Record and brief — Perdue v. Kenny A.

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Text

Se es eee ee pase Oro

No. O8-970

lithe:

Docketed:

Lower CL

Case Nos.:

Decision Date:

Sonny Perdue. Governor of Georgia. ct al., Petitioners

\.

Kenny A... By His Next Friend Linda Winn. et al.

February 2, 2009

United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

(06-15514. 06-15874)

July 3. 2008

Rehearing Denied: November 5, 2008

Questions Presented

Date - -

Jan 29 2009

Mar 4 2009

Mar 18 2009

Apr 6 2009

Apr 16 2009

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Jun 20 2009

Jun 22 2009

Jun 22 2009

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Jun 29 2009

Jun 29 2009

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\ug 28 2009

http: origm.www supremecourtus. gov docket UX-970 htm

Proceedings and Orders - yee

Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due Mareh 4. 2009)

Bnef of respondents Kenny A.. By His Next Friend Linda Winn, et al. in opposition filed.

DISTRIBUTED tor Conference of April 3, 2009.

Petition GRANTED limited to Question 1 presentud by the petition for a writ of

certiorari.

The time within which to file the joint appen<ix and petitioners’ brief on the merits is

extended to and including June 22. 2009.

The time within which to file respondents’ brief ~ the merits is extended to and including

August 21. 2009.

Brief amici curiae of National Sheriffs’ Association, et al. filed.

Joint appendix filed. (Statement of costs filed)

Brief of petitioners Sonny Perdue. Governor of Georgia. et al. filed.

Brief amicus curiae of United States filed.

Brief amici curiae of Alabama. et al. filed.

Bricf amicus curiae of Washington Legal loundation filed.

Brief amici curiae of Old Republic Insurance Company. et al. filed.

Brief amicus curiae of National School Boards Association filed.

Brief amici curiae of National Governors .\ssociation. et al. filed.

Brief amicus curiae of Association County Commissioners ef Georgia filed.

SET FOR ARGUMENT ON Wednesday. October 14. 2009

CIRCULATED.

Record for the US.D.C. for the District of Georgia received from U.S_C_A. for the 11th

‘ireuit. (20 boxes) There are sealed documents in the record.

Record received from the U.S.C.A. lor 11th Circuit. (1 envelope)

Motion of the Solietor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae

and for divided argument filed

Brief of respondents Kenny A.. By His Next Friend Tinda Winn, et al) Hled. (Distributed)

Brict amicus curiae of N.\ACP Legal Defense and l-ducational Fund. Ine. tiled.

Brief amict curiae of Small Private Law Firms That Rely on Statutory Pees \wards in

Public Interest Litigation filed.

Briefamict curiae of Liberty Legal Institute. et al. filed. (Distributed)

Brief amict curtae of American Association for Justice. et al filed) (Distributed)

11.6.7009

PAOCKREL POT UG 7 /!

Page 2015)

Aug 28 2009 Briefamici curiae of New York State Bar Association. et al. filed. (Distributed)

Aug 28 2009 Brief amici curiae of Law and economics Scholars Lucian .\. Bebchuk. et al. filed.

(Distributed)

Aug 28 2009 Briefamict curtae of Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, et al. filed.

Aug 28 2009 Brief amicus curiae of Civil Rights Clinic at [loward University School of Law filed.

(Distributed)

Sep 21 2009 Reply of petitioners Sonny Perdue, Governor of Georgia, et al. filed. (Distributed)

Sep 30 2009 Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae

and for divided argument GRANTED.

Oct 14 2009) Argued. For petitioners: Mark H. Cohen. Atlanta. Ga: and Pratik A. Shah, Assistant to the

Solicitor General. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States. as amicus

curiae.) For respondents: Paul D. Clement. Washington, D.C.

Name Address

Attorneys for Petitioners:

Mark H. Cohen Troutman Sanders I.1.P

Counsel of Record Bank of America Plaza. Suite $200

600 Peachtree Street. N.L.

Atlanta. GA 30308

mark.cohen@ troutmansanders.com

Party name: Sonny Perdue. Governor of Georgia. et al.

Attorneys for Respondents:

Paul DD. Clement King and Spalding 1..1..P.

Counsel of Record 1700 Pennsylvania .\we.. N.W.

Washington, DC 20006

Party name: Kenny A.. By His Next Friend Linda Winn, et al.

Michael B. de Leeuw lried Frank Llarris Shriver & Jacobson LLP

One New York Plaza

New York. NY 10004

Party name: Lawvers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law. et al.

Marcia Robinson Lowry Children's Rights

330 7th Avenue. Fourth Floor

New York. NY 10016

miowry @childrensrights.org

Party name? Kenny \.. By His Next Friend Tinda Winn. et al.

Other:

hftn: oriom www ciamremecoinirtiic oa dackeot (2.070) htm

Phone

(404) 885-

3597

(202) 737-

0500

(212) &59-

S000

(212) O83-

2210

114A, Www

ll tt i ’ =o” i

Lisa k. Cleary Patterson Belknap Webb & ‘Tyler LLP (212) 536-

2000

1133 Avenue of the Americas

New York, NY 10036-6710

Party name: New York State Bar Association, et al.

' : . . 06-

Aderson Bellegarde Francois Associate Professor of Law — -

Supervising Attorney Civil Rights Clinic

Iloward University School of Law

2900 Van Ness Street NW

Washington, DC 20008

Party name: Civil Rights Clinic at Lloward University School of Law

; oe ste : 4)-522-

James F. Grubiak Association County Commissioners of Georgia ar 22

50 Hurt Plaza, Suite 1000

Atlanta. G.\ 30303

jgrubiak'@aceg.org

Party name: .\ssociation County Commissioners of Georgia

’ : a : 02) 514-

Elena Kagan Soheitor General : ms "

United States Department of Justice

950 Pennsylvania Avenue. N.W.

Washington, DC 20530-0001]

SupremeCtBrielsa@ USDOT. gov

Party name: United States

| pA .7-

Deanne F. \avnard Morrison & Foerster LLP vo soa

2000 Pennsylvania Ave.. NW

Washmeton, DC 20006

Party name: Law and Economies Scholars Lucian .\. Bebchuk. et al.

Corey L.. Maze Soheitor General aoe 442-

Office of the \ttorney General

S00 Dexter Avenue

Montgomery. AT. 30130

Mize @ ago. state. us

Party name Alabama. et al.

http: origi 7 emecourtus.g0v docket 08-970. htm 116.2009 a

Docket for 08-970 Page 4 of 5

NAACP Legal Delense & Educational Fund, — (212) 968-

Ine. 2200

99 Hudson Street. 16th Floor

New York. NY 10013

Party name: NAACP [egal Defense and Educational Fund. Ine

John Payton

Sa : +15) 433-

Sanford Jav Rosen Rosen Bien & Galvan LLP pe 4

”.

315 Montgomery Street

10th Floor

San Franciseo. C.\ 94104-1823

Party name: Small Private Law Firms ‘That Rely on Statutory Fee Awards in Public Interest Litigation

Richard Ruda State and I ocal [egal Center yen _

444 North Capitol Street. N.W..

Suite 309

Washington, DC 20001

Party name: National Governors .\ssociation. et al.

: ae ; (202) S88-

Richard A. Sam Washington Legal Foundation

P g c 0302

2009 Massachusetts Ave... NW

Washington, DC 20036

Party name: washington Legal [Foundation

! : | | | 972) 423-

Kelly J. Shackelford Liberty Legal Institute 3131

903 Last 18th Street

Suite 230

Plano, TN) 75074

Party name: Liberty Legal Institute. et al.

Pratihh \. Shah \ssistant to the Solicitor General

Department of Justice

Washington, DC 20530

Party name: Sonny Perdue. Governor of Georgia. etal. v. Kenny A. By Lis Next Friend Linda Winn.

et al

(202) 533-

Mark blot Solomons Greenberg Traurig LLP 36]

doe ’

210! L Street. N. W.

PAOCKREL LOF US-7F/U

Suite 1000

Washington, DC 20037

Party name: Old Republic Insurance Company, et al.

Thomas FE. Wheeler I Frost Brown Todd LIC

201 North Tlinois.

Suite 1900

Indianapolis. IN. 46244

Party name: National School Boards Association

Jeftrey Robert White Center for Constitutional Litigation PC

777 Sixth Street. NW

Suite 250

Washington, DC 20001

jeffrey white'@ecllirm.com

Party name: .\merican .\ssociation for Justice. et al.

Travis Russell Wisdom Travis Wisdom LIC

S61 N. Dean Rd.

Suite C

Auburn, AL 36830

Party name: National Sheriffs’ Association, et al.

hftn: orioem www cunremecourtiic ony dacket (8.070) ht

Page 9 ol 5

(317) 237-

3810

(202) 944-

2839

(334) 826-

0722

114 Www

PETITION

FOR

WRIT OF

CERTIORARI

Supreme Court. U.S.

‘y ‘ FILED

No.7 98 970 JAN 29 2009

Jn The OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Supreme Court of the Anited States

°

SONNY PERDUE, in his official capacity

as Governor of the State of Georgia, ef a/.,

Petitioners,

Vv.

KENNY A., by his next friend Linda Winn, e/ al.,

Respondents.

+

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Eleventh Circuit

—— . —

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

. —

THURBERT E. BAKER MARK H. COHEN’

Attorney General of Georgia TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP

DENNIS R. DUNN Bank of America Plaza

Deputy Attorney General Suite 5200

SHALEN S. NELSON 600 Peachtree Street, N.E.

Senor Assistant Atlanta, Georgia 30308

Attorney General (404) B85-3597

ELIZABETH M. WILLIAMSON

Assistant Attorney General

STATE LAW DEPARTMENT

40 Capito! Square, S.W.

Atlanta, Georgia 30334

(404) 656.3377

Counsel of Record

Attorneys for Petitioners

i MWe TE AW Pee E HIN TENG, © 0) Nee

mee QPL eek bee De tere tay !

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1.

Can a reasonable attorney’s fee award under a

federal fee-shifting statute ever be enhanced based

solely on quality of performance and results obtained

when these factors already are included in the lode-

star calculation?

2.

Is an enhancement to the lodestar based on

quality of representation and results obtained con-

trary to this Court’s decisions in Pennsylvania v.

Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478

U.S. 546 (1986), and City of Burlington v. Dague, 505

U.S. 557 (1992), particularly after the lodestar has

been reduced for excessive hours billed?

il

RULE 14.1(b) STATEMENT

A list of all parties to the proceeding in the court

whose judgment is the subject of the petition is as

follows:

Defendants-Appellants and_ Petitioners: Sonny

Perdue, in his official capacity as Governor of the

State of Georgia; Georgia Department of Human

Resources; B.J. Walker, in her official capacity as

Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Human

Resources; Fulton County Department of Family and

Children Services; Dannette Smith, in her official

capacity as Director of the Fulton County Depart-

ment of Family and Children Services; DeKalb

County Department of Family and Children Services;

and Walker E. Solomon, II, in his official capacity as

Director of the DeKalb County Department of Family

and Children Services.

Plaintiffs-Appellees and Respondents: Kenny A.,

by his next friend Linda Winn; Kara B., by her next

friend Linda Pace; Maya C., by her next friend Linda

Pace; Phelicia D., by her next friend Theresa Roth;

Sabrina E., by her next friend, Rebecca Silvey; Kor-

rina E., by her next friend Rebecca Silvey; Tanya F.,

by her next friend Carol Huff; Priscilla G., by her

next friend Roslyn M. Satchel; and Briana H., by her

next friend Linda Pace, on their own behalf and on

behalf of all others similarly situated.

ill

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ....................0c0cceeceeeees i

Bees ea BE. DCD) BE RPR REIN, © se vccsccccescsssscccssesseseocsess il

py Re yy 8 > rie Vv

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI......... 1

TTT EE ee 5 RE es Re a 1

EE Oe Oe eae 1

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED ............. 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE...................eceseceeeeeees 3

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ..... 9

A. An Enhancement to the Lodestar Based on

Quality of Representation and Results

Obtained, Particularly When the Lodestar

Is Reduced for Excessive Hours Claimed,

Has Not Been Favored in Prior Decisions

Sg. RRR LE RPL eee SLA CIs eset) SARC 10

B. This Court Should Grant Certiorari To

Determine Whether a Reasonable Attorney’s

Fee Award Can Be Enhanced for Results

Obtained or Quality of Performance and, If

So, Whether Such an Enhancement Would

Still Be Unauthorized When the Lodestar

Is Reduced for Excessive Hours Billed ....... 15

INT schaieinctennttiiieninncentenbinceaniensaneesindinntves 30

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS — Continued

Page

APPENDIX A (Opinion of the U.S. Court of

Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, filed

EE TT cnséiincuitheibinnihinneinondidontiniaaniantiin App. 1

APPENDIX B (Order of the U.S. District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia,

filed Oct. 3, 2006)................. ilaalnaimeauaiel App. 94

APPENDIX C (Opinion of the U.S. Court of

Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, filed

I TEs Hie thise-siacaninititinincsnmaconierusccmmniin App. 173

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness

SCRE, GSS Cs DOO (ESTOS cvicvensevcoscosssccnconsescsysecses LO

Americans United for Separation of Church &

State v. Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids, 717

F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Mich. 1989) ............ cece cece eee ee 23

Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood

Ass’n v. County of Albany, 484 F.3d 162 (2d

II EET P cawsiconicnccninonnennsisesneeiianimaiiandmmaaanmaaa 26

Bishop v. Osborn Transp., Inc., 687 F. Supp.

Fe aI Sec: So tnisiisssthsnivssnneniensenansspiesainaoondemiatel 23

Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989)......... 11, 26

Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984)..........0..... passim

Campbell v. Kansas State Univ., 804 F. Supp.

IG MI, IID os ikeciesindncscrcesimoscenpiewectnesalanumdsials 22

Cary v. Chicago Hous. Auth., No. 87 C 6998,

1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6176 (N.D. Tll. Apr.

TEI: TIIIIED va. cnan-odedsesosenantatusnudaneienaeaseaainmbansesiaaaeaennle 22

City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557

CRIED ssexcencnigsdcascerinivsdesssennevineiniedeniakiaiaaiaeaae passim

Donnell v. United States, 682 F.2d 240 (D.C.

bi. SERRE SE eer ema DmEU Rr eh Soe aa 27

Forshee ». Waterloo Indus., Inc., 178 F.3d 527

GE Te TI vv cckn cn cacocecicataccccedncscieesaemnaeeenieca 21

Geter v. Sundquist, 372 F.3d 784 (6th Cir. 2004) ...... 21

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

Grable v. Gregory J. Barro, PLC, 1:05-CV-3133-

JEC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19709 (N.D. Ga.

sii sacs naeiniunnbeinieirgaeadeddinacnnsendene 17

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983) .... 11, 12, 23, 26

Hyatt v. Apfel, 195 F.3d 188 (4th Cir. 1999) .............. 21

In re Burlington Northern, Inc. Employment

Practices Litig., 810 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1986)....21, 22

Johnson v. City of Tulsa, No. 94-CV-39-H(M),

2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26377 (N.D. Okla.

a nertanindicheniensiiensseniinasenes 25

Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488

RE Fe GEE GS BOPP ccccccccccccccccccccscsesssscceces passim

Jordan v. Multnomah County, 815 F.2d 1258

cis line cassie snianiinbeitiedoweeinstiasorsens 21

Kenny A. v. Perdue, 454 F. Supp. 2d 1260 (N.D.

CT nek aie eelicteend sagas deniienserens passim

Kenny A. v. Perdue, 532 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir.

Titi th tiialil dads adhdined natnonedennieseudedediccuevenwned passim

Kenny A. v. Perdue, 547 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir.

tiene haainiiipnibtlondeceesanensbenesidenisqoserectocs passim

Liberles v. Daniel, 619 F. Supp. 1016 (N.D. TI.

alicia spnbtoccocenaanscbeccsants 25

Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Engida, No. 06-CV-

00225-LTB, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62862 (D.

i sna cc cctsenansbbagesiniennacenes 22

Miller v. Holzmann, 575 F. Supp. 2d 2 (D.D.C.

Vil

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

NAACP v. Evergreen, 812 F.2d 1332 (11th Cir.

BT Psi sacinwcsiiihiscntnmeuieinhiiiidddaaliebigliad biti tie giultl 6, 7

Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. NTDEC, 822 F. Supp.

I, CIID cits iscisiccecosnsstinbinestepiesonanesitenadiahaesossubiis 22

Norman v. Housing Authority of Montgomery,

836 F.2d 1292 (1lth Cir. 1988).........................0006- 6, 7

Norwood v. Charlotte Mem'l Hosp. & Med. Ctr.,

720 F. Supp. 543 (W.D.N.C. 1989)... eee 26

Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’

Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546 (1986)..... passim

Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’

Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711 (1987)............ 14

Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988).................. 26

Quaratino v. Tiffany & Co., 166 F.3d 422 (2d

I PIII cccinscctiecilecdediuiehenctepiaelatakicitedtted Giada tailed ace l 21

Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1983)....24, 25

Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain Conference Resort,

Inc., 124 F.34 1221 (10th Cir. 1907) ....................... 21

Shakman v. City of Chicago, No. 69 C 2145,

2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21431 (N.D. Ill. Mar.

IIIT sccesdsincins.cii-dincicerutacctuneh bsabiencsondeicaaiiialioa ambien iniiiiins 22

Shipes v. Trinity Indus., 987 F.2d 311 (5th Cir.

