Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Reeley v. Pennsylvania Railroad
Supreme Court brief1941
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IN THE
Supreme Court of the United —y
OcToBER TERM, 1940.
mee
No. € 3,
ELVA MAE REELEY, Window, AND ON BEHALF OF THE THREE
INFANT CHILDREN OF THE LATE GEORGE A.
REELEY, DECEASED,
Petitioner,
against
THE PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY,
EMPLOYER AND SELF-INSURER.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND, AND
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF.
ISAAC LOBE STRAUS,
Munsey Building,
Baltimore, Maryland,
Counsel for Petitioner.
AVRUM K. RIFMAN,
Munsey Building,
Baltimore, Maryland,
Of Counsel.
; { aed Uffice - Supreme Court, U.S,
POD ONC oP nad SOOO RN BELT WAT od -~
tbh nains Rd thaeh BRt ADP Ritd Min SK
ee ed
The Daily Record Co. Print, Baltimore.
as ae
SUBJECT INDEX.
PAGE
Petition for writ of certiorari..........ccssscceccccccevecsccessccns 1
A. Statement of the matter involved...........c ec ee ee cereceees 1
Sarees SLRMOMIOME isos ky.0 tee ess Sonecbaecarescaeeses 11
C. The questions presented... ....cccccccccvccccsscncccsccccces 12
D. Reasons relied on for the allowance of the writ............ . 14
Brief in support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari..............0006. 19 4
F APUONMIOW, oc crcle had cche a edu esas eebanece ees ccs tenn ke 19
By SURI GA cas bcnacs Kase cobs seetvaescimeebsseleeests 19
PVE OMCAGIGNe Ce CRP CANO.) oc diec cab ckaviene ces Oe aeberew eee cise 20
TV. Specification Of CLOG. 6i cis ce kee tees cecetioveccnvesnes 20
Wy, PPO. oan Sree ie pele teks Head VRS ew RES SRC Spy eC eberee eae 23
BUMMALY (OF AYROMORE .iii5 ic cQeck ce thcsaiecte ccs teas sewers 23 z
ON ia aie.k sides Huse CRS ORY OST EEN CIN ORS RAS HCO e Ee CREE 28 %
| oft Scere ore eed Care te eee Pee ewe rea eerie eo 34 &
sas Chior ci wen cee an da saaelas does eens 39 ‘
SIN iis ore Kode names ne dens enek ioe tean ce aes 433 &
af RR eae may set Flat te OE NEY Pate on oR EP 50 é
CONCHISION .crcccncccrscrcvscccseccensstessevesecccresnce 57 4
if
TABLE OF CASES CITED ,
Balto. &€ Ohio C. T. R. Co. vy. Industrial Commission, 366 Ill. 223, 8 g|
Pee CS Oi oi ackats ot oes aceareswewar ative 805.0) Rkcnas cis ous 34 =i
Balto, & Ohio S. W. R. Co. v. Burtch, 2683 U.S. 540... ee eee ee 43
Baughman y. Grand Trunk Western R. Co., 271 Mich, 244, 259 N. W.
ev *_2e**f © « @f © eee eee eee eee eee eee eee eee eee eee eee eee eee eer eee eee §2
Berry Vv. St. Louis € 8S. F. Ry. Co., 324 Mo. 775, 26 S. W. (2) 988, cert.
GOR; Dk Oy By Faas ce oe ERKS Cd RRR CMa ves ooo dCe Re eenURKe 43
Boston & M, R. hd V. APMOiie, BEE UB. Boke kek as ceagiectawicervenas 48
Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. vy. Harrington, 241 U. S. 177..........4. 31, 56
Chicago & BE. I. R. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 284 U. S. 296....... 34, 56
Chicago Junction Ry. Co. v. Industrial Board, 277 Ml. 512, 115 N. E.
