Appendix — Luckenbach Steamship Co. v. Societa Anonima Partecipazioni Industriali Commerciali

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DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE WILBUR

Wiser, Circuit Judge:

I dissent,

An explanation of my reasons for disagreeing with

the opinion of the majority requires a detailed examina-

tion of the facts. The collision between the steamship

Edward Luekenhbach and the motorship Feltre oeenrred

at 1:40 on the morning of February 17, 1937, in the Colum-

bia River at a point between Cottonwood Island and

Prescott, Oregon, about four miles above Loneview,

Washington. The question at issue herein is the responsi-

bility for the collision. The Commissioner held both ves-

sels at fault and the owners of the “dward Luckenbach

entitled to limit their liability. The district court ap-

proved and adopted the findings and entered an inter-

locutory decree. From this decree hoth sides have ap-

pealed,

The Edward Lueckenbach was owned by the Luekenbach

Steamship Company, Ine., and the Feltre by the Societa

Anonima Partecipazioni Industrial Commercial.

The Societa Anonima Partecipazioni Tndustriali Com-

merciali and Navigazione Libera Triestina, S. A.. the

owner and operator of the Feltre, filed a libel against

the Lueckenbach Steamship Company, Ine.. as owner and

operator of the Luckenbach, and against the Luckenbach

herself, to recover damages sustained by the Feltre and

her cargo in the said collision. This libel was filed in the

Northern District of California.

Thereafter, the Luekenhach Steamship Company, Inc.,

as owner of the Edward Luckenhack. filed in the District

ECW TRE CRA A Naf FRO NOD EDS PROTEIN RAA n LTA LOE ATE it ALN DIONNE ta PIE lS SE ARTERY RI LNES TE LO TN ~

ii

Court for the Northern District of California, a petition

for exoneration from or limitation of liability. The own-

ers and operators of the Feltre and her cargo thereupon

filed claims and answers in the limitation proceedings,

as did the Spett Societa di Sicurata Fra Amatori, the

underwriter of the Feltre’s hull.

Objections to these claims and answers were filed by

petitioner Luckenbach Steamship Company, Inc., which

also filed a cross-libel against the owners and operator

of the Feltre for damages sustained by the Luckenbach

in the collision.

The trial court found as follows:

‘“‘The Edward Luckenbach is a steamturbine vessel

of about 6141 net tons burden, being 457 feet long

and having a beam of 57 feet. At the time of the

collision she was proceeding up the Columbia River

bound for Portland, Oregon. She was partly loaded

and had a draft of 14 feet 6 inches forward and 18

feet 6 inches aft.

‘‘The Feltre, a motorship powered by means of a

Burmeister Diesel engine, is a vessel of 6101 tons

gross burden and 3773 tons net burden and is about

460 feet in length with a beam of 55 feet. At the

time of the collision she was proceeding down the

Columbia River bound to sea. She was carrying about

3500 tons of cargo and had a draft of 16 feet 2 inches

forward and 18 feet aft.

‘‘Prior to and at the time of the collision, the wind

was estimated to be blowing from 25 to 60 miles per

hour from a south southeasterly direction, or approxi-

mately directly down the Upper Cottonwood [sland

Range. The wind was striking the Feltre astern and was

Br

G tT.

iii

striking the Edward Luckenbach on her starboard bow

as the vessels proceeded toward the point where the

collision occurred. Visibility was good, although it

was raining, and was estimated by witnesses to be

from three to six miles. The tide was ebb and was

running against the Luckenbach; and the set of the

tide and current was toward the Washington side of

the river in the vicinity where the collision occurred.

The current was running at a speed of about two

knots per hour, The vessels sighted each other when

the Edward Luckenbach was below the red flashing

buoy on Dobelbower Bar and the Feltre was about

Prescott.

‘The Columbia River in the vicinity where the two

vessels were navigating for some time prior to and

at the time of the collision is a narrow channel within

the meaning of Article 25 of the Inland Rules (33 U.S.

Code, section 210), and said Article 25 was applicable

to the navigation of both vessels in approaching and

passing each other.

‘“‘Both vessels had been proceeding with engines at

full speed ahead for some time prior to the collision

and both vessels continued with engines at full speed

ahead until the impact. The speed of the Edward

Luckenbach was about 7.77 knots per hour over the

ground and the speed of the Feltre was about 12

knots per hour over the ground.

““The two vessels collided at a sharp angle. The

stem of the Edward Luckenbach struck the Feltre on

her starboard side at the No. 2 hatch and ripped off a

considerable section of the Feltre’s plating, as a result

of which the Feltre sank.

‘The collision occurred about four miles above

Longview, Washington, at a point between the upper

iv

end of Cottonwood Island and the lower end of Pres-

eott Dock, and, with respect to the channel, the col-

lision occurred between the Upper Cottonwood Island

Range and a point 300 feet to the right of the Upper

Cottonwood Island Range, proceeding upstream.

“‘The collision and the resulting damage to both

vessels and to the cargo carried on the Feltre was

due to and caused by the negligent navigation and

faults of both vessels in the particulars hereinafter

set forth.

‘“The steamship Edward Luckenbach and petitioner

were guilty in the following respects of negligent

navigation and faults which contributed to and caused

the said collision and consequent damages :

‘$1, She violated the narrow channel rule in that

she navigated too far to her own left and crossed the

Upper Cottonwood Island Range.