SRE eer otra e PE ONE ATES AS ING he Pe 21

Van Gerwen v. Guarantee Mut. Life Co., 214

Ee es Ce TG ND citdekccadsncctcinihitesidenscctonasendaten 21

vill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

STATUTES

| Ea a eee eer money RARER ENON D 2

ee IED ccttiscicncciinncaniusinoniseetnesetniegnimiieninammeidian 2

Re I iisttecditeevnctsninasicdnusmentes 2, 3, 10, 11, 12

H.R. Rep. No. 94-1558 (1976)......................ccssseees 10, 11

Bs es Pe SEE 0 IIIT crteirecciitiinesceniccncesescenasis 10, 11

RULES

I GATE, TID BRE Pi rcicccenicsscccceccesccssiccnsscunsesemnend 8

Supreme Court Rules 13.1 & 13.3 ............. eee eeeee 2

1

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Governor Sonny Perdue and the other Petitioners

respectfully petition for a writ of certiorari to review

the opimon and judgment of the U.S. Court of Ap-

peals for the Eleventh Circuit.

¢

OPINIONS BELOW

The panel opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Eleventh Circuit, dated July 3, 2008, is offi-

cially reported at 532 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir. 2008) and

is reproduced at Appendix A, at App. 1-93.

The fees opinion and order of the U.S. District

Court for the Northern District of Georgia, dated

October 3, 2006, is officially reported at 454 F. Supp.

2d 1260 (N.D. Ga. 2006) and is reproduced at Appen-

dix B, at App. 94-172.

The en banc opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Eleventh Circuit, denying further review and

the dissents thereto, dated November 5, 2008, is

officially reported at 547 F.3d 1319 (1lth Cir. 2008)

and is reproduced at Appendix C, at App. 173-223.

e

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Eleventh Circuit sought to be reviewed was entered

on July 3, 2008. The order denying rehearing en banc

was entered on November 5, 2008. The petition is

2

timely under 28 U.S.C. § 2102(c) and Supreme Court

Rules 13.1 & 13.3 because it is being filed within 90

days after the denial of a timely petition for rehear-

ing. This Court has jurisdiction to review the judg-

ment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh

Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

4

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The relevant statutory provision involved is 42

U.S.C. § 1988(b), which states as follows:

In any action or proceeding to enforce a pro-

vision of sections 1981, 198la, 1982, 1983,

1985, and 1986 of this title, title [IX of Public

Law 92-318, the Religious Freedom Restora-

tion Act of 1993, the Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, title VI

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or section

13981 of this title, the court, in its discretion,

may allow the prevailing party, other than

the United States, a reasonable attorney’s

fee as part of the costs, except that in any ac-

tion brought against a judicial officer for an

act or omission taken in such officer’s judi-

cial capacity such officer shall not be held li-

able for any costs, including attorncy’s fees,

unless such action was clearly in excess of

such officer’s jurisdiction.

«

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On June 6, 2002, a class action complaint was

filed on behalf of 3,000 foster children against nu-

merous State of Georgia officials alleging both consti-

tutional and _ statutory violations and_ seeking

injunctive relief to alter the State’s administration of

the foster care system in two metropolitan Atlanta

counties. After a period of initial discovery, the denial

of Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction after

a hearing, the denial of Defendants’ motion to dis-

miss, and both lay and expert discovery, the District

Court referred the parties to mediation. The media-

tion lasted four months and resulted in a consent

decree approved by the District Court on October 27,

2005, which contained a comprehensive agreement on

all pending issues except the amount of attorney’s

fees and expenses to award to Plaintiffs as prevailing

parties pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

On December 9, 2005, Plaintiffs’ counsel filed

their application for award of attorney’s fees and

expenses, claiming that they expended nearly 30,000

hours on the case resulting in a_ lodestar of

$7,171,434.30, but seeking an enhancement of twice

the purported lodestar, or a total fee award of

$14,342,868.60. Defendants opposed the application,

asserting in part that the lodestar should be reduced

due to excessive hours and that the enhancement was

not authorized based on the existing precedent of this

Court.

4

The District Court, after finding that many of

Plaintiffs’ counsel’s entries were “vague,” “noncom-

pensable,” “excessive,” and “unreasonable,” reduced

Plaintiffs’ lodestar through a fifteen percent reduction

in hours claimed, resulting in a monetary reduction of

over $1,000,000 in the lodestar amount to $6,102,802.90.

Kenny A. v. Perdue, 454 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1274-77,

1279-81, 1283, 1286 (N.D. Ga. 2006). However, even

after recognizing that “most of the factors relevant to

calculating a reasonable fee are already reflected in

the lodestar amount” and should not serve as grounds

for increasing the lodestar, the District Court never-

theless adjusted the lodestar upward by a 1.75 multi-

plier, for a total fee award of $10,522,4°2.08. Id. at

1288, 1290.

The District Court justified its enhancement to

the lodestar for three reasons. First, the District

Court concluded that the quality of service was “far

superior to what consumers of legal services in the

legal marketplace in Atlanta could reasonably expect

to receive for the rates used in the lodestar calcula-

tion,” which ranged from $215 to $425 per hour. /d. at

1287-88. This conclusion was supported, according to

the District Court, because: (1) class counsel were

required to advance case expenses of $1.7 million over

a three-year period, (2) class counsel were not paid on

an ongoing basis while the work was being per-

formed, and (3) class counsel's ability to recover fees

was contingent on the outcome of the case. Id. at

1288.

5

Second, the District Court found that the “superb

quality” of class counsel’s representation “far ex-

ceeded what could reasonably be expected for the

standard hourly rates used to calculate the lodestar.”

Id. at 1288-89. In the District Court’s view, Plaintiffs’

counsel “brought a higher degree of skill, commit-

ment, dedication, and professionalism” to the litiga-

tion than the District Court had observed by any

other lawyers “in any other case during its 27 years

on the bench.” Jd. at 1289.

Third, the District Court viewed Plaintiffs’ suc-

cess, achieved only by Defendants’ agreement to a

consent decree after court-ordered mediation, as

“truly exceptional” and providing “sweeping relief to

the plaintiff class.” Jd. The District Court observed

that “la}fter 58 years as a practicing attorney and

federal judge, the Court is unaware of any other case

in which a plaintiff class has achieved such a favor-

able result on such a comprehensive scale.” Jd. at

1290.

A panel of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals

affirmed the decision of the District Court. Kenvry A.

v. Perdue, 532 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir. 2008). In recogniz-

ing this Court’s decisions “that bend|] decidedly

against enhancements” of the lodestar,’ one of the

panel members concluded that “(t]he district court’s

See City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992): Pa.

t. Del. Valley Citizens’ Counciu for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546 (1986)

“Delaware Valley I’). Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984).

6

$4.5 million enhancement to the $6 million lodestar

in the present case cannot be squared with the Su-

preme Court decisions we have discussed.” Jd. at

1221, 1225 (Carnes, J., concurring). According to

Judge Carnes, none of the factors relied upon by the

District Court (quality of service, contingency, and

results obtained) justified the boosting of the award.

Id. at 1225-31.

Nevertheless, the panel as a whole concluded

that they were “not free to decide the enhancement

issue” based upon the Eleventh Circuit’s earlier

decisions in NAACP v. Evergreen, 812 F.2d 1332 (11th

Cir. 1987), and Norman v. Housing Authority of

Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292 (11th Cir. 1988), both of

which “were issued after the Supreme Court last

spoke on the subject of enhancements for quality of

representation and superior results, which was in the

Delaware Valley I case.” Kenny A., 532 F.3d at 1236-

37. In NAACP and Norman, the Eleventh Circuit

vacated district court orders denying enhancements

for superior results and issued remand instructions

which left open the possibility that superior results

coupled with superior performance could serve as the

basis for an enhancement to the lodestar. See

NAACP, 812 F.2d at 1336-37; Norman, 836 F.2d at

1302, 1306. As a later panel, Judge Carnes concluded

that the panel was bound to follow NAACP and

Norman based on the prior panel precedent rule,

notwithstanding his conclusion that those holdings

were wrong and conflicted with this Court’s relevant

7

precedents. Kenny A., 532 F.3d at 1238 (Carnes, J.,

concurring). Judge Carnes concluded by stating:

Of course, this Court sitting en banc, or the

Supreme Court, can overrule any prior deci-

sions of this Court. Unless and until this

Court does overrule NAACP and Norman, we

are constrained to let stand the $4,500,000

enhancement to the lodestar amount that is

included in the district court’s judgment in

this. case.

Td. at 1242.

The subsequent petition for rehearing en banc

was denied by a 9-3 vote. Kenny A. v. Perdue, 547

F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2008). Judge Carnes, joined by

Judges Tjoflat and Dubina, authored a dissent from

the denial of rehearing en banc for “the first time

in sixteen years on the bench,” opining that this was

“an important question of federal law that has not

been, but should be, settled by [the Supreme] Court.”

Id. at 1331 (Carnes, J., dissenting from the denial of

* Judge Wilson agreed that the panel was bound by the

prior panel precedents of NAACP and Norman, but believed that

those precedents correctly held that enhancements of the

lodestar amount should be permitted for quality of representa-

tion and the results obtained. Kenny A., 532 F.3d at 1242

(Wilson, J.. concurring). Judge Hill also agreed that they were

bound by these prior panel precedents, and expressed his view

that the opinions of Judges Carnes and Wilson were scholarly

and “will be of interest to jurists who might wish to pursue the

matter in further proceedings, should any arise.” 7d. at 1251

(Hill, J.. concurring).

8

rehearing en banc) (citing Sup. Ct. R. 10(c)). Judge

Carnes stated that the question of “whether a district

court can [|] increase the award beyond that reason-

able amount [reflected in the lodestar] based on its

finding that the attorney’s performance was of supe-

rior quality and the results achieved were excep-

tional” is one that affects “at least one hundred

federal fee-shifting statutes that allow the prevailing

party to recover a reasonable attorney’s fee from the

losing party.” Jd. at 1331-32, 1337-39. Judge Carnes

summed up the critical importance of this appeal as

follows:

The record in this case and the facts and

findings drawn from it present this impor-

tant, unresolved issue as well as any case

will and better than almost any other case

can. It presents an opportunity for the Su-

preme Court to reach the issue it could not

reach in Blum and Delaware Valley: Under

the federal fee-shifting statutes can a rea-

sonable attorney’s fee be enhanced based on

extraordinary effort or results where some

evidence and findings support the enhance-

ment, or are all of the factors that lead to the

quality of the performance and the results

obtained already covered in the lodestar cal-

culation, as the opinions in Delaware Valley

and Dague imply?

Id. at 1337.

Judge Tjoflat authored a separate dissent from

the denial of rehearing en banc, reasoning in part

that “it can never be appropriate to enhance the

9

attorneys fees in a case seeking injunctive relief on

the basis of ‘exceptional’ or ‘superior’ results.” Jd. at

1330 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting from the denial of rehear-

ing en banc). Judge Tjoflat concluded that, “I believe

that a lodestar hourly rate that is already at the top

of the relevant market is simply ineligible for an

additional enhancement.” /d. at 1330-31.

¢

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

In affirming the District Court’s enhancement of

a lodestar amount based on superior results, quality

of representation, and the contingent nature of the

case, factors that are normally subsumed within the

lodestar calculation, the Eleventh Circuit has decided

an important federal question in a way that conflicts

with this Court’s decisions regarding the application

of federal fee-shifting statutes.

To the extent that the decisions of this Court

have been interpreted by United States Courts of

Appeals to permit an increase of an award of attor-

neys fees beyond the lodestar amount based or

superior quality of representation and exceptional

results, this is a question of federal law that has not

been, but should be, settled by this Court in order to

provide definitive and final guidance on this issue.

This Court should grant certiorari to address an

issue affecting over one hundred federal fee-shifting

statutes to enable uniform application with respect to

10

the manner in which petitions for enhancements to

lodestar amounts are considered by trial courts.

A. An Enhancement to the Lodestar Based on

Quality of Representation and Results Ob-

tained, Particularly When the Lodestar Is

Reduced for Excessive Hours Claimed, Has

Not Been Favored in Prior Decisions of

This Court.

Under the “American Rule,” the prevailing

litigant ordinarily is not entitled to collect a reason-

able attorney’s fee from the losing party unless there

is an exception to the rule, such as a specific statu-

tory authorization to the contrary. Alyeska Pipeline

Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 270

(1975). Following this Court’s decision in Alyeska,

Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees

Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, to authorize

courts to award a reasonable attorney’s fee to a

prevailing plaintiff in a civil rights action. See H.R.

Rep. No. 94-1558, p. 1 (1976); S. Rep. No. 94-1011, p.

4 (1976). In determining the factors that should be

considered in determining a reasonable fee, the

legislative history of this enactment referred to the

twelve factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia High-

way Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974),° which

The Johnson factors are as follows:

(1) time and labor required;

(2) novelty and difficulty of the questions;

‘Continued on following page)

11

included factors such as “the skill requisite to per-

form the legal service properly,” “whether the fee is

fixed or contingent,” and “the amount involved and the

results obtained.” Jd. at 718; see also H.R. Rep. No. 94-

1558, p. 8 (1976); S. Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 6 (1976).

This Court first established the framework and

methodology for calculating a reasonable attorney's

fee award to a prevailing party pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1988 in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983).

The “starting point for determining the amount of a

reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably

expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable

hourly rate.” Jd. at 433. The product of this calcula-

tion is commonly referred to as the “lodestar.” Penn-

sylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Counsel for

(3) skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;

(4) preclusion of other employment by the attorney due

to acceptance of the case;

(5) customary fee;

(6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent;

(7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circum-

stances;

(8) amount involved and the results obtarned;

(9) experience, reputation and ability of the attorneys:

(10) “undesirability” of the case;

(ll) nature and length of the professional relationship

with the client; and

(12) awards in similar cases.

Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 5th

Cir. 1974), abrogated on other grounds, Blanchard v. Bergeron,

489 U.S. 87, 91-94 (1989).

12

Clean Air (“Delaware Valley I”), 478 U.S. 546, 563

(1986). In Hensley, this Court indicated that the

lodestar calculation “does not end the inquiry” and

that there were other considerations “that may lead

the district court to adjust the fee upward or down-

ward, including the important factor of the ‘results

obtained,’” although it was also noted that many of

the Johnson factors “usually are subsumed within the

initial calculation of hours reasonably expended at a

reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 &

n.9. This Court concluded the discussion of the issue

of potential enhancements to the lodestar by stating

that an enhanced award may be justified “in some

cases of exceptional success.” Jd. at 435.

The issue of a potential enhanced award of

attorney's fees next appeared in Blum v. Stenson, 465

U.S. 886 (1984), where a fee applicant was awarded a

50 percent upward adjustment over the lodestar to

compensate for the complexity of the case, the novelty

of the issues, and the “great benefit” achieved. Jd. at

891. This Court held that these reasons did not

support the increase to the lodestar, concluding that

factors such as “complexity of the issues,” “quality of

representation,” and “results obtained” are “nor-

mally” or “generally” reflected in either the number of

billable hours or the hourly rates charged and should

not usually provide an independent hasis for increas-

ing the fee award. /d. at 898-900. While the Court

rejected the argument “that an upward adjustment to

an attorney's fee is never appropriate under § 1988,”

it held that the evidence in Blum failed to establish

13

that an enhancement was needed to provide reason-

able compensation for services rendered. /d. at 901.

This Court next considered the propriety of an

enhancement of an award of attorney’s fees in a fee-

shifting statute in Delaware Valley I. Prior to consid-

ering the plaintiffs’ request for “multipliers” to adjust

the lodestar amount upward, the district court there

in fact eliminated a significant number of hours

claimed because they were not documented in suffi-

cient detail or were excessive. 478 U.S. at 554. The

district court nevertheless applied a multiplier of two

to raise the lodestar based upon the contingent na-

ture of the case and the superior quality of represen-

tation, which was affirmed by the Third Circuit. /d.

at 555-56. This Court reversed. First, this Court held

that it was error to increase the fee award based upon

the “superior quality” of the attorneys’ performance

“|bjecause consideraticns concerning the quality of a

prevailing party’s counsel's representation normally

are reflected in the reasonable hourly rate,” and the

overall quality of a lawyer’s performance “ordinarily

should not be used to adjust the lodestar.” /d. at 566.

Importantly for the case at hand, this Court stated

that “|t|he District Court’s elimination of a large

number of hours on the grounds that they were

unnecessary, unreasonable, or unproductive is not

supportive of the court’s later conclusion that the

remaining hours represented work of ‘superior qual-

ity.”” Id. at 566-67. As there were no detailed findings

of why the lodestar amount did not reflect the quality

of representation or why the results were so superior,

14

this Court found no reason to increase the fee award

for quality of representation. Jd. at 568. This Court

then withheld a decision as to whether an upward

adjustment to the lodestar could be made based on

the risk of loss and scheduled reargument. /d.

The question of whether an enhancement based

upon the contingent nature of a fee is appropriate

was initially left unresolved in Pennsylvania v. Dela-

ware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S.

711 (1987) (“Delaware Valley IT’), but then was defini-

tively resolved in City of Burlington v. Dague, 505

U.S. 557 (1992). This Court again stated that there is

a “strong presumption” that the lodestar represents a

reasonable fee and that the burden was on the fee

applicant to establish that an upward adjustment “is

necessary to the determination of a reasonable fee.”

Dague, 505 U.S. at 562 (emphasis added) (citing

Delaware Valley I and Blum). The Court found that

the difficulty of establishing the merits of a case, one

of the factors to consider for risk of loss, is normally

subsumed in the lodestar “either in the higher num-

ber of hours expended to overcome the difficulty, or in

the higher hourly rate of the attorney skilled and

experienced enough to do so.” /d. The Court also

found that the relative merits of the claim, the other

factor in a contingent fee determination, should play

no part in the calculation of a fee award. Id. at 563-

65. “|Wje hold that enhancement for contingency is

not permitted under the |federal! fee-shifting statutes

at issue.” Id. at 567.

