Appendix — Luckenbach Steamship Co. v. Societa Anonima Partecipazioni Industriali Commerciali
Supreme Court brief1942
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DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE WILBUR
Wiser, Circuit Judge:
I dissent,
An explanation of my reasons for disagreeing with
the opinion of the majority requires a detailed examina-
tion of the facts. The collision between the steamship
Edward Luekenhbach and the motorship Feltre oeenrred
at 1:40 on the morning of February 17, 1937, in the Colum-
bia River at a point between Cottonwood Island and
Prescott, Oregon, about four miles above Loneview,
Washington. The question at issue herein is the responsi-
bility for the collision. The Commissioner held both ves-
sels at fault and the owners of the “dward Luckenbach
entitled to limit their liability. The district court ap-
proved and adopted the findings and entered an inter-
locutory decree. From this decree hoth sides have ap-
pealed,
The Edward Lueckenbach was owned by the Luekenbach
Steamship Company, Ine., and the Feltre by the Societa
Anonima Partecipazioni Industrial Commercial.
The Societa Anonima Partecipazioni Tndustriali Com-
merciali and Navigazione Libera Triestina, S. A.. the
owner and operator of the Feltre, filed a libel against
the Lueckenbach Steamship Company, Ine.. as owner and
operator of the Luckenbach, and against the Luckenbach
herself, to recover damages sustained by the Feltre and
her cargo in the said collision. This libel was filed in the
Northern District of California.
Thereafter, the Luekenhach Steamship Company, Inc.,
as owner of the Edward Luckenhack. filed in the District
ECW TRE CRA A Naf FRO NOD EDS PROTEIN RAA n LTA LOE ATE it ALN DIONNE ta PIE lS SE ARTERY RI LNES TE LO TN ~
ii
Court for the Northern District of California, a petition
for exoneration from or limitation of liability. The own-
ers and operators of the Feltre and her cargo thereupon
filed claims and answers in the limitation proceedings,
as did the Spett Societa di Sicurata Fra Amatori, the
underwriter of the Feltre’s hull.
Objections to these claims and answers were filed by
petitioner Luckenbach Steamship Company, Inc., which
also filed a cross-libel against the owners and operator
of the Feltre for damages sustained by the Luckenbach
in the collision.
The trial court found as follows:
‘“‘The Edward Luckenbach is a steamturbine vessel
of about 6141 net tons burden, being 457 feet long
and having a beam of 57 feet. At the time of the
collision she was proceeding up the Columbia River
bound for Portland, Oregon. She was partly loaded
and had a draft of 14 feet 6 inches forward and 18
feet 6 inches aft.
‘‘The Feltre, a motorship powered by means of a
Burmeister Diesel engine, is a vessel of 6101 tons
gross burden and 3773 tons net burden and is about
460 feet in length with a beam of 55 feet. At the
time of the collision she was proceeding down the
Columbia River bound to sea. She was carrying about
3500 tons of cargo and had a draft of 16 feet 2 inches
forward and 18 feet aft.
‘‘Prior to and at the time of the collision, the wind
was estimated to be blowing from 25 to 60 miles per
hour from a south southeasterly direction, or approxi-
mately directly down the Upper Cottonwood [sland
Range. The wind was striking the Feltre astern and was
Br
G tT.
iii
striking the Edward Luckenbach on her starboard bow
as the vessels proceeded toward the point where the
collision occurred. Visibility was good, although it
was raining, and was estimated by witnesses to be
from three to six miles. The tide was ebb and was
running against the Luckenbach; and the set of the
tide and current was toward the Washington side of
the river in the vicinity where the collision occurred.
The current was running at a speed of about two
knots per hour, The vessels sighted each other when
the Edward Luckenbach was below the red flashing
buoy on Dobelbower Bar and the Feltre was about
Prescott.
‘The Columbia River in the vicinity where the two
vessels were navigating for some time prior to and
at the time of the collision is a narrow channel within
the meaning of Article 25 of the Inland Rules (33 U.S.
Code, section 210), and said Article 25 was applicable
to the navigation of both vessels in approaching and
passing each other.
‘“‘Both vessels had been proceeding with engines at
full speed ahead for some time prior to the collision
and both vessels continued with engines at full speed
ahead until the impact. The speed of the Edward
Luckenbach was about 7.77 knots per hour over the
ground and the speed of the Feltre was about 12
knots per hour over the ground.
““The two vessels collided at a sharp angle. The
stem of the Edward Luckenbach struck the Feltre on
her starboard side at the No. 2 hatch and ripped off a
considerable section of the Feltre’s plating, as a result
of which the Feltre sank.
‘The collision occurred about four miles above
Longview, Washington, at a point between the upper
iv
end of Cottonwood Island and the lower end of Pres-
eott Dock, and, with respect to the channel, the col-
lision occurred between the Upper Cottonwood Island
Range and a point 300 feet to the right of the Upper
Cottonwood Island Range, proceeding upstream.
“‘The collision and the resulting damage to both
vessels and to the cargo carried on the Feltre was
due to and caused by the negligent navigation and
faults of both vessels in the particulars hereinafter
set forth.
‘“The steamship Edward Luckenbach and petitioner
were guilty in the following respects of negligent
navigation and faults which contributed to and caused
the said collision and consequent damages :
‘$1, She violated the narrow channel rule in that
she navigated too far to her own left and crossed the
Upper Cottonwood Island Range.