‘2. She failed seasonably to sound the danger sig-

nal and failed to stop and reverse under the attend-

ant circumstances and conditions.

«3. She proceeded at an immoderate rate of speed

for the conditions prevailing.

‘‘4. She failed, in a channel of ample width to

enable the vessels to pass safely without crowding,

to navigate so as to allow a safe margin for passing

the Feltre.

‘5 She failed to take any compass bearings of the

approaching Feltre, a precaution which would have

permitted her to observe a safer margin in passing

the Feltre.

‘“‘The Feltre and those in charge of her navigation

were guilty in the following respects of negligent nav-

igation and faults which contributed to and caused

the said collision and consequent damage:

‘1. She did not have a proper lookout in that no

lookout was stationed in the bow of the ship and no

member of the watch was stationed elsewhere for the

sole purpose of acting as lookout.

**2. She failed to sound the danger signal and

failed to stop and reverse as required by the attend-

ant circumstances and conditions.

**3. She sounded a two-blast signal and altered

her course to her own left before the Edward Lucken-

bach assented.

“4. She violated the narrow channel rule by swing-

ing to her own left across the Upper Cottonwood

Island Range.

‘5. She proceeded at an immoderate rate of speed

for the conditions prevailing.

‘“*6. She failed in a channel of ample width to al-

low a safe margin for passing the Edward Lucken-

bach.

“7. She failed to take any compass bearings of

the Edward Luekenbach as the two vessels approached

each other, a precaution which would have permitted

her to observe a safer margin in passing the Edward

Luckenbach.’’

A copy of the government chart of the loeality is in-

corporated in the majority opinion, with explanatory re-

marks inserted thereon. The location of the wreck of

the Feltre is indicated by an arrow. TI shall refer to

the ranges and the lights as indicated on the chart with-

out further description except where necessary to explain

the point under discussion.

NT ARI PE, MLE OT, Mk LITE MEO ALLE CY OM

vi

The meridian line of the chart is at an angle of about

45° with the vertical line of the chart as printed in the

opinion. The course along the lower Cottonwood Range

is 126°. The course along the Upper Cottonwood Range

upstream is 173°. The terms upper and lower range are

used to distinguish between ‘two ranges, one of which

is farther downstream than the other. I shall refer to

the easterly and northerly bank on the Washington side

of the stream as the Feltre’s side of the channel, and the

southerly and westerly side of the stream, that is, the

Oregon side, as the Luckenbach’s side of the channel.

I agree, as the lower court found and the majority opin-

ion holds, that the vessels were obligated to follow the

narrow channel rule in their relation to each other as

they approached for passing. The chart shows the wreck

of the Feltre about 300 feet from the upper range on

the Luckenbach’s side of the channel. There is some

dispute between the parties as to whether or not the loca-

tion of the wreck of the Feltre is at the point of collision,

the Feltre claiming that the collision occurred on the

Upper Cottonwood Island range and that the Feltre was

shoved off the range to her present location by the Luck-

enbach in the collision.

The character of the injuries to the Feltre and her

cargo would indicate a sudden sinking. Divers examin-

ing the wreck found certain wreckage on the bottom lo-

eated about 15 feet from the starboard side of the Feltre

and 55 feet upstream from the point on the Feltre from

which they were detached by the force of the collision.

The anchor flukes of the Luckenhach which were broken

Vii

off by a boat davit on the Feltre were also found in the

same relation to the wreck of the Feltre, indicating a

movement of 55 feet downstream and 15 feet transversely.

I conclude that the collision occurred 55 feet upstream

from the position of the Feltre wreck while she was 15

feet farther to her right than the position of the wreck.

The place of the collision corroborates the testimony

of the Luekenbach that she was proceeding upstream on

her own side of the channel, in conformity with a one-

blast signal given by the Feltre and answered by the

Luckenbach, when the Feltre sounded two blasts and

turned to her left to the point of collision and that the

Luckenbach, while sounding the danger signal, attempted

to conform to the two-blast signal by turning to her left

to the point of collision. It also tends to negative the

contention of the Feltre that the Luckenbach hegan to

cross to the wrong side of the channel, thus justifving

the two-blast signal and left turn of the Feltre, and then

turned to her right to reeross the bow of the Feltre just

before the collision. As the point of collision is virtually

decisive of the case T shall answer more fully some of the

arguments advanced on behalf of the Feltre to support

her contention.

Tt is claimed the Feltre was proceeding downstream on

the upper range, which would give her a heading of 353°;

that the Luekenbach crossed her bow from left. to right

when only a thousand feet away, then turned hack to her

own right and struck the Feltre’s starboard side before.

the Feltre could alter her course. That is to say, that the

Feltre, during the 1,000 feet, would continue to advance

fee

vili

along the course she was then steering and not in the

direction of the new heading because of the principle

known as the advance of a vessel during turning.' In

‘Under the laws of physics governing the movement

of a vessel through water, the ‘Feltre’ could not have

veered appreciably from her old course before the col-

lision. Even after her head began to change direction,

her hull continued to ‘erab’ straight ahead or even to

leeward. The subject is clearly and accurately discussed

by the outstanding book on navigation—Knight’s Modern

Seamanship 8th edition. ;

‘In diseussing the subject of the steering of steamers,

he has the following to say: (p. 328)

‘<The first effect of putting the rudder over is to

throw the whole mass of the ship off to leeward, so

to speak; that is to say, to the side opposite that

toward which it is desired to gain ground. The

stern goes off most; but the whole ship, except the

extreme bow, is thrown more or less to this side, and

some experiments have seemed to show that even the

bow goes off at first.

