Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Porter v. Lee

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APR 15

“Nos.1116-1117 *

(uci noceaceariemenmy

7 Betonen TERM, 1945

“Pauw A. Poirres, biiawcajiiccc, Girvnch | OF PRICE

SSOMINISTRATION, PETITIONER

x v.

De Lucas J. Lee. AND einer Les - .'

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“Pave A. Pores, ihaconigaceas OFFICE OF PRICE

; NADIEEIIERYSION, PETITIONER

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Chest. 0S TLYCRL OROPLEY

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Sigs: tun AND Lucas J. LEE, hina ‘AND SUE_

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_WEYITION YOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI 70 THE UNITED

; rade Justice OF THE Pzace, Covincton,

‘STATES. vcs oedaraln oF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH ©

«/ CERCUIT

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INDEX

gee : emcee: iat

Opinions below — __- - eves 2

Jurisdiction “ 2

Questions [prese nte d - oe 2

Statutes and regulati ions involved re : : 3

Statement ie aig 3

Specification of errors to be urged ‘ mae : S

Reasons for granting the writ Ss a ore.

Conelusion Py Genprt ape : 16

Appendix ; , ane

CITATIONS

Cases: :

Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. 8. 503 ---. 4, 12, 14, 15, 16

Federal Trade Commission v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,

U.S. 257¢ oe epee eke Sag 10°

Hamilton-Brown Shoe Cé. v. Wolf Brothers & Co., 240 U.S.

ot ieee: : pe wanda a -13-

Hecht Co..v. Bocwiee, mth ie. “eS

Henderson v. Fleckinger, 136 F. 2d 381__..-..' __.__.. 9, 10, 16

Jones ‘v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 208 U.S. 1_- 10

Panama R. R. Co. v. Napier Shtpping Ce., 166 U.S. 280° - 13

Tezas & NO. R. Co. v. Northside Belt Ry. Co., 276 U.S.

RRR yeep eerie ah Ca A gee emo, WIE ea 10

Toledo Scale Co. v. Coninetinn ‘Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399. alae 12

Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, 323.U.S.37...-.-. -.. _ 10

Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414. .-___.- - ee 4

Statutes:

: Emérgency Price Control Act of 1942 (56 Stat. 23, 50

Su U.S.C. App. See. 901, ef seq., as alle nded) : Ay

Dk eS ha waka edaekcad eye hccansoncabanees 3, 17

BD ieiunsdanssccccvaducesaes paseccestascen SOR

Sees Si eee LO oe ee ee ee

See. 205 (8). eee + 1 IB

reer ee He ert tad Ue 18

(ec). rene Sire yes a Pee oe aie se.

aig ak ae ee anaes es Seer 20°

SEAR Aa oY ae ee 20.4%,

Af)”. aaa eee , _. 19, 22

ayy WS sacs ont SEAN DAES Set ee:

Miscellaneous: =~

Rent Regulations for Housing, as amended (10 F. R. 3 136,

13528) : 2s ;

8 eee ie pes : Casita nena

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Satie Sure Court of the Bnited Sites

OcTOBER TE RM, 1945,

No. 1116 ars | aa

PavL A. PorTER, ADMINISTRATOR, OFFIC E OF PRICE

ADMINISTRATION, PETITIONER |

Vv.

Dr. Lucas J. LEE AND Mazet LEE

8

No.1117__. >

Patt A. ee ADMINIST RATOR, OFFICE OF PRIC FE

ADMINISTRATION, PETITIONER

v.

, ; : . 6

“HazEL LER AND Lucas J. LEE, AGENT, AND SUE

LAKENAN, JUSTICE .OF THE PEACE, COVINGTON,

Ky. ; - ne

>

PETITION FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED >

_ STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH

CIRCUIT.

Paul A. Porter, Administrator of the Office of

Price. Administration, petitioner. herein, ‘prays .

that writs of certiorari be issued to review the

_ judgments’ of the United States Circuit Court of

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in the above ell-«

titled cases, entered on April 8, 1946, dismissing

(i) - YM,

. ) ~-

_

as moot appeals from two decisions of the district

court dismissing suits for injunctions.

OPINIONS BELOW

“ The opinion of the District Court in the first —

case (R. 20-23) -has not yet been Feported. It.

filed no opinion in the second case.. The Cireuit.

Court of Appeals wrote no opinion. |

JURISDICTION

The judgmént of the Circuit Court of Appeals

was entered on April'8,°1946, The jurisdiction of

this court is invoked under Section 240 (a) of the —

J udicial Code, as amended by the Act of February ‘

13, 1925,

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

In order to forestall an eviction in violation of

the Price. Administrator’s rent regulations and to

prevent further violation of the regulations by re-

spondents Lee, the Administrator sued in the

United ‘States District Court for injunctive’ re-

lief. The District Court/held that it lacked juris-

diction to interfere, with the state court eviction

proceeding. « An appeal having been.taken, the Cir- -

cuit Court of Appeals denied the Administrator’s

application for a restraining order pending the ap-

peal. The tenant was then forced to vacate the

premises. At the time the appeals were argued re-

- spondents mov ed to have the appeals dismissed as-

moot, and the Cireuit Court of Appeals granted

the motion. >The questions presented are:

3

1. Whether the court below erred in holding the

case moot. Res ores:

2. Whether the court below abused its discre-

tion in denying the application for a temporary

restraining order. |

. 3. Whether the District Court erred in holding

that it had no jurisdiction to enjoin the unlawful

eviction by the state court. - ;

: STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

The statutes and regulations involved are the

capes ‘y Price Control Act of 1942) (56 Stat.