15

Consequently, this Court has held that an en-

hancement to a lodestar amount for the contingent

nature of the case is absolutely prohibited and that

upward adjustment based upon supcrior performance

and the results obtained should not usually be

awarded, because these factors are normally sub-

sumed within the lodestar calculation of the product

of hours claimed multiplied by the hourly rate. Al-

though it remains undefined what exceptional cir-

cumstances would justify an enhancement to the

lodestar based upon superior performance and suc-

cess obtained, it appears that the reduction of the

hours claimed based upon vague, duplicative, and

excessive entries would belie any contention that an

upward adjustment based upon superior performance

should be permitted.

B. This Court Should Grant Certiorari To

Determine Whether a Reasonable Attor-

ney’s Fee Award Can Be Enhanced for Re-

sults Obtained or Quality of Performance

and, If So, Whether Such an Enhancement

Would Still Be Unauthorized When the

Lodestar Is Reduced for Excessive Hours

Billed.

The record in this case presents a clear opportu-

nity to resolve the issue which this Court could not

reach in Blum and Delaware Valley 1: Can a reason-

able attorney’s fee award be enhanced for results

obtained or quality of performance, or are those factors

already subsumed into the lodestar, as Delaware

16

Valley 1 and Dague appear to indicate? See Dague,

505 U.S. at 562-63 (stating that the difficulty of

establishing the merits of the claim “is ordinarily

reflected in the lodestar — either in the higher num-

ber of hours expended to overcome the difficulty, or in

the higher hourly rate of the attorney skilled and

experienced enough to do so” and cautioning that

“[tlaking account of it again through lodestar en-

hancement amounts to double counting”); Delaware

Valley I, 478 U.S. at 565-66 (citing Blum for the

proposition that “the ‘quality of representation,’ and

the ‘results obtained’ from the litigation are presuma-

bly fully reflected in the lodestar amount” and ex-

plaining that “[cjalculating the fee award in a manner

that accounts for these factors, either in determining

the reasonable number of hours expended on the

litigation or in setting the reasonable hourly rate,

thus adequately compensates the attorney, and leaves

very little room for enhancing the award based on his

post-engagement performance”); see also Kenny A.,

547 F.3d at 1337 (Carnes, J., dissenting from the

denial of rehearing en banc) (“|This case] presents an

opportunity for the Supreme Court to reach the issue

it could not reach in Blum and Delaware Valley:

Under the federal fee-shifting statutes can a reason-

able attorney’s fee be enhanced based on extraordi-

nary effort or results where some evidence and

findings support the enhancement, or are all of the

factors that lead to the quality of the performance

and the results obtained already covered in the

lodestar calculation, as the opinions in Delaware

Valley and Dague imply?”).

17

Petitioners respectfully contend that this issue

has caused confusion in its application by district

courts and review by the Courts of Appeals, and this

case presents the best opportunity to resolve it. As

Judge Carnes explained in his dissent from the denial

of rehearing en banc, joined by Judges Tjoflat and

Dubina, “(t]he record in this case and the facts and

findings drawn from it present this important, unre-

solved issue as well as any case will and better than

almost any other case can.” Kenny A., 547 F.3d at

1337 (Carnes, J., dissenting from the denial of re-

hearing en banc) (emphasis added).

The record shows that the District Court in this

case itself reduced Plaintiffs’ purported lodestar by

more than $1 million for the excessive hours billed in

order to arrive at a reasonable lodestar of $6 million,

but the District Court then immediately turned

around and enhanced its own reasonable lodestar

determination by a 1.75 multiplier for a total fee

award (not including expenses) of $10.5 million.

Kenny A., 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1266, 1286, 1290. The

District Court based its enhancement on contingency

and delay of payment (in contravention of Dague’),

* The District Court interpreted this Court’s decision in

Dague as holding merely that “a lodestar enhancement cannot

be based on contingency alone.” Kenny A., 454 F. Supp. 2d at

1288 n&, cited in Grable v Gregory J. Barro, PLC, 1:05-CV-

3133-JEC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19709, at *14 n.8 (N_D. Ga.

Mar. 19, 2007) (refusing, in contrast to Kenny A., to grant an

enhancement and stating that “in this case the reasoning of the

Supreme Court for not enhancing an award applies”).

18

the results obtained, and the superior quality of

Plaintiffs’ counsel’s legal performance. /d. at 1288-89.

The current state of the law is confusing to the

Courts of Appeals and district courts as to whether an

enhancement is ever appropriate based on results

obtained or the quality of the performance, but it

certainly makes no sense that an enhancement for

results obtained or superior performance should be

awarded when the district court itself determines the

fee applicant’s purported lodestar should be reduced,

as the District Court in this case explained through-

out its decision:

Billing Judgment Generally: “The Court has

reviewed the entries cited by State Defen-

dants and agrees that many of the entries

are too vague to permit the Court to deter-

mine whether the time was reasonably ex-

pended. Many of the entries also reflect

purely administrative tasks that are non-

compensable.”

Complaint and Mandatory Disclosures:

“(Blased on its experience in other complex

class actions, 1,648.41 hours is excessive for

pre-suit investigation and drafting the com-

plaint and mandatory disclosures.”

Document Production and Analysis: “|T)he

Court finds that more than 7,100 hours ex-

pended on document review and analysis

over the two-and-one-half years between the

filing of the complaint and the commence-

ment of the mediation is unreasonable. That

is the equivalent of more than one full-time

19

employee reviewing and analyzing docu-

ments continuously for that entire period.”

Discovery Motions: “It was clearly unneces-

sary to have spent in excess of 60 hours pre-

paring this response. The Court also agrees

with State Defendants that an unreasonable

number of plaintiffs’ attorneys attended

many of the discovery and status conferences

conducted by the Court.”

Intra- and Inter-Office Conferences and Cor-

respondence: “(T]he Court believes that the

very large number of attorneys and parale-

gals who worked on this case inevitably re-

sulted in some duplication of effort. This is

reflected by the fact that more than 8% of all

the time expended on the case was devoted

to communications among counsel. While

some of this time was undoubtedly reason-

able and necessary, the Court finds this per-

centage somewhat high even for a complex

class action such as this.”

Expert Witnesses and Reports: “|Sjome time

entries by attorneys reflect time spent draft-

ing and revising expert reports, work which

should have been done by the experts them-

selves. Likewise, many of the paralegals’ time

entries reflect that the work performed was

administrative and secretarial in nature.”

Motion for Summary Judgment: “(T!he num-

ber of hours expended was unreasonable.

One need only consider the fact that 1,720

hours is the equivalent of one attorney work-

ing full time for nearly an entire vear to

20

conclude that no response to a motion for

summary judgment justifies such an expen-

diture of time.”

Trial Preparation: “(Tjhe Court cannot agree

that it was reasonable to spend more than

2,000 hours on this task [for a trial which

never occurred |.”

Id. at 1274-75, 1277, 1279-81, 1283."

A review of cases from the Courts of Appeals and

various district courts shows the confusion that exists

in this area. Judge Wilson in his concurring opinion

in the denial of rehearing en banc maintains that

there is no Circuit split on this issue. See Kenny A.,

547 F.3d at 1321 (Wilson, J., concurring in the denial

of rehearing en banc) (citing Kenny A., 532 F.3d 1209,

* This case also demonstrates vividly the penalty that an

enhancement can impose on a government agency that settles a

case. The District Court indicated that “if plaintiffs had pre-

vailed in a trial of this case, it is doubtful that they would have

obtained relief ‘as intricately detailed and comprehensive’ as

that contained in the Consent Deeree.” Kenny A., 454 F. Supp.

2d at 1289-90. It only was through the efforts of Plaintiffs’

counsel and Petitioners that this settlement was ever reached.

The District Court’s enhancement of the lodestar effectively

results in a penalty upon the State of Georgia and its officials for

settling this case. If the District Court's award of attorney's fees

and expenses is allowed to stand, the message to governments

which have to defend similar class action claims will be clear:

settlement of claims could result in the government getting

assessed with a larger award of attorney's fees than if the case

goes to trial and a “lesser” result is mandated. This will result in

fewer consent agreements and more tnals on the merits.

21

1242 (11th Cir. 2008); Geier v. Sundquist, 372 F.3d

784, 794-95 (6th Cir. 2004); Van Gerwen v. Guarantee

Mut. Life Co., 214 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2000);

Quaratino v. Tiffany & Co., 166 F.3d 422, 425 (2d Cir.

1999): Forshee v. Waterloo Indus., Inc., 178 F.3d 527,

531-32 (8th Cir. 1999); Hyatt v. Apfel, 195 F.3d 188,

192 (4th Cir. 1999); Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain Con-

ference Resort, Inc., 124 F.3d 1221, 1233 n.8 (10th Cir.

1997); Shipes v. Trinity Indus., 987 F.2d 311, 320 (5th

Cir. 1993)).

However, unlike the cases cited by Judge Wilson

where circuit courts have interpreted this Court’s

decisions as permitting an enhancement to the lode-

star based upon quality of performance and results

obtained, other circuit and district courts have con-

cluded otherwise. See, e.g., Jordan v. Multnomah

County, 815 F.2d 1258, 1262 n.6 (9th Cir. 1987)

(“Among the Johnson factors that cannot serve as

independent bases for adjusting fee awards are: (1)

the novelty and complexity of the issues, (2) the

special skill and experience of counsel, (3) the quality

of representation, and (4) the results obtained.”)

(citing Blum and Delaware Valley 1); In re Burlington

Northern, Inc. Employment Practices Litig., 810 F.2d

601, 607-08 (7th Cir. 1986) (“Finally, one can question

whether enhancement for exceptional success is ever

appropriate. ‘The lodestar figure includes most, if not

all, of the relevant factors comprising a “reasonable”

attorney's fee, and it is unnecessary to enhance the

fee for superior performance in order to serve the

statutory purpose of enabling plaintiffs to secure

22

legal assistance.’”) (quoting Delaware Valley I) (em-

phasis added); Shakman v. City of Chicago, No. 69 C

2145, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21431, at *20-21 (N.D.

Ill. Mar. 18, 2008) (“[T]he Seventh Circuit has ques-

tioned whether ‘an enhancement for exceptional cir-

cumstance is ever appropriate’ in fee-shifting cases.”)

(citing Burlington Northern); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v.

Engida, No. 06-CV-00225-LTB, 2008 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 62862, at *9 (D. Colo. July 30, 2008) (stating

that novelty, difficulty, and result achieved are “pre-

sumably fully reflected in the lodestar amount, and

thus cannot serve as independent bases for increasing

the basic fee award”) (quoting Delaware Valley I);

Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. NTDEC, 822 F. Supp. 1462,

1467 (D. Ariz. 1993) (“Specifically, the subsumed

factors are: the novelty and complexity of the issues,

the special! skill and experience of counsel, the quality

of the representation, the results obtained and the

superior performance of counsel.”); Campbell ov.

Kansas State Univ., 804 F. Supp. 1393, 1396 (D. Kan.

1992) (“The novelty and complexity of the issues, the

special skill and experience of counsel, the quality of

representation, and the results obtained from the

litigation are presumably fully reflected in the lode-

star amount, and thus cannot serve as independent

reasons for increasing the fee award.”); Cary v. Chi-

cago Hous. Auth., No. 87 C 6998, 1992 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 6176, at “19-22 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 29, 1992) (refus-

ing enhancement on one hand because “the Supreme

Court found in |Delaware Valley I| that upward

adjustments of the lodestar for the ‘superior quality’

of counsel’s performance were redundant to factors in

23

the lodestar calculation, and impermissible,” but then

granting enhancement on grounds that “the Delaware

Valley I court did hold out the possibility that an

upward adjustment to the lodestar may be obtained

in cases of ‘exceptional’ results”); Americans United

for Separation of Church & State v. Sch. Dist. of

Grand Rapids, 717 F.Supp. 488, 502 (W.D. Mich.

1989) (“Blum states explicitly that the results ob-

tained do not justify enhancing an otherwise reason-

able fee.”); Bishop v. Osborn Transp., Inc., 687

F. Supp. 1526, 1533 (N.D. Ala. 1988) (“From a reading

of |Hensley, Blum, and Delaware Valley I), the John-

son factors 1, 2, 3, 5, 8 and 9 are clearly subsumed

within the initial calculations of hours reasonably

expended at a reasonable hours rate.”).

In Judge Carnes’ opinion, there are two contra-

dictory ways to read Delaware Valley I, and he re-

spectfully encourages that the correct reading should

be made clear by this Court. One way to read Dela-

ware Valley I is holding that “an enhancement for

superior representation and exceptional results is

never permitted; and even if it were, there was insuffi-

cient evidence or findings of anything special in that

case.” Kenny A., 547 F.3d at 1334 (Carnes, J., dissent-

ing from the denial of rehearing en banc) (emphasis

added). The other way to read the decision is that

such enhancements are allowed, but only with “spe-

cific evidence and findings to support the conclusion

that the quality of representation and results ob-

tained were truly special.” /d. (emphasis added).

24

Whichever method is correct, the fact remains

that attempts by the Courts of Appeals to provide

guidance have only further confused rather than

clarified the issue for district courts. As just one

example, in Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546 (10th Cir.

1983), the Tenth Circuit tried to define with particu-

larity what can constitute superior performance

worthy of a lodestar enhancement:

[W]e think that this genius factor diminishes

and eventually disappears as the number of

hours expended on the case increases. A brii-

liant idea may shortcut one aspect of the

case and save many hours, but in protracted

litigation a lawyer is also likely to pursue

blind alleys and expend many unproductive

hours. In a case such as the one at bar, in

which more than 9000 hours were reported,

we do not believe that any adjustment for ex-

traordinary performance could be warranted.

We also believe that tne greater the number

of attorneys involved on a side, the less likely

it is that an extraordinary performance bo-

nus is appropriate. Here the plaintiffs util-

ized 12 attorneys, 5 of whom expended more

than 200 hours. In such a case it is unlikely

that the genius of one lawyer will so affect

the case that a bonus would be warranted.

Furthermore, in awarding a genius bonus

the district court should take care not to du-

plicate the skill reflected in the attorney's

billing rate. Thus, we believe that bonuses or

multipliers of the normal fee because of the

extraordinary skill of counsel should be

rarely awarded, and should be confined to

25

cases in which the bulk of the work was done

by a single attorney who exhibits extraordi-

narv skill or to cases in which the work was

done well in a relatively short time given the

complexity of the task.

Id. at 557.° Highlighting the confusion in this area

and the various applications of this Court’s instruc-

tions, this aspect of the Ramos decision has both been

questioned by at least one district court from another

Circuit in light of subsequent Supreme Court prece-

dent, and more recently, it has been followed by a

district court in the same Circuit.”

* In this case, “(t]he time records submitted in support of

plaintiffs’ fee application show that plaintiffs’ [thirty-eight]

attorneys, paralegais, and legal interns devoted a total of

29,908.73 hours to this litigation,” far more than the number of

timekeepers and hours for which fee recovery was sought in

Ramos. Kenny A., 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1273-74.

' See Liberles v. Daniel, 619 F. Supp. 1016, 1019 (N.D. IIL.

1985) (“Ramos was decided a year before Blum, and its explana-

tion of ‘exceptional success’ has been limited to some extent by

the Supreme Court. In particular, the Supreme Court rejected

(in most cases) one of the two primary reasons offered by the

Tenth Circuit for enhancing a fee: the results achieved in the

case.”).

* See Johnson v. City of Tulsa, No. 94-CV-39-H(M)}, 2003

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26377, at *34-35 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 29, 2003)

(“Like Ramos, this case is protracted litigation involving thou-

sands of attorney hours. The case did not establish new law or

result in a total victory. It instead resulted in a compromise that

achieved excellent results for Plaintiffs’ clients and the City of

Tulsa as a whole. Although Plaintiffs did have to battle larger

law films and endured a period of significant discovery disputes,

these disputes were of a kind to be anticipated in such litigation

‘Continued on following page)

26

As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals explained

in a 2007 decision, with former Justice O’Connor

sitting by designation, “Jolur fee-setting jurispru-

dence has become needlessly confused,” and it re-

spectfully laid some of the responsibility with this

Court for never fully resoiving the interplay between

the lodestar method and the Johnson factors:

And the Supreme Court has not yet fully re-

solved the relationship between the two

methods. In cases decided after Hensley and

Blum, it has both (1) suggested that district

courts should use the Johnson factors to ad-

just the lodestar, see, e.g., Blanchard, 489

U.S. at 94 (stating that the district court

should arrive at an initial estimate and then

“adjust this lodestar calculation by other

factors”); see also id. (“The Johnson factors

may be relevant in adjusting the lodestar

amount... .”); Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S.

552, 582-83 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring)

(suggesting that factors might exist “that

would justify an enhancement of the lode-

star”), and (2) reiterated its holding in

Hensley and Blum that “many of the Johnson

factors ‘are subsumed within the initial cal-

culation.’” Del. Valley I, 478 U.S. at 564.

Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass'n v.

County of Albany, 484 F.3d 162, 163 (2d Cir. 2007);

see also Norwood v. Charlotte Mem'l Hosp. & Med.

and Plaintiffs’ counsel is being fully compensated for that

time.”).

27

Ctr., 720 F. Supp. 5438, 547 (W.D.N.C. 1989) (stating

that the difficulties courts experience in applying the

“instructions” for attorney’s fee awards result from

misunderstanding regarding proper application of the

Johnson factors).

As recently as this summer, Judge Lamberth of

the District Court for the District of Columbia at-

tempted to divine this area of the law and ultimately

concluded that “the lodestar, calculated using coun-

sel’s established billing rates, adequately reflects

this superior quality of representation.” Miller v.