‘««The ship ranges ahead nearly along the line of

her original course, but slightly to leeward of it,

for a distance which may be roughly stated as from

two to three ship’s lengths, before she commences to

gain ground in the desired direction.

‘<¢The momentum of the ship along her original

course persists for a time and drives her on along

this line in spite of the forces which are turning

her head away from it.

‘« «The stern does not finally clear the line of the

original course until it has covered from two to

three lengths measured along that line. In the mean-

time, the ship’s head has changed by more than

three points.’

‘Moreover, the Commissioner recognizes the sound-

ness of the contention of Admiral Knight, that a ship

accent meas eae aaa

ix

short, the argument is that the Feltre skidded into the

Luckenbach along the course she was pursuing at the

time the two-blast signal was given by the Feltre which

would mean that the collision must have occurred upon

the upper range if the Feltre was proceeding along it as

she claims. The Feltre’s deduction from this situation

is that she was pushed to the point where she sank after

the collision and that she did not leave her side of the

channel until forced over by the Luckenbach. My conclu-

sion is that the Feltre’s argument that the collision oc-

curred on the upper range is not sustained but, on the

other hand, the argument leads to the conclusion that the

ranges along her course for two or three lengths, after

a helm order is given and executed, in holding as

follows:

“It is an established fact that a ship does not

begin to change her course immediately upon chang-

ing rudder, but will actually move away from the

direction of the turn, or pursue her old course be-

fore it proceeds in the new course. The distance thus

achieved along the new course is called ‘‘advance’’.’

Pe * * * * * *

‘“Knight’s book sets out diagrams showing that a vessel

#20 feet long (the ‘Feltre’ was 460 feet long) proceeds

for over 600 feet along her old course before beginning

to make actual progress on the new course, away from

the old. Her heading may change by 3 points (33 degrees

or more), but the path followed in the water by her hull

continues along the old line.

‘In this case Knight’s principle means that while the

Feltre’s heading may have changed to the left 20 de-

grees (as Second Officer Magris testified), her hull con-

tinued along her old path on the Cottonwood range, right

up to the time of collision.’’

x

Feltre was proceeding on the wrong side of the channel

when she was. struck by the Luckenbach.

Moreover, in addition to the circumstantial evidence as

to the place of collision, which is well-nigh conclusive,

there is direct evidence of the pilot and the helmsman of

the Feltre that before her two-blast signal the Feltre had

already turned off the upper range to the left, presum-

ably for the purpose of following the channel which

passes between the flashing red buoy and the green light,

and that instead of steering directly toward the upper

range lights the Feltre was then being steered with the

range lights on her starboard bow. I quote from their

testimony in the margin.’ I recognize that these wit-

2Captain Turppa:

“‘Q. Prior to your blowing two whistles were you

or were you not still steering by the range lights on

the Upper Cottonwood Range?

‘“A. T was, but I changed it, because the Feltre

was slow-steering; she didn’t change her course very

much.

* * * * * * *

‘‘Mr. Graham: I understand, yes. Captain, at the

time you blew the two whistles on the Feltre were you

or were you not on the Cottonwood Island Range?

‘‘A. T was on the Cottonwood Island Range, but

I steered off from it a little bit. I was just starting

to swing when the Luckenbach came from my star-

board side and nearly headon.’’

Cernolli, wheelsman:

‘“‘Q. Could you tell whether the lights of the ship

which you saw were or were not coming toward

your ship?

‘“\. Yes, they were coming towards our bow.

“<Q, And how did the white lights which you

xi

nesses also gave contrary testimony, but the statements

set out herein are more in harmony with the known facts

and other testimony. In evaluating this testimony it

should be observed that the pilot in command of the

Feltre was not using compass courses to steer by but

was conning the ship with reference to the navigational

beacons and that at the particular time involved in this

action, the helmsman who had been steering with the

upper range lights dead ahead had apparently been di-

rected to swing to the left from the range without being

given any exact or accurate course to steer.

With such steering it is quite understandable that the

Feltre may have swung to her left too far and too soon

and in so doing placed the Luckenbach between herself

and the range lights. As there are considerations which

were steering by bear at that time?

‘‘A. You mean the shore lights? The shore lights

were on my starboard.

* * * * » * *

‘‘Mr. Graham: He has already testified that the

lights he was steering with bore dead ahead of

him.

‘‘Mr. Dorr: No, that was testimony of counsel,

statement.

‘‘Mr. Graham: I don’t think it was. Let me ask

you, when you first saw the vessel, the lights of a

vessel, on your port end [hand], as you testified,

where did the lights that you were steering by

bear?

‘‘A. Directly at our bow. Directly at our bow.

I am talking about the shore lights. Of course, I

don’t know anything about the position of the lights.

