Record and brief — Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co.
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DOCKET
No. 09-448
Title
Docketed:
Lower Ct:
Case Nos.:
SUPREME COURT
Bridget Hardt, Petitioner
V.
Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company
October 15, 2009
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
(08-1896)
Decision Date: July 14, 2009
Rehearing
Denied:
Questions
Presented
~~~Date~~~
Oct 14 2009
Oct 26 2009
Nov 9 2009
August 10, 2009
~~~~~~~Proceedings and Orders~~~~~~~~~ serene nary mememere ne
Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due November 16, 2009)
Waiver of right of respondent Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company to
respond filed.
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of November 24, 2009
Nov 17 2009 Response Requested . (Due December 17, 2009)
Dec 16 2009 Brief of respondent Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company in opposition
filed.
Dec 29 2009 Reply of petitioner Bridget Hardt filed.
Dec 30 2009 DISTRIBUTED for Conference of January 15, 2010.
Jan 15 2010
Feb 16 2010
Feb 24 2010
Feb 25 2010
Feb 25 2010
Feb 25 2010
Mar 4 2010
Mar 4 2010
Mar 4 2010
Petition GRANTED. The brief of petitioner is to be filed on or before Thursday,
February 25, 2010. The brief of respondent is to be filed on or before Thursday,
March 25, 2010. A reply brief, if any, is to be filed in accordance with Rule 25 3
of the Rules of this Court.
SET FOR ARGUMENT ON Monday, April 26, 2010
Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs in support of either party or neither
party received from counsel for the respondent.
Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs in support of either party or neither
party received from counsel! for the petitioner.
Brief of petitioner Bridget Hardt filed
Joint appendix filed. (Statement of costs filed)
Brief amicus curiae of United States filed.
Brief amicus curiae of United Policyholders filed
Brief amici curiae of AARP and Nationa! Employment Lawyers Association
filed.
Mar 52010
Mar 18 2010
Mar 24 2010
Mar 31 2010
Mar 31 2010
Apr 16 2010
Apr 19 2010
Apr 26 2010
Record received from U.S.C.A. for 4th Circuit. (1 envelope)
CIRCULATED.
Brief of respondent Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company filed.
(Distributed)
Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as
amicus curiae and for divided argument filed.
Brief amicus curiae of DRI - The Voice of the Defense Bar filed. (Distributed)
Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as
amicus curiae and for divided argument GRANTED.
Reply of petitioner Bridget Hardt filed. (Distributed)
Argued. For petitioner: John R. Ates, Alexandria, VA.; and Pratik A. Shah,
Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
(for United States, as amicus curiae.) For respondent: Nicholas Q. Rosenkranz,
Washington, D. C.
PETITION
FOR
WRIT OF
CERTIORARI
No. (1) Supreme Cow, US.
——
Su The 09-- 4 4 8 OCT 14 2009
Supreme Court of the Aged States
VWitags K. Suter, Clori:
.
BRIDGET HARDT,
Petitioner,
RELIANCE STANDARD
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Respondent.
+
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FOURTH CIRCUIT
°
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
.
Ann Sullivan John R. Ates*
CRENSHAW, WARE Counsel of Record
& MARTIN, P.L.C. ATES LAW Firy, P.C.
1200 Bank of America Center’ 1800 Diagonal Road
Norfolk, VA 23510 Suite 600
(757) 623-3000 Alexandria, VA 22314
(703) 647-7501
Counsel for Petitioner Dated: October 14, 2009
THE LEX GROUP?C e 1750 K Street N.W. @ Suite 475 ¢ Washington, DC 20006
(202) 955-0001 @ (800) 815-3791 ¢ Fax: (202) 955-0022 ewww.thelesgroupdc.com
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Section 502(g)(1) of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) provides: “In
any action under this subchapter ... by a
participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary, the court in its
discretion may allow a reasonable attorney’s fee
and costs of the action to cither party.” 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(g)(1).
The Fourth Circuit in the decision below held that
“only a prevailing party is entitled to consideration
for attorneys’ fees in an ERISA action,” while the
Second, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have declined to
read a “prevailing party” requirement into § 502(g)(1)
and other circuits have issued conflicting authority.
The Fourth Circuit also held that th “prevailing
party” standard was not met and vacated an award
of attorneys’ fees to petitioner, even where the
district court found “compelling evidence that
[petitioner] is totally disabled,” ruled that petitioner
“did not get the kind of review to which she was
entitled under applicable law” and remanded for a
redetermination of benefits with an instruction that
respondents “act on [petitioner’s] application by
adequately considering all the evidence discussed
within this Opinion within thirty (30) days of its date
of issuance” or “judgment will be issued in favor of
[petitioner]” and petitioner obtained the requested
long-term disability benefits upon remand.
The questions presented are:
1. Whether the Fourth Circuit erred in holding that
ERISA § 502(g)(1) provides a district court
discretion to award reasonable attorney’s fees
only to a prevailing party?
ll
2. Whether a party is entitled to attorney’s fees
pursuant to § 502(g)(1) when she persuades a
district court that a violation of ERISA has
occurred, successfully secures a judicially-ordered
remand requiring a_ redetermination of
entitlement to benefits and subsequently receives
the benefits sought on remand?
ill
RULE 14.1(b) STATEMENT
The parties are as stated in the caption.
iV
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ....................-scesseeceeeeeeeees i
FUL 14.16%) STAT RAMEN ED 200cccccccseccccscssvevescesosscsees ill
ee ee I iia hens ccticiccivescinnssesesssneseseents iv
TRE GE GAEF FOIE ENTE sien ncsecvsnssccscssccsecesssnnes vii
SI ee a 1
ios nneihciidonaanmmialicnnneimmndanesansmionenn 1
ee Ee BTW RIT TM ecssniscssscccssesiseccccnsssccossessosssnsess 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .....................-..c0sseessesees 2
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ............... 14
I. The Circuits Conflict On Whether
Attorney’s Fees May Be Awarded at the
District Court’s Discretion To Either
Party or Only to a “Prevailing Party”
Umer S GORE) .....000..ccceccceees PANTO SP 15
A. The Courts of Appeals Are
Intractably Divided Over the
ss id ccnteaencennsnninecien 16
B. Petitioner’s Case Is an Ideal Vehicle
for Resolving the Question ....................... 23
C. Certiorari Is Further Warranted
Because This Issue Is_ Both
Frequently Recurring and Important...... 23
D. The Fourth Circuit’s' Decision
Conflicts with This Court’s Prior
Reasoning and Is Incorrect on the
BIRD scncevccsscinovsevcabeiuamanimunamuanaan 25
II. The Courts of Appeal Are Divided
On Whether a Remand For a
Redetermination of Benefits Is
Sufficient To Support an Award of
Attorneys Fees and Costs Under
I oneness esenovevcasScdcsicsnaneeuesetc ane 28
CITE RII cs eccssesnassssnccsonsnsesssniace enna 34
APPENDIX:
Unpublished Opinion of
The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit
entered July 14, 2009.................0....0... la
Opinion and Order of
The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia
entered August 7, 2008 ..................... l2a
Opinion and Order of
The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia
entered March 27, 2008...............0..... 3la
v1
Order of
The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit
Re: Denying Petition for Rehearing and
Rehearing En Banc
entered August 10, 2009.................... 50a
29 U.S.C. 1132(g)(2006)
Employment Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974, § 502(g), as amended .. ............ 5la
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
CASES
Anderson vu. Emergency Medicine Assoc.,
860 F.2d 987 (10th Cir. 1988)................00..... 18
Antolik v. Saks, Inc.,
463 F.3d 796 (8th Cir. 2006)....................0..... 22
Arfsten v.
Frontier Airlines, Inc. Ret. Plan for Pilots,
967 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1992)............. 17-18, 22
Bowerman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
Be ee Fe Ce Gls I cecceciccccccsccccccscccecses 9
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v.
W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res.,
ee ED sittidinincccttcnindacitincsnencctnes passim
Chambers v. Family Health Plan Corp.,
100 F.3d 818 (10th Cir. 1996)...........0.0..000..... 18
Colby v. Assurant Employee Benefits, et al.,
Civil Action No. 07-11488-RCL,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65340
(D. Mass. July 22, 2009)..................... 16, 21, 28
Conn. Natl Bank v. Germain,
503 U.S. 249 (1992) ................ SI ES TO ret Pete Ne 26
vill
Cottrill v. Sparrow, Johnson & Ursillo, Inc.,
be §& 7," fo = eens 20
Deboard v. Sunshine Mining & Ref. Co.,
208 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2000)...................... 17
Doe v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
167 F.2e GS Chat Cin. 1GG6)............000000000....225.5. 20
Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co. of Am..,
be | Fikes Seer 9
EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co..,
I cnepummensiiniebia 27
First Trust Corp. v. Bryant,
410 F.3d 842 (6th Cir. 2005) ................0..... 20
Flom v. Holly Corp.,
276 Fed. Appx. 615 (9th Cir. 2008).......... 30, 31
Freeman v. Continental Ins. Co.,
996 F.2d 1116 (11th Cir. 1993) ........0.....000.8. 19
Gibbs v. Gibbs,
210 F.3d 491 (5th Cir. 2000) .................... 19, 26
Goldstein v. Moatz,
445 F.3d 747 (4th Cir. 2006)........ 12, 13, 28, 29
Gordon v. U.S. Steel Corp.,
724 F.2d 106 (10th Cir. 1983) ............0.. 17
Graham v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co.,
501 F.3d 1153 (10th Cir. 2007) .................2006 18
Gray v. New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co.,
9s ) (Fe fe | ee 9, 20
Griggs v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co.,
385 F.3d 440 (4th Cir. 2004)..................00.00... 28
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs.,
--- U.S. ---, 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009).................. 27
Janowshki v. International Broth. of
Teamsters Local No. 710 Pension Fund,
bw fF Le Le A. , nae 21
Kholyavskty v. Schlecht,
479 F. Supp. 2d 897 (E.D. Wis. 2007)............ 35
Lindh v. Murphy,
I a 27
Marquardt v. N. Am. Car Corp.,
652 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1981).................... 21, 33
Martin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Va., Inc.,
115 F.3d 1201 (4th Cir. 1997)...... 12, 16, 18, 19
Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell,
ee OD een 15, 23, 25, 26
McKay v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co.,
46 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1272,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16667
CES UE, HIE. iy BUI ccncesccersccoceceseseos 15, 20
Mertens v. Hewitt Associates,
I ass sencaundnounsusiuons 25, 26
Miller v. United Welfare Fund,
72 F.3d 1066 (2d Cir. 1995).......... 18, 27, 29, 32
Mizzell v.
Provident Life and Accident Insurance Co.,
32 Fed. Appx. 352 (9th Cir. 2002).................. 31
Morgan v. Indep. Drivers Ass’n Pension Plan,
975 F.2d 1467 (10th Cir. 1992)...................... 17
Nachman Corp. v.
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation,
i i ieccitincenindnnsenesevennaie 25
New York State Conference of Blue Cross &
Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co..,
a a sinanienasiieisani 23
Peterson v. Continental Casualty Co.,
SES FBS BES GOS Gar. BOGB)....0.2000.0cccerpvecceeeses. 29
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux,
ESRI rere ner 15, 26
Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co. of N. America,
867 F.24 1017 (4th Cir. 1903).......................... 9
Quinn v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass'n,
IRs Evy iv. Le S| eee 32
Salley v. EI. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,
966 F.2d 1011 (Sth Cir. 1992)..................0000. 19
Sec. of Dept. of Labor v. King,
775 F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1985) ....................cceere0- 9
xi
Sharron v.
Amalgamated Ins. Agency Services, Inc.,
704 F.2d 562 (11th Cir. 1983)..............0.00...... i9
Smith v. CMTA-IAM Pension Trust,
654 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1981) ..............0.....0.08.. 31
Smith v. CMTA-IAM Pension Trust,
746 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1984).................... 32, 33
Tate v. Long Term Disability Plan For Salaried
Employees of Champion Int'l Corp. #506,
545 F.3d 555 (7th Cir. 2008).................... 21, 32
Trustmark Life Ins. Co. v.
University of Chicago Hosps.,
207 F.3d 876 (7th Cir. 2000).......................... 21
Wade v. Hewlett-Packard Dev. Co.
LP Short Term Disability Plan,
493 F.3d 533 (Sth Cir. 2007).......................... 19
White v. Jacobs Engineering Group
Long Term Disability Ben. Plan,
896 F.2d 344 (9th Cir. 1990)... 30, 32
STATUTES
i ID son cs ed eaunnesonnemnceconsncennendeinbiaoien 1
Be Ne I csdecicocnenisteasnbinasatnhabatnsaiinedinetinnetendeasite 11
ne EE ernincciinsineeninstuncetuneneensanininicistainbeaine 7
ee es ae eee 2
xl
EE i cn senuciccinnqandnemnetotacdesneneprensensseseceeseusen 2
NE TT nccicicicseinasiasesdediendiectidasenianecemennein 2
a i iio sariissieietnisnnduneieeuhianensbiopesenneninnns 26
I ici a eccihinibnbninstiialnnenhinneoneinwnbii 33
I on cchsaiicnbintecivnptisenaenesnnsommneuiiinuns 7
St i nisin sisieiaicsintenisessetmetsonnetetl passim
ee ED . nensivesensinargnensseciconi passim
Be le Oe SEED siccsicnscsscsessesesenssncnseesseses 3, 18, 27
RULES
ETRE ne pn ne an OnE TEP aR Cer ome 16, 23
gE EES ee an a ae ee RIO 16, 28
Rs TN 0 ED aiidbssdnscinennsocerensseconsiemnnnnnseontesneens 19
OTHER AUTHORITIES
2008 Annual Report of the Director: Judicial
Business of the United States Courts,
Appendix Table C-2A, Cases
Commenced, by Nature of Suit,
2004 Through 2008, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2008/
appendices/CO2ASe pdt
(last visited October 13, 2009)
Xill
Samuel R. Berger,
Court Awarded Attorneys’ Fees:
What Is “Reasonable”?,
BSS LU. PG. Ee. TOU. BE CIITA) ..cnnseccccecces....s.:. 26
Fact Sheet: EBSA Achieves $1.2 Billion in
Total Monetary Results in Fiscal Year 2008,
available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/
newsroom/fsFYO8results. html
(last visited October 13, 2009) ............0.000...... 24
Eric C. Surette,
Annotation, Requirement that
Party Prevail to Obtain Attorney’s
Fees under § 502 (g) of ERISA,
172 A.L.R. Fed. 571 (2001) ........0...00000000000002.. 15
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioner Bridget Hardt respectfully petitions for
a writ of certiorari to review the judgment and
opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit.
OPINIONS BELOW
The district court opinion finding “compelling
evidence that [petitioner] is totally disabled,” ruling
that petitioner “did not get the kind of review to
which she was entitled under applicable law,” and
remanding for a redetermination of benefits with an
instruction for the plan administrator to “adequately
consider[{] all the evidence discussed within this
Opinion within thirty (30) days of its date of
issuance” or “judgment will be issued in favor of
[petitioner]” was reported at 540 F. Supp. 2d 656
(E.D. Va. 2008) and is reproduced in the Appendix
(App. 3la-49a). The district court’s subsequent order
awarding attorneys fees and costs and entering
judgment in favor of petitioner is unreported (App.
12a-30a). The opinion of the court of appeals (App.
la-1la) is unreported, but may be found at 2009 U.S.
App. LEXIS 15478.
JURISDICTION
The court of appeals issued its opinion and
entered judgment on July 14, 2009. It denied
rehearing and rehearing en banc by order entered
August 10, 2009. This petition is filed within ninety
days of that date. This Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
STATUTES INVOLVED
Section 502(g) of ERISA (29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)) is
reproduced in the Appendix (App. 5la-52a).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. In enacting ERISA, Congress determined
“that the continued well-being and security of
millions of employees and their dependents are
directly affected by” employee benefit plans. § 2, as
codified at 29 U.S.C. § 100l(a). ERISA governs
employee welfare benefit plans that, “through the
purchase of insurance or otherwise,” provide
medical, surgical, or hospital care, or benefits in
the event of sickness, accident, disability, or death.
§ 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).
A fundamental policy of ERISA is “to protect...
participants in employee benefit plans and their
beneficiaries . . . by establishing standards of
conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries
of employee benefit plans, and by providing for
appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to
the Federal courts.” § 2, as codified at 29 U.S.C. §
1001(b). To further this policy, Congress specifically
allowed for attorney’s fees to encourage participants
and others to bring suit when warranted: “In any
action under this subchapter .. . by a participant,
beneficiary, or fiduciary, the court in its discretion
may allow a reasonable attorney's fee and costs of
the action to either party.” § 502(g), as currently
codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). (Congress in 1980
added a separate provision to Section 502(g) to
require an award of attorney’s fees and costs in cases
by fiduciaries to recover delinquent contributions in
which judgment in favor of the plan is granted. See
Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-364, § 306(b), 94 Stat. 1208,
1295 (1980), as codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2) (‘In
any action under this title by a fiduciary or on behalf
of a plan to enforce section 515 in which a judgment
in favor of the plan is awarded, the court shall award
the plan” specified relief, including “reasonable
attorney’s fees and costs of the action, to be paid by
the defendant”)).
2. Dan River Inc. is a textile manufacturer that
provides benefits to qualified participants in its
Group Long-Term Disability Insurance Program
Plan (the Plan). App. 3la. Dan River administers the
Plan, and Reliance Standard Life Insurance
Company (Reliance) both decides whether a claimant
is entitled to benefits and pays for such benefits. Jd.
at 32a.
Petitioner Hardt served as an administrative
assistant to the President of Dan River. Jd. In 2000,
Hardt began experiencing pain in her neck and
shoulders. Physicians diagnosed her as suffering
from carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS). Jd. Despite
surgery on both of her wrists, Hardt still experienced
pain, and she stopped working on January 23, 2003.
Id.