Holzmann, 575 F. Supp. 2d 2, 54 (D.D.C. 2008). The

court noted that the District of Columbia Circuit had

years ago lamented in Donnell v. United States, 682

F.2d 240 (D.C. Cir. 1982): “district courts’ increasing

predilection for ‘adjust{ing] the lodestar upward to

reflect what the courts [subjectively] view as a high

. quality of representation,’ ... ‘should stop.’ It

stops here.” Miller, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 54 (quoting

Donnell, 682 F.2d at 254) (brackets in original).

Moreover, specifically citing this case, Judge Lam-

berth “agree|d] with Judge Carnes of the Eleventh

Circuit Court of Appeals that ‘bad and excessive

billing is inconsistent with superb lawyering’” and

emphasized that “[{a]nalogously, routinely devoting

excessive manpower to tasks is inconsistent with

efficient case management” and should prohibit any

enhancement of the lodestar. Jd. at 49 n.76 (quoting

Kenny A., 532 F.3d at 1229).

This case starkly shows the confusion and incon-

sistent application of this Court’s existing attorney's

28

fee precedent. The District Court’s award lays bare

the substantial costs that can be imposed on a gov-

ernment defendant when misapplication occurs,

especially when the district court concludes on the

one hand that the purported lodestar is excessive and

reduces it, but then nevertheless with the other hand

provides a fee enhancement. See Kenny A., 547 F.3d

at 1335 (“The bottom line for certiorari review pur-

poses, however, is that the law of the Eleventh Circuit

permits this kind of enhancement, and that law was

applied to permit a $4.5 million enhancement of the

lodestar amount in this case.”) (Carnes, J., dissenting

from the denial of rehearing en banc) (emphasis

added).

The important unresolved question presented by

this case is whether “no evidence or findings can ever

justify an enhancement on performance and results

grounds because the lodestar already takes into

account all of the factors that go into how well an

attorney performs and the result obtained.” Jd. at

1336. Certainly, some federal judges believe that

“Itlhe decisions in Dague and Delaware Valley imply

as much.” /d. If so, as the Court of Appeals and Dis-

trict Court decisions in this case show, “the Supreme

Court needs to tell those ... on the lower courts

because that point has not gotten across.” Id.

Given the confusion over the proper application

of results obtained and superior performance in

calculating attorney’s fee awards pursuant to federal

fee-shifting statutes, Petitioner respectfully requests

that this Court grant certiorari to resolve finally

29

whether results obtained or quality of performance

can provide an appropriate basis for enhancing the

lodestar, or whether these factors are always sub-

sumed in the lodestar such that providing an en-

hancement based on these factors is impermissible.

See Blum, 465 U.S. at 899 (stating that “the District

Court’s rationale for providing an upward adjustment

for quality of representation is a clear example of

double counting”). Even if this Court concludes that

enhancement for results obtained and quality of

representation is still possible, this Court should

further decide whether such enhancement is ever

appropriate if the lodestar has been reduced due to

excessive hours billed.

30

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the petition for a

writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

MaArRK H. COHEN*

TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP

Bank of America Plaza

Suite 5200

600 Peachtree Street, N.E.

Atlanta, Georgia 30308

(404) 885-3597

*Counsel of Record

THURBERT E. BAKER

Attorney General of Georgia

DENNIS R. DUNN

Deputy Attorney General

SHALEN S. NELSON

Senior Assistant

Attorney General

ELIZABETH M. WILLIAMSON

Assistant Attorney General

STATE LAW DEPARTMENT

40 Capitol Square, S.W.

Atlanta, Georgia 30334

(404) 656-3377

Attornevs for Petitioners

5

jn The

Supreme Court of the Gnited States

¢

SONNY PERDUE, in his official capacity as

Governor of the State of Georgia, et al.,

Petitioners,

Vv.

KENNY A., by his next friend Linda Winn, et a/.,

Respondents.

*

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Eleventh Circuit

¢

APPENDIX TO THE

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

¢

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

APPENDIX A (Opinion of the U.S. Court of

Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, filed

PT sciniicisieraihtaitabidtignnitigindsanmeineuenn App. l

APPENDIX B (Order of the U.S. District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia,

RE PMs Gy BTID cn ncccecncessccsccescoencccssceees App. 94

APPENDIX C (Opinion of the U.S. Court of

Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, filed

| _—_—_EEEE EN nD DD Ere App. 173

App. l

APPENDIX A

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

Nos. 06-15514 & 06-15874

D. C. Docket No. 02-01686-CV-MHS-1

KENNY A., by his next friend Linda Winn,

KARA B., by her next friend Linda Pace,

MAYA C., by her next friend Linda Pace,

PHELICIA D., by her next friend Theresa Roth,

SABRINA E., by her next friend Rebecca Silvey,

KORRINA E., by her next friend Rebecca Silvey,

TANYA F., by her next friend Carol Huff,

PRISCILLA G., by her next friend Roslyn M. Satchel,

BRIANA H., by her next friend Linda Pace,

on their own behalf and on behalf of all others

similarly situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellees-

Cross-Appellants,

versus

SONNY PERDUE, in his official capacity as

Governcr of the State of Georgia,

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES

OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA,

JAMES MARTIN, in his official capacity as

Commissioner of the Department of

Human Resources of the State of Georgia,

DIVISION OF FAMILY AND CHILDREN SERVICES,

Fulton County,

App. 2

BEVERLY JONES, in her official capacity as

Director of the Fulton County Department of

Family and Children Services,

DEKALB COUNTY DFCS,

WAYNE DRUMMOND, in his official capacity as

Director of the DeKalb County Department of

Family and Children Services,

Defendants-Appellants-

Cross-Appellees,

FULTON COUNTY,

DEKALB COUNTY,

Defendants.

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

(July 3, 2008)

Before CARNES, WILSON and HILL, Circuit Judges.

CARNES, Circuit Judge:

When asked how much money would be enough

for him, John D. Rockefeller reportedly said: “Just a

little bit more.” The attorneys for the plaintiff class

in this case want more than just a little bit more.

They want a lot more money than they would receive

from multiplying the number of hours they worked on

this case by the hourly rate they charge. And the

Robert M. Sharp, The Lore and Legends of Wall Street 233

(1989)

App. 3

district court gave them a lot more — $4,500,000 more

— out of the pockets of the taxpayers of Georgia.

Not caught up in the district court’s spirit of

generosity with their money, the Georgia taxpayers

(through their governor and other officials who are

defendants) have appealed the attorneys’ fees award

because of that multi-million dollar enhancement and

for other reasons. The plaintiffs’ attorneys, convinced

that the district court was not generous enough, have

cross-appealed (through the class they represent),

insisting that they deserve even more than the

$10,500,000 total fees that the court awarded them.

I.

Kenny A. and eight other named plaintiffs in this

lawsuit are foster children in the custody of the

Georgia Department of Human Resources. Kenny A.

ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 454 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1266

(N.D. Ga. 2006) (Kenny A. III). In June 2002, on

behalf of a class of all foster children in Fulton and

DeKalb Counties and a subclass of African American

foster children, the plaintiffs sued the governor, DHR,

its commissioner, Fulton and DeKalb Counties, each

county's department of family and children services,

and the director of each of those departments. /d. at

1266-67. The complaint alleged systemic deficiencies

in the counties’ foster care systems. /d. at 1267. These

deficiencies, according to the complaint, included:

(1) assigning excessive numbers of cases to

inadequately trained and poorly supervised

App. 4

caseworkers; (2) not developing a sufficient

number of foster homes properly screened to

ensure the plaintiff children’s safety; (3) not

identifying adult relatives who could care for

the plaintiff children as an alternative to

strangers or impersonal institutions; (4) fail-

ing to provide relevant information and sup-

port services to foster parents in order to

prevent foster placements from being dis-

rupted; (5) failing to develop administrative

controls such as an information management

system that ensures plaintiff children are

expeditiously placed in a foster home

matched to meet the children’s specific

needs; (6) failing to provide timely and ap-

propriate permanency planning, including

failing to provide services that would enable

plaintiffs te achieve their permanency plan-

ning goals; (7) placing plaintiffs in danger-

ous, unsanitary, inappropriate shelters and

other placements; (8) failing to provide ap-

propriate and necessary mental health,

medical, and education services to children

in their custody; and (9) separating teenage

mothers in foster care from their own chil-

dren and separating siblings in foster care

from each other without providing visitation.

ld.

The complaint asserted fifteen causes of action

under federal and state law. Kenny A. ex rel. Winv v.

Perdue, 218 F.R.D. 277, 283 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (Kenny

A. 1). The federal law claims included alleged viola-

tions, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, of the class

App. 5

members’ Fourteenth Amendment rights to substan-

tive and procedural due process and their First,

Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to liberty,

privacy, and association. Jd. The complaint also

alleged violations of the class members’ statutory

rights under the Adoption Assistance and Child

Welfare Act of 1980, the Multiethnic Placement Act of

1994, as well as violations of the early and periodic

screening, diagnosis, and treatment program of the

Medicaid Act. /d. The state law claims asserted

included violations of the class members’ substantive

due process and equal protection rights under the

Georgia Constitution, violations of various Georgia

statutes, and claims of nuisance, breach of contract,

and inadequate and ineffective legal representation.

Id. The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive

relief, as well as attorneys’ fees and expenses. /d. at

283 n.1.

The district court denied the defendants’ motions

to dismiss and for summary judgment. Kenny A. III,

454 F. Supp. 2d at 1269; Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v.

Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1355 (N.D. Ga. 2005)

(Kenny A. II); Kenny A. I, 218 F.R.D. at 305. It certi-

fied the class of all foster children in the Fulton and

DeKalb County foster care systems, and the subgroup

of African American foster children “who have had, or

are subject to the risk of having, their adoption

delayed or denied on the basis of their race or color,”

Kenny A. I, 218 F.R.D. at 305, and set the case for

trial, Kenny A. IIT, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1268-69.

App. 6

At the same time, the district court referred the

case to mediation. Jd. at 1269. As that court would

later describe it, “over the next four months the par-

ties attended eighteen separate mediation sessions

where they spent more than 110 hours trying to

hammer out a settlement agreement.” Jd. They were

eventually successful. /d.

In May 2006 the district court gave final ap-

proval to the settlement between the plaintiff class

and Fulton and DeKalb Counties; the parties agreed

to an attorneys’ fees award in that part of the case;

the district court entered that award, and it has not

been appealed. This appeal arises from the settle-

ment involving the rest of the defendants, which was

approved by the district court in October 2005. /d.

The court summarized that settlement this way:

Its centerpiece is a series of thirty-one out-

come measures that State Defendants have

agreed to meet and sustain for at least three

consecutive six-month reporting periods.

The outcome measures, many of them

requiring phased-in results over a two-year

period, seek to improve performance in the

following areas: timely commencement and

thorough completion of investigations of re-

ported abuse or neglect; regular visits of fos-

ter children by case workers; approval and

licensure of foster homes and other place-

ments; the percentage of children who are

the victims of substantiated maltreatment

while in foster care; the percentage of chil-

dren in foster homes that exceed their

App. 7

licensed capacity; the percentage of children

who have experienced multiple moves while

in foster care; and periodic judicial reviews of

the safety and status of foster children.

In addition, the Consent Decree requires

comprehensive and periodic delivery of medi-

cal, dental, and mental health services to fos-

ter children; a detailed process for improved

goal-setting, case planning and periodic re-

views of children’s status while in foster care;

limits on the placement of children in emer-

gency shelters and group homes and institu-

tions, and protections against overcrowding

in foster homes; and the establishment of re-

imbursement rates to adequately compen-

sate providers for caring for foster children.

Moreover, State Defendants commit to

reduced caseloads for all case managers and

supervisors; a fully implemented single

statewide automated child welfare informa-

tion system; and maintaining or establishing

placements and related services identified in

a “needs assessment” to be conducted by a

neutral expert. The settlement also includes

processes for the supervision of private con-

tract agencies that provide homes and ser-

vices for foster children; improvements in

foster parent screening, licensing and train-

ing, as well as foster parent support and

cormmunication; improvements in case man-

ager training; improvements in processes for

addressing suspected abuse or neglect and

suspected corporal punishment of children in

App. 8

foster care; and improvements in efforts to

maximize available federal funding.

Finally, the settlement provides that two

child welfare specialists will serve as the

Court’s independent accountability agents

charged with the responsibility of measuring

and reporting publicly on the State Defen-

dants’ compliance with these and other un-

dertakings as_ specified in the Consent

Decree.

Id. at 1289.

The 2005 settlement agreement further acknowl-

edged that “Plaintiff Class is entitled to recover its

expenses of litigation, including reasonable attorneys’

fees and nontaxable costs, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1988 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h).” The agreement said

that the parties would “attempt without court inter-

vention to resolve the proper amount of Class Coun-

sel’s fees and expenses of litigation.” If the parties

could not reach an agreement, then “|t|/he amount of

any award shall be determined by the Court in accor-

dance with the requirements of applicable law and

procedures.”

That is what happened. Because the parties

could not agree on the amount of fees, the class filed a

motion for the court to make a determination and

award. Id. at 1269-70. It was accompanied by 2,500

pages of billing records, by affidavits from the two

lead counsel for the class, and by affidavits from five

Atlanta area attorneys who were not involved in the

~

case. Id. at 1270, 1290. The motion sought a total of

App. 9

$14,342.860 in fees. Jd. Half of that amount,

$7,171,434.30, was to compensate the attorneys and

their paralegals for the 29,908.73 hours they claimed

to have worked at rates they sought; those rates

ranged from $75 to $495. Id. The other $7,171,434.30

they sought was to be an enhancement of the fee

award for a job well done. Jd.

The defendants objected to some of the hourly

rates requested and to the number of hours claimed.

Id. They broke down the 2,500 pages of submitted

billing records into fifteen categories of hours repre-

senting different stages of the case, and argued that

in fourteen of those categories the plaintiffs’ attorneys

had expended more hours than was reasonably

necessary to effectively represent the class. Jd. at

1273-74 & n.5. The defendants also argued that many

of the entries on the billing records were too vague to

support a claim for compensation. /d. at 1274.

As for the request that the fee award be doubled

by means of a $7 million enhancement, the defen-

dants objected, arguing that this was not one of the

rare cases in which an enhancement would be appro-

priate. They argued that enhancing the fee based on

the results obtained would be improper because the

skill of the plaintiffs’ attorneys in litigating the case

would already have been taken into account in set-

ting their hourly rates. Double counting the skill

factor would be inappropriate, the defendants argued.

The district court overruled all of the defendants’

objections to the hourly rates sought by the plaintiffs’

App. 10

attorneys. Jd. at 1285. It granted in full each hourly

rate requested, ranging from $215 to $495 for plain-

tiffs’ attorneys, depending on their relative skill and

experience. /d. at 1284-85. The court did not reduce

the requested rates at all even though some of them

were New York rates instead of Atlanta rates, and

even though some of the attorneys (for example,

Marcia Robinson Lowry, one of the two lead attor-

neys) recently had been awarded a smaller hourly

rate for work on another case of exactly the same

type. Jd. at 1284-86. Likewise, the court approved in

full the requested hourly rates of $75 to $150 for

paralegal work. Jd. at 1285.

The district court did partially sustain the defen-

dants’ objection to the number of hours that the

plaintiffs’ attorneys claimed to have worked on the

case. /d. at 1274. The court agreed with the defen-

dants that some of the entries on counsel’s billing

records were vague and that the hours claimed for

eight of the fifteen billing categories were excessive.

Those eight excessively billed categories were: (1)

preparing the complaint and mandatory disclosures;

(2) litigating the preliminary injunction motion; (3)

producing and analyzing documents; (3) [sic] litigat-

ing discovery motions; (4) [sic] conferencing with each

other; (5) |sic] preparing expert witness reports;

(6) [sic] responding to the summary judgment motion;

(7) [sic] preparing for trial; and (8) [sic] travel. /d. at

1274-84, 1286.

The court dealt with the vague and excessive

billing two ways, one for the non-travel hours and the

App. 11

other for travel hours. It made “an across-the-board

15% reduction in the number of non-travel related

hours claimed by plaintiffs’ counsel.” Jd. at 1286. This

15 percent reduction amounted to 4,371.22 hours

being sliced off the 29,141.46 total number of non-

travel hours for which the attorneys had requested

compensation. In dollar terms, that amounted to a

reduction of $1,040,176.92 in non-travel related

attorneys’ fees. To remedy the vagueness and exces-

sive billing problem as it related to travel hours, the

court halved the hourly rate, thereby effectively

halving the number of travel hours that were com-

pensated from 767.27 to 383.64, which amounted to a

reduction of $118,460.75. When travel and non-travel

fees are considered together, the court reduced the

overall $7,171,434.30 fee request by $1,158,631.40,

which amounted to an overall reduction of 16 percent.

After the reductions, the total award was $6,012,802.90

before enhancement. /d.

On the applicability of an enhancement to the fee

request, the court overruled the defendants’ objec-

tions. Id. at 1288. The court found that the plaintiffs’

attorneys were entitled to an enhancement because

their hourly rate did “not take into account (1) the

fact that class counsel were required to advance case

expenses of $1.7 million over a three-year period with

no ongoing reimbursement, (2) the fact that class

counsel were not paid on an on-going basis as

the work was being performed, and (3) the fact that

class counsel's ability to recover a fee and expense

App. 12

reimbursement were completely contingent on the

outcome of the case.” Jd. (footnote omitted).

The district court also found that “the superb

quality of |counsel’s] representation far exceeded

what could reasonably be expected for the standard

hourly rates used to calculate the [fee].” Jd. at

1288-89. The court commented that “[qluite simply,

plaintiffs’ counsel brought a higher degree of skill,

commitment, dedication, and professionalism to this

litigation than the Court has seen displayed by the

attorneys in any other case during its 27 years on the

bench.” /d. at 1289. Finally, the court said that an

enhancement was appropriate because “the evidence

establishes that plaintiffs’ success in this case was

truly exceptional.” Jd.