It is dark, I don’t know anything about the posi-

tion. I only follow the instructions of the pilot.’

xil

tend to contradict this conclusion I do not attempt to

find the exact course pursued by either vessel. It is |

enough to say that the evidence indicates a clear fault

on the part of the Feltre in leaving her side of the chan-

nel with no clear, convincing proof that the Luckenbach

was in the wrong;’ on the contrary, the circumstantial

evidence and the quoted testimony given by pilot and

wheelsman of the Feltre corroborates the testimony of

the Luckenbach that she was at all times on her own side

of the channel and that the collision resulted from the

action of the Feltre in leaving her side of the channel.

(The City of New York, 147 U.S. 72, 85; The Victory &

The Plymothian, 168 U.S. 410, 423.)

The Feltre and the cargo claimants, in order to ex-

culpate the Feltre from fault in making a sudden change

of course to her left, advance the claim that the Lucken-

bach, in violation of the Feltre’s right of way and pre-

‘Where fault on the part of one vessel is established

by uncontradicted testimony, and such fault is, of itself,

sufficient to account for the disaster, it is not enough

for such vessel to raise a doubt with regard to the

management of the other vessel. There is some presump-

tion at least adverse to its claim, and any reasonable

doubt with regard to the propriety of the conduct of such

other vessel should be resolved in its favor.’’ The City

of New York, 147 U.S. 72, 85.

‘“As between these vessels, the fault of the Victory

being obvious and inexcusable, the evidence to establish

fault on the part of the Plymothian must be clear and

convincing in order to make a case for apportionment.

The burden of proof is upon each vessel to establish

fault on the part of the other.’’ The Victory and The

Plymothian, 168 U.S. 410, 423.

xiii

vious one-blast signal, began to cross the Feltre’s bow

to the wrong side of the Upper Cottonwood Island range,

and thus produced a situation which justified the Feltre

in acting in extremis to attempt to avoid the collision

by a left wheel as she did. To support this conclusion

which, as I have already pointed out, is inconsistent with

the location of the collision, it is attempted to reconstruct

the whole course of the Luckenbach from the time she

left the Longview Bridge until the time of the collision.

This attempt is based largely upon the automatic record

of the gyro compass course and time shown by the auto-

matic gyro compass recorder on the Luckenbach which

shows the heading of the ship at all times during this pe-

riod. In order to interpret the gyroscopic compass record

the recording roll was sent to the Sperry Gyroscope Com-

pany which examined the record and from it certified the

compass heading for each minute of time from 1:15 a. m.

when the Luckenbach passed under the Longview Bridge

until 1:41 a. m., the time of the collision.

With these headings and corresponding times Captain

Conway, an expert pilot, attempted to draw upon a chart

the course indicated by the gyro record. There are sev-

eral reasons why his charted course should be entirely

disregarded. In the first place, the record certified by

the Sperry Gyroscope Company is not as accurate as it

might have been. The company certified that: ‘‘A more

accurate and closer check of this Course Recorder record

could he made with a special instrument we have for that

purpose. This instrument is at our New York office but

could he brought here if necessary.’’

xiv

Second, the record did not take into account the effect

of the ebb tide or of leeway on the actual course of the

vessel.

Third, the course drawn necessarily assumes the ele-

ment of distance which in turn involves the speed of the

vessel, as to which Captain Conway made no satisfactory

assumptions and reached no reasonably acceptable con-

clusions.

One illustration of the difficulties presented by his

charted course is shown by the contention of the parties

with relation to the course from the white light on the

Middle Dike to the passage between the red and green

lights off Dobelbower Bar.

Captain Conway showed this space to have been tra-

versed in two minutes, the first minute at 151.5° and the

second at 152°. The distance thus run is 3,000 feet which

would require a speed of 15 knots. As the Edward Luck-

enbach could not make more than 18 knots under the most

favorable conditions and was heading against an ebb tide

estimated at a knot and one-half or two knots, the Feltre

argues that the time during which the Luckenhbach trav-

elled at approximately 151.5° was about three minutes,

that is, that it took three, and not two, minutes to pass

between these points. From this point it is argued that

the speed was 101%, knots, instead of 15 as shown by Con-

way’s charted course, which speed of 1014 knots conforms

to the testimony of some of the witnesses as to speed.

The difficulty with this argument is that it proves the

chart to be utterly worthless. That is to say, instead of

proving it to he accurate it proves that the chart shows

XV

that a certain distance was traversed in two minutes

whereas it was actually travelled in three minutes.

The course traversed by the Luckenbach up to the

time the two vessels sighted one another when one and

one-half miles distant is entirely immaterial. The Feltre

and cargo claimants rely so strongly upon the contention

that the evidence shows that during that period the

Luckenbach was travelling on the wrong side of the

channel that perhaps something further should be said

on the subject. [It is true that in navigation the course

and distance traversed between changes of course are

considered in determining the position of the vessel at

any given time. This approximate method is called dead

reckoning. A position ascertained by dead reckoning al-

ways gives way to the more correct determination of the

actual position by astronomical observation, or by a fixing

of the position of the vessel with reference to distance

and direction from known objects or monuments. For

illustration, if the Luekenbach passed within 150 feet

of the flashing red buoy, as her witnesses testified, it is

of no significance that the course charted by Captain

Conway placed the ship within 300 feet of the green

light. The difference would merely show that Captain

Conway’s course was wrong.