OIE 6 isos 5 SARE AREER CRS EERE DOSS EN MUR RAEN CESS aes swans 52
Chicago € NY. W. Ry. Co. v. Botle, 284 U. 8. 74... ..cccecccevcoece 33, 55, 56
Chicago, R. I. € P. Ry. Co. v. Devine, 239 vU. . Di clus CORES en wes 12
Colangelo vy. Pittsburgh & L. E. R. Co., 836 Pa. 490, 9 A. (2) 391....... 35
Coe v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 332 Mo. 991, 6i S. W. (2) 962.............. 46
Delaware L. € W. R. Co. v. Peek, 225 F. 261 (C0. C. An)... cece cence 50
Serer seni emer er
ii }
2 PaGE
Pere ee Mee. Ge NE SEs Me BEG So Aiba aes vabaved daa cds onesies 56
ee: Ee, ae i Ss I I BP ns 6-80 obo ew aes bowen weeees 56
Erte Retiroed Ca. v. Welel, 282 U. B. S06... cies cc cescewecuieass 32, 41
Flack v. Delaware, L. &€ W. Co., 45 F. (2) 683 (C. C. A. 2). . &
Geraghty v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 70 F. (2) 300 (Cc. Cc. ‘a 2), Wn F. 3
Supe. Sts (D.C. N. ¥.), SB BR. €2) FSS CC. C1, ZB) vcccccccccccces 50
Gidley v. Chicago Short Line Ry. Co., 346 Ill, 122, 178 N. E. 399, cert.
A SM Rs nian Sheen ce det CIN sonatas as sew ba eee eee; 35
Grigsby vy. Southern Ruy. Co., 3 F. (2) 988 (C. C. A. 6), cert. den. 268
TOM co ea eee Lei de brircin eked sd hie DR Sd Deda ae A RIES i456 45
CITES D.C Ce i, Os ho an ob oS a hiv ows nee cn Os eewaes ae 36, 40
Heffner v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 81 F. (2) 28 (C. C. A. 2)........085, 52
Howard vy. Mobile & O. R. Co., 335 Mo. 295, 73 S. W. (2) 272.......... 48 ;
Titinots Cent. BR. BR. Co. v. Behrens, 233 U. 8. 478... cece cccccccccecs 31, 41
Illinois Cent. R. R. Co. v. Peery, 242 U. 8. - ee reer e Pete 33, 41, 48
Industrial Accident Comm. v. Davis, 259 U.S. 182...... 00. c eee 12, 34, 49 |
Jarvis v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 327 Mo. ~ 37 8S . (2) 602, cert.
RE EE RETA Seer Lae ye oN rt ae ne re are eR 2
Kinzell v. Chicago, M. € St. P. Ry. Co., 250 U. 8. 180... .cccccsecces 12
Konsoute AL Pe ee Railroad Co,, 287 Pa. 302, 135 A. 209, cert. )
i Er le cock at hb Adie Od eee Sb bee hak CoA eks 34
Kraemer vy. Chicago € \. W. Ry. Co., 148 Minn. 310, 181 N. W. 847, 186
es AS a daecu wre eee aa nie sae Wal nee pel bcnie AA batch ee oe oka e 52
LaLone vy, St. Louis M. B. T. Ry. Co., 316 Mo, 835, 293 S. W. 379, cert.
Or We a ahaa ra ainda wis Sain ws bab aie a hws S35. A ke Saas cues bs 42
Lavigne vy. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co,, 287 Ml. App. 258, 4 N. E. (2) j
785, and cases cited, cert. den. 302 U. S. 688.............ccceee 52
Lawrie v. Atlantic City R. Co., 3 N. J. Mise. 267, 127 A. 818.......... 50
Lehigh Valley Railroad Co. v. Barlow, 244 U. 8S. 188.......... 0.0065 41, 53
Louisville € N. R. Co. vy. Strange’s Admx., 156 Ky. 489, 161 8. W. 239.. 50 )
Louisville € Nashville R. R. Co. v. Parker, 242 U. 8. 18..........00055 42
Mayer vy. Union R. Co., 256 Pa. 474, 100 A. 967, cert. den. 243 U. 8S. 656. 50
Mayor y. Central Vermont Ry. Co., 26 F. (2) 905, aff. 26 F. (2) 907 j
CC. Se Ie Te Fh in oss a cde ck ce wicivecvescs 49
McBain y. Northern Pac, Ry. Co., 52 Mont. 578, 160 P. 654............ 52
MeCoy v. Southern Pac. Co., 29 Cal. A. 16, 83 P. (2) 970, cert. den. 307
i Oe a 6A ow Rae wr tbentes slab Aas belo Re DOs oS Roe Kale oes 6 35
McDermott v. Chicago € N. W. Ry. Co., 124 Neb. 727, 248 N. W. 59. keane 50 }
Mease vy. Reading Co., 126 Pa. Super. 436, 191 A. 402, cert. den. 392 F
Ds nd I Wa este 0 hile aka RR NETS ba Blake DAG AA bia 6b kw © poe Aseibd's b0 68S 6
Metion Vv. Weber, 115 Oh. St. O03, 152 N. B. 758.0... ccc ccvccscccccese 43
Middleton vy. Southern Pac. Co., 61 F. (2) 929 (C. C. A. 5), wut, den.
