt that these defendant

directors, in their attempt. in 1884, to acquire for their con-

stituents — all of them without distinction—a new lease of

corporate life. acted in pertect good faith towards all of those

constituents ¢

This allegation of the complainants against the defendant

directors. of “discouraging reports” and “a concealment of the

true value of the assets.” being supported by no evidence, and

being unsustained by the Court below, might well be left without

further comment. But it has a logical aspect and,an expressed

connection which may be used to show in still stronger light

the complete good taith of these deiendants. Discouraging

reports and a concealment of value of assets would logically

imply a desire to get those assets away. from its present owners.

for an inadequate consideration. And this desire is expressly

alleged: the defendants are expressly charged with the purpose

of ** procuring a sale of the property, at private sale, for less

than its value.” *

Now, the case shows no action whatever in execution or

attempted execution of such a purpose. There is no indication

that they ever entertained that design. All their action in the

premises has been @/7g tn/actu, with the very opposite aim and

with antipodal intent. As far as the east is from the west, so

far have their thoughts and meditations been from that design or

desire. They have attempted nothing but the re-incorporation

of their old stockholders; plainly so, in their action of 1884.

now before this Court.

And later action of theirs

appeal — has been more direct and indisputably plain toward

action taken pending this

this same fair and righteous end. This appears in the Statutes

and judicial decisions of Michigan, where this Court can take

knowledge of it, and was briefly as follows : —

The privilege of renewing, by a vote ot two-thirds of all the

stockholders, corporate life, the exercise of which the legislation

* Far. FA., P-2-

of 1882 contined within the last year of the charter period, the

Michigan Legislature of 1887* enlarged in time, so that it

could be exercised at “any time before the dissolution of the

corporation shall become complete.”

Under this last enactment, at the call of these defendant

directors, the shareholders of the Pewabic Mining Company

came together, on February 4, 1888, and, as authorized by

Statute, resolved to extend the corporate life of that corporation

for a period of thirty vears from April 4, 1883. with the

shareholders then holding, all of them, these complainants

included: every individual whose name was on the list, without

distinction.

What came of this action will be developed later, when

this argument shall find it in order to untold to the Court the

bad taith, the inequitable aim, — ves, the iniquitous purpose, —

of these complainants. In this stage of the discussion it is enough

to present it as an effort of these defendants not to deprive any

of their shareholders of any of their shares, but to add to their

value by making them corporate shares, and to reclothe all

these stockholders with powers as corporators : to re-enfranchise

them all.

Thus, through all the action of these detendants, their good

faith has been transparent. There has been no sinister purpose,

no corrupt design, no scheme of private or partisan advantage,

nothing oblique, or of ulterior, concealed aim, anywhere in all

their course. Every step on their part has been straightforward

and open, in the light of day, and capable of enduring that

light.

Tur DEFENDANTS ARE IN COURT WITH CLEAN JIIANDs.

Second.

THE COMPLAINANTS ARE NOT WITH CLEAN HANDS IN THIS

CASE.

The standing of the complainants is now to be considered.

Here itis admitted that the complainants have a right in law and

equity to withdraw their portion of the corporate property from

the whole. Nothing inequitable is alleged or intimated in any

* March 1g. in amendment ot Act of 1882.

Sk bes Beate ap ee Ce ig RS chases Vases Sit ek Ly * SS AR ak i esi Ju gare sities bs —_— _

oe pores pelea ae PAR i ee ch NIGER SPIER SS Se BI Seabakiwnt ae ———

16

litigation on their part, properly directed to that object alone.

If they were now in Court with this as the real object of their

suit, they also might be suitors in equity with clean hands.

But they are not here with that as the real object of their suit.

In their answer. the defendants distinctly charge that this bill

was brought in interests rival to those of the corporation in

which, as stockholders, the complainants sue; for special advan-

tage also to themselves, not as such stockholders, to be derived

from injury to the general interests of other stockholders.

They show that charge to have been publicly made in the

stockholders’ meeting, and not denied by the complainants

present.* And this counsel has found no such denial in the

record, although it contains a memorandum of the brief for the

complainants in the Court below.t This allegation of the

defendants. then, is “to be taken as confessed in the pleadings.” ¢

Besides these undenied allegations in the answer, there is

other evidence of the bad faith of these complainants.

They do not, in their bill of complaint, content themselves

with praying that their share of the corporate property may be

ascertained and handed over to them. They have never, any-

where, in any phase of this controversy, asked that such share

may be set off to them, —a fair and equitable praver. Nor have

they, at any stage of this or any other case touching the contro-

versy herein involved, shown any willingness to be satisfied with

such segregation to themselves, with a control over so much of

the corporate property as dclongs to them. They have hereto-

fore insisted, and are now insisting, that they shall be allowed to

direct the disposal of all that property, including. of course,

what belongs to all the other shareholders. They will be satis-

fied with nothing buta sale of the total property at public vendue.

