Record and brief — Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co.

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DOCKET

No. 09-448

Title

Docketed:

Lower Ct:

Case Nos.:

SUPREME COURT

Bridget Hardt, Petitioner

V.

Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company

October 15, 2009

United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

(08-1896)

Decision Date: July 14, 2009

Rehearing

Denied:

Questions

Presented

~~~Date~~~

Oct 14 2009

Oct 26 2009

Nov 9 2009

August 10, 2009

~~~~~~~Proceedings and Orders~~~~~~~~~ serene nary mememere ne

Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due November 16, 2009)

Waiver of right of respondent Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company to

respond filed.

DISTRIBUTED for Conference of November 24, 2009

Nov 17 2009 Response Requested . (Due December 17, 2009)

Dec 16 2009 Brief of respondent Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company in opposition

filed.

Dec 29 2009 Reply of petitioner Bridget Hardt filed.

Dec 30 2009 DISTRIBUTED for Conference of January 15, 2010.

Jan 15 2010

Feb 16 2010

Feb 24 2010

Feb 25 2010

Feb 25 2010

Feb 25 2010

Mar 4 2010

Mar 4 2010

Mar 4 2010

Petition GRANTED. The brief of petitioner is to be filed on or before Thursday,

February 25, 2010. The brief of respondent is to be filed on or before Thursday,

March 25, 2010. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed in accordance with Rule 25 3

of the Rules of this Court.

SET FOR ARGUMENT ON Monday, April 26, 2010

Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs in support of either party or neither

party received from counsel for the respondent.

Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs in support of either party or neither

party received from counsel! for the petitioner.

Brief of petitioner Bridget Hardt filed

Joint appendix filed. (Statement of costs filed)

Brief amicus curiae of United States filed.

Brief amicus curiae of United Policyholders filed

Brief amici curiae of AARP and Nationa! Employment Lawyers Association

filed.

Mar 52010

Mar 18 2010

Mar 24 2010

Mar 31 2010

Mar 31 2010

Apr 16 2010

Apr 19 2010

Apr 26 2010

Record received from U.S.C.A. for 4th Circuit. (1 envelope)

CIRCULATED.

Brief of respondent Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company filed.

(Distributed)

Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as

amicus curiae and for divided argument filed.

Brief amicus curiae of DRI - The Voice of the Defense Bar filed. (Distributed)

Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as

amicus curiae and for divided argument GRANTED.

Reply of petitioner Bridget Hardt filed. (Distributed)

Argued. For petitioner: John R. Ates, Alexandria, VA.; and Pratik A. Shah,

Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.

(for United States, as amicus curiae.) For respondent: Nicholas Q. Rosenkranz,

Washington, D. C.

PETITION

FOR

WRIT OF

CERTIORARI

No. (1) Supreme Cow, US.

——

Su The 09-- 4 4 8 OCT 14 2009

Supreme Court of the Aged States

VWitags K. Suter, Clori:

.

BRIDGET HARDT,

Petitioner,

RELIANCE STANDARD

LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Respondent.

+

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FOURTH CIRCUIT

°

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

.

Ann Sullivan John R. Ates*

CRENSHAW, WARE Counsel of Record

& MARTIN, P.L.C. ATES LAW Firy, P.C.

1200 Bank of America Center’ 1800 Diagonal Road

Norfolk, VA 23510 Suite 600

(757) 623-3000 Alexandria, VA 22314

(703) 647-7501

Counsel for Petitioner Dated: October 14, 2009

THE LEX GROUP?C e 1750 K Street N.W. @ Suite 475 ¢ Washington, DC 20006

(202) 955-0001 @ (800) 815-3791 ¢ Fax: (202) 955-0022 ewww.thelesgroupdc.com

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Section 502(g)(1) of the Employee Retirement

Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) provides: “In

any action under this subchapter ... by a

participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary, the court in its

discretion may allow a reasonable attorney’s fee

and costs of the action to cither party.” 29 U.S.C.

§ 1132(g)(1).

The Fourth Circuit in the decision below held that

“only a prevailing party is entitled to consideration

for attorneys’ fees in an ERISA action,” while the

Second, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have declined to

read a “prevailing party” requirement into § 502(g)(1)

and other circuits have issued conflicting authority.

The Fourth Circuit also held that th “prevailing

party” standard was not met and vacated an award

of attorneys’ fees to petitioner, even where the

district court found “compelling evidence that

[petitioner] is totally disabled,” ruled that petitioner

“did not get the kind of review to which she was

entitled under applicable law” and remanded for a

redetermination of benefits with an instruction that

respondents “act on [petitioner’s] application by

adequately considering all the evidence discussed

within this Opinion within thirty (30) days of its date

of issuance” or “judgment will be issued in favor of

[petitioner]” and petitioner obtained the requested

long-term disability benefits upon remand.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether the Fourth Circuit erred in holding that

ERISA § 502(g)(1) provides a district court

discretion to award reasonable attorney’s fees

only to a prevailing party?

ll

2. Whether a party is entitled to attorney’s fees

pursuant to § 502(g)(1) when she persuades a

district court that a violation of ERISA has

occurred, successfully secures a judicially-ordered

remand requiring a_ redetermination of

entitlement to benefits and subsequently receives

the benefits sought on remand?

ill

RULE 14.1(b) STATEMENT

The parties are as stated in the caption.

iV

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ....................-scesseeceeeeeeeees i

FUL 14.16%) STAT RAMEN ED 200cccccccseccccscssvevescesosscsees ill

ee ee I iia hens ccticiccivescinnssesesssneseseents iv

TRE GE GAEF FOIE ENTE sien ncsecvsnssccscssccsecesssnnes vii

SI ee a 1

ios nneihciidonaanmmialicnnneimmndanesansmionenn 1

ee Ee BTW RIT TM ecssniscssscccssesiseccccnsssccossessosssnsess 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .....................-..c0sseessesees 2

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ............... 14

I. The Circuits Conflict On Whether

Attorney’s Fees May Be Awarded at the

District Court’s Discretion To Either

Party or Only to a “Prevailing Party”

Umer S GORE) .....000..ccceccceees PANTO SP 15

A. The Courts of Appeals Are

Intractably Divided Over the

ss id ccnteaencennsnninecien 16

B. Petitioner’s Case Is an Ideal Vehicle

for Resolving the Question ....................... 23

C. Certiorari Is Further Warranted

Because This Issue Is_ Both

Frequently Recurring and Important...... 23

D. The Fourth Circuit’s' Decision

Conflicts with This Court’s Prior

Reasoning and Is Incorrect on the

BIRD scncevccsscinovsevcabeiuamanimunamuanaan 25

II. The Courts of Appeal Are Divided

On Whether a Remand For a

Redetermination of Benefits Is

Sufficient To Support an Award of

Attorneys Fees and Costs Under

I oneness esenovevcasScdcsicsnaneeuesetc ane 28

CITE RII cs eccssesnassssnccsonsnsesssniace enna 34

APPENDIX:

Unpublished Opinion of

The United States Court of Appeals for the

Fourth Circuit

entered July 14, 2009.................0....0... la

Opinion and Order of

The United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Virginia

entered August 7, 2008 ..................... l2a

Opinion and Order of

The United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Virginia

entered March 27, 2008...............0..... 3la

v1

Order of

The United States Court of Appeals for the

Fourth Circuit

Re: Denying Petition for Rehearing and

Rehearing En Banc

entered August 10, 2009.................... 50a

29 U.S.C. 1132(g)(2006)

Employment Retirement Income Security

Act of 1974, § 502(g), as amended .. ............ 5la

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES

Anderson vu. Emergency Medicine Assoc.,

860 F.2d 987 (10th Cir. 1988)................00..... 18

Antolik v. Saks, Inc.,

463 F.3d 796 (8th Cir. 2006)....................0..... 22

Arfsten v.

Frontier Airlines, Inc. Ret. Plan for Pilots,

967 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1992)............. 17-18, 22

Bowerman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,

Be ee Fe Ce Gls I cecceciccccccsccccccscccecses 9

Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v.

W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res.,

ee ED sittidinincccttcnindacitincsnencctnes passim

Chambers v. Family Health Plan Corp.,

100 F.3d 818 (10th Cir. 1996)...........0.0..000..... 18

Colby v. Assurant Employee Benefits, et al.,

Civil Action No. 07-11488-RCL,

2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65340

(D. Mass. July 22, 2009)..................... 16, 21, 28

Conn. Natl Bank v. Germain,

503 U.S. 249 (1992) ................ SI ES TO ret Pete Ne 26

vill

Cottrill v. Sparrow, Johnson & Ursillo, Inc.,

be §& 7," fo = eens 20

Deboard v. Sunshine Mining & Ref. Co.,

208 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2000)...................... 17

Doe v. Travelers Ins. Co.,

167 F.2e GS Chat Cin. 1GG6)............000000000....225.5. 20

Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co. of Am..,

be | Fikes Seer 9

EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co..,

I cnepummensiiniebia 27

First Trust Corp. v. Bryant,

410 F.3d 842 (6th Cir. 2005) ................0..... 20

Flom v. Holly Corp.,

276 Fed. Appx. 615 (9th Cir. 2008).......... 30, 31

Freeman v. Continental Ins. Co.,

996 F.2d 1116 (11th Cir. 1993) ........0.....000.8. 19

Gibbs v. Gibbs,

210 F.3d 491 (5th Cir. 2000) .................... 19, 26

Goldstein v. Moatz,

445 F.3d 747 (4th Cir. 2006)........ 12, 13, 28, 29

Gordon v. U.S. Steel Corp.,

724 F.2d 106 (10th Cir. 1983) ............0.. 17

Graham v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co.,

501 F.3d 1153 (10th Cir. 2007) .................2006 18

Gray v. New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co.,

9s ) (Fe fe | ee 9, 20

Griggs v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co.,

385 F.3d 440 (4th Cir. 2004)..................00.00... 28

Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs.,

--- U.S. ---, 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009).................. 27

Janowshki v. International Broth. of

Teamsters Local No. 710 Pension Fund,

bw fF Le Le A. , nae 21

Kholyavskty v. Schlecht,

479 F. Supp. 2d 897 (E.D. Wis. 2007)............ 35

Lindh v. Murphy,

I a 27

Marquardt v. N. Am. Car Corp.,

652 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1981).................... 21, 33

Martin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Va., Inc.,

115 F.3d 1201 (4th Cir. 1997)...... 12, 16, 18, 19

Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell,

ee OD een 15, 23, 25, 26

McKay v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co.,

46 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1272,

2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16667

CES UE, HIE. iy BUI ccncesccersccoceceseseos 15, 20

Mertens v. Hewitt Associates,

I ass sencaundnounsusiuons 25, 26

Miller v. United Welfare Fund,

72 F.3d 1066 (2d Cir. 1995).......... 18, 27, 29, 32

Mizzell v.

Provident Life and Accident Insurance Co.,

32 Fed. Appx. 352 (9th Cir. 2002).................. 31

Morgan v. Indep. Drivers Ass’n Pension Plan,

975 F.2d 1467 (10th Cir. 1992)...................... 17

Nachman Corp. v.

Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation,

i i ieccitincenindnnsenesevennaie 25

New York State Conference of Blue Cross &

Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co..,

a a sinanienasiieisani 23

Peterson v. Continental Casualty Co.,

SES FBS BES GOS Gar. BOGB)....0.2000.0cccerpvecceeeses. 29

Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux,

ESRI rere ner 15, 26

Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co. of N. America,

867 F.24 1017 (4th Cir. 1903).......................... 9

Quinn v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass'n,

IRs Evy iv. Le S| eee 32

Salley v. EI. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,

966 F.2d 1011 (Sth Cir. 1992)..................0000. 19

Sec. of Dept. of Labor v. King,

775 F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1985) ....................cceere0- 9

xi

Sharron v.

Amalgamated Ins. Agency Services, Inc.,

704 F.2d 562 (11th Cir. 1983)..............0.00...... i9

Smith v. CMTA-IAM Pension Trust,

654 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1981) ..............0.....0.08.. 31

Smith v. CMTA-IAM Pension Trust,

746 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1984).................... 32, 33

Tate v. Long Term Disability Plan For Salaried

Employees of Champion Int'l Corp. #506,

545 F.3d 555 (7th Cir. 2008).................... 21, 32

Trustmark Life Ins. Co. v.

University of Chicago Hosps.,

207 F.3d 876 (7th Cir. 2000).......................... 21

Wade v. Hewlett-Packard Dev. Co.

LP Short Term Disability Plan,

493 F.3d 533 (Sth Cir. 2007).......................... 19

White v. Jacobs Engineering Group

Long Term Disability Ben. Plan,

896 F.2d 344 (9th Cir. 1990)... 30, 32

STATUTES

i ID son cs ed eaunnesonnemnceconsncennendeinbiaoien 1

Be Ne I csdecicocnenisteasnbinasatnhabatnsaiinedinetinnetendeasite 11

ne EE ernincciinsineeninstuncetuneneensanininicistainbeaine 7

ee es ae eee 2

xl

EE i cn senuciccinnqandnemnetotacdesneneprensensseseceeseusen 2

NE TT nccicicicseinasiasesdediendiectidasenianecemennein 2

a i iio sariissieietnisnnduneieeuhianensbiopesenneninnns 26

I ici a eccihinibnbninstiialnnenhinneoneinwnbii 33

I on cchsaiicnbintecivnptisenaenesnnsommneuiiinuns 7

St i nisin sisieiaicsintenisessetmetsonnetetl passim

ee ED . nensivesensinargnensseciconi passim

Be le Oe SEED siccsicnscsscsessesesenssncnseesseses 3, 18, 27

RULES

ETRE ne pn ne an OnE TEP aR Cer ome 16, 23

gE EES ee an a ae ee RIO 16, 28

Rs TN 0 ED aiidbssdnscinennsocerensseconsiemnnnnnseontesneens 19

OTHER AUTHORITIES

2008 Annual Report of the Director: Judicial

Business of the United States Courts,

Appendix Table C-2A, Cases

Commenced, by Nature of Suit,

2004 Through 2008, available at

http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2008/

appendices/CO2ASe pdt

(last visited October 13, 2009)

Xill

Samuel R. Berger,

Court Awarded Attorneys’ Fees:

What Is “Reasonable”?,

BSS LU. PG. Ee. TOU. BE CIITA) ..cnnseccccecces....s.:. 26

Fact Sheet: EBSA Achieves $1.2 Billion in

Total Monetary Results in Fiscal Year 2008,

available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/

newsroom/fsFYO8results. html

(last visited October 13, 2009) ............0.000...... 24

Eric C. Surette,

Annotation, Requirement that

Party Prevail to Obtain Attorney’s

Fees under § 502 (g) of ERISA,

172 A.L.R. Fed. 571 (2001) ........0...00000000000002.. 15

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner Bridget Hardt respectfully petitions for

a writ of certiorari to review the judgment and

opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Fourth Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The district court opinion finding “compelling

evidence that [petitioner] is totally disabled,” ruling

that petitioner “did not get the kind of review to

which she was entitled under applicable law,” and

remanding for a redetermination of benefits with an

instruction for the plan administrator to “adequately

consider[{] all the evidence discussed within this

Opinion within thirty (30) days of its date of

issuance” or “judgment will be issued in favor of

[petitioner]” was reported at 540 F. Supp. 2d 656

(E.D. Va. 2008) and is reproduced in the Appendix

(App. 3la-49a). The district court’s subsequent order

awarding attorneys fees and costs and entering

judgment in favor of petitioner is unreported (App.

12a-30a). The opinion of the court of appeals (App.

la-1la) is unreported, but may be found at 2009 U.S.

App. LEXIS 15478.

JURISDICTION

The court of appeals issued its opinion and

entered judgment on July 14, 2009. It denied

rehearing and rehearing en banc by order entered

August 10, 2009. This petition is filed within ninety

days of that date. This Court has jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTES INVOLVED

Section 502(g) of ERISA (29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)) is

reproduced in the Appendix (App. 5la-52a).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. In enacting ERISA, Congress determined

“that the continued well-being and security of

millions of employees and their dependents are

directly affected by” employee benefit plans. § 2, as

codified at 29 U.S.C. § 100l(a). ERISA governs

employee welfare benefit plans that, “through the

purchase of insurance or otherwise,” provide

medical, surgical, or hospital care, or benefits in

the event of sickness, accident, disability, or death.

§ 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).

A fundamental policy of ERISA is “to protect...

participants in employee benefit plans and their

beneficiaries . . . by establishing standards of

conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries

of employee benefit plans, and by providing for

appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to

the Federal courts.” § 2, as codified at 29 U.S.C. §

1001(b). To further this policy, Congress specifically

allowed for attorney’s fees to encourage participants

and others to bring suit when warranted: “In any

action under this subchapter .. . by a participant,

beneficiary, or fiduciary, the court in its discretion

may allow a reasonable attorney's fee and costs of

the action to either party.” § 502(g), as currently

codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). (Congress in 1980

added a separate provision to Section 502(g) to

require an award of attorney’s fees and costs in cases

by fiduciaries to recover delinquent contributions in

which judgment in favor of the plan is granted. See

Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of

1980, Pub. L. No. 96-364, § 306(b), 94 Stat. 1208,

1295 (1980), as codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2) (‘In

any action under this title by a fiduciary or on behalf

of a plan to enforce section 515 in which a judgment

in favor of the plan is awarded, the court shall award

the plan” specified relief, including “reasonable

attorney’s fees and costs of the action, to be paid by

the defendant”)).

2. Dan River Inc. is a textile manufacturer that

provides benefits to qualified participants in its

Group Long-Term Disability Insurance Program

Plan (the Plan). App. 3la. Dan River administers the

Plan, and Reliance Standard Life Insurance

Company (Reliance) both decides whether a claimant

is entitled to benefits and pays for such benefits. Jd.

at 32a.

Petitioner Hardt served as an administrative

assistant to the President of Dan River. Jd. In 2000,

Hardt began experiencing pain in her neck and

shoulders. Physicians diagnosed her as suffering

from carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS). Jd. Despite

surgery on both of her wrists, Hardt still experienced

pain, and she stopped working on January 23, 2003.