Se We CNA wah Gamdaancu cet wk ces bat a eed shee iss ce eweacd oan
Minneapolis & St. Louis R. R. Co. vy. Winters, 242 U. S. 358.......... 34, 538
Mississippi Cent. R. Co, vy. Knight, 138 Miss. 621, 103 So. 377, cert. den.
BE eS i I SING hae Se cians aa uals Aivoisiniee SS BASE oie SOS SEK pwaleaicws aie
Missouri Pac. R. Co. vy. Industrial Commission, 348 Il. 355. 180. N. E. “
SNR ina a acai eilive: paral alo mb lea a Hi vib aia os AGES ESTED Ste i
Mitchell v. Louisville € N. R. Co.. 305 Ill. A. 635, 27 N. E. (2) 861.... 35
Murray v. Pittsburgh C., C. & St. L. R. Co., 263 Pa. 398, 107 Atl. 21.... 46
New York Cent. d H. R. R. Co. v. Carr, 238 U. S. 260...... jeeaewses 48
iii
PAGE
New York Cent, R. Co. v. Marcone, 281 U. 8. B45... cc cece eee eee eee 42
New York Cent. R. R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188.......6..- 0. eee eee ee 34
New York, N. H. € H.R. Co, v, Bezue, 284 U.S. AVG. ec eee eee ee 338, 48
North Carolina R. R. Co, v. Zachary, 232 U.S. 24S. cece eee eee 33, 36, 41
Osborne Vv. Gray, 241 U. S. 16..... cece cece cece scree ese cesen voces 5 ee
Painter v. Balto, & O. R, Co., (Pa. 140), 13 A. (2) 396, cert. den.
het BNE TIO a assole s siarens seekers v0.0 8.3/6 « Ae Le, SAO IER ee 46
Palermo vy. Erie R. Co., 173 N. Y. Supp. 456, 185 App. POI GOGs wc ta cas 43
Pedersen v. Delaware, Lack, &€ West. R. R. Co., 229 U.S. ee 34, 438
Pennsylvania Co, vy. Donat, 239 U.S. SER EN rer Semana rat er Car ae Ear 43,
Pennsylvania Railroad Co. vy. Stallings, 165 Md. 615, 170 A. BGG vv oiecs.a erent 35
Philadelphia € R, Ry. Co, v. Berman, 295 FP. G58 (CLC. ALB) eee eee 43
Phillips v. Union Terminal Ry. Co., 828 Mo, 240, 40 S. W. (2) 1046,
COPE: GIGI, ek TS 5 GODS arin 0 04) .0:5'5.0 win e'snje oii sie wieenin ws 684 see Be be 36
Pope vy, Utah-Idaho Cent. R. Co., 54 F. (2) 575 (S45. By BBY ven ose 46
Raymond vy. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., YRS i Oe Te ree 3
Red Cross Line vy. Atlantic Fruit Co,, 264 U.S. 109... cece ee eee 36
Reif v. Schumacker, et al., (Cal, 1940), 102 PL (2) 815... e ee eee eee eee 30
Rice v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 42 F. (2) 387 (0. CO. ALG) eee ee eee eee 46
Richmond & Danville R. R. Co. v. Powers, 145 U.S. AB. cece eee 40
Roberson vy. St. Louis M. B. T. Ry. Co., 201 Mo, App. 672, 213.8. W. 878. 45
Rogers v. Canadian Nat. Ry. Co., 246 Mich, 399, 224 N. W. 429, cert.