They demand that the whole be distributed among all the stock-

holders, — an -officious, meddlesome, inequitable, and injurious

request, in its general and essential character. And in its par-

ticular aspects — that is, by the special facts in this case — it is

ageravated into an ineguitable artifice and scheme, an iniquitous

proceeding to obtain this whole property at a price below its

=

value.

Par. £5, pp. 32, 23.

t pp. 57-63: see Waterbury v7. The Merchants’, ete... Co.. 50 Barb. 107.

t Sparhawk 7. Union, etc., Co., 54 Pa. St. 401 (457

17

When the complainant Smith appeared in the stockholders’

meeting to oppose the consummation of the re-organization, the

testimony is, that he did not “ object to the price.” “No, sir; he

simply wanted the sale of the property to the highest bidder.

fis protest was against a renewal of the charter; not against

the price fixed, because every one knew the price was nominal.” *

The protest completely supports this testimony of the witness

Demmon, corroborated as he is by two others, Chandler and

Perkins.t That protest does not mention price, —any price

whatever. It protests “against any sale, transfer, and convey-

ance of either of the real and personal property of said company

to a new corporation to be organized under the mining laws of

Michigan, and the receiving in payment therefor of the capital

stock of said new corporation,”’~ without any qualification or

condition as to price, to any sale whatever for the purpose of

retaining the corporate property to its actual owners, in prosecu-

tion of the original enterprise.

That protest was obviously drawn and signed before the

opening of the meeting, when the complainants had no know!l-

edge of the action which these detendants intended to recommend

to the shareholders, other than what was contained in the official

call of the meeting. And that call mentioned no price. It

recited merely a sale to a new corporation, to be paid for in the

stock of such new corporation, in almost the exact words of the

protest. §

And against this sale, without regard to price, against such a

sale at any price, against any sale which continued the old

stockholders as a body politic, these complainants raised their

protest.

And their protest goes on to rest itself on ‘*the following

And among those following grounds there is never

grounds.”

a mention of price.

The first ground stated is, that, “ without the consent of each

and every stockholder,” the corporation ‘‘has no legal right,

authority, or power” to make such sale.{ Without regard to

price; at any price whatever. Does that look like a protest

against an inadequate price:

* p. Sg. + pp. S68, S6y, SSo. > pp. 7, 5.

pn. S € p. 8, clause 1.

§ pp. 411. goe. p-

15

And in the second ground is, stated the only ‘legal right,

authority, and power ~ which these complainants then and there

did allow to this defendant corporation. That was the power to

sell, and receive ** cash in payment.” And they here again

repeat their protest ‘‘ against any sale” ‘+ otherwise than for

cash.” And. they then ‘*‘ insist and demand that the real and

personal property of said Pewabic Mining Company be sold for

cash.” *

Not one word about inadequate price in all this. On the

other hand, they protest against something else besides price:

they object to a renewalin any manner of corporate life. They

set themselves against the intention of their associates to con-

tinue to hold their own property. They set themselves against

that, without condition or qualification. They declare that they

have the absolute legal right, authority. and power uncondition-

ally to defeat that intent. They ask no equitable imposition of

proper conditions. They demand and insist upon a sale tor

cash.

Later they opposed a still more direct and simple form of

re-incorporation. In 18838, when the Legislature of Michigan

had tendered to these shareholders an extension of their

incorporation, — pure and simple,— clothing with a franchise

all the shareholders, involving not even a nominal sale, they

protested against its acceptance, and finally procured it-to be

vacated, as will later be narrated.

And they seek the same object. and pursue the same line and

the same purpose. here.

Meanwhile, in all this opposition to the continued existence of

this corporation, the complainants have no grounds whatever

which can properly support corporators in such opposition.

And they do not pretend to have any. They do not even allege

that a continuation of the corporate enterprise is unpremising ;

and their own testimony to the opposite effect is unanimous and

overwhelming.

They unblushingly put torward their claim to bring this

enterprise to an untimely and abrupt end, upon their right to

exercise their own caprice in that matter.

The praver of the bill of complaint is, ** that all the assets

and property of said Pewabic Mining Company be sold at

‘'n. S, clause 2.

Re

19

public vendue.” ‘+ to the highest bidder :” and that the proceeds,

after payment of the debts, be distributed +‘ to the stockholders

pro rata, according to the amount ot their respective holdings ;” *

‘¢ that a receiver be appointed,” with all the power of a receiver

in such cases, to wind up the affairs of said Pewabic Mining

Company, and distribute its assets.” ft

This is ofhicious and intermeddlesome, for (1) there are no

creditors in Court asking the Court to see them paid; and (2)

a large majority of the shareholders are here to oppose such

distribution of their portion of the corporate property. The

equity of the complaint is satisfied and exhausted when the

complainants receive the money value of their portion of the

corporate property.

In thus asking for, and insisting upon, a compulsory sale ot

this property, the complainants are going beyond their own

rights for the purpose of making an inequitable demand. They

are making that inequitable demand for an iniquitous purpose:

not for the legitimate object of protecting their interests as

shareholders, but tor the purpose of creating an opportunity to

them. as intending purchasers at such compulsory sale, — an

opportunity to purchase. at less than the actual value.