Id.

Hardt subsequently requested that Reliance pay

her long-term disability (LTD) benefits pursuant to

the Plan, explaining in her claim form that she

suffered from numbness, tingling, loss of feeling, and

extreme pain in her arms, hands, shoulders, and

neck. Jd. Reliance provisionally approved Hardt’s

claim for LTD benefits and required her to submit to

a functional capacities evaluation (“FCE”). Id.

Hardt participated in an FCE in October 2003,

which was limited to assessing the impact of Hardt’s

CTS and neck pain on her ability to work. Id. The

evaluator summarized Hardt’s pertinent medical

history and found that Hardt suffered from major

limitations in several areas, but nonetheless

concluded that Hardt could perform sedentary work

and lft 4 to 5 pounds on occasion with her right

hand, and 2 to 3 pounds on a frequent basis. Jd. at

32a-33a.

Based on the results of this FCE, Reliance denied

Hardt LTD benefits in December 2003, concluding

that she did not meet the Plan’s definition of total

disability. Jd. at 33a. Hardt filed an administrative

appeal, and Reliance partially reversed its decision,

agreeing to provide Hardt LTD benefits for twenty-

four months based on her inability to perform her

current position. Id.

Meanwhile, one of Hardt’s treating physicians

diagnosed her as suffering from a separate condition —

hereditary small-fiber neuropathy, which is a

disorder involving small sensory cutaneous nerves

with symptoms including tingling, numbness,

burning pain or extreme coldness, brief, painful

sensations, and loss of temperature sensation. Id.

The physician found, inter alia, that that Hardt’s

motor skills were limited by pain. Id. Despite

increases in prescribed pain medication, Hardt

“continued to have obvious pain,” which became

worse over the following months. Jd. at 34a. The

neuropathy caused Hardt a “burning sensation in

the feet all the way to the ankles[{,] pain and

cramping to the upper 1/3 of her calves,” and swollen

feet, making walking difficult. Jd. at 34a-35a.

(punctuation altered).

Hardt then applied to the Social Security

Administration (“SSA”) for disability insurance

benefits and submitted questionnaires completed by

two of her treating physicians. Jd. at 35a. One

concluded Hardt could not return to gainful

employment in her prior position or other sedentary

positions because of her neuropathy and other

ailments. Id. The physician also observed that Hardt

would experience “pain or other symptoms severe

enough to interfere with attention and concentration

... {cJonstantly,” and that she had limitations on her

ability to walk, sit, or stand due to her impairments.

Id. The second treating physician concluded that

Hardt would have difficulty working at a regular job

on a sustained basis. Jd. He noted, among other

things, that Hardt’s disability placed limitations on

her ability to walk, sit, and stand and that she

experienced “pain or other symptoms severe enough

to interfere with attention and concentration .. .

frequently.” Jd. Both doctors found that Hardt was

not a malingerer. Jd. The SSA determined that

Hardt was “disabled” under the Social Se urity Act

because it was “impossible for her to return to her

former employment or make an adjustment to

perform other work.” Jd. at 35a-36a.

A few months after Hardt received Social

Security disability benefits, Reliance notified her

that it would terminate her LTD benefits at the end

of the twenty-four month period. Jd. at 36a. The Plan

provided LTD benefits after twenty-four months only

if she was totally disabled from all occupations. Id.

Reliance found that Hardt was not totally disabled

due to her CTS and noted that the FCE conducted in

2003 demonstrated that she had _ sedentary

restrictions, but that she could perform a sedentary

job. Id.

Hardt filed an administrative appeal regarding

the termination of her LTD benefits. Jd. In support

of her claim, Hardt submitted all of her medical

records, the SSA questionnaires completed by her

treating physicians, and an updated questionnaire

from one physician that again determined Hardt

would be unable to maintain a job. 7d.

Before ruling on the appeal, Reliance decided to

obtain an updated FCE. Id. Although Rehance knew

Hardt had been diagnosed with neuropathy,

Reliance did not request that the testing company

review Hardt for neuropathy or neuropathic pain;

instead, the FCE was limited to determine whether

Hardt had CTS or neck pain. See id. at 36a.

Hardt appeared for two separate FCEs, but the

results of both were considered invalid because the

examiners believed Hardt’s effort was submaximal.

Id. at 37a. One examiner noted that Hardt “refused

multiple tests . . . for fear of nausea/illness/further

pain complaints,” but Reliance did not mention

neuropathy or neuropathic pain in its referral

request to the testing company. /d.

Rather than have a doctor personally examine

Hardt, Reliance hired a doctor to review some, but

not all, of her medical records. Jd. The doctor

ultimately concluded in his peer review report that

Hardt’s health was expected to improve, yet the

report failed to address any of the pain medications

prescribed to Hardt, the effect her pain had on her

ability to work, or the treating physicians’

questionnaires finding that Hardt was completely

disabled. Jd. at 37a-38a. Reliance also retained a

vocational rehabilitation counselor to determine

what jobs, if any, Hardt could perform. Jd. at 38a.

The labor market study identified eight employment

opportunities for Hardt, but the study was based on

an evaluation of Hardt’s health in 2003. Id.

On March 27, 2006, Reliance notified Hardt that

it would not change its decision to terminate her

LTD benefits, basing its decision on the FCEs, the

peer review report, and the labor market study. Id.

3. Hardt exhausted her administrative appeals

and then filed suit in the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, which had

jurisdiction pursuant to ERISA § 502(e) (29 U.S.C. §

1132(e)) and Zo U.S.C. § 1331.

On March 27, 2008, the court issued an Opinion

and Order based upon the parties’ cross motions for

summary judgment. App. 3la-49a. The court denied

Reliance’s motion for summary judgment, stating

that “it is clear that Reliance’s decision to deny []

Hardt long-term disability benefits was not based on

substantial evidence.” Jd. at 47a.

With regard to Hardt’s motion for summary

judgment, the district court found “compelling

evidence that {] Hardt is totally disabled due to her

neuropathy” and that “the record indicates that []

Hardt did not get the kind of review to which she

was entitled under applicable law.” Jd. at 48a. The

district court remanded the case to Reliance “to fully

and adequately assess [] Hardt’s claim.” Jd. The

district court clearly indicated that that Hardt would

prevail if the Plan did not abide by the court’s

instruction to consider all the medical evidence. Jd.

at 49a. (specifically instructing Reliance to act on

Hardt’s application by “adequately considering all

the evidence discussed within this Opinion within

thirty (30) days of its date of issuance. Otherwise,

judgment will be issued in favor of [] Hardt.”).

Reliance found Hardt eligible for benefits after

this judicially-ordered remand. Id. at 13a.

The district court then granted Hardt’s motion

for attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to ERISA

§ 502(g)(1). Id. at 30a. Recognizing prior Fourth

Circuit precedent requiring prevailing party status

before fees and costs could issue under § 502(g)(1),

the district court found that “the court sanctioned a

material change in the legal relationship of the

parties by ordering the defendant to conduct the type

of review to which the plaintiff was entitled” and

thus “[iJn light of the fact that, on remand, the

plaintiff received precisely the benefits she had

sought, she meets the definition of a ‘prevailing

party’ and is eligible for an award of attorneys’ fees.”

Id. at 22a.

The district court next evaluated whether

attorneys fees were justified under an established

five-factor test used to guide the court’s discretion.

Id. at 22a-25a. These factors are: (1) the degree of

9

opposing parties’ culpability or bad faith; (2) ability

of opposing parties to satisfy an award of attorneys’

fees, (3) whether an award of attorneys’ fees against

the opposing parties would deter other persons

acting under similar circumstances; (4) whether the

parties requesting attorneys’ fees sought to benefit

all participants and beneficiaries of an ERISA plan

or to resolve a significant legal question regarding

ERISA itself; and (5) the relative merits of the

parties’ positions. Jd. at 16a-17a.!

In regard to the degree of bad faith or culpability

factor, the district court found that:

the record is replete with instances of

[Reliance’s} staunch opposition to

awarding any benefits to [Hardt]. . . . the

totality of circumstances seems to

: Nearly all courts of appeals, including the Fourth Circuit,

have used this five-factor test to determine when fees should be

awarded. See Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co. of N. America, 987

F.2d 1017, 1028-29 (4th Cir. 1993) (en banc); see also Eddy v.

Colonial Life Ins. Co. of Am., 59 F.3d 201, 206-07 (D.C. Cir.

1995); Gray v. New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 792 F.2d 251, 257-258

(ist Cir. 1986), and cases cited therein from Second, Third,

Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits adopting

test; Sec. of Dept. of Labor v. King, 775 F.2d 666, 669 (6th Cir.

1985). The Seventh Circuit has used two tests to determine

whether fee awards in ERISA actions are justified. Bowerman

vu. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 226 F.3d 574, 592-93 (7th Cir. 2000)

(describing five-factor test and “substantially justified” test).

The Seventh Circuit does not consider these different tests as

having significant practical consequences. See id.

Regardless, the issues in this case are limited to whether

an award of attorney’s fees should issue only to a prevailing

party and, if so, whether a remand for reconsideration of

benefits in these circumstances meets a prevailing party test

for purposes of § 502(g)(1).

10

indicate that it was [Reliance’s] goal from

the beginning to dc: .* [Hardt] the

benefits she had claimed, and that, to

further that goal, [Reliance] engaged in

only the most cursory review of the

medical evidence. With the (not

insignificant) exception of actually

awarding her benefits on remand,

[Reliance] has opposed [Hardt’s] position

throughout the course of this litigation.

And even when [Reliance] did award

[Hardt] the benefits she sought, it was

only after having been ordered by the

court to provide the kind of meaningful

review of the evidence to which [Hardt]

was entitled by law. Thus, the bad faith

and culpability of [Reliance] in ignoring

the medical evidence of [{Hardt’s]

disability weigh in favor of an award of

attorneys’ fees to [Hardt].

Id. at 22a-23a. In regard to the second and third

factors, the district court found that Reliance could

pay an award of attorneys’ fees and that an award of

fees in this case “would deter similarly-situated

defendants from failing to consider the full breadth

of medical evidence available to them when

reviewing a claim for benefits.” Jd. at 23a-24a. The

court found that the fourth factor (the amount of

benefit the action conferred on members of the plan)

weighed against awarding fees. Jd. at 24a. It held as

to the fifth factor (relative merits of the parties’

positions) that Hardt’s “position clearly has the

higher relative merit, as demonstrated in the court’s

remand order and—more importantly-—the ultimate

11

resolution of the case” and that this factor weighed

in favor of granting fees to Hardt. Jd. at 24a-25a

(noting, in addition, that the court had found that

“Reliance’s decision to deny {| Hardt long-term

disability benefits was not based on substantial

evidence”). Based on the five-factor test and the

totality of the circumstances of the case, the district

court determined to exercise its discretion and award

fees and costs to Hardt. Jd. at 25a.

After reviewing the reasonableness of the fees

and costs requestea, the district court awarded

Hardt reduced attorneys’ fees and costs and issued

judgment in her favor. Id. at 29a-30a.

4. Reliance appealed the award of attorneys’ fees

and costs to the Fourth Circuit. Reliance limited its

appeal to a single question: “Is Ms. Hardt a

‘prevailing party?” Fourth Circuit Case No. 08-1896,

Appeal Docket 15, p.18 (Brief of Appellant, at p.11).

See also, id., Appeal Docket 21, p.5 (Reply Brief of

Appellant at p.1) (“The single question before this

Court is whether Ms. Hardt can be considered a

‘prevailing party’ as required under the ERISA fee-

shifting statute when there is no judgment on the

merits in her favor and there is no consent decree.”).

Reliance did not appeal the district court’s use or

application of the five-factor test.

The Fourth Circuit, with jurisdiction pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1291, vacated the district court’s

judgment and award of attorneys’ fees. App. la-1la.

In so ruling, the Fourth Circuit first discussed its

established requirement for awarding fees in ERISA

cases:

12

It is well settled that “only a prevailing

party is entitled to consideration for

attorneys’ fees in an ERISA action.”

Martin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of

Va., Inc., 115 F.3d 1201, 1210 (4th Cir.

1997). To be a prevailing party, “a

plaintiff [must] receive at least some

relief on the merits of his [or her] claim.”

Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W.

Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532

U.S. 598, 603 (2001)). “[E]ven an award

of nominal damages suffices under this

test.” Id. at 604. The Supreme Court has,

however, established a _ bright-line

boundary on what constitutes “relief on

the merits” of a particular claim: only

“enforceable judgments on the merits and

court-ordered consent decrees create the

material alteration of the legal

relationship of the parties necessary to

permit an award of attorney’s fees.”

Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604 (internal

quotation marks omitted).

Id. at 7a-8a (brackets in original).

The Fourth Circuit then examined whether

Petitioner met the Fourth Circuit’s post-Buckhannon

prevailing party test. The Fourth Circuit reviewed

its decision in Goldstein v. Moatz, 445 F.3d 747, 751

(4th Cir. 2006), in which the court acknowledged it

“clarified [the] Buckhannon standard by holding that

there is no exception for ‘tactical mooting’ — the

situation where a defendant chooses to settle rather

13

than risk an award of attorney’s fees.” Jd. at 8a. The

court then noted that Goldstein “left open the

question of whether there is an exception to the

Buckhannon rule where a defendant has agreed to

provide the relief requested in response to an

affirmative indication by the presiding court that the

plaintiff is about to prevail.” Jd. at 8a-9a (internal

punctuation omitted).

The Fourth Circuit ultimately concluded that

petitioner's case was a “tactical mooting” case and

that she did not meet the court’s prevailing party

test. As the Fourth Circuit saw it, the district court’s

findings that petitioner is totally disabled and that

she did not get the kind of review to which she was

entitled under applicable law, coupled with its

remand order for the Plan to re-determine whether

petitioner qualified for benefits under threat of

judgment being entered in favor of petitioner were

“simply insufficient to overcome the _ statutory

requirement that a party applying for a fees and

costs award must first have been accorded some

relief in the district court.” Id. at 10a (quoting

Goldstein, 445 F.3d at 752). The Fourth Circuit held

that because the district court remand “did not

require Reliance to award benefits” the order does

not “constitute an ‘enforceable judgment{] on the

merits’ as Buckhannon requires. 532 U.S. at 604.”

Id.

Because petitioner did not qualify as a prevailing

party in the Fourth Circuit’s view, the court vacated

the award of attorney’s fees.

14

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

By granting certiorari, this Court will resolve a

widely acknowledged, long-standing and frequently

recurring circuit division on an important question

of law — whether § 502(g)(1) requires prevailing

party status for an award of attorneys’ fees. The

Fourth Circuit’s decision that “only a prevailing

party is entitled to consideration for attorneys’ fees

in an ERISA action” is incorrect and directly

conflicts with other circuits (and the clear language

and structure of the statute). This split has festered

and the lower courts have not converged.

This case also presents a recurring question on

which the circuits have spht — whether a court-

ordered remand for reconsideration of an ERISA

benefits decision and subsequent grant of benefits

permits an award of attorney’s fees and costs.

Review by this Court plainly is warranted to

provide needed uniformity on these issues that have

profound implications for this comprehensive statute

affecting millions of workers across the United

States. ERISA was enacted to provide consistent

rules across the United States to govern the

administration and enforcement welfare and pension

benefit plans, especially given that many ERISA

plans are national in scope. Plan participants should

not be treated differently in an action to enforce

their statutory rights based on the circuit in which

they live. Yet, that is precisely what is occurring due

to the current unsettled state of the law.

This case is an ideal vehicle for the Court to settle

these critical questions regarding the enforcement of

ERISA. The Court should grant certiorari.

15

I. The Circuits Conflict On Whether Attorney’s

Fees May Be Awarded at the District Court’s

Discretion To Either Party or Only to a

“Prevailing Party” Under § 502(g).

To assist participants, beneficiaries, or fiduciaries

of ERISA-governed plans to enforce their rights,

Congress provided in § 502(g)(1) that “fiJn any

action .. . by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary,

the court in its discretion may allow a reasonable

attorney’s fee and costs of action to either party.” See

Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 147

(1985) (citing § 502(g)(1) and noting its purpose: “in

answer to a possible concern that attorney’s fees

might present a barrier to maintenance of suits for

small claims, thereby risking underenforcement of

beneficiaries’ statutory rights, it should be noted that

ERISA authorizes the award of attorney’s fees”). This

Court has acknowledged that attorney’s fees and

costs may be awarded to either party under § 502(g).

See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 53

(1987) (“In an action under these civil enforcement

provisions, the court in its discretion may allow an

award of attorney’s fees to either party. § 502(g).”)

Nonetheless, “[t]here is a significant split of

authority between—and within—federal appeals courts

on whether [§ 502(g)(1)] requires a party to prevail for

a fee award.” McKay v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 46

Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1272, 2009 U:S. Dist.

LEXIS 16667 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 3, 2009); see also Eric

C. Surette, Annotation, Requirement that Party Prevail

to Obtain Attorney's Fees under § 502 (g) of ERISA, 172

A.L.R. Fed. 571 (2001) (reviewing split of authority

within and among the circuits on the issue). Indeed,

even “[t]hose courts that have recognized the split of

16

authority do not interpret the conflicting decisions in

a uniform manner.” Colby v. Assurant Employee

Benefits, et al., Civil Action No. 07-11488-RCL, 2009

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65340, *8, n.3 (D. Mass. July 22,

2009) (describing conflicting interpretations of

whether particular circuits require a party to prevail

in order to be eligible to recover fees and costs).

The Court should decide this important yet

unresolved issue to bring clarity to the existing state

of confusion in the lower courts regarding whether a

prevailing party requirement exists within § 502(g)(1).

See Rule 10(a), (c).

A. The Courts of Appeals Are Intractably

Divided Over the Question Presented.

In interpreting § 502(g)(1), the lower courts are in

disarray regarding whether a party must prevail to

obtain attorney’s fees. The Fourth Circuit clearly has

imposed a prevailing party requirement, and the

Tenth Circuit appears to as well; the Second, Fifth

and Eleventh Circuits expressly have _ rejected

this interpretation; and other circuits issued

indeterminate or conflicting opinions on the issue.

