Petition — Wood v. Georgia
Supreme Court brief1981
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RECEIVED
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAQBSCE OF Fiec Cit
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— f-814 1980 |
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| SSPREtS CORP, U.S.
OCTOBER TERM, 1979
no. “14 -lb027
RAYMOND WOOD, EDNA ALLEN, ance
JAMES TANTE,
Petitioners,
vs.
THE STATE OF GEORGIA,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE
GEORGIA COURT OF APPEALS
ee eee ee
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GLENN ZELL, Attorney for Peitioner
Suite 620
66 Luckie Street,
Atlanta, Georgia
(404) 524-6878
30303
INDEX
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Ceaniem. POON «6 2 a Se 1 8e e EC ee ee ee
GUS LSOROESOR.. ce Glew al Res
GCupetion Presneee: i... « «6-4 6 ee eee ee
Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved
Statement of the Case «1. 1 6s te ee es we 6 ee eS
Reasons For Granting The Writ:
I. This Case Presents For Review An Issue Expressly
401 U.S.
395 (1971) and Williams vs. Illinois, 300 U.S. 235
(1970) - The Imprisonment of The Defendant For
Failure To Pay A Fine on Installments Due to His
Reserved By This Court In Tate vs. Short,
Indigency After Being Placed on Probation.
II. There Is A Conflict Between the Federal Courts
And The State Courta. « « « «
GONELUETON: 2. 8 °k% @ 4 ate we oe) Sa a ee eee
INDEX TO APPENDICES
Appendix A.
Appendix 8.06 6 6 8S ew we Se tee ee se ee
Appendix ©. 2. « «'s t «= © « a) @ & Sus
Appendix D. ... .
4
5
7
Al
A3
A4
A5
TABLE OF CITATIONS
Allen, et al. vs. State, 144 Ga. App 233, 240 S.E. 2d 754
(1977)) .. ce a we ae 6 ld. ek ee ee ee ee eS 2
Barnett vs. Hopper, 234 Ga. 692, 217 S.E. 2d 208 (1975) .. 5
Barnett vs. Hopper, 548 F. 2d 550 (1977, 5th Cir.). 7
Gagnon vs. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 617 (1973). 5
Griffin vs. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) 4
Hensley vs. U.S., 257 F. 2d 681 (1958 5th Cir.)...... 6
Hunter vs. Dean, 240 Ga. 214, 239 S.E. 2d 791 (L977)... 7 |
Hopper vs. Barnett U.S. __, 58 L. Ed. 2d 701 (Dec. 11, 1978),
Morrisey vs. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) 5,.7|
meee We. Snort, 401 U.S. 395 (1971 , », pp wp ep vveovere 4, 5|
Some Ve. Boswell, 605 F. 24 171 (1979, Sth Cir.) ....+s+e §$
U. S. vs. Savage; 440 F. 2d 1237 (1971, Sth Cir.)...... 5
U. &. ve. Taylor. 321 F. 2d 339 (1963, 4 Cir.) ae, ae oe eee
Williams vs. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970). 4,5
Wood, et al. vs. State, 150 Ga. App. 582, 258 S.E. 2d 171
(1979) “0 Oe ea ae er ae a a a ce oe 2 i ee 2
Wood, et al. vs. State, 144 Ga. App. 236, 240 S.E. 2d 743 (1977) |
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MISCELLANEOUS |
Georgia Code Annotated 27-2901 ........ 6 |
:
United States Constitution (14th Amendment) 2,4,6,7 |
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1979
NO.
RAYMOND WOOD, EDNA ALLEN, and
JAMES TANTE,
Petitioners,
vs.
THE STATE OF GEORGIA,
Respondent.
*~e e+ + + + + + H+
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE
GEORGIA COURT OF APPEALS
an?
Petitioners pray that a Writ of Certiorari issue to
to review the opinion and judgment of the Georgia Court of Appeals
entered in the above case on June 5, 1979.
OPINION BELOW
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The opinion of the Georgia Court of Appeals is reported
at 150 Ga. App. 582, 258S.E. 2d 171 (1979), and is set forth in
Appendix "A".
JURISDICTION
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The Judgement of the Georgia Court of Appeals was en- |
tered on June 5, 1979. An Application for rehearing was timely |
filed and denied on July 6, 1979. Copy of said denial is set
forth in Appendix "B" hereto. Thereafter, the Supreme Court of
Georgia denied a timely filed Petition for Writ of Certiorari on
September 4, 1979. Copy of said denial is set for th herein in
Appendix "C". Mr. Justice Powell granted an extension of time
to and including February1,1980 within which to file this Peti-
tion. The Court's jurisdiction is invoked under Title 28, United
States Code §1257 (3).
