Petition for Writ of Certiorari — United States v. Silk

Supreme Court brief1946

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OcroBeR TERM, 1946

——————

“UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER

a: ° | -

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Avpert Sirk, Doing Business aS ALBERT SILK

am , Coat CoMPaNy

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH

CIRCUIT .

. ~

-_--——.-

Opinions below. * oer rs eat Reva air . ]

Jurisdiction. —__. 5 ae ee ae mee 2

Questions presented...” eee ek« 2

‘Statites aid re gulations involved Ce Re ene see er -f- 2

Statement. - : : ae i - 2

Specification of errors to be urged inden z 5

Reasons for granting the writ es 6

Conelusion..- =... ean ie ee re Ls ©

Appendix S utes eee 13

‘CITATIONS |. .

Cases: ings ’

American Oil Co. v. Fly, J 35 ee & | Se a

- Bedford Pulp & Paper @. v. Early, decided April 6, 1944,

Dp. C., E. D: Va ne gscthsgnnasede es V1

Deecy Products Co. v. We Ich, 124 KF. 2d! 592__: re eee 9

For Park Timber Co. v. Baker, 53 Wyo. 467 : —S 11

Conn v. Beard, 141 V. 24-376, certiorari denied, seh Ss. :

724, rehearing denicd, 324 USS. 889... : , 8,9

Glenn ves tandurd Oil Co., 148 F. 2d ~ —

é Greet Vv. Magruder, 148 F. 2d 679, certiorari denieg October

8 1945, No. 102, October 1945 Term, : P & 7:3-9

Poke Rapids ~~ Co. v. United State#, decided March

30, 1942, D.C. Dy, Balen. : ra Na 11

Hiner, Matter oj; pea d Se pte mber 2. 1941, D. C.8. D.,

Ind. : . Siok , 11

Industrial Com, v. “Bonfils, 78 Golo, 306... = a... s 11

Jones v. Goodson, 121 F. 2d. 176 ior )

National Labtr Refffions Board:y. Hearst P ublieations, 322

Ure, bes eee age ; 7,10, 11

Nevins, Inc. ¥: Rothersies, 151 F. 2d 189, affirining 58 F.

— Supp. 460___- 2 a

Perkins Bros., Inc. v. Dicninslen: decided October 19, 1944,

;D.C. N. D., Iowa_.--- 5 a ee wits lt

Texas Co. v. Higgins, 118 F. 24 636— ‘ ae

United States y. Aberdeen Aerie No ae & F. 2d 655" Q

, United States v. Vogue, Imé., 145 Fo 2d 0Q9 j7 8,9

\ Willard Sugar Co. v. Gentsch, 59 F. Sapp 1}

Statutes: ; ete

Internal Reyenue Code: :

- See. 1400 (26 U.S.C. 1940 ed., See, 1400) — 14.

Sec, 1401 (26 U.S. C. 1940.ed., See. 1401) 2 14

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Statutes——Continnued -

See. 1410 (26 U. GI Bee, 1410:

See, 1426 (26 U. ab , See, 1426)

Pn te oP ; hap:

a

. : St,

yt See. 1600 (26 UL S.C. 1940 ed., See. 1600) =

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31,

a

See. 1607 (26.0, IMO ed, See. 1607)”

Social Security Aet, ¢ . gol, 49 Stat. 620: “

' See, $01 (442 UL SL 1940 od, pee. LOL)

i See, 802 (42 Us8. C. M0 ed., See, 10025 cas

See, 804 (42 U8. C. 1940 ed, See. 1004) ye

See. $11 42 US. . 1940 ed., See. LOM).

See. 9O1 (42 — . C. 1940 ed, See. 11015 Ame

¥ See, 907 (42 U.S. CL 1940 ed., See. 1107) :

Miscellaneous: , ors

~ Restatement of the Law of Agency, See. 2207, p. 486 Py :

Treasury. Regulations 90, Art: 205. __

Treasury Regulations 91, Am. G2... jak th ae eens

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| Inthe Supreme Court of the United States

OcroBer Term, 1946

Unirep States or AMERICA, PETITIONER

; e sin

_ALBerr Sink, Domina Business AS

o> ak OAL COMPANY

.