The Fourth Circuit in this case held that it “is

well settled ‘that only a prevailing party is entitled

to consideration of attorneys’ fees in an ERISA

action.” App. 7a-8a (quoting Mariin v. Blue Cross &

Blue Shield of Va., Inc., 115 F.3d 1201, 1210 (4th

Cir. 1997)). In effect, the Fourth Circuit has read a

“prevailing party” standard into § 502(g)(1) without

grounding in the statutory language.

The Tenth Circuit has recognized that § 502(g)(1)

contains no express requirement that a party prevail

17

to obtain an award of fees and costs, but nonetheless

takes into account prevailing party status in

determining whether to reverse, deny, or grant

awards:

Courts considering whether to award

attorney’s fees in ERISA actions consider

five factors: a party’s culpability or bad

faith; its ability to satisfy an award of fees;

the deterrence value of an award; the

number of plan participants affected by

the case or the significance of the impact

of the legal question involved; and “the

relative merits of the parties’ positions.”

Gordon, [{v. U.S. Steel Corp., 724 F.2d

106, 109 (10th Cir. 1983)]. We also afford

certain weight to prevailing party status,

even though we acknowledge that the

ERISA attorney’s fees provision is not

expressly directed at prevailing parties.

See. e.g., Deboard v. Sunshine Mining &

Ref. Co., 208 F.3d 1228, 1245 (10th Cir.

2000) (reversing and remanding an

attorney's fee award because appellate

decision “alter[ed] the relative merits of

the parties’ positions”); Morgan v. Indep.

Drivers Ass'n Pension Plan, 975 F.2d

1467, 1471 (10th Cir. 1992) (“Although

the statute does not expressly require

that a party prevail as a condition to

receiving an award of attorneys’ fees...

we have remanded cases for denial of fees

without explanation only when the party

seeking fees had prevailed at least

partially.” (citations omitted)); Arfsten v.

Frontier Airlines, Inc. Ret. Plan for Pilots,

18

967 F.2d 438, 442 n.3 (10th Cir. 1992)

(“Because we reverse the district court’s

decision on the merits, plaintiff is not a

prevailing party, and his arguments on

attorney's fees are moot.”).

Graham v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 501

F.3d 1153, 1162 (10th Cir. 2007). See also, Chambers

v. Family Health Plan Corp., 100 F.3d 818, 828 (10th

Cir. 1996) (recognizing § 502(g)(1) permits a fee

award to either party but declining to award fees or

remand for the district court to determine the issue

because the plaintiff did not prevail on any of his

claims); Anderson v. Emergency Medicine Assoc., 860

F.2d 987, 992 (10th Cir. 1988) (characterizing a

request for attorney's fees and costs by a party that

did not prevail as “unsupportable’”).

In contrast, three circuits have held explicitly

that a party need not prevail to obtain attorney's

fees under § 502(g)(1). For example, the Second

Circuit, noting the distinction Congress drew in

amending the ERISA fees provision in 1980, held

that “Section 502(g)(1) contains no requirement that

the party awarded attorneys’ fees be the prevailing

party. Cf. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2).” Miller v. United

Welfare Fund, 72 F.3d 1066, 1074 (2d Cir. 1995). The

Fourth Circuit in Martin cited this contrary decision

in Miller, but declined to follow it without

explanation. Martin, 115 F.3d at 1210.

The Eleventh Circuit, like the Second Circuit, has

followed the plain language of § 502(g)(1) and held

that it allows a court to award fees to either party,

regardless of “prevailing party” status: “Unlike other

fee-shifting provisions, which give the court discretion

19

to award fees to a prevailing party, § [502(g)(1)]

allows a court to award fees to either party.”

Freeman v. Continental Ins. Co., 996 F.2d 1116, 1119

(11th Cir. 1993). See also, Sharron v. Amalgamated

Ins. Agency Services, Inc., 704 F.2d 562, 569 (11th

Cir. 1983) (noting “under ERISA, see 29 U.S.C.A. §

1132(g), the losing party may under certain

circumstances be entitled to attorney’s fees . . .”).

The Fifth Circuit in Gibbs v. Gibbs, 210 F.3d 491,

503 (5th Cir. 2000), examined the Fourth Circuit's

Martin decision in detail and expressly rejected it.

Analyzing the language of § 502(g)(1), the Fifth

Circuit remarked that the term “prevailing” is

“[c]onspicuously absent,” although Congress often

uses the term in other fee-shifting statutes. Jd. at

501. After surveying the conflicting opinions in

other circuits, the Fifth Circuit concluded that “the

greater weight of authority, from outside and within

our own circuit, supports the notion that a party

need not prevail in order to be eligible for an award

of attorneys’ fees under § 1132(g)(1) of ERISA.” Jd. at

501-503.2

2 The Fifth Circuit appears to have retreated from Gibbs for

purposes of determining costs under § 502(g)(1), requiring a

party to meet a “prevailing party” standard. See Wade uv.

Hewlett-Packard Dev. Co. LP Short Term Disability Plan, 493

F.3d 533, 543 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e read [Salley v. EJ. DuPont

de Nemours & Co., 966 F.2d 1011, 1017 (5th Cir. 1992)] now as

establishing, for ERISA’s fee-shifting provision, a ‘prevailing

party’ test, analogous to the test under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d), for

the award of costs. As Salley is the first case to discuss the

award of costs under ERISA, Salley’s application of the

‘prevailing party’ test controls this case.”). Wade involved an

award of costs only, not attorneys’ fees. /bid., at 537. Wade

sows further confusion in the lower courts as to whether

prevailing party status is required for an award of attorney's

fees and costs and provides further support for granting

certiorari.

20

The Sixth Circuit ikewise appears not to require a

prevailing party status for an award of fees. For

example, in First Trust Corp. v. Bryant, 410 F.3d 842,

851 (6th Cir. 2005), the Sixth Circuit emphasized that

“the court, in its discretion, ‘may allow a reasonable

attorney's fee and costs of action to either party.”

(emphasis in original). In Bryant, the court ultimately

held that the district court erred in awarding

attorney fees under § 502(g)(1) to the former trustee

of an ERISA-governed pension plan because the

equities favored the pension plan beneficiary and

relevant factors weighed against such an award to the

trustee in that interpleader action. But see, McKay,

2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16667, at *10 (recognizing

“lack of controlling Sixth Circuit law” on the issue

and analyzing circuit and intra-circuit splits).

The First Circuit has issued conflicting authority

on whether a party must prevail to obtain an award

of fees and costs, which adds to the unsettled nature

of the law on this important question. Compare Doe

v. Travelers Ins. Co., 167 F.3d 53, 61 (1st Cir. 1999)

(“Naturally, fawards under Section 502] are

normally for the prevailing party, if at all. . .”) and

Cottrill v. Sparrow, Johnson & Ursillo, Inc., 100

F.3d 220, 225 (ist Cir. 1996) (stating “Congress

declared that, in any ERISA claim advanced by a

‘participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary, the court in its

discretion may allow a reasonable attorney's fee to

the prevailing party. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1)” and

thereafter assuming only “prevailing plaintiffs and

prevailing defendants” can recover fees and costs)

with Gray v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 792 F.2d

251, 258 (1st Cir. 1986). (holding courts should use a

five-factor balancing approach for determining

whether a court should award fees and costs in an

21

ERISA action “regardless of which party prevails.”).

But see, Colby, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65340, at *5

(‘the First Circuit has consistently read [Section

502(g)] as limiting recovery of fees and costs to

prevailing parties’).

Although the Seventh Circuit recently appears in

line with the Fourth Circuit, requiring prevailing

party status before awarding fees, its prior contrary

decision has not been overruled. Sze Janowski v.

International Broth. of Teamsters Levcl No. 710

Pension Fund, 812 F.2d 295, 297 (7th Cir. 1987)

(reversing award of attorney’s fees where party did

not meet “prevailing party” test). See also, Tate v.

Long Term Disability Plan For Salaried Employees

of Champion Int'l Corp. #506, 545 F.3d 555, 564 (7th

Cir. 2008) (refusing to award fees without prevailing

party status); Trustmark Life Ins. Co. v. University

of Chicago Hosps., 207 F.3d 876, 884 (7th Cir. 2000)

(“Our decision to reverse the district court’s

judgment means that Trustmark is no longer a

prevailing party, and, therefore, is no longer entitled

to an award of attorney’s fees.”). The Seventh Circuit

previously held that “[t]here is no requirement that

a party must ‘prevail’ in order to receive an award

pursuant to § 1132(g). But, as a practical matter, we

recognize that a court is more likely to find

appropriate an award to a prevailing party than an

award to a non-prevailing party.” Marquardt v. N.

Am. Car Corp., 652 F.2d 715, 718 n.2 (7th Cir. 1981).

This has led some courts and commentators to find

that the Seventh Circuit has conflicting authority on

the issue. See Colby, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65340,

*8-9, n.3 (noting different conclusions courts and

commentators have drawn from the Seventh

22

Circuit’s cases). Of course, this confusion simply

highlights the need for clarity.

Finally, the Eighth Circuit in Antolik v. Saks,

Inc., 463 F.3d 796 (8th Cir. 2006), stated the

question is open in its circuit, but allowed fees

potentially to be awarded to a non-prevailing party,

which is in direct conflict with the Fourth Circuit:

The district court's award of substantial

attorneys’ fees must also be reversed

because plaintiffs are no longer prevailing

parties. However, it is an open issue in

this circuit whether attorneys’ fees may

be awarded under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1)

to an ERISA plan claimant who does not

prevail. .. . But Saks’s deceptive behavior

and flagrant disregard of its ERISA

disclosure duties may make this the rare

case where some modest award is

appropriate. That is an issue we leave in

the first instance to the district court’s

discretion. Accordingly, the judgment of

the district court is reversed and the case

is remanded for entry of judgment on the

merits in favor of Saks and for further

consideration of the attorneys’ fee issue

Ibid., at 803. It also conflicts with the Tenth Circuit's

refusal to remand for an award of attorney’s fees to a

non-prevailing party. See Arfsten, 967 F.2d at 442

n.3 (reversing decision on merits and holding

“plaintiff is not a prevailing party [so] his arguments

on attorney’s fees are moot.”)

23

Clearly, the Court’s intervention is needed to

resolve this intolerable conflict within the lower

courts. Rule 10(a).

B. Petitioner’s Case Is an Ideal Vehicle for

Resolving the Question.

This case cleanly and squarely presents this

important issue for resolution. As noted, Reliance

challenged on appeal only whether Hardt was a

“prevailing party,” not whether she was entitled to

fees and costs under the five-factor approach. See

supra, 9-11. Thus, this case is a uniquely appropriate

vehicle to determine whether § 502(g)(1) requires

prevailing party status for fees to be awarded, as the

issue directly determined the outcome below.

C. Certiorari Is Further Warranted Because

This Issue Is Both Frequently Recurring

and Important.

This Court has acknowledged “Congress’s intent

to establish the regulation of employee welfare

benefit plans ‘as exclusively a federal concern” and

to create uniformity in benefit administration and

enforcement of ERISA plans. See New York State

Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans uv.

Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1995). The

Court also has recognized that a fundamental

purpose of the attorney’s fees provision in ERISA is

to prevent underenforcement of these exclusively

federal statutory rights. See Russell, 473 U.S. at 147

(“in answer to a possible concern that attorney's fees

might present a barrier to maintenance of suits for

small claims, thereby risking underenforcement of

beneficiaries’ statutory rights, it should be noted

that ERISA authorizes the award of attorney’s fees”).

24

This statutory enforcement provision is essential,

particularly as our aging workforce retires and relies

more heavily on ERISA pension and welfare plans in

even greater numbers.

The reach of ERISA is staggering. As noted by

the United States Department of Labor’s Employee

Benefits Security Administration, their oversight

authority “extends to nearly 700,000 retirement plans,

approximately 2.5 million health plans, and a similar

number of other welfare benefit plans, such as those

providing life or disability insurance,” which cover

about 150 million workers and their dependents.” Fact

Sheet: EBSA Achieves $1.2 Billion in Total Monetary

Results in Fiscal Year 2008, available at

http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/fsFYO08results.html

(last visited October 13, 2009). Ensuring an effective

private enforcement provision for ERISA therefore is

critical.

According to the Administrative Office of the

United States Courts, approximately 9,000 to 11,000

ERISA cases were filed in federal court each year

from 2004 through 2008. See 2008 Annual Report of

the Director: Judicial Business of the United States

Courts, Appendix Table C-2A, Cases Commenced, by

Nature of Suit, 2004 Through 2008, available at

http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2008/appendices/C02

ASep08.pdf (last visited October 13, 2009). Excepting

prisoner petitions, ERISA cases comprise the third

highest statutory-based civil claims filed in the

federal courts, behind employment and other civil

rights claims. See id. Whether attorney’s fees should

be awarded therefore arises in a significant number

of cases and is frequently recurring in the lower

courts.

25

Given ERISA’s far-reaching impact, its goal for

uniformity across the United States and the

enforcement mechanisms embodied in the statute to

ensure rights are protected, it is especially important

that workers within the Fourth Circuit not be

treated differently in actions to enforce their

statutory rights when compared to workers in other

parts of the country. This is particularly critical

given that many ERISA plans are national in scope.

A worker in Maryland or Virginia should have the

same right to receive attorney’s fees in bringing suit

under ERISA as a worker in Florida, Texas or New

York. Yet, under the current unsettled state of the

law, that is not occurring.

The Court should step in to resolve the untenable

split in the lower courts on this vital ERISA

enforcement issue, and this case is a fitting vehicle

directly presenting the question.

D. The Fourth Circuit’s Decision Conflicts

with This Court’s Prior Reasoning and Is

Incorrect on the Merits.

This Court has repeatedly emphasized that

ERISA in particular is a “comprehensive and

reticulated statute” with “carefully integrated civil

enforcement provisions,” Russell, 473 U.S. at 146

(quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension’ Benefit

Guaranty Corporation, 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980)).

The Act is “an enormously complex and detailed

statute that resolved innumerable disputes between

powerful competing interests -- not all in favor of

potential plaintiffs.” Mertens v. Hewitt Associates,

508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993) Given the “evident care”

with which ERISA was crafted, this Court has been

26

“reluctant to tamper with [the] enforcement scheme”

embodied in the statute. Russell, 473 U.S. at 147

(declining to create an implied private cause of

action for extracontractual damages); see also

Mertens, 508 U.S. at 262 (rejecting claim that ERISA

allows cause of action against a nonfiduciary who

knowingly participates in a fiduciary breach);

Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56, (holding that civil

enforcement scheme codified at § 502(a) is not to be

supplemented by state-law remedies). Contrary to

this inclination not to upset the carefully crafted

civil enforcement provisions of ERISA, the Fourth

Circuit erroneously has read a “prevailing party”

requirement into § 502(g)(1), despite such language

being “conspicuously absent” from that section. See

Gibbs, 210 F.3d at 501.

Such a reading not only is contrary to prior

decisions of this Court, but it also is wrong on the

merits. Section 502(g)(1) unambiguously states that

“the court in its discretion may allow a reasonable

attorney’s fee and costs of action to either party.” 29

U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) (emphasis added). “[C]ourts must

presume that a legislature says in a statute what it

means and means in a statute what is says there.”

Conn. Natl Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54

(1992). Had Congress intended a prevailing party

restriction in § 502(g)(1), it would have included it,

as Congress did in numerous other fee-shifting

statutes. See Samuel R. Berger, Court Awarded

Attorneys’ Fees: What Is “Reasonable”?, 126 U. Pa. L..

Rev. 281, 305 nn.109-10 (1977) (collecting statutes

with express prevailing party requirements in

existence around time ERISA was enacted in 1974).

This conclusion is reinforced when one considers

that, in most cases, only one party prevails. It thus is

27

an unwarranted interpretation to jump from the

clear Congressionally-enacted language that a court

may award fees and cost “to either party” to read the

statute as stating that “only a prevailing party is

entitled to consideration for attorneys’ fees.”

Moreover, when Congress subsequently amended

ERISA, it left what is now § 502(g)(1) alone, but

added a provision (what is now § 502(g)(2)) requiring

attorney's fees and other relief where “judgment in

favor of the plan is awarded.” See Multiemployer

Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.

96-364, § 306(b), 94 Stat. 1208, 1295 (1980), as

codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2). The clear inference

from this amendment and the resulting language

and structure of § 502(g) is that Congress did not

intend to require a prevailing party requirement in §

502(g)(1). See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., --- U.S. ---,

129 S. Ct. 2343, 2349 (2009). That 1s, when Congress

chooses to amend one statutory provision but not

another, it is presumed to have acted intentionally,

and the resulting differences generally compel an

inference that the provision not amended does not

contain the newly-inserted requirement. See 1d.

(‘negative implications raised by _ disparate

provisions are strongest” where the provisions were

“considered simultaneously when the language

raising the implication was inserted”) (citing EEOC

v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 256

(1991) and quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320,

330 (1997))). See also, Miller, 72 F.3d at 1074 (noting

difference in language between §§ 502(g)(1) and

502(g)(2) in concluding no _ prevailing party

requirement exists within § 502(g)(1)).

28

The Fourth Circuit's decision below on this

important federal question conflicts with the

reasoning of prior decisions of this Court and is

wrong on the merits. The Court should grant

certiorari to resolve the issue. See Rule 10(c).

II. The Courts of Appeal Are Divided On

Whether a Remand For a Redetermination of

Benefits Is Sufficient To Support an Award

of Attorney’s Fees and Costs Under § 502(g).

This case also squarely presents a_ second

important issue — whether a claimant is entitled to

attorney's fees under § 502(g)(1) where she secures a

remand to her plan administrator for reconsideration

of her benefits claim after persuading the district

court that the plan administrator violated ERISA.

There is an acknowledged split in the lower courts

on this issue. See Colby, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

65340, *11 (stating First Circuit had not decided

issue and recognizing “[c]ourts in other circuits have

split almost evenly on the issue.”). The Court should

grant certiorari to consider fully the circumstances

under which attorney's fees may be _ granted

pursuant to ERISA § 502(g)(1).