The cargo claimants have introduced testimony of sev-

eral witnesses to show that the Edward Luckenhach,

while passing between these red and green lights, was

within two or three hundred feet of the green one on

the wrong side of the channel.

Before proceeding to consider the testimony of these

Witnesses separately, I draw attention to a fact which

PE nd

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AGG RARE BRN

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xvi

must be remembered with reference to all of them; that

is, that it is impossible for a person observing a light

more than a few hundred feet away to tell how far

away the light is. This known fact was shown by the

testimony of Captain Turppa, pilot of the Feltre, who,

when asked whether his ship was 1500 to 2000 feet

from the Edward Luckenbach when he gave his two-blast

signal, replied, ‘‘Probably so, but in the night time it

is awful hard to tell, when you have got a light ahead

of you, it is hard to judge the distance.”’ Captain Stayton,

another witness, also testified that it is impossible to

judge the distance of a light with any degree of accuracy.

With this fact in mind, I turn to an examination of the

testimony offered by the cargo claimants.

he first of the witnesses mentioned was Captain

Turppa, pilot of the Feltre, who testified that the Ed-

ward Luckenbach was ‘‘unusually close’’, ‘‘very close to

the green light’? when she passed between the two lights.

As indicated by him on a chart, the distance was ap-

proximately two hundred fifty feet. Had the Hdward

Luckenbach been approaching directly toward the witness,

her apparent position in relation to the red and green

lights would have remained constant, and could have

been observed with accuracy at any time, whether while

she was in fact between them, or before or after. [ow-

ever, as Captain Turppa himself testified, the Edward

Luckenbach was not coming toward him, but was on a

course crossing his bow from left to right. Under these

conditions, her lights would have appeared to move

steadily from the red light toward the green one, and

it would have been only in the moment that she was in

XVil

fact crossing the line between the two lights that he

could have seen her true position in relation to them.

Thus, the accuracy of Captain Turppa’s observation of

the relative distances between the ship and the red and

green lights, depends upon the accuracy of his deter-

mination of the precise instant when she was crossing

the line between the lights. Such a determination, how-

ever, could only rest upon his estimate of her distance

from him; and since he could see nothing of her but

her lights, he had no way of determining the distance.

Captain Turppa estimated this distance to have been

half a mile at the time that he believed the Kdward

Luckenbach to be between the lights. Since the Edward

Luckenbach and the Feltre were approaching the point

of collision at speeds of about twelve and ten knots,

respectively, the Kdward Luckenbach, when half a mile

from the Feltre, would have been about 1382 feet down-

stream from the point of collision. If she was in fact

that far up the stream, and moving in the direction

to which Captain Turppa testified, reference to the chart

will show that she must in fact have passed between

the red and green lights about three minutes before,

close to the red one, although she appeared to Captain

Turppa to be between them at the later time and closer

to the green.

The second witness offered by the cargo claimants to

establish the Edward Luekenbach’s position as nearer

the green light was Lloyd Deuechar, watchman on duty

on the bridge of the tug Georgia Burton. The Georgia

Burton, with five barges in tow, was proceeding up the

right hand side of the channel at a speed which Deuchar

XViii

could only describe as ‘‘slow’’, and which her pilot, Cap-

tain Carrau, estimated as about four knots. Deuchar

fixed the position of the Georgia Burton as about op-

posite the Dobelbower white light, (half a mile upstream

from Rainier) when the Edward Lueckenbach made her

first turn from the general direction of the lower range.

(126° to 151°)

Deuchar estimated that his vessel was then about a

mile astern of the Luekenbach. The distance marked by

him on the chart is about a mile and a quarter. We

have already pointed out that no reasonably accurate

estimate can be made of the distance of a light at night.

Deuchar, however, claimed to have been able to fix the

position of the Edward Luekenbach upstream at various

points. He stated that he knew that she had passed the

Middle Dyke light some distance before she began to

turn (from 126° to 151°), because he could see open

water between the light and the ship, and that he could

tell when she was between the red and green lights

because ‘‘she opened up the lower range, then she

opened up the red light,”’ and that he could put her

lights in a line with the two shore lights, and see that

she was nearer the green.

An examination of Deuchar’s testimony and chart shows

that after making her first turn, the Edward Luckenbach

was moving to his right at an angle of 25° with his

course as he observed her. It follows that he, as Cap-

tain Turppa, could only observe her relative position

when between the red and green lights at the moment

when she was actually crossing the line between them,

and that moment he had no way of determining. His

RT 8 a YR WPT Rn MNT A ETP RIE SAE PRR rt

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3

Xix

explanations, referred to above, as to how he fixed the

Edward Luckenbach’s position with respect to her dis-

tance from him, will be seen on examination to have no

merit. Everything which he observed would have had

the very appearance which he described, whether the

Edward Luckenbach was where he thought her, or very

much closer to him, so long as she was in the same diree-

tion from him. That she was in such a closer position

is the testimony of her own officers, and Deuchar was

not in a position to observe anything by which this testi-

mony could be refuted.