Hardt subsequently requested that Reliance pay
her long-term disability (LTD) benefits pursuant to
the Plan, explaining in her claim form that she
suffered from numbness, tingling, loss of feeling, and
extreme pain in her arms, hands, shoulders, and
neck. Jd. Reliance provisionally approved Hardt’s
claim for LTD benefits and required her to submit to
a functional capacities evaluation (“FCE”). Id.
Hardt participated in an FCE in October 2003,
which was limited to assessing the impact of Hardt’s
CTS and neck pain on her ability to work. Id. The
evaluator summarized Hardt’s pertinent medical
history and found that Hardt suffered from major
limitations in several areas, but nonetheless
concluded that Hardt could perform sedentary work
and lft 4 to 5 pounds on occasion with her right
hand, and 2 to 3 pounds on a frequent basis. Jd. at
32a-33a.
Based on the results of this FCE, Reliance denied
Hardt LTD benefits in December 2003, concluding
that she did not meet the Plan’s definition of total
disability. Jd. at 33a. Hardt filed an administrative
appeal, and Reliance partially reversed its decision,
agreeing to provide Hardt LTD benefits for twenty-
four months based on her inability to perform her
current position. Id.
Meanwhile, one of Hardt’s treating physicians
diagnosed her as suffering from a separate condition —
hereditary small-fiber neuropathy, which is a
disorder involving small sensory cutaneous nerves
with symptoms including tingling, numbness,
burning pain or extreme coldness, brief, painful
sensations, and loss of temperature sensation. Id.
The physician found, inter alia, that that Hardt’s
motor skills were limited by pain. Id. Despite
increases in prescribed pain medication, Hardt
“continued to have obvious pain,” which became
worse over the following months. Jd. at 34a. The
neuropathy caused Hardt a “burning sensation in
the feet all the way to the ankles[{,] pain and
cramping to the upper 1/3 of her calves,” and swollen
feet, making walking difficult. Jd. at 34a-35a.
(punctuation altered).
Hardt then applied to the Social Security
Administration (“SSA”) for disability insurance
benefits and submitted questionnaires completed by
two of her treating physicians. Jd. at 35a. One
concluded Hardt could not return to gainful
employment in her prior position or other sedentary
positions because of her neuropathy and other
ailments. Id. The physician also observed that Hardt
would experience “pain or other symptoms severe
enough to interfere with attention and concentration
... {cJonstantly,” and that she had limitations on her
ability to walk, sit, or stand due to her impairments.
Id. The second treating physician concluded that
Hardt would have difficulty working at a regular job
on a sustained basis. Jd. He noted, among other
things, that Hardt’s disability placed limitations on
her ability to walk, sit, and stand and that she
experienced “pain or other symptoms severe enough
to interfere with attention and concentration .. .
frequently.” Jd. Both doctors found that Hardt was
not a malingerer. Jd. The SSA determined that
Hardt was “disabled” under the Social Se urity Act
because it was “impossible for her to return to her
former employment or make an adjustment to
perform other work.” Jd. at 35a-36a.
A few months after Hardt received Social
Security disability benefits, Reliance notified her
that it would terminate her LTD benefits at the end
of the twenty-four month period. Jd. at 36a. The Plan
provided LTD benefits after twenty-four months only
if she was totally disabled from all occupations. Id.
Reliance found that Hardt was not totally disabled
due to her CTS and noted that the FCE conducted in
2003 demonstrated that she had _ sedentary
restrictions, but that she could perform a sedentary
job. Id.
Hardt filed an administrative appeal regarding
the termination of her LTD benefits. Jd. In support
of her claim, Hardt submitted all of her medical
records, the SSA questionnaires completed by her
treating physicians, and an updated questionnaire
from one physician that again determined Hardt
would be unable to maintain a job. 7d.
Before ruling on the appeal, Reliance decided to
obtain an updated FCE. Id. Although Rehance knew
Hardt had been diagnosed with neuropathy,
Reliance did not request that the testing company
review Hardt for neuropathy or neuropathic pain;
instead, the FCE was limited to determine whether
Hardt had CTS or neck pain. See id. at 36a.
Hardt appeared for two separate FCEs, but the
results of both were considered invalid because the
examiners believed Hardt’s effort was submaximal.
Id. at 37a. One examiner noted that Hardt “refused
multiple tests . . . for fear of nausea/illness/further
pain complaints,” but Reliance did not mention
neuropathy or neuropathic pain in its referral
request to the testing company. /d.
Rather than have a doctor personally examine
Hardt, Reliance hired a doctor to review some, but
not all, of her medical records. Jd. The doctor
ultimately concluded in his peer review report that
Hardt’s health was expected to improve, yet the
report failed to address any of the pain medications
prescribed to Hardt, the effect her pain had on her
ability to work, or the treating physicians’
questionnaires finding that Hardt was completely
disabled. Jd. at 37a-38a. Reliance also retained a
vocational rehabilitation counselor to determine
what jobs, if any, Hardt could perform. Jd. at 38a.
The labor market study identified eight employment
opportunities for Hardt, but the study was based on
an evaluation of Hardt’s health in 2003. Id.
On March 27, 2006, Reliance notified Hardt that
it would not change its decision to terminate her
LTD benefits, basing its decision on the FCEs, the
peer review report, and the labor market study. Id.
3. Hardt exhausted her administrative appeals
and then filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, which had
jurisdiction pursuant to ERISA § 502(e) (29 U.S.C. §
1132(e)) and Zo U.S.C. § 1331.
On March 27, 2008, the court issued an Opinion
and Order based upon the parties’ cross motions for
summary judgment. App. 3la-49a. The court denied
Reliance’s motion for summary judgment, stating
that “it is clear that Reliance’s decision to deny []
Hardt long-term disability benefits was not based on
substantial evidence.” Jd. at 47a.
With regard to Hardt’s motion for summary
judgment, the district court found “compelling
evidence that {] Hardt is totally disabled due to her
neuropathy” and that “the record indicates that []
Hardt did not get the kind of review to which she
was entitled under applicable law.” Jd. at 48a. The
district court remanded the case to Reliance “to fully
and adequately assess [] Hardt’s claim.” Jd. The
district court clearly indicated that that Hardt would
prevail if the Plan did not abide by the court’s
instruction to consider all the medical evidence. Jd.
at 49a. (specifically instructing Reliance to act on
Hardt’s application by “adequately considering all
the evidence discussed within this Opinion within
thirty (30) days of its date of issuance. Otherwise,
judgment will be issued in favor of [] Hardt.”).
Reliance found Hardt eligible for benefits after
this judicially-ordered remand. Id. at 13a.
The district court then granted Hardt’s motion
for attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to ERISA
§ 502(g)(1). Id. at 30a. Recognizing prior Fourth
Circuit precedent requiring prevailing party status
before fees and costs could issue under § 502(g)(1),
the district court found that “the court sanctioned a
material change in the legal relationship of the
parties by ordering the defendant to conduct the type
of review to which the plaintiff was entitled” and
thus “[iJn light of the fact that, on remand, the
plaintiff received precisely the benefits she had
sought, she meets the definition of a ‘prevailing
party’ and is eligible for an award of attorneys’ fees.”
Id. at 22a.
The district court next evaluated whether
attorneys fees were justified under an established
five-factor test used to guide the court’s discretion.
Id. at 22a-25a. These factors are: (1) the degree of
9
opposing parties’ culpability or bad faith; (2) ability
of opposing parties to satisfy an award of attorneys’
fees, (3) whether an award of attorneys’ fees against
the opposing parties would deter other persons
acting under similar circumstances; (4) whether the
parties requesting attorneys’ fees sought to benefit
all participants and beneficiaries of an ERISA plan
or to resolve a significant legal question regarding
ERISA itself; and (5) the relative merits of the
parties’ positions. Jd. at 16a-17a.!
In regard to the degree of bad faith or culpability
factor, the district court found that:
the record is replete with instances of
[Reliance’s} staunch opposition to
awarding any benefits to [Hardt]. . . . the
totality of circumstances seems to
: Nearly all courts of appeals, including the Fourth Circuit,
have used this five-factor test to determine when fees should be
awarded. See Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co. of N. America, 987
F.2d 1017, 1028-29 (4th Cir. 1993) (en banc); see also Eddy v.
Colonial Life Ins. Co. of Am., 59 F.3d 201, 206-07 (D.C. Cir.
1995); Gray v. New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 792 F.2d 251, 257-258
(ist Cir. 1986), and cases cited therein from Second, Third,
Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits adopting
test; Sec. of Dept. of Labor v. King, 775 F.2d 666, 669 (6th Cir.
1985). The Seventh Circuit has used two tests to determine
whether fee awards in ERISA actions are justified. Bowerman
vu. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 226 F.3d 574, 592-93 (7th Cir. 2000)
(describing five-factor test and “substantially justified” test).
The Seventh Circuit does not consider these different tests as
having significant practical consequences. See id.
Regardless, the issues in this case are limited to whether
an award of attorney’s fees should issue only to a prevailing
party and, if so, whether a remand for reconsideration of
benefits in these circumstances meets a prevailing party test
for purposes of § 502(g)(1).
10
indicate that it was [Reliance’s] goal from
the beginning to dc: .* [Hardt] the
benefits she had claimed, and that, to
further that goal, [Reliance] engaged in
only the most cursory review of the
medical evidence. With the (not
insignificant) exception of actually
awarding her benefits on remand,
[Reliance] has opposed [Hardt’s] position
throughout the course of this litigation.
And even when [Reliance] did award
[Hardt] the benefits she sought, it was
only after having been ordered by the
court to provide the kind of meaningful
review of the evidence to which [Hardt]
was entitled by law. Thus, the bad faith
and culpability of [Reliance] in ignoring
the medical evidence of [{Hardt’s]
disability weigh in favor of an award of
attorneys’ fees to [Hardt].
Id. at 22a-23a. In regard to the second and third
factors, the district court found that Reliance could
pay an award of attorneys’ fees and that an award of
fees in this case “would deter similarly-situated
defendants from failing to consider the full breadth
of medical evidence available to them when
reviewing a claim for benefits.” Jd. at 23a-24a. The
court found that the fourth factor (the amount of
benefit the action conferred on members of the plan)
weighed against awarding fees. Jd. at 24a. It held as
to the fifth factor (relative merits of the parties’
positions) that Hardt’s “position clearly has the
higher relative merit, as demonstrated in the court’s
remand order and—more importantly-—the ultimate
11
resolution of the case” and that this factor weighed
in favor of granting fees to Hardt. Jd. at 24a-25a
(noting, in addition, that the court had found that
“Reliance’s decision to deny {| Hardt long-term
disability benefits was not based on substantial
evidence”). Based on the five-factor test and the
totality of the circumstances of the case, the district
court determined to exercise its discretion and award
fees and costs to Hardt. Jd. at 25a.
After reviewing the reasonableness of the fees
and costs requestea, the district court awarded
Hardt reduced attorneys’ fees and costs and issued
judgment in her favor. Id. at 29a-30a.
4. Reliance appealed the award of attorneys’ fees
and costs to the Fourth Circuit. Reliance limited its
appeal to a single question: “Is Ms. Hardt a
‘prevailing party?” Fourth Circuit Case No. 08-1896,
Appeal Docket 15, p.18 (Brief of Appellant, at p.11).
See also, id., Appeal Docket 21, p.5 (Reply Brief of
Appellant at p.1) (“The single question before this
Court is whether Ms. Hardt can be considered a
‘prevailing party’ as required under the ERISA fee-
shifting statute when there is no judgment on the
merits in her favor and there is no consent decree.”).
Reliance did not appeal the district court’s use or
application of the five-factor test.
The Fourth Circuit, with jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1291, vacated the district court’s
judgment and award of attorneys’ fees. App. la-1la.
In so ruling, the Fourth Circuit first discussed its
established requirement for awarding fees in ERISA
cases:
12
It is well settled that “only a prevailing
party is entitled to consideration for
attorneys’ fees in an ERISA action.”
Martin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Va., Inc., 115 F.3d 1201, 1210 (4th Cir.
1997). To be a prevailing party, “a
plaintiff [must] receive at least some
relief on the merits of his [or her] claim.”
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W.
Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532
U.S. 598, 603 (2001)). “[E]ven an award
of nominal damages suffices under this
test.” Id. at 604. The Supreme Court has,
however, established a _ bright-line
boundary on what constitutes “relief on
the merits” of a particular claim: only
“enforceable judgments on the merits and
court-ordered consent decrees create the
material alteration of the legal
relationship of the parties necessary to
permit an award of attorney’s fees.”
Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 7a-8a (brackets in original).
The Fourth Circuit then examined whether
Petitioner met the Fourth Circuit’s post-Buckhannon
prevailing party test. The Fourth Circuit reviewed
its decision in Goldstein v. Moatz, 445 F.3d 747, 751
(4th Cir. 2006), in which the court acknowledged it
“clarified [the] Buckhannon standard by holding that
there is no exception for ‘tactical mooting’ — the
situation where a defendant chooses to settle rather
13
than risk an award of attorney’s fees.” Jd. at 8a. The
court then noted that Goldstein “left open the
question of whether there is an exception to the
Buckhannon rule where a defendant has agreed to
provide the relief requested in response to an
affirmative indication by the presiding court that the
plaintiff is about to prevail.” Jd. at 8a-9a (internal
punctuation omitted).
The Fourth Circuit ultimately concluded that
petitioner's case was a “tactical mooting” case and
that she did not meet the court’s prevailing party
test. As the Fourth Circuit saw it, the district court’s
findings that petitioner is totally disabled and that
she did not get the kind of review to which she was
entitled under applicable law, coupled with its
remand order for the Plan to re-determine whether
petitioner qualified for benefits under threat of
judgment being entered in favor of petitioner were
“simply insufficient to overcome the _ statutory
requirement that a party applying for a fees and
costs award must first have been accorded some
relief in the district court.” Id. at 10a (quoting
Goldstein, 445 F.3d at 752). The Fourth Circuit held
that because the district court remand “did not
require Reliance to award benefits” the order does
not “constitute an ‘enforceable judgment{] on the
merits’ as Buckhannon requires. 532 U.S. at 604.”
Id.
Because petitioner did not qualify as a prevailing
party in the Fourth Circuit’s view, the court vacated
the award of attorney’s fees.
14
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
By granting certiorari, this Court will resolve a
widely acknowledged, long-standing and frequently
recurring circuit division on an important question
of law — whether § 502(g)(1) requires prevailing
party status for an award of attorneys’ fees. The
Fourth Circuit’s decision that “only a prevailing
party is entitled to consideration for attorneys’ fees
in an ERISA action” is incorrect and directly
conflicts with other circuits (and the clear language
and structure of the statute). This split has festered
and the lower courts have not converged.
This case also presents a recurring question on
which the circuits have spht — whether a court-
ordered remand for reconsideration of an ERISA
benefits decision and subsequent grant of benefits
permits an award of attorney’s fees and costs.
Review by this Court plainly is warranted to
provide needed uniformity on these issues that have
profound implications for this comprehensive statute
affecting millions of workers across the United
States. ERISA was enacted to provide consistent
rules across the United States to govern the
administration and enforcement welfare and pension
benefit plans, especially given that many ERISA
plans are national in scope. Plan participants should
not be treated differently in an action to enforce
their statutory rights based on the circuit in which
they live. Yet, that is precisely what is occurring due
to the current unsettled state of the law.
This case is an ideal vehicle for the Court to settle
these critical questions regarding the enforcement of
ERISA. The Court should grant certiorari.
15
I. The Circuits Conflict On Whether Attorney’s
Fees May Be Awarded at the District Court’s
Discretion To Either Party or Only to a
“Prevailing Party” Under § 502(g).
To assist participants, beneficiaries, or fiduciaries
of ERISA-governed plans to enforce their rights,
Congress provided in § 502(g)(1) that “fiJn any
action .. . by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary,
the court in its discretion may allow a reasonable
attorney’s fee and costs of action to either party.” See
Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 147
(1985) (citing § 502(g)(1) and noting its purpose: “in
answer to a possible concern that attorney’s fees
might present a barrier to maintenance of suits for
small claims, thereby risking underenforcement of
beneficiaries’ statutory rights, it should be noted that
ERISA authorizes the award of attorney’s fees”). This
Court has acknowledged that attorney’s fees and
costs may be awarded to either party under § 502(g).
See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 53
(1987) (“In an action under these civil enforcement
provisions, the court in its discretion may allow an
award of attorney’s fees to either party. § 502(g).”)
Nonetheless, “[t]here is a significant split of
authority between—and within—federal appeals courts
on whether [§ 502(g)(1)] requires a party to prevail for
a fee award.” McKay v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 46
Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1272, 2009 U:S. Dist.
LEXIS 16667 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 3, 2009); see also Eric
C. Surette, Annotation, Requirement that Party Prevail
to Obtain Attorney's Fees under § 502 (g) of ERISA, 172
A.L.R. Fed. 571 (2001) (reviewing split of authority
within and among the circuits on the issue). Indeed,
even “[t]hose courts that have recognized the split of
16
authority do not interpret the conflicting decisions in
a uniform manner.” Colby v. Assurant Employee
Benefits, et al., Civil Action No. 07-11488-RCL, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65340, *8, n.3 (D. Mass. July 22,
2009) (describing conflicting interpretations of
whether particular circuits require a party to prevail
in order to be eligible to recover fees and costs).
The Court should decide this important yet
unresolved issue to bring clarity to the existing state
of confusion in the lower courts regarding whether a
prevailing party requirement exists within § 502(g)(1).
See Rule 10(a), (c).
A. The Courts of Appeals Are Intractably
Divided Over the Question Presented.
In interpreting § 502(g)(1), the lower courts are in
disarray regarding whether a party must prevail to
obtain attorney’s fees. The Fourth Circuit clearly has
imposed a prevailing party requirement, and the
Tenth Circuit appears to as well; the Second, Fifth
and Eleventh Circuits expressly have _ rejected
this interpretation; and other circuits issued
indeterminate or conflicting opinions on the issue.