. »

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

ALBERT SILK

STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH —

“< CIRCUIT &-

z

The Solicitor General, on behalf of the United

States of America, prays that a writ of certiorari

* Issue to review the judgment‘of the Circuit Court

of Appeals for the Tenth Cireuit, entered in the

above cause on April 19, 1946, affirming the de-

"cision. of the Distvict Court of the U hited State s

for tile Distriet of K, » Eirst Division.

OPINIONS BELOW |

The | opinion ‘of the District Court (Oral ‘state

ment R. 104-108 ) is not reported. The Opinion

of the Cireuit Court vof Appeals (R. 110-113) is”

het vot ported, ete]

ili

:

“~

>

; : JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Cireuit, Court -of Apyeals

ras entered on April 19, 1946. Fe 113-114.) The

jurisdiction of this: Court. is invoBed .under See-

tion 240 (a) of the Judicial} Code, as amended by

= Actwf February 13, 1925 .

' QUESTIONS PRESENTED 2

1. Whether certain persons when unloading

coal from freight cars into the bins of the tax-

payer, a retail eoak dealer*™ were performing serv-

ices as his employees within the me ang of See-

tions 811 (b) and 907 (e) of the’ Social Security

- “Act and Sections 1426 (b) and 1607 («)* of the

iow Revenue Code; as amended. eae

» Whether certain other persons when. engaged:

in ties coal ae taxpaye r were performing

services as -his employees within the me: ning of

Sections 811 (b) and 907 (c) of the Soci al Seea-

rity Act and Sections 1 1426 (b) and: 1607 (e)° of.

the Internal Pevenue Code, as amended

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED |

The statutes and regulations Anvolved .are set

_forth in the Appe ndix, infra, pp. 13-17... =

dake a asst resaaie

. . .

Roopaniiny nit brought this action’ for re fund f

taxes levied and collected by the petitioner wm es

Titles VIIL and IX of the’ Social Security ct

"and subchapters A and € of Chapter. 9 of the

-

Pe RS A stem cy

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bes

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Internal Revenue Code, for the years 1936 through

1939. The tax was levied with respect to amounts

paid by respondent to. certain persons known sas

; “unloaders”) whe anloaded tlie respondent's coal .

from ‘freight cars, into his storagg, bins and

‘“trickers who‘ later hauled -the ‘coal to the re;

spondent’s cistomers:” The sole” Rgfie ‘hetween

the parties in the court below: was whether or

not these persons were engaged in performing the

tinloading and hauling services as employees of.

- the respondent within the meaning of the tax-

ing provisions. ~ (RB. 16-17.). aes

The facts are-net in dispute.’ : aN

OA The unloaders.—Qeshondent ix a’ retail coal

dealer ur¥ Topeka,. Kansas. He has‘ latee and

extensive retail coal business. The unloaders are

men Who.come to respondents’ coal yard and un-

load coal’ trom railroad: cars into the -bins. If

When they come. there its coal to_unlo ; they are

assigned a car and told.in what bin they are to put.

the coal. They furnish their’ own tools—shovels’

and sometimes picks (R. 84, 88)—and are paid

. an agreed price per ton, They come and go as

they please. They likewise: work forvothers at

“tas; without Knowledge or conser of “respond-

ent. he only unloader who testified’ as respond. _

ent’s witness, declared that he worked ‘two-thirds’

: : i Migs ;

of the time in the’ winter season ‘as: an unloader

‘Except. where otherwise idicated the facts are taken

from the findings of. the Districf Court’ (R. 7-12)° and the

opiniga of the Circuit Court of/Appeals (R. 110-112).

7

an respondent yard (R. 9uy, Respondent testi-

fied that the unloaders did what the vard fore-

man ‘told them to do”, that although i did not

direct, them in their duties, “he Supervised” ai 3

98). The court below interpreted this’ as meaning

that he mere ly designated the ear and the bin inte

which they were to unload? Siu. testified °

thatthe men are told ‘‘not'to break the coal more

= un Hipseaean help it”” (R55).