The third of these witnesses offered by the cargo

claimants was Captain Carrau, pilot of the Georgia Bur-

ton. He testified that the Edward Luckenbach passed him

just at the upper end of Rainier, and turned to the

right after getting well past the Middle Dyke light and

close to the green light. He said that it would be ‘‘pretty

hard’? for him to tell how close she was to the green

light; and as [ have already shown with reference to

Captain Turppa and Deuchar, it would in fact be im-

possible for him to estimate the distance. Captain Carrau

attempted to fix the position of the Edward Luckenbach

as passing near the green light by stating that she

shut it off from him; but that would have been equally

true had she turned to the right much farther down-

stream than he thought.

It should also be observed that if the Georgia Burton

was just at the upper end of Rainier when the Edward

Luckenbach passed her, as Captain Carrau testified, and

was opposite the Dobelbower white light when the Fd-

ward Luekenbach turned, as Deuchar testified, and her

FC WTS hE EES CTT

P Pe Aer ge attr

xX

speed was four knots or more, as stated by Captain

Carrau, then only about eight minutes can have elapsed

between those events. For the Edward Luckenbach, in

those eight minutes, to have traveled from the upper

end of Rainier to the point fixed by Deuchar and Captain

Carrau as her place of turn she would have had to move

at a speed of about fourteen knots. Since her top speed,

without adverse wind or tide, was thirteen knots, it

seems much more likely that she turned farther down-

stream than Deuchar and Captain Carrau_ believed.

The fourth of these witnesses offered by the cargo

claimants was Captain Stayton, pilot of the West Ca-

margo. The West Camargo was a freighter which left

Longview, bound upstream, just as the Edward Lucken-

bach was passing. Her speed was about eight knots over

the ground. When the West Camargo reached the lower

range, a mile upstream from Longview, the Edward

Luckenbach appeared to Captain Stayton to be about

a mile and a half farther upstream, either on the range

or within a ship’s width of it to the left. He could see

nothing of her but her stern light. At a point which

Captain Stayton believed to be about opposite the Middle

Dyke light the Edward Luckenbach turned to the right

(126° to 152°); but he stated that he could not tell

whether it was abeam of the light or above or below it.

He testified that when she passed between the red blinker

and green light he could see that she was in the

half of the channel nearer the green light, about one-third

of the way from the green to the red. He saw the Feltre

at that time about opposite the upper end of the Prescott

dock, but could not tell whether she was in her right

—

XXi

or left half of the channel. He did not notice the Edward

Luckenbach after she passed the flashing white front light

of the upper range, and at that time she had not crossed

to the left of the upper range.

Captain Stayton himself repeatedly pointed out that it

was impossible to judge the distance between him and

the Edward Luckenbach. His estimate of a mile and a

half is obviously erroneous. The two ships were at Long-

view at the same time, and the highest estimate of the

Edward Luckenbach’s speed (based on the time it took

her to go from Longview Bridge to the Middle Dyke) is

about twelve knots. If the speed of the West Camargo

was eight knots, the Edward Luckenbach would have

been only half a mile, rather than a mile and a half,

upstream from the West Camargo when the latter was a

mile from Longview.

Captain Stayton, who was himself on the lower range,

contradicts the testimony of other witnesses, (Deuchar and

Carrau) whose point of view was less advantageous, that

the Edward Luckenbach was substantially to the left of

the range. He was admittedly unable to tell how far up-

stream she was when she turned from 126° to 152° and

he would for the same reason have been unable to tell

when she was in fact between the flashing red buoy and

green lights. Thus his testimony so far as it rests on

matters which it was within his power to observe sup-

ports, rather than conflicts with, the contention of the

Edward Luckenbach that she was at all times on her

side of the channel.

Xxli

The Feltre owners have attempted by the testimony of

officers and men of their own ship to establish the course

of the Edward Luckenbach from the time she passed be-

tween the flashing red buoy and fixed green light until

the collision. Captain Turppa, pilot of the Feltre, testified

that he was steering directly down the Upper Cottonwood

Island range (353°) prior to the collision, and that the

Edward Luckenbach was proceeding steadily on a course

which, as he drew it on a chart, was of 155°, inter-

secting the course of the Feltre on the range less than a

ship’s length upstream from the front light of the upper

range. The speed of the Feltre he estimated as twelve

knots over the ground. He stated that he blew a one-blast

signal for a port-to-port passing, just after the Edward

Luckenbach had passed between the flashing red buoy

and fixed green light, which he estimated to be about

a half mile away from the Feltre. He heard no answer

to this signal and testified that the Edward Luckenbach

held a steady course. He testified that he continued on his

course, 353°, until the Edward Luckenbach crossed his

bow, so that she obscured the lights of the Upper Range

on which he was steering, and continued to hide them

from him until after the collision. Upon seeing his range

lights obscured, Captain Turppa ordered his wheel left

(or hard left) and blew a two-blast signal for a starboard-

to-starboard passing, believing, as he testified, that a

port-to-port passing was no longer possible. He believed

the ships then to be 1500 to 2000 feet apart. Captain

Turppa was unable, because of the darkness, to fix his

position up or down stream at the time this was done,

except that he was below Prescott. He testified that the

XXlil

Feltre had just begun to swing left when the Edward

Luckenbach, which he testified had held a steady course up

* * * whirled right around

to that moment, ‘‘all at once

and came over at him.’’ He testified that within half

a minute after his two-blast signal was given, the Edward

Luckenbach hit the Feltre on her starboard side abreast

of the number two hatch, pushing her three hundred feet

off the range to her left and that the Feltre sank about

450 or 500 feet downstream from the place of collision.