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Once a State Court has determined that probation is the
appropriate punishment for a particular offender, and also imposes
a fine to be paid on installments during the probationary period,
may it, consistently with the Equal Protection and Due Process
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, revoke the probation of the
offender for failure to pay the installments as directed where the
evidence established that the offender was indigent and that the |
offender was not negligent in any manner, and did not deliberate-
ly disburse or dissipate monies that resulted in his inability to
pay? |
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
INVOLVED
The pertinent provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution as well as Georgia Code Annotated |
27-2901, are set forth in Appendix "D" hereto.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioners were placed on probation after being con-
victed of distribution of obscene materials. Their cases are
reported at 144 Ga. App. 236, 240 S.E. 2d.743 (1977), and 144 Ga. |
App. 233, 240 S.E. 2d. 754 (1977). Wood received a ten thousand
($10,000.00) dollar fine and twelve (12) months on probation on
each of two (2) counts:to run consecutively. Tante and Allen
each received a five thousand ($5,000.00) dollar fine and twelve
(12) months on probation.
The remittiturs were made the judgment of the trial
court on October 23, 1978. (R-20, 21, 22). The trial judge. in
each probation order, as a condition required each appellant to
pay five hundred ($500.00) dollars per month until the fine was
paid. (R-23, 24, 25).
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Thereafter, on January 12, 1979, or approximately 2 1/2
months after being placed on probation, a petition for revoca-
tion of probation was filed against each Petitioner and the sole}
ground for revoking the probation was that the Petitioner failed
to pay as directed. (R-26, 27, 28.)
-2=
A hearing was held on January 26, 1979. Jacqueline L.
Tomlin, Edna Allen's probation officer, testified that the Peti-
tioner was on unemployment compensation, and that Allen had not
paic 2 $500.00 per month and had no idea how she would raise
the fine money. (T-4-6). Upon questioning by her Counsel, Allen
testified that she receives $64.00 per week or about $250.00 per
month, and has no other assets or sources of income. (T-7)
Allen is presently having eye trouble, is 54 years of age, and has
been turned down for employment. (T-8, 9, 24, 25) She borrowed
money to pay for her eye glasses, and has no money left over, |
after paying expenses, to pay on her fine. (T-9-11)
Gene Odum, James Tante' probation officer, testified
that Tante had complied with the conditions of probation except
paying the $500.00 per month on the fine. Tante told Odum that |
his employer was supposed to pay the fine, and that he was on a
very tight budget. (T-23, 33) Tante testified he worked for the
State of Georgia as a correctional officer. (T-33) His gross
income is $540.00 per month, and he has no other property or
income. (T-35) His net pay is $516.00 per month, and he had
nothing left over in November and December to pay on the fine.
(T-37).
Tante is 60 years of age, and was unemployed for eight
months, and was on unemployment before he obtained his present
job. (T-38-40)
Dixon E. Nash, Raymond Wood's probation officer, ice
fied that Wood had not paid the fine as directed. Wood had been |
terminated from his prior employment, and just started a new job.)
His gross income is $120.00 per week at his new job. .(T-53).
Wood's net pay was about $155.00 after deductions on his old job,
and he had no money left over to pay his fine. Also, he is the
sole support of his wife and three children. (T-54, 55)
The Court issued an order revoking the probation of al
three Petitioners on the sole ground that each Petitioner violated
the terms of probation by not paying the fine as directed, being
$500.00 per month or $1500.00 for 3 months. (R-29-34) (R-37,38,39).
=3-
REASON FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I.
This Case Presents For Review An Issue Expressly Re-
served By This Court In Tate vs. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) and
Williams vs. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) - The Imprisonment of
The Defendant For Failure To Pay A Fine On Installments Due To
His Indigency After Being Placed On Probation.
In Tate vs. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 400 (1971), this Court
-..Nor is our decision to be understood as precluding
imprisonment as an enforcement method when alternative means are
unsuccessful despite the defendant's reasonable efforts to satis-
fy the fines by those means; the determination of the constitu-
tionality of imprisonment in that circumstance must await the |
presentation of a concrete case." |
In Williams vs. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 243 (1970), this
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stated that" |
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court stated that: |
.. We have no occasion to reach the question whether
a State is precluded in any other circumstances from holding an
indigent accountable for a fine by use of a penal sanction..."
This case appears to be the concrete case mentioned in
Tate vs. Short, supra.
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The Georgia Court of Appeals in Wood, et al. vs. State,
supra, held that:
"At the revocation hearing, it was established that
none of the appellants had the financial resources to make the
payments..."