‘2. She failed seasonably to sound the danger sig-
nal and failed to stop and reverse under the attend-
ant circumstances and conditions.
«3. She proceeded at an immoderate rate of speed
for the conditions prevailing.
‘‘4. She failed, in a channel of ample width to
enable the vessels to pass safely without crowding,
to navigate so as to allow a safe margin for passing
the Feltre.
‘5 She failed to take any compass bearings of the
approaching Feltre, a precaution which would have
permitted her to observe a safer margin in passing
the Feltre.
‘“‘The Feltre and those in charge of her navigation
were guilty in the following respects of negligent nav-
igation and faults which contributed to and caused
the said collision and consequent damage:
‘1. She did not have a proper lookout in that no
lookout was stationed in the bow of the ship and no
member of the watch was stationed elsewhere for the
sole purpose of acting as lookout.
**2. She failed to sound the danger signal and
failed to stop and reverse as required by the attend-
ant circumstances and conditions.
**3. She sounded a two-blast signal and altered
her course to her own left before the Edward Lucken-
bach assented.
“4. She violated the narrow channel rule by swing-
ing to her own left across the Upper Cottonwood
Island Range.
‘5. She proceeded at an immoderate rate of speed
for the conditions prevailing.
‘“*6. She failed in a channel of ample width to al-
low a safe margin for passing the Edward Lucken-
bach.
“7. She failed to take any compass bearings of
the Edward Luekenbach as the two vessels approached
each other, a precaution which would have permitted
her to observe a safer margin in passing the Edward
Luckenbach.’’
A copy of the government chart of the loeality is in-
corporated in the majority opinion, with explanatory re-
marks inserted thereon. The location of the wreck of
the Feltre is indicated by an arrow. TI shall refer to
the ranges and the lights as indicated on the chart with-
out further description except where necessary to explain
the point under discussion.
NT ARI PE, MLE OT, Mk LITE MEO ALLE CY OM
vi
The meridian line of the chart is at an angle of about
45° with the vertical line of the chart as printed in the
opinion. The course along the lower Cottonwood Range
is 126°. The course along the Upper Cottonwood Range
upstream is 173°. The terms upper and lower range are
used to distinguish between ‘two ranges, one of which
is farther downstream than the other. I shall refer to
the easterly and northerly bank on the Washington side
of the stream as the Feltre’s side of the channel, and the
southerly and westerly side of the stream, that is, the
Oregon side, as the Luckenbach’s side of the channel.
I agree, as the lower court found and the majority opin-
ion holds, that the vessels were obligated to follow the
narrow channel rule in their relation to each other as
they approached for passing. The chart shows the wreck
of the Feltre about 300 feet from the upper range on
the Luckenbach’s side of the channel. There is some
dispute between the parties as to whether or not the loca-
tion of the wreck of the Feltre is at the point of collision,
the Feltre claiming that the collision occurred on the
Upper Cottonwood Island range and that the Feltre was
shoved off the range to her present location by the Luck-
enbach in the collision.
The character of the injuries to the Feltre and her
cargo would indicate a sudden sinking. Divers examin-
ing the wreck found certain wreckage on the bottom lo-
eated about 15 feet from the starboard side of the Feltre
and 55 feet upstream from the point on the Feltre from
which they were detached by the force of the collision.
The anchor flukes of the Luckenhach which were broken
Vii
off by a boat davit on the Feltre were also found in the
same relation to the wreck of the Feltre, indicating a
movement of 55 feet downstream and 15 feet transversely.
I conclude that the collision occurred 55 feet upstream
from the position of the Feltre wreck while she was 15
feet farther to her right than the position of the wreck.
The place of the collision corroborates the testimony
of the Luekenbach that she was proceeding upstream on
her own side of the channel, in conformity with a one-
blast signal given by the Feltre and answered by the
Luckenbach, when the Feltre sounded two blasts and
turned to her left to the point of collision and that the
Luckenbach, while sounding the danger signal, attempted
to conform to the two-blast signal by turning to her left
to the point of collision. It also tends to negative the
contention of the Feltre that the Luckenbach hegan to
cross to the wrong side of the channel, thus justifving
the two-blast signal and left turn of the Feltre, and then
turned to her right to reeross the bow of the Feltre just
before the collision. As the point of collision is virtually
decisive of the case T shall answer more fully some of the
arguments advanced on behalf of the Feltre to support
her contention.
Tt is claimed the Feltre was proceeding downstream on
the upper range, which would give her a heading of 353°;
that the Luekenbach crossed her bow from left. to right
when only a thousand feet away, then turned hack to her
own right and struck the Feltre’s starboard side before.
the Feltre could alter her course. That is to say, that the
Feltre, during the 1,000 feet, would continue to advance
fee
vili
along the course she was then steering and not in the
direction of the new heading because of the principle
known as the advance of a vessel during turning.' In
‘Under the laws of physics governing the movement
of a vessel through water, the ‘Feltre’ could not have
veered appreciably from her old course before the col-
lision. Even after her head began to change direction,
her hull continued to ‘erab’ straight ahead or even to
leeward. The subject is clearly and accurately discussed
by the outstanding book on navigation—Knight’s Modern
Seamanship 8th edition. ;
‘In diseussing the subject of the steering of steamers,
he has the following to say: (p. 328)
‘<The first effect of putting the rudder over is to
throw the whole mass of the ship off to leeward, so
to speak; that is to say, to the side opposite that
toward which it is desired to gain ground. The
stern goes off most; but the whole ship, except the
extreme bow, is thrown more or less to this side, and
some experiments have seemed to show that even the
bow goes off at first.