The true kers.—Respondent does not own the:

sia ‘ks or other vehiéles used -for the purpose of

delivering the: ‘eoal le sells. He contraets: with

individual owners of trucks for the delivery of

coal at an agreed’ price pe r ton. They provide

their own equipment dnd supplies. ‘He pays the m,

usually JOE a We ek, out of the. price received

from: his custome ‘es. They make C. O. D, collec-

tiofis for him when, requested CR, 41, 86).

The tritckers assemble iin a desiznated hiiildine

.on respondent’s premises; and, by - their’ own

arrangement? answer in retation tally front re-

coal. A trucker is not required to make any de-. -

‘ | |

livery: he May reject the order. If he aeceysts

it he drives his truck to the proper bin in re-

spondent’ s yard, Joads the truck hinixelf, \and -

spondent When he receives an order to déliver:

delivers the coal to the customer's bin. He fixes.

* "There is wso testimony that unloaders: worked under the

direction of the yard foreman with respect to miscellaneous

yard work such‘as screening and cleaning mp the yard, w here

they were cme by the hour. (R. 59) 89-90.)

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. Lad

lis own hours, can come and go as he pleases,

ahd is, not supervised vin his agtivittes. Cus-.

tomers’ compli nts as rs dncne are made to

respondent, who tells the trucke ry (R. 48, 95).

Respondent: sends SOMONE to clean up, when

necessary, and pays for. ‘any damage (R. js—40,

95-06 ).

The truckers also haul: for other * persons whe ny

ys so desire. “But during the winter seasorf

they usually stick to responde nt ¢R: 52). Many

of the same men would show up: regularly day

after day for years (R. 69, 30, 84, 94). Those

who testified * all indicated that by far the largest

pgen. of their Income—m some Instances prac-

ally all of. it—was derived from working® for

respondeait (CR. 78-79, 84,: 96, 100),

Upon the faets just ‘Summarized the District.

Court held that both the truckers and tlie cox! un-

loaders were not employees, of fhe respondent Ipet,

instead, were independe ‘it contractors, “and that

the remuneration whieh -he. pail ta the an for their

services did not come within the scone of the tax-

ing provisibns of thie Social Si enrity Act) and

corresponding sections of the -Tntermak Revenne

Code. (CR. 13, 104-108). . The Cireuis Court of

Appeals affirmed *R, 110-113).

SPECIFICATION SF ERRORS TO BE URGED

The Gireuit Court of Appe “als erred in fail-

zine te hold that the persens in que stion were oe

—_—_-—_—

~At the urging of the court the number of witnesses Was

; limited | in order to avoid clmutative testimony CR, @1, 103).

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plovees of the 2 respondent and that he, Was liable

for the social security taxes in question. .

: ‘The Cireuit Court of Appeals erred in fail

ing to look-to the pugposes of the Social See urity”

Act and to consider the. economic facts of the -

>)

relations hip in holdifg that the persons engaged

i unléading and hauling coal for the respondent

were not. bis: employees within the meaning: of

sat Act. : <¢. =e

3. The Circuit Court of f Appe als erred in fail-

ray to consider the simple and mariual nature of .

the work being’ performed by the persons unload-

ing and h ling eoal-and in applying a legal con-—

cept “of the traditional employver- -mployee rela-

tionship so rest rictive dn its scope as to eliminate

“all cmployinent except that performed under e¢on-

stant and detailed direction and control by, the

REASONS FOR GRANTING .THE WRIT

: : 6 ;

respondent, - & g -* . fF

. Insofar asthe unloade ‘Ts are cone erned, the-

a “iston, be loa squarely contlic ‘ts with the decision

of the Court of at ee! for the District of Colum-

bin in Grace % Mugruder, VA8 FS 2d 679, cer-

tierari q(lenied October 8, 1945, October, Yerm

A945; No. 102.) The Grace ease also involved the

status under the Social Seeurity’ Act of laborers: .