That they desire to purchase, that they intend to purchase if

the price is low enough, appears in their very bill of complaint.

They place themselves before the Court as willing to take the

property, as would-be bidders for it: and they actually make

their bid. If they can get this property for $75.000, they will

take it.} And that offer, as already shown, is the lowest

bid vet made.

Further, these complainants are shown to be interested in the

Quincy Mining Company :§ one of them is a director thereof; |

another is a son of the president of that company. The map

shows this unexplored lode of the Pewabic Company to under-

lie, in part, the operations of the Quincy Company. The testi-

mony for the complainants shows the copper in the Quincy

mine to trend towards the Pewabic property ; ** that “the chances

are as good in the Pewabic as in the Quincy: ” tt and that “ the

time is not far distant when the Pewabic mine will be the mine

"rar. AYV., Clause 2, p. to. + Id.. p. 11, clause 8.

Cer. Ade, Ps @ § Ans., par. 15, p. 32. p. yo.

7 Ans., par. 1§, p. 32. ee, 228. TT p. 128.

20

of the three.” * This certainly shows it to be a desirable acqui-

sition to the Quincy Company. And the president of that com-

pany, father of the complainant Mason,t called by the defend-

ants, on cross-examination by the complainants, testifies that

for “a period of three or four years,” to use his own words, “I

was waiting for some proposition for which I could purchase

the property.” “About the time the sale was accomplished to

the Pewabic Company.” It was known that “I would like to

buy it.” t

An actual purchase in the Quincy interest, or in the interest

of these complainants, appears in the case. For, after these

defendants were actually and fully, by the expiration of the

charter and knowledge thereof, prevented from raising by

assessment any money for corporate purposes, there was a sale

on execution of real estate of their corporation; and the pur-

chase was by one of the attorneys of the complainants in this

case,§ the Quincy Mining Company furnishing the money to

pay for it.|| (It is not these complainants. but the defendants,

who have redeemed the property from that sale. )

Not only have these complainants endeavored to procure a

compulsory sale of the property, to the end that it may be

purchased to their advantage, but also they have heretofore

endeavored, and are now endeavoring, to diminish competition

ot bidders at such sale.

Of mining land like this. and plant for mining, there can be

no sale except to mining companies: and among such com-

panies the competition will, generally, be confined to those to

which the location of the mine is convenient and favorable.

Looking at the plan of this property.4 it will be seen at once

that there are. or have been. three companies to whom the loca-

tion of this Pewabic mine is convenient,— three companies

whose working shafts, produced, would reach the lode pur-

chased by the Pewabic Company in 1879.

These have been the Quincy, Franklin, and Pewabic Mining

Companies. And ot these three, the most promising competi-

tor — the competitor who would not have allowed the property

to be disposed of at a sacrifice — was the present owner of the

property, the Pewabic corporation: the shareholders who, in

° nm. 384. t Ans., par. 1§. p. 32. ~ pp. 268. 269.

pp. St. ° | p. S§2. q pp. 39. 583.

2I

1879, paid for it out of their private resources. And this cor-

poration is disabled from competing at that sale by the action of

these complainants. Their action in this suit to that end, and

not to any milder measure of obtaining what belongs to them,

need not be again recited here.

But their action against the subsequent attempt of these de-

fendants to re-invigorate their corporation remains to be stated.

That attempt was the acceptance by these stockholders of the

privilege extended to them by the Legislature of Michigan, of

renewing their corporate existence by a two-thirds vote. This

done. it was open to these complainants —if they wanted their

distributive share of the corporate property, and nothing else

to go into a Court of Equity, Federal or State. and ask for that.

Thus, they could have obtained their individual property with-

out annulling the re-incorporation of their associates. But they

would not take that conscientious and equitable proceeding.

They brought guo warrando, at law, that they might have

judgment ousting their associates trom their attempted re-incor-

poration. They alleged the Statute which authorized this

renewal of corporate life to be in violation of the Constitution of

the United States, as impairing the obligation of a contract; and

in violation of the Constitution of the State, as depriving the

relators, these complainants, of their property without due pro-

cess of law. And the Supreme Court of Michigan refused to

sustain either of these allegations.

That Court did, however, find very narrow and technical

ground, and wholly confined to Michigan, on which to give

judgment of ouster against the defendants. The Constitution of

that State provides that, with irrelevant exceptions, “ no corpora-

tion” “shall be created for a longer time than thirty years.” *

And the Court held that that provision prohibited the Legis-

lature from authorizing the renewal of the corporate existence

of any corporations after a corporate existence of thirty years.

This decision, however, does not apply to the creation of a

new corporation out of a portion. or even the whole, of the old

shareholders. It is enough that such corporation should be as

the complainants allege was the fact in this case, — technically

“a new corporation, a new legal entity, a new body politic and

* Art. XV.. Sect. 10.