‘««The ship ranges ahead nearly along the line of
her original course, but slightly to leeward of it,
for a distance which may be roughly stated as from
two to three ship’s lengths, before she commences to
gain ground in the desired direction.
‘<¢The momentum of the ship along her original
course persists for a time and drives her on along
this line in spite of the forces which are turning
her head away from it.
‘« «The stern does not finally clear the line of the
original course until it has covered from two to
three lengths measured along that line. In the mean-
time, the ship’s head has changed by more than
three points.’
‘Moreover, the Commissioner recognizes the sound-
ness of the contention of Admiral Knight, that a ship
accent meas eae aaa
ix
short, the argument is that the Feltre skidded into the
Luckenbach along the course she was pursuing at the
time the two-blast signal was given by the Feltre which
would mean that the collision must have occurred upon
the upper range if the Feltre was proceeding along it as
she claims. The Feltre’s deduction from this situation
is that she was pushed to the point where she sank after
the collision and that she did not leave her side of the
channel until forced over by the Luckenbach. My conclu-
sion is that the Feltre’s argument that the collision oc-
curred on the upper range is not sustained but, on the
other hand, the argument leads to the conclusion that the
ranges along her course for two or three lengths, after
a helm order is given and executed, in holding as
follows:
“It is an established fact that a ship does not
begin to change her course immediately upon chang-
ing rudder, but will actually move away from the
direction of the turn, or pursue her old course be-
fore it proceeds in the new course. The distance thus
achieved along the new course is called ‘‘advance’’.’
Pe * * * * * *
‘“Knight’s book sets out diagrams showing that a vessel
#20 feet long (the ‘Feltre’ was 460 feet long) proceeds
for over 600 feet along her old course before beginning
to make actual progress on the new course, away from
the old. Her heading may change by 3 points (33 degrees
or more), but the path followed in the water by her hull
continues along the old line.
‘In this case Knight’s principle means that while the
Feltre’s heading may have changed to the left 20 de-
grees (as Second Officer Magris testified), her hull con-
tinued along her old path on the Cottonwood range, right
up to the time of collision.’’
x
Feltre was proceeding on the wrong side of the channel
when she was. struck by the Luckenbach.
Moreover, in addition to the circumstantial evidence as
to the place of collision, which is well-nigh conclusive,
there is direct evidence of the pilot and the helmsman of
the Feltre that before her two-blast signal the Feltre had
already turned off the upper range to the left, presum-
ably for the purpose of following the channel which
passes between the flashing red buoy and the green light,
and that instead of steering directly toward the upper
range lights the Feltre was then being steered with the
range lights on her starboard bow. I quote from their
testimony in the margin.’ I recognize that these wit-
2Captain Turppa:
“‘Q. Prior to your blowing two whistles were you
or were you not still steering by the range lights on
the Upper Cottonwood Range?
‘“A. T was, but I changed it, because the Feltre
was slow-steering; she didn’t change her course very
much.
* * * * * * *
‘‘Mr. Graham: I understand, yes. Captain, at the
time you blew the two whistles on the Feltre were you
or were you not on the Cottonwood Island Range?
‘‘A. T was on the Cottonwood Island Range, but
I steered off from it a little bit. I was just starting
to swing when the Luckenbach came from my star-
board side and nearly headon.’’
Cernolli, wheelsman:
‘“‘Q. Could you tell whether the lights of the ship
which you saw were or were not coming toward
your ship?
‘“\. Yes, they were coming towards our bow.
“<Q, And how did the white lights which you
xi
nesses also gave contrary testimony, but the statements
set out herein are more in harmony with the known facts
and other testimony. In evaluating this testimony it
should be observed that the pilot in command of the
Feltre was not using compass courses to steer by but
was conning the ship with reference to the navigational
beacons and that at the particular time involved in this
action, the helmsman who had been steering with the
upper range lights dead ahead had apparently been di-
rected to swing to the left from the range without being
given any exact or accurate course to steer.
With such steering it is quite understandable that the
Feltre may have swung to her left too far and too soon
and in so doing placed the Luckenbach between herself
and the range lights. As there are considerations which
were steering by bear at that time?
‘‘A. You mean the shore lights? The shore lights
were on my starboard.
* * * * » * *
‘‘Mr. Graham: He has already testified that the
lights he was steering with bore dead ahead of
him.
‘‘Mr. Dorr: No, that was testimony of counsel,
statement.
‘‘Mr. Graham: I don’t think it was. Let me ask
you, when you first saw the vessel, the lights of a
vessel, on your port end [hand], as you testified,
where did the lights that you were steering by
bear?
‘‘A. Directly at our bow. Directly at our bow.
I am talking about the shore lights. Of course, I
don’t know anything about the position of the lights.