TE A 8 ie. Ho ee rer aren ea eee we Se kee eee ee 52
Russell y. St. Louis, S. F. Ry. Co., 386 Mo, 845, 81S. W. (2) 621.... 34
St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Fraser, 75 Okla, 265, 183 P. 4T8......665- 45
Schauffele v. Director General, 276 F. 115 (C. ©, A. 3), cert. den, 257
ie 1 ge Pe ele ee yr ee eee Eee ee ee ee eee ee oe . +
Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Koennecke, 239 U.S. 852... 0... ce eee ee 43
Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Padgett, 236 U.S. GO8. 0.0... cee cee eee ee 12
Second Employers’ Liability Cases, 223 U.S. Lecce cece cece eee eens 30, 45
Seyle y. Charleston Terminal Co., 106 8, Car, 215, 90 8. E. 1016. 109
S. Gar, 0B) OG BR. BR, TB isan ie sree eee e inh vecesecesene ene’ 4:
Shanks v. Delaware, Lack. & West. R. R. Co., 239 U.S. 556.......-. 33, 56
Niegel vy. Missouri-K.-T. R. Co,, 342 Mo. 180, 119 8. W. (2) 376, cert.
eR a 7 ge, SE a ee eer eT re wree ted Tae a ete ay 46
Smith v. Interurban Ry. Co., 186 Towa 1045, 171 N. W. 134, cert. den.
EE ae OTe ae eee ee eee ey fon TT ee eee re . 80
Smith v. Salt Lake & U, R. R. Corp. (Utah, 1940), 105 P. (2) 358....0 45
Southern Pac. Co. v. Industrial Acci. Comim., 251 U.S. 259.......-4. 12, 34
Southern Pac. Co. vy. Middleton, 54 F. (2) 888 (C. GC. AL 5) eee ee eee 45
Southern Pacific Co. v. Schuyler, 227 U.S. GOL... cee cee eens 36
Southern Railway Co. v. Lloyd, 239 U. S. 496... 0... cee eee eens 41
Npencer v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 336 Ill. 560, 168 N. E. 686, cert.
eh ee Oe AUN soe pv sowic ssa besvi sae ncbhescte tesa sees Sebwwe 46
Teras & Pacific Ry. Co. vy. Cor, W445 UL S. SOB. ec eee eee 36
Tipton vy. Atchison, T, &€ S. F. Ry. Co., 298 U.S. Wal... eee eee 36
Toledo, St. Louis & West. R. R. Co. v. Slavin, 236 U.S, 404....-6065. 12
United States v. Lowden, 308 U.S. 225..... 0... eee eee Fae ice hee Batons i 47
Van Brimmer v. Teras & P. Ry. Co., 190 F. 394 (D, C. Tex.) ........ 46
Voelker y. Delaware, L. & West. R. Co., 31 F. Supp. 887 (D.C. N.Y)... 86
iv .
Western € Atlantic R. R. vy. Hughes, 278 U. S. 4
Wichita Falls & Southern R. R. Co. vy. Holbrook, 125 Tex. 184, 78 S. W.
C2) Wie COEe Cee. 208 Ue Fe GIG ic iene checks aden secducsscees 38
Wichita Falls & S. R. Co. vy, Lindley, (Tex. 1940), 143 S. W. (2) 428.. 46
Winfree v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 227 U. 8. 206. ..cccccccccsesccsccs 46
Wise v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 43 F. (2) 692 (C. C. A. 2).........0008, 45
STATUTES CITED.
Federal Employers’ Liability Act (U.S. C. Tit. 45, Sec. 51, et seq.). 3.11, 20
OCU Eh a5 sna d calcs <a Sh Re ee RRNRR RE Chu aoa ee eebace 23, 28, 30, 32, 45
Amendment of August 11, 1939 (53 Stat. 1404).................. 46
SUBIR CONS, BECO BOO CD) 5 cad osc Fvnsiek ¥en kdtb as tiepaeepesomes 11,19
Maryland Workmen's Compensation Act (Code of P. G. L. of Md., 1939,
PORN Os hiiinis 7a a0 Cee CLKCES SENSES CSOD ROTOR OR MERU hee 3, 11
EU Es 065. e sa scours Oe oka Coe ke esse MEW ea Rha me bleneee 85
OMIT ED 5 he 0.5 6 pc cicke Reweeac RelacUa ch cahscs us wabeeveuweeees 3
RCUIONIC AD i iivaciat oUeeL ECU EGDEREOR SHR RO ERY SAU CRS BEETS 35
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OcToBER TERM, 1940.
No.
ELVA MAE REELEY, Winow, AND ON BEHALF OF THE THREE
INFANT CHILDREN OF THE LATE GEORGE A.
REELEY, DECEASED,
Petitioner,
against
THE PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY,
EMPLOYER AND SELF-INSURER.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND.