For these reasons, and based on the affidavits of

some Atlanta area attorneys urging the court to

enhance the fee award (even more than it did), the

court multiplied the $6,012,802.90 fee award by 1.75,

thereby enhancing it by 75 percent or $4,509,602.00.

Id. at 1290. That enhancement boosted the total fee

award to $10,522,405.08. Id.

II.

In reviewing the decisions of the district court

raised in this appeal and cross-appeal, we look at

questions of law anew but we review the court's

findings of fact only for clear error. Adanta Journal &

Constitution ov. City of Atlanta Dep't of Aviation,

442 F.3d 1283, 1287 (11th Cir. 2006). The abuse of

App. 13

discretion standard applies to the district court’s

determination of the number of compensable billable

hours, the hourly rate at which plaintiffs’ counsel is

compensated, the award of costs and expenses, and

the enhancement decision. See Am. Civil Liberties

Union of Ga. v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 439 (11th Cir.

1999); Richardson v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 935 F.2d

1240, 1248-49 (11th Cir. 1991). In applying the abuse

of discretion standard, we keep in mind that “[w]hen

a district court has discretion, there are usually a

range of choices it may make and still be affirmed;

there is not only one right choice for the court to

make.” Blasland, Bouck & Lee, Inc. v. City of N.

Miami, 283 F.3d 1286, 1298 (11th Cir. 2002);

McMahan v. Toto, 256 F.3d 1120, 1128 (11th Cir.

2001) (same). This is true “even though we would

have gone the other way had it been our call.” Ras-

bury v. Internal Revenue Serv., 24 F.3d 159, 168 (11th

Cir. 1994).

Of course, “|a] district court by definition abuses

its discretion when it makes an error of law.” Koon v.

United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100, 116 S. Ct. 2035, 2047

(1996); accord Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 333, 115

S. Ct. 851, 870 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“It is

a paradigmatic abuse of discretion for a court to base

its judgment on an erroneous view of the law.”). We

may also find an abuse of discretion if the district

court failed to follow proper procedures in making its

determination, based an award upon findings of fact

that are clearly erroneous, or committed a clear error

of judgment. Johnson v. Breeden, 280 F.3d 1308, 1326

App. 14

(llth Cir. 2002); SunAmerica Corp. v. Sun Life As-

surance Co. of Can., 77 F.3d 1325, 1333 (11th Cir.

1996); BankAtlantic v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber,

Inc., 12 F.3d 1045, 1048 (11th Cir. 1994).

iil.

In their cross-appeal the plaintiffs contend that

the district court abused its discretion in two re-

spects: (1) by not applying the common fund and

common benefit doctrines, which would have resulted

in a fee award substantially higher than the one they

received; and (2) by not compensating them for the

$801,864.40 they spent on expert witness expenses.

The district court resolved each of those two issues

correctly, and we affirm its decision of them on the

basis of the reasoning contained in its opinion. Kenny

A. ITI, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1270-72, 1291-92.

IV.

The defendants conceded in the _ settlement

agreement that the class had prevailed in the litiga-

tion and was entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’

fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. That section provides in

relevant part that in any action, like this one, where

the plaintiffs seek to enforce their constitutional

rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “the court, in its

discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than

the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part

of the costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988tb).

App. 15

In their appeal the defendants contend that the

district court abused its discretion in three ways.

Their first contention is that the district court should

not have awarded the plaintiffs’ attorneys all of the

photocopying expenses they claimed. See Kenny A.

III, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1294-95. Although we probably

would not award the full amount of the claimed

expenses if we were deciding the matter in the first

instance, we cannot say that the district court abused

its discretion in doing so.

V.

We turn now to the defendants’ other conten-

tions, starting with their argument that the district

court erred in calculating the lodestar amount. “The

most useful starting point for determining the

amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours

reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a

reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461

U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939 (1983). The

product of this formula is the “lodestar,” Loranger v.

Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 781 (11th Cir. 1994) (per

curiam), which is “the guiding light of our fee-shifting

jurisprudence,” City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S.

557, 562, 112 S. Ct. 2638, 2641 (1992).

Although the defendants no longer contest the

hourly rate component of the district court’s lodestar

App. 16

calculation, they do contend that the district court

compensated the plaintiffs’ attorneys for an unrea-

sonable number of hours. As we have already

explained, the court essentially cut the total number

of hours submitted by 16 percent because of vague

entries and excessive billing. See supra at 10-11. We

have held that where the billing records are volumi-

nous, as they are here, a district court may make a

reasonable across the board reduction in hours in-

stead of engaging in the pick and shovel work neces-

sary to make a more precise determination. See

Loranger, 10 F.3d at 783. Even so, the defendants

argue, the district court’s cut was unreasonably

shallow — it should have cut much deeper.

The district court’s reduction of only 16 percent

in the submitted hours does appear charitable, maybe

even excessively so, in favor of the plaintiffs’ attor-

neys, but we are not quite convinced that it was a

clear error of judgment, which is what we would have

to conclude in order to find an abuse of discretion. See

Johnson, 280 F.3d at 1326; SunAmerica Corp., 77

F.3d at 1333; BankAtlantic, 12 F.3d at 1048. Even

though we would have cut the billable hours more if

we were deciding the matter in the first instance, we

cannot say that the result the district court reached

’ The defendants did object in the district court that the

hourly rates requested were too high, but they have not raised

that as an issue on appeal. Accordingly, we have no occasion to

pass on that matter. but we do not mean to imply approval of

those hourly rates, which appear to be on the generous side.

App. 17

was outside the range of permissible choices on this

record. See Cook ex rel. Estate of Tessier v. Sheriff of

Monroe County, Fla., 402 F.3d 1092, 1103-1104 (11th

Cir. 2005); Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d 695, 711-

12 (11th Cir. 2004); Rasbury, 24 F.3d at 168.

VI.’

The defendants’ final contention is that the

district court should not have granted plaintiffs’

attorneys a $4.5 million enhancement to the $6

million lodestar amount. That contention can claim

the favor of a presumption, and not a weak one either.

The Supreme Court has instructed us that there is a

“strong presumption” that the lodestar figure, with-

out any adjustment, is the reasonable fee award.

Dague, 505 U.S. at 562, 112 S. Ct. at 2641; Pennsyl-

vania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean A\tr,

478 U.S. 546, 565, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 3098 (1986)

(Delaware Valley 1). That strong presumption can be

rebutted only in “rare” and “exceptional” cases, Dela-

ware Valley I, 478 U.S. at 565, 106 S.Ct. at 3098,

where the fee applicant has shown that without an

’ The views expressed in Parts I-V and Part VII of this

opinion represent the views of a majority of the Court, consisting

of Judges Carnes and Iiill. The views expressed in this part,

Part VI, of this opinion represent the views of the author of this

opinion alone. The views of Judge Hill on the question addressed

in this part are expressed in his separate concurring opinion.

The views of Judge Wilson are expressed in his separate concur-

ring opimion

App. 18

upward adjustment of the lodestar amount the fee

would be unreasonable, Dague, 505 U.S. at 562, 112

S. Ct. at 2641. Even in the rare and exceptional case

where an enhancement is permissible, it must be

“supported by both ‘specific evidence’ on the record

and detailed findings by the lower court.” Delaware

Valley I, 478 U.S. at 565, 106 S. Ct. at 3098.

A.

In order to appreciate just how rare and excep-

tional a case must be for an enhancement of the

lodestar amount to be permissible these days, a

review of the evolution of Supreme Court thinking in

this area is necessary. The history of the issue is one

of early, tentative statements indicating more recep-

tiveness to enhancements than the statements and

holdings of later decisions actually permit. Sugges-

tion has been followed by retrenchment, resulting in

a decisional arc that bends decidedly against en-

hancements.

Hensley, a 1983 decision, was the Court's first

stab at interpreting what Congress meant by a “rea-

sonable fee” under $1988 and similar fee-shifting

statutes. In that case the Court adopted the lodestar

method for calculating fees. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-

34, 103 S. Ct. at 1939-40. In doing so, the Court said

that “|t}he most useful starting point for determining

the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours

reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a

reasonable hourly rate.” /d. at 433, 103 S. Ct. at 1939.

App. 19

It added, however, that this “does not end the in-

quiry,” because “(|t]here remain other ccasiderations

that may lead the district court to adjust the fee

upward or downward, including the important factor

of the ‘results obtained.’” Jd. at 434, 103 S.Ct. at

1940. The context in which that statement was made,

however, was not one of upward enhancement.

Instead, the actual adjustment issue decided in

Hensley was whether the lodestar figure should be

reduced for plaintiffs who have achieved only partial

or limited success. See id. at 426, 103 S. Ct. at 1935-

36 (“The issue in this case is whether a partially

prevailing plaintiff may recover an attorney’s fee for

legal services on unsuccessful claims.”); see also id. at

434-37, 103 S. Ct. at 1940-41. The Court decided that

the fees should be reduced by the amount spent on

claims that do not succeed. Jd. at 440, 103 S. Ct. at

1943 (“Where the plaintiff has failed to prevail on a

claim that is distinct in all respects from his success-

ful claims, the hours spent on the unsuccessful claim

should be excluded in considering the amount of a

reasonable fee.”); see also id. (“[W]here the plaintiff

achieved only limited success, the district court

should award only that amount of fees that is reason-

able in relation to the results obtained.”). Even

though the issue of enhancements was not presented

in Hensley, the opinion does contain this dicta:

“Where a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his

attorney should recover a fully compensatory fee.

Normally this will encompass all hours reasonably

expended on the litigation, and indeed in some cases

App. 20

of exceptional success an enhanced award may be

justified.” Jd. at 435, 103 S. Ct. at 1940. The use of

“may be” instead of “will be” was a harbinger of

decisions to come.

The next term the Supreme Court decided Blum

uv. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 104 S.Ct. 1541 (1984),

which, unlike Hensley, was a case in which the

district court had actually awarded an enhancement.

Jd. at 891, 104S. Ct. at 1545. The court had enhanced

the lodestar figure by 50 percent “because of the

quality of representation, the complexity of the is-

sues, the riskiness of success, and the great benefit to

the large class that was achieved.” Jd. (quotation

omitted). Unimpressed with that reasoning, the

Supreme Court held that awarding the enhancement

was an abuse of discretion. Jd. at 896-902, 104 S. Ct.

at 1547-50.

While repeating the Hensley opinion’s statement

that “in some cases of exceptional success an en-

hanced award may be justified,” id. at 897, 104 S. Ct.

at 1548 (quotation omitted), the Blum Court qualified

that possibility with the statement that the lodestar

amount “is presumed to be the reasonable fee con-

templated by § 1988,” td. The Court then considered

and rejected each of the district court’s four justifica-

tions for the enhancement. It began:

The novelty and complexity of the issues pre-

sumably were fully reflected in the number

of billable hours recorded by counsel and

thus do not warrant an upward adjustment

in a fee based on the number of billable

App. 21

hours times reasonable hourly rates. There

may be cases, of course, where the experi-

ence and special skill of the attorney will re-

quire the expenditure of fewer hours than

counsel normally would be expected to spend

on a particularly novel or complex issue. In

those cases, the special skill and experience

of counsel should be reflected in the reason-

ableness of the hourly rates. Neither com-

plexity nor novelty of the issues, therefore,

is an appropriate factor in determining

whether to increase the basic fee award.

Id. at 898-99, 104 S. Ct. at 1549.

The Blum Court then moved on to the next

factor:

The “quality of representation” ... generally

is reflected in the reasonable hourly rate. It,

therefore, may [note the use, again, of the

word “may” instead of “will”] justify an up-

ward adjustment only in the rare case where

the fee applicant offers specific evidence to

show that the quality of service rendered

was superior to that one reasonably should

expect in light of the hourly rates charged

and that the success was “exceptional.”

Id. at $99, 104 S.Ct. at 1549 (words in brackets

added). Otherwise, the Court said, “an upward ad-

justment for quality of representation is a clear

example of double counting.” Jd. The Court found

the district court’s opinion that “[t]he quality of

work performed by counsel throughout this case was

high,” without any specific evidence to support it,

App. 22

insufficient to justify the enhancement. Jd. at 899-90,

104 S. Ct. at 1549 (quotation omitted).

Regarding the results obtained factor, the Court

reasoned that successful results are to be considered

when calculating counsel’s hourly rate. Jd. at 900, 104

S. Ct. at 1549-50. “Because acknowledgment of the

‘results obtained’ generally will be subsumed within

other factors used to calculate a reasonable fee, it

normally should not provide an independent basis for

increasing the fee award.” Jd. (footnote omitted).

The Blum Court left for another day the question

of whether the risk borne by the plaintiffs’ counsel in

taking the case on a contingency basis could ever

justify an enhancement of the lodestar. Jd. at 901

n.17, 104 S. Ct. at 1550 n.17. Assuming that it could,

however, the Court said that the record did not iden-

tify any specific risks to counsel in that case. /d. at

901, 104 S.Ct. at 1550. Accordingly, the Court va-

cated the portion of the district court’s order enhanc-

ing the plaintiffs’ fees award. /d. at 901-02, 104 S. Ct.

at 1550.

The Court's next “reasonable fee” case was Dela-

ware Valley I.‘ The district court had enhanced the

* In Delaware Valley I, the Court reviewed an attorneys’ fees

award that was ordered pursuant to the Clean Air Act § 304(d),

42 U.S.C. § 7604(d). Delaware Valley I, 478 U.S. at 557, 106

S. Ct. at 3094. The Court held that “!gliven the common purpose

of both § 304(d) and § 1988 to promote citizen enforcement of

important federal policies, we find no reason not to interpret

both provisions governing attorney's fees in the same manner.”

(Continued on following page)

App. 23

plaintiffs’ lodestar calculation in that case because of

the contingent nature of the fee and the quality of

counsel’s work “which culminated in an outstanding

result.” Delaware Valley I, 478 U.S. at 555, 106 S. Ct.

at 3093 (quotation omitted). As it had done in Blum,

the Delaware Valley I Court reviewed the district

court’s reasons for enhancing the fee award and found

all of them wanting. This time the Court did not just

say that there’s a presumption, but emphasized that

there is a “strong presumption” that the lodestar

figure represents the reasonable fee. Jd. at 565, 106

S. Ct. at 3098. The Court explained the basis for that

strong presumption:

A strong presumption that the lodestar

figure — the product of reasonable hours

times a reasonable rate — represents a “rea-

sonable” fee is wholly consistent with the ra-

tionale behind the usual fee-shifting statute,

including the one in the present case. These

statutes were not designed as a form of eco-

nomic relief to improve the financial lot of at-

torneys, nor were they intended to replicate

exactly the fee an attorney could earn

through a private fee arrangement with his

client. Instead, the aim of such statutes was

to enable private parties to obtain legal help

in seeking redress for injuries resulting from

Id. at 560, 106 S. Ct. at 3096. Delaware Valley ] has been applied

to § 1988 cases by this Court, as well. See, e.g., Norman v.

Housing Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1298-99 (11th Cir.

1988)

Id.

App. 24

the actual or threatened violation of specific

federal laws. Hence, if plaintiffs, such as

Delaware Valley, find it possible to engage a

lawyer based on the statutory assurance that

he will be paid a “reasonable fee,” the pur-

pose behind the fee-shifting statute has been

satisfied.

The Court in Delaware Valley I closed some doors

for enhancements that it had left ajar in earlier cases.

It held that the strong presumption that the lodestar

figure is the amount to be awarded — the presumption

against enhancements — cannot be overcome by the

special skill and experience of counsel, the quality of

representation, or the results obtained. Jd. Those

factors, the Court reasoned, “are presumably fully

reflected in the lodestar amount, and thus cannot

serve as independent bases for increasing the basic

fee award.” /d. This is the Court’s reasoning:

[Wjhen an attorney first accepts a case and

agrees to represent the client, he obligates

himself to perform to the best of his ability

and to produce the best possible results

commensurate with his skill and his client's

interests. Calculating the fee award in a

manner that accounts for these factors, ei-

ther in determining the reasonable number

of hours expended on the litigation or in set-

ting the reasonable hourly rate, thus ade-

quately compensates the attorney, and leaves

very little room for enhancing the award

based on his post-engagement performance.

App. 25

In short, the lodestar figure includes most, if

not all, of the relevant factors constituting a

“reasonable” attorney’s fee, and it is unnec-

essary to enhance the fee for superior per-

formance in order to serve the statutory

purpose of enabling plaintiffs to secure legal

assistance.

Id. at 565-66, 106 S. Ct. at 3098. Not using the over-

all quality of performance to enhance the fee removes

“any danger of ‘double counting.” /d. at 566, 106

S. Ct. at 3099.

The Delaware Valley I Court reversed the en-

hancement part of the fee award insofar as the en-

hancement was based on the quality of the attorney’s

work and the outstanding result obtained. Jd. at 568,

106 S. Ct. at 3099-100. It left undecided the question

of whether the enhancement was proper insofar as it

was based on the contingency nature of the fee — the

risk that the attorneys would lose the case and re-

ceive no fees. That issue was to be reargued in the

same case the next term, 7d., 106 S. Ct. at 3100, but

that attempt to decide it misfired when the Court

fractured, with no opinion garnering a majority vote,

see Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for

Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 107 S. Ct. 3078 (1987) (Dela-

ware Valley 11).