It is dark, I don’t know anything about the posi-
tion. I only follow the instructions of the pilot.’
xil
tend to contradict this conclusion I do not attempt to
find the exact course pursued by either vessel. It is |
enough to say that the evidence indicates a clear fault
on the part of the Feltre in leaving her side of the chan-
nel with no clear, convincing proof that the Luckenbach
was in the wrong;’ on the contrary, the circumstantial
evidence and the quoted testimony given by pilot and
wheelsman of the Feltre corroborates the testimony of
the Luckenbach that she was at all times on her own side
of the channel and that the collision resulted from the
action of the Feltre in leaving her side of the channel.
(The City of New York, 147 U.S. 72, 85; The Victory &
The Plymothian, 168 U.S. 410, 423.)
The Feltre and the cargo claimants, in order to ex-
culpate the Feltre from fault in making a sudden change
of course to her left, advance the claim that the Lucken-
bach, in violation of the Feltre’s right of way and pre-
‘Where fault on the part of one vessel is established
by uncontradicted testimony, and such fault is, of itself,
sufficient to account for the disaster, it is not enough
for such vessel to raise a doubt with regard to the
management of the other vessel. There is some presump-
tion at least adverse to its claim, and any reasonable
doubt with regard to the propriety of the conduct of such
other vessel should be resolved in its favor.’’ The City
of New York, 147 U.S. 72, 85.
‘“As between these vessels, the fault of the Victory
being obvious and inexcusable, the evidence to establish
fault on the part of the Plymothian must be clear and
convincing in order to make a case for apportionment.
The burden of proof is upon each vessel to establish
fault on the part of the other.’’ The Victory and The
Plymothian, 168 U.S. 410, 423.
xiii
vious one-blast signal, began to cross the Feltre’s bow
to the wrong side of the Upper Cottonwood Island range,
and thus produced a situation which justified the Feltre
in acting in extremis to attempt to avoid the collision
by a left wheel as she did. To support this conclusion
which, as I have already pointed out, is inconsistent with
the location of the collision, it is attempted to reconstruct
the whole course of the Luckenbach from the time she
left the Longview Bridge until the time of the collision.
This attempt is based largely upon the automatic record
of the gyro compass course and time shown by the auto-
matic gyro compass recorder on the Luckenbach which
shows the heading of the ship at all times during this pe-
riod. In order to interpret the gyroscopic compass record
the recording roll was sent to the Sperry Gyroscope Com-
pany which examined the record and from it certified the
compass heading for each minute of time from 1:15 a. m.
when the Luckenbach passed under the Longview Bridge
until 1:41 a. m., the time of the collision.
With these headings and corresponding times Captain
Conway, an expert pilot, attempted to draw upon a chart
the course indicated by the gyro record. There are sev-
eral reasons why his charted course should be entirely
disregarded. In the first place, the record certified by
the Sperry Gyroscope Company is not as accurate as it
might have been. The company certified that: ‘‘A more
accurate and closer check of this Course Recorder record
could he made with a special instrument we have for that
purpose. This instrument is at our New York office but
could he brought here if necessary.’’
xiv
Second, the record did not take into account the effect
of the ebb tide or of leeway on the actual course of the
vessel.
Third, the course drawn necessarily assumes the ele-
ment of distance which in turn involves the speed of the
vessel, as to which Captain Conway made no satisfactory
assumptions and reached no reasonably acceptable con-
clusions.
One illustration of the difficulties presented by his
charted course is shown by the contention of the parties
with relation to the course from the white light on the
Middle Dike to the passage between the red and green
lights off Dobelbower Bar.
Captain Conway showed this space to have been tra-
versed in two minutes, the first minute at 151.5° and the
second at 152°. The distance thus run is 3,000 feet which
would require a speed of 15 knots. As the Edward Luck-
enbach could not make more than 18 knots under the most
favorable conditions and was heading against an ebb tide
estimated at a knot and one-half or two knots, the Feltre
argues that the time during which the Luckenhbach trav-
elled at approximately 151.5° was about three minutes,
that is, that it took three, and not two, minutes to pass
between these points. From this point it is argued that
the speed was 101%, knots, instead of 15 as shown by Con-
way’s charted course, which speed of 1014 knots conforms
to the testimony of some of the witnesses as to speed.
The difficulty with this argument is that it proves the
chart to be utterly worthless. That is to say, instead of
proving it to he accurate it proves that the chart shows
XV
that a certain distance was traversed in two minutes
whereas it was actually travelled in three minutes.
The course traversed by the Luckenbach up to the
time the two vessels sighted one another when one and
one-half miles distant is entirely immaterial. The Feltre
and cargo claimants rely so strongly upon the contention
that the evidence shows that during that period the
Luckenbach was travelling on the wrong side of the
channel that perhaps something further should be said
on the subject. [It is true that in navigation the course
and distance traversed between changes of course are
considered in determining the position of the vessel at
any given time. This approximate method is called dead
reckoning. A position ascertained by dead reckoning al-
ways gives way to the more correct determination of the
actual position by astronomical observation, or by a fixing
of the position of the vessel with reference to distance
and direction from known objects or monuments. For
illustration, if the Luekenbach passed within 150 feet
of the flashing red buoy, as her witnesses testified, it is
of no significance that the course charted by Captain
Conway placed the ship within 300 feet of the green
light. The difference would merely show that Captain
Conway’s course was wrong.