Captain Turppa’s testimony that the Edward Lucken-

bach held a steady course until immediately before the

collision is contradicted by the automatic record of her

compass heading, and his estimate of the Edward Luck-

enbach’s position when, as he testified, she obscured the

range lights is inconsistent both with his estimate of

the distance (1500 to 2000 feet) between the vessels at

that time, and with the actual place of collision, which

would necessarily have been at least a quarter of a mile

farther downstream, had his placing of the Luckenbach

been correct.

I conclude that Captain Turppa’s account of the acci-

dent is so at variance with established facts as to be

altogether unreliable.

‘This mechanical record establishes that the Edward

Luckenbach did not run on a steady course after passing

the flashing red light and until the two-blast signal of

the Feltre, as the Feltre’s pilot testified. On the con-

trary, her course had varied from 152° to 188.5°. The

change of course in the last minute from 188.5° to 180.5°

indicates her effort to comply with the two-blast signal

of the Feltre and also indicates why the Edward Lucken-

bach struck the starboard side of the Feltre.

XXiV

Other witnesses on the Feltre, whose testimony was

introduced, were Carlo Cernolli, the wheelsman, Ezio

Magris, second officer, who was on the bridge, Mario

Rainieri, the captain, and Antonio Roiaz, a sailor.

Cernolli testified that he was steering on the range

lights, which were in a straight line ‘‘directly on the

bow’’, though he also stated, as previously noted herein,

that they were on his starboard. He stated that the

Feltre blew a one-blast signal, to which he heard no

answer; that about two minutes later the Edward Luck-

enbach crossed his bow, and the Feltre blew two blasts

and ordered hard left. He testified that he could not

remember whether or not the Edward Luckenbach ob-

seured the range lights as she crossed his bow, and,

that she did.

Immediately prior to the crash, and after the hard

left order was given, Cernolli saw the Edward Lucken-

bach’s mast lights and green running light on his. star-

board hand. He testified both that the Feltre swung

left in response to the hard left wheel before the col-

lision, and that he could not recall whether or not she

had done so. It is apparent that his testimony as to the

course of the Edward Luckenbach is opposed to her aute-

matie compass record, and to that extent is untrue.

Ezio Magris, second mate of the Feltre, was on duty

on the bridge at the time of the collision. He testified

that the ship was steering on the upper range lights,

directly ahead in line, at a speed of 12 knots over the

ground. The Edward Luckenbach was first seen 114 miles

off on a course crossing their course at an angle of

XXV

from 40° to 50°. Magris also saw the flashing red buoy

put could not estimate the Edward Luckenbach’s distance

from it. The Edward Luckenbach holding this steady

course, the Feltre, when they were about three-quarters

of a mile apart, blew a single blast. The Edward Lucken-

bach gave no reply, and made no change in her course,

continuing across the Feltre’s bow until when about a

quarter mile ahead she obscured the range lights. At

that instant the Feltre blew two blasts and her wheel was

ordered hard left. The Edward Luckenbach continued

to the Feltre’s right, and the Feltre swung to her left,

turning about 20° in the thirty seconds following the

two-blast signal. This he testified placed the two vessels

about parallel and far enough apart to pass safely star-

board to starboard. Then the Edward Luckenbach swung

suddenly to her left, and her bow hit the Feltre on her

starboard side at the number two hatch, forward of ihe

bridge. The Feltre heeled slightly to her left, then within

three or four seconds listed to her right at an angle of

about 45°. After drifting for a few minutes, she came to

rest on the bottom.

This testimony, like that of Captain Turppa and Cer-

nolli, is irreconcilable with the Edward Luckenbach’s

compass headings.

Captain Rainieri, master of the Feltre, was not on deck

at the time of the collision, but was in his eabin under

the bridge, on the starboard side. He heard the single

blast, and no answer. Then he heard the double blast,

and recognizing it as abnormal, looked out of a starboard

porthole, but could see nothing. He then started up to

the bridge, and the collision came within 30 or 40

XXxvl

seconds, and before he reached it. The Feltre first listed

slightly to the left under the impact, then about 40°

to the right, and sank rapidly. Prior to the collision, the

ship was steering on the range lights, at a speed of

1214, to 13 knots over the ground, the speed of the current

being from one to 114 knots.

The last Feltre witness whose testimony could shed

any light on the conduct of the Edward Luckenbach was

Antonio Roiaz, a sailor whe had been on the bridge but

had gone below to make coffee before the collision. He

testified that immediately on hearing the two whistles he

looked out from the port side of the Feltre, and saw the

stern of the Edward Luckenbach crossing the Feltre’s

bow but could not estimate its distance away. He heard

no whistles from the Edward Luckenbach. He returned

to the pantry, and the collision followed shortly. He

estimated the interval between the single and double

blasts as about a minute.

This testimony tends to corroborate that of Captain

Turppa; but, for reasons which I have already stated, I

cannot accept the icory that the Edward Luekenbach in

fact crossed the bow of the Feltre in the manner de-

scribed.

The cargo claimants also offered the testimony of Fred

Closner. Closner was a track walker who observed the

collision from a railroad track close to the Washington

shore, at a point about five-eighths of a mile upstream

from Carrolls Bluff.