To the Honorable, the Chief Justice and the Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States:
The Petitioner, Elva Mae Reeley, widow, and on behalf
of the three infant children of the late George A. Reeley,
deceased, respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue
to review the decision of the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land rendered in the above cause on December 18, 1940.
A.
STATEMENT OF THE MATTER INVOLVED.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland, reversing without a
new trial the judgment rendered on a verdict and specific
findings of a jury that a deceased employee was, at the
2
time he received injuries resulting in his death, engaged
in intrastate work to the extent that it was clearly sepa-
rable and distinguishable from any interstate transporta-
tion in which he had previously been engaged, and that
such interstate transportation had terminated prior to )
his being injured, held that the trial Court erred in allow-
ing the jury to pass on the questions of fact involved in the
determination of the status of the deceased employee at
the time of his injuries, and that the trial Court should
have instructed the jury that, as a matter of law, the un-
contradicted evidence in the case showed that the deceased
Was engaged in interstate commerce at the time of his
injuries and death. That there was an interstate move-
a ment of ore by train from Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, to the
¥ Canton ore piers in Baltimore, Maryland, and that de-
: ceased worked as brakeman on said train previous to the
time of his injuries and death, is, as the trial Court plainly
found and stated (R. 141), not disputed. As the jury
found, however, and, we submit, as the evidence clearly
shows, the interstate character of the work in which de-
ceased had previously been engaged, and all of his inter-
state duties, had for all purposes ceased and terminated at
the Canton yards prior to the time of his injuries, and at
said time he was not engaged in interstate transportation
3 or in work so closely related to it as to be practically a part
: of it but was, pursuant to detailed and specific orders of his
employer, engaged in intrastate work clearly separable and
distinguishable from his previous activities. Moreover,
the instrumentalities, namely, the engine and tender, upon
which deceased was in attendance had been, at the time
3 of his injuries, so far as the evidence shows, completely
F withdrawn and retired from interstate transportation, and
; Respondent did not attempt to show any other, different )
or contemplated future use thereof, although all evidence
on that subject was exclusively within Respondent's
knowledge and power to adduce.
Letiehit evs see
ot as POLE ES
The cause originated when Petitioner, Elva Mae Reeley,
widow of George A. Reeley, deceased, and mother of their }
3
three infant children, all dependents of the deceased,
sought compensation (R. 6, 9) for herself and said infant
dependents pursuant to the provisions of the Maryland
Workmen’s Compensation Act (Code of P. G. L. of Md.,
1939, Article 101) from The Pennsylvania Railroad Com-
pany, Respondent, his employer, for his death resulting
from accidental personal injuries sustained by him arising
out of and in the course of his said employment by Re-
spondent as a brakeman. Respondent, a self-insurer (R.
9) conformably to other provisions of the Maryland Act,
contested the claim and State jurisdiction by invoking, as
exclusively controlling of the rights and liabilities of the
parties and as determinative of the validity of the claim for
compensation, the provisions of the Federal Employers’
Liability Act of 1908 (35 Stat. 65; U. S. C. Tit. 45, Sec. 51,
et seq.); and in furtherance of its defense under the Federal
Act requested that the State Industria! Accident Commis-
sion of Maryland, before which body the matter initially
came on for hearing, decide, as Respondent’s issue (R. 9):
“Whether or not George A. Reeley, deceased employee,
was engaged in interstate commerce at the time of the
alleged injury”. The Commission held that it had no jur-
isdiction because deceased was engaged in interstate com-
merce, and found for Respondent on the issue thus pre-
sented, which was the sole issue decided by it, which re-
sulted in the disallowance of the claim for compensation
(R. 9).
Thereafter, as authorized by Section 70 of said Article
101 of the Maryland Code, Petitioner seasonably filed an
appeal (R. 3) from the decision of the Commission to the
Superior Court of Baltimore City and elected to have the
questions of fact involved in the case submitted for deter-
mination by a jury. Proposed issues of fact of Petitioner
(R. 3-4) and of Respondent (R. 4) were filed and, each op-
posing party having excepted to the other’s proposed
issues, the trial Court ruled (R. 5) that the cause be tried
and submitted to the jury upon two issues of fact, Peti-
3
*
.
tioner’s proposed issues Nos. 3 and 4, namely: “Was the
decedent, George A. Reeley, at the time of the accidental
personal injury resulting in his death, on the 21st day of
November, 1937, engaged in intrastate work to the extent
that it was clearly separable and distinguishable from his
interstate work”; and “Did the employment of George A.