The cargo claimants have introduced testimony of sev-
eral witnesses to show that the Edward Luckenhach,
while passing between these red and green lights, was
within two or three hundred feet of the green one on
the wrong side of the channel.
Before proceeding to consider the testimony of these
Witnesses separately, I draw attention to a fact which
PE nd
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See ihe’ cA teigreeN
AGG RARE BRN
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xvi
must be remembered with reference to all of them; that
is, that it is impossible for a person observing a light
more than a few hundred feet away to tell how far
away the light is. This known fact was shown by the
testimony of Captain Turppa, pilot of the Feltre, who,
when asked whether his ship was 1500 to 2000 feet
from the Edward Luckenbach when he gave his two-blast
signal, replied, ‘‘Probably so, but in the night time it
is awful hard to tell, when you have got a light ahead
of you, it is hard to judge the distance.”’ Captain Stayton,
another witness, also testified that it is impossible to
judge the distance of a light with any degree of accuracy.
With this fact in mind, I turn to an examination of the
testimony offered by the cargo claimants.
he first of the witnesses mentioned was Captain
Turppa, pilot of the Feltre, who testified that the Ed-
ward Luckenbach was ‘‘unusually close’’, ‘‘very close to
the green light’? when she passed between the two lights.
As indicated by him on a chart, the distance was ap-
proximately two hundred fifty feet. Had the Hdward
Luckenbach been approaching directly toward the witness,
her apparent position in relation to the red and green
lights would have remained constant, and could have
been observed with accuracy at any time, whether while
she was in fact between them, or before or after. [ow-
ever, as Captain Turppa himself testified, the Edward
Luckenbach was not coming toward him, but was on a
course crossing his bow from left to right. Under these
conditions, her lights would have appeared to move
steadily from the red light toward the green one, and
it would have been only in the moment that she was in
XVil
fact crossing the line between the two lights that he
could have seen her true position in relation to them.
Thus, the accuracy of Captain Turppa’s observation of
the relative distances between the ship and the red and
green lights, depends upon the accuracy of his deter-
mination of the precise instant when she was crossing
the line between the lights. Such a determination, how-
ever, could only rest upon his estimate of her distance
from him; and since he could see nothing of her but
her lights, he had no way of determining the distance.
Captain Turppa estimated this distance to have been
half a mile at the time that he believed the Kdward
Luckenbach to be between the lights. Since the Edward
Luckenbach and the Feltre were approaching the point
of collision at speeds of about twelve and ten knots,
respectively, the Kdward Luckenbach, when half a mile
from the Feltre, would have been about 1382 feet down-
stream from the point of collision. If she was in fact
that far up the stream, and moving in the direction
to which Captain Turppa testified, reference to the chart
will show that she must in fact have passed between
the red and green lights about three minutes before,
close to the red one, although she appeared to Captain
Turppa to be between them at the later time and closer
to the green.
The second witness offered by the cargo claimants to
establish the Edward Luekenbach’s position as nearer
the green light was Lloyd Deuechar, watchman on duty
on the bridge of the tug Georgia Burton. The Georgia
Burton, with five barges in tow, was proceeding up the
right hand side of the channel at a speed which Deuchar
XViii
could only describe as ‘‘slow’’, and which her pilot, Cap-
tain Carrau, estimated as about four knots. Deuchar
fixed the position of the Georgia Burton as about op-
posite the Dobelbower white light, (half a mile upstream
from Rainier) when the Edward Lueckenbach made her
first turn from the general direction of the lower range.
(126° to 151°)
Deuchar estimated that his vessel was then about a
mile astern of the Luekenbach. The distance marked by
him on the chart is about a mile and a quarter. We
have already pointed out that no reasonably accurate
estimate can be made of the distance of a light at night.
Deuchar, however, claimed to have been able to fix the
position of the Edward Luekenbach upstream at various
points. He stated that he knew that she had passed the
Middle Dyke light some distance before she began to
turn (from 126° to 151°), because he could see open
water between the light and the ship, and that he could
tell when she was between the red and green lights
because ‘‘she opened up the lower range, then she
opened up the red light,”’ and that he could put her
lights in a line with the two shore lights, and see that
she was nearer the green.
An examination of Deuchar’s testimony and chart shows
that after making her first turn, the Edward Luckenbach
was moving to his right at an angle of 25° with his
course as he observed her. It follows that he, as Cap-
tain Turppa, could only observe her relative position
when between the red and green lights at the moment
when she was actually crossing the line between them,
and that moment he had no way of determining. His
RT 8 a YR WPT Rn MNT A ETP RIE SAE PRR rt
REE Y
3
Xix
explanations, referred to above, as to how he fixed the
Edward Luckenbach’s position with respect to her dis-
tance from him, will be seen on examination to have no
merit. Everything which he observed would have had
the very appearance which he described, whether the
Edward Luckenbach was where he thought her, or very
much closer to him, so long as she was in the same diree-
tion from him. That she was in such a closer position
is the testimony of her own officers, and Deuchar was
not in a position to observe anything by which this testi-
mony could be refuted.