It was not until five years later, after the mem-

bership of the Court had changed, that the contin-

gency issue was definitively resolved. In Dague the

Court squarely rejected the proposition that a court

“may enhance the fee award above the ‘lodestar’

App. 26

amount in order to reflect the fact that the party’s

attorneys were retained on a contingent-fee basis and

thus assumed the risk of receiving no payment at all

for their services.” Dague, 505 U.S. at 559, 112 S. Ct.

at 2639.° The Court reasoned that an enhancement

for contingency would duplicate in substantial part

factors that had already been considered in arriving

at the lodestar. It explained that “[tJhe risk of loss in

a particular case (and, therefore, the attorney’s

contingent risk) is the product of two factors: (1) the

legal and factual merits of the claim, and (2) the

difficulty of establishing those merits.” /d. at 562, 112

S. Ct. at 2641.

The second factor, the Court said, is “ordinarily

reflected in the lodestar — either in the higher num-

ber of hours expended to overcome the difficulty, or in

the higher hourly rate of the attorney skilled and

experienced enough to do so.” /d. “Taking account of it

again through lodestar enhancement amounts to

double counting.” Jd. at 563, 112 S. Ct. at 2641.

The Court recognized that, unlike the second

contingency factor, the first one — the relative merits

* The fees in Dague were awarded pursuant to the Solid

Waste Disposal Act § 7002(e), 422 U.S.C. § 6972(e), and the Clean

Water Act § 505(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d). Dague, 505 U.S. at 559,

112 S Ct. at 2639. As it had in Delaware Valley 1, the Dague

Court held that the language of these attorneys’ fees statutes

are “similar to that of many other federal fee-shifting statutes;

our case law construing what is a ‘reasonable’ fee applies

uniformly to all of them.” Jd. at 562, 112 S. Ct. at 2641 ‘citing 42

U.S.C. § 1988).

App. 27

of the claim — is not taken into consideration in

determining the lodestar figure. That is no problem,

the Court decided, because the relative merits of the

claim “should play no part in the calculation of the

award.” Jd. For one thing, there is always a risk that

a case will be lost — “no claim has a 100% chance of

success.” Id. As a result, permitting adjustments

based on risk would mean that the “computation of

the lodestar would never end the court’s inquiry in

contingent-fee cases.” Jd. That would contradict the

Court’s repeated instruction that there is a strong

presumption that the lodestar is the fee to be

awarded and adjustments to it are to be the rare

exception, not the general rule.

Not only that, the Court said, but awarding

enhancements based on the financial risk in taking

the case would also “provide attorneys with the same

incentive to bring relatively meritless claims as

relatively meritorious ones.” Jd. The “social cost of

indiscriminately encouraging nonmeritorious claims”

would be too high, and encouraging attorneys to take

less meritorious cases is “an unlikely objective of the

‘reasonable fees’ provisions.” Jd. at 563, 112 S. Ct. at

2642. Accordingly, the Court concluded that a contin-

gency enhancement is “not consistent with our gen-

eral rejection of the contingent-fee model for fee

awards, nor is it necessary to the determination of a

reasonable fee.” Jd. at 566, 112 S. Ct. at 2643. The

Court in Dague did not merely reverse the application

of a contingency or risk enhancement in that case,

but also ruled out one in any case, “concluding that

App. 28

no contingency enhancement whatever is compatible

with the fee-shifting statutes at issue.” Jd. at 565, 112

S. Ct. at 2643.

The Dague decision is the last word we have from

the Supreme Court on the issue of whether, and if so

when, the lodestar amount may be enhanced in

calculating the attorneys’ fees under one of the fed-

eral fee-shifting statutes.

B.

The district court’s $4.5 million enhancement to

the $6 million lodestar figure in the present case

cannot be squared with the Supreme Court decisions

we have discussed. The district court did not explic-

itly mention, much less give full effect to, the strong

presumption that the lodestar amount is a reasonable

fee and therefore the fee to be awarded. See Dague,

505 U.S. at 562, 112 S. Ct. at 2641 (“We have esiab-

lished a strong presumption that the lodestar repre-

sents the reasonable fee, and have placed upon the

fee applicant who seeks more than that the burden of

showing that such an adjustment is necessary to the

determination of a reasonable fee.” (quotation and

citation omitted)); Delaware Valley I, 478 U.S. at 565,

106 S. Ct. at 3098 (“A strong presumption that the

lodestar figure — the product of reasonable hours

times a reasonable rate — represents a ‘reasonable’ fee

is wholly consistent with the rationale behind the

usual fee-shifting statute, including the one in the

present case.”).

App. 29

The district court relied on several factors in

granting the multi-million dollar enhancement to the

lodestar figure, most of which are cited in the follow-

ing passage from its opinion:

First, the evidence establishes that the

quality of service rendered by class counsel,

including their extraordinary commitment of

capital resources, was far superior to what

consumers of legal services in the legal mar-

ketplace in Atlanta could reasonably expect

to receive for the rates used in the lodestar

calculation. Specifically, the evidence shows

that the hourly rates used in the lodestar

calculation do not take into account (1) the

fact that class counsel were required to ad-

vance case expenses of $1.7 million over a

three-year period with no ongoing reim-

bursement, (2) the fact that class counsel

were not paid on an on-going basis as the

work was being performed, ard (3) the fact

that c’ iss counsel’s ability to recover a fee

and expense reimbursement were completely

contingent on the outcome of the case.FN8

(Chandler Decl. 49 5-8; Fellows Decl. 94 5-8;

Knowles Decl. GQ 7-12; Rawls Decl. 9 5-8;

Lowry Decl. 4 25; Bramlett Decl. 7] 7(a) &

10, 13-14.)

FN8. A lodestar enhancen.i can-

not be based on contingency alone.

City of Burlington v. Dague, 505

U.S. 557, 112 S. Ct. 2638 (1992). In

this case, however, the risk of non-

recovery is only one of several fac-

tors which, taken together, establish

App. 30

a level of service well beyond what

could reasonably be expected for the

rates claimed.

Kenny A., 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1288 (citations omitted).

None of the three factors the district court relied on

in that passage to justify boosting the award is a

proper basis for doing so.

1.

Starting from the end of the list, the district

court’s reliance on the quality of service and superior

performance, which are essentially the same thing,

conflicts with the Supreme Court’s teachings that

those considerations are adequately accounted for

“either in determining the reasonable number of

hours expended on the litigation or in setting the

reasonable hourly rates,” and that it is “unnecessary

to enhance the fee for superior performance in order

to serve the statutory purpose of enabling plaintiffs to

secure legal assistance.” Delaware Valley I, 478 U.S.

at 565-66, 106 S. Ct. at 3098; see also id. at 565, 106

S. Ct. at 3098 (“Hence, if plaintiffs ... find it possible

to engage a lawyer based on the statutory assurance

that he will be paid a ‘reasonable fee,’ the purpose

behind the fee-shifting statute has been satisfied.”).

In this case, the district court specifically considered

“the stellar performance of plaintiffs’ counsel

throughout this long and difficult case” in approving

their hourly rates, which reached $450 and $495 for

lead counsel. Kenny A. III, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1284,

1286. Having already been used to increase the

App. 31

lodestar amount, the quality of the services rendered

and superior performance could not also be used to

enhance the lodestar amount that had been calcu-

lated using those higher rates. See Delaware Valley 1,

478 U.S. at 565, 106 S. Ct. at 3098. Double counting

simply is not allowed.

It was after the successful settlement had been

achieved, after they knew how well they had per-

formed, after they knew the degree of difficulty

involved, and after they knew how much capital

resources and legal effort had been required that the

plaintiffs’ attorneys asked for hourly rates they

thought that they deserved. Over the objections of the

defendants, the district court gave them those rates

in full. It did not reduce a single hourly rate for any

attorney or paralegal by so much as a penny.”

In requesting their hourly rates, the lead counsel

for the plaintiffs represented that those rates were

adequate, subject to considerations they specified, to

compensate them. Marcia Robinson Lowry, one of the

two lead counsel, testified by affidavit that:

The standard hourly rates reflected in

Exhibit 2 are fair, reasonable, and consistent

with hourly rates in the Atlanta market

for the price of legal services of comparable

* The district court did cut the hourly rates for travel time

in half, but not in order to lower the rates. Instead, the reduc-

tion was the court’s way of correcting for the attorneys’ excessive

billing of time Kenny A. JI], 454 F Supp. 2d at 1284.

App. 32

quality rendered in cases demanding similar

skill, judgment and performance. These

standard hourly rates do not, however, take

into account the fact that class counsel was

required in this case to advance the entire

$1.7 million expense of prosecuting this case

for the benefit of the class, or the fact that

class counsel’s compensation was totally con-

tingent upon prevailing in this action.

Jeffrey O. Bramlett, the other lead counsel,

testified by affidavit that: “The hourly rates set forth

in Exhibit 1 correctly reflect the hourly rates my law

firm currently charges and collects from clients who

hire us to perform legal services on a Standard

Hourly Rate basis.” However, he further testified:

Standard Hourly Rates are predicated

on the assumptions that the client will pay

in full on a 30-60 day cycle, that counsel is

not required to shoulder any significant fi-

nancial risk of unreimbursed case expense,

and that counsel will be paid currently re-

gardless of the result ultimately achieved.

Here, Class Counsel was forced to advance

case expenses approaching $1.7 million to

protect the Class’ interests, largely because

State Defendants refused Plaintiffs’ sugges-

tion of a neutral case record review that

would have saved both sides (and ultimately

the State) duplicative cost. Here, Class

Counsel was forced to personally advance

Plaintiffs’ portion of that cost in the face of

State Defendants’ vigorous assertion that it

would not and could not be recovered. Here,

App. 33

Class Counsel’s recovery of any cost, let

alone fee, was utterly dependent upon the

contingency of a successful result. Here,

Class Counsel was forced to invest more

than $8.85 million of professional time and

out-of-pocket expense over a three-and-one-

half year period with no assurance of any re-

covery.

There is no indication that Mr. Bramlett’s firm’s

regular hourly rates are anywhere near the low side

of the Atlanta legal market or even the midpoint.

The position that the two lead counsel took in

their affidavits is that the hourly rates used to calcu-

late the lodestar figure were the saine rates paying

clients would have been charged. They each repre-

sented that those rates would fully compensate them

except for three facts that the district court listed in

its opinion: “(1) the fact that class counsel were

required to advance case expenses of $1.7 million over

a three-year period with no ongoing reimbursement,

(2) the fact that class counsel were not paid on an on-

going basis as the work was being performed, and (3)

the fact that class counsel’s ability to recover a fee

and expense reimbursement were completely contin-

gent on the outcome of the case.” Kenny A. Ill, 454

F. Supp. 2d at 1288.

y

a.

The first two of those three considerations are

delayed payment factors, and if they were permissible

bases for enhancing a fee award, an enhancement

App. 34

would be required in virtually every class action

covered by one of the traditional federal fee-shifting

statutes. It is a rare § 1983 action where those whose

rights have been violated finance the cost of the

litigation. Attorneys for the plaintiffs in these types of

cases almost always have to advance the cost of the

litigation and do not receive any payment for their

time until the case is completed. That is simply the

nature of the beast. If the delays in reimbursement

for costs and payment for services that these cases

inevitably entail justified enhancement, there would

be an enhancement in almost every case. We know

that cannot be, because the Supreme Court has

instructed us that we must employ a strong presump-

tion against enhancements and confine them to the

rare and exceptional case. Dague, 505 U.S. at 562,

112 S. Ct. at 2641; Delaware Valley I, 478 U.S. at 565,

106 S. Ct. at 3098.

Particularly instructive on this point is some of

the Supreme Court’s reasoning in concluding that

there could be no enhancement for the contingency

nature of a case — for the risk that the plaintiffs

would not be paid at all for the costs they advanced

and the time they expended. See Dague, 505 U.S. at

563, 112 S. Ct. at 2641. Because there is always a risk

that a case will be lost, permitting enhancements

based on the degree of risk would mean that calcula-

tion of the lodestar would never end the ir.gquiry ina

contingent-fee case, and that, the Court decided,

would be unacceptable. /d. Likewise, permitting

enhancements for the delay in compensation for

f

App. 35

expenses incurred and services rendered would mean

that calculation of the lodestar would be merely the

first step, not the presumptive last step in the proc-

ess. That would be unacceptable.

Finally, we have said that any delay in payment

for professional services rendered is offset by the fact

that the hourly rates used are those that prevail at

the completion of the case instead of the usually

lower rates that were in effect at the time the earlier

work was done. See Norman, 836 F.2d at 1302

(“{Wjhere there is a delay the court should take into

account the time value of money and the effects of

inflation and generally award compensation at cur-

rent rates rather than at historic rates.”). In this

case, as in most, the hourly rates used were those in

effect after the case had been completed. (See

R32:495-Ex.C:]6) (“The hourly rates set forth in

Exhibit 1 correctly reflect the hourly rates my firm

currently charges and collects from clients who hire

us to perform legal services on a Standard Hourly

Rate basis.”). That covers two of the three factors the

district court relied on in determining that the hourly

rates were underinclusive and an enhancement was

warranted. Kenny A. I/1, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1288.

3.

The third factor was the contingent nature of the

case. Enhancing a lodestar based on contingency is

flatly forbidden by the Dague decision. The district

court wes under the mistaken impression that the

App. 36

Dague rule forbids only an enhancement based on

contingency alone. Jd. at 1288 n.8. The rule is not so

limited. The Supreme Court’s description of the

scope of its holding leaves no wiggle room. The Court

stated that it was “concluding that no contingency

enhancement whatever is compatible with the fee-

shifting statutes at issue.” Dague, 505 U.S. at 565,

112 S. Ct. at 2643. In case anyone missed the point of

that, the Court unequivocally stated in the penulti-

mate sentence of its opinion: “[Wle hold that en-

hancement for contingency is not permitted under the

fee-shifting statutes at issue.” /d. at 567, 112 S. Ct. at

2643-44. Period.

Even if we were to go beyond that clear language

of the Supreme Court’s command, the reasons it gave

for concluding that contingency enhancements are

incompatible with the fee-shifting statutes apply with

equal force to using contingency as one of severai

reasons for an enhancement. For example, taking the

risk of loss into account both in the lodestar and in an

enhancement amounts to double counting the diffi-

culty of the case, id. at 562-63, 112 S.Ct. at 2641,

regardless of whether contingency is the sole en-

hancement factor. No double counting means no

double counting. Allowing contingency to figure into

an enhancement to any extent would also provide

attorneys with an incentive to bring relatively merit-

less claims. See id. at 563, 112 S. Ct. at 2642; see also

id. at 566, 112 S. Ct. at 2643 (“Contingency enhance-

ment would make the setting of fees more complex

and arbitrary, hence more unpredictable, and hence

App. 37

more litigable.”). That, the Court reasoned, would be

bad. Dague, 505 U.S. at 566, 112 S. Ct. at 2643.

In summary, none of the three factors that the

district court enumerated as a basis for determining

that the professional services rendered by plaintiffs’

counsel were “far superior to what consumers of legal

services in the legal marketplace in Atlanta could

reasonably expect to receive for the rates used in the

lodestar calculation,” Kenny A. III, 454 F. Supp. 2d at

1288, is a permissible basis for enhancing the lode-

star amount. An enhancement based on them is

inconsistent with controlling Supreme Court deci-

sions.

4.

Making a further attempt to justify the en-

hancement, the district court also stated that:

In addition, based on its personal obser-

vation of plaintiffs’ counsel's performance

throughout this litigation, the Court finds

that the superb quality of their representa-

tion far exceeded what could reasonably be

expected for the standard hourly rates used

to calculate the lodestar. Quite simply, plain-

tiffs’ counsel brought a higher degree of skill,

commitment, dedication, and professionalism

to this litigation than the Court has seen

displayed by the attorneys in any other case

during its 27 years on the bench. The foster

children of Fulton and DeKalb Counties were

indeed fortunate to have such unparalleled

App. 38

legal representation, and the Court would be

remiss if it failed to compensate counsel for

this extraordinary level of service to their

clients.

Id. at 1288-89. This rationale is little more than a

restatement of the district court’s position that the

lodestar amount should be enhanced because of the

quality of the representation. Two points about that.

First, the district court itself found that plaintiffs’

attorneys had submitted vague records and overbilled

in eight of fifteen categories, forcing the court to cut

more than 4,700 hours off those they claimed,

amounting to a reduction of more than $1 million of

billable time. See supra at 10-11. And, as we have

indicated, if anything, the district court was too kind

to plaintiffs’ attorneys in that respect. See supra at

15-17. Any kindness aside, in Delaware Valley J the

Supreme Court held that the “elimination of a large

number of hours on the grounds that they were

unnecessary, unreasonable, or unproductive is not

supportive of the court’s later conclusion that the

remaining hours represented work of ‘superior qual-

ity."” Delaware Valley 1, 478 U.S. at 567, 106 S. Ct. at

3099; see generally id. at 554 n.2, 106 S. Ct. at 3093

n.2. The holding reflects the common sense idea that

bad and excessive billing is inconsistent with superb

lawyering. The district court failed to consider that

inconsistency in its findings.

The second, and more fundamental, point about

the district court’s reliance on the quality of the

App. 39

representation as a ground for enhancing the lodestar

amount is that it amounts to double counting and is

contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in Delaware

Valley I. As we have already explained, in that deci-

sion the Court reversed an enhancement for superior

performance, holding that “the special skill and

experience of counsel” and “the quality of representa-

tion” are “presumably fully reflected in the lodestar

amount, and thus cannot serve as independent bases

for increasing the basic fee award.” Delaware Valley I,

478 U.S. at 565, 106 S. Ct. at 3098 (quotation and

citation omitted); see also id. at 566, 106 S.Ct. at

3098 (“In short, the lodestar figure includes most, if

not all, of the relevant factors constituting a ‘reason-

able’ attorney’s fee, and it is unnecessary to enhance

the fee for superior performance in order to serve the

statutory purpose of enabling plaintiffs to secure legal

assistance.” (emphasis added)).'