In the case below, the Fourth Circuit held that

petitioner was not a prevailing party entitled to

attorney's fees. App. 10a-lla. The Fourth Circuit

reached that conclusion by relying on its prior

decision applying this Court’s Buckhannon decision

to ERISA claims. App. 7a (citing Griggs v. EI.

Dupont de Nemours & Co., 385 F.3d 440, 454 (4th

Cir. 2004)). It also relied on an Equal Access to

Justice Act (EAJA) attorney’s fees case, Goldstein v.

Moatz, 445 F.3d 747 (4th Cir. 2006), which held that

29

this Court’s Buckhannon standard applies to the

EAJA and that Buckhannon does not allow for a

“tactical mooting” exception to permit an award of

fees where a defendant has agreed to the plaintiffs

requested relief in order to avoid the prospect of an

adverse fees and costs award. See App. 8a (citing

Goldstein, 445 F.3d at 752). The Fourth Circuit in

the case below determined that the district court’s

finding of an ERISA violation and remanding (under

threat of judgment being entered in favor of

petitioner) for a redetermination of whether

petitioner qualified for benefits were “simply

insufficient to overcome the statutory requirement

that a party applying for a fees and costs award

must first have been accorded some relief in the

district court.” App. 10a (quoting Goldstein, 445 F.3d

at 752). The Fourth Circuit concluded petitioner was

not a prevailing party entitled to attorneys’ fees

because the district court remand “did not require

Reliance to award benefits” and, as such, was not an

enforceable judgment on the merits. Jd.

Cases in the Second and Ninths Circuits directly

conflict with the Fourth Circuit's holding in this

case. For example, in Peterson v. Continental

Casualty Co., 282 F.3d 112, 122 (2d Cir. 2002), the

Second Circuit held that plaintiffs were prevailing

parties when they succeeded after a court-ordered

remand to an ERISA plan administrator with

retention of jurisdiction. This directly conflicts with

the Fourth Circuit's ruling below. See also, Miller, 72

F.3d at 1074 (ordering district court to remand the

case to the plan administrator for a redetermination

of benefits and ordering that the district court

reconsider the grant of attorney’s fees, insinuating

that plaintiff may not be a prevailing party, but also

30

stating that “[t]he district court may in fact

determine that Miller is the prevailing party to the

extent that her motion for summary judgment

claimed that the Fund's denial was arbitrary and

capricious’).

Likewise, the Ninth Circuit has allowed an award

of attorneys’ fees to a claimant when a case is

remanded for a determination of benefits. See White

v. Jacobs Engineering Group Long Term Disability

Ben. Plan, 896 F.2d 344, 352 (9th Cir. 1990). In

White, the district court had granted summary

judgment to defendants on an employee's claim for

benefits on the ground that he failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies and also granted summary

judgment to the defendants on their counterclaim for

benefits paid while the employee allegedly was not

totally disabled. Jd. at 346. The Ninth Circuit

reversed the grants of summary judgment “and

remand/[ed] to the district court with instructions to

remand to the plan appeals board for adjudication on

the merits.” Jd. at 352. Based on the remand for a

determination of henefits, the Ninth Circuit held

that the plaintiff-employee “is entitled to attorney

fees in an amount to be determined by the district

court.” Id.

The Ninth Circuit in post-Buckhannon cases

continues to hold that a district court’s remand to a

plan administrator confers “prevailing party” status

upon an ERISA claimant. For example, in Flom uv.

Holly Corp., 276 Fed. Appx. 615, 617 (9th Cir. 2008),

the court concluded that the district court erred in

denying a disability benefit claimant’s motion for

attorney's fees against the plan administrator under

§ 502(g)(1). It held that the district court’s remand to

31

the administrator provided the “judicial imprimatur

required by Buckhannon” for the claimant to be a

prevailing party because it created “a judicially-

sanctioned change” in claimant’s “legal relationship

with [the administrator] and ultimately led to

[claimant’s] success in securing a reinstatement of

benefits.” Jd. Similarly, Mizzell v. Provident Life and

Accident Insurance Co., 32 Fed. Appx. 352, 353 (9th

Cir. 2002), involved an ERISA action for recovery of

long-term disability insurance benefits, and the

district court concluded that the plan administrator

abused its discretion, remanded the case to the plan

administrator for a new determination of benefits

eligibility, and awarded attorney’s fees and costs to

the plaintiff. The plan administrator appealed. The

Ninth Circuit concluded that the award of fees was

proper because plaintiff “succeeded on a significant

issue in litigation, te., whether [the plan

administrator] abused its discretion in denying

[plaintiffs] claim, which achieve[d] some of the

benefit [plaintiff] sought in bringing suit, i.e., to

obtain a full and fair review of his claim.” Jd. at 354

(some internal punctuation omitted).

The Ninth Circuit also has found prevailing party

status under ERISA when an employee-plaintiff

secures the requested benefits via settlement on

remand. In Smith, the district court dismissed the

plaintiffs ERISA claims. On appeal, the Ninth

Circuit found the employee stated a potential

violation of ERISA and remanded. See Smith uv.

CMTA-IAM Pension Trust, 654 F.2d 650, 653-54,

656-60 (9th Cir. 1981) (Smith J). “Upon remand, the

parties settled,” with a provision allowing the parties

to attempt agree on attorney’s fees for the plaintiff

32

or, failing that, for the plaintiff to file a motion for

fees. Smith v. CMTA-IAM Pension Trust, 746 F.2d

587, 589 (9th Cir. 1984) (Smith ID). “The parties

could not agree on the payment of plaintiffs

attorney’s fees, and [plaintiff-employee] moved for

fees pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1).” Id. The

district court denied the motion. On appeal, the

Ninth Circuit found the plaintiff to be “a prevailing

employee participant.” Smith IJ, 746 F.2d at 590.

Holding that “absent special circumstances, a

prevailing ERISA employee plaintiff should

ordinarily receive attorneys fees from the

defendant,” the Ninth Circuit directed the district

court to reconsider its denial of fees. Smith II, 746

F.2d at 591.

In contrast, the Seventh Circuit in Tate held that

a claimant who is awarded a remand in an ERISA

case “generally is not a ‘prevailing party’ in the

‘truest sense of the term.” 545 F.3d at 564 (quoting

Quinn v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass’n, 161 F.3d

472, 478-79 (7th Cir. 1998)). Though the claimant in

Tate urged the Seventh Circuit to reconsider Quinn

in light of the Second and Ninth Circuit decisions in

Miller and White, it refused to do so and ruled the

claimant was not entitled to fees based on the

remand. 545 F.3d at 564.

The circuits clearly have hardened in their

positions, and this Court’s intervention is needed to

resolve the split on this issue of profound importance

to the proper functioning of ERISA. Applying the

Buckhannon test and allowing for tactical mooting in

ERISA cases “would facilitate-rather than

discourage—[a defendant’s] bullying” and incent

33

defendants to “litigat[e] muschievously.” See

Kholyavskiy v. Schlecht, 479 F. Supp. 2d 897, 906

(E.D. Wis. 2007) (declining to apply Buckhannon to

EAJA claims). Many ERISA claimants can seek only

equitable relief via 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). In such

circumstances, “the [defendant] can _ htigate

vigorously to wear down the plaintiff and then

‘tactically moot’ the case prior to judicial action.” /d.

Many participants or beneficiaries who bring suit

to enforce their rights under ERISA are of limited

means. See, e.g., Smith I], 746 F.2d at 590 (‘when an

employee participant brings suit under ERISA,

whether it is against the trustees or the employer,

the resources available to the pensioner are

limited.”); Marquardt, 652 F.2d at 718 (“Lavern

Marquardt is a retired man in his sixties. He

receives an actuarily reduced pension from the

Company, and the record does not show that he has

any significant alternative source of funds.”).

Allowing plan administrators to “tactically moot” a

case after vigorously opposing benefits at every step

of the process until a judicially-ordered remand

would lead to underenforcement of rights in

contravention of one of the primary goals of ERISA.

This is because, under the Fourth Circuit's holding,

fee shifting would never apply in such a

circumstance and the costs of securing an attorney

could deprive a worker of her entire award (or more).

Plan administrators therefore are incented to engage

in such “you sue, you lose” tactics.

The Court should grant certiorari to resolve the

circuit split on this important issue.

34

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, petitioner urges the

Court to grant a writ of certiorari in this case.

Respectfully submitted,

Ann K. Sullivan John R. Ates

CRENSHAW, WARE & (Counsel of Record)

MARTIN, P.L.C. ATES LAW FIRM, P.C.

1200 Bank of America 1800 Diagonal Road

Center Suite 600

Norfolk, VA 23510 Alexandria, VA 22314

(757) 623-3000 (703) 647-7501

October 14, 2009

APPENDIX

ia

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Appendix Page

Unpublished Opinion of

The United States Court of Appeals for the

Fourth Circuit

II I os scncncnonmsdenetednbnadeniaadial la

Opinion and Order of

The United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Virginia

SE GI Ge, CI hcncccescccsnecenncsocsccssosens 12a

Opinion and Order of

The United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Virginia

entered March 27, 2006 ...................0....00000 3la

Order of

The United States Court of Appeals for the

Fourth Circuit

Re: Denying Petition for Rehearing and

Rehearing En Banc

SMOSIOE Aas 10, BOG «2... .cccccccccsccesssesesses: 50a

29 U.S.C. 1132(g)(2006)

Employment Retirement Income Security Act of

1974, § SOZ(q), as AMONG. ..............cccccrccccccscecescess Sla

la

[ENTERED: JULY 14, 2009]

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-1896

BRIDGET HARDT,

Plaintiff — Appellee,

Vv.

RELIANCE STANDARD LIFE

INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant — Appellant,

and

DAN RIVER GROUP LONG-TERM

DISABILITY PLAN,

Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Jerome B.

Friedman, District Judge. (2:07-cv-00105-JBF-JEB)

Argued: March 25, 2009 Decided: July 14, 2009

2a

Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge,! WILKINSON,

Circuit Judge, and David A. FABER, Senior United

States District Judge for the Southern District of

West Virginia, sitting by designation.

Vacated by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: Joshua Bachrach, WILSON, ELSER,

MOSKOWITZ, EDELMAN & DICKER, LLP,

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for Appellant. Ann

Sullivan, CRENSHAW, WARE & MARTIN, PLC,

Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Elaine

Kathryn Inman, CRENSHAW, WARE & MARTIN,

PLC, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in

this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company

(“Reliance”) appeals an award of attorney’s fees to

Bridget Hardt, arguing that the district court’s

remand of Hardt’s claim for long-term disability

benefits to Reliance for additional consideration did

not make Hardt a prevailing party for purposes of an

attorney's fees award. We agree, and for the reasons

below, we vacate the award of attorney's fees to

Hardt.

' Chief Judge Williams heard oral argument in this case

but did not participate in the decision. The decision is filed by a

quorum of the panel pursuant to 28 U S.C. § 46(d).

3a

I.

In 2000, Hardt was employed as an executive

assistant to the president of Dan River Inc., a textile

manufacturer. During that year, Hardt began

experiencing pain in her neck and shoulders; she

was diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome (“CTS”)

and underwent surgery on both of her wrists. Hardt

continued experiencing pain, however, and stopped

working on January 23, 2003.

In August 2003, Hardt requested that

Reliance pay her long-term disability benefits

pursuant to Dan River Inc.'s Group Long-Term

Disability Insurance Program Plan (“the Plan”).

Pursuant to the terms of the Plan, Dan River

administers the Plan, but Reliance underwrites the

Plan and decides whether a particular individual is

entitled to benefits. In response to Hardt’s request,

Reliance notified Hardt that she was required to

submit to a functional capacities evaluation (“FCE”)

and granted her a provisional approval.

Hand Rehabilitation of Hampton Roads

administered the FCE to Hardt in October 2003. The

evaluator concluded that Hardt suffered the

following major limitations: neck and _ upper

extremity pain, decreased right hand dexterity and

strength, restricted overhead reach, a restricted

ability to squat and kneel, the inability to crawl or to

climb ladders, and decreased lift, carrying, and push

and pull capabilities. In December 2003, Reliance

denied Hardt’s claim, concluding that she did not

meet the Plan’s definition of total disability.

Pursuant to the terms of the Plan, Hardt appealed

4a

this decision, and Reliance reversed its original

decision so that Hardt ultimately received temporary

disability benefits for twenty-four months.

In the meantime, Hardt was also diagnosed

with hereditary small-fiber neuropathy,? and her

pain became worse over the following months. In

addition to other symptoms, Hardt experienced

burning sensations in her feet and pain in her

calves, making walking difficult.

Hardt applied to the Social Security

Administration (“SSA”) for disability insurance

benefits and submitted two questionnaires

completed by her treating physicians that concluded

she could not return to her prior position or other

sedentary positions because of her neuropathy and

other maladies. The SSA found that Hardt was

“disabled” under the Social Security Act because she

was unable to return to her former employment or

make an adjustment to perform other work.

A few months later, Reliance notified Hardt

that her benefits would expire at the end of the

twenty-four month period. The Plan provided

benefits after twenty-four months only to individuals

totally disabled from all occupations. Reliance,

having reviewed the medical documentation in

Hardt’s file and a Residual Employability Analysis

that found she had_= several employment

2 Small-fiber neuropathy is a disorder involving small

sensory cutaneous nerves. Symptoms include tingling;

numbness; burning pain or extreme coldness; brief, painful

sensations; and loss of temperature sensation.

5a

opportunities still available, found that Hardt was

not totally disabled under the Plan.

Hardt again appealed this denial of her claim

to Reliance and, in support of her claim, submitted

her medical records, the SSA _ questionnaires

completed by her treating physicians, and an

updated questionnaire from one of those physicians

that again opined Hardt would be unable to

maintain a job. Reliance requested that Hardt

complete an updated FCE before making a final

decision on her claim, but did not request that the

testing company review Hardt for neuropathic pain.

Hardt underwent the updated FCE on

December 29, 2005 and a second updated FCE on

January 26, 2006, but the results of both

examinations were considered invalid by the

examiners because Hardt's effort was submaximal.

Specifically, one examiner noted that Hardt “refused

multiple tests . . . for fear of nausea/illness/further

pain complaints.” (J.A. at 475.)

Reliance then hired Dr. Michael Leibowitz,

who reviewed only some of Hardt’s medical records.

In his report, Dr. Leibowitz does not mention any of

the pain medications Hardt was taking or the

treating physicians’ questionnaires. Dr. Leibowitz

ultimately concluded that Hardt’s health was

expected to improve. Reliance also hired a vocational

rehabilitation counselor to determine if any jobs

existed that Hardt could perform. That labor market

study identified eight employment opportunities

suitable for Hardt, but the study was based on

Hardt’s health in 2003.

6a

On March 27, 2006, Reliance advised Hardt

that, based on its review of her file, she was still

ineligible to receive long-term disability benefits.

Reliance’s decision was based on the FCEs, Dr.

Leibowitz’s report, and the labor market study.

Hardt exhausted her administrative remedies

and filed a complaint in the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, alleging

that Reliance violated ERISA by wrongfully denying

her long-term disability benefits. The district court

denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment,

but remanded Hardt’s claim to Reliance Standard for

reconsideration. [n remanding Hardt’s claim, the

district court stated that if Reliance did not

adequately consider all of the evidence discussed in

its opinion within 30 days of the date the opinion

was issued, “judgment will be issued in favor of Ms.

Hardt.” (J.A. at 65.)

On remand, Hardt provided additional

medical records to Reliance for its consideration, and

Reliance ultimately reversed its earlier decision and

awarded Hardt full long-term disability benefits

until her sixty-sixth birthday, as well as retroactive

benefits for the time already elapsed. Hardt then

filed a motion for attorney’s fees and costs in the

district court based upon her status as the prevailing

party.2 See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(g)(1) (West 2009)

J This case was originally heard by the Honorable Walter

D. Kelley, who remanded the case back to Relance for

reconsideration, and who resigned effective May 16, 2008.

Upon Judge Kelley’s resignation, te case was transferred to

the Honorable Jerome B. Friedman, who heard and ruled upon

Hardt’s motion for attorney's fees.

Ta

(providing that “the court in its discretion may allow

a reasonable attorney's fee and costs of action to

either party.). The district court granted her motion

on August 7, 2008, concluding that “the court

sanctioned a material change in the legal

relationship of the parties by ordering [Reliance] to

conduct the type of review to which [Hardt] was

entitled,” and that because, “on remand, [Hardt]

received precisely the benefits she had sought, she

meets the definition of a ‘prevailing party and is

eligible for an award of attorneys’ fees.” (J.A. at 79.)

The district court thus awarded Hardt $39,149.00 in

fees, and Reliance timely appealed. We have

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West

2006).

IT.

We review de novo the district court's

determination that Hardt was a “prevailing party”

for purposes of awarding attorney’s fees. See

Goldstein v. Moatz, 445 F.3d 747, 751 (4th Cir. 2006)

(performing de novo review of whether applicant for

attorney's fees was a prevailing party under EAJA).4

A.

It is well settled that “only a prevailing party

is entitled to consideration for attorneys’ fees in an

4 Fee-shifting provisions are generally interpreted

consistently. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W. Va. Dep't

of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603 n.4 (2001), and

Griggs v._ El. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 385 F.3d 440, 454

(4th Cir. 2004) (applying Buckhannon to ERISA claims).

8a

ERISA action.” Martin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield

of Va., Inc., 115 F.3d 1201, 1210 (4th Cir. 1997). To

be a prevailing party, “a plaintiff [must] receive at

least some relief on the merits of his [or her] claim.”

Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t

of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001)).

“TE]ven an award of nominal damages suffices under

this test.” Id. at 604. The Supreme Court has,

however, established a bright-line boundary on what

constitutes “relief on the merits” of a particular

claim: only “enforceable judgments on the merits and

court-ordered consent decrees create the material

alteration of the legal relationship of the parties

necessary to permit an award of attorney’s fees.”

Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604 (internal quotation

marks omitted).