22

corporate.* If it were the same old corporation that before

owned the property, what would be the meaning of their prayer

against a “transfer” of the property? t

This remains just as constitutional as in 1878, when the Quincy

Company used it,t or when the National Company used it,$ or

when Mr. Pond advised it. |

Thus, upon the action of these complainants — action not at

all necessary to their obtaining all their rights — these detendants

are now before this Court, still disorganized, and unable as a

corporate body, acting through their trusted directors, to appear

at a sale of their own property, should this Court order one.

and, by competing bids, to prevent it from being sold for a song.

And in thus disabling competition at the sale which they are

striving to procure, they further show the indirect object and

bad faith of their complaint.

In their insisting upon a compulsory sale of this property, the

bad faith of ‘these complainants towards these respondents

appears in the time when they became stockholders, if that time

be considered in its proper relations.

They first became stockholders in October, 1882. then buying

fitty shares; and all the rest of their shares were purchased

later. That is, they bought after the corporation had made the

purchase of 1879, towards which purchase, then, all the shares

which they bought had contributed. They came in as success-

ors to corporators, who had-actually pledged themselves to a

continuance of the corporate enterprise until ‘the lode, newly

purchased, should be properly explored: and, if what they

themselves say is true, they came in without notice of the

approaching expiration of the charter.

They came in, then, as to a continuing corporation, with the

intent, and for the purpose, of sharing in the prosecution of the

original enterprise of the company as modified and extended bv

the purchase of 1879. They voluntarily submitted their share

of the corporate property to be continued in the corporate enter-

prise at the pleasure of two-thirds of their associate shareholders.

For such was the law of Michigan as applicable to this corpo-

ration when they purchased their shares: to wit. from the

beginning of October, 1852, to April 4. 1883. If, by the

* Protest, pp. 7, 8: also clauses 1 and 2, p. 8: par. N.. p. g.

7 Par. AV... PP: Ww, tf. = p. go2. $ p. gIS. || Pp. GIy. q pp. 66, 433.

expiration of the charter on this last-named date, they acquired

the legal right to withdraw their shares from the corporate stock

(which the defendants do not here deny), they did not thereby

acquire any right in equity to prevent their associates from going

on in the enterprise with so much ot the corporate property as

belongs to those associates, — that is, with the whole of it, after

4- the complainants are paid for their portion.

Thus, coming into this corporation, acquiring shares which

were, by contribution to the purchase of 1879, pledged to a con-

tinuance of this enterprise. is it in good faith on their part to

seize the first, and press to harsh extremity the second, oppor-

enterprise 7

2. shares on which they brought this bill of complaint.*

continuing in corporate existence.

tunity which the technical rules of law raise for them, to compel,

not merely the withdrawal of their share, but the compulsory

sale of the whole property, and the termination of the corporate

The complainants would have their intent to continue in the

enterprise accompany all their purchases prior to their knowledge

of the expiration of the charter: that is, their purchase of all the

Down,

then, to February 19, 1884. the date of the call for the stock-

holders’ meeting of March 26, 1884, which was to take action

upon the expiration of the charter, these stockholders, as they

themselves say, entered the corporation in contemplation of its

-If they bought with this purpose and intent, and under an

implied pledge to their associates to fulfil it. good faith to those

associates, even under the changed technical conditions, requires

that they should now content themselves with a withdrawal of their

portion of the corporate property in the manner least injurious to

their associates, and that they should not insist, as a s¢ve gua non,

upon a compulsory sale of the whole property, — an arrest of the

corporate enterprise, and an absolute dissolution of the corporation.

Nor have they clean hands here. if. entering the corporation

with honest intent to continue in the enterprise, they now pervert

their unexpected right to withdraw from it, into a scheme to

injure their associates. They have a right, an undoubted right.

to use a compulsory sale of this property in order to enable them

to obtain their share of the corporate property, if it is absolutely

24

necessary to that end. But upon this record, it is submitted that

that is not what they are doing. That is just what they are not

doing. On the other hand, they are using their right to a por-

tion of the property in order to procure such compulsory sale.

Their distributive portion should, in equity, be the end; and the

compulsory sale, if necessary, the means. In fact, their owner-

ship is the means merely, and the compulsory sale the end, ot

all their suit. Anda suit thus prosecuted is not prosecuted in

good faith.

If these complainants, in 1882 and 1883, when the affairs of

the Pewabic Company were putting on their darkest aspect,

became shareholders therein with any other intent than that of

continuing in the prosecution of the enterprise then on foot,

what was that other intent : |

They deny notice *‘of the expiration of said charter, or the.

time that it would expire.” This is hardly a denial of knowl_

edge. ‘ae

Their counsel, in his cross-examination, implies* ‘that it 1s

something out of the common course. that neither the Pewabic

counsel at Houghton nor the resident director — both within

short distance from the court-house — did, from the papers there

to be seen, learn of the time of the period of the charter, — before

November 1, 1883. And how was it with the complainants:

They, as one of them testifies, were ‘* stock-brokers ;” had

known the Pewabic Mining Company “for more than twenty

years: "+ had *+ been accustomed to see their reports from year to

vear.” ** regularly ;” had ‘*always been familiar with” those

reports, and ** with the mining companies ot Michigan.”