who unloaded ; coal. Tn that case, as in this one,

the laborers worked when they liked, without

supervision, worked for other persons ax well as

the taxpayer, provided their own tools, and were

MrT e chad

\

not required to accept particularjobs The only

factual difference is that©in the Grace case the-

.

laborers unloaded from the delivery truck into the’

customer’s storage bin, whereas here the workers

‘unload from the railroad car into. the: bin. in the.

dealer-t taxpa yer ‘syard: As has heen pointed out, in.

the present case the unloader is assigned by re-

spondent to a parti-alar car and bin, an item of,

control not present in the Grace case.’ The un-

loadgyt at the customer's’ establishment is obvious shy

subject tc"less sapervision and control than the un- °

loader, in the dealer’s own yard On the facts, if

there is any difference at allethe-unloaders in this

case are more Ce er es ‘han in in te bi race

case. 3 ¢ fe a7 ae

s,

The dncieiaig in the eee Ge that the unlodt-.__

ers, therein called “hustlers, are employees of

oy if

s

the dealer is thus. plainly Snconsistent with the

decision below“here. T he Pourt of Appeals for

the District .of Columbia ,following National La-

—

* The facts of the Grace case. ‘were not fully set forth in the

- opinion of the Court of Appeals. They may be found, how-

ever, at pages 56-62 of the Record file with this Court in.

Grace Vv. Magruder, No. T02; October 1945 Term, certiorari

denied,’October $1945. = *

* In the Grace case the trial court had found that the tax-

payer (148 F. 2d, at 682) :

“*. * © has no agreemept ‘with the hustlers reserving

_the right to supervise’the work of storing or directing the

‘manner in which they store the coal, and [2] that. no super-

vision or control is exercised either by plaintiff or the-éus-

tomer over the Storage of coal or over the ran who does the

work of storing, or over the time and manner in which the

work i isdone, * * 9%

2 708002- 46 2

.

hor Relati

322° U.S. a

euit in United i

609, , reasoned that Nye. test ‘unde y the Soci al x.

ee eonitad tors”’ ee the objet ‘of Congr ress in en-—

4 acting Social Se ‘curity. legislathon (14a F. 2d ; at

(580-681). In the alternative the Court of Ap-

peals held tliat even under the arthodox tort: lia-

bility test, the’ unloaders were not independent

ro ontrac ‘tors,

a

\

The eourt. below in the iiakent ease, although

stating .that the “strict, common. law concept:

* *°* is not the test” (R. 112), proceeds to

base its decision on the absence of What it regards

as ‘sufficient “direction and control over the meth-

cod and means. of performing the serviees per-

formed” (R.: 112-113 as ‘Such ; standard, wed

think, is indistinguishable from the so- calle ‘d com-

MOD ‘law ‘test: which the court plirported to reject.

7 he. decision in our-view thus ‘conflicts with (rrace

/. v. Magruder both with respect to whether the so-

a conmort Law approac th is to be used ‘in cases

_ of this type and on the applicability of that test,

Hit is td be used, an identical facts.

W ©. recognize that this Court has de ied certi-

pe orari on other oe casions.” on which its attention

®Glenn-v. Beard, 141 F. 2d 376 (C. C. A. 6), certiorari

| deniedeRe3 U.S. 724, reheari ing: denied, 24 - S/889; Grace

: ; ¥. Magruder, 148 F. 2d 679 (App, D. C.), certiorari denied

v October 8, 1945, / pe :

an

bikes v. po Ine., 145 H; 2d 9

4

Be ty tk een ea ae

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has been edlled bath to the Hnportance of a defini- |

tive ruling as. to ‘the test to be applied in deter-

-mining that persons are employees siibject to the

Social, Security Act, and to the fact that some

* crreuit courts appeals © were follawine the rule

of the Hearst case while others” were applying”

the so-called ‘commen law”? rule. nt wsmuch’ ag

nOne of those ca es involved identical factual matua-

fons, each coult be said to turn on its particular:

faets. Sinée the Grace case and the decision be-

pate indistinguishabie in their facts, that ob-

stacle ween does. not exist here. In view:

- af’ the ceontlet this is selearly an appropriate deci-®

a sion for thas Court to ket lew. 0° ; rk cane

2, It does not seem necessary here to elaborate

on. the oby ios: lnpoertance of: a decision as to-

Whether the. strict: control (or “commowv law’

‘test or one moré consistant with the purposes of

the statute shall apply under the Social Securits

Act. W heré individuals: are epgaged to devote

their manual labot to the. business of another fer

‘ wages! differe nees in ‘the. degree of supervision

e:

ES IIE ER

7 United States ¥, on c live. - 145 F. 2d 608 (C.C, A. 4);

(rrace v. Magruder, supra. Cf. Nevins, Inc. ¥. Rothensies,

151 F. 2d.189 «C. CLA. 3) affirming per curiam.58 F. Supp.

160, (FE. D. Pa.). ena C ‘

*(slenn Vv. rey supia; “lenn Vv. Standard OA CO. Las’ F’.

94 51 (C.C. A. ): : Teras Ca, v. ‘Higgins, Lik F. vd 656 (CL.

A Bie es ce Products Co. v. Welch, 124 F. 2d 592

@(C.C.A.1); American Oil Co. vy. Fly 135 F.2d gor (CLC, .%

5) ; Jones y. Goodson, 121 F. 2d 176 (C, C. A. 40) + ef. Pitted

States v, Aberdeen Ae rit No. 24. 148 F. 2d 655 (C, ©. AL 9).

—\ es 10

over them should not be controlling in passing on

the question of employment for purposes of a stat-_

ute having as its end econoinic .prote ction in old

age and‘in. periods of unemployment. A factor.

of much greater consequence should be a worker’s

economic dependence upon the employer. ‘To hold

that tnskilled laborers, whose work is not super-

vised because it is too simple to require super-

vision, are independer nt contractors” and accord. ’

ingly: not within the “Social See ‘urity Act clearly

“frustrates the accomplishment of the objectives of —

that legislation. (Cf. .National Labor Relations

Board vy. Ifearst Publications, Ine., 322 U. >F 111.

The divergence in approach among the circuit

courts of’ appeals emphasizes the desirability and~

importance of*an authoritative disposition of the

| question.. °

3. We also urge that if the Court is of the view

that the question as to the status.of the unloaders

should be reviewed for the reasons set out above,

the status of the truckers also be considered in

order that theewhole case may be disposed. of in

adcordance with what this Court decides to be the

_ correct test. The primary afference between the

truckers and the unloaders is that the former own

* See Revtat ment of the Law of Agency, Sec. 220, p. 486 |

(subsectio ument €) in which it is stated: “Unskilled

bor is usually performed by those customarily regarded as

servants, and. a laborer is almost conclusively a serv rant? in

spite of the fact that he may nominally contract to do a -

"specified job for a specified price”,

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ore - < ™ , od

ee a Oe) ee ne Speer Leer eee

Mu

equipment of substantial value, their trucks.” In

other respects their work of loading the trucks,

driving them to the customer’s establishment -and

unloading them ig not substantially different. - Al-

though the truckers do not have-to tindertake par-

tietlar jobs, onee they acce ‘pta job their work i is of

the sort customarily performed by employees, and

in fact many of them work ste adily for respondent *

' and derive thegnajor portion of their income from

such work (sce p. 5, infra). if, as the I/carst

decision holds, the werd Semployee” should -be

construed in accordance w A, the objectives of the.

‘statute in which it is found, persons whe perform

such work for another should be covered by the,

Sovial Security Act... : .

‘The employinent arrange ment With respect to

fhe trucKers is not ajnovel one. It is fairly typi-

eal of innumerable others which have been worked”

out, by employers to.meet the peculiar exigenéies

of their businesses, These arrangements fall -

In a yiimber of cases thig has been hekd’%ot to preclude

truck owners from being employees. Redford Pulp & Paper

Cov. barly, decided April 6, 1944, D.C. E. D. Va. (4 P-H

Seiad Security Tax Service, par. 36316): Grand Rapids

‘Ciravel Cov. United States, decided Mareh 30, 443, D.C.

Ww. 7 ae, (1 PFE Social Securitye Tax Service, par.