The third of these witnesses offered by the cargo
claimants was Captain Carrau, pilot of the Georgia Bur-
ton. He testified that the Edward Luckenbach passed him
just at the upper end of Rainier, and turned to the
right after getting well past the Middle Dyke light and
close to the green light. He said that it would be ‘‘pretty
hard’? for him to tell how close she was to the green
light; and as [ have already shown with reference to
Captain Turppa and Deuchar, it would in fact be im-
possible for him to estimate the distance. Captain Carrau
attempted to fix the position of the Edward Luckenbach
as passing near the green light by stating that she
shut it off from him; but that would have been equally
true had she turned to the right much farther down-
stream than he thought.
It should also be observed that if the Georgia Burton
was just at the upper end of Rainier when the Edward
Luckenbach passed her, as Captain Carrau testified, and
was opposite the Dobelbower white light when the Fd-
ward Luekenbach turned, as Deuchar testified, and her
FC WTS hE EES CTT
P Pe Aer ge attr
xX
speed was four knots or more, as stated by Captain
Carrau, then only about eight minutes can have elapsed
between those events. For the Edward Luckenbach, in
those eight minutes, to have traveled from the upper
end of Rainier to the point fixed by Deuchar and Captain
Carrau as her place of turn she would have had to move
at a speed of about fourteen knots. Since her top speed,
without adverse wind or tide, was thirteen knots, it
seems much more likely that she turned farther down-
stream than Deuchar and Captain Carrau_ believed.
The fourth of these witnesses offered by the cargo
claimants was Captain Stayton, pilot of the West Ca-
margo. The West Camargo was a freighter which left
Longview, bound upstream, just as the Edward Lucken-
bach was passing. Her speed was about eight knots over
the ground. When the West Camargo reached the lower
range, a mile upstream from Longview, the Edward
Luckenbach appeared to Captain Stayton to be about
a mile and a half farther upstream, either on the range
or within a ship’s width of it to the left. He could see
nothing of her but her stern light. At a point which
Captain Stayton believed to be about opposite the Middle
Dyke light the Edward Luckenbach turned to the right
(126° to 152°); but he stated that he could not tell
whether it was abeam of the light or above or below it.
He testified that when she passed between the red blinker
and green light he could see that she was in the
half of the channel nearer the green light, about one-third
of the way from the green to the red. He saw the Feltre
at that time about opposite the upper end of the Prescott
dock, but could not tell whether she was in her right
—
XXi
or left half of the channel. He did not notice the Edward
Luckenbach after she passed the flashing white front light
of the upper range, and at that time she had not crossed
to the left of the upper range.
Captain Stayton himself repeatedly pointed out that it
was impossible to judge the distance between him and
the Edward Luckenbach. His estimate of a mile and a
half is obviously erroneous. The two ships were at Long-
view at the same time, and the highest estimate of the
Edward Luckenbach’s speed (based on the time it took
her to go from Longview Bridge to the Middle Dyke) is
about twelve knots. If the speed of the West Camargo
was eight knots, the Edward Luckenbach would have
been only half a mile, rather than a mile and a half,
upstream from the West Camargo when the latter was a
mile from Longview.
Captain Stayton, who was himself on the lower range,
contradicts the testimony of other witnesses, (Deuchar and
Carrau) whose point of view was less advantageous, that
the Edward Luckenbach was substantially to the left of
the range. He was admittedly unable to tell how far up-
stream she was when she turned from 126° to 152° and
he would for the same reason have been unable to tell
when she was in fact between the flashing red buoy and
green lights. Thus his testimony so far as it rests on
matters which it was within his power to observe sup-
ports, rather than conflicts with, the contention of the
Edward Luckenbach that she was at all times on her
side of the channel.
Xxli
The Feltre owners have attempted by the testimony of
officers and men of their own ship to establish the course
of the Edward Luckenbach from the time she passed be-
tween the flashing red buoy and fixed green light until
the collision. Captain Turppa, pilot of the Feltre, testified
that he was steering directly down the Upper Cottonwood
Island range (353°) prior to the collision, and that the
Edward Luckenbach was proceeding steadily on a course
which, as he drew it on a chart, was of 155°, inter-
secting the course of the Feltre on the range less than a
ship’s length upstream from the front light of the upper
range. The speed of the Feltre he estimated as twelve
knots over the ground. He stated that he blew a one-blast
signal for a port-to-port passing, just after the Edward
Luckenbach had passed between the flashing red buoy
and fixed green light, which he estimated to be about
a half mile away from the Feltre. He heard no answer
to this signal and testified that the Edward Luckenbach
held a steady course. He testified that he continued on his
course, 353°, until the Edward Luckenbach crossed his
bow, so that she obscured the lights of the Upper Range
on which he was steering, and continued to hide them
from him until after the collision. Upon seeing his range
lights obscured, Captain Turppa ordered his wheel left
(or hard left) and blew a two-blast signal for a starboard-
to-starboard passing, believing, as he testified, that a
port-to-port passing was no longer possible. He believed
the ships then to be 1500 to 2000 feet apart. Captain
Turppa was unable, because of the darkness, to fix his
position up or down stream at the time this was done,
except that he was below Prescott. He testified that the
XXlil
Feltre had just begun to swing left when the Edward
Luckenbach, which he testified had held a steady course up
* * * whirled right around
to that moment, ‘‘all at once
and came over at him.’’ He testified that within half
a minute after his two-blast signal was given, the Edward
Luckenbach hit the Feltre on her starboard side abreast
of the number two hatch, pushing her three hundred feet
off the range to her left and that the Feltre sank about
450 or 500 feet downstream from the place of collision.