In Goldstein, we clarified this Buckhannon

standard by holding that there is no exception for

“tactical mooting” - the situation where a defendant

chooses to settle rather than risk an award of

attorney’s fees. Goldstein, 445 F.2d at 752. Although

Buckhannon does not specifically address tactical

mooting, we explained in Goldstein that “[t]he

Supreme Court in Buckhannon ... did not leave the

door ajar for an inferior court to engraft a broad

tactical mooting exception onto its ruling... [and

the Court instead] concluded that tactical mooting

concerns are simply insufficient to overcome the

statutory requirement that a party applying for a

fees and costs award must first have been accorded

some relief in the district court.” Id. In Goldstein,

however, we left open the question of “whether there

is an exception to the Buckhannon rule where a

defendant has agreed to provide the relief requested

9a

in response to an affirmative indication by the

presiding court that the plaintiff is about to prevail.”

Id.

In this case, the district court determined that

Hardt was a prevailing party based upon a previous

remand order. That order denied both cross-motions

for summary judgment but required Reliance to

reconsider Hardt’s claim within 30 days and stated

that if Reliance did not comply, “judgment will be

issued in favor of Ms. Hardt.” (J.A. at 65.) Although

the district court, reviewing the earlier remand

order, noted that at the time the case was remanded,

it had been “inclined to reserve judgment and permit

[Reliance] to conduct a proper review of all of the

medical evidence” and explained that “fhjad

[Reliance] completed its review in the manner

ordered by the court and in the prescribed time

period, and again determined that [Hardt] was not

eligible for benefits, it is certainly possible that the

court would have found the result satisfactory,” (J.A.

at 77), the district court found Hardt to be a

prevailing party because, “on remand, [Hardt]

received precisely the benefits she had sought,” (J.A.

at 79). As the district court explained, “[t]he

defendant, under threat of judgment against it,

reversed its decision and chose to award the plaintiff

the precise relief she was seeking.” (J.A. at 77.) In

the district court’s view, this “[c]learly” constituted

“judicially sanctioned relief.” (J.A. at 77.)

B.

On appeal, Reliance contends that, at best,

this is a case of “tactical mooting” and that there was

10a

no enforceable judgment on the merits or judicially

sanctioned relief. We agree. Hardt’s case presents a

set of circumstances that, like those presented in

Goldstein, are “simply insufficient to overcome the

statutory requirement that a party applying for a

fees and costs award must first have been accorded

some relief in the district court.” Goldstein, 445 F.3d

at 752.

Hardt attempts to fit her case within the

question we left open in Goldstein, but that opening

provides her no relief. Hardt’s case simply does not

present the type of affirmative indication

contemplated by Goldstein. On remand, the district

court required Reliance to provide Hardt with an

appropriate review of her claim; it gave no indication

that Hardt was “about to prevail.” Id. Had Reliance

continued to refuse Hardt complete disability

benefits after further review, Hardt would have had

the opportunity to bring the decision back before the

district court, at which time the court could rule on

the merits of the claim. Because it did not require

Reliance to award benefits to Hardt, however, the

remand does not constitute an “enforceable

judgmentf] on the merits” as Buckhannon requires.

532 U.S. at 604.

To avoid this result, Hardt points to two

district court cases in which a party was awarded

attorney's fees after a remand to a plan

administrator: Clark v. Metro Life Ins. Co., 384 F.

Supp. 2d 894 (E.D. Va. 2005), and Christian v.

DuPont-Waynesboro Health Care Coverage Plan, 12

F. Supp. 2d 535 (W.D. Va. 1998). Even assuming

these cases are consistent with Buckhannon, they do

lla

not aid Hardt. In each of those cases, the plaintiff

included a second count alleging procedural error

under ERISA and requesting remand as the

appropriate legal relief. Thus, by remanding the

case, the district court in those cases was providing

the very relief requested by the complaint. Hardt,

however, did not include such a count in her

complaint.

Because (1) Hardt’s only request for relicf was

the award of benefits, which the district court did

not award, and (2) the district court’s remand order

did not satisfy the requirements of Buckhannon or

Goldstein, Hardt does not qualify as a prevailing

party and is thus not eligible for an award of

attorney’s fees.

Il.

For the foregoing reasons, Hardt’s attorney's

fees award is

VACATED.

12a

[ENTERED: AUGUST 7, 2008]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Norfolk Division

BRIDGET HARDT,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 2:07cv105

RELIANCE STANDARD LIFE

INSURANCE CO.,

and

DAN RIVER GROUP LONG-TERM

DISABILITY PLAN,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Pending before the court is a motion for

attorneys fees and costs, filed by the plaintiff,

Bridget Hardt, pursuant to the fee shifting provision

of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act

(“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). After examination

of the briefs and record, this court determines that

oral argument is unnecessary because the facts and

legal arguments are adequately presented, and the

decisional process would not be significantly aided

by oral argument The court, for the reasons stated

fully herein, GRANTS the plaintiffs motion for an

award of attorneys’ fees.

13a

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The facts and the procedural history of this

case are more fully detailed in the court’s order of

March 27, 2008,! denying the parties’ cross-motions

for summary judgment and remanding the case to

defendant Reliance Standard Life Insurance

Company (hereinafter “the defendant’)? for

reconsideration of all of the medical evidence in the

opinion regarding the plaintiffs disability? On

remand, the defendant reversed its decision

regarding long-term disability coverage for the

plaintiff, and awarded her benefits retroactive to

August 23, 2005 and prospectively until her 66th

birthday.

. This case was originally assigned to the docket of

former US. District Judge Walter D. Kelley, and it was Judge

Kelley who ordered that the case be remanded to the defendant

for reconsideration. After Judge Kelley’s resignation effective

May 16, 2008, the case was transferred to the docket of the

undersigned.

2 As the court’s previous orders make clear, the Dan

River Group Long-Term Disability Plan (“the Plan”) is

administered by Dan River, Inc., but defendant Reliance serves

the dual roles of deciding whether a claimant is entitled to

benefits and paying such benefits. Accordingly, aJthough the

Plan is named as a defendant, the instant motion seeks

recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs only from Reliance.

3 That order directed that, if the defendant did not

complete its reevaluation within the prescribed time period,

judgment would issue in favor of the plaintiff. The parties have

confirmed to the court that the defendant completed the

reevaluation within the time period as instituted by the court

in the March 27, 2008 order and modified by order dated April

24, 2008.

l4a

On July 11, 2008, the plaintiff filed the

instant motion for attorneys’ fees and _ costs,

contending that she is the “prevailing party” in this

matter, and that an award of fees in this matter

would be proper under the five-factor guideline

approach announced by the Fourth Circuit in

Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co. of N. America, 9&7 F.2d

1017, 1028-29 (4th Cir. 1993). In support of the

motion, the plaintiff filed a largely self-serving

affidavit from one of her attorneys, explaining the

fees charged and contending that such fees are fair

and commensurate with the fees billed by other

attorneys practicing in similar matters in this court.

The plaintiff requests an award of attorneys’ fees in

the amount of $58,920.73, plus costs. On July 18,

2008, the defendant filed a_ response brief,

contending that the plaintiff is not a prevailing party

and therefore not entitled to an award of fees, and

regardless, that the requested fees are unjustifiably

inflated. The plaintiff filed a reply brief on July 25,

2008, further arguing in favor of an award of fees

and including the affidavit of Richard C. Mapp, III, a

Norfolk attorney unaffiliated with the plaintiffs

attorneys, who attests to having reviewed the billing

statements in this matter and opines that the

15a

requested fees are reasonable. The matter is

therefore ripe for consideration.

Il. Standard of Review

ERISA provides that “the court in its

discretion may allow a reasonable attorney’s fee and

costs of action to either party.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g).

Although not statutorily-mandated, the Fourth

Circuit has held that “only a prevailing party is

entitled to consideration for attorneys’ fees in an

ERISA action.” Martin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield

of Virginia, Inc., 115 F.3d 1021, 1210 (4th Cir. 1997).

A party may be called a “prevailing party” for the

4 On July 30, 2008, the defendant filed a motion to strike

the plaintiff's reply brief, contending that its filing was tardy

and that, regardless, it addressed matters outside the response

brief. Further, the defendant claims that the affidavit of

Richard C. Mapp, III, is incomplete in various facets. At the

outset, it is noted that the plaintiffs reply brief was in fact

tumely filed, in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d), which adds

three days to the deadline for the filing of certain documents.

See United States District Court, Eastern District of Virginia,

Electronic Case Filing Policies and Procedures, at 25, available

at http://www.vaed.uscourts.gov/ecf/ECF%20I}SERS%20

MANUAL.pdf. Thus, the defendant’s response brief was served

on the plaintiff on July 17, 2008. Under Rule 7(F) of the Rules

of the Linited States District Court for the Eastern District of

Virginia, the plaintiff was afforded three days from the date of

service to file a reply brief. However, the weckend of July 19-20

is not counted when computing this deadline, see Fed. R. Civ.

P. 6(a)(2), and the so-called “mailing rule” extended the due

date an additional three days, making the reply brief due on

July 25, 2008, the date on which it was filed. With regard to the

contention that the plaintiffs reply brief raises additional

arguments not addressed in the plaintiffs orginal brief, the

court finds that in fact the reply brief is limited in scope to

responding to the claims raised in the defendant’s brief in

opposition. Accordingly, the motion to strike is DENIED.

16a

purposes of fee-shifting provisions only if he has

received at least some relief on the merits of his

claim. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va.

Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603

(2001).

Once the court determines that a party is

properly construed as “prevailing,” it is guided by

the five factors adopted by the Fourth Circuit in

Reinking v. Philadelphia American Life Ins. Co., 910

F.2d 1210, 1217-18 (4th Cir. 1990), and further

clarified in Quesinberry, in determining whether an

award of attorneys’ fees is appropriate. Quesinberry,

987 F.2d at 1028-29. These factors are:

(1) the degree of opposing parties’

culpability or bad faith;

(2) ability of opposing parties to

satisfy an award of attorneys’ fees;

(3) whether an award of attorneys’

fees against the opposing parties would

deter other persons acting under

similar circumstances;

(4) whether the parties requesting

attorneys’ fees sought to benefit all

participants and beneficiaries of an

ERISA plan or to resolve a significant

legal question regarding ERISA itself;

and

(5) the relative merits of the parties’

positions.

17a

Id. at 1029. The Quesinberry court clarified that this

approach “is not a rigid test, but rather provides

general guidelines for. the district court in

determining whether to grant a request for

attorneys’ fees.” Id.

If a court determines that an award of fees is

appropriate, it must review the attorneys’ fees and

costs requested and limit them to a reasonable

amount. See, e.g., Allen v. U.S., 606 F.2d 432, 436

(4th Cir. 1979). The “starting point for determining

reasonable attorneys’ fees is the number of hours

reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by

a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 416

U.S. 424, 433 (1983). The plaintiff bears the burden

of proving the reasonableness of the requested

hourly rate and should produce affidavits from her

attorneys as well as “specific evidence of the

‘prevailing market rates in the relevant community”

for the type of work performed in this litigation.

Plyler v. Evatt, 902 F.2d 273 277 (4th Cir. 1990)

(quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984)).

In analyzing the reasonableness of the fee request,

the court should look to the multi-factor analysis

established by the Fifth Circuit in Johnson v.

Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th

Cir. 1974). See Blum, 465 U.S. at 897; Allen, 606

F.2d at 433. Pursuant to Johnson, the court should

analyze:

(1) the time and labor expended; (2) the

novelty and difficulty of the questions

raised; (3) the skill required to properly

perform the legal services rendered; (4)

the preclusion of other employment by

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the lawyer due to acceptance of the

case; (5) the customary fee for similar

work; (6) the contingency of a fee; (7)

the time pressures imposed in the case;

(8) the award involved and the results

obtained; (9) the experience, reputation,

and ability of the lawyer; (10) the

‘undesirability’ of the case within the

legal community in which the suit

arose; (11) the nature and length of the

professional relationship between the

lawyer and the client; and, (12) fee

awards made in similar cases.

Ailen, 606 F.2d at 433.

III. Discussion

A. Prevailing Party Status

The parties devote a portion of their briefs to

addressing whether the plaintiff actually can be

considered a “prevailing party” for the purposes of

making her eligible for ERISA’s _ fee-shifting

provision. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that,

because the defendant, on remand, ultimately

decided to award her disability benefits-the exact

relief she had requested in filing suit-she should be

considered a “prevailing party” because she achieved

a judicially sanctioned material change in her legal

relationship with the defendant. The defendant

counters by noting that the Supreme Court in

Buckhannon specifically rejected the _ so-called

“catalyst theory,” noting that “it allows an award

where there is no judicially sanctioned change in the

19a

legal relationship of the parties.” Buckhannon, 532

U.S. at 605.

The first issue to be resolved, then, is whether

this court’s order denying the parties’ cross-motions

for summary judgment and remanding for the

defendant to fully consider all of the medical

evidence, constitutes a “judicially sanctioned change

in the legal relationship” between the plaintiff and

the defendant. The plaintiff contends that the

defendant’s change in conduct was not voluntary,

but was in fact required by the court’s order. While

the denial of the cross-motions for summary

judgment is evidence of the fact that the court was

not sanctioning a certain result on remand, the court

quite clearly expressed the consequences to the

defendant were it to fail to complete its

reconsideration in an expeditious manner. Indeed,

the order explicitly stated that, should the defendant

not complete its review of the evidence within thirty

days, “judgment will be issued in favor of Ms.

Hardt.” Opinion and Order of March 27, 2008, at 20.

Had the court been of the opinion that neither party

had a stronger case, then such an ultimatum would

have been’ entirely unnecessary and even

inappropriate. Accordingly, 1ts use can only signify

that the court was displeased with the cursory

review that the defendant had initially given to the

plaintiffs claim. but was inclined to reserve

judgment and permit the defendant to conduct a

proper review of all of the medical evidence.

However, if such a review was not forthcoming, the

20a

court would have sanctioned judgment in favor of the

plaintiff.®

Although the Court in Buckhannon held that

a plaintiff is not entitled to relief if he simply files a

lawsuit and, in response, the defendant voluntarily

changes his behavior,® the facts in this case remove

it from the scope of the “catalyst theory,” and into

the realm of those cases where a court has

sanctioned a change in the legal relationship

between the parties. Thus, Buckhannon, although

instructive, is ultimately inapposite. Although the

Fourth Circuit does not appear to have addressed

whether a plaintiff can be a “prevailing party” when

her claims are remanded for reconsideration, the

Alexandria Division of this court and other district

courts within the Fourth Circuit have done so,

concluding that, when an ERISA claim is remanded

and the administrator decides to award benefits, the

plaintiff is indeed a “prevailing party.” See, eg.,

5 Had the defendant completed its review in the manner

ordered by the court and in the prescribed time period, and

again determined that the plaintiff was not eligible for benefits,

it is certainly possible that the court would have found the

result satisfactory. Nonetheless, speculation as to what might

have happened is useless in hght of what actually did happen-

namely, the defendant, under threat of judgment against it,

reversed its decision and chose to award the plaintiff the

precise relief she was seeking. Clearly, then, the plaintiff was

afforded judicially sanctioned relief.

6 The Court held: “We cannot agree that the term

‘prevailing party’ authorizes federal courts to award attorney's

fees to a plaintiff who, by simply filing a nonfrivolous but

nonetheless potentially meritless lawsuit (it will never be

determined), has reached the ‘sought-after destination’ without

obtaining any judicial relief.” Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 606

(interna! citations omitted).

2la

Clark v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 384 F.Supp.2d 894, 897

(E.D. Va. 2005) (Cacheris, J.) (holding that the

plaintiff was a prevailing party with respect to the

portion of her complaint that sought a full and fair

review of the medical evidence); Christian v. Dupont-

Waynesboro Health Care Coverage Plan, 12

F.Supp.2d 535, 537 (W.D. V: 1998) (“The fact that

the court remanded the plaintiffs request for

benefits does not prohibit her status as a ‘prevailing

party.”).

Further, the Seventh Circuit, in Quinn v. Blue

Cross & Blue Shield, 161 F.3d 472, 479 (7th Cir.

1998), in remanding a claim to the ERISA plan

administrator for further review, noted _ that

“{s]hould Quinn ultimately succeed in her claim and

be awarded benefits, she will then have the benefit,

as the prevailing party, of the modest presumption

that she is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees.” Id.

Although dicta, the court was recognizing the

possibility that the plaintiff could be a “prevailing

party” if she was awarded benefits by the

administrator on remand. See also Soltysiak v.

Unum Provident Corp., 480 F.Supp.2d 970, 974

(W.D. Mich. 2007) (holding that a plaintiff is a

prevailing party eligible for attorneys’ fees where the

claim had been remanded to the defendant with

instructions to adequately consider all of the

evidence).

Indeed, in remanding the claim to the

defendant, the court indicated:

Based on the record described above,

this Court finds compelling evidence

22a

that Ms. Hardt is totally disabled due to

her neuropathy. However, this is not

the end of the inquiry. The Court must

decide whether the evidence is_ so

overwhelming that Ms. Hardt is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

While the Court is inclined to rule in

Ms. Hardt’s favor, it would be unwise to

take this step without first giving

Reliance the chance to address the

deficiencies in its approach. The record

demonstrates that Ms. Hardt did not

get the kind of review to which she was

entitled under applicable law.

Opinion and Order of March 27, 2008, at 18-19.

Thus, the court sanctioned a material change in the

legal relationship of the parties by ordering the

defendant to conduct the type of review to which the

plaintiff was entitled. In lhght of the fact that, on

remand, the plaintiff received precisely the benefits

she had sought, she meets the definition of a

“prevailing party” and is eligible for an award of

attorneys’ fees.