WOT): Perkine Brox dine. v. Bormingham, decided October

is), a Tey oe A Dow? (1-P-H Social Security Tax :

Sorvirt ie, pean. * 36.347 ) : Billard Suqur Co. v. Geantach, | ee

Supp. 82 ON. D. Ohio); Matter of Henen, decided September

, 2, 1901, DC. ‘SS. Donde P - Social’ Security Tax Service,

par. 36, 13): Patiiateiel Com. . Bunfils, Js Colo. 6 5 Foe ;

Puck Pimber Co. ¥. Baker, 3 w yo! 167.

ain

12

m .

With inv twilight zone be twee n thos@relationships ;

which are wnequat vocally employment and those

which are cles arly eutrepreneurial. They partake,

In part, of the nature of both, but are truly repre-

sentative of neither. A ‘decision by this Court as

to the truckers will greatly aid in clarifying the

application of the Act to the cases of this. group.

9 ss conctvsi08N a tees

For the reasons stated: cit is respectfully sub-

mitted that this petition fot a writ of certiorari

should be granted,

a, Howarp McGrath

‘Sol iertor General.

‘

JULY 1946)

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Ba = oor ee

APPENDIX

‘ Sotial Security’ Act, ¢. 531, 49 Stat. 620;

Tire VITT—Tares With Respect “To

Employment oF pe

.

Ke * * : ¥* *

, ee is o

© SkctTION SOL. In addition to, other taxes,

there: shall? be levied, collected, ard pak

upon the income of every individual a.ta

equal to the following percentages of

wages (as defined in section ST1) recelye

“by him atter Pegember 31, 1936, with re-

— spect to. employment (as defined in section

811) after<uch date: *.\ * * .

442 UL S.C. 1940 ed, See. 1001, )

. Spe, 802. (a) The thx imposed by section

801 shalh be eollected by the emplover of the

taxpayer, by deducting the amount of the

tax from the wages as and when paid.

Every employer required so to deduet the

-tax is hereby made liable-for the payiient

sof such. tax) and is hereby indemnified.

agauist the ¢Yfims and demands of any peys

‘son. for ive enc of any such payiyént

made by such emplover,

Ge Sa ae * % oe

fie (42 U.S. C. 1940 ed., See, 1002.)

Sec. 804. In addition to. other taxes, *y

every emplover shall pay an excise tax, with

respect to having individuals in his emplox,

equal to the following percentages of the.

wages (as defined in section 811) paid dy’

him after Deceniber A, 1936.vith respect

to ‘employment (as defied in section Sit)

after such date-* * * ‘

(42-0. s. _ ih 10 ed... See. TO04.)

13)

L.. Sea

\

» eration for employment; including the eash

, Value of all) remuneration paid in any

medium other thaneash; * * *

— (b) The ferm “employment” means any

service, .of | whatever “nature, performed

withip the United States by an employde

forAhis, employer [with exceptions no

* A en F

s

—— ety : : 14 ¢

MM gh he ge

SEC. S11. When Usain this tithe—

(a) The term “wages” means all remun-

£

herein relevant] *

(42 US. ©. 1940 ed., See. 1011.)

Tite IX—Tar On Employers of Bight”

Or More

+. x ie fone -# : *

e

SECTION 904.°Or and after January J

°

1936, every employer (as defined In section”

907) shall pay for each calendar vear an

‘ise tax, with respect. to having individ-

uals in his employ, equal to the following .

percentages of the total wages (as défined in -

section 907) payable by him (regardless

of the time of pavinent ) with respect to”

emplovinent Cas defined iu*, section 07 )

during such calendar Feats oe 8

(42 U.S. @. 1940 ed, See, 1101.) . °

Sec. 907 When used in this title— ~-.

* * . - & 2 € *

(h) The term “wages”” means all pre.

muneration for employment, ineluding the’

-eash value of all remuneration paid in any

medium other than cash,

(¢) The term “employment” means any

_ Service, of whatever nature, performed

Within the United States’ by an, employee

for “nis employer [with exceptions not

herein relevant] *. * * (42 U...8: €.