The Fourth Circuit in this case held that it “is
well settled ‘that only a prevailing party is entitled
to consideration of attorneys’ fees in an ERISA
action.” App. 7a-8a (quoting Mariin v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield of Va., Inc., 115 F.3d 1201, 1210 (4th
Cir. 1997)). In effect, the Fourth Circuit has read a
“prevailing party” standard into § 502(g)(1) without
grounding in the statutory language.
The Tenth Circuit has recognized that § 502(g)(1)
contains no express requirement that a party prevail
17
to obtain an award of fees and costs, but nonetheless
takes into account prevailing party status in
determining whether to reverse, deny, or grant
awards:
Courts considering whether to award
attorney’s fees in ERISA actions consider
five factors: a party’s culpability or bad
faith; its ability to satisfy an award of fees;
the deterrence value of an award; the
number of plan participants affected by
the case or the significance of the impact
of the legal question involved; and “the
relative merits of the parties’ positions.”
Gordon, [{v. U.S. Steel Corp., 724 F.2d
106, 109 (10th Cir. 1983)]. We also afford
certain weight to prevailing party status,
even though we acknowledge that the
ERISA attorney’s fees provision is not
expressly directed at prevailing parties.
See. e.g., Deboard v. Sunshine Mining &
Ref. Co., 208 F.3d 1228, 1245 (10th Cir.
2000) (reversing and remanding an
attorney's fee award because appellate
decision “alter[ed] the relative merits of
the parties’ positions”); Morgan v. Indep.
Drivers Ass'n Pension Plan, 975 F.2d
1467, 1471 (10th Cir. 1992) (“Although
the statute does not expressly require
that a party prevail as a condition to
receiving an award of attorneys’ fees...
we have remanded cases for denial of fees
without explanation only when the party
seeking fees had prevailed at least
partially.” (citations omitted)); Arfsten v.
Frontier Airlines, Inc. Ret. Plan for Pilots,
18
967 F.2d 438, 442 n.3 (10th Cir. 1992)
(“Because we reverse the district court’s
decision on the merits, plaintiff is not a
prevailing party, and his arguments on
attorney's fees are moot.”).
Graham v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 501
F.3d 1153, 1162 (10th Cir. 2007). See also, Chambers
v. Family Health Plan Corp., 100 F.3d 818, 828 (10th
Cir. 1996) (recognizing § 502(g)(1) permits a fee
award to either party but declining to award fees or
remand for the district court to determine the issue
because the plaintiff did not prevail on any of his
claims); Anderson v. Emergency Medicine Assoc., 860
F.2d 987, 992 (10th Cir. 1988) (characterizing a
request for attorney's fees and costs by a party that
did not prevail as “unsupportable’”).
In contrast, three circuits have held explicitly
that a party need not prevail to obtain attorney's
fees under § 502(g)(1). For example, the Second
Circuit, noting the distinction Congress drew in
amending the ERISA fees provision in 1980, held
that “Section 502(g)(1) contains no requirement that
the party awarded attorneys’ fees be the prevailing
party. Cf. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2).” Miller v. United
Welfare Fund, 72 F.3d 1066, 1074 (2d Cir. 1995). The
Fourth Circuit in Martin cited this contrary decision
in Miller, but declined to follow it without
explanation. Martin, 115 F.3d at 1210.
The Eleventh Circuit, like the Second Circuit, has
followed the plain language of § 502(g)(1) and held
that it allows a court to award fees to either party,
regardless of “prevailing party” status: “Unlike other
fee-shifting provisions, which give the court discretion
19
to award fees to a prevailing party, § [502(g)(1)]
allows a court to award fees to either party.”
Freeman v. Continental Ins. Co., 996 F.2d 1116, 1119
(11th Cir. 1993). See also, Sharron v. Amalgamated
Ins. Agency Services, Inc., 704 F.2d 562, 569 (11th
Cir. 1983) (noting “under ERISA, see 29 U.S.C.A. §
1132(g), the losing party may under certain
circumstances be entitled to attorney’s fees . . .”).
The Fifth Circuit in Gibbs v. Gibbs, 210 F.3d 491,
503 (5th Cir. 2000), examined the Fourth Circuit's
Martin decision in detail and expressly rejected it.
Analyzing the language of § 502(g)(1), the Fifth
Circuit remarked that the term “prevailing” is
“[c]onspicuously absent,” although Congress often
uses the term in other fee-shifting statutes. Jd. at
501. After surveying the conflicting opinions in
other circuits, the Fifth Circuit concluded that “the
greater weight of authority, from outside and within
our own circuit, supports the notion that a party
need not prevail in order to be eligible for an award
of attorneys’ fees under § 1132(g)(1) of ERISA.” Jd. at
501-503.2
2 The Fifth Circuit appears to have retreated from Gibbs for
purposes of determining costs under § 502(g)(1), requiring a
party to meet a “prevailing party” standard. See Wade uv.
Hewlett-Packard Dev. Co. LP Short Term Disability Plan, 493
F.3d 533, 543 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e read [Salley v. EJ. DuPont
de Nemours & Co., 966 F.2d 1011, 1017 (5th Cir. 1992)] now as
establishing, for ERISA’s fee-shifting provision, a ‘prevailing
party’ test, analogous to the test under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d), for
the award of costs. As Salley is the first case to discuss the
award of costs under ERISA, Salley’s application of the
‘prevailing party’ test controls this case.”). Wade involved an
award of costs only, not attorneys’ fees. /bid., at 537. Wade
sows further confusion in the lower courts as to whether
prevailing party status is required for an award of attorney's
fees and costs and provides further support for granting
certiorari.
20
The Sixth Circuit ikewise appears not to require a
prevailing party status for an award of fees. For
example, in First Trust Corp. v. Bryant, 410 F.3d 842,
851 (6th Cir. 2005), the Sixth Circuit emphasized that
“the court, in its discretion, ‘may allow a reasonable
attorney's fee and costs of action to either party.”
(emphasis in original). In Bryant, the court ultimately
held that the district court erred in awarding
attorney fees under § 502(g)(1) to the former trustee
of an ERISA-governed pension plan because the
equities favored the pension plan beneficiary and
relevant factors weighed against such an award to the
trustee in that interpleader action. But see, McKay,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16667, at *10 (recognizing
“lack of controlling Sixth Circuit law” on the issue
and analyzing circuit and intra-circuit splits).
The First Circuit has issued conflicting authority
on whether a party must prevail to obtain an award
of fees and costs, which adds to the unsettled nature
of the law on this important question. Compare Doe
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 167 F.3d 53, 61 (1st Cir. 1999)
(“Naturally, fawards under Section 502] are
normally for the prevailing party, if at all. . .”) and
Cottrill v. Sparrow, Johnson & Ursillo, Inc., 100
F.3d 220, 225 (ist Cir. 1996) (stating “Congress
declared that, in any ERISA claim advanced by a
‘participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary, the court in its
discretion may allow a reasonable attorney's fee to
the prevailing party. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1)” and
thereafter assuming only “prevailing plaintiffs and
prevailing defendants” can recover fees and costs)
with Gray v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 792 F.2d
251, 258 (1st Cir. 1986). (holding courts should use a
five-factor balancing approach for determining
whether a court should award fees and costs in an
21
ERISA action “regardless of which party prevails.”).
But see, Colby, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65340, at *5
(‘the First Circuit has consistently read [Section
502(g)] as limiting recovery of fees and costs to
prevailing parties’).
Although the Seventh Circuit recently appears in
line with the Fourth Circuit, requiring prevailing
party status before awarding fees, its prior contrary
decision has not been overruled. Sze Janowski v.
International Broth. of Teamsters Levcl No. 710
Pension Fund, 812 F.2d 295, 297 (7th Cir. 1987)
(reversing award of attorney’s fees where party did
not meet “prevailing party” test). See also, Tate v.
Long Term Disability Plan For Salaried Employees
of Champion Int'l Corp. #506, 545 F.3d 555, 564 (7th
Cir. 2008) (refusing to award fees without prevailing
party status); Trustmark Life Ins. Co. v. University
of Chicago Hosps., 207 F.3d 876, 884 (7th Cir. 2000)
(“Our decision to reverse the district court’s
judgment means that Trustmark is no longer a
prevailing party, and, therefore, is no longer entitled
to an award of attorney’s fees.”). The Seventh Circuit
previously held that “[t]here is no requirement that
a party must ‘prevail’ in order to receive an award
pursuant to § 1132(g). But, as a practical matter, we
recognize that a court is more likely to find
appropriate an award to a prevailing party than an
award to a non-prevailing party.” Marquardt v. N.
Am. Car Corp., 652 F.2d 715, 718 n.2 (7th Cir. 1981).
This has led some courts and commentators to find
that the Seventh Circuit has conflicting authority on
the issue. See Colby, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65340,
*8-9, n.3 (noting different conclusions courts and
commentators have drawn from the Seventh
22
Circuit’s cases). Of course, this confusion simply
highlights the need for clarity.
Finally, the Eighth Circuit in Antolik v. Saks,
Inc., 463 F.3d 796 (8th Cir. 2006), stated the
question is open in its circuit, but allowed fees
potentially to be awarded to a non-prevailing party,
which is in direct conflict with the Fourth Circuit:
The district court's award of substantial
attorneys’ fees must also be reversed
because plaintiffs are no longer prevailing
parties. However, it is an open issue in
this circuit whether attorneys’ fees may
be awarded under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1)
to an ERISA plan claimant who does not
prevail. .. . But Saks’s deceptive behavior
and flagrant disregard of its ERISA
disclosure duties may make this the rare
case where some modest award is
appropriate. That is an issue we leave in
the first instance to the district court’s
discretion. Accordingly, the judgment of
the district court is reversed and the case
is remanded for entry of judgment on the
merits in favor of Saks and for further
consideration of the attorneys’ fee issue
Ibid., at 803. It also conflicts with the Tenth Circuit's
refusal to remand for an award of attorney’s fees to a
non-prevailing party. See Arfsten, 967 F.2d at 442
n.3 (reversing decision on merits and holding
“plaintiff is not a prevailing party [so] his arguments
on attorney’s fees are moot.”)
23
Clearly, the Court’s intervention is needed to
resolve this intolerable conflict within the lower
courts. Rule 10(a).
B. Petitioner’s Case Is an Ideal Vehicle for
Resolving the Question.
This case cleanly and squarely presents this
important issue for resolution. As noted, Reliance
challenged on appeal only whether Hardt was a
“prevailing party,” not whether she was entitled to
fees and costs under the five-factor approach. See
supra, 9-11. Thus, this case is a uniquely appropriate
vehicle to determine whether § 502(g)(1) requires
prevailing party status for fees to be awarded, as the
issue directly determined the outcome below.
C. Certiorari Is Further Warranted Because
This Issue Is Both Frequently Recurring
and Important.
This Court has acknowledged “Congress’s intent
to establish the regulation of employee welfare
benefit plans ‘as exclusively a federal concern” and
to create uniformity in benefit administration and
enforcement of ERISA plans. See New York State
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans uv.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1995). The
Court also has recognized that a fundamental
purpose of the attorney’s fees provision in ERISA is
to prevent underenforcement of these exclusively
federal statutory rights. See Russell, 473 U.S. at 147
(“in answer to a possible concern that attorney's fees
might present a barrier to maintenance of suits for
small claims, thereby risking underenforcement of
beneficiaries’ statutory rights, it should be noted
that ERISA authorizes the award of attorney’s fees”).
24
This statutory enforcement provision is essential,
particularly as our aging workforce retires and relies
more heavily on ERISA pension and welfare plans in
even greater numbers.
The reach of ERISA is staggering. As noted by
the United States Department of Labor’s Employee
Benefits Security Administration, their oversight
authority “extends to nearly 700,000 retirement plans,
approximately 2.5 million health plans, and a similar
number of other welfare benefit plans, such as those
providing life or disability insurance,” which cover
about 150 million workers and their dependents.” Fact
Sheet: EBSA Achieves $1.2 Billion in Total Monetary
Results in Fiscal Year 2008, available at
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/fsFYO08results.html
(last visited October 13, 2009). Ensuring an effective
private enforcement provision for ERISA therefore is
critical.
According to the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, approximately 9,000 to 11,000
ERISA cases were filed in federal court each year
from 2004 through 2008. See 2008 Annual Report of
the Director: Judicial Business of the United States
Courts, Appendix Table C-2A, Cases Commenced, by
Nature of Suit, 2004 Through 2008, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2008/appendices/C02
ASep08.pdf (last visited October 13, 2009). Excepting
prisoner petitions, ERISA cases comprise the third
highest statutory-based civil claims filed in the
federal courts, behind employment and other civil
rights claims. See id. Whether attorney’s fees should
be awarded therefore arises in a significant number
of cases and is frequently recurring in the lower
courts.
25
Given ERISA’s far-reaching impact, its goal for
uniformity across the United States and the
enforcement mechanisms embodied in the statute to
ensure rights are protected, it is especially important
that workers within the Fourth Circuit not be
treated differently in actions to enforce their
statutory rights when compared to workers in other
parts of the country. This is particularly critical
given that many ERISA plans are national in scope.
A worker in Maryland or Virginia should have the
same right to receive attorney’s fees in bringing suit
under ERISA as a worker in Florida, Texas or New
York. Yet, under the current unsettled state of the
law, that is not occurring.
The Court should step in to resolve the untenable
split in the lower courts on this vital ERISA
enforcement issue, and this case is a fitting vehicle
directly presenting the question.
D. The Fourth Circuit’s Decision Conflicts
with This Court’s Prior Reasoning and Is
Incorrect on the Merits.
This Court has repeatedly emphasized that
ERISA in particular is a “comprehensive and
reticulated statute” with “carefully integrated civil
enforcement provisions,” Russell, 473 U.S. at 146
(quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension’ Benefit
Guaranty Corporation, 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980)).
The Act is “an enormously complex and detailed
statute that resolved innumerable disputes between
powerful competing interests -- not all in favor of
potential plaintiffs.” Mertens v. Hewitt Associates,
508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993) Given the “evident care”
with which ERISA was crafted, this Court has been
26
“reluctant to tamper with [the] enforcement scheme”
embodied in the statute. Russell, 473 U.S. at 147
(declining to create an implied private cause of
action for extracontractual damages); see also
Mertens, 508 U.S. at 262 (rejecting claim that ERISA
allows cause of action against a nonfiduciary who
knowingly participates in a fiduciary breach);
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56, (holding that civil
enforcement scheme codified at § 502(a) is not to be
supplemented by state-law remedies). Contrary to
this inclination not to upset the carefully crafted
civil enforcement provisions of ERISA, the Fourth
Circuit erroneously has read a “prevailing party”
requirement into § 502(g)(1), despite such language
being “conspicuously absent” from that section. See
Gibbs, 210 F.3d at 501.
Such a reading not only is contrary to prior
decisions of this Court, but it also is wrong on the
merits. Section 502(g)(1) unambiguously states that
“the court in its discretion may allow a reasonable
attorney’s fee and costs of action to either party.” 29
U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) (emphasis added). “[C]ourts must
presume that a legislature says in a statute what it
means and means in a statute what is says there.”
Conn. Natl Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54
(1992). Had Congress intended a prevailing party
restriction in § 502(g)(1), it would have included it,
as Congress did in numerous other fee-shifting
statutes. See Samuel R. Berger, Court Awarded
Attorneys’ Fees: What Is “Reasonable”?, 126 U. Pa. L..
Rev. 281, 305 nn.109-10 (1977) (collecting statutes
with express prevailing party requirements in
existence around time ERISA was enacted in 1974).
This conclusion is reinforced when one considers
that, in most cases, only one party prevails. It thus is
27
an unwarranted interpretation to jump from the
clear Congressionally-enacted language that a court
may award fees and cost “to either party” to read the
statute as stating that “only a prevailing party is
entitled to consideration for attorneys’ fees.”
Moreover, when Congress subsequently amended
ERISA, it left what is now § 502(g)(1) alone, but
added a provision (what is now § 502(g)(2)) requiring
attorney's fees and other relief where “judgment in
favor of the plan is awarded.” See Multiemployer
Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-364, § 306(b), 94 Stat. 1208, 1295 (1980), as
codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2). The clear inference
from this amendment and the resulting language
and structure of § 502(g) is that Congress did not
intend to require a prevailing party requirement in §
502(g)(1). See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., --- U.S. ---,
129 S. Ct. 2343, 2349 (2009). That 1s, when Congress
chooses to amend one statutory provision but not
another, it is presumed to have acted intentionally,
and the resulting differences generally compel an
inference that the provision not amended does not
contain the newly-inserted requirement. See 1d.
(‘negative implications raised by _ disparate
provisions are strongest” where the provisions were
“considered simultaneously when the language
raising the implication was inserted”) (citing EEOC
v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 256
(1991) and quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320,
330 (1997))). See also, Miller, 72 F.3d at 1074 (noting
difference in language between §§ 502(g)(1) and
502(g)(2) in concluding no _ prevailing party
requirement exists within § 502(g)(1)).
28
The Fourth Circuit's decision below on this
important federal question conflicts with the
reasoning of prior decisions of this Court and is
wrong on the merits. The Court should grant
certiorari to resolve the issue. See Rule 10(c).
II. The Courts of Appeal Are Divided On
Whether a Remand For a Redetermination of
Benefits Is Sufficient To Support an Award
of Attorney’s Fees and Costs Under § 502(g).
This case also squarely presents a_ second
important issue — whether a claimant is entitled to
attorney's fees under § 502(g)(1) where she secures a
remand to her plan administrator for reconsideration
of her benefits claim after persuading the district
court that the plan administrator violated ERISA.
There is an acknowledged split in the lower courts
on this issue. See Colby, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
65340, *11 (stating First Circuit had not decided
issue and recognizing “[c]ourts in other circuits have
split almost evenly on the issue.”). The Court should
grant certiorari to consider fully the circumstances
under which attorney's fees may be _ granted
pursuant to ERISA § 502(g)(1).