B. Propriety of Attorneys’ Fees

Having found that the plaintiff is a “prevailing

party,” the court turns next to the Quesinberry

factors to determine whether she is entitled to

recover attorneys’ fees from the defendant in this

matter. In considering these factors, most of which

weigh in favor of the plaintiff, the court concludes

that she is entitled to recover at least some of her

attorneys’ fees in litigating the matter. Turning to

23a

the first Quesinberry factor, the defendant’s degree

of bad faith or culpability, the record is replete with

instances of the defendant's staunch opposition to

awarding any benefits to the plaintiff. While staunch

opposition is not in and of itself evidence of bad faith,

the totality of circumstances seems to indicate that it

was the defendant’s goal from the beginning to deny

the plaintiff the benefits she had claimed, and that,

to further that goal, the defendant engaged in only

the most cursory review of the medical evidence.’

With the (not insignificant) exception of actually

awarding her benefits on remand, the defendant has

opposed the plaintiffs position throughout the course

of this litigation. And even when the defendant did

award the plaintiff the benefits she sought, it was

only after having been ordered by the court to

provide the kind of meaningful review of the

evidence to which the plaintiff was entitled by law.

Thus, the bad faith and culpability of the defendant

in ignoring the medical evidence of the plaintiffs

disability weigh in favor of an award of attorneys’

fees to the plaintiff.

With respect to the ability of the defendant to

pay an award of fees, the defendant has

The court, noting that the defendant had relied almost

completely on the opinion of Dr. Leibowitz, found serious flaws

in Dr. Leibowitz’s methodology, noting that his medical

conclusions were “extremely vague and conclusory” and that he

“failed to cite to any medical evidence to support his

conclusion,” and instead offered conclusions on symptoms of

which the plaintiff had never complained. Opinion and Order of

March 27, 2008, at 13-14. The court further held that the

defendant had arbitrarily ignored the findings of the plaintiff's

treating physicians, instead crediting Dr Leibowitz's report, a

report which also ignored those findings.

24a

acknowledged such, and therefore this factor weighs

in favor of granting the plaintiffs motion. As to

whether such an award would constitute a deterrent,

the court finds that this factor, too, weighs in favor

of the plaintiff, as it would deter similarly-situated

defendants from failing to consider the full breadth

of medical evidence available to them when

reviewing a claim for benefits. Although the plaintiff

claims that, by filing the instant lawsuit, she sought

to resolve a significant legal question regarding

ERISA itself, the facts demonstrate that the case

was merely regarding the defendant’s denial of

benefits to the plaintiff and her attempt to have that

decision reversed. Although the issue arose in the

context of what constitutes a proper review of the

evidence, the court did not decide “whether a plan

administrator can shield itself with the claim that

there were conflicting medical reports when, in fact,

the administrator chose to rely virtually exclusively

on the conclusions of a peer reviewer who has not

personally examined the claimant while completely

[sic] the conclusions of the claimant’s own treating

physicians and other evidence presented by the

claimant.” Brief in Support of Motion for Attorneys’

Fees, at 6-7. Thus, this factor weighs against the

imposition of the plaintiffs attorneys’ fees against

the defendant.

With respect to the fifth of the Quesinberry

factors, the plaintiffs position clearly has the higher

relative merit, as demonstrated in the court’s

3 The plaintiff also claims that the award of fees may

benefit other plan participants, but fails to allege that she has

“sought to benefit all participants.” Quesinberry, 987 F.2d at

1029.

25a

remand order and-more importantly-the ultimate

resolution of the case. As the court noted, “it is clear

that Reliance’s decision to deny Ms. Hardt long-term

disability benefits was not based on substantial

evidence.” Opinion and Order of March 27, 2008, at

17-18. Accordingly, this factor also weighs in favor of

granting the plaintiff an award of fees. Considering

the factors outlined in Quesinberry, as well as the

totality of this case, the court finds that a

discretionary award of fees in favor of the plaintiff is

appropriate.

C. Reasonableness of Fees Requested

Having found that the plaintiff is both a

“prevailing party” «und that the Quesinberry factors

support an award of fees, the court must now

determine whether the fees requested by the

plaintiff, a total of $58,920.73, are reasonable. The

plaintiff has provided an affidavit from Ann K.

Sullivan, an attorney at the law firm of Crenshaw,

Ware & Martin, which represented her throughout

the course of this litigation. See Brief in Support of

Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Exhibit A (hereinafter

“Sullivan Affidavit”). Also attached is a breakdown of

the billable hours worked by the attorneys and

paralegals on the plaintiffs behalf. See Sullivan

Affidavit, Exhibit 3. According to that breakdown,

Ann K. Sullivan, who served as lead counsel on the

matter, worked a total of 54.4 hours at the time of

filing, and expected to work an additional 10.0 hours

on the remainder of the case. Ms. Sullivan bills at a

rate of $275.00 per hour. Elaine K. Inman is the

other attorney at Crenshaw, Ware & Martin who

worked on the plaintiffs case. She worked a total of

26a

171.7 hours and anticipated that she would work an

additional 4.0 hours on the remainder of the case.

Ms. Inman bills at the hourly rate of $200 per hour.

In addition, four paralegals provided work on the

plaintiffs case at various points. Lori K. Krezel, Suzi

C. North, Debbie S. Grimm, and Christine M. Jordan

worked a combined total of 62.2 hours, and billed at

an hourly rate of $95 per hour.

Although the court finds that the hourly rates

billed by the attorneys and paralegals are

appropriate considering their experience, it also

finds that the total number of hours billed by the

plaintiffs attorneys and their paralegals is excessive,

in light of the straightforward nature of the case and

various points at which the case was “overlawyered.”

Specifically, both Ms. Inman and Ms. Sullivan

attended the Rule 26(f) scheduling conference on

April 26, 2007 and a discovery dispute conference on

June 26, 2007. Both attorneys billed time in

preparation for arguing their cross-motions for

summary judgment, and indeed both attorneys

attended the hearing, although only Ms. Sullivan

actually argued at the hearing. Finally, it is noted

that, although the plaintiffs attorneys have

submitted documentation regarding anticipated time

spent at oral argument on her motion for attorneys’

fees, the court has found that argument on this

motion is not necessary. Given these issues, the

court finds it appropriate to eliminate the hours

billed by Ms. Inman with regard to the April 26 and

June 26, 2007 conferences, the hours billed by Ms.

Inman on September 14, 17, and 19, 2007 with

regard to the hearing on the motions for summary

judgment, and the hours billed by both Ms. Sullivan

27a

and Ms. Inman in relation to an anticipated hearing

on the instant motion for attorneys’ fees. Further,

the court finds excessive the number of hours billed

in relation to discovery requests, as discovery in

ERISA cases is ordinarily straightforward and

limited to the evidence before the plan administrator

at the time of its decision. See, e.g., Elliott v. Sara

Lee Corp., 190 F.3d 601, 608-09 (4th Cir. 1999).9

Although the court did authorize the plaintiff to

request additional discovery, it believes that the

amount of hours spent by the plaintiffs attorney

with regard to discovery matters is excessive, and

that the time spent on May 1-3 and June 29, 2007,

by Ms. Inman regarding drafting correspondence to

the court concerning discovery, should be eliminated.

Accordingly, the court will reduce Ms. Imnan’s billed

hours by 19 hours and Ms. Sullivan’s billed hours by

2.0 hours.

More significantly, however, the court finds

that the total number of hours billed on this matter

are excessive, in light of the nature of the case, the

results obtained, and the experience of the plaintiff's

attorneys in handling such cases. Specifically, the

evidence presented to the court by the plaintiff

indicates that Ms. Inman, who has billed a total of

$35,140-nearly 60% of the attorneys’ fees requested-

appears to have little, if any, experience in ERISA

matters.!° Although her biography from her law

9 It is true that the court permitted a limited amount of

discovery, as agreed to by the parties and memorialized in the

Rule 16(b) scheduling order, However, the plaintiff's repeated

motions with regard to discovery were denied by the court.

Lo Despite ample opportunity to provide the court with

evidence of Ms. Inman's relevant experience in ERISA

28a

firm’s website indicates that she handles “a wide

range of civil litigation matters,” it fails to mention

any prior work in ERISA cases,!! and in fact

indicates that, prior to her practice with the firm of

Crenshaw, Ware & Martin, Ms. Inman served as an

assistant public defender, a _ position’ that

undoubtedly did not involve ERISA matters.!2 See

Sullivan Affidavit, Exhibit 2. And it is noteworthy

that, although Ms. Sullivan’s affidavit touts her

experience with ERISA matters, it fails to mention

any relevant experience in such cases possessed by

Ms. Inman.!3 While Ms, Inman bills at a lower rate

than Ms. Sullivan, the court believes that Ms.

Inman’s apparent inexperience with ERISA matters

litigation, the plaintiff has failed to do so, instead claiming only

that “Ms. Inman has been practicing for six years and has

handled multiple cases in federal court and has focused

primarily on labor and employment law since joining

Crenshaw, Ware & Martin, P.L.C.” Plaintiffs Rebuttal Brief, at

10.

i In contrast, Ms. Sullivan’s firm biography clearly

mentions her ERISA experience, and notes that she was named

in the 2007 Edition of Virginia Super Lawyers with respect to

“employee benefits/ERISA.” See Sullivan Affidavit, Exhibit 1.

12 The Sullivan Affidavit indicates that Ms. Inman joined

the firm of Crenshaw, Ware & Martin in 2006. See Sullivan

Affidavit, at 4 9.

13 This is true to an even greater extent in the Mapp

Affidavit, which makes no attestation as to the skill or

experience of Ms. Inman. See Plaintiffs Rebuttal Brnef, Exhibit

A. Further, the Mapp Affidavit fails to indicate whether the

affiant believes that the number of hours spent on the ease by

the attorneys for the plaintiff is reasonable, and in fact appears

incorrect 1n asserting that “the case is fully litigated.”

29a

contributed significantly to an increase in the fees

charged to the plaintiff.

Thus, the court finds it appropriate to reduce

Ms. Inman’s billed hours total by 50%. After the

reduction of 19 hours as explained above, her total

number of hours stands at 156.7. A reduction of 50%

brings Ms. Inman’s total hours to 78.35. At a rate of

$200 per hour, the plaintiff is entitled to an award of

$15,670.00 with respect to Ms. Inman’s time. With

respect to Ms. Sullivan’s time, the court has reduced

her billed hours to 62.4, and at a rate of $275, the

plaintiff is entitled to an award of $17,160.00 with

respect to Ms. Sullivan’s work. The work of the four

paralegals involved in this matter on the plaintiffs

behalf entitles the plaintiff to an award of $5,909.00.

Accordingly, the plaintiff is entitled to an award of

attorneys’ fees in the total amount of $38,739.00.'*

D. Costs

The plaintiff, having prematurely filed a bill of

costs, has mow requested that the document be

renewed. From the face of the bill, it is not apparent

whether the plaintiff is seeking costs under the same

ERISA statute that authorizes attorneys’ fees, 29

(1S.C. § 1132(g), or under the more general cost-

shifting provision ef Rule 54(d)(1) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. However, as indicated

— = ees -—“S—S

4 The billing statement submitted by the plaintiff

undacates additional expenses that total $161.73. but appear to

be in the nature of costs, not attorneys’ fees. It is not clear te

the court whether these expenses are incorporated or

duplicated in the bill of costs submitted by the plaintiff, and

therefore the court decliunes to order them reimbursed with

respect to the motion for attorneys’ fees.

30a

supra, courts have inferred a “prevailing party’

requirement into the terms of 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g),

and Rule 54(d)(1) by its explicit terms requires

“prevailing party” status as a prerequisite to

recovery of costs. Because the court finds that the

plaintiff is a prevailing party, she is entitled to

recover her costs, and therefore the court awards her

costs in the amount of $410.00, as indicated in the

bill of costs.

IV. Conclusion

As set forth fully above, the court finds that

the plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorneys fees

and costs and therefore that her motion is

GRANTED. The cowrt finds that a reasomable

award of fees is as follows: $32,830.00 in attorneys’

fees, $5,909.00 im paralegal fees, and $410.00 in

costs. The total award is $39,149.00, and judgment

in this amount is hereby entered im favor of the

plaintiff at the expense of the defendant. It

appearing to the court that no further legal issues

remain to be resolved im this matter, the case is

DISMISSED.

The Clerk is REQUESTED to send a copy of

this Order to the counsel of record for all parties.

It is so ORDERED.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

August 7, 2008

Norfolk, Virginia

3la

[ENTERED: MARCH 27, 2008]

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Norfolk Division

BRIDGET HARDT,

Plaintiff,

Vv. Civil Action No. 2:07cv105

RELIANCE STANDARD LIFE

INSURANCE CO., et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Bridget Hardt brought this action

under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act

of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., alleging

that Defendant Rehance Standard Life Insurance

Company’s (“Reliance”) demal of her claim for long-

term disability benefits was not supported by

substantial evidence. For the reasons set forth

below, the parties’ Cross-Motions for Summary

Judgment (Docket Nos. 19, 31) are DENIED, and

the case is REMANDED for further review.

I. Facts and Procedural History

Dan River Inc. (“Dan River”) is a textile

manufacturer that provides benefits to qualified

32a

participants in its Group Long-Term Disability

Insurance Program Plan (“the Plan”). Dan River

administers the Plan, and Reliance serves the dual

roles of deciding whether a claimant is entitled to

benefits and paying for such benefits.

In 2000, Bridget Hardt, an executive assistant

to the president of Dan River, began experiencing

pain in her neck and shoulders. After seeing several

doctors, Ms. Hardt was diagnosed with carpal tunnel

syndrome (“CTS”). She underwent surgery on both of

her wrists, yet she still suffered from pain. She

stopped working on January 23, 2003.

In or about August 2003, Ms. Hardt requested

that Reliance pay her long-term disability benefits

pursuant to the Plan. Ms. Hardt explaimed in her

claim form that she suffered from mumbness,

tingling, loss of feelimg, and extreme pain in her

arms, hands, shoulders, amd neck. Reliance

provisionally approved her claim, but notified Ms.

Hardt that she was required to submit to a

functional capacities evaluation (“PCE”).

On October 13, 2003, Hand Rehabilitation of

Hampton Roads conducted the FCE to assess the

impact of Ms. Hardt’s CTS and neck pain on her

ability to work. The evaluator summarized Ms.

Hardt’s pertinent medical history as including pain

in her neck, left shoulder, parathesias on both

hands, and CTS. The evaluator further noted that

Ms. Hardt’s other previous medical problems

included lower back pain, hypertension, and anxiety.

The evaluator ultimately concluded that Ms.

Hardt suffered from major limitations in moving her

neck, upper extremity pain, decreased right hand

dexterity and strength, restricted overhead reach, a

restricted ability to squat and kneel, the inability to

crawl or to climb ladders, as well as decreased lift,

carrying, and push and pull capabilities. The

evaluator nonetheless found that Ms. Hardt could

perform a sedentary level of work and lift 4 to 5

pounds on oecasion with her right hand, and 2 to 3

pounds on 4 frequent basis. Based on these findings,

Rehance demed Ms. Hardt benefits in December

2003. Upon considering Ms. Hardt’s administrative

appeal, Reliance reversed its decision somewhat and

agreed to provide disability benefits for twenty-four

months based on Ms. Hardt’s inability to perform

her current position.

While Ms. Hardt was being evaluated, one of

her treating physicians, Gilbert M. Snider, M.D.,

diagnosed Ms. Hardt with another condition -

hereditary small-fiber neuropathy.! Ms. Hardt had

recently developed a tingling and numbness in her

lower extremities that resulted in an_ icy-hot

sensation. During a neurological exam, Dr. Snider

found that Ms. Hardt had to keep her fingers mildly

flexed because it hurt to fully extend them, that

manipulation of the hands and feet during the

examination was unpleasant, and that her motor

skills were somewhat limited by pain. He opined

' Small-fiber neuropathy is a disorder inwolvimg small

sensory cutaneous nerves (Pl.’s Mem. in Opp'n to Def.'s Mot.

For Summ. J. 2.) Symptoms include tingling, mumbness,

burning pain or extreme coldness, brief, painful sensations, and

loss of temperature sensation. Id

34a

that there could be symmetric distal weakness in the

lower extremities, but that a detailed examination

was difficult due to pain. He concluded that “[t]he

painful nature and involvement of pain sensation

[indicated that Ms. Hardt suffered from] small-fiber

neuropathy,” but that it may not show up in nerve

conduction studies. (AR 460.)?

Ms. Hardt’s pain became worse over the

following months. In a follow-up visit, Dr. Snider

noted that Ms. Hardt had experienced some relief by

taking 800 milligrams of Neurontin three times a

day, but she continued to have obvious pain and

constantly stomped her feet. He recommended

increasing her pain medication. The following

month, Dr. Snider recommended increasing Ms.

Hardt’s dosage yet again because she continued to

have a burning sensation in her feet during the

night. Two months later, Dr. Snider noted that Ms.

Hardt was not doing well. Although her prescription

for Neurontin had doubled, it was not clear that the

increased dosage was providing additional relief.

Further, the neuropathy caused Ms. Hardt difficulty

while walking, and she had a “burning sensation in

the feet all the way to the ankles and pain and

cramping to the upper 1/3 of her cal[ves]. . . . [H]er

? Ms. Hardt asserts in Plaintiffs Objection to

Defendant's Notice of Filing of Administrative Record and Brief

in Support Thereof (Docket No. 24) that the administrative

record is not complete because it lacks the Claims Department

Administrative Procedures Manual. However, the language in

the manual is clear that the steps identified are guidelines and

may not apply to every claim. Thus, the failure to abide by the

document or include it in the administrative record does not

affect the outcome of the decision. For this reason, Ms. Hardt's

objection 1s demied and the manual is excluded.

35a

feet [were] swollen and it [was] clumsy [for her] to

walk on them.” (AR 437.)

While Ms. Hardt was receiving treatment for

neuropathy, she applied to the Social Security

Administration (“SSA”) for disability benefits. In

conjunction with this request, she submitted

questionnaires completed by her treating physicians,

Julius S. Miller, M.D., and Dr. Snider. Dr. Miller

concluded that Ms. Hardt could not return to gainful

employment in her prior position or other sedentary

positions because of her neuropathy, combined with

her other ailments. He stated that Ms. Hardt would

experience “pain or other symptoms severe enough

to interfere with attention and concentration .. .