Reeley, decedent, in interstate commerce as such, term-
inate when the cars were ‘cut off’ at the Canton yards on
the 21st day of November, 1937, preceding his accidental
personal injury and death’. The case was tried before
the Court and a jury upon the transcript of testimony
taken before the Commission, additional testimony of wit-
nesses, and exhibits.
‘ Upon the conclusion of the evidence Respondent re-
quested the trial Court to rule and to instruct the jury )
that, as a matter of law, the uncontradicted evidence in the
; case showed that the deceased was engaged in “interstate
i commerce” at the time of his death and the answers to the
ly issues submitted should be in the negative, which request
was by the trial Court refused (R. 146). Respondent
then requested the trial Court to instruct the jury that the
decision of the Commission was prima facie correct and
that, therefore, Petitioner had the burden of proving that
her husband, the deceased, was not engaged in interstate
commerce, which request was by the trial Court granted
(R. 144).
——
4 MIE ro
Ele EAE se CPR
: At the request of Petitioner the trial Court instructed
d the jury (R. 144-146) that if it found from the evidence
: that at the time Reeley sustained the accidental personal
injuries resulting in his death he was engaged in intra-
state work to the extent that it was clearly separable and
distinguishable from his interstate work, then the answer }
of the jury to the first issue submitted to it should be in
the affirmative; further, that if the jury found from the
evidence that the employment of deceased, in interstate
commerce as such, terminated when the sixty-two freight
cars were cut off at the Canton yards on November 21, |
CAME ERS REN BAI NS
5
1937, and thereafter the deceased sustained an accidental
personal injury resulting in his death, and arising out of
and in the course of his employment by Respondent, while
engaged in intrastate work, then the answer of the jury to
the second issue submitted to it should be in the affirma-
tive; and, finally, that while the decision of the Commission
was prima facie correct, yet if the jury was satisfied by a
preponderance of the testimony that deceased sustained
the accidental personal injuries resulting in his death,
which arose out of and in the course and scope of his em-
ployment by Respondent, and that at the time deceased
sustained said injuries he was not engaged in interstate
transportation or in work so closely related to it as to be
practically a part of it, then the answer of the jury to both
issues submitted to it should be in the affirmative.
The verdict of the jury was an affirmative answer to
each of the issues submitted to it, resulting in the reversal
of the decision of the Commission (R. 5). Respondent
moved for a new trial, which was denied, and judgment
was entered for Petitioner (R. 5). Respondent then filed
an appeal to the Court of Appeals of Maryland which, as
stated, reversed without a new trial the findings of the jury
and the judgment thereon of the Superior Court of Balti-
more City, and held that the trial Court committed error in
refusing Respondent’s first or demurrer prayer (R. 146),
which contained the request that the trial Court rule as a
matter of law that deceased had been engaged in “inter-
state commerce” at the time of his death, and held, further,
as a matter of law, that the remedy afforded by the Federal
Employers’ Liability Act was paramount and exclusive
and that the Commission had no jurisdiction of the claim
for compensation.
At the time of his death deceased was forty-five years of
age, was a brakeman in the employ of Respondent (R. 6),
and lived with his wife and infant children in Baltimore,
Maryland. There were no eye witnesses to the accident
causing the injuries to deceased that resulted in his death,
6
but it is clear from all the evidence adduced, and particu-
larly from the nature and extent of his injuries as testi-
fied to by the Coroner (R. 71-74) and as they appear from
the latter’s inquest and verdict (R. 7-8), that deceased was
run over or crushed (R. 73) by an engine in Respondent’s
Highland yards in Baltimore City, sometime shortly after
5:18 P. M. and before 6:30 P. M., on November 21, 1937,
and died almost immediately thereafter. Because of the
lack of eye witnesses the evidence bearing upon the cause
and occurrence of the fatal accident was wholly circum-
stantial, and, for the added reasons that the events and de-
ceased’s activities and movements preceding the happen-
ing of the accident occurred while he was working with
the crew of one of Respondent's freight trains, and that
the accident occurred at an isolated point in Respondent's
Highland yards, no testimony as to the preceding events
or the accident itself, and no testimony of any of Re-
spondent’s activities or those of its instrumentalities in-
volved, was available to Petitioner except that obtainable
from deceased’s fellow workmen and other employees of
Respondent.