And this complainant then produces,{ as previously lying in

the office of his firm, eight annual reports of the operations of

the Pewabic Company. Preserved there for what purpose? Of

course, for the proper purpose of making these stock-brokers

acquainted with those operations and with the financial condition

of the company, to the end that they might intelligently advise

their customers —and themselves, it appears in fact— in the

matter of buying and selling that stock. When, in skilful action

of stock-brokers. were those reports to be consulted? Of course,

before and in view of any large dealing in that stock: that is,

; pp. 67, 68.

* p. Sgog. Tp. 35

oa

to

cst

in this case, before commencing a purchase of as many as

twenty-five hundred shares. And these reports, thus consulted.

would have shown, in six different places,* that the Pewabic

Mining Company was in active operation as a corporation in the

year 1853; and, under the Constitution of Michigan, such cor-

porations may not run beyond thirty years.

And, familiar as these complainants were with mining com-

panies, they knew that at the State capital and the county seat,

the exact period of this corporation was of public record. And

the county seat was as near to the Quincy mine and its counsel

as to the Pewabic. With their view, here maintained. of the

law of corporations, —to wit, that any one shareholder, of any

one share, could absolutely prevent the extension of an expiring

charter, and bring the whole corporate property to the auction

block, — was it the course of wisdom on their part to purchase

twenty-five hundred shares in this corporation, without ascer-

taining when that power would come to every stockholder?

If they learned when that power would come to themselves

by purchase of shares, and purchased with intent to exercise it

when it did arise, what claim have they upon a Court of Equity

for aid in the execution of that iniquitous intent? Legal rights

they may have, which even a Court of Equity. with full

knowledge of their bad faith, must respect and protect. But

this is-all that such a Courtis bound to doin their behalf. They

are not entitled to its favor. They are under its disfavor.

THEY ARE NOT BEFORE THIS COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS ;

THAT IS. WITH THEIR DEMAND FOR A COMPULSORY SALE.

Third.

THE EqQuITyY OF THE COMPLAINANTS DOES NOT REQUIRE

THE SALE PRAYED FOR: AND THE EQUITY OF THE DEFEND-

ANTS FORBIDS IT TO BE ORDERED.

The complainants have made neither allegation nor proof,

that the sale at public vendue, which is the very burden of their

prayer, is necessary in order to enable them to secure all that

* pp. 459. 490, 515, 576. 337, 535.

26

belongs to them, even as they allege their belongings. They

do not show that they cannot obtain to themselves their share of the

corporate property in any other manner than by such sale. They

do not show that that is even the best way in which their equity

may be satisfied. It nowhere in the record appears that ,the

value of the whole property of the expiring detendant corpora-

tion cannot be judicially ascertained. There is neither finding,

evidence, nor even Contention, to that effect in any part of the

case. And this tact ought to appear. before it 1s accepted as a

basis of judicial action. On the other hand, it is apparent that

such value can be judicially ascertained.

The value of the whole being determined. that of the com-

plainants’ share 1s easily obtained. Little more than a division:

of that whole by sixteen ts required.

Still more important. there is no indication, to the mind of

this Court, that this corporate property will bring more, if put

up at a compulsory sale. under judicial decree, than the sum at

which the Court may be led to value it. The complainants base

their positive demand for such a sale, not upon that consideration.

That consideration they do not deem any part of their case, as

petitioners for such sale, to present to the Court. They deem it

suflicient to the support of their praver, that they set out their

absolute. unqualified right to have such a sale. If the com-

plainants are not interested in having this property bring a fair

price when sold, the defendants are. The defendants do not

wish property tor which they paid ten dollars and more per

share exposed to the hazard of a compulsory sale.

Let the Court consider the practical difference between the

two methods of ascertaining the sum due to the complainants:

for a sum in money is all that thev pray for. Let the two

methods be considered as operating upon the desire of the de-

ftendants to retain their own property. Let the same value be

assumed to result in each method: tor instance. the sum thought

Ot by the Court below. $506,000.

Now. upon a valuation at that sum, the detendants may per-

form all the equities set up by the complainants by raising and

paying. as directed by the Court. about one-sixteenth of that

sum, — not a great deal more than $30,000.

This done. they are in unembarrassed control of their own

property. to be used and enjoyed in any manner allowed to them

under the laws ot the sovereign State of Michigan.

tJ

“I

If they wish to accomplish the same purpose under an order

for a compulsory sale for cash, which sale for cash is what the

complainants demand, then a much more laborious and expen-

sive method must be taken to reach the same result to both

parties — the same result precisely ; that is, their share in money

to the complainants, and the rest of the property to its present

owners, the defendants.

Then, the defendants must raise in cash the whole supposed

sum, — half a million dollars, — pay it over to the selling officer,

to lie in his hands till the account of sales can be settled, and

the expenses of sale shall be paid, and then the net proceeds

to be disposed of, how? In round numbers, one-sixteenth to the

complainants and fifteen-sixteenths to the defendants.

The same final result in both methods; the equities of the

case performed, and nothing more.