1940 ed., See. 1107.) :

Sebtions 1400, 1401 (a) (b), 1410, 1426 (a).(b),

1600 and 1607 (h) (¢) of the Internal Revenue

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SR a,

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‘ : Pre ero

Siebel Sy: SSoicniity is GSS tena

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15

Code, ih so far as pertinent here, are substan. .

tially the same as Seetions 801, 802 (a), S804, 811

(a) (b), 901, and 907 (b) ¢e) set out ‘above. .

Treasury Regulations 90; promulgated’ under

Title LX of the Social See ‘urity Act: jules

Arr. 205. Em ploye d individuals. —An in-

dividual’ is in the ¢mploy of another within.

the meaning of the Act if he performs serv-

ives in an emplévment'as defined in section

907 .(¢). However, the relationship be-

tween the: individual who performs such

services and: the’ person for whom such

services are rendered must, as to those

.- ‘services, be the legal relationship of em-

ployer and employee, Whe Act makes no

distinetion between classes or” grades of em-

_ ployees. Thus, superintendents, ee )

“and other superior employees are employee

“within the meaning of the Act,

The words\ employ’ ’*, “employer”, and

“employee” . as used in this artic le, are to

be taken in their ordinary meaning. An

ra Te sana however, may be : ap individual, a

corporation, a partneminp, a trust or

estate, a joint-stock company, an associa-

. _ tien, or a syndicate, group, pool, joint ven-

ture, or other unincorporated organization,

group, or entity. An employer may be a

wersoiracting in a fiduciary ¢apacity or on

Prva of another, such as a enuardima, com-

mittee, trustee, executor or ‘administrator,

trustee in) bankruptey, receiver, assignee

_ for the benefit of creditors, or conservator.

eee =O Whether the’ bel lationship of employer

_% and employee exists, will in doubtful cases

oe “be determined upon.an examination of the

ad partie ular facts of each case,

‘Generally the relationzhip exists when

the person for whom services are performed

has the right-te.contemt-and: direct the anit ~~~

m , ay ve

e - .

’ ee | if : | |

dividual who performs the services, not

_ only as to the result to be accomplished by ~

the work but also as to the details and

“means by which that result.is accomplished,

That is, an eniployee is subject to the Will .

and control of the employer not ‘only as to |

what shall be done but how it shall’be done.

In this connection, it is not necessary that

the employer actually direct or control the

ie manner in wwhieh the serviees are per-

“formed; it is sufficient if he’ has the rreht

> todo so. The righ? to discharge is alse nan

Important factor indicating tliat the. person

possessing that right is an employer. Other

*£ factors characteristicesef an employer are.

the furnishing of topls and the furnishing

_. of a place to work, to the individual who

performs the: services. Tn general, if an.

Individual is subject-to the control or diree:

tion of another merely %s to the result to be

accomplished by the work and not as to: the

means and methods for accomplishing thé

result, he isan rndependenc contractor, not

an employee, 3 ee - ,

a If the relationship of employer .and em-.

ployee exists, the designation or deserip- | +

tion of the relationship hy the parties as

anything other than. that of employer and

employee is immaterjal. Thus,’ if two ipd

dividuals in fact stafid in the relation of

employgr and employee to each other, it: is

of noJconsequenee ‘that the employee. is +

_ designaged -as a partner, coadventurery —

agent, or independent contractor. ee

~ The measurement, method, or designation

of compensation is also immaterial. if the

relationship of employer and Employee in

fact exists, arene ge =

Tuelividuals* performing services as. in-

dependént contractors gare not employees,

‘Generally, physicians, lawyers,.» dentists,

veterinarians, contractors, subcontractors,

public stenographers, auctioneers, and

_ others who follow an ‘Independent trade,

business, or profession, in which they offer

thei services to: the public, are inde pe nde nt

contractors aitd not employees.

* See * * eax

ARTICLE 3, Treasury Regulations 91, promul-

fate d-under ‘Title Viib of the Sociat Security

Act, in so far as pertinent here, is substantially:

the same as Article 205 of Treasury Regulations

9 set out abbve,

t

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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