On the day of the accident deceased was working as a
brakeman with a freight train crew consisting of a con-
ductor (Hudson), engineman (Lambie), fireman (Mor-
gan) and flagman (Arnold). All but the flagman, who
appeared only at the Coroner's inquest, testified in the
case, the conductor being called as a witness by Respon-
dent, and the engineman and fireman testifying at the re-
quest of Petitioner. The evidence is conflicting as to
whether these men, except for the trip of November 21,
operated regularly as a crew, the conductor testifying (R.
29) that he had been with the crew for a month and that
deceased had worked with him for that length of time, the
engineman testifying (R. 58) that they had no regular
crew, that sometimes deceased worked with him only at
intervals of several weeks, and that they make up a train
crew for each round trip out of Baltimore, and the fireman
7
testifying (R. 80) that he works “extra list” and that the
trip in question was the only one he made with the so-
called crew.
The entire group had, on November 20, the day before
the accident, left Baltimore and gone to Enola, Pennsyl-
vania, which is across the Susquehanna River and about
five miles from Harrisburg, Pennsylvania (R. 10, 31, 32).
At 3:30 A. M. on November 21 the group, which was rest-
ing in a bunk house at Enola (R. 32), was awakened and
orally directed to go to Harrisburg (R. 10). The men pro-
cured, at Enola, engine No. 6733 and tender and a caboose
in which they left Enola at 4:15 A. M. (R. 36, 37) and went
to Harrisburg where the same engine, tender and caboose
were coupled to a train of sixty-three cars of ore (R. 32)
destined for the Canton ore piers in Baltimore, and con-
signed to the Bethlehem Steel Company at Sparrows Point,
Maryland (R. 10, 34). This train was an “extra train” or
an “extra made-up train”, and, as distinguished from a
“booked train”, had no regular schedule and no fixed or
regular times for beginning or terminating its run ( R. 36),
nor did the men in the group have any fixed or regular
shift or time for working on the train (R. 31, 34).
In order to show the origin and destination of the ore
cars, about which there is no dispute, Respondent offered
in evidence a copy of the wheel report (Employer’s Ex-
hibit No. 1, R. 13-18), which shows that the train was an
“extra”; twelve of the sixty-three waybills (Employer’s
Exhibit No. 2, R. 20-28), which establish that the ore cars
were to be delivered by Respondent to the Canton ore
piers and were consigned to the Bethlehem Steel Company
at Sparrows Point, Maryland; photostatic copy of the re-
mainder of the waybills, which Respondent, although re-
quested to do so (R. 58, 97), failed to produce before the
Commission and did not include in the record; the engine-
man’s time sheet (Defendant’s Exhibit C, R. 99-102); and
the conductor’s time sheet (Defendant’s Exhibit D, R. 104-
108). Petitioner requested Respondent at the hearing
8
before the Commission to produce the time cards (R. 79),
which Respondent declined to do until the hearing in the
Superior Court on appeal from the Commission, and which
Respondent did not include in the record.
The train, with deceased acting as front brakeman, left
Harrisburg at 7:20 A. M. on November 21 and, after drop-
ping one ore car which had developed trouble (R. 34, 39,
59), passed, but did not stop at (R. 37, 41, 42), the first
Baltimore station, Bay View yards, at 4:10 (R. 38, 60) or
4:20 P. M. (R. 10, 37) on the same day (R. 10). The first
stop in Baltimore was at approximately 4:35 (R. 60) or
4:45 P. M. (R. 43) in Highland yards, which are stated to be
about a half-mile (R. 10) toa mile (R. 42, 81) beyond Bay
View yards; and the ultimate stop of deceased and his group
in Baltimore, where, pursuant to specific orders, engine No.
6733 and its tender were uncoupled from the ore train (R.
10), was in Canton yards which are a half-mile (R. 10, 44)
beyond Highland yards. The Canton ore piers, to which
the ore train was hauled from Canton yards by a yard
engine under the supervision of a yard crew (R. 11), are
one mile (R. 10) beyond the Canton yards.