But what a hardship is laid upon the defendants by the method

insisted upon by the complainants! If this property is worth

that sum, they must contribute per share (the number of shares

has been doubled since 1879) the same amountas in the original

purchase, or double the amount on every share then held. How

can this be done, with no corporate capacity to act?

Meanwhile, let it be noticed that if the present owners are

disabled from purchasing, the best competitor is prevented from

bidding, and the chances of a sale far below the sum just

supposed are increased. |

The plan shows that there have been three mining companies

whose working shatts, produced, would reach the lode purchased

by the Pewabic Company in 1879; to wit, the Quincy, the

Franklin, and the Pewabic. And of these three, the most

earnest competitor must be supposed to be the company that

once showed itself willing to purchase: that is, the Pewabic.

Except [under an absolute necessity, a sale ought not to be

ordered while that company is disabled from bidding: least of

all ought it to be ordered merely on the petition of those who

have disabled the Pewabic Company from taking part in such

competition.

If the complainants have any interests which can be served

by the ordering of a sale under such disadvantageous circum-

stances, those interests must be interests as intending purchasers.

They cannot be interests. pure and simple. of shareholders in

28

the Pewabic Company. of selling owners of the property. On

the other hand, in resisting the order for such a sale, these de-

fendants are asserting merely their legitimate interests as present

owners of the property in question.

Their action shows itself intent upon making the most of the

corporate property, for the benefit of all its owners. It is hardly

possible that it could have other aim. <A large majority of the

shareholders could not well be moved in united action save for

the general good. But a small portion — one-fifth, even —

might easily have schemes for the promotion of their interests,

apart from, and even hostile to, the common good of the common

corporation. | |

No measure could afford a better opportunity for the operation

of such schemes than a compulsory sale for cash of the whole

corporate property. especially where that property consists of

mining plant and mineral lands. It would be very hard indeed

to justify an order for such a sale, on the petition of a small

faction of the shareholders, especially if that faction were

tainted with a strong suspicion of bad faith towards the.common

enterprise, and of a design to make gain out of the wreck ot

the corporation. |

The Court below foresaw the hazard of a sacrifice ot this prop-

erty, through want of competition, at a compulsory sale at public

vendue to the highest bidder. This plainly appears in the con-

dition which was to deteat that sale. which the Court attached

to its order thereot,— its closely attached proviso, to this pur-

port: “that if. at such sale, the bid for the aggregate of the

property and assets of said company should not be in excess of

fifty thousand dollars above the amount of the debts of said com-

pany,’ “then that the arrangement tor the sale, of the property

of said company made at the stockholders’ meeting in Boston on

the twenty-sixth day of March, A.D. 1864, and as set up in the

defendants’ answer, shall be carried out.” *

That is, a minimum limit was to be fixed at the opening of the

auction. And if that limit was not passed, then there was to be

no compulsory sale: but the sale attempted by the defendants,

and thus far enjoined at the suit of the complainants. was to be

relieved from injunction and completed. The real value of the

29

complainants’ shares being thus secured to them, the re-incor-

poration intended by the defendants was to be accomplished

under the direction, and with the resulting protection, of the

Court. The whole equity of the complainants was deemed

satishied when they got the value of their shares.

It is seen at once that this condition of defeasance is not ade-

quate to effect its intended purpose. A bid in trifling excess of

the named minimum would be outside this defeating condition,

and yet not save the property from sacrifice. It is essential to

the protection of the defendants that the decree to be made.

should .be effective to the execution of this equitable intent

towards them, of the Court below, as manifested in the above

inadequate safeguard. This can be done in the manner submit-

ted by the defendants, — the defendants to pay the value of the

complainants’ shares, when ascertained.

Such a decree, the defendants believe, will be a Solomon’s

judgment, ascertaining the real purpose of this complaint. The

defendants will not be required, or even allowed, to pay for a

single share withdrawn. A compulsory sale made hopeless,

there is nothing left that the complainants will sue for. A new

charter made certain, they desire to be under it. A re-incor-

poration assured, they mean to be among the corporators.

IN FINE, NO NECESSITY TO THE COMPLAINANTS APPEARS

FOR SUCH SALE, AND IFS ORDERING WOULD BE HIGHLY IN-

JURIOUS TO THE DEFENDANTS.

THE LAW OF THIS CASE.

[. Neither the Constitution of Michigan or of the United

States, nor the common or statute law of that State. nor the

principles of equity as administered in the United States Courts,

give the complainants an absolute right and title to have ordered

a compulsory sale of the corporate property of the expiring

defendant corporation. Nor has the Court below any direct

duty, or even authority, to make such an order. It has no

express jurisdiction to that end as a substantive right. As

against the attempted proceedings of the defendants an “in-

junction is not of right, but of grace :” * still more an order of sale.

* Sparhawk v7. Union Pass. Rwy. Co., 54 Pa. St. 401 (454).

39

The Court is not bound to decree a dissolution. even when a

majority of the directors and stockholders request it to be done.”

II. The only substantive right of the plaintiffs shown any-

where in this case is their right of property in their distributive

share of the assets of the expiring corporation: and any claim

of theirs to have ordered such compulsory sale must be consid-

ered as incidental to that right of property. and not substantive

at all.