In the case below, the Fourth Circuit held that
petitioner was not a prevailing party entitled to
attorney's fees. App. 10a-lla. The Fourth Circuit
reached that conclusion by relying on its prior
decision applying this Court’s Buckhannon decision
to ERISA claims. App. 7a (citing Griggs v. EI.
Dupont de Nemours & Co., 385 F.3d 440, 454 (4th
Cir. 2004)). It also relied on an Equal Access to
Justice Act (EAJA) attorney’s fees case, Goldstein v.
Moatz, 445 F.3d 747 (4th Cir. 2006), which held that
29
this Court’s Buckhannon standard applies to the
EAJA and that Buckhannon does not allow for a
“tactical mooting” exception to permit an award of
fees where a defendant has agreed to the plaintiffs
requested relief in order to avoid the prospect of an
adverse fees and costs award. See App. 8a (citing
Goldstein, 445 F.3d at 752). The Fourth Circuit in
the case below determined that the district court’s
finding of an ERISA violation and remanding (under
threat of judgment being entered in favor of
petitioner) for a redetermination of whether
petitioner qualified for benefits were “simply
insufficient to overcome the statutory requirement
that a party applying for a fees and costs award
must first have been accorded some relief in the
district court.” App. 10a (quoting Goldstein, 445 F.3d
at 752). The Fourth Circuit concluded petitioner was
not a prevailing party entitled to attorneys’ fees
because the district court remand “did not require
Reliance to award benefits” and, as such, was not an
enforceable judgment on the merits. Jd.
Cases in the Second and Ninths Circuits directly
conflict with the Fourth Circuit's holding in this
case. For example, in Peterson v. Continental
Casualty Co., 282 F.3d 112, 122 (2d Cir. 2002), the
Second Circuit held that plaintiffs were prevailing
parties when they succeeded after a court-ordered
remand to an ERISA plan administrator with
retention of jurisdiction. This directly conflicts with
the Fourth Circuit's ruling below. See also, Miller, 72
F.3d at 1074 (ordering district court to remand the
case to the plan administrator for a redetermination
of benefits and ordering that the district court
reconsider the grant of attorney’s fees, insinuating
that plaintiff may not be a prevailing party, but also
30
stating that “[t]he district court may in fact
determine that Miller is the prevailing party to the
extent that her motion for summary judgment
claimed that the Fund's denial was arbitrary and
capricious’).
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit has allowed an award
of attorneys’ fees to a claimant when a case is
remanded for a determination of benefits. See White
v. Jacobs Engineering Group Long Term Disability
Ben. Plan, 896 F.2d 344, 352 (9th Cir. 1990). In
White, the district court had granted summary
judgment to defendants on an employee's claim for
benefits on the ground that he failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies and also granted summary
judgment to the defendants on their counterclaim for
benefits paid while the employee allegedly was not
totally disabled. Jd. at 346. The Ninth Circuit
reversed the grants of summary judgment “and
remand/[ed] to the district court with instructions to
remand to the plan appeals board for adjudication on
the merits.” Jd. at 352. Based on the remand for a
determination of henefits, the Ninth Circuit held
that the plaintiff-employee “is entitled to attorney
fees in an amount to be determined by the district
court.” Id.
The Ninth Circuit in post-Buckhannon cases
continues to hold that a district court’s remand to a
plan administrator confers “prevailing party” status
upon an ERISA claimant. For example, in Flom uv.
Holly Corp., 276 Fed. Appx. 615, 617 (9th Cir. 2008),
the court concluded that the district court erred in
denying a disability benefit claimant’s motion for
attorney's fees against the plan administrator under
§ 502(g)(1). It held that the district court’s remand to
31
the administrator provided the “judicial imprimatur
required by Buckhannon” for the claimant to be a
prevailing party because it created “a judicially-
sanctioned change” in claimant’s “legal relationship
with [the administrator] and ultimately led to
[claimant’s] success in securing a reinstatement of
benefits.” Jd. Similarly, Mizzell v. Provident Life and
Accident Insurance Co., 32 Fed. Appx. 352, 353 (9th
Cir. 2002), involved an ERISA action for recovery of
long-term disability insurance benefits, and the
district court concluded that the plan administrator
abused its discretion, remanded the case to the plan
administrator for a new determination of benefits
eligibility, and awarded attorney’s fees and costs to
the plaintiff. The plan administrator appealed. The
Ninth Circuit concluded that the award of fees was
proper because plaintiff “succeeded on a significant
issue in litigation, te., whether [the plan
administrator] abused its discretion in denying
[plaintiffs] claim, which achieve[d] some of the
benefit [plaintiff] sought in bringing suit, i.e., to
obtain a full and fair review of his claim.” Jd. at 354
(some internal punctuation omitted).
The Ninth Circuit also has found prevailing party
status under ERISA when an employee-plaintiff
secures the requested benefits via settlement on
remand. In Smith, the district court dismissed the
plaintiffs ERISA claims. On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit found the employee stated a potential
violation of ERISA and remanded. See Smith uv.
CMTA-IAM Pension Trust, 654 F.2d 650, 653-54,
656-60 (9th Cir. 1981) (Smith J). “Upon remand, the
parties settled,” with a provision allowing the parties
to attempt agree on attorney’s fees for the plaintiff
32
or, failing that, for the plaintiff to file a motion for
fees. Smith v. CMTA-IAM Pension Trust, 746 F.2d
587, 589 (9th Cir. 1984) (Smith ID). “The parties
could not agree on the payment of plaintiffs
attorney’s fees, and [plaintiff-employee] moved for
fees pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1).” Id. The
district court denied the motion. On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit found the plaintiff to be “a prevailing
employee participant.” Smith IJ, 746 F.2d at 590.
Holding that “absent special circumstances, a
prevailing ERISA employee plaintiff should
ordinarily receive attorneys fees from the
defendant,” the Ninth Circuit directed the district
court to reconsider its denial of fees. Smith II, 746
F.2d at 591.
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit in Tate held that
a claimant who is awarded a remand in an ERISA
case “generally is not a ‘prevailing party’ in the
‘truest sense of the term.” 545 F.3d at 564 (quoting
Quinn v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass’n, 161 F.3d
472, 478-79 (7th Cir. 1998)). Though the claimant in
Tate urged the Seventh Circuit to reconsider Quinn
in light of the Second and Ninth Circuit decisions in
Miller and White, it refused to do so and ruled the
claimant was not entitled to fees based on the
remand. 545 F.3d at 564.
The circuits clearly have hardened in their
positions, and this Court’s intervention is needed to
resolve the split on this issue of profound importance
to the proper functioning of ERISA. Applying the
Buckhannon test and allowing for tactical mooting in
ERISA cases “would facilitate-rather than
discourage—[a defendant’s] bullying” and incent
33
defendants to “litigat[e] muschievously.” See
Kholyavskiy v. Schlecht, 479 F. Supp. 2d 897, 906
(E.D. Wis. 2007) (declining to apply Buckhannon to
EAJA claims). Many ERISA claimants can seek only
equitable relief via 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). In such
circumstances, “the [defendant] can _ htigate
vigorously to wear down the plaintiff and then
‘tactically moot’ the case prior to judicial action.” /d.
Many participants or beneficiaries who bring suit
to enforce their rights under ERISA are of limited
means. See, e.g., Smith I], 746 F.2d at 590 (‘when an
employee participant brings suit under ERISA,
whether it is against the trustees or the employer,
the resources available to the pensioner are
limited.”); Marquardt, 652 F.2d at 718 (“Lavern
Marquardt is a retired man in his sixties. He
receives an actuarily reduced pension from the
Company, and the record does not show that he has
any significant alternative source of funds.”).
Allowing plan administrators to “tactically moot” a
case after vigorously opposing benefits at every step
of the process until a judicially-ordered remand
would lead to underenforcement of rights in
contravention of one of the primary goals of ERISA.
This is because, under the Fourth Circuit's holding,
fee shifting would never apply in such a
circumstance and the costs of securing an attorney
could deprive a worker of her entire award (or more).
Plan administrators therefore are incented to engage
in such “you sue, you lose” tactics.
The Court should grant certiorari to resolve the
circuit split on this important issue.
34
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, petitioner urges the
Court to grant a writ of certiorari in this case.
Respectfully submitted,
Ann K. Sullivan John R. Ates
CRENSHAW, WARE & (Counsel of Record)
MARTIN, P.L.C. ATES LAW FIRM, P.C.
1200 Bank of America 1800 Diagonal Road
Center Suite 600
Norfolk, VA 23510 Alexandria, VA 22314
(757) 623-3000 (703) 647-7501
October 14, 2009
APPENDIX
ia
APPENDIX
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Appendix Page
Unpublished Opinion of
The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit
II I os scncncnonmsdenetednbnadeniaadial la
Opinion and Order of
The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia
SE GI Ge, CI hcncccescccsnecenncsocsccssosens 12a
Opinion and Order of
The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia
entered March 27, 2006 ...................0....00000 3la
Order of
The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit
Re: Denying Petition for Rehearing and
Rehearing En Banc
SMOSIOE Aas 10, BOG «2... .cccccccccsccesssesesses: 50a
29 U.S.C. 1132(g)(2006)
Employment Retirement Income Security Act of
1974, § SOZ(q), as AMONG. ..............cccccrccccccscecescess Sla
la
[ENTERED: JULY 14, 2009]
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-1896
BRIDGET HARDT,
Plaintiff — Appellee,
Vv.
RELIANCE STANDARD LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant — Appellant,
and
DAN RIVER GROUP LONG-TERM
DISABILITY PLAN,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Jerome B.
Friedman, District Judge. (2:07-cv-00105-JBF-JEB)
Argued: March 25, 2009 Decided: July 14, 2009
2a
Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge,! WILKINSON,
Circuit Judge, and David A. FABER, Senior United
States District Judge for the Southern District of
West Virginia, sitting by designation.
Vacated by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Joshua Bachrach, WILSON, ELSER,
MOSKOWITZ, EDELMAN & DICKER, LLP,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for Appellant. Ann
Sullivan, CRENSHAW, WARE & MARTIN, PLC,
Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Elaine
Kathryn Inman, CRENSHAW, WARE & MARTIN,
PLC, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in
this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company
(“Reliance”) appeals an award of attorney’s fees to
Bridget Hardt, arguing that the district court’s
remand of Hardt’s claim for long-term disability
benefits to Reliance for additional consideration did
not make Hardt a prevailing party for purposes of an
attorney's fees award. We agree, and for the reasons
below, we vacate the award of attorney's fees to
Hardt.
' Chief Judge Williams heard oral argument in this case
but did not participate in the decision. The decision is filed by a
quorum of the panel pursuant to 28 U S.C. § 46(d).
3a
I.
In 2000, Hardt was employed as an executive
assistant to the president of Dan River Inc., a textile
manufacturer. During that year, Hardt began
experiencing pain in her neck and shoulders; she
was diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome (“CTS”)
and underwent surgery on both of her wrists. Hardt
continued experiencing pain, however, and stopped
working on January 23, 2003.
In August 2003, Hardt requested that
Reliance pay her long-term disability benefits
pursuant to Dan River Inc.'s Group Long-Term
Disability Insurance Program Plan (“the Plan”).
Pursuant to the terms of the Plan, Dan River
administers the Plan, but Reliance underwrites the
Plan and decides whether a particular individual is
entitled to benefits. In response to Hardt’s request,
Reliance notified Hardt that she was required to
submit to a functional capacities evaluation (“FCE”)
and granted her a provisional approval.
Hand Rehabilitation of Hampton Roads
administered the FCE to Hardt in October 2003. The
evaluator concluded that Hardt suffered the
following major limitations: neck and _ upper
extremity pain, decreased right hand dexterity and
strength, restricted overhead reach, a restricted
ability to squat and kneel, the inability to crawl or to
climb ladders, and decreased lift, carrying, and push
and pull capabilities. In December 2003, Reliance
denied Hardt’s claim, concluding that she did not
meet the Plan’s definition of total disability.
Pursuant to the terms of the Plan, Hardt appealed
4a
this decision, and Reliance reversed its original
decision so that Hardt ultimately received temporary
disability benefits for twenty-four months.
In the meantime, Hardt was also diagnosed
with hereditary small-fiber neuropathy,? and her
pain became worse over the following months. In
addition to other symptoms, Hardt experienced
burning sensations in her feet and pain in her
calves, making walking difficult.
Hardt applied to the Social Security
Administration (“SSA”) for disability insurance
benefits and submitted two questionnaires
completed by her treating physicians that concluded
she could not return to her prior position or other
sedentary positions because of her neuropathy and
other maladies. The SSA found that Hardt was
“disabled” under the Social Security Act because she
was unable to return to her former employment or
make an adjustment to perform other work.
A few months later, Reliance notified Hardt
that her benefits would expire at the end of the
twenty-four month period. The Plan provided
benefits after twenty-four months only to individuals
totally disabled from all occupations. Reliance,
having reviewed the medical documentation in
Hardt’s file and a Residual Employability Analysis
that found she had_= several employment
2 Small-fiber neuropathy is a disorder involving small
sensory cutaneous nerves. Symptoms include tingling;
numbness; burning pain or extreme coldness; brief, painful
sensations; and loss of temperature sensation.
5a
opportunities still available, found that Hardt was
not totally disabled under the Plan.
Hardt again appealed this denial of her claim
to Reliance and, in support of her claim, submitted
her medical records, the SSA _ questionnaires
completed by her treating physicians, and an
updated questionnaire from one of those physicians
that again opined Hardt would be unable to
maintain a job. Reliance requested that Hardt
complete an updated FCE before making a final
decision on her claim, but did not request that the
testing company review Hardt for neuropathic pain.
Hardt underwent the updated FCE on
December 29, 2005 and a second updated FCE on
January 26, 2006, but the results of both
examinations were considered invalid by the
examiners because Hardt's effort was submaximal.
Specifically, one examiner noted that Hardt “refused
multiple tests . . . for fear of nausea/illness/further
pain complaints.” (J.A. at 475.)
Reliance then hired Dr. Michael Leibowitz,
who reviewed only some of Hardt’s medical records.
In his report, Dr. Leibowitz does not mention any of
the pain medications Hardt was taking or the
treating physicians’ questionnaires. Dr. Leibowitz
ultimately concluded that Hardt’s health was
expected to improve. Reliance also hired a vocational
rehabilitation counselor to determine if any jobs
existed that Hardt could perform. That labor market
study identified eight employment opportunities
suitable for Hardt, but the study was based on
Hardt’s health in 2003.
6a
On March 27, 2006, Reliance advised Hardt
that, based on its review of her file, she was still
ineligible to receive long-term disability benefits.
Reliance’s decision was based on the FCEs, Dr.
Leibowitz’s report, and the labor market study.
Hardt exhausted her administrative remedies
and filed a complaint in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, alleging
that Reliance violated ERISA by wrongfully denying
her long-term disability benefits. The district court
denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment,
but remanded Hardt’s claim to Reliance Standard for
reconsideration. [n remanding Hardt’s claim, the
district court stated that if Reliance did not
adequately consider all of the evidence discussed in
its opinion within 30 days of the date the opinion
was issued, “judgment will be issued in favor of Ms.
Hardt.” (J.A. at 65.)
On remand, Hardt provided additional
medical records to Reliance for its consideration, and
Reliance ultimately reversed its earlier decision and
awarded Hardt full long-term disability benefits
until her sixty-sixth birthday, as well as retroactive
benefits for the time already elapsed. Hardt then
filed a motion for attorney’s fees and costs in the
district court based upon her status as the prevailing
party.2 See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(g)(1) (West 2009)
J This case was originally heard by the Honorable Walter
D. Kelley, who remanded the case back to Relance for
reconsideration, and who resigned effective May 16, 2008.
Upon Judge Kelley’s resignation, te case was transferred to
the Honorable Jerome B. Friedman, who heard and ruled upon
Hardt’s motion for attorney's fees.
Ta
(providing that “the court in its discretion may allow
a reasonable attorney's fee and costs of action to
either party.). The district court granted her motion
on August 7, 2008, concluding that “the court
sanctioned a material change in the legal
relationship of the parties by ordering [Reliance] to
conduct the type of review to which [Hardt] was
entitled,” and that because, “on remand, [Hardt]
received precisely the benefits she had sought, she
meets the definition of a ‘prevailing party and is
eligible for an award of attorneys’ fees.” (J.A. at 79.)
The district court thus awarded Hardt $39,149.00 in
fees, and Reliance timely appealed. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West
2006).
IT.
We review de novo the district court's
determination that Hardt was a “prevailing party”
for purposes of awarding attorney’s fees. See
Goldstein v. Moatz, 445 F.3d 747, 751 (4th Cir. 2006)
(performing de novo review of whether applicant for
attorney's fees was a prevailing party under EAJA).4
A.
It is well settled that “only a prevailing party
is entitled to consideration for attorneys’ fees in an
4 Fee-shifting provisions are generally interpreted
consistently. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W. Va. Dep't
of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603 n.4 (2001), and
Griggs v._ El. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 385 F.3d 440, 454
(4th Cir. 2004) (applying Buckhannon to ERISA claims).
8a
ERISA action.” Martin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield
of Va., Inc., 115 F.3d 1201, 1210 (4th Cir. 1997). To
be a prevailing party, “a plaintiff [must] receive at
least some relief on the merits of his [or her] claim.”
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t
of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001)).
“TE]ven an award of nominal damages suffices under
this test.” Id. at 604. The Supreme Court has,
however, established a bright-line boundary on what
constitutes “relief on the merits” of a particular
claim: only “enforceable judgments on the merits and
court-ordered consent decrees create the material
alteration of the legal relationship of the parties
necessary to permit an award of attorney’s fees.”
Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
In Goldstein, we clarified this Buckhannon
standard by holding that there is no exception for
“tactical mooting” - the situation where a defendant
chooses to settle rather than risk an award of
attorney’s fees. Goldstein, 445 F.2d at 752. Although
Buckhannon does not specifically address tactical
mooting, we explained in Goldstein that “[t]he
Supreme Court in Buckhannon ... did not leave the
door ajar for an inferior court to engraft a broad
tactical mooting exception onto its ruling... [and
the Court instead] concluded that tactical mooting
concerns are simply insufficient to overcome the
statutory requirement that a party applying for a
fees and costs award must first have been accorded
some relief in the district court.” Id. In Goldstein,
however, we left open the question of “whether there
is an exception to the Buckhannon rule where a
defendant has agreed to provide the relief requested
9a
in response to an affirmative indication by the
presiding court that the plaintiff is about to prevail.”
Id.
In this case, the district court determined that
Hardt was a prevailing party based upon a previous
remand order. That order denied both cross-motions
for summary judgment but required Reliance to
reconsider Hardt’s claim within 30 days and stated
that if Reliance did not comply, “judgment will be
issued in favor of Ms. Hardt.” (J.A. at 65.) Although
the district court, reviewing the earlier remand
order, noted that at the time the case was remanded,
it had been “inclined to reserve judgment and permit
[Reliance] to conduct a proper review of all of the
medical evidence” and explained that “fhjad
[Reliance] completed its review in the manner
ordered by the court and in the prescribed time
period, and again determined that [Hardt] was not
eligible for benefits, it is certainly possible that the
court would have found the result satisfactory,” (J.A.
at 77), the district court found Hardt to be a
prevailing party because, “on remand, [Hardt]
received precisely the benefits she had sought,” (J.A.
at 79). As the district court explained, “[t]he
defendant, under threat of judgment against it,
reversed its decision and chose to award the plaintiff
the precise relief she was seeking.” (J.A. at 77.) In
the district court’s view, this “[c]learly” constituted
“judicially sanctioned relief.” (J.A. at 77.)
B.
On appeal, Reliance contends that, at best,
this is a case of “tactical mooting” and that there was
10a
no enforceable judgment on the merits or judicially
sanctioned relief. We agree. Hardt’s case presents a
set of circumstances that, like those presented in
Goldstein, are “simply insufficient to overcome the
statutory requirement that a party applying for a
fees and costs award must first have been accorded
some relief in the district court.” Goldstein, 445 F.3d
at 752.
Hardt attempts to fit her case within the
question we left open in Goldstein, but that opening
provides her no relief. Hardt’s case simply does not
present the type of affirmative indication
contemplated by Goldstein. On remand, the district
court required Reliance to provide Hardt with an
appropriate review of her claim; it gave no indication
that Hardt was “about to prevail.” Id. Had Reliance
continued to refuse Hardt complete disability
benefits after further review, Hardt would have had
the opportunity to bring the decision back before the
district court, at which time the court could rule on
the merits of the claim. Because it did not require
Reliance to award benefits to Hardt, however, the
remand does not constitute an “enforceable
judgmentf] on the merits” as Buckhannon requires.
532 U.S. at 604.
To avoid this result, Hardt points to two
district court cases in which a party was awarded
attorney's fees after a remand to a plan
administrator: Clark v. Metro Life Ins. Co., 384 F.
Supp. 2d 894 (E.D. Va. 2005), and Christian v.
DuPont-Waynesboro Health Care Coverage Plan, 12
F. Supp. 2d 535 (W.D. Va. 1998). Even assuming
these cases are consistent with Buckhannon, they do
lla
not aid Hardt. In each of those cases, the plaintiff
included a second count alleging procedural error
under ERISA and requesting remand as the
appropriate legal relief. Thus, by remanding the
case, the district court in those cases was providing
the very relief requested by the complaint. Hardt,
however, did not include such a count in her
complaint.
Because (1) Hardt’s only request for relicf was
the award of benefits, which the district court did
not award, and (2) the district court’s remand order
did not satisfy the requirements of Buckhannon or
Goldstein, Hardt does not qualify as a prevailing
party and is thus not eligible for an award of
attorney’s fees.
Il.
For the foregoing reasons, Hardt’s attorney's
fees award is
VACATED.
12a
[ENTERED: AUGUST 7, 2008]
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Norfolk Division
BRIDGET HARDT,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 2:07cv105
RELIANCE STANDARD LIFE
INSURANCE CO.,
and
DAN RIVER GROUP LONG-TERM
DISABILITY PLAN,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the court is a motion for
attorneys fees and costs, filed by the plaintiff,
Bridget Hardt, pursuant to the fee shifting provision
of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act
(“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). After examination
of the briefs and record, this court determines that
oral argument is unnecessary because the facts and
legal arguments are adequately presented, and the
decisional process would not be significantly aided
by oral argument The court, for the reasons stated
fully herein, GRANTS the plaintiffs motion for an
award of attorneys’ fees.
13a
I. Factual and Procedural Background
The facts and the procedural history of this
case are more fully detailed in the court’s order of
March 27, 2008,! denying the parties’ cross-motions
for summary judgment and remanding the case to
defendant Reliance Standard Life Insurance
Company (hereinafter “the defendant’)? for
reconsideration of all of the medical evidence in the
opinion regarding the plaintiffs disability? On
remand, the defendant reversed its decision
regarding long-term disability coverage for the
plaintiff, and awarded her benefits retroactive to
August 23, 2005 and prospectively until her 66th
birthday.
. This case was originally assigned to the docket of
former US. District Judge Walter D. Kelley, and it was Judge
Kelley who ordered that the case be remanded to the defendant
for reconsideration. After Judge Kelley’s resignation effective
May 16, 2008, the case was transferred to the docket of the
undersigned.
2 As the court’s previous orders make clear, the Dan
River Group Long-Term Disability Plan (“the Plan”) is
administered by Dan River, Inc., but defendant Reliance serves
the dual roles of deciding whether a claimant is entitled to
benefits and paying such benefits. Accordingly, aJthough the
Plan is named as a defendant, the instant motion seeks
recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs only from Reliance.
3 That order directed that, if the defendant did not
complete its reevaluation within the prescribed time period,
judgment would issue in favor of the plaintiff. The parties have
confirmed to the court that the defendant completed the
reevaluation within the time period as instituted by the court
in the March 27, 2008 order and modified by order dated April
24, 2008.
l4a
On July 11, 2008, the plaintiff filed the
instant motion for attorneys’ fees and _ costs,
contending that she is the “prevailing party” in this
matter, and that an award of fees in this matter
would be proper under the five-factor guideline
approach announced by the Fourth Circuit in
Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co. of N. America, 9&7 F.2d
1017, 1028-29 (4th Cir. 1993). In support of the
motion, the plaintiff filed a largely self-serving
affidavit from one of her attorneys, explaining the
fees charged and contending that such fees are fair
and commensurate with the fees billed by other
attorneys practicing in similar matters in this court.
The plaintiff requests an award of attorneys’ fees in
the amount of $58,920.73, plus costs. On July 18,
2008, the defendant filed a_ response brief,
contending that the plaintiff is not a prevailing party
and therefore not entitled to an award of fees, and
regardless, that the requested fees are unjustifiably
inflated. The plaintiff filed a reply brief on July 25,
2008, further arguing in favor of an award of fees
and including the affidavit of Richard C. Mapp, III, a
Norfolk attorney unaffiliated with the plaintiffs
attorneys, who attests to having reviewed the billing
statements in this matter and opines that the
15a
requested fees are reasonable. The matter is
therefore ripe for consideration.
Il. Standard of Review
ERISA provides that “the court in its
discretion may allow a reasonable attorney’s fee and
costs of action to either party.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g).
Although not statutorily-mandated, the Fourth
Circuit has held that “only a prevailing party is
entitled to consideration for attorneys’ fees in an
ERISA action.” Martin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield
of Virginia, Inc., 115 F.3d 1021, 1210 (4th Cir. 1997).
A party may be called a “prevailing party” for the
4 On July 30, 2008, the defendant filed a motion to strike
the plaintiff's reply brief, contending that its filing was tardy
and that, regardless, it addressed matters outside the response
brief. Further, the defendant claims that the affidavit of
Richard C. Mapp, III, is incomplete in various facets. At the
outset, it is noted that the plaintiffs reply brief was in fact
tumely filed, in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d), which adds
three days to the deadline for the filing of certain documents.
See United States District Court, Eastern District of Virginia,
Electronic Case Filing Policies and Procedures, at 25, available
at http://www.vaed.uscourts.gov/ecf/ECF%20I}SERS%20
MANUAL.pdf. Thus, the defendant’s response brief was served
on the plaintiff on July 17, 2008. Under Rule 7(F) of the Rules
of the Linited States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia, the plaintiff was afforded three days from the date of
service to file a reply brief. However, the weckend of July 19-20
is not counted when computing this deadline, see Fed. R. Civ.
P. 6(a)(2), and the so-called “mailing rule” extended the due
date an additional three days, making the reply brief due on
July 25, 2008, the date on which it was filed. With regard to the
contention that the plaintiffs reply brief raises additional
arguments not addressed in the plaintiffs orginal brief, the
court finds that in fact the reply brief is limited in scope to
responding to the claims raised in the defendant’s brief in
opposition. Accordingly, the motion to strike is DENIED.
16a
purposes of fee-shifting provisions only if he has
received at least some relief on the merits of his
claim. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va.
Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603
(2001).
Once the court determines that a party is
properly construed as “prevailing,” it is guided by
the five factors adopted by the Fourth Circuit in
Reinking v. Philadelphia American Life Ins. Co., 910
F.2d 1210, 1217-18 (4th Cir. 1990), and further
clarified in Quesinberry, in determining whether an
award of attorneys’ fees is appropriate. Quesinberry,
987 F.2d at 1028-29. These factors are:
(1) the degree of opposing parties’
culpability or bad faith;
(2) ability of opposing parties to
satisfy an award of attorneys’ fees;
(3) whether an award of attorneys’
fees against the opposing parties would
deter other persons acting under
similar circumstances;
(4) whether the parties requesting
attorneys’ fees sought to benefit all
participants and beneficiaries of an
ERISA plan or to resolve a significant
legal question regarding ERISA itself;
and
(5) the relative merits of the parties’
positions.
17a
Id. at 1029. The Quesinberry court clarified that this
approach “is not a rigid test, but rather provides
general guidelines for. the district court in
determining whether to grant a request for
attorneys’ fees.” Id.
If a court determines that an award of fees is
appropriate, it must review the attorneys’ fees and
costs requested and limit them to a reasonable
amount. See, e.g., Allen v. U.S., 606 F.2d 432, 436
(4th Cir. 1979). The “starting point for determining
reasonable attorneys’ fees is the number of hours
reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by
a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 416
U.S. 424, 433 (1983). The plaintiff bears the burden
of proving the reasonableness of the requested
hourly rate and should produce affidavits from her
attorneys as well as “specific evidence of the
‘prevailing market rates in the relevant community”
for the type of work performed in this litigation.
Plyler v. Evatt, 902 F.2d 273 277 (4th Cir. 1990)
(quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984)).
In analyzing the reasonableness of the fee request,
the court should look to the multi-factor analysis
established by the Fifth Circuit in Johnson v.
Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th
Cir. 1974). See Blum, 465 U.S. at 897; Allen, 606
F.2d at 433. Pursuant to Johnson, the court should
analyze:
(1) the time and labor expended; (2) the
novelty and difficulty of the questions
raised; (3) the skill required to properly
perform the legal services rendered; (4)
the preclusion of other employment by
18a
the lawyer due to acceptance of the
case; (5) the customary fee for similar
work; (6) the contingency of a fee; (7)
the time pressures imposed in the case;
(8) the award involved and the results
obtained; (9) the experience, reputation,
and ability of the lawyer; (10) the
‘undesirability’ of the case within the
legal community in which the suit
arose; (11) the nature and length of the
professional relationship between the
lawyer and the client; and, (12) fee
awards made in similar cases.
Ailen, 606 F.2d at 433.
III. Discussion
A. Prevailing Party Status
The parties devote a portion of their briefs to
addressing whether the plaintiff actually can be
considered a “prevailing party” for the purposes of
making her eligible for ERISA’s _ fee-shifting
provision. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that,
because the defendant, on remand, ultimately
decided to award her disability benefits-the exact
relief she had requested in filing suit-she should be
considered a “prevailing party” because she achieved
a judicially sanctioned material change in her legal
relationship with the defendant. The defendant
counters by noting that the Supreme Court in
Buckhannon specifically rejected the _ so-called
“catalyst theory,” noting that “it allows an award
where there is no judicially sanctioned change in the
19a
legal relationship of the parties.” Buckhannon, 532
U.S. at 605.
The first issue to be resolved, then, is whether
this court’s order denying the parties’ cross-motions
for summary judgment and remanding for the
defendant to fully consider all of the medical
evidence, constitutes a “judicially sanctioned change
in the legal relationship” between the plaintiff and
the defendant. The plaintiff contends that the
defendant’s change in conduct was not voluntary,
but was in fact required by the court’s order. While
the denial of the cross-motions for summary
judgment is evidence of the fact that the court was
not sanctioning a certain result on remand, the court
quite clearly expressed the consequences to the
defendant were it to fail to complete its
reconsideration in an expeditious manner. Indeed,
the order explicitly stated that, should the defendant
not complete its review of the evidence within thirty
days, “judgment will be issued in favor of Ms.
Hardt.” Opinion and Order of March 27, 2008, at 20.
Had the court been of the opinion that neither party
had a stronger case, then such an ultimatum would
have been’ entirely unnecessary and even
inappropriate. Accordingly, 1ts use can only signify
that the court was displeased with the cursory
review that the defendant had initially given to the
plaintiffs claim. but was inclined to reserve
judgment and permit the defendant to conduct a
proper review of all of the medical evidence.
However, if such a review was not forthcoming, the
20a
court would have sanctioned judgment in favor of the
plaintiff.®
Although the Court in Buckhannon held that
a plaintiff is not entitled to relief if he simply files a
lawsuit and, in response, the defendant voluntarily
changes his behavior,® the facts in this case remove
it from the scope of the “catalyst theory,” and into
the realm of those cases where a court has
sanctioned a change in the legal relationship
between the parties. Thus, Buckhannon, although
instructive, is ultimately inapposite. Although the
Fourth Circuit does not appear to have addressed
whether a plaintiff can be a “prevailing party” when
her claims are remanded for reconsideration, the
Alexandria Division of this court and other district
courts within the Fourth Circuit have done so,
concluding that, when an ERISA claim is remanded
and the administrator decides to award benefits, the
plaintiff is indeed a “prevailing party.” See, eg.,
5 Had the defendant completed its review in the manner
ordered by the court and in the prescribed time period, and
again determined that the plaintiff was not eligible for benefits,
it is certainly possible that the court would have found the
result satisfactory. Nonetheless, speculation as to what might
have happened is useless in hght of what actually did happen-
namely, the defendant, under threat of judgment against it,
reversed its decision and chose to award the plaintiff the
precise relief she was seeking. Clearly, then, the plaintiff was
afforded judicially sanctioned relief.
6 The Court held: “We cannot agree that the term
‘prevailing party’ authorizes federal courts to award attorney's
fees to a plaintiff who, by simply filing a nonfrivolous but
nonetheless potentially meritless lawsuit (it will never be
determined), has reached the ‘sought-after destination’ without
obtaining any judicial relief.” Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 606
(interna! citations omitted).
2la
Clark v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 384 F.Supp.2d 894, 897
(E.D. Va. 2005) (Cacheris, J.) (holding that the
plaintiff was a prevailing party with respect to the
portion of her complaint that sought a full and fair
review of the medical evidence); Christian v. Dupont-
Waynesboro Health Care Coverage Plan, 12
F.Supp.2d 535, 537 (W.D. V: 1998) (“The fact that
the court remanded the plaintiffs request for
benefits does not prohibit her status as a ‘prevailing
party.”).
Further, the Seventh Circuit, in Quinn v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield, 161 F.3d 472, 479 (7th Cir.
1998), in remanding a claim to the ERISA plan
administrator for further review, noted _ that
“{s]hould Quinn ultimately succeed in her claim and
be awarded benefits, she will then have the benefit,
as the prevailing party, of the modest presumption
that she is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees.” Id.
Although dicta, the court was recognizing the
possibility that the plaintiff could be a “prevailing
party” if she was awarded benefits by the
administrator on remand. See also Soltysiak v.
Unum Provident Corp., 480 F.Supp.2d 970, 974
(W.D. Mich. 2007) (holding that a plaintiff is a
prevailing party eligible for attorneys’ fees where the
claim had been remanded to the defendant with
instructions to adequately consider all of the
evidence).
Indeed, in remanding the claim to the
defendant, the court indicated:
Based on the record described above,
this Court finds compelling evidence
22a
that Ms. Hardt is totally disabled due to
her neuropathy. However, this is not
the end of the inquiry. The Court must
decide whether the evidence is_ so
overwhelming that Ms. Hardt is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
While the Court is inclined to rule in
Ms. Hardt’s favor, it would be unwise to
take this step without first giving
Reliance the chance to address the
deficiencies in its approach. The record
demonstrates that Ms. Hardt did not
get the kind of review to which she was
entitled under applicable law.
Opinion and Order of March 27, 2008, at 18-19.
Thus, the court sanctioned a material change in the
legal relationship of the parties by ordering the
defendant to conduct the type of review to which the
plaintiff was entitled. In lhght of the fact that, on
remand, the plaintiff received precisely the benefits
she had sought, she meets the definition of a
“prevailing party” and is eligible for an award of
attorneys’ fees.