When the ore train made its first stop in Highland yards
the conductor already had specific orders (R. 10, 33, 34, 41,
42, 45) which he had received in Harrisburg, and received
further orders from the Highland yardmaster (R. 41, 52,
59, 78, 86, 88), that they were to haul the ore train on No. 1
track (R. 43, 61) only “to the head of the Canton yards to
get our engine loose on account of it being too big to get
down to the ore pier, and the yard engine handled the
train from the yard at Canton to the ore pier” (R. 10, 41,
42, 43, 44, 69). The caboose was cut from the train in
Highland yards and there placed upon a spur track, and
the conductor and flagman remained there (R. 46) with
the caboose while the engineman, fireman and deceased
went on with the train to Canton yards (R. 45), the latter’s
duty being to uncouple the road engine and tender from
the train at Canton yards (R. 10). Upon arriving at Can-
9
ton yards at about 5:15 P. M. (R. 43, 44) the road engine
and tender were uncoupled from the ore train (R. 44, 69)
which was taken completely in hand by the yard engine
and crew and hauled the remaining distance to its destina-
tion at the Canton ore piers (R. 11, 44), while the road
engine and tender were backed in reverse to Highland
yards (R. 44, 45) after having been switched to No. 2 track.
The road engine and tender started the backing movement
from Canton yards on No. 2 track (R. 50, 53, 66), with the
tender in the lead, at approximately 5:18 P. M. (R. 8, 45),
although there is considerable conflict as to the exact
amount of elapsed time, and prior to the start of the back-
ing movement was the last time deceased was ever seen
alive. He was known to have delivered the waybills for
the ore cars to the yardmaster at Canton yards (R. 78, 79),
and was seen to throw a switch in said yards, and then to
climb upon the rear step of the tender and walk across the
end sill to a ladder that leads from the back of the tender
to the brakeman’s cabin or “dog house” in the tender (R.
8, 65, 66, 80, 81). When the engine and tender reached
Highland yards on the return trip they were recoupled to
the caboose (R. 53, 66) and then, still in reverse, with the
tender in the lead (R. 67), continued the return trip, after
being switched on to the south track (R. 48, 66, 81), to the
Bay View yards (R. 87).
There is conflicting testimony as to when deceased was
first missed, the conductor first testifying that they missed
him when the engine and tender backed into Highland
yards from Canton yards (R. 47), and then stating (R. 49,
53) that they missed him when they reached Bay View
yards, and finally denying (R. 55) that deceased had been
missed before arriving back at Bay View yards. The first
report that deceased was missing and inquiry as to his
whereabouts (R. 67) were made after the engine, tender
and caboose came into Bay View yards (R. 49) at about
6:10 P. M. (R. 54), at which time a mark and some hair
and blood were found on the rear or end brake beam of
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10
the tender (R. 53, 68, 84), after which the remaining mem-
bers of the group accompanied by a yardmaster, in
an effort to locate deceased, started to go back with
the engine and tender over the route they had tray.
ersed from Canton yards (R. 49). Reaching High-
land yards on this return trip they brought the engine toa
stop and, while walking ahead, found the body of deceased
between the rails of No. 2 track in said yards (R. 49, 50,
88) at a point estimated from one hundred and seventy
feet (R. 56, 87) to two hundred and fifty feet (R. 56) south
of the place where the caboose had been cut off and placed
on the spur, and about seven or eight car lengths (R. 68)
or four hundred feet (R. 83) from the Highland yard-
master’s station. Deceased’s cap and a cushion from the
brakeman’s cabin were found about forty-five feet south
of his body (R. 72), and fuses and his gloves were found
close by (R. 77).
After the body was found the yardmaster took charge
of the situation and the engine and tender were returned
to Bay View yards at 6:30 P. M. (R. 34, 37, 38, 54) where
the caboose was, pursuant to previous orders, placed on
the cabin track, and the engine and tender, likewise pur-
suant to orders, placed on the storage track (R. 82) at the
ash pit in Orangeville (R. 11, 109), which is approximately
one-quarter of a mile from Bay View yards (R. 54).
At the trial in the Superior Court Respondent’s counsel
read to the jury (R. 93-95) certain of Respondent’s rules
to show the general duties of its employees, and there is
testimony as to said rules (R. 48, 88-90, 92-95, 143) brought
out upon cross-examination of Respondent’s employees in
a fruitless effort of Petitioner to ascertain whether there
was a written rule applicable to the duties of deceased at
the time of his injuries. There also was testimony (R. 88,
89, 91, 92) from which it was attempted to be ascertained
whether Respondent’s crews leave their duties as a unit,
and as to the duties of train and engine crews generally
(R. 140-142), but such evidence as was adduced from all
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