The only jurisdiction which the Court has to order such sale

is as a necessary incident, in equity, to the securing for the

complainants of the value of such distributive share, — the value

of such share in money, and not the portion in kind: for the

complainants’ prayer is not for a set-off in kind, but for a pay-

ment in money.

lil. Such necessity must be shown, and shown clearly.

And if the method of ascertaining the value of their share.

prayed for by them, appears to be injurious to the intérests of

the defendants, then such necessity must be shown to be abso-

lute and exclusive. It must appear that there is no other less

objectionable way in which they can obtain that value. The

complainants, being allowed to withdraw from the corporate

enterprise, must withdraw in the manner least injurious to their

associates.

IV. In the present case the method of compulsory sale is

unnecessary, — entirely unnecessary to the doing of complete

equity to the complainants. The case shows that the Court

below would have found no difficulty in ascertaining the actual

value of the assets of this corporation, had it proceeded to a con-

sideration of that question. | The Court below simply declined

to attempt to ascertain the exact value as a basis of its decree.t

while the case shows that it could have been easily ascertained. ?

Neither party has alleged otherwise. An allegation otherwise

would be absurd. The value of one-sixteenth of the net assets

of this corporation is ascertainable, — easily so.

* Jn re Niagara Ins. Co., 1 Paige, 259. t p. g22. + p. 820

V. On the other hand, such a sale would be very injurious

to these defendants and to the large body of stockholders whom

these detendants include or represent. |

This sale can be to no proper practical purpose, which this

tribunal can promote. save that about one-sixteenth of the net

proceeds be paid over to these complainants.

VI. In this case the value to be ascertained is as of March,

1854, when the defendants attempted to prosecute further the

original enterprise, and were prevented by the bill brought by

the complainants. Anda sale in 1890 would not ascertain value

in 1884.

VII. The property in question — mineral land in large block,

and mining plant, more or less affixed to land —is of a kind

which, in general, ought not to be disposed of at public auction.

VIII. Any competition at such sale on the part of these

director defendants. as authorized representatives of their stock-

holders, having been rendered impracticable by the action of

these complainants, the sale is likely to be a sacrifice for want

of competition. The complainants have even withdrawn their

obligation to bid, as offered in their bill.”

IX. It is a case of a compulsory sale, praved for in behalf

of only about one-sixteenth of the whole property to be sold:

the large residue resisting the application. Such sale not being

necessary to the securing of any right of the complainants (the

only rights asking the protection of the Court). it seems as

though the objection thereto of a large majority of the shares

ought to be controlling and conclusive. “It is strong evidence

that the interests of the stockholders generally” will not be

promoted by the sale prayed ftor.+

In the actual aspects of this case, the opposition of an over-

whelming majority of the owners 1s of itself sufficient for a

decree against such sale. “~The particular interest of the tew

+

must give way to the general interest of the many.” t

«

*y. 6s. + /n re Niagara Ins. Co., 1 Paige. 20y. { /# re Niagara Ins. Co.. supra.

32

Michigan law has a provision * for the dissolution of corpora-

tions, at the suit of stockholders: under conditions, however, not

existing in this case.

But such suit can be brought only on the prayer of the holders

of not less than one-third of all the shares. And the opposition

of two-thirds of the shares is sufficient to prevent a decree ot

dissolution, if made manifest at any time before such decree

‘becomes final.

X. There is no evidence that the continued prosecution otf

the original enterprise aimed at by the defendants is not. so far

as can be judged, for the benefit of the corporate property and

ihe best interests of all the stockholders. On the other hand,

the evidence that such prosecution is in the exercise of a sound

business judgment, is uncontradicted and overwhelming. ‘There

is not even allegation against it. :

In seeking to thwart this aim, the complainants rest their jus-

tification solely on their absolute right to exercise their caprice.

Such caprice is a very meagre and scant support for any

action of a Court of Equity in their behalf. The right of

caprice extends in full only to several property. When one

becomes the owner of property jointly with other owners, he

loses some of his rights of caprice. He comes under obligation

to regard the interests of his co-owners in his handling of the

thing owned. He is bound not to injure their interests in the

mere indulgence of such caprice. This duty to his associates

a Court of Equity should enforce against him, even in his with-

drawal of his share trom the whole joint property.

XI. <Any interest in a compulsory sale which these com-

plainants might have as prospective purchasers at such sale.

either as individuals or as stockholders, or persons interested,

in a rival corporation, is of no weight in favor of an order for

such sale. That is not an interest proper of a corporator, and

‘nothing but the benefit to be received as a corporator” is now

to be considered. t |

“To entitle a stockholder to maintain a suit of this nature,”

the Court must ** feel that he is acting for the benefit. or what

he believes to be the benefit, of the company.”{ The suit must

* April 11, 1877, Sect. 42: H., Sect. 4117.

+ Irvin v7. Susquehanna, etc.. Co., 2 Penrose & Watts (Penn.), 471.