' The Court in Delaware Valley I also said that “[bJlecause

considerations concerning the quality of a prevailing party’s

counsel's representation normally are reflected in the reasonable

hourly rate, the overall quality of performance ordinarily should

not be used to adjust the lodestar, thus removing any danger of

‘double counting.” Delaware Valley I, 478 U.S. at 566, 106 S. Ct.

at 3099. Judge Wilson’s concurring opinion reads the words

“normally” and “ordinarily” to eviscerate the Court’s clear

instruction that “it is unnecessary to enhance the fee for supe

rior performance in order to serve the statutory purpose of

enabling plaintiffs to secure legal assistance.” Jd. That reading,

which infers too much from two words, would license courts to

award enhancements for superior performance or results in any

case where the performance or result was anything better than

“ordinary” or “normal,” thereby contradicting the Court's clear

(Continued on following page)

App. 40

The final reason the district court gave for the

$4.5 million enhancement was that “plaintiffs’ success

in this case was truly exceptional.” Kenny A. III, 454

F. Supp. 2d at 1289. The result was so good, the court

said, that: “After 58 years as a practicing attorney

and federal judge, the Court is unaware of any other

case in which a plaintiff class has achieved such a

favorable result on such a comprehensive scale.” /d.

at 1290. Not only that, but the district court also said

that “even if the plaintiffs had prevailed in a trial of

this case, it is doubtful that they would have obtained

relief as ‘intricately detailed and comprehensive’ as

that contained in the Consent Decree.” Jd. at 1289-90.

To the extent that the district court rewarded

plaintiffs’ counsel with an enhancement for obtaining

better results than the class would have received had

the case been resolved on the merits, that is plainly

wrong. The purpose of the fee-shifting statutes, as the

Supreme Court explained in Delaware Valley I, is “to

enable private parties to obtain legal help in seeking

redress for injuries resulting from the actual or

threatened violation of specific federal laws.” Dela-

ware Valley I, 478 U.S. at 565, 106 S. Ct. at 3098. The

statutes are designed to ensure that civil rights

instruction that there is a strong presumption against an

enhancement for any reason and that they should rarely be

granted for any reason. 7d. at 565, 106 S.Ct. at 3098. That

reading would also be inconsistent with much of what the Court

has said on the subject, contradicting, for example, the clear

implication of the Court’s later teachings in the Dayue case. See

infra at 40-42

App. 41

plaintifls are adequately represented by counsel. See

Hensley. 461 U.S. at 429, 103 S.Ct. at 1937 (“The

purpose of § 1988 is to ensure ‘effective access to the

judicial process’ for persons with civil rights griev-

ances.” (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1558, at 1 (1976))).

For that reason, a fee award should “result| } in fees

which are adequate to attract competent counsel, but

which do not produce windfalls to attorneys.” Blum,

465 U.S. at 893-94, 104 S.Ct. at 1546 (quoting S.

Rep. No. 94-1011, at 6 (1976), reprinted in 1976

U.S.C.A.A.N. [sic] 5908, 5913).

Stated from the other direction, the fee-shifting

statutes are not designed to provide representation

that will win plaintiffs more than a correct applica-

tion of substantive and remedial law entitles them to

receive. Their purpose is not to provide representa-

tion that will secure settlement relief that is more

“intricately detailed and comprehensive,” Kenny A.

III, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1289-90, than the plaintiffs

would have received if their claims had been litigated

to final judgment. The purpose of the statutes, most

assuredly, is not to provide plaintiffs with representa-

tion that dazzles or bedazzles the district court judge.

Fee awards should be calculated in a way that fur-

thers the purpose of the fee-shifting statutes; they

should not be used to encourage or reward results

that go bevond that purpose. See Blum, 465 U.S at

893-95, 104 S. Ct. at 1546-47.

Some of the discussion in the Dagwe opinion is

useful in understanding why enhancements should

not he given for merits-exceeding results. As we have

App. 42

recounted, in that case the Supreme Court rejected

the idea of enhancements for contingency or risk of

loss in part because permitting them would provide

attorneys with some incentive to bring relatively

meritless claims. Dague, 505 U.S. at 563, 112 S. Ct. at

2641-42. The social cost of encouraging attorneys to

press claims of dubious merit would be too high, the

Court reasoned, and providing attorneys with incen-

tives to bring them is “an unlikely objective of the

‘reasonable fees’ provision.” 7d. at 563, 112 S. Ct. at

2643.

A result that obtains more or better relief than

plaintiffs are entitled to receive under the law is, to

the extent it exceeds their entitlement on the merits,

analogous to relief on a meritless claim. Just as

Dague instructs us that fee awards should not un-

derwrite efforts to obtain relief where none is due

under the law, neither should they underwrite efforts

to receive more or better relief than that due under

the law. Just as the societal costs for fee awards for

non-meritorious claims are too high, so also are they

too high for results that exceed what the law allows.

Just as encouraging non-meritorious claims cannot

have been an objective of the fee-shifting provisions,

neither can encouraging results that go beyond what

the law allows have been an objective.

To put it in an either-or manner, superb results

are either what a fair application of the law produces,

which means that they are not truly “su erb,” or they

are results that exceed what the law allows and for

that reason are beyond the purpose of the fee shifting

App. 43

statutes. Those statutes are designed to provide a

reasonable fee for a reasonable result, not an ex-

traordinary fee for a result that gocs beyond what the

law would provide if the claims were litigated to their

correct conclusion on the merits.

Look at it this way. A merits-exceeding result for

plaintiffs must be the product of one, or some combi-

nation, of the following factors: superior lawyering by

plaintiffs’ counsel, bad lawyering by defendants’

counsel, poor decision making by the court, or dumb

luck. The Supreme Court held in Delaware Valley J

that superior lawyering by the plaintiffs’ counsel is

not a proper basis for an enhancement. Delaware

Valley I, 478 U.S. at 565-68, 106 S. Ct. at 3098-100.

So, the first possible cause of results that go beyond

the merits cannot be used to justify an enhancement.

Nor can it plausibly be argued that plaintiffs’ attor-

neys ought to reap a windfall, and defendants ought

to have to pay more in fees than they otherwise

should, because of bad lawvyering on the defense side.

Surely a defendant suffers enough from the addi-

tional relief granted against it because of inferior

representation without making the defendant pay a

surcharge to the other side for the privilege of having

been the victim of bad lawyering. Nor can it be ar-

gued, with tongue out of cheek, that fees should be

increaseo to reward plaintiffs’ attorneys for being on

the side that happens to benefit from bad judging or

good luck. That exhausts the possible explanations

for excessively favorable results, and none supports

awarding an enhancement.

App. 44

5.

The district court relied to some extent on four of

the five affidavits that the plaintiffs’ attorneys in this

case obtained from their friends who do similar work.

Kenny A. III, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1290." The district

court found that the affiants were “disinterested

Atlanta attorneys.” Jd. That finding is clearly errone-

ous. At oral argument, one of the two lead counsel for

the plaintiffs conceded that he not only had recruited

these attorneys to provide the affidavits but that in

the past he had also supplied some cf them with

similar affidavits to help boost their own fee awards.”

" It is unclear why, in its discussion of the affidavits, the

district court omitted any discussion of the one signed by Ralph

Goldberg. See Kenny A. Ill, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1290. For the

sake of completeness, we will include it in our discussion.

Four of the five affidavits indicate that they are from

attorneys who practice regularly as plaintiffs’ lawyers depending

on attorneys’ fee awards. The lone exception is John Chandler,

whose affidavit indicates that although most of his work has

been on the defense side he has also served as counse! for some

plaintiffs’ classes.

* Court: Who selected those lawyers who served as

experts?

Bramlett: I sought those witnesses out. I mean the

Court didn’t say -

Court: 1 would be shocked if you told me you had

never filed an affidavit for one of them

Bramlett: You would be shocked and that would be in-

correct. But, but the fact is that all four of

these lawyers are highly experienced, highly

competent, have practiced law in the Atlanta

market -

(Continued on following page)

App. 45

Aside from the need to support those who support

them, the lawyers who signed the affidavits have a

financial interest in keeping the fee award in this

case and every case like it as high as possible. The

higher this fee award is the more useful it will be as

precedent for the lawyer signing the affidavit when

he seeks a high fee award in his own cases. The

affiants are anything but “disinterested.”"’

The lodestar amount will never suffice for attor-

neys who practice in this area. They will always

believe, in all sincerity, that they deserve more and

that the justice system will function better if they are

paid more. Lawyers who handle these kinds of cases

cannot be disinterested witnesses because they are

financially interested. To state this is not to slam

lawyers in general or plaintiffs’ lawyers in particular.

It simply recognizes that because self-interest is

hard-wired into human circuitry, no group is disinter-

ested when it comes to the question of what members

Court: And highly interested in keeping the rates up

and the multipliers as high as possible -

Bramlett: Ah.

* The concurring opinion states that “lilt cannot be rea-

sonably contended that the able and experienced district judge

in this case never considered the possibility that the affiants .. .

could derive an indirect benefit from the precedential value of a

high fee award.” See infra at &3-84 (Wilson, J., concurring

specially). Actually, the able and experienced district court judge

himself explicitly found that the affilant attorneys were “disin-

terested.” That finding, which underlay any credit the court

gave to the affidavits, is clearly erroneous. It just is not true.

App. 46

of the group are to be paid. Cf. H.L. Mencken, A Little

Book in C Major 22 (John Lane Co. 1916) (“It is hard

to believe that a man is telling the truth when you

know that you would lie if you were in his place.”).

Aside from the obvious self-interest of the affi-

ants, the contents of the affidavits that were filed in

this case are also flawed in other ways. For example,

in each of them the affiant solemnly swore that the

amount of compensable time claimed in this case was

“reasonable,” was “reasonable, fair, and fully com-

pensable,”” or was “fair, reasonable, and fully deserv-

ing of adequate and full compensation.” Yet, we

know those assertions are not true. As we have al-

ready noted, the district court found that plaintiffs

had inflated the number of hours for which they were

due compensation in most of the fifteen billing cate-

gories and by a substantial amount. Kenny A. III, 454

F. Supp. 2d at 1274-84, 1286; supra at 10-11. The

court’s finding, which is being affirmed by this Court,

that the hours submitted were not reasonable contra-

dicts a key premise in every one of the lawyer affiants.

All five of the affidavits urged the district court

to enhance the fee award based on the fact that

(R32:495:Ex.F:4 (affidavit of John Chandler):

(R32:495:Ex.G:4) (affidavit of Henry D. Fellows, Jr.):

(R32:495:Ex.H:4) (affidavit of James C. Rawls).

* (R32:495:Ex.E:4-5) (affidavit of Ralph Goldberg).

" (R32:495:Ex.D:5) ‘affidavit of Kalph 1. Knowles, Jr.)

(emphasis omitted).

App. 47

plaintiffs’ counsel advanced the cost of expenses."

That is not a permissible basis for an enhancement.

See supra at 32-34. All of the affidavits urged the

court to enhance the fee award because of the risk or

contingency factor.’ That, too, is an impermissible

factor for an enhancement, as the concurring opinion

in this case concedes. See infra at 82 (Wilson, J.,

concurring specially). The Supreme Court itself has

specifically ruled it out. See supra at 34-36. Four of

the affidavits even urged the court to base its fee

award on the common fund or common benefit doc-

trines,” which the district court correctly concluded

was not legally permissible or even possible. See

Kenny A. III, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1270-72; supra at 14.

The fact that the opinions expressed in all five of the

affidavits were based on consideration of several

improper factors makes any finding of the district

court based on the affidavits clearly erroneous, and it

* (R32:495:Ex.D:6-8, 11) (affidavit of Ralph Ll. Knowles,

Jr.); (R32:495:Ex.E:5-6) (‘affidavit of Ralph Goldberg);

(R32:495:Ex.F:4-5) (affidavit of John Chandler);

(R32:495:Ex.G:4-5) (affidavit of Henry D. Fellows, Jr.);

(R32:495:Ex.H:4-5) (affidavit of James C. Rawls).

" (R32:495:Ex.D:6-8, 11) (affidavit of Ralph I. Knowles,

Jr), (R32:495:Ex.E:5-6) (‘affidavit of Ralph Goldberg):

(R32:495:Ex.F:4-5) ‘affidavit of John Chandler);

(R32:495:Ex.G:4-5) ‘(affidavit of Henry D. Fellows, Jr.);

(R32:495:Ex.H:4-5) (affidavit of James C. Rawls).

(R32:495:Ex.D:8) (affidavit of Ralph I. Knowles, Jr):

(R382.495:Ex.F:5) (affidavit of John Chandler), (R382.495:.Ex.G:4-

5) (affidavit of Henry 1D. Fellows, Jr): (R32:495:Ex.H:5) affidavit

of James C. Rawls).

App. 48

renders any reliance the court placed on those affida-

vits an abuse of discretion. As we have recognized,

“li]t would be a paradigmatic abuse of discretion for a

court to base its judgment on an erroneous view of

the law.” McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1173 (11th

Cir. 2008) (internal marks omitted) (quoting Schlup v.

Delo, 513 U.S. at 333, 115 S. Ct. at 870 (O’Connor, J.,

concurring)); see also Koon, 518 U.S. at 100, 116 S. Ct.

at 2047 (“A district court by definition abuses its

discretion when it makes an error of law.”); United

States v. Hall, 349 F.3d 1320, 1323 (11th Cir. 2003)

(explaining that if a district court decision is “based

on an error of law, then it is by definition an abuse of

discretion”). It is no less an abuse of discretion for a

district court to base its decision on affidavits that

are themselves based on legally error.eous assump-

tions.

Were it otherwise, there would be no end to

enhancements and no limit to them. In every case

where an established member of the Bar seeks an

enhancement he will be able to get his colleagues who

are interested in keeping fee awards as high as

possible to sign affidavits stating that the only thing

that will ensure adequate representation in cases like

that one is a multi-million dollar enhancement. And

some district court judges will credit those interested

affiants as “disinterested attorneys.”

But none of this and none of the multiple, spe-

cific, and serious defects in the affidavits that were

filed in this case should obscure the more fundamen-

tal point, which is that enhancements for superior

App. 49

performance and results are not permissible, no

matter how much the interested members of this

particular segment of the Bar might want them to be.

See supra at 36-42. Supreme Court decisions cannot

be overruled by affidavits.

6.

Our conclusion that the enhancement to the

lodestar amount in this case was improper does not

mean that one will never be appropriate under any

circumstances. If, as the Supreme Court has in-

structed us, the proper calculation of the lodestar

amount leaves “very little room” for enhancements,

which may be proper only in “rare” and “exceptional”

cases, Delaware Valley I, 478 U.S. at 565-66, 106

S. Ct. at 3098, where is that little room — and what

are those rare and exceptional cases that may fit

within it? We can think of some.

Suppose, for example, that an attorney's repre-

sentation vindicates the federal rights of an unpopu-

lar client and as a result that attorney suffers a loss

of standing in the community which damages his

practice and income. The kind of situation we have in

mind was discussed by Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr.,

albeit not on the issue of enhancing a_ lodestar

amount. Actually, the discussion came before the

enactment of the § 1988 fee-shifting statute and was

in the context of deciding the amount of fees that

should be awarded by the court through the exercise

of its equitable power. NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp.

App. 50

703 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff’d in relevant part, 493 F.2d

614 (5th Cir. 1974). In deciding how much the attor-

ney should receive, Judge Johnson stated:

[A] lawyer representing black plaintiffs in an

employment discrimination case, or in any

civil rights litigation, is likely to suffer social,

political and community ostracism. This like-

lihood is multiplied, of course, in a case such

as the present one in which plaintiffs have

sued high-ranking state officials and have al-

leged and proved racial discrimination. Even

more damaging to an attorney involved in

such litigation is the probability that he will

be estranged from other members of his pro-

fession who are unwilling to participate in,

or even lend moral support to, suits seeking

to vindicate the public good.

Id. at 710.

We hope that three-and-a-half decades after

those words were written in the Allen case attorneys

who represent victims of racial discrimination no

longer suffer social, political, or professional ostra-

cism. But attorneys who represent other types of

plaintiffs might. It could happen to an attorney who

represents a pedophile attacking a sexual offender

registration law on Due Process grounds, or perhaps

to an attorney in a small Bible Belt town who suc-

ceeds in having a popular public religious practice

enjoined as contrary to the Establishment Clause.

Whether those circumstances, and others we have not

mentioned, would be proper ones for enhancing the

App. 51

lodestar amount are issues for other days. For now it

is enough to recognize the possibility and to point out

that the “rare” and “exceptional” circumstances that

we have mentioned would be more likely to fit within

the “very little room” that the Supreme Court has

told us is left for enhancements. Delaware Valley I,

478 U.S. at 565-66, 106 S. Ct. at 3098. The Supreme

Court decisions on fee-shifting do not clearly preclude

an enhancement of the lodestar amount in those

circumstances. And an enhancement in those circum-

stances is less likely to result in double counting, or

to encourage meritless lawsuits, or to go beyond the

basic purpose of the fee-shifting statutes than the

enhancement that the district court awarded in this

case does.

Representing children who find themselves in

foster care is not the same as representing activist

atheists in the Bible Belt or pedophiles anywhere.

The plaintiffs’ attorneys in this case do not, and

reasonably could not, claim to have suffered any

social or professional ostracism, nor do they contend

that their victory here will somehow damage their

legal practice. To the contrary, vindicating the rights

of helpless children is the kind of accomplishment

that brings professional accolades and enhances one’s

standing in the community. It is to that type of en-

hancement, instead of a monetary one, that the

attorneys must look for any satisfaction beyond the

$6.012,802.90 they are already receiving for their

work in this case.

App. 52

And Mr. Bramlett, for one, has done so. The

“Attorney Profile” on his law firm’s website boasted of

his “track record of results in class action litigation,”

listing three of his biggest successes.’ The one that

was discussed the most was described as follows:

Prosecution of class action in conjunction

with New York’s Children’s Rights, Inc. re-

sulting in systematic reform of State of

Georgia’s dysfunctional foster care system

and establishing that foster children have a

right to counsel.