[clonstantly” (AR 416), that she had limitations on

her ability to walk, sit, or stand due to her

impairments, and that Ms. Hardt would have

difficulty working at a regular job on a sustained

basis (AR 415).

Dr. Sniders SSA _ questionnaire similarly

stated that Ms. Hardt would have difficulty working

at a regular job on a sustained basis. (AR 432.) He

opined that Ms. Hardt’s disability would cause her to

miss work more than three times a month, placed

limitations on her ability to walk, sit, and stand, and

that she experienced “pain or other symptoms severe

enough to interfere with attention and concentration

... frequently.” (AR 432-33.) Both doctors also found

that Ms. Hardt was not a malingerer. (AR 415, 431.)

The SSA determined that Ms. Hardt was “disabled”

as defined under the Social Security Act because it

was impossible for her to return to her former

36a

employment or make an adjustment to perform other

work. (AR 74.)

A few months after Ms. Hardt received Social

Security disability benefits, Reliance notified her

that it would terminate her benefits upon expiration

of the twenty-four month period. Under the terms of

the Plan, Ms. Hardt did not qualify for benefits after

twenty-four months unless she was totally disabled

from all occupations. Reliance found that Ms. Hardt

was not totally disabled from CTS since her

magnetic resonance image (“MRI”) and

electromyogram (“EMG”) were both negative. They

also noted that the FCE conducted in 2003

demonstrated that she had sedentary restrictions,

but that she could perform a sedentary job.

Once again, Ms. Hardt administratively

appealed Reliance’s decision. In connection with her

appeal, Ms. Hardt submitted all of her medical

records, the SSA questionnaires completed by Drs.

Miller and Snider, as well as an _ updated

questionnaire from Dr. Miller in which he again

opined that Ms. Hardt was not a malingerer and

would have difficulty working at a regular job on a

sustained basis. Before ruling on the appeal,

Reliance decided to obtain an updated FCE to

determine whether Ms. Hardt had CTS or neck pain.

Although Reliance knew that Ms. Hardt had been

diagnosed with neuropathy in 2004, Reliance did not

mention neuropathy or neuropathic pain in its

referral request to the testing company.

Ms. Hardt appeared for a FCE on December

29, 2005. The results of the examination were found

37a

to be invalid because Ms. Hardt’s effort was

submaximal. A second evaluation was scheduled for

January 26, 2006, but the results of that evaluation

were also found to be invalid for similar reasons. The

first evaluator noted that Ms. Hardt “refused

multiple tests .. . for fear of nausea/illness/further

pain complaints.” (AR 48.)

Neither of the inconclusive FCEs were able to

support a decision to deny benefits. Rather than

have a doctor personally examine Ms. Hardt,

Reliance decided to hire a doctor to review some, but

not all, of her medical records. The reviewing

physician, Michael Leibowitz, M.D., found that Ms.

Hardt’s prognosis for CTS, neck pain, and

neuropathy were either excellent or fair to good. He

concluded that Ms. Hardt underwent successful

bilateral carpal tunnel release surgery and no longer

had any electrophysiological evidence of entrapment

of the median nerves at the carpal tunnels. Dr.

Leibowitz also concluded that the prognosis for Ms.

Hardt’s cervical sprain and strain was good, and that

he expected to see improvement in her symptoms

over time if she complied with a home exercise

program and ergonomic interventions. Finally, Dr.

Leibowitz opined that the prognosis for Ms. Hardt’s

neuropathy was fair to good since she did not suffer

from the autonomic nervous component of hereditary

small-fiber neuropathy.

Dr. Leibowitz failed to address in his report

any of the pain medications prescribed to Ms. Hardt

or the effect that her pain had on her ability to

perform a job. It is also unclear whether Dr.

Leibowitz reviewed the questionnaires completed by

38a

Drs. Miller and Snider in which they opined that Ms.

Hardt was completely disabled from her conditions.

Dr. Leibowitz diu not mention any of the

questionnaires in his report.

In addition to the peer review performed by

Dr. Leibowitz, Reliance had a_ vocational

rehabilitation counselor perform an evaluation to

determine what jobs, if any, Ms. Hardt could

perform. Based on the results of a_ residual

employability analysis that was performed in 2003,

which was based on the FCE performed in 2003, the

counselor conducted a labor market study. The study

identified eight employment opportunities Ms. Hardt

could perform.

By letter dated March 27, 2006, Reliance

advised Ms. Hardt that it had completed its review

of her claim file and found that its decision to

terminate benefits was correct. Reliance based its

decision on the FCEs, the peer review report by Dr.

Leibowitz, and the labor market study.

After exhausting her administrative remedies,

Ms. Hardt filed this action in the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia,

alleging that Reliance violated ERISA by wrongfully

denying her long-term disability benefits.

39a

Il. Analysis

A. Standards of Review

1. Cross Motions for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when there

are no genuine issues of material fact, and the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Where both parties have

moved for summary judgment, a court should

consider “each motion separately on its own merits

to determine whether either of the parties deserves

judgment as a matter of law.” Rossignol v. Voorhaar,

316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th. Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).

For each motion, “the court must take care to

‘resolve all factual disputes and any competing,

rational inferences in the light most favorable’ to the

party opposing that motion.” Id. (quoting Wightman

v. Spri d Terminal Ry. Co., 100 F.3d 228, 230

(1st Cir. 1996)). The party who bears the burden of

proof on an issue at trial, however, cannot survive

summary judgment without forecasting evidence

sufficient to sustain his or her burden of proof on

that point. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327.

2. ERISA Standard of Review

This Court already ruled in Hardt v. Reliance

Standard Life Insurance Co., 494 F. Supp. 2d 391

(E.D. Va. 2007), that it would review Reliance’s

denial of long-term disability benefits under a

modified abuse of discretion standard of review. Id.

at 392. This standard is necessary to compensate for

40a

the effect of any potential conflict that may arise due

to Reliance’s dual role as claims reviewer and policy

insurer. Id. at 393. The modified standard deviates

from the usual abuse of discretion review “only to

the extent necessary to counteract any influence

unduly resulting from the conflict [of interest].” Ellis

v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 228, 233 (4th Cir.

1997). “The more incentive for the administrator or

fiduciary to benefit itself by a certain interpretation

of benefit eligibility or other plan terms, the more

objectively reasonable the administrator’ or

fiduciary’s decision must be and the more

substantial the evidence must be to support it.” Id.

When reviewing the discretionary decision of

a plan administrator to deny employee benefits,

“judicial review . . . is limited to the body of evidence

before the administrator at the time it rejected [the]

claim.” Donnell v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 165 F. App’x.

288, 294 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing Elliott v. Sara Lee

Corp., 190 F.3d 601, 608-09 (4th Cir. 1999)). The

“administrator’s decision will not be disturbed if it ‘is

the result of a deliberate, principled reasoning

process and if it is supported by substantial

evidence.” Elliott, 190 F.3d at 605 (quoting Brogan

v. Holland, 105 F.3d 158, 161 (4th Cir. 1997)).

Substantial evidence is evidence that “a

reasoning mind would accept as sufficient to support

a particular conclusion.” Donnell, 165 F. App’x. at

295 (quoting LeFebre v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,

747 F.2d 197, 208 (4th Cir. 1984)). It consists of

“more than a_ scintilla but less than a

preponderance.” Id. However, a decision to deny

benefits is neither reasonable nor supported by

4la

substantial evidence if an administrator fails to fully

consider all ailments affecting the claimant and

properly assess their impact. See G‘hrie v. Nat'l

Rural Elec. Coop. Ass’n Long-Term Disability Plan,

509 F.3d 644, 651-52 (4th Cir. 2007).

To determine whether an administrator's

decision was reasonable and based on substantial

evidence, the United States Court of Appeals for the

Fourth Circuit has formulated a nonexhaustive list

of eight factors that a court may consider. Booth v.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assoc. Health & Welfare Plan,

201 F.3d 335, 342-43 (4th Cir. 2000) (including the

language of the plan, whether the decision making

process was reasoned and principled, the adequacy

of the materials considered to make the decision, and

the degree to which they support it). The relevant

factors in this case are the adequacy of the materials

considered and whether Reliance’s decision was the

result of a deliberate, principled, and reasoned

process.

B. Reliance’s Motion for Summary Judgment?

Reliance asserts that the Court should grant

summary judgment in its favor because it did not

abuse its discretion when it concluded Ms. Hardt

was not totally disabled. In its letter to Ms. Hardt

dated March 27, 2006, Reliance outlined the

information upon which it relied to deny her claim:

3 Ms. Hardt filed a Motion to Strike Defendant's Motion

for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support Thereof (Docket

No. 25) asserting that Reliance failed to comply with local

rules. The Court will assess the case on its merits. Thus, the

motion is demed.

42a

a FCE performed on October 13, 2003;

° a FCE performed on December 29,

2005;

° a FCE performed on January 26, 2006;

° a peer review performed by Dr. Michael

Leibowitz on March 4, 2006; and

° a vocational evaluation performed on

March 10, 2006.

(Mem. of Law in Support of Def.’s Mot. For Summ. J.

3-6.) This listing makes it clear that Reliance’s

decision to deny benefits was based on incomplete

information. None of the FCEs assessed the impact

of neuropathy and neuropathic pain on Ms. Hardt.

Moreover, Dr. Leibowitzs report was itself

incomplete.

First, the basis for Dr. Leibowitz’s medical

conclusions is extremely vague and conclusory.

Without addressing any of the medical records that

reflect Ms. Hardt’s severe pain, the increasingly

strong pain medications prescribed to her, or her

decreasing ability to walk, Dr. Leibowitz concluded

that the prognosis for her neuropathy was fair to

good. Strikingly, he spent a substantial majority of

the diagnosis portion of his report discussing Ms.

43a

Hardt’s CTS and cervical sprain.* He addressed Ms.

Hardt’s prognosis for neuropathy in only a cursory

manner.

In addition, Dr. Leibowitz failed to cite to any

medical evidence to support his conclusion. He

merely noted that Ms. Hardt does not suffer from an

“autonomic nervous system component.” (AR 357.)

However, this seems to be a red herring, since Dr.

Snider never stated that Ms. Hardt suffered from

autonomic symptoms. Autonomic symptoms “include

such symptoms as bladder and bowel control

problems, blood pressure regulation problems and

difficulty with sexual function.” (Pl.’s Mem. In Opp’n

to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. 23.) Dr. Snider instead

diagnosed Ms. Hardt with neuropathy and

neuropathic pain. As_ stated previously, the

symptoms of these ailments include tingling,

numbness, burning pain or extreme coldness, brief,

painful sensations, and loss of temperature

sensation. See supra note 1. Dr. Leibowitz

mentioned these symptoms in his summary of

relevant medical records, yet he made no analysis of

them in his diagnosis or prognosis.

4 The information in the record is mixed regarding Ms.

Hardt’s recovery from CTS. Dr. Snider found that Ms. Hardt’s

surgery on her left and right wrists had provided limited, if

any, benefit. However, he also reported that there had heen

improvement in the right median sensory amplitudes and the

right median motor distal latency indicating successful release

of the median nerve in the carpal tunnel.

Given the conflicting reports, it was within Reliance’s

discretion to deny the claim based on CTS and neck pain only.

Booth, 201 F.3d at 345 (“Confronted with this record of

conflicting opinion, . . . it is not an abuse of discretion for a plan

fiduciary to deny . . . benefits where conflicting medical reports

were presented.” (quoting Elliott, 190 F.3d at 606)).

44a

As the Fourth Circuit explained in Guthrie,

509 F.3d at 651-52, an admunistrator’s denial of

benefits is unreasonable if the administrator fails to

consider all conditions from which the plaintiff

suffers. In Guthrie, the administrator found that the

plaintiff was not disabled due to occupational

asthma based on the reports of two pulmonologists.

Id. at 652. Yet, the administrator failed to consider

the “multiple other problems” from which the

plaintiff suffered that neither doctor addressed. Id.

The court held the administrator’s decision was 15

unreasonable. Id. at 651-52.

Dr. Leibowitz’s report is further inadequate

because he failed to address the treating physicians’

contradictory medical findings. Reliance does not

have to give special weight to Ms. Hardt’s treating

physicians’ conclusions; however, Reliance “may not

arbitrarily refuse to credit a claimant’s reliable

evidence, including the opinions of . . . treating

physician[s].” Black and Decker Disability Plan v.

Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 834 (2003). Both of Ms. Hardt’s

doctors concluded that she was completely disabled,

yet Reliance ignored these findings and gave them

no weight at all in its decision. Reliance instead

relied most significantly on Dr. Leibowitz’s report - a

report that studiously ignored the diagnoses of these

physicians.

Reliance correctly notes that an administrator

doves not act unreasonably by denying benefits if the

record contains “conflicting medical reports.” Elliott,

190 F.3d at 606. However, the contradictory evidence

must be substantial. Stup v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of

Am., 390 F.3d 301, 308 (4th Cir. 2004). Dr.

45a

Leibowitz’s conclusory and incomplete report does

not meet the quantum of evidence that “a reasoning

mind would accept as sufficient to support a

particular conclusion.” Donnell, 165 F. App’x. at 295.

“{[A]n administrator operating under a conflict of

interest does not act reasonably in denying benefits

if faced, on the one hand, with substantial evidence

of disability and, on the other, with only tentative

and ambiguous evidence that might, or might not,

favor denial of benefits.” Stup, 390 F.3d at 309.

In addition to relying on an incomplete record,

Reliance’s decision to deny benefits was also

inadequate because it improperly rejected muth of

the evidence that Ms. Hardt submitted. Reliance

found that there was “no support in the medical

records for Plaintiffs claim of total disability based

on small-fiber neuropathy,” (Def.’s Combined Resp.

to Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. and Rep. in Supp. of Def’s

Mot. 5), because the diagnosis was based on

subjective complaints of pain. Id. at 9.

Reliance wrongly rejected Ms. Hardt’s

evidence of pain. As explained in Wasson v. Media

Gen., Inc., 446 F. Supp. 2d 579, 599 (E.D. Va. 2006)

(Payne, J.), the Fourth Circuit does not require that

objective evidence be in the form of “an MRI, X-ray

or some other tangible or physical demonstration of

disability.” Although “the professional opinions of

doctors, based on physical examination of a patient

and the related observations ... are not the same

kind of objective evidence as a CT scan or an MRI,

they certainly are objective evidence in the form of

medical opinion based on first hand observation.” Id.

at 594 (citation omitted); see also Hines _v.

o

46a

Barnhardt, 453 F.3d 559, 564-66 (4% Cir.

2006)(holding that social security’ disability

applicants may rely exclusively on_ subjective

complaints of pain if diagnosed with a condition that

is reasonably likely to cause chronic or acute pain).

Reliance further ignored the substantial

amount of pain medication Ms. Hardt’s treating

physicians had prescribed to her. As explained in

Wasson, the medical decision to prescribe pain

medication is objective evidence of a_ painful

condition absent proof otherwise.

While over-medication and fraudulent

medication may be a serious and real

problem today, there is absolutely no

evidence in this matter that [the

claimant’s] prescriptions result from

fraud or over-zealous’ prescribing

physicians. Absent any such evidence,

this Court and the [administrator] must

accept that [the claimant’s] physicians

prescribed these drugs because they

reasonably believed that [the claimant]

suffers from debilitating pain. Those

medical decisions and the prescriptions

are objective evidence of § {the

claimant's] painful condition.

Id. at 595. Similar to the claimant in Wasson, there

is objective evidence, based upon _ professional

medical opinions and prescriptions for numerous

pain medications, that Ms. Hardt suffers from

neuropathy and is totally disabled.

47a

Finally, the vocational report lacks probative

value because it was based on an outdated FCE that,

once again, failed to assess Ms. Hardt’s neuropathic

pain. “[I]n order for a vocational expert’s opinion to

be relevant or helpful, it must be based upon a

consideration of all other evidence in the record... .”

Hines, 453 F.3d at 561 (quoting Walker v. Bowen,

889 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1989).

In summary, it is clear that Reliance’s

decision to deny Ms. Hardt long-term disability

benefits was not based on substantial evidence. The

FCEs did not assess the impact of Ms. Hardt’s

neuropathy or neuropathic pain on her ability to

perform a sedentary job. The peer review report was

incomplete and inadequate. The vocational report

was based on outdated information. Further,

Reliance failed to consider medical _ records

submitted by Ms. Hardt that demonstrated she was

suffering from neuropathy. For these reasons,

Reliance’s motion for summary judgment is denied.

C. Ms. Hardt’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Ms. Hardt has also moved for summary

judgment based on her claim that Reliance’s decision

to deny her long-term disability benefits is

unreasonable. In essence, Ms. Hardt claims that the

medical records, physician questionnaires, and SSA

48a

findings® are overwhelming evidence that she is

totally disabled due to CTS and neuropathy.

Based on the record described above, this

Court finds compelling evidence that Ms. Hardt is

totally disabled due to her neuropathy. However,

this is not the end of the inquiry. The Court must

decide whether the evidence is so overwhelming that

Ms. Hardt is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

While the Court is inclined to rule in Ms. Hardt’s

favor, it would be unwise to take this step without

first giving Reliance the chance to address the

deficiencies in its approach. The record demonstrates

that Ms. Hardt did not get the kind of review to

which she was entitled under applicable law.

It is for this reason that the Court remands

this case back to Reliance to fully and adequately

assess Ms. Hardt’s claim. This case presents one of

those scenarios where the plan administrator has

failed to comply with the ERISA guidelines and the

“proper course of action is to remand to the plan

administrator for a ‘full and fair review.” Weaver v.

Phoenix Home Life Mut. Ins. Co., 990 F.2d 154, 159

(4th Cir. 1993) (citing Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761

F.2d 1003, 1007 n.4 (4th Cir. 1985)).

5 As acknowledged in the Memorandum of Law in

Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, the SSA

award of disability benefits is not binding on plan

administrators. Also, because the Court finds that there is

persuasive evidence that Ms. Hardt suffers from a disability

without considering the SSA's decision, it does not factor into

the Court's determination.