+ Filder v7. Rwy. Co., 1 Hem. XN M. 489: Waterbury 7. Merchants’, etc., Co..,

so Barb. 168: Belmont v. Erie Rwy. Co.. 52 Barb. 662.

9

ere)

have ‘*in view the legitimate purposes of the company,’ — must

‘*be a dona fide one, faithfully, truthfully, sincerely directed to

the benefit and the interests” of stockholders as stockholders.*

The dona fides of the complaint must be ‘* unquestioned, or

capable of vindication it questioned.” ‘* A stockholder is

bound to come with clean hands. with a sincere complaint, free

from all false pretences.” The genuineness of his character

will always be looked to. ‘** The question is whether this is a

stockholders’ bill.” ¢

For, ‘* under the pretence of serving the interests of one

company, the shareholders in a rival company, by purchasing

shares for the purpose of litigation,” cannot make a Court of

Equity ‘*the instrument of defeating or injuring the company

into which they so intrude themselves.” } The object of the

suit must not be ‘‘to establish the interests and benefits of a

rival scheme.” The plaintiff must not be “the puppet of

another company.” § An interest. either direct in a rival cor-

poration, or In any way adverse to the company whose interests

the bill pretends to champion, ‘‘is fatal to the suit.” |) A

bill brought in such adverse interest may even be stricken trom

the files as ‘* an imposition upon the Court.” {

XII. As matter of precedent, the method of compulsory sale

is unusual in analogous cases. Where Courts have interposed

for the protection of the rights of dissentient corporators, against

the organization or action of a majority of their associates which

could not lawfully be imposed upon the dissentients, there the

remedy has not been that of a compulsory sale of the corporate

property or a vacation of the organization. In all the examina-

tion of decisions which all the controversy between these parties

has raised, not a single case of such dissolution or prevention of

the organization has come to the knowledge of this counsel, at

the time of this writing. in America or England.

XIII. The only method in which Courts of Equity do equity

in cases of this character is by. imposing upon the enterprising

* Forrest 7. Manchester, etc.. Rwy. LAK, 4 ets. F.. = 126 (120).

+ Sparhawk v. U. Pass. Rwy. Co., 54 Pa. St. gor (454).

+t Ffooks v. S. W. Rwy. Co., 15m. &X G. 142 (167

§ Forrest 7. Manchester, etc.. Rwy. ee supra.

| Waterbury 7. Merchants’, etc.. Co.. supra

€ Robson wv. Doders. 8 L. R. Eq. 301.

34

majority, terms in favor of the opposing minority. Those who

would go forward are required to secure to the dissentients the

payment of the value of their portion of the corporate property,

payment to be made as soon as value is judicially ascertained.

Upon the furnishing of such security, the majority are allowed —

to go forward with their organization or enterprise. This

method was approved in the cases named below. It is as fully

within the jurisdiction of the Court as any other method of

ascertaining value.*

The case nearest parallel to the present is to be found in

England. A quarry company being in process of liquidation,

with a view to winding up, the holders of a majority of the

paid-up shares conceived the purpose of continuing the com-

pany, and accordingly, by a representative, prayed that “all

further proceedings in relation to the winding up of the com-

pany might be stayed.” One holder of a hundred and fifty

shares, considering the experiments intended by the majority,

and for which he would have to contribute, “ would be fruitless,”

appeared in opposition to the above prayer. being “ desirous that

the liquidation should proceed, and the slate quarry sold in the’

usual way.” He was not allowed to stand in the way of the

wishes of his fellow-shareholders. He was merely allowed

fourteen days “ within which to elect whether he will remain a

se

*

member of the company, or will retire and give up his shares ;

on his election to retire, the value of his interest to be referred

for ascertainment, and thereafter to be paid by the petitioner. t

Let the injunction, is the decree in one case, “be dissolved on

the defendants giving security to the plaintiff in double the

market value of his stock, to pay for said stock when its value

shall be ascertained.” ¢

XIV. The Court below recognized the right of the defend-

ants to go forward to a re-incorporation, provided they gave to

the complainants the equitable value of their shares.§ |

This equitable result, however, aimed at by the Court, could

not be accomplished in the manner arranged by the Court, or

in any way through a sale. |

*Lauman v. The Lebanon V. R. R. Co., 30 Pa. St. 42: The State v. Bailey,

16 Ind. 46 (51). ;

+ Jn re South Barrule, etce.. Co., 8 L. R. Eq. 688.

+ Lauman 7. The Lebanon V. R. R. Co., 30 Pa. St. 49.

§$ pp. g22. 923. 924-

. 35

CONCLUSION.

That this equity, along with all the other equities of this case,

may be completely satisfied, the defendants ask that the usual

practice of Chancery Courts in like cases may here be followed:

that the defendants’ may be ordered to secure the payment to

the complainants of the value of their shares when ascertained,

and upon the giving of such security, the injunction upon the

defendants may be dissolved, and the defendants be allowed to

complete the suspended transfer.

THOMAS H. TALBOT,

Counsel for Pewabic Mining Company et als.,

Defendants below.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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