B. Propriety of Attorneys’ Fees
Having found that the plaintiff is a “prevailing
party,” the court turns next to the Quesinberry
factors to determine whether she is entitled to
recover attorneys’ fees from the defendant in this
matter. In considering these factors, most of which
weigh in favor of the plaintiff, the court concludes
that she is entitled to recover at least some of her
attorneys’ fees in litigating the matter. Turning to
23a
the first Quesinberry factor, the defendant’s degree
of bad faith or culpability, the record is replete with
instances of the defendant's staunch opposition to
awarding any benefits to the plaintiff. While staunch
opposition is not in and of itself evidence of bad faith,
the totality of circumstances seems to indicate that it
was the defendant’s goal from the beginning to deny
the plaintiff the benefits she had claimed, and that,
to further that goal, the defendant engaged in only
the most cursory review of the medical evidence.’
With the (not insignificant) exception of actually
awarding her benefits on remand, the defendant has
opposed the plaintiffs position throughout the course
of this litigation. And even when the defendant did
award the plaintiff the benefits she sought, it was
only after having been ordered by the court to
provide the kind of meaningful review of the
evidence to which the plaintiff was entitled by law.
Thus, the bad faith and culpability of the defendant
in ignoring the medical evidence of the plaintiffs
disability weigh in favor of an award of attorneys’
fees to the plaintiff.
With respect to the ability of the defendant to
pay an award of fees, the defendant has
The court, noting that the defendant had relied almost
completely on the opinion of Dr. Leibowitz, found serious flaws
in Dr. Leibowitz’s methodology, noting that his medical
conclusions were “extremely vague and conclusory” and that he
“failed to cite to any medical evidence to support his
conclusion,” and instead offered conclusions on symptoms of
which the plaintiff had never complained. Opinion and Order of
March 27, 2008, at 13-14. The court further held that the
defendant had arbitrarily ignored the findings of the plaintiff's
treating physicians, instead crediting Dr Leibowitz's report, a
report which also ignored those findings.
24a
acknowledged such, and therefore this factor weighs
in favor of granting the plaintiffs motion. As to
whether such an award would constitute a deterrent,
the court finds that this factor, too, weighs in favor
of the plaintiff, as it would deter similarly-situated
defendants from failing to consider the full breadth
of medical evidence available to them when
reviewing a claim for benefits. Although the plaintiff
claims that, by filing the instant lawsuit, she sought
to resolve a significant legal question regarding
ERISA itself, the facts demonstrate that the case
was merely regarding the defendant’s denial of
benefits to the plaintiff and her attempt to have that
decision reversed. Although the issue arose in the
context of what constitutes a proper review of the
evidence, the court did not decide “whether a plan
administrator can shield itself with the claim that
there were conflicting medical reports when, in fact,
the administrator chose to rely virtually exclusively
on the conclusions of a peer reviewer who has not
personally examined the claimant while completely
[sic] the conclusions of the claimant’s own treating
physicians and other evidence presented by the
claimant.” Brief in Support of Motion for Attorneys’
Fees, at 6-7. Thus, this factor weighs against the
imposition of the plaintiffs attorneys’ fees against
the defendant.
With respect to the fifth of the Quesinberry
factors, the plaintiffs position clearly has the higher
relative merit, as demonstrated in the court’s
3 The plaintiff also claims that the award of fees may
benefit other plan participants, but fails to allege that she has
“sought to benefit all participants.” Quesinberry, 987 F.2d at
1029.
25a
remand order and-more importantly-the ultimate
resolution of the case. As the court noted, “it is clear
that Reliance’s decision to deny Ms. Hardt long-term
disability benefits was not based on substantial
evidence.” Opinion and Order of March 27, 2008, at
17-18. Accordingly, this factor also weighs in favor of
granting the plaintiff an award of fees. Considering
the factors outlined in Quesinberry, as well as the
totality of this case, the court finds that a
discretionary award of fees in favor of the plaintiff is
appropriate.
C. Reasonableness of Fees Requested
Having found that the plaintiff is both a
“prevailing party” «und that the Quesinberry factors
support an award of fees, the court must now
determine whether the fees requested by the
plaintiff, a total of $58,920.73, are reasonable. The
plaintiff has provided an affidavit from Ann K.
Sullivan, an attorney at the law firm of Crenshaw,
Ware & Martin, which represented her throughout
the course of this litigation. See Brief in Support of
Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Exhibit A (hereinafter
“Sullivan Affidavit”). Also attached is a breakdown of
the billable hours worked by the attorneys and
paralegals on the plaintiffs behalf. See Sullivan
Affidavit, Exhibit 3. According to that breakdown,
Ann K. Sullivan, who served as lead counsel on the
matter, worked a total of 54.4 hours at the time of
filing, and expected to work an additional 10.0 hours
on the remainder of the case. Ms. Sullivan bills at a
rate of $275.00 per hour. Elaine K. Inman is the
other attorney at Crenshaw, Ware & Martin who
worked on the plaintiffs case. She worked a total of
26a
171.7 hours and anticipated that she would work an
additional 4.0 hours on the remainder of the case.
Ms. Inman bills at the hourly rate of $200 per hour.
In addition, four paralegals provided work on the
plaintiffs case at various points. Lori K. Krezel, Suzi
C. North, Debbie S. Grimm, and Christine M. Jordan
worked a combined total of 62.2 hours, and billed at
an hourly rate of $95 per hour.
Although the court finds that the hourly rates
billed by the attorneys and paralegals are
appropriate considering their experience, it also
finds that the total number of hours billed by the
plaintiffs attorneys and their paralegals is excessive,
in light of the straightforward nature of the case and
various points at which the case was “overlawyered.”
Specifically, both Ms. Inman and Ms. Sullivan
attended the Rule 26(f) scheduling conference on
April 26, 2007 and a discovery dispute conference on
June 26, 2007. Both attorneys billed time in
preparation for arguing their cross-motions for
summary judgment, and indeed both attorneys
attended the hearing, although only Ms. Sullivan
actually argued at the hearing. Finally, it is noted
that, although the plaintiffs attorneys have
submitted documentation regarding anticipated time
spent at oral argument on her motion for attorneys’
fees, the court has found that argument on this
motion is not necessary. Given these issues, the
court finds it appropriate to eliminate the hours
billed by Ms. Inman with regard to the April 26 and
June 26, 2007 conferences, the hours billed by Ms.
Inman on September 14, 17, and 19, 2007 with
regard to the hearing on the motions for summary
judgment, and the hours billed by both Ms. Sullivan
27a
and Ms. Inman in relation to an anticipated hearing
on the instant motion for attorneys’ fees. Further,
the court finds excessive the number of hours billed
in relation to discovery requests, as discovery in
ERISA cases is ordinarily straightforward and
limited to the evidence before the plan administrator
at the time of its decision. See, e.g., Elliott v. Sara
Lee Corp., 190 F.3d 601, 608-09 (4th Cir. 1999).9
Although the court did authorize the plaintiff to
request additional discovery, it believes that the
amount of hours spent by the plaintiffs attorney
with regard to discovery matters is excessive, and
that the time spent on May 1-3 and June 29, 2007,
by Ms. Inman regarding drafting correspondence to
the court concerning discovery, should be eliminated.
Accordingly, the court will reduce Ms. Imnan’s billed
hours by 19 hours and Ms. Sullivan’s billed hours by
2.0 hours.
More significantly, however, the court finds
that the total number of hours billed on this matter
are excessive, in light of the nature of the case, the
results obtained, and the experience of the plaintiff's
attorneys in handling such cases. Specifically, the
evidence presented to the court by the plaintiff
indicates that Ms. Inman, who has billed a total of
$35,140-nearly 60% of the attorneys’ fees requested-
appears to have little, if any, experience in ERISA
matters.!° Although her biography from her law
9 It is true that the court permitted a limited amount of
discovery, as agreed to by the parties and memorialized in the
Rule 16(b) scheduling order, However, the plaintiff's repeated
motions with regard to discovery were denied by the court.
Lo Despite ample opportunity to provide the court with
evidence of Ms. Inman's relevant experience in ERISA
28a
firm’s website indicates that she handles “a wide
range of civil litigation matters,” it fails to mention
any prior work in ERISA cases,!! and in fact
indicates that, prior to her practice with the firm of
Crenshaw, Ware & Martin, Ms. Inman served as an
assistant public defender, a _ position’ that
undoubtedly did not involve ERISA matters.!2 See
Sullivan Affidavit, Exhibit 2. And it is noteworthy
that, although Ms. Sullivan’s affidavit touts her
experience with ERISA matters, it fails to mention
any relevant experience in such cases possessed by
Ms. Inman.!3 While Ms, Inman bills at a lower rate
than Ms. Sullivan, the court believes that Ms.
Inman’s apparent inexperience with ERISA matters
litigation, the plaintiff has failed to do so, instead claiming only
that “Ms. Inman has been practicing for six years and has
handled multiple cases in federal court and has focused
primarily on labor and employment law since joining
Crenshaw, Ware & Martin, P.L.C.” Plaintiffs Rebuttal Brief, at
10.
i In contrast, Ms. Sullivan’s firm biography clearly
mentions her ERISA experience, and notes that she was named
in the 2007 Edition of Virginia Super Lawyers with respect to
“employee benefits/ERISA.” See Sullivan Affidavit, Exhibit 1.
12 The Sullivan Affidavit indicates that Ms. Inman joined
the firm of Crenshaw, Ware & Martin in 2006. See Sullivan
Affidavit, at 4 9.
13 This is true to an even greater extent in the Mapp
Affidavit, which makes no attestation as to the skill or
experience of Ms. Inman. See Plaintiffs Rebuttal Brnef, Exhibit
A. Further, the Mapp Affidavit fails to indicate whether the
affiant believes that the number of hours spent on the ease by
the attorneys for the plaintiff is reasonable, and in fact appears
incorrect 1n asserting that “the case is fully litigated.”
29a
contributed significantly to an increase in the fees
charged to the plaintiff.
Thus, the court finds it appropriate to reduce
Ms. Inman’s billed hours total by 50%. After the
reduction of 19 hours as explained above, her total
number of hours stands at 156.7. A reduction of 50%
brings Ms. Inman’s total hours to 78.35. At a rate of
$200 per hour, the plaintiff is entitled to an award of
$15,670.00 with respect to Ms. Inman’s time. With
respect to Ms. Sullivan’s time, the court has reduced
her billed hours to 62.4, and at a rate of $275, the
plaintiff is entitled to an award of $17,160.00 with
respect to Ms. Sullivan’s work. The work of the four
paralegals involved in this matter on the plaintiffs
behalf entitles the plaintiff to an award of $5,909.00.
Accordingly, the plaintiff is entitled to an award of
attorneys’ fees in the total amount of $38,739.00.'*
D. Costs
The plaintiff, having prematurely filed a bill of
costs, has mow requested that the document be
renewed. From the face of the bill, it is not apparent
whether the plaintiff is seeking costs under the same
ERISA statute that authorizes attorneys’ fees, 29
(1S.C. § 1132(g), or under the more general cost-
shifting provision ef Rule 54(d)(1) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. However, as indicated
— = ees -—“S—S
4 The billing statement submitted by the plaintiff
undacates additional expenses that total $161.73. but appear to
be in the nature of costs, not attorneys’ fees. It is not clear te
the court whether these expenses are incorporated or
duplicated in the bill of costs submitted by the plaintiff, and
therefore the court decliunes to order them reimbursed with
respect to the motion for attorneys’ fees.
30a
supra, courts have inferred a “prevailing party’
requirement into the terms of 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g),
and Rule 54(d)(1) by its explicit terms requires
“prevailing party” status as a prerequisite to
recovery of costs. Because the court finds that the
plaintiff is a prevailing party, she is entitled to
recover her costs, and therefore the court awards her
costs in the amount of $410.00, as indicated in the
bill of costs.
IV. Conclusion
As set forth fully above, the court finds that
the plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorneys fees
and costs and therefore that her motion is
GRANTED. The cowrt finds that a reasomable
award of fees is as follows: $32,830.00 in attorneys’
fees, $5,909.00 im paralegal fees, and $410.00 in
costs. The total award is $39,149.00, and judgment
in this amount is hereby entered im favor of the
plaintiff at the expense of the defendant. It
appearing to the court that no further legal issues
remain to be resolved im this matter, the case is
DISMISSED.
The Clerk is REQUESTED to send a copy of
this Order to the counsel of record for all parties.
It is so ORDERED.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
August 7, 2008
Norfolk, Virginia
3la
[ENTERED: MARCH 27, 2008]
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Norfolk Division
BRIDGET HARDT,
Plaintiff,
Vv. Civil Action No. 2:07cv105
RELIANCE STANDARD LIFE
INSURANCE CO., et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Bridget Hardt brought this action
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., alleging
that Defendant Rehance Standard Life Insurance
Company’s (“Reliance”) demal of her claim for long-
term disability benefits was not supported by
substantial evidence. For the reasons set forth
below, the parties’ Cross-Motions for Summary
Judgment (Docket Nos. 19, 31) are DENIED, and
the case is REMANDED for further review.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Dan River Inc. (“Dan River”) is a textile
manufacturer that provides benefits to qualified
32a
participants in its Group Long-Term Disability
Insurance Program Plan (“the Plan”). Dan River
administers the Plan, and Reliance serves the dual
roles of deciding whether a claimant is entitled to
benefits and paying for such benefits.
In 2000, Bridget Hardt, an executive assistant
to the president of Dan River, began experiencing
pain in her neck and shoulders. After seeing several
doctors, Ms. Hardt was diagnosed with carpal tunnel
syndrome (“CTS”). She underwent surgery on both of
her wrists, yet she still suffered from pain. She
stopped working on January 23, 2003.
In or about August 2003, Ms. Hardt requested
that Reliance pay her long-term disability benefits
pursuant to the Plan. Ms. Hardt explaimed in her
claim form that she suffered from mumbness,
tingling, loss of feelimg, and extreme pain in her
arms, hands, shoulders, amd neck. Reliance
provisionally approved her claim, but notified Ms.
Hardt that she was required to submit to a
functional capacities evaluation (“PCE”).
On October 13, 2003, Hand Rehabilitation of
Hampton Roads conducted the FCE to assess the
impact of Ms. Hardt’s CTS and neck pain on her
ability to work. The evaluator summarized Ms.
Hardt’s pertinent medical history as including pain
in her neck, left shoulder, parathesias on both
hands, and CTS. The evaluator further noted that
Ms. Hardt’s other previous medical problems
included lower back pain, hypertension, and anxiety.
The evaluator ultimately concluded that Ms.
Hardt suffered from major limitations in moving her
neck, upper extremity pain, decreased right hand
dexterity and strength, restricted overhead reach, a
restricted ability to squat and kneel, the inability to
crawl or to climb ladders, as well as decreased lift,
carrying, and push and pull capabilities. The
evaluator nonetheless found that Ms. Hardt could
perform a sedentary level of work and lift 4 to 5
pounds on oecasion with her right hand, and 2 to 3
pounds on 4 frequent basis. Based on these findings,
Rehance demed Ms. Hardt benefits in December
2003. Upon considering Ms. Hardt’s administrative
appeal, Reliance reversed its decision somewhat and
agreed to provide disability benefits for twenty-four
months based on Ms. Hardt’s inability to perform
her current position.
While Ms. Hardt was being evaluated, one of
her treating physicians, Gilbert M. Snider, M.D.,
diagnosed Ms. Hardt with another condition -
hereditary small-fiber neuropathy.! Ms. Hardt had
recently developed a tingling and numbness in her
lower extremities that resulted in an_ icy-hot
sensation. During a neurological exam, Dr. Snider
found that Ms. Hardt had to keep her fingers mildly
flexed because it hurt to fully extend them, that
manipulation of the hands and feet during the
examination was unpleasant, and that her motor
skills were somewhat limited by pain. He opined
' Small-fiber neuropathy is a disorder inwolvimg small
sensory cutaneous nerves (Pl.’s Mem. in Opp'n to Def.'s Mot.
For Summ. J. 2.) Symptoms include tingling, mumbness,
burning pain or extreme coldness, brief, painful sensations, and
loss of temperature sensation. Id
34a
that there could be symmetric distal weakness in the
lower extremities, but that a detailed examination
was difficult due to pain. He concluded that “[t]he
painful nature and involvement of pain sensation
[indicated that Ms. Hardt suffered from] small-fiber
neuropathy,” but that it may not show up in nerve
conduction studies. (AR 460.)?
Ms. Hardt’s pain became worse over the
following months. In a follow-up visit, Dr. Snider
noted that Ms. Hardt had experienced some relief by
taking 800 milligrams of Neurontin three times a
day, but she continued to have obvious pain and
constantly stomped her feet. He recommended
increasing her pain medication. The following
month, Dr. Snider recommended increasing Ms.
Hardt’s dosage yet again because she continued to
have a burning sensation in her feet during the
night. Two months later, Dr. Snider noted that Ms.
Hardt was not doing well. Although her prescription
for Neurontin had doubled, it was not clear that the
increased dosage was providing additional relief.
Further, the neuropathy caused Ms. Hardt difficulty
while walking, and she had a “burning sensation in
the feet all the way to the ankles and pain and
cramping to the upper 1/3 of her cal[ves]. . . . [H]er
? Ms. Hardt asserts in Plaintiffs Objection to
Defendant's Notice of Filing of Administrative Record and Brief
in Support Thereof (Docket No. 24) that the administrative
record is not complete because it lacks the Claims Department
Administrative Procedures Manual. However, the language in
the manual is clear that the steps identified are guidelines and
may not apply to every claim. Thus, the failure to abide by the
document or include it in the administrative record does not
affect the outcome of the decision. For this reason, Ms. Hardt's
objection 1s demied and the manual is excluded.
35a
feet [were] swollen and it [was] clumsy [for her] to
walk on them.” (AR 437.)
While Ms. Hardt was receiving treatment for
neuropathy, she applied to the Social Security
Administration (“SSA”) for disability benefits. In
conjunction with this request, she submitted
questionnaires completed by her treating physicians,
Julius S. Miller, M.D., and Dr. Snider. Dr. Miller
concluded that Ms. Hardt could not return to gainful
employment in her prior position or other sedentary
positions because of her neuropathy, combined with
her other ailments. He stated that Ms. Hardt would
experience “pain or other symptoms severe enough
to interfere with attention and concentration .. .