49a

III. Conclusion

For the aforementioned reasons, the Court

DENIES Defendant's Motion for Summary

Judgment (Docket No. 19), DENIES Plaintiffs

Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No 31),

REMANDS tthis’' matter to Reliance, and

INSTRUCTS Reliance to act on Ms. Har’t’s

application by adequately considering all the

evidence discussed within this Opinion within thirty

(30) days of its date of issuance. Otherwise,

judgment will be issued in favor of Ms. Hardt.

The Clerk is DIRECTED to send a copy of

this Opinion and Order to all counsel of record.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/

Walter D. Kelley, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Norfolk, Virginia

March 27, 2008

50a

[ENTERED: AUGUST 10, 2009]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-1896

(2:07-cv-00105-JBF-JEB)

BRIDGET HARDT,

Plaintiff - Appellee

Vv.

RELIANCE STANDARD LIFE

INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant - Appellant

and

DAN RIVER GROUP LONG-TERM

DISABILITY PLAN,

Defendant

ORDER

This Court denies the petition for rehearing

and rehearing en banc. No judge requested a poll

under Fed. R. App. P. 35 on the petition for

rehearing en banc.

Entered at the direction of the panel: Judge

Wilkinson and Senior District Judge Faber.

For the Court

/s/ Patricia S. Connor, Clerk

29 U.S.C. §1132(g)

Section 502(g) of ERISA provides:

g) Attorney’s fees and costs; awards in

actions involving delinquent

contributions

(1) In any action under this subchapter (other

than an action described in paragraph 2)

by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary,

the court in its discretion may allow a

reasonable attorney's fee and costs of the

action to either party.

(2) In any action under this title by a fiduciary

for or on behalf of a plan to enforce section

515 in which a judgment in favor of the

plan is awarded, the court shall award the

plan—

(A)the unpaid contributions,

(B) interest on the unpaid contributions,

(C)an amount equal to the greater of—

(i) interest on the unpaid contributions,

or

(ii) tquidated damages provided for

under the plan in an amount not in

excess of 20 percent (or such higher

percentage as may be _ permitted

under Federal or State law) of the

amount determined by the court

under subparagraph (A),

(D)reasonable attorney's fees and costs of

the action, to be paid by the defendant,

and

(E)such other legal or equitable relief as

the court deems appropriate.

52a

For purposes of this paragraph, interest on

unpaid contributions shall be determined by

using the rate provided under the plan, or, if

none, the rate prescribed under section 6621

of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986

OPPOSITION

BRIEF

Supreme Cour. US. |

. FILED

Oy, DEC 16 2009

N O 09- 44 8 OFFICE OF THE CLERK

In The

Supreme Court of the Anited States

BRIDGET HARD?,

Petitioner,

Vv.

RELIANCE STANDARD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Respondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorart

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fourth Circuit

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

JOSHUA BACHRACH

WILSON, ELSER, MoskowiTz,

EDELMAN & DICKER LLP

THE CurTIS CENTER

Suite 1130 East

INDEPENDENCE SQUARE WEST

PHiLaDe.Lpni, PA 19106-3308

(215) 606-3906

joshua. bachrach@wilsonelser.com

December 16, 2009

— ———— —

Becker Gallagher - Cincinnati, OH + Washington, D.C. + 800.890.5001

i

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Respondent Reliance Standard Life Insurance

Company hereby discloses that it is a subsidiary of

Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company of Texas,

which in turn is a subsidiary of Delphi Financial

Group, Inc., which is a publicly held corporation.

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Corporate Disclosure Statement ............... i

Se iid eas oe eS EKER ii

Table of Cited Authorities .................... ili

es oa a eee a eee dels fa nda o ERT 1

Reasons for Denying the Petition .............. 2

I. NoConsiderations Warrant this Court’s Review

of the Fourth Circuit’s Decision that a Party

Must Prevail to Recover Attorney’s Fees under

SA... ns oe sey pees aia pa ee eel 2

A. The Supreme Court Has Already Decided

the Issue Presented for Review by

RES A ee ae ee ee 2

B. There Is No Actual Split in the Circuits

Regarding the Prevailing Party Requirement

For an Award of Attorney’s Fees under

erro: 1 2c c because Oe eae nears od 4

Il. The Supreme Court Has Already Addressed in

Buckhannon the Second Issue Presented by

I rk ey Cae gd ce ane 9g

I Naar et ee ee ae ere a 11

iil

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Cases

Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Society,

SSE ED 5 cee sedeeeceseseeeeeds 3

Birmingham v. SoGen-Swiss Int'l Corp. Ret. Plan,

718 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1983) ............ cone 4

Boggs v. Boggs,

82 F.3d 90 (5 Cir. 1996), rev’d on other

grounds, 520 U.S. 833 (1997) ............. 5,6

Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't

of Health & Human Res.,

632 U.S. GOS (ZOOL) .. wc eee ee 2,9, 10

Cook v. Liberty Life Assur. Co. of Boston,

344 F.3d 122 (1% Cir. 2003) ................. 8

Cefali v. Buffalo Brass Co., Inc.,

748 F. Supp. 1011 (W.D.N.Y. 1990) .......... 5

Chapman v. ChoiceCare Long Island Long Term

Disability Plan,

No. 07-2518-CV, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 233 (2d

Rg ga aa pbs De geae e Seta, Paar ae 4

Dillards Liberty Life Assur. Co. of Boston,

456 F.3d 901 (8 Cir. 2006) ................ 8

Dixon v. Seafarers’ Welfare Plan,

878 F.2d 1411 (11" Cir. 1989) ............... 7

iv

Doe v. Travelers Ins. Co.,

167 F.3d 53 (1% Cir. 1999) .......... cc ceeees 8

Fleming v. Ayers & Associates,

948 F.2d 993 (6" Cir. 1991) ................. 8

Florence Nightingale Nursing Serv., Inc. v. Blue

Cross/Blue Shield of Alabama,

SB 6

Freeman v. Continental Ins. Co.,

996 F.2d 1116 (11 Cir. 1993) ............... 7

Gaeth v. Hartford Life Ins. Co.,

538 F.3d 524 (6 Cir. 2008) .............00.. 7

Gibbs v. Gibbs,

210 F.3d 591 (5 Cir. 2000) ............... 5,6

Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Information

Sys. & Network Corp.,

523 F.3d 266 (4™ Cir. 2008) ................. 3

Jackson v. Metro. Life. Ins. Co.,

303 F.3d 884 (8 Cir. 2002) .......... ...... 8

Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins,

CE, PEPE ovo wc ccccccsuces 1, 2,3,4,9

Laborer’s Pension Fund v. Lay Com,

68 F.3d G02 (7° Cir. BOOB)... 2. cee eee 8

Miller v. United Welfare Fund,

72 F.3d 1066 (2d Cir. 1995) ............... 4,5

v

Moore v. Lafayette Life Ins. Co.,

458 F.3d 416 (6™ Cir. 2006) ................. 8

Peterson v. Continental Cas. Co.,

Fs Bi fo ft | = ee 10

Rittenhouse v. UnitedHealth Group Long Term

Disability Ins. Plan,

476 F.3d 626 (8 Cir. 2007) ................. 8

Sharron v. Amalgamated Ins. Agency Servs., Inc.,

704 F.2d 562 (11™ Cir. 1983) ................ 7

Sheehan v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.,

450 F. Supp. 2d 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ......... 5

Tate v. Long Term Disability Program,

545 F.3d 555(7" Cir. 2008) ................- 8

Wade v. Hewlett-Packard Dev. Co. LP Short Term

Disability Plan,

493 F.3d 533 (5" Cir. 2007) .............0 ce 6

Statutes and Rules

Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974

SP Ps EL, nc cecsctdsuenseueeee 1, 2,6

See Whee ES SEED 0c ce csv aseantaeea 1,6

4: & & MTree: ee 1, 3, 10

1

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner is asking this Court to review an

unpublished decision of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Fourth Circuit which denied her

request for attorney’s fees. As her primary argument,

Petitioner states that certiorari should be granted

based on a split in the circuits on whether prevailing

party status is required for an award of attorney’s fees

under § 502(g) of the ERISA statute.’ For many

reasons, this issue does not satisfy the considerations

stated in Supreme Court Rule 10 regarding the grant

of a petition for a writ of certiorari.

First and foremost, Petitioner’s brief overlooks this

Court’s decision in Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins, 455

U.S. 72, 89 n.14 (1982). There, the Supreme Court

addressed fee awards under the ERISA statute. The

Court recognized that in an ERISA action, “attorney’s

fees are noriually awarded only to prevailing

parties....” Jd. There is no reason for the Court to re-

visit the issue.

The petition should also be denied because there is

no actual split in authority in the various circuits.

This is not surprising based on the Supreme Court’s

pronouncement in Kaiser Steel. To the extent that a

circuit may have strayed from the holding in Kaiser

Steel, this still would not justify granting the petition.

As stated in Supreme Court Rule 10, “the

misapplication of a properly stated rule of law” will

“rarely” justify the grant of a petition for a writ of

certiorari.

‘ The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29

U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1).

2

The second basis raised in the petition also does not

justify review by this Court. Petitioner argues that

there is a split in the circuits on whether a court’s

remand to the plan for further consideration is

sufficient to permit an award of attorney’s fees and

costs under ERISA. This issue has indirectly been the

subject of a decision by this Court. In Buckhannon

Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health &

Human Res. , 532 U.S. 598 (2001), this Court explained

that to be eligible for an award of fees, there must be

a judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent

decree. A remand to the plan does not satisfy these

requirements. For this reason as well, the petition

should be denied.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

I. No Considerations Warrant this Court’s

Review of the Fourth Circuit’s Decision that

a Party Must Prevail to Recover Attorney’s

Fees under ERISA.

A. The Supreme Court Has Already Decided

the Issue Presented for Review by

Petitioner.

As noted, Petitioner asks whether the Fourth

Circuit erred when it limited an award of attorney’s

fees under § 502(g) of ERISA to only a prevailing party.

Petitioner overlooks the fact that the Supreme Court

has already commented on this issue. See Kaiser Steel

Corp. v. Mullins, 455 U.S. 72, 89 n.14(1982). In Kaiser

Steel, the district court entered judgment in favor of

the respondent and awarded attorney’s fees under

§ 502(g) of ERISA. That decision was affirmed by the

3

Court of Appeals. For reasons that are not pertinent

to this case, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment

in favor of the respondent. Turning next to the district

court’s award of fees, this Court held that “[b]ecause

attorney’s fees are normally awarded only to prevailing

parties, the award of attorney’s fees to respondent is

also reversed.” Id.

In the years since Kaiser Steel was decided, the

Supreme Court has not identified any circumstances

which would allow a court to deviate from the general

rule that attorney’s fees may only be awarded, if at all,

to the prevailing party. This is not surprising since an

award of attorney's fees is not the norm and the

Supreme Court has expressed “a general practice of

not awarding fees” even to a prevailing party “absent

explicit statutory authority.” Alyeska Pipeline Service

Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 262 (1975).

Petitioner has not stated any basis which would justify

this Court revisiting the issue.

The decision of the Fourth Circuit which Petitioner

seeks to have reviewed is consistent with the decision

of this Court in Kaiser Steel. Even if the Fourth

Circuit decision was in conflict, it would still not justify

the petition. The decision of the Court of Appeals is

unpublished and, therefore, is not binding precedent

even in the Fourth Circuit. Great-West Life & Annuity

Ins. Co. v. Information Systems & Network Corp., 523

F.3d 266, 272 (4 Cir. 2008). Additionally, pursuant to

Supreme Court Rule 10, “[a) petition for a writ of

certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error

consists of ... misapplication of a properly stated rule

of law.” To the extent that any Court of Appeals has

issued a decision that is inconsistent with Kaiser Steel,

4

it does not justify a grant of certiorari. However, as

explained below, the “circuit split” argued by Petitioner

does not exist.

B. There Is No Actual Split in the Circuits

Regarding the Prevailing Party

Requirement For an Award of Attorney’s

Fees under ERISA.

According to the petition before this Court, the

prevailing party requirement imposed by the Fourth

Circuit has been rejected by the Second, Fifth and

Eleventh Circuits. This statement is incorrect.

Looking first to the Second Circuit, in support of this

proposition, Petitioner cites to Miller v. United Welfare

Fund, 72 F.3d 1066 (2d Cir. 1995). Decisions from the

Second Circuit and the district courts within it both

prior to and after the decision in Miller have

recognized a prevailing party requirement for an

award of fees under ERISA.

One of the earliest decision from the Second Circuit

which mentions a prevailing claimant in the context of

a motion for attorney’s fees is Birmingham v. SoGen-

Swiss Int'l Corp. Ret. Plan, 718 F.2d 515, 523 (2d Cir.

1983). There, the Second Circuit held that “attorney’s

fees may be awarded to the prevailing party under

ERISA in the absence of some particular justification

for not doing so.” Jd. The Second Circuit recognized

the prevailing party requirement more recently in

Chapman v. ChoiceCare Long Island Long Term

Disability Plan, No. 07-2518-CV, 2009 U.S. App.

LEXIS 233 (2d Cir. 2009). District courts within the

Second Circuit have also recognized that a party must

prevail in order to recover fees under ERISA. See e.g.

5

Sheehan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 450 F. Supp. 2d

321, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“The law of this Circuit

makes it. plain that an ERISA plaintiff must prevail in

his action in order to recover attorney’s fees.”); Cefali

v. Buffalo Brass Co., Inc., 748 F. Supp. 1011, 1017

(W.D.N.Y. 1990) (same).

Additionally, the Second Circuit’s decision in Miller

is not as definitive as Petitioner suggests. After the

language in Miller relied on by Petitioner, the Second

Circuit stated that “the district court may in fact

determine that Miller is the prevailing party ....”

Miller, 72 F.3d at 1074. There is no dispute in any

circuit that it is within the discretion of a court to

award fees to a prevailing party under ERISA.

The Fifth Circuit decision relied on by Petitioner

also does not support her argument that there is a split

in the circuits. Petitioner cites to Gibbs v. Gibbs, 210

F.3d 591 (5™ Cir. 2000), as “expressly reject[ing]” the

prevailing party requirement.” Contrary to this

statement, and quoting from an earlier Fifth Circuit

decision, the court recognized that ERISA “allows the

court to award ERISA beneficiaries, participants, and

fiduciaries reasonable attorney’s fees when they are

the prevailing party.” Gibbs, 210 F.3d at 503 (quoting

Boggs v. Boggs, 82 F.3d 90, 94 n.1 (5 Cir. 1996), rev’d

on other grounds, 520 U.S. 833 (1997)). At issue in

Gibbs was the “propriety of awarding fees to prevailing

defendants, or to other third parties who may have

been forced to join in an ERISA action.” Gibbs, 210

F.3d at 503. According to the Fifth Circuit, its earlier

decision in Boggs “simply does not speak to” this issue.

Id. However, Boggs does speak directly to the issue in

6

this case and the Fourth Circuit’s decision against

Petitioner is consistent with Boggs.

More recently, the Fifth Circuit reiterated the

prevailing party requirement as stated in Boggs. See

Wade v. Hewlett-Packard Dev. Co. LP Short Term

Disability Plan, 493 F.3d 533, 543 (5 Cir. 2007).

Petitioner attempts to limit the holding in Wade to

only those cases involving an award of costs. The

ERISA statute makes no distinction between a request

for fees and one for costs. Section 502(g) of ERISA

states that a court “may allow a reasonable attorney’s

fee and costs of action....”. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1).

Wade unequivocally imposes a “prevailing party”

requirement under “ERISA’s fee-shifting provision.”

Id. Accordingly, Fifth Circuit law does not support

Petitioner's argument that there is a split in the

circuits.”

At first glance, Eleventh Circuit law may appear

inconsistent with the Fourth Circuit's decision;

however, it is not. Petitioner ignores the context in

which the Eleventh Circuit stated that the ERISA fee-

shifting statute permits an award of fees to either

party. The statement relied on by Petitioner appears

in decisions in which the Eleventh Circuit has rejected

the argument that there should be a presumption in

favor of awarding fees to a prevailing claimant. See

Florence Nightingale Nursing Service, Inc. v. Blue

* The decision of the Fifth Circuit in Wade is important for an

additional reason. To the extent that Gibbs can be interpreted in

the manner suggested by Petitioner, it would not be binding

precedent in the Fifth Circuit due to a conflict with an earlier

panel’s decision. The Fifth Circuit recognizes that “[w]hen there

are conflicting panel decisions, the earliest panel decision

controls.” Wade, 493 F.3d at 543.

7

Cross/Blue Shield of Alabama, 41 F.3d 1476, 1485

(1995); Freeman v. Continental Ins. Co., 996 F.2d 1116,

1119(11™ Cir. 1993). Dixon v. Seafarers’ Welfare Plan,

878 F.2d 1411, 1412 (11 Cir. 1989). The Eleventh

Circuit rejected a presumption in favor of awarding

fees to a prevailing claimant because the statute

“allows a court to award fees to either party.”

Freeman, 996 F.2d at 1119. This is not the issue that

Petitioner is asking this Court to review.

Petitioner also cites to the Eleventh Circuit’s

decision in Sharron v. Amalgamated Ins. Agency

Services, Inc., 704 F.2d 562, 569 (11" Cir. 1983). In

Sharron, the Eleventh Circuit actually reversed the

district court’s award of attorney’s fee in favor of the

plaintiff. This decision was based on the court’s

conclusion that the defendant was entitled to judgment

in its favor and because “ERISA does not apply to this

Pension Plan.” Sharron, 704 F.2d at 569. Clearly, the

actual decision in Sharron does not support Petitioner.

Significantly, Petitioner cannot identify a single casc

in which the Eleventh Circuit permitted an award of

attorney’s fees to a non-prevailing party in an ERISA

case.

Petitioner next argues that other circuits also may

not require prevailing party status for an award of

attorney’s fees. Cases from these other circuits also do

not support this contention. One circuit identified by

Petitioner is the Sixth Circuit. However, in Gaeth v.

Hartford Life Ins. Co., 538 F.3d 524, 534 (6™ Cir. 2008),

the court suggested that “a district court woul

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Record and brief — Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co. · 560 U.S. 242 | Frix