In Tate vs. Short, supra, this Court struck a sentence
that converted a fine into imprisonment due to the indigency of
the defendant. Similarly in Williams vs. Illinois, supra, it wa
held that the term of imprisonment for an offense ooule not be
extended beyond the maximum period fixed by law resultiny directly
from an involuntary nonpayment of a fine or court costs.
The fundamental question boils down to whether the sort
of sentence an offender must serve may ever explicitly turn sole-~
ly upon the amount of money he has. Griffin vs. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
It is now clear that the conditional liberty of an of-
fender who has been awarded probation is part of the liberty
wie
directly secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. Morrisey vs. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471 (1972); Gagnon vs. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 617 (1973).
The evidence showed that the installment payment of
$500.00 per month on the fine was more than Wood and Allen made
in a month. Tante's net pay was $516.00 a month. On these facts,|
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the alternative offered the petitioners was, in effect, a nullity.
There is no “inverse discrimination" that is mentioned
. * . . . . |
in Williams vs. Illinois, supra, and Tate vs. Short, supra, since
the petitioners were serving their sentence on probation. They
were reporting to their probation officers and were complying with
the terms and conditions of their probation. They were, in essence,
serving their sentence. |
It should be pointed out that the fine is a judgment |
against the defendant, and the State can always levy against any |
property the defendant may own at a later time. Also, the State |
may file a garnishment against the salary of the defendant in |
order to collect the fine. Therefore, the petitioners are sub-
ject to paying the fine at a later time, and even after the pro- |
bation period is over. |
II. |
There Is A Conflict Between the Federal Courts And The |
State Courts.
Recently in U.S. vs. Boswell, 605 F. 2d. 171, (1979, |
5th Cir.), the Court held that a revocation of probation was
erroneous if the defendant did not have the resources evettable,
had no way to acquire them, and was not negligent or deliberate
in allowing funds that he had to be disbursed or dissipated in a
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manner that resulted in his inability to pay. |
Similarly in U.S. vs. Taylor, 321 F. 2d. 339 (1963, sill
Cir.), the court held that if the defendant was too poor to pay
the fines, was not to blame for it, and was sincere in trying to |
pey the fines, his probation should not be revoked.
The applicable law is stated in U.S. vs. Savage, 440
F. 2d 1237, 1239 (1971, Sth Cir.) that a defandant:
-5<
",..Can not be held to be in violation of the condition
(of his parole) unless he is clearly at fault." See also Hensley
vs. U.S., 257 F. 2d 681 (1958, Sth Cir.).
The above cited federal cases clearly reflect that in
order to revoke the probation of the defendant, he must be negli-
gent in not paying the installment payments, or willfully refuses
to pay the fine.
Georgia refuses to follow the Fourth and Fifth Circuits
and holds that probation can be revoked solely because of the in-
digency of the defendant.
This conflict should be resolved and this case is the
proper case for this court to provide a uniform rule of law for
the United States.
The Petitioners have not been negligent, and have not
surrendered a fair opportunity to make the required installment
payments.
To imprison the Petitioners when in the same circum-
stances a person of means would remain free constitutes a denial
of the equal protection of the law. The confinement results from
failure to pay a fine on installements being directly converted
into imprisonment. The defendant who is involuntarily unable to
pay is subjected to imprisonment solely because of his indigency.
The trial court has determined that the Petitioners
need not be confined for their crimes and that the State's penal
interests would be met by a fine to be paid in installments and
probation. (See Ga. Code Ann. §27-2901) This is an individual-
ized sentence and the Petitioners certainly have no quarrel with
the court's essential judgment. But to revoke the probation due
to their indigency is irrational, unnecassary, and impermissibly
barred them from the benefits which the court adjudged them worthy
of. This violates due process of law.
The State must accomodate their indigency and permit
them the same escape from confinement open to a defendant of
means under the same sentence. It cannot offer probation only
to those who can pay.
Whether a person can pay a fine on installments has no
apparent relationship to punishment or to rehabilitation.
Wood was a mere clerk in a bookstore; Allen was a mere
ticket taker in a theater; and Tant was a mere projectionist in a
theater. The imposition of substantial fines on this type of
person can only result in the revoking of the probation sooner
or later. The trial court was fully aware of the financial situ-
ation of the Petitioners when he imposed the sentences.
If the probation sentence can be revoked in this case,
then the probation sentence was illusory and amounted to the trial
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judge giving the three Petitioners a test of liberty for three (3
months, but in effect was really giving them a sentence to serv
in prison. Under the holdings of Morrisey vs. Brewer, supra, th
State court is required to keep the Petitioners on probation as
they were clealy not at fault in failing to comply with the terme
of probation.