[clonstantly” (AR 416), that she had limitations on
her ability to walk, sit, or stand due to her
impairments, and that Ms. Hardt would have
difficulty working at a regular job on a sustained
basis (AR 415).
Dr. Sniders SSA _ questionnaire similarly
stated that Ms. Hardt would have difficulty working
at a regular job on a sustained basis. (AR 432.) He
opined that Ms. Hardt’s disability would cause her to
miss work more than three times a month, placed
limitations on her ability to walk, sit, and stand, and
that she experienced “pain or other symptoms severe
enough to interfere with attention and concentration
... frequently.” (AR 432-33.) Both doctors also found
that Ms. Hardt was not a malingerer. (AR 415, 431.)
The SSA determined that Ms. Hardt was “disabled”
as defined under the Social Security Act because it
was impossible for her to return to her former
36a
employment or make an adjustment to perform other
work. (AR 74.)
A few months after Ms. Hardt received Social
Security disability benefits, Reliance notified her
that it would terminate her benefits upon expiration
of the twenty-four month period. Under the terms of
the Plan, Ms. Hardt did not qualify for benefits after
twenty-four months unless she was totally disabled
from all occupations. Reliance found that Ms. Hardt
was not totally disabled from CTS since her
magnetic resonance image (“MRI”) and
electromyogram (“EMG”) were both negative. They
also noted that the FCE conducted in 2003
demonstrated that she had sedentary restrictions,
but that she could perform a sedentary job.
Once again, Ms. Hardt administratively
appealed Reliance’s decision. In connection with her
appeal, Ms. Hardt submitted all of her medical
records, the SSA questionnaires completed by Drs.
Miller and Snider, as well as an _ updated
questionnaire from Dr. Miller in which he again
opined that Ms. Hardt was not a malingerer and
would have difficulty working at a regular job on a
sustained basis. Before ruling on the appeal,
Reliance decided to obtain an updated FCE to
determine whether Ms. Hardt had CTS or neck pain.
Although Reliance knew that Ms. Hardt had been
diagnosed with neuropathy in 2004, Reliance did not
mention neuropathy or neuropathic pain in its
referral request to the testing company.
Ms. Hardt appeared for a FCE on December
29, 2005. The results of the examination were found
37a
to be invalid because Ms. Hardt’s effort was
submaximal. A second evaluation was scheduled for
January 26, 2006, but the results of that evaluation
were also found to be invalid for similar reasons. The
first evaluator noted that Ms. Hardt “refused
multiple tests .. . for fear of nausea/illness/further
pain complaints.” (AR 48.)
Neither of the inconclusive FCEs were able to
support a decision to deny benefits. Rather than
have a doctor personally examine Ms. Hardt,
Reliance decided to hire a doctor to review some, but
not all, of her medical records. The reviewing
physician, Michael Leibowitz, M.D., found that Ms.
Hardt’s prognosis for CTS, neck pain, and
neuropathy were either excellent or fair to good. He
concluded that Ms. Hardt underwent successful
bilateral carpal tunnel release surgery and no longer
had any electrophysiological evidence of entrapment
of the median nerves at the carpal tunnels. Dr.
Leibowitz also concluded that the prognosis for Ms.
Hardt’s cervical sprain and strain was good, and that
he expected to see improvement in her symptoms
over time if she complied with a home exercise
program and ergonomic interventions. Finally, Dr.
Leibowitz opined that the prognosis for Ms. Hardt’s
neuropathy was fair to good since she did not suffer
from the autonomic nervous component of hereditary
small-fiber neuropathy.
Dr. Leibowitz failed to address in his report
any of the pain medications prescribed to Ms. Hardt
or the effect that her pain had on her ability to
perform a job. It is also unclear whether Dr.
Leibowitz reviewed the questionnaires completed by
38a
Drs. Miller and Snider in which they opined that Ms.
Hardt was completely disabled from her conditions.
Dr. Leibowitz diu not mention any of the
questionnaires in his report.
In addition to the peer review performed by
Dr. Leibowitz, Reliance had a_ vocational
rehabilitation counselor perform an evaluation to
determine what jobs, if any, Ms. Hardt could
perform. Based on the results of a_ residual
employability analysis that was performed in 2003,
which was based on the FCE performed in 2003, the
counselor conducted a labor market study. The study
identified eight employment opportunities Ms. Hardt
could perform.
By letter dated March 27, 2006, Reliance
advised Ms. Hardt that it had completed its review
of her claim file and found that its decision to
terminate benefits was correct. Reliance based its
decision on the FCEs, the peer review report by Dr.
Leibowitz, and the labor market study.
After exhausting her administrative remedies,
Ms. Hardt filed this action in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia,
alleging that Reliance violated ERISA by wrongfully
denying her long-term disability benefits.
39a
Il. Analysis
A. Standards of Review
1. Cross Motions for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate when there
are no genuine issues of material fact, and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Where both parties have
moved for summary judgment, a court should
consider “each motion separately on its own merits
to determine whether either of the parties deserves
judgment as a matter of law.” Rossignol v. Voorhaar,
316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th. Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).
For each motion, “the court must take care to
‘resolve all factual disputes and any competing,
rational inferences in the light most favorable’ to the
party opposing that motion.” Id. (quoting Wightman
v. Spri d Terminal Ry. Co., 100 F.3d 228, 230
(1st Cir. 1996)). The party who bears the burden of
proof on an issue at trial, however, cannot survive
summary judgment without forecasting evidence
sufficient to sustain his or her burden of proof on
that point. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327.
2. ERISA Standard of Review
This Court already ruled in Hardt v. Reliance
Standard Life Insurance Co., 494 F. Supp. 2d 391
(E.D. Va. 2007), that it would review Reliance’s
denial of long-term disability benefits under a
modified abuse of discretion standard of review. Id.
at 392. This standard is necessary to compensate for
40a
the effect of any potential conflict that may arise due
to Reliance’s dual role as claims reviewer and policy
insurer. Id. at 393. The modified standard deviates
from the usual abuse of discretion review “only to
the extent necessary to counteract any influence
unduly resulting from the conflict [of interest].” Ellis
v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 228, 233 (4th Cir.
1997). “The more incentive for the administrator or
fiduciary to benefit itself by a certain interpretation
of benefit eligibility or other plan terms, the more
objectively reasonable the administrator’ or
fiduciary’s decision must be and the more
substantial the evidence must be to support it.” Id.
When reviewing the discretionary decision of
a plan administrator to deny employee benefits,
“judicial review . . . is limited to the body of evidence
before the administrator at the time it rejected [the]
claim.” Donnell v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 165 F. App’x.
288, 294 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing Elliott v. Sara Lee
Corp., 190 F.3d 601, 608-09 (4th Cir. 1999)). The
“administrator’s decision will not be disturbed if it ‘is
the result of a deliberate, principled reasoning
process and if it is supported by substantial
evidence.” Elliott, 190 F.3d at 605 (quoting Brogan
v. Holland, 105 F.3d 158, 161 (4th Cir. 1997)).
Substantial evidence is evidence that “a
reasoning mind would accept as sufficient to support
a particular conclusion.” Donnell, 165 F. App’x. at
295 (quoting LeFebre v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
747 F.2d 197, 208 (4th Cir. 1984)). It consists of
“more than a_ scintilla but less than a
preponderance.” Id. However, a decision to deny
benefits is neither reasonable nor supported by
4la
substantial evidence if an administrator fails to fully
consider all ailments affecting the claimant and
properly assess their impact. See G‘hrie v. Nat'l
Rural Elec. Coop. Ass’n Long-Term Disability Plan,
509 F.3d 644, 651-52 (4th Cir. 2007).
To determine whether an administrator's
decision was reasonable and based on substantial
evidence, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit has formulated a nonexhaustive list
of eight factors that a court may consider. Booth v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assoc. Health & Welfare Plan,
201 F.3d 335, 342-43 (4th Cir. 2000) (including the
language of the plan, whether the decision making
process was reasoned and principled, the adequacy
of the materials considered to make the decision, and
the degree to which they support it). The relevant
factors in this case are the adequacy of the materials
considered and whether Reliance’s decision was the
result of a deliberate, principled, and reasoned
process.
B. Reliance’s Motion for Summary Judgment?
Reliance asserts that the Court should grant
summary judgment in its favor because it did not
abuse its discretion when it concluded Ms. Hardt
was not totally disabled. In its letter to Ms. Hardt
dated March 27, 2006, Reliance outlined the
information upon which it relied to deny her claim:
3 Ms. Hardt filed a Motion to Strike Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support Thereof (Docket
No. 25) asserting that Reliance failed to comply with local
rules. The Court will assess the case on its merits. Thus, the
motion is demed.
42a
a FCE performed on October 13, 2003;
° a FCE performed on December 29,
2005;
° a FCE performed on January 26, 2006;
° a peer review performed by Dr. Michael
Leibowitz on March 4, 2006; and
° a vocational evaluation performed on
March 10, 2006.
(Mem. of Law in Support of Def.’s Mot. For Summ. J.
3-6.) This listing makes it clear that Reliance’s
decision to deny benefits was based on incomplete
information. None of the FCEs assessed the impact
of neuropathy and neuropathic pain on Ms. Hardt.
Moreover, Dr. Leibowitzs report was itself
incomplete.
First, the basis for Dr. Leibowitz’s medical
conclusions is extremely vague and conclusory.
Without addressing any of the medical records that
reflect Ms. Hardt’s severe pain, the increasingly
strong pain medications prescribed to her, or her
decreasing ability to walk, Dr. Leibowitz concluded
that the prognosis for her neuropathy was fair to
good. Strikingly, he spent a substantial majority of
the diagnosis portion of his report discussing Ms.
43a
Hardt’s CTS and cervical sprain.* He addressed Ms.
Hardt’s prognosis for neuropathy in only a cursory
manner.
In addition, Dr. Leibowitz failed to cite to any
medical evidence to support his conclusion. He
merely noted that Ms. Hardt does not suffer from an
“autonomic nervous system component.” (AR 357.)
However, this seems to be a red herring, since Dr.
Snider never stated that Ms. Hardt suffered from
autonomic symptoms. Autonomic symptoms “include
such symptoms as bladder and bowel control
problems, blood pressure regulation problems and
difficulty with sexual function.” (Pl.’s Mem. In Opp’n
to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. 23.) Dr. Snider instead
diagnosed Ms. Hardt with neuropathy and
neuropathic pain. As_ stated previously, the
symptoms of these ailments include tingling,
numbness, burning pain or extreme coldness, brief,
painful sensations, and loss of temperature
sensation. See supra note 1. Dr. Leibowitz
mentioned these symptoms in his summary of
relevant medical records, yet he made no analysis of
them in his diagnosis or prognosis.
4 The information in the record is mixed regarding Ms.
Hardt’s recovery from CTS. Dr. Snider found that Ms. Hardt’s
surgery on her left and right wrists had provided limited, if
any, benefit. However, he also reported that there had heen
improvement in the right median sensory amplitudes and the
right median motor distal latency indicating successful release
of the median nerve in the carpal tunnel.
Given the conflicting reports, it was within Reliance’s
discretion to deny the claim based on CTS and neck pain only.
Booth, 201 F.3d at 345 (“Confronted with this record of
conflicting opinion, . . . it is not an abuse of discretion for a plan
fiduciary to deny . . . benefits where conflicting medical reports
were presented.” (quoting Elliott, 190 F.3d at 606)).
44a
As the Fourth Circuit explained in Guthrie,
509 F.3d at 651-52, an admunistrator’s denial of
benefits is unreasonable if the administrator fails to
consider all conditions from which the plaintiff
suffers. In Guthrie, the administrator found that the
plaintiff was not disabled due to occupational
asthma based on the reports of two pulmonologists.
Id. at 652. Yet, the administrator failed to consider
the “multiple other problems” from which the
plaintiff suffered that neither doctor addressed. Id.
The court held the administrator’s decision was 15
unreasonable. Id. at 651-52.
Dr. Leibowitz’s report is further inadequate
because he failed to address the treating physicians’
contradictory medical findings. Reliance does not
have to give special weight to Ms. Hardt’s treating
physicians’ conclusions; however, Reliance “may not
arbitrarily refuse to credit a claimant’s reliable
evidence, including the opinions of . . . treating
physician[s].” Black and Decker Disability Plan v.
Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 834 (2003). Both of Ms. Hardt’s
doctors concluded that she was completely disabled,
yet Reliance ignored these findings and gave them
no weight at all in its decision. Reliance instead
relied most significantly on Dr. Leibowitz’s report - a
report that studiously ignored the diagnoses of these
physicians.
Reliance correctly notes that an administrator
doves not act unreasonably by denying benefits if the
record contains “conflicting medical reports.” Elliott,
190 F.3d at 606. However, the contradictory evidence
must be substantial. Stup v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of
Am., 390 F.3d 301, 308 (4th Cir. 2004). Dr.
45a
Leibowitz’s conclusory and incomplete report does
not meet the quantum of evidence that “a reasoning
mind would accept as sufficient to support a
particular conclusion.” Donnell, 165 F. App’x. at 295.
“{[A]n administrator operating under a conflict of
interest does not act reasonably in denying benefits
if faced, on the one hand, with substantial evidence
of disability and, on the other, with only tentative
and ambiguous evidence that might, or might not,
favor denial of benefits.” Stup, 390 F.3d at 309.
In addition to relying on an incomplete record,
Reliance’s decision to deny benefits was also
inadequate because it improperly rejected muth of
the evidence that Ms. Hardt submitted. Reliance
found that there was “no support in the medical
records for Plaintiffs claim of total disability based
on small-fiber neuropathy,” (Def.’s Combined Resp.
to Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. and Rep. in Supp. of Def’s
Mot. 5), because the diagnosis was based on
subjective complaints of pain. Id. at 9.
Reliance wrongly rejected Ms. Hardt’s
evidence of pain. As explained in Wasson v. Media
Gen., Inc., 446 F. Supp. 2d 579, 599 (E.D. Va. 2006)
(Payne, J.), the Fourth Circuit does not require that
objective evidence be in the form of “an MRI, X-ray
or some other tangible or physical demonstration of
disability.” Although “the professional opinions of
doctors, based on physical examination of a patient
and the related observations ... are not the same
kind of objective evidence as a CT scan or an MRI,
they certainly are objective evidence in the form of
medical opinion based on first hand observation.” Id.
at 594 (citation omitted); see also Hines _v.
o
46a
Barnhardt, 453 F.3d 559, 564-66 (4% Cir.
2006)(holding that social security’ disability
applicants may rely exclusively on_ subjective
complaints of pain if diagnosed with a condition that
is reasonably likely to cause chronic or acute pain).
Reliance further ignored the substantial
amount of pain medication Ms. Hardt’s treating
physicians had prescribed to her. As explained in
Wasson, the medical decision to prescribe pain
medication is objective evidence of a_ painful
condition absent proof otherwise.
While over-medication and fraudulent
medication may be a serious and real
problem today, there is absolutely no
evidence in this matter that [the
claimant’s] prescriptions result from
fraud or over-zealous’ prescribing
physicians. Absent any such evidence,
this Court and the [administrator] must
accept that [the claimant’s] physicians
prescribed these drugs because they
reasonably believed that [the claimant]
suffers from debilitating pain. Those
medical decisions and the prescriptions
are objective evidence of § {the
claimant's] painful condition.
Id. at 595. Similar to the claimant in Wasson, there
is objective evidence, based upon _ professional
medical opinions and prescriptions for numerous
pain medications, that Ms. Hardt suffers from
neuropathy and is totally disabled.
47a
Finally, the vocational report lacks probative
value because it was based on an outdated FCE that,
once again, failed to assess Ms. Hardt’s neuropathic
pain. “[I]n order for a vocational expert’s opinion to
be relevant or helpful, it must be based upon a
consideration of all other evidence in the record... .”
Hines, 453 F.3d at 561 (quoting Walker v. Bowen,
889 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1989).
In summary, it is clear that Reliance’s
decision to deny Ms. Hardt long-term disability
benefits was not based on substantial evidence. The
FCEs did not assess the impact of Ms. Hardt’s
neuropathy or neuropathic pain on her ability to
perform a sedentary job. The peer review report was
incomplete and inadequate. The vocational report
was based on outdated information. Further,
Reliance failed to consider medical _ records
submitted by Ms. Hardt that demonstrated she was
suffering from neuropathy. For these reasons,
Reliance’s motion for summary judgment is denied.
C. Ms. Hardt’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Ms. Hardt has also moved for summary
judgment based on her claim that Reliance’s decision
to deny her long-term disability benefits is
unreasonable. In essence, Ms. Hardt claims that the
medical records, physician questionnaires, and SSA
48a
findings® are overwhelming evidence that she is
totally disabled due to CTS and neuropathy.
Based on the record described above, this
Court finds compelling evidence that Ms. Hardt is
totally disabled due to her neuropathy. However,
this is not the end of the inquiry. The Court must
decide whether the evidence is so overwhelming that
Ms. Hardt is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
While the Court is inclined to rule in Ms. Hardt’s
favor, it would be unwise to take this step without
first giving Reliance the chance to address the
deficiencies in its approach. The record demonstrates
that Ms. Hardt did not get the kind of review to
which she was entitled under applicable law.
It is for this reason that the Court remands
this case back to Reliance to fully and adequately
assess Ms. Hardt’s claim. This case presents one of
those scenarios where the plan administrator has
failed to comply with the ERISA guidelines and the
“proper course of action is to remand to the plan
administrator for a ‘full and fair review.” Weaver v.
Phoenix Home Life Mut. Ins. Co., 990 F.2d 154, 159
(4th Cir. 1993) (citing Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761
F.2d 1003, 1007 n.4 (4th Cir. 1985)).
5 As acknowledged in the Memorandum of Law in
Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, the SSA
award of disability benefits is not binding on plan
administrators. Also, because the Court finds that there is
persuasive evidence that Ms. Hardt suffers from a disability
without considering the SSA's decision, it does not factor into
the Court's determination.