Captain Turppa’s testimony that the Edward Lucken-
bach held a steady course until immediately before the
collision is contradicted by the automatic record of her
compass heading, and his estimate of the Edward Luck-
enbach’s position when, as he testified, she obscured the
range lights is inconsistent both with his estimate of
the distance (1500 to 2000 feet) between the vessels at
that time, and with the actual place of collision, which
would necessarily have been at least a quarter of a mile
farther downstream, had his placing of the Luckenbach
been correct.
I conclude that Captain Turppa’s account of the acci-
dent is so at variance with established facts as to be
altogether unreliable.
‘This mechanical record establishes that the Edward
Luckenbach did not run on a steady course after passing
the flashing red light and until the two-blast signal of
the Feltre, as the Feltre’s pilot testified. On the con-
trary, her course had varied from 152° to 188.5°. The
change of course in the last minute from 188.5° to 180.5°
indicates her effort to comply with the two-blast signal
of the Feltre and also indicates why the Edward Lucken-
bach struck the starboard side of the Feltre.
XXiV
Other witnesses on the Feltre, whose testimony was
introduced, were Carlo Cernolli, the wheelsman, Ezio
Magris, second officer, who was on the bridge, Mario
Rainieri, the captain, and Antonio Roiaz, a sailor.
Cernolli testified that he was steering on the range
lights, which were in a straight line ‘‘directly on the
bow’’, though he also stated, as previously noted herein,
that they were on his starboard. He stated that the
Feltre blew a one-blast signal, to which he heard no
answer; that about two minutes later the Edward Luck-
enbach crossed his bow, and the Feltre blew two blasts
and ordered hard left. He testified that he could not
remember whether or not the Edward Luckenbach ob-
seured the range lights as she crossed his bow, and,
that she did.
Immediately prior to the crash, and after the hard
left order was given, Cernolli saw the Edward Lucken-
bach’s mast lights and green running light on his. star-
board hand. He testified both that the Feltre swung
left in response to the hard left wheel before the col-
lision, and that he could not recall whether or not she
had done so. It is apparent that his testimony as to the
course of the Edward Luckenbach is opposed to her aute-
matie compass record, and to that extent is untrue.
Ezio Magris, second mate of the Feltre, was on duty
on the bridge at the time of the collision. He testified
that the ship was steering on the upper range lights,
directly ahead in line, at a speed of 12 knots over the
ground. The Edward Luckenbach was first seen 114 miles
off on a course crossing their course at an angle of
XXV
from 40° to 50°. Magris also saw the flashing red buoy
put could not estimate the Edward Luckenbach’s distance
from it. The Edward Luckenbach holding this steady
course, the Feltre, when they were about three-quarters
of a mile apart, blew a single blast. The Edward Lucken-
bach gave no reply, and made no change in her course,
continuing across the Feltre’s bow until when about a
quarter mile ahead she obscured the range lights. At
that instant the Feltre blew two blasts and her wheel was
ordered hard left. The Edward Luckenbach continued
to the Feltre’s right, and the Feltre swung to her left,
turning about 20° in the thirty seconds following the
two-blast signal. This he testified placed the two vessels
about parallel and far enough apart to pass safely star-
board to starboard. Then the Edward Luckenbach swung
suddenly to her left, and her bow hit the Feltre on her
starboard side at the number two hatch, forward of ihe
bridge. The Feltre heeled slightly to her left, then within
three or four seconds listed to her right at an angle of
about 45°. After drifting for a few minutes, she came to
rest on the bottom.
This testimony, like that of Captain Turppa and Cer-
nolli, is irreconcilable with the Edward Luckenbach’s
compass headings.
Captain Rainieri, master of the Feltre, was not on deck
at the time of the collision, but was in his eabin under
the bridge, on the starboard side. He heard the single
blast, and no answer. Then he heard the double blast,
and recognizing it as abnormal, looked out of a starboard
porthole, but could see nothing. He then started up to
the bridge, and the collision came within 30 or 40
XXxvl
seconds, and before he reached it. The Feltre first listed
slightly to the left under the impact, then about 40°
to the right, and sank rapidly. Prior to the collision, the
ship was steering on the range lights, at a speed of
1214, to 13 knots over the ground, the speed of the current
being from one to 114 knots.
The last Feltre witness whose testimony could shed
any light on the conduct of the Edward Luckenbach was
Antonio Roiaz, a sailor whe had been on the bridge but
had gone below to make coffee before the collision. He
testified that immediately on hearing the two whistles he
looked out from the port side of the Feltre, and saw the
stern of the Edward Luckenbach crossing the Feltre’s
bow but could not estimate its distance away. He heard
no whistles from the Edward Luckenbach. He returned
to the pantry, and the collision followed shortly. He
estimated the interval between the single and double
blasts as about a minute.
This testimony tends to corroborate that of Captain
Turppa; but, for reasons which I have already stated, I
cannot accept the icory that the Edward Luekenbach in
fact crossed the bow of the Feltre in the manner de-
scribed.