Since we have a national constitution , the
application ofthe constitution should be uniform in both the state
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CONCLUSION
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The Georgia Court of Appeals relied on Hunter vs. Dean,
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240 Ga. 214, 239 S.E. 2d 791 (1977) in upholding the trial court's
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and federal courts.
decision. Hunter vs. Dean is based on Barnett vs. Hopper, 234
Ga. 692, 217 S.E. 2d 208 (1975). Subsequently that judgment was
reversed in Barnett vs. Hopper, 548 F. 2d 550 (1977, 5th Cir.).
This Court granted certiorari in Hopper vs. Barnett, U.S. /
58 L.Ed. 2d 701 (Dec. 11, 1978) and vacated the judgment of the
Fifty Circuit on the grounds of mootness. In both Dean and
Barnett, the sentence required payment of a fine in a lump sum
before the defendant could be placed on probation. It therefore
appears that a Writ of Certiorari should be granted based on thi
Court vacating the Fifth Circuit's ruling in Hopper vs. Barnett,
and Hunter vs. Dean, supra, being based on Barnett vs. Hopper,
ZX, Vip
GLENN ZELL, oad | Pete’
234 Ga. 692, 217 S.E. 2d 208 (1975).
Suite 620
66 Luckie Street, N.W.
Atlanta. Georgia 30303
— JUN 5 1979
; Appendiy'h”
| 57867. WOOD (RAYMOND) c+ al. v. THE STATE. Ba-102
BANKE, Judge.
Each of the three appellants was convicted of dis-
tributing obscene materiale and each was sentenced to pay
a fine and to serve 12 months on probation. Following the
affirmance of tnese convictiong on appeal, tne trial court
entered probation orders requirin each appellent to meke~
payments of $500 per month towards payment of his or her.
: fine 7s a condition of probation. Tnereafter, each
appellant's probation was rovoked for failure to make the
$500 payments as directed.
At tne revocation hearing, it wae esteblished tnat
none of tne appellants nad tne financial resources to make
tne payments. On appeal, tne appellants contend tnat to
revoke tneir probation under these circumstances amounts to
imprisoning them for their indigency, in violation of their
rignts under tne Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Tney further contend tnat tne trial court
was without authority under Georgia law to require payment
of the fines ag a condition of probation. Held:
1. In Hunter v. Dean, 240 Ga. 214 (239 SE2d 792)
(1977), a requirement tnat a defendant pay a fine as a
condition precedent to serving a sentence on probation was
held not to violate the equal protection or due process
provisions of the United States Constitution; even "wnen:
the defendent is indigent and unable to make immediate
payment of the fine." See generally Code Ann. § 27-2709.
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Tne appellants contend that while this may be the law
where payment of the fine is required as a condition pre-
cedent to probation, the situation is different where pay-
ment of the fine is required as a condition of the proba~
tion itself. We are unable to accord tnis delicate dis-
tinction the weight which the appellants seek to give it.
‘ In our view, Hunter controls tnis case and requires the
| affirmance of the trial court's ruling.
2. Tne fact tnat Code Ann. 27-2711 does not list
‘ payment of a validly imposed fine as one of the permissible
conditions of probation does not require a different result.
It is well settled that the conditions enumerated in that
section are not exclusive, but tne court may impose other
7 requirements not specifically listed therein. See George
v. State, 99 Ga. App. &92, 893 (109 SE2@d 883) (1959); Gay
v. State, 101 Ga. App. 225 (1) (113 SE2d 223) (1960).
Judgment affirmed. McMurray, P. J.. and Underwood,
J., concur.
eee...
. , . A ppandsxt re) ,
Court of Appeals : 2
of the State of Georgia |
ATLANTA, duly 6, 1979
The !onorable Court of Appeals met pursuant to adjournment.
The following order was passed:
57867. Raymond Wood et ale ve The State
Upon consideration of the motion for a rehearinz filed in this case, it is ordered
that it be hereby denied.
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia
CLERK’SOFFICE, ATLANTA JUL -6 IS79
I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes
of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.
Witness my signature and the seai of said court hereto affixed
the day and year last above written.
Appel —
A. san Dy —— neon
os ; re Apps dix *C ;
CLERK'S OFFICE, SUPREME ae oa OF GEORGIA
a
The Supreme Court today denied the writ of options in this case.
All the justices TA
2... Mcaratetken
Ll, Diy t
Very truly yours,
MRS. JOLINE B, WILLIAMS, Clerk
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