Closner testified that he watched the Feltre and the

Edward Luckenbach approaching one another for six

XXVil

or seven minutes up to the time of the collision; that the

Feltre was moving downstream on her right hand side of

the river and that she turned slightly away from him

just before the collision; that the Edward Luckenbach

eame steadily toward him across the river, until she

turned rapidly to her right half or three-quarters of a

minute before the collision; and that the collision occurred

on his side of the river.

Perhaps the first comment to be made on Closner’s

testimony is that Cottonwood Island interposed between

him and the main part of the river where the collision

occurred. This would in itself make it difficult for him

to judge the position of the ships in relation to the sides

of the river. He testified that he could not tell if the

ships moved toward him or away from him after the

collision. It is not shown that he knew the location of

the navigable channel and he did not claim to locate

the ships with relation to the channel, which is the point

in dispute.

It will also be noted that Closner’s statement that the

Edward Luckenbach pursued a steady course toward him

until half or three-quarters of a minute before the col-

lision is refuted by her gyro record which shows a steady

turn to the right for the period from three minutes be-

fore the collision to one minute before it. All the evidence

to the contrary is insufficient to overcome the evidence

of the pilot of the Luckenbach and his corroborating

witnesses that he steered for a point about 150 feet to

the left of the red flashing buoy and passed the buoy at

that distance from it.

XXViii

I conclude that the Edward Luckenbach was not at

fault in passing to the left hand side of the channel or ip

failing to allow sufficient space for safe passage of the

Feltre.

The Luckenbach’s other faults.

The Commissioner and the trial court also found the

Edward Luckenbach failed seasonably to sound the danger

signal and to stop and reverse. The evidence is that there

was no apparent danger of collision until the Feltre

sounded the two-blast signal and that the Edward Luck-

enbach instantly sounded the danger signal and signaled

to stop and reverse and that the engines were stopped,

but that in the short period, estimated at 30 seconds, be-

fore the collision there was no time to reverse.

In support of the finding the cargo claimants argue

that, whether or not the Edward Luckenbach both violated

the narrow channel rule and also failed seasonably to

stop and sound the danger signal, she must be guilty

of at least one of these faults. According to her own

witnesses, they say, the Edward Luckenbach’s danger

signal and stop order preceded the collision by from

ten to thirty seconds. The Feltre could not leave her

course in so short a time. Therefore, the collision was

necessarily on the course which the Feltre had been on

before her two-blast signal was given. If that course was

on the range, the Edward Luckenbach, to strike the

Feltre as she did on the starboard, must have violated

the narrow channel rule. If, on the other hand, that course

was to the left of the range, the Edward Luckenbach

should have observed that fact and blown a danger signal

long before the Feltre’s two-blast signal was given.

| XX1x

The answer to this is that, according to Captain Turppa,

the Feltre had begun her left turn away from the range

before the two-blast signal was given. This turn probably

was not observable from the Edward Luckenbach until

about the time of the two-blast signal, following which

it continued to accelerate until, at the time of the col-

lision, it had placed the Feltre three hundred feet to

her left of the range.

Cargo claimants next argue that the Edward Lucken-

bach was at fault in not sooner stopping and reversing.

If, they argue, the collision occurred thre hundred feet

off the range, as the owners of the Edward Luckenbach

contend, the Feltre, to achieve that transverse distance

from her course, must have moved forward at least 1725

feet. This estimate is based on turning tables shown in

Knight on Modern Seamanship. While the Feltre was

travelling this 1725 feet, the Edward Luckenbach would

have travelled at least 1574 feet, so that the vessels must

have been separated by at least 3299 feet when the Feltre

first began to leave the range. In other words, over a

minute and a half before the collision, if it occurred 300

feet to the Feltre’s left of the range, the Edward Lucken-

bach should have seen the necessity for stopping and re-

versing, a precaution which she delayed for more than

a minute.

This entire argument rests on the assumption, which

is said to be admitted, that the Feltre was on the range

until she made her hard left turn. In fact this was not

admitted. The Luckenbach witnesses merely testified that

the Feltre appeared to be about on the range. Since they

themselves were never on the range, they could not do

xxx

more than approximate the Feltre’s position in relation

to it, never with enough accuracy to support the careful

structure of computations erected by the cargo claimants,

I conclude that the Edward Luckenbach did not fail

seasonably to sound the danger signal, stop and reverse,

The finding of the commissioner and the trial court

that the Edward Luckenbach proceeded at an immoderate

speed is not sustained by the evidence. The evidence in

that regard is that her speed did not exceed 10 or 10%,

knots, owing to a head wind and ebb tide.

The commissioner also found that the Edward Lucken-

bach was at fault in failing to take compass bearings of

the Feltre. No such fault was alleged in the pleadings,

and there is no testimony indicating that such compass

bearings would have been of any value under the cir.

cumstances.

The interlocutory order should be reversed and the

trial court directed to proceed in accordance with the

findings as modified, namely, that the Edward Lucken-

bach was without fault and the Feltre was solely to

blame for the collision.

(Endorsed:) Opinion and Dissenting Opinion. Filed

Mar. 23, 1942. Pauli P. O’Brien, Clerk.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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