The cargo claimants also offered the testimony of Fred
Closner. Closner was a track walker who observed the
collision from a railroad track close to the Washington
shore, at a point about five-eighths of a mile upstream
from Carrolls Bluff.
Closner testified that he watched the Feltre and the
Edward Luckenbach approaching one another for six
XXVil
or seven minutes up to the time of the collision; that the
Feltre was moving downstream on her right hand side of
the river and that she turned slightly away from him
just before the collision; that the Edward Luckenbach
eame steadily toward him across the river, until she
turned rapidly to her right half or three-quarters of a
minute before the collision; and that the collision occurred
on his side of the river.
Perhaps the first comment to be made on Closner’s
testimony is that Cottonwood Island interposed between
him and the main part of the river where the collision
occurred. This would in itself make it difficult for him
to judge the position of the ships in relation to the sides
of the river. He testified that he could not tell if the
ships moved toward him or away from him after the
collision. It is not shown that he knew the location of
the navigable channel and he did not claim to locate
the ships with relation to the channel, which is the point
in dispute.
It will also be noted that Closner’s statement that the
Edward Luckenbach pursued a steady course toward him
until half or three-quarters of a minute before the col-
lision is refuted by her gyro record which shows a steady
turn to the right for the period from three minutes be-
fore the collision to one minute before it. All the evidence
to the contrary is insufficient to overcome the evidence
of the pilot of the Luckenbach and his corroborating
witnesses that he steered for a point about 150 feet to
the left of the red flashing buoy and passed the buoy at
that distance from it.
XXViii
I conclude that the Edward Luckenbach was not at
fault in passing to the left hand side of the channel or ip
failing to allow sufficient space for safe passage of the
Feltre.
The Luckenbach’s other faults.
The Commissioner and the trial court also found the
Edward Luckenbach failed seasonably to sound the danger
signal and to stop and reverse. The evidence is that there
was no apparent danger of collision until the Feltre
sounded the two-blast signal and that the Edward Luck-
enbach instantly sounded the danger signal and signaled
to stop and reverse and that the engines were stopped,
but that in the short period, estimated at 30 seconds, be-
fore the collision there was no time to reverse.
In support of the finding the cargo claimants argue
that, whether or not the Edward Luckenbach both violated
the narrow channel rule and also failed seasonably to
stop and sound the danger signal, she must be guilty
of at least one of these faults. According to her own
witnesses, they say, the Edward Luckenbach’s danger
signal and stop order preceded the collision by from
ten to thirty seconds. The Feltre could not leave her
course in so short a time. Therefore, the collision was
necessarily on the course which the Feltre had been on
before her two-blast signal was given. If that course was
on the range, the Edward Luckenbach, to strike the
Feltre as she did on the starboard, must have violated
the narrow channel rule. If, on the other hand, that course
was to the left of the range, the Edward Luckenbach
should have observed that fact and blown a danger signal
long before the Feltre’s two-blast signal was given.
| XX1x
The answer to this is that, according to Captain Turppa,
the Feltre had begun her left turn away from the range
before the two-blast signal was given. This turn probably
was not observable from the Edward Luckenbach until
about the time of the two-blast signal, following which
it continued to accelerate until, at the time of the col-
lision, it had placed the Feltre three hundred feet to
her left of the range.
Cargo claimants next argue that the Edward Lucken-
bach was at fault in not sooner stopping and reversing.
If, they argue, the collision occurred thre hundred feet
off the range, as the owners of the Edward Luckenbach
contend, the Feltre, to achieve that transverse distance
from her course, must have moved forward at least 1725
feet. This estimate is based on turning tables shown in
Knight on Modern Seamanship. While the Feltre was
travelling this 1725 feet, the Edward Luckenbach would
have travelled at least 1574 feet, so that the vessels must
have been separated by at least 3299 feet when the Feltre
first began to leave the range. In other words, over a
minute and a half before the collision, if it occurred 300
feet to the Feltre’s left of the range, the Edward Lucken-
bach should have seen the necessity for stopping and re-
versing, a precaution which she delayed for more than
a minute.
This entire argument rests on the assumption, which
is said to be admitted, that the Feltre was on the range
until she made her hard left turn. In fact this was not
admitted. The Luckenbach witnesses merely testified that
the Feltre appeared to be about on the range. Since they
themselves were never on the range, they could not do
xxx
more than approximate the Feltre’s position in relation
to it, never with enough accuracy to support the careful
structure of computations erected by the cargo claimants,
I conclude that the Edward Luckenbach did not fail
seasonably to sound the danger signal, stop and reverse,
The finding of the commissioner and the trial court
that the Edward Luckenbach proceeded at an immoderate
speed is not sustained by the evidence. The evidence in
that regard is that her speed did not exceed 10 or 10%,
knots, owing to a head wind and ebb tide.
The commissioner also found that the Edward Lucken-
bach was at fault in failing to take compass bearings of
the Feltre. No such fault was alleged in the pleadings,
and there is no testimony indicating that such compass
bearings would have been of any value under the cir.
cumstances.
The interlocutory order should be reversed and the
trial court directed to proceed in accordance with the
findings as modified, namely, that the Edward Lucken-
bach was without fault and the Feltre was solely to
blame for the collision.
(Endorsed:) Opinion and Dissenting Opinion. Filed
Mar. 23, 1942. Pauli P. O’Brien, Clerk.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.