The federal judge who presided over the

case for Georgia’s foster children wrote of the

work performed by the legal team led by Jeff

and Marcia Robinson Lowry of New York’s

Childrens’ Rights, Inc.: “{P]laintiffs’ counsel

brought a higher degree of skill, commit-

ment, dedication and professionalism to this

litigation than the Court has seen displayed

by the attorneys in any other case during its

27 years on the bench... . After 58 years asa

practicing attorney and federal judge, the

Court is unaware of any other case in which

a plaintiff class has achieved such a favor-

able result on such a comprehensive scale.”

454 F. Supp. 2d at 1289-90.""

~~ Bondurant, Mixson & Elmore LLP, Jeffrey O. Bramlett

Attorney Profile, httpy/www.atlantageorgiatnallawyers.com/attorneys/

business_torts_lawver_bramlett. html (last visited Dec 8, 2007).

* Bondurant, Mixson & Elmore LLP. Jeffrey O Bramlett

Attorney Profile, http://www.atlantageorgiatriallawyers.com/

(Continued on following page)

App. 53

The profile also recounted that Mr. Bramlett received

the Elbert P. Tuttle Jurisprudence Award from the

Anti-Defamation League “for dedication to justice and

fair treatment for all people.”” He received that

award in 2007 and he was also chosen as President-

elect of the Georgia State Bar that same year.” Those

honors came the year after the judgment that he

helped secure was entered in this lawsuit. It appears

that, if anything, Mr. Bramlett’s professional stand-

ing and prestige, as well as his earning ability, have

been enhanced as a result of his service as one of the

lead counsel for the foster children.

The other co-lead counsel for the foster children

in this ease has not suffered any reduction in profes-

sional standing or livelihood because of her work in it,

either. To the contrary, what she did in this case has

furthered her credentials, her rep:itation, her chosen

lifework, and the purpose of her organization. Marcia

Robinson Lowry has litigated on behalf of children’s

welfare for more than a quarter of a century. She has

“directed major litigation efforts in jurisdictions

attornevs/business_torts_lawyer_bramlett.htm] ‘last visited Dec.

8, 2007).

“ Bondurant, Mixson & Elmore LLP, Jeffrey O. Bramlett

Attorney Profile, http://www.atlantageorgiatriallawyers.com/

attorneys/business_torts_lawyer_bramlett.html ‘last visited Dec.

8, 2007).

“ Bondurant, Mixson & Elmore LLP. Jeffrey O. Bramlett

Attorney Profile, http: /www.atlantagceorgiatriallawyers.com/

attorneys business_torts_lawyer_bramlett. htm] ‘last visited Dec.

8, 2007)

App. 54

throughout the United States designed to promote

major reform of child welfare systems.”

(R32:495:Ex.B:2.)

Ms. Lowry founded and is the Executive Director

of the Children’s Rights Group, a non-profit organiza-

tion that advocates and litigates on behalf of children.

The organization’s website explains that, among

other things, “Children’s Rights files class action

lawsuits on behalf of classes of abused and neglected

children who have contact with public child welfare

systems, to enforce their legal rights. The goal of

these lawsuits is to improve the functioning of state

child welfare systems. .. .””’

As with any organization that is largely depend-

ent upon donations and grants, Children’s Rights

cannot afford to hide its achievements, and it has not

been shy about what it achieved in this case. In at

least four press releases over the course of the law-

suit, Children’s Rights trumpeted what it had done

and was doing for “some of Atlanta’s most vulnerable

citizens,” and it proudly proclaimed that “fa]fter so

“ Children’s Rights, Frequently Asked Questions, http://

www.childrensrights.org/site/PageServer?pagename=faq#Lawsuit

(last visited June 5, 2008).

“ Press Release, Children’s Rights, New Settlement Guar-

antees the Right to Legal Counsel for Abused and Neglected

Children in DeKalb County, Georgia, http://www.childrensrights.

org/pdfs/press releases/DeKalbCountySettle3% 20231.pdf (last

visited June 5, 2008)

App. 55

many years of failure and broken promises by the

state, this lawsuit has given these abused and ne-

glected children a voice.” The organization described

one of the district court’s rulings as “a landmark

decision nationally and a huge victory for the rights

of abused and neglected children.” It later referred

to the “groundbreaking settlement agreement” in the

case, adding that the agreement “appears to be the

first of its kind nationally, and we expect that chil-

dren throughout Georgia and perhaps elsewhere in

the country will benefit.” The accomplishments of

Children’s Rights in this case were discussed in its

annual report: “In 2006-2007, we took the fight for

America’s abused and neglected children” to eight

“ Press Release, Children’s Rights, Settlement of Class-

Action Lawsuit Mandates Sweeping Reform of Foster Care in

Atlanta, Georgia (July 5, 2005), http://www.childrensrights.org/

pdfs/press_releases/07-05-05, pdf (last visited June 5, 2008).

“ Press Release, Children’s Rights, Inc., In First Ruling of

its Kind in Nation, Federal Judge in Georgia Rules Abused and

Neglected Children Have Right to an Attorney While in State

Custody (Feb. 8, 2005), at http://www.childrensrights.org/pdfs/

press_releases/02-08-65.pdf (last visited June 5, 2008).

“ Press Release, Children’s Rights, Inc., Landmark Settle-

ment Guarantees the Right to Legal Counsel for Abused and

Neglected Children in Atlanta, Georgia (Feb. 13, 2006), at http://

www.childrensrights.org pdis/press_releases.3197_001. pdf ‘last

visited June 5, 2008).

App. 56

states.” Georgia is listed in the report as one of the

eight states where Children’s Rights took “the fight.””’

The point is not that Ms. Lowry and her organi-

zation don’t have every reason to boast about their

role in this case. The point is that their work in this

case is something that is in their interest to boast

about. It is not something that requires more than

the $495 per hour that Ms. Lowry received to attract

her and her organization to this case. This area of the

law is the sea in which they sail and class action

lawsuits are their chosen vessel. It is what they do.

They submitted three-fourths of the billable hours in

this lawsuit. Except for the relatively insignificant

travel hours, they were paid at the high hourly rates

they demanded. To suggest that the prospect of a

huge monetary bonus was needed to attract them to

this lawsuit is not only absurd, but it also demeans

the dedication of Ms. Lowry and her organization. Cf.

Delaware Valley 1, 478 U.S. at 567, 106 S. Ct. at 3099

(“Clearly, Delaware Valley was able to obtain counsel

without any promise of reward for extraordinary

performance.” ).

The multi-million dollar enhancement, over and

beyond the full lodestar sum that Ms. Lowry and her

“ Children’s Rights, Inc., Annual Report, at 4 (2006-2007),

http:’’www.childrensrights.org’/pdfs/Annual® 20Re port @ 202006-

2007. pdf Vast visited June 5, 2008).

~ Children’s Rights, Inc., Annual Report, at 5 (2006-2007),

http: www.childrensrights.org’/pdfs Annual‘? 20Report’ 202006

2007. pdf (ast visited June 5, 2008)

App. 57

organization received, amounts to an involuntary,

federal court ordered contribution from the taxpayers

of Georgia to a non-profit organization. The perverse

irony of the seven figure, court ordered gratuity in

this case is that it reduces the amount of state funds

available to care for what Children’s Rights itself has

described as some of Georgia’s “most vulnerable

citizens,” the very group that the organization is

dedicated to protecting.

For all of the reasons we have discussed, were we

free to decide the issue we would readily conclude

that the district court’s award of a $4,500,000 en-

hancement to the lodestar amount in this case is an

abuse of discretion, because it is based on an errone-

ous view of the law and reflects a clear error of judg-

ment.

C.

Unfortunately, under the prior panel precedent

rule we are not free to decide the enhancement issue,

but must instead follow this Court’s earlier decisions

in NAACP v. City of Evergreen, 812 F.2d 1332 (11th

Cir. 1987), and Norman v. Housing Authority of

Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292 (11th Cir. 1988). Both of

those decisions were issued after the Supreme Court

last spoke on the subject of enhancements for quality

of representation and superior results, which was in

the Delaware Valley I case.

In the NAACP case, the plaintiffs’ attorneys had

requested a 50 percent enhancement of the lodestar

App. 58

amount, which was based, in part, on “the assertion

that the relief obtained was of great benefit to the

black citizens of Evergreen and represented excep-

tional success.” NAACP, 812 F.2d at 1336. After the

district court denied the request, the plaintiffs ap-

pealed and this Court vacated and remanded, in part

because “|t|he district court’s opinion does not ad-

dress at all the last factor that the NAACP argued

justified enhancement — that the relief obtained was

of great benefit to the black citizens of Evergreen and

represented exceptional success.” Jd. In remanding,

the Court instructed:

(Tjhe district court should make findings

with regard to each of the grounds put for-

ward by the NAACP as warranting an en-

hancement and relate those findings to its

ultimate determination of the issue. We note,

however, in remanding, that the Supreme

Court has held that the fact the results ob-

tained would be of far-reaching significance

to a large number of people usually is not

grounds for enhancement, because the re-

sults obtained, as one of the Johnson factors,

normally will be subsumed in the calculation

of a reasonable fee and, therefore, usually

should not provide an independent basis for

increasing the fee award. Blum v. Stenson,

465 U.S. 886, 900, 104 S. Ct. 1541, 1549-50

(1984). The award may be enhanced, how-

ever, “in some cases of exceptional success.”

Id. at 897, 104 S.Ct. at 1548 (quoting

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435, 103 S. Ct. at 1940).

The district court’s reconsideration of the

App. 59

appropriateness of an enhancement based on

this factor should be made in light of these

principles. FN6

FN6. The basic assumption of Blum,

however, is that the district court

will have taken factors such as the

benefit obtained into account in its

initial determination of the reason-

able fee. There is no indication that

the district court has done so in this

case. In fact, it appears that the dis-

trict court limited its consideration

of the results obtained to its deter-

mination that the prevailing and

unsuccessful claims were separable.

On remand, the district court should

take into account all relevant con-

siderations put forth by the NAACP

in determining the effect of the re-

sults obtained, as well as the effect

of the other Johnson factors, on its

initial calculation of a reasonable at-

torney’s fee. It should then consider

whether the NAACP has shown

grounds for an enhancement of that

initial calculation.

Norman, 812 F.2d at 1337 & n.6 (citations omitted).

In Norman the attorneys for the prevailing civil

rights plaintiffs had requested a substantial en-

hancement of the lodestar amount based in part on

the “quality of representation provided.” Norman, 836

F.2d at 1297. In denying that request the district

court found “that substantial results were obtained

App. 60

even if the lawsuit was unnecessary to obtain them,”

but that an enhancement was inappropriate “because

of the possibility of duplication of efforts and the

possibility of improperly charged hours.” Jd. at 1297-

98. This Court reversed the denial of the enhance-

ment because “the wrong standards were applied.” /d.

at 1306.

In doing so, the Norman Court explained that

“(i]f the results obtained were exceptional, then some

enhancement of the lodestar might be called for.” Jd.

at 1302 (citing Delaware Valley I, 478 U.S. at 564-65,

106 S. Ct. at 3098). It also stated that “(e]xceptional

results are results that are out of the ordinary, un-

usual or rare,” not those that are expected, because

“(t]he law is usually faithful to its teachings, and so

an outcome that is not unexpected in the context of

extant substantive law will not ordinarily be excep-

tional.” Jd. These were among the remand instruc-

tions in the Norman case:

Any enhancement begins with a finding that

the results were exceptional; the district

court has also failed to address this issue

with reference to the extant substantive law.

Accordingly, we remand for reconsideration.

In adjusting the lodestar, as has been noted

earlier, the court must take into account the

significance of the results obtained in rela-

tion to those sought. It is at this point that

the court may wish to make adjustments for

unsuccessful theories and dismissal of the

case as to some parties.

App. 61

Even if the court found the results ob-

tained to be exceptional, no enhancement for

these results would be justified unless the

court also finds that class counsel’s represen-

tation was superior to that which would have

been expected considering the rates re-

quested. Blum, 465 U.S. at 899, 104 S. Ct. at

1549.

Norman, 836 F.2d at 1306; accord Ass’n of Disabled

Ams. v. Neptune Designs, Inc., 469 F.3d 1357, 1359

(llth Cir. 2006) (dicta) (“The court may then adjust

the lodestar to reach a more appropriate attorney’s

fee, based on a variety of factors, including the degree

of the plaintiff’s success in the suit.” (footnote omit-

ted)); Villano v. City of Boynton Beach, 254 F.3d 1302,

1308 (11th Cir. 2001) (dicta) (“If the court determines

that the result obtained was an excellent result, then

the award of fees ‘will encompass all hours reasona-

bly expended on the litigation, and indeed in some

cases of exceptional success an enhanced award may

be justified.” (citation omitted)); Duckworth v. Whis-

enant, 97 F.3d 1393, 1399 (11th Cir. 1996) (dicta)

(“After determining the lodestar amount as above, the

court is entitled to adjust the amount of final fees

awarded in light of the results obtained through the

litigation.”).

The NAACP and Norman decisions both vacated

district court orders denying enhancements for supe-

rior results and issued remand instructions. Those

instructions, especially the ones in Norman, consti-

tute a holding that superior results coupled with

App. 62

superior performance can be the basis for an en-

hancement of the lodestar amount. For the reasons

we have already explained at length, we are con-

vinced that holding is wrong and conflicts with rele-

vant Supreme Court decisions.

Nonetheless, as a later panel we are bound to

follow it. Hurth v. Mitchem, 400 F.3d 857, 862 (11th

Cir. 2005) (““[W]Je are not permitted to reach a result

contrary to a prior panel’s decision merely because we

are convinced it is wrong... .”); Smith v. GTE Corp.,

236 F.3d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001) (“The idea of an

exception to the prior panel precedent rule where a

subsequent panel is convinced the prior one reached

the wrong result — for whatever reason — is also

inconsistent with a number of decisions in which

panels of this Court have obediently followed prior

panel precedents they were convinced were wrong.”);

id. at 1304 (“In summary, the parties’ alternative

argument boils down to the position that [a decision

of this Court] incorrectly interpreted and applied [a

Supreme Court decision].... The prior panel prece-

dent rule clearly forecloses their position.”); Wascura

v. Carver, 169 F.3d 683, 687 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Was-

cura argues that the reasoning of |a decision of this

Court] is unclear and inadequate to support its

holding. We have no occasion to pass on that criti-

cism, because we are bound by |that] decision regard-

less of whether we agree with it.”); U/nited States v.

Steele, 147 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 1998) (en banc)

(“Under our prior precedent rule, a panel cannot

App. 63

overrule a prior one’s holding even though convinced

it is wrong.”).

Our colleague, Judge Wilson, is of the opinion

that this Court’s decisions in NAACP and Norman

are correct, that enhancements of the lodestar

amount can and should be allowed for the quality of

representation and the exceptional nature of the

results obtained. While we respect those views, we

are unpersuaded by them.”

The concurring opinion essentially adopts the

position of the Sixth Circuit in Geier v. Sundquist,

372 F.3d 784 (6th Cir. 2004), that the Supreme

Court’s holding about performance enhancements in

Delaware Valley I is nothing but dicta. Id. at 794.”

“ Both Judges Wilson and Hill have authored concurring

opinions in this case. See n.3. supra. References in this opinion

to “the concurring opinion” are to Judge Wilson’s.

* The concurring opinion cites six additional cases from

other circuits in support of its position that the district court

may enhance the lodestar based on the quality of the represen-

tation and superior results: the Second Circuit’s decision in

Quaratino v. Tiffany & Co., 166 F.3d 422 (2d Cir. 1999), the

Fourth Circuit's decision in Hyatt v. Apfel, 195 F.3d 188 (4th Cir.

1999), the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Shipes v. Trinity Indus., 987

F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1993), the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Van

Gerwen v. Guarantee Mutual Life Co., 214 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir.

2000), the Eighth Circuit's in Forshee v. Waterloo Indus., Inc..

178 F.3d 4527 (&th Cir 1999), and the Tenth Circuit's Roe v

Chevenne Mountain Conference Resort, Inc., 124 F.3d 1221 (10th

Cir. 1997). There are three problems with reliance on those

decisions.

For one thing, none of them actually holds that the lodestar

may be enhanced based on the quality of representation. Indeed

(Continued on following page)

App. 64

That proposition is a matter of necessity for those

who defend enhancements based on superior per-

formance and the results it produces, because what

the Court instructed us in the Delaware Valley I

the Shipes decision rejected the district court’s enhancement on

that ground, holding that “[e)ven though Shipes’s counsel

presented extensive statistical data with competence, nothing

less should be expected of counsel; consequently, this factor

alone does not support enhancement.” Shipes, 987 F.2d at 321.

Because the Quaratino case did not even involve, directly or

indirectly, an enhancement of any type, Quaratino, 166 F.3d at

424, anything that opinion says about enhancements is pure

dicta. Likewise, the issue before the court in Van Gerwen was

“whether — and if so, how - a district court may permissibly

reduce an attorney’s fees award under federal fee-shifting

statutes to reflect poor quality of representation.” Van Gerwen,

214 F.3d at 1044. Because it was a fee reduction case, not an

enhancement case, anything the Van Gerwen opinion says about

enhancements is also dicta. Finally, in Forshee, the court of

appals [sic] reversed the district court’ fee enhancement

because it was based on the contingent nature of the case.

Forshee, 178 F.3d at 532. There was no evidence supporting an

enhancement for superior representation or results. The court

said: “the case was not unusually difficult or complex to prepare

and try, the result while favorable to Forshee was not excep-

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Record and brief — Perdue v. Kenny A. · 559 U.S. 542 | Frix