49a
III. Conclusion
For the aforementioned reasons, the Court
DENIES Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment (Docket No. 19), DENIES Plaintiffs
Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No 31),
REMANDS tthis’' matter to Reliance, and
INSTRUCTS Reliance to act on Ms. Har’t’s
application by adequately considering all the
evidence discussed within this Opinion within thirty
(30) days of its date of issuance. Otherwise,
judgment will be issued in favor of Ms. Hardt.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to send a copy of
this Opinion and Order to all counsel of record.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/
Walter D. Kelley, Jr.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Norfolk, Virginia
March 27, 2008
50a
[ENTERED: AUGUST 10, 2009]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-1896
(2:07-cv-00105-JBF-JEB)
BRIDGET HARDT,
Plaintiff - Appellee
Vv.
RELIANCE STANDARD LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant - Appellant
and
DAN RIVER GROUP LONG-TERM
DISABILITY PLAN,
Defendant
ORDER
This Court denies the petition for rehearing
and rehearing en banc. No judge requested a poll
under Fed. R. App. P. 35 on the petition for
rehearing en banc.
Entered at the direction of the panel: Judge
Wilkinson and Senior District Judge Faber.
For the Court
/s/ Patricia S. Connor, Clerk
29 U.S.C. §1132(g)
Section 502(g) of ERISA provides:
g) Attorney’s fees and costs; awards in
actions involving delinquent
contributions
(1) In any action under this subchapter (other
than an action described in paragraph 2)
by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary,
the court in its discretion may allow a
reasonable attorney's fee and costs of the
action to either party.
(2) In any action under this title by a fiduciary
for or on behalf of a plan to enforce section
515 in which a judgment in favor of the
plan is awarded, the court shall award the
plan—
(A)the unpaid contributions,
(B) interest on the unpaid contributions,
(C)an amount equal to the greater of—
(i) interest on the unpaid contributions,
or
(ii) tquidated damages provided for
under the plan in an amount not in
excess of 20 percent (or such higher
percentage as may be _ permitted
under Federal or State law) of the
amount determined by the court
under subparagraph (A),
(D)reasonable attorney's fees and costs of
the action, to be paid by the defendant,
and
(E)such other legal or equitable relief as
the court deems appropriate.
52a
For purposes of this paragraph, interest on
unpaid contributions shall be determined by
using the rate provided under the plan, or, if
none, the rate prescribed under section 6621
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
OPPOSITION
BRIEF
Supreme Cour. US. |
. FILED
Oy, DEC 16 2009
N O 09- 44 8 OFFICE OF THE CLERK
In The
Supreme Court of the Anited States
BRIDGET HARD?,
Petitioner,
Vv.
RELIANCE STANDARD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Respondent.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorart
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
JOSHUA BACHRACH
WILSON, ELSER, MoskowiTz,
EDELMAN & DICKER LLP
THE CurTIS CENTER
Suite 1130 East
INDEPENDENCE SQUARE WEST
PHiLaDe.Lpni, PA 19106-3308
(215) 606-3906
joshua. bachrach@wilsonelser.com
December 16, 2009
— ———— —
Becker Gallagher - Cincinnati, OH + Washington, D.C. + 800.890.5001
i
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Respondent Reliance Standard Life Insurance
Company hereby discloses that it is a subsidiary of
Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company of Texas,
which in turn is a subsidiary of Delphi Financial
Group, Inc., which is a publicly held corporation.
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Corporate Disclosure Statement ............... i
Se iid eas oe eS EKER ii
Table of Cited Authorities .................... ili
es oa a eee a eee dels fa nda o ERT 1
Reasons for Denying the Petition .............. 2
I. NoConsiderations Warrant this Court’s Review
of the Fourth Circuit’s Decision that a Party
Must Prevail to Recover Attorney’s Fees under
SA... ns oe sey pees aia pa ee eel 2
A. The Supreme Court Has Already Decided
the Issue Presented for Review by
RES A ee ae ee ee 2
B. There Is No Actual Split in the Circuits
Regarding the Prevailing Party Requirement
For an Award of Attorney’s Fees under
erro: 1 2c c because Oe eae nears od 4
Il. The Supreme Court Has Already Addressed in
Buckhannon the Second Issue Presented by
I rk ey Cae gd ce ane 9g
I Naar et ee ee ae ere a 11
iil
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES
Cases
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Society,
SSE ED 5 cee sedeeeceseseeeeeds 3
Birmingham v. SoGen-Swiss Int'l Corp. Ret. Plan,
718 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1983) ............ cone 4
Boggs v. Boggs,
82 F.3d 90 (5 Cir. 1996), rev’d on other
grounds, 520 U.S. 833 (1997) ............. 5,6
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't
of Health & Human Res.,
632 U.S. GOS (ZOOL) .. wc eee ee 2,9, 10
Cook v. Liberty Life Assur. Co. of Boston,
344 F.3d 122 (1% Cir. 2003) ................. 8
Cefali v. Buffalo Brass Co., Inc.,
748 F. Supp. 1011 (W.D.N.Y. 1990) .......... 5
Chapman v. ChoiceCare Long Island Long Term
Disability Plan,
No. 07-2518-CV, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 233 (2d
Rg ga aa pbs De geae e Seta, Paar ae 4
Dillards Liberty Life Assur. Co. of Boston,
456 F.3d 901 (8 Cir. 2006) ................ 8
Dixon v. Seafarers’ Welfare Plan,
878 F.2d 1411 (11" Cir. 1989) ............... 7
iv
Doe v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
167 F.3d 53 (1% Cir. 1999) .......... cc ceeees 8
Fleming v. Ayers & Associates,
948 F.2d 993 (6" Cir. 1991) ................. 8
Florence Nightingale Nursing Serv., Inc. v. Blue
Cross/Blue Shield of Alabama,
SB 6
Freeman v. Continental Ins. Co.,
996 F.2d 1116 (11 Cir. 1993) ............... 7
Gaeth v. Hartford Life Ins. Co.,
538 F.3d 524 (6 Cir. 2008) .............00.. 7
Gibbs v. Gibbs,
210 F.3d 591 (5 Cir. 2000) ............... 5,6
Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Information
Sys. & Network Corp.,
523 F.3d 266 (4™ Cir. 2008) ................. 3
Jackson v. Metro. Life. Ins. Co.,
303 F.3d 884 (8 Cir. 2002) .......... ...... 8
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins,
CE, PEPE ovo wc ccccccsuces 1, 2,3,4,9
Laborer’s Pension Fund v. Lay Com,
68 F.3d G02 (7° Cir. BOOB)... 2. cee eee 8
Miller v. United Welfare Fund,
72 F.3d 1066 (2d Cir. 1995) ............... 4,5
v
Moore v. Lafayette Life Ins. Co.,
458 F.3d 416 (6™ Cir. 2006) ................. 8
Peterson v. Continental Cas. Co.,
Fs Bi fo ft | = ee 10
Rittenhouse v. UnitedHealth Group Long Term
Disability Ins. Plan,
476 F.3d 626 (8 Cir. 2007) ................. 8
Sharron v. Amalgamated Ins. Agency Servs., Inc.,
704 F.2d 562 (11™ Cir. 1983) ................ 7
Sheehan v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.,
450 F. Supp. 2d 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ......... 5
Tate v. Long Term Disability Program,
545 F.3d 555(7" Cir. 2008) ................- 8
Wade v. Hewlett-Packard Dev. Co. LP Short Term
Disability Plan,
493 F.3d 533 (5" Cir. 2007) .............0 ce 6
Statutes and Rules
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
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See Whee ES SEED 0c ce csv aseantaeea 1,6
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1
INTRODUCTION
Petitioner is asking this Court to review an
unpublished decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit which denied her
request for attorney’s fees. As her primary argument,
Petitioner states that certiorari should be granted
based on a split in the circuits on whether prevailing
party status is required for an award of attorney’s fees
under § 502(g) of the ERISA statute.’ For many
reasons, this issue does not satisfy the considerations
stated in Supreme Court Rule 10 regarding the grant
of a petition for a writ of certiorari.
First and foremost, Petitioner’s brief overlooks this
Court’s decision in Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins, 455
U.S. 72, 89 n.14 (1982). There, the Supreme Court
addressed fee awards under the ERISA statute. The
Court recognized that in an ERISA action, “attorney’s
fees are noriually awarded only to prevailing
parties....” Jd. There is no reason for the Court to re-
visit the issue.
The petition should also be denied because there is
no actual split in authority in the various circuits.
This is not surprising based on the Supreme Court’s
pronouncement in Kaiser Steel. To the extent that a
circuit may have strayed from the holding in Kaiser
Steel, this still would not justify granting the petition.
As stated in Supreme Court Rule 10, “the
misapplication of a properly stated rule of law” will
“rarely” justify the grant of a petition for a writ of
certiorari.
‘ The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29
U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1).
2
The second basis raised in the petition also does not
justify review by this Court. Petitioner argues that
there is a split in the circuits on whether a court’s
remand to the plan for further consideration is
sufficient to permit an award of attorney’s fees and
costs under ERISA. This issue has indirectly been the
subject of a decision by this Court. In Buckhannon
Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health &
Human Res. , 532 U.S. 598 (2001), this Court explained
that to be eligible for an award of fees, there must be
a judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent
decree. A remand to the plan does not satisfy these
requirements. For this reason as well, the petition
should be denied.
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION
I. No Considerations Warrant this Court’s
Review of the Fourth Circuit’s Decision that
a Party Must Prevail to Recover Attorney’s
Fees under ERISA.
A. The Supreme Court Has Already Decided
the Issue Presented for Review by
Petitioner.
As noted, Petitioner asks whether the Fourth
Circuit erred when it limited an award of attorney’s
fees under § 502(g) of ERISA to only a prevailing party.
Petitioner overlooks the fact that the Supreme Court
has already commented on this issue. See Kaiser Steel
Corp. v. Mullins, 455 U.S. 72, 89 n.14(1982). In Kaiser
Steel, the district court entered judgment in favor of
the respondent and awarded attorney’s fees under
§ 502(g) of ERISA. That decision was affirmed by the
3
Court of Appeals. For reasons that are not pertinent
to this case, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment
in favor of the respondent. Turning next to the district
court’s award of fees, this Court held that “[b]ecause
attorney’s fees are normally awarded only to prevailing
parties, the award of attorney’s fees to respondent is
also reversed.” Id.
In the years since Kaiser Steel was decided, the
Supreme Court has not identified any circumstances
which would allow a court to deviate from the general
rule that attorney’s fees may only be awarded, if at all,
to the prevailing party. This is not surprising since an
award of attorney's fees is not the norm and the
Supreme Court has expressed “a general practice of
not awarding fees” even to a prevailing party “absent
explicit statutory authority.” Alyeska Pipeline Service
Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 262 (1975).
Petitioner has not stated any basis which would justify
this Court revisiting the issue.
The decision of the Fourth Circuit which Petitioner
seeks to have reviewed is consistent with the decision
of this Court in Kaiser Steel. Even if the Fourth
Circuit decision was in conflict, it would still not justify
the petition. The decision of the Court of Appeals is
unpublished and, therefore, is not binding precedent
even in the Fourth Circuit. Great-West Life & Annuity
Ins. Co. v. Information Systems & Network Corp., 523
F.3d 266, 272 (4 Cir. 2008). Additionally, pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule 10, “[a) petition for a writ of
certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error
consists of ... misapplication of a properly stated rule
of law.” To the extent that any Court of Appeals has
issued a decision that is inconsistent with Kaiser Steel,
4
it does not justify a grant of certiorari. However, as
explained below, the “circuit split” argued by Petitioner
does not exist.
B. There Is No Actual Split in the Circuits
Regarding the Prevailing Party
Requirement For an Award of Attorney’s
Fees under ERISA.
According to the petition before this Court, the
prevailing party requirement imposed by the Fourth
Circuit has been rejected by the Second, Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits. This statement is incorrect.
Looking first to the Second Circuit, in support of this
proposition, Petitioner cites to Miller v. United Welfare
Fund, 72 F.3d 1066 (2d Cir. 1995). Decisions from the
Second Circuit and the district courts within it both
prior to and after the decision in Miller have
recognized a prevailing party requirement for an
award of fees under ERISA.
One of the earliest decision from the Second Circuit
which mentions a prevailing claimant in the context of
a motion for attorney’s fees is Birmingham v. SoGen-
Swiss Int'l Corp. Ret. Plan, 718 F.2d 515, 523 (2d Cir.
1983). There, the Second Circuit held that “attorney’s
fees may be awarded to the prevailing party under
ERISA in the absence of some particular justification
for not doing so.” Jd. The Second Circuit recognized
the prevailing party requirement more recently in
Chapman v. ChoiceCare Long Island Long Term
Disability Plan, No. 07-2518-CV, 2009 U.S. App.
LEXIS 233 (2d Cir. 2009). District courts within the
Second Circuit have also recognized that a party must
prevail in order to recover fees under ERISA. See e.g.
5
Sheehan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 450 F. Supp. 2d
321, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“The law of this Circuit
makes it. plain that an ERISA plaintiff must prevail in
his action in order to recover attorney’s fees.”); Cefali
v. Buffalo Brass Co., Inc., 748 F. Supp. 1011, 1017
(W.D.N.Y. 1990) (same).
Additionally, the Second Circuit’s decision in Miller
is not as definitive as Petitioner suggests. After the
language in Miller relied on by Petitioner, the Second
Circuit stated that “the district court may in fact
determine that Miller is the prevailing party ....”
Miller, 72 F.3d at 1074. There is no dispute in any
circuit that it is within the discretion of a court to
award fees to a prevailing party under ERISA.
The Fifth Circuit decision relied on by Petitioner
also does not support her argument that there is a split
in the circuits. Petitioner cites to Gibbs v. Gibbs, 210
F.3d 591 (5™ Cir. 2000), as “expressly reject[ing]” the
prevailing party requirement.” Contrary to this
statement, and quoting from an earlier Fifth Circuit
decision, the court recognized that ERISA “allows the
court to award ERISA beneficiaries, participants, and
fiduciaries reasonable attorney’s fees when they are
the prevailing party.” Gibbs, 210 F.3d at 503 (quoting
Boggs v. Boggs, 82 F.3d 90, 94 n.1 (5 Cir. 1996), rev’d
on other grounds, 520 U.S. 833 (1997)). At issue in
Gibbs was the “propriety of awarding fees to prevailing
defendants, or to other third parties who may have
been forced to join in an ERISA action.” Gibbs, 210
F.3d at 503. According to the Fifth Circuit, its earlier
decision in Boggs “simply does not speak to” this issue.
Id. However, Boggs does speak directly to the issue in
6
this case and the Fourth Circuit’s decision against
Petitioner is consistent with Boggs.
More recently, the Fifth Circuit reiterated the
prevailing party requirement as stated in Boggs. See
Wade v. Hewlett-Packard Dev. Co. LP Short Term
Disability Plan, 493 F.3d 533, 543 (5 Cir. 2007).
Petitioner attempts to limit the holding in Wade to
only those cases involving an award of costs. The
ERISA statute makes no distinction between a request
for fees and one for costs. Section 502(g) of ERISA
states that a court “may allow a reasonable attorney’s
fee and costs of action....”. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1).
Wade unequivocally imposes a “prevailing party”
requirement under “ERISA’s fee-shifting provision.”
Id. Accordingly, Fifth Circuit law does not support
Petitioner's argument that there is a split in the
circuits.”
At first glance, Eleventh Circuit law may appear
inconsistent with the Fourth Circuit's decision;
however, it is not. Petitioner ignores the context in
which the Eleventh Circuit stated that the ERISA fee-
shifting statute permits an award of fees to either
party. The statement relied on by Petitioner appears
in decisions in which the Eleventh Circuit has rejected
the argument that there should be a presumption in
favor of awarding fees to a prevailing claimant. See
Florence Nightingale Nursing Service, Inc. v. Blue
* The decision of the Fifth Circuit in Wade is important for an
additional reason. To the extent that Gibbs can be interpreted in
the manner suggested by Petitioner, it would not be binding
precedent in the Fifth Circuit due to a conflict with an earlier
panel’s decision. The Fifth Circuit recognizes that “[w]hen there
are conflicting panel decisions, the earliest panel decision
controls.” Wade, 493 F.3d at 543.
7
Cross/Blue Shield of Alabama, 41 F.3d 1476, 1485
(1995); Freeman v. Continental Ins. Co., 996 F.2d 1116,
1119(11™ Cir. 1993). Dixon v. Seafarers’ Welfare Plan,
878 F.2d 1411, 1412 (11 Cir. 1989). The Eleventh
Circuit rejected a presumption in favor of awarding
fees to a prevailing claimant because the statute
“allows a court to award fees to either party.”
Freeman, 996 F.2d at 1119. This is not the issue that
Petitioner is asking this Court to review.
Petitioner also cites to the Eleventh Circuit’s
decision in Sharron v. Amalgamated Ins. Agency
Services, Inc., 704 F.2d 562, 569 (11" Cir. 1983). In
Sharron, the Eleventh Circuit actually reversed the
district court’s award of attorney’s fee in favor of the
plaintiff. This decision was based on the court’s
conclusion that the defendant was entitled to judgment
in its favor and because “ERISA does not apply to this
Pension Plan.” Sharron, 704 F.2d at 569. Clearly, the
actual decision in Sharron does not support Petitioner.
Significantly, Petitioner cannot identify a single casc
in which the Eleventh Circuit permitted an award of
attorney’s fees to a non-prevailing party in an ERISA
case.
Petitioner next argues that other circuits also may
not require prevailing party status for an award of
attorney’s fees. Cases from these other circuits also do
not support this contention. One circuit identified by
Petitioner is the Sixth Circuit. However, in Gaeth v.
Hartford Life Ins. Co., 538 F.3d 524, 534 (6™ Cir. 2008),
the court suggested that “a district court woul
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