23,50 U.S. CL App. See. 901, ef seg.) as amended,

and Rent Regulation for Housing, as amended

(10 F. R. 3436), issued under that ‘Aet. | The -

pertinent provisions are set forth in the Ap-

pendix, infra, pp. 17-31. Maer seer

STATEMENT

These cases-were joined on appeal pursuant to

an order of the Sixth Cigtuit Court of Appeals,

dated October 6, 1945, anting the petitioners’

motion to consolidate the two appeals for briefing

and argument. Throughout this petitidn, refer-

ences to the Record, in the first case, No. 10007 in the

court below and No. 1116 here, will be shown as" R™

and _ references to the record in the second case, No.

~. 10079 below and No. 1117 here, wilk be shown as

v

“2R”’. ,

Section 2 (d) of the Emergency Price Control

Act authorizes the Administrator, whenever such

+

action is necessary or proper in order to effectuate

the purposes of the Act, to “‘regniate or pro-

hibit * * * speculative or manipulative prae-

tices or renting or leasing practices (including oh

tices relating to recovery of the possession) 1

- connection with any defense-area housing shorn:

modations, which in his judgment are equivi ‘alent

to or are likely to result in * * *~ rent in-

creasés * * * inconsistent with the purposes

of this Act.””. Under the authority of this Seetion, . .

the Administrator has, by Section 6 .of the Rent °

- Regulation for Housing, provided that so long

as the tenant continues to pay the rent to which

the landlord is entitied no tenant shall: be re-

moved or evicted (except on grourids none of

which is or was present in ‘this: case) unless, on

petition, the Administragor of the Office of Price

Administration issues a certificate authori izing the

eviction.’ - Violation of this regulation is forbidden

by Sections 4 (a), and Seetion 205 empowers the -

Administ rator to seek injunctive telief against sueh

violation, © | 3 |

On or about June 15, 1942, Robert C. Beever

rented an apartment from the respondent, Dr.

Lucas Lee, for the sun ef. Forty-three dollars a

month, payable in advance on the 18th day of

each month (R. 67). On Oetober 18, 1944, be-

cause the tenant's child was ill, his. wife was un.”

. The validity of this frevision is not challenged, nor cond

it, be’ attac ked in this phoceeding. Yakus v. United States.

321 U.S. 414; Bowles v. w illingham, 821 U, 3. 503,

—_

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= -

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able to pay the rent due on that day CR. 73).

“Mr. Beever was employed on a day shift and wie

was unable to pay the rent in. persou CR. 68),

However, on the following day, October 19, 1944;

Mrs. i went to Dr. Lee's office to pay the

rent CR. 51, 52)6 ‘Dr. Lee owas not mh the office,

but the ae who had ‘oh previous occasions

accepted the rent (R. 45, 74) and who collected |

the rent when the respondent Lee wis net in

(R: 101), was present. The rent was tendered

-* to the janitor, but he declined to accept it because

he had no receipt book (R. 51, 73).5 On O¢tober

20, 1944; a notice to vacate was served on the

tenant (R.54). On the same day the tenant mailed

a money order to respondent Lee for the amount

of the rent. (R. 62). However, this tender was re-

fused, and the money ‘order was returned by Lee's

attorney (R.56). In the past, Lee had accepted

- payments’ of rent one to: six days after the due

date without objection (R. 44. 62, 68, T4- 75).

This was also true with respect to other tenants

of the respondents (R, 87, 92). No demand Was

made for the rent om October 18th (RL ST) and

no receipt was tendered on the I8th or the 19th

“(R. 64)... Shortly afterward «Dr. Lee ‘told the

tenant that the real reason ‘for the eviction Was ,

not the non- payment of rent but “the fact that

he didn’t want ‘children jn. the apartme nt any

longer’, and that “that is the way it is going to

be done”. (R. 71; ef. R. 58-59).

6

On October 20, 1944, respondent Lee com-

menced ‘an action in the Justice Court ‘of Sue

Lakenan to recover possession of the premises _

by reason "of the alleged. non-payment of rent due

on October 18, 1944 (R.18).°.The trial of this -

action was continued by the Justice of the Peace

to December 4, 1944. ‘ 7

On the latter date ‘the ibminiabvater brought

the first action herein (No. 10,007 in the court °

-below) -to enjoin the Lees from prosecuting evic-

tion. proceedings against ‘Beever or any other.

tenant” and to enjoin them -frow violating the

Rent ‘Regulations issued pursuant to the Emer-

gency Price.Control Act (R. 5). A. temporary

restraiging or der was isstied? by the United States.

District Court. (R. 11); enjoining the Lees, from

prosecuting: the eviction against Beever, The de-

fendants thereafter moved to discharge the tem-

porary restraining order and to dismiss the com-

plaint (R. 15, 16). The motion was heard on

oral testimony and documentary evidence (R. 29-

108). After a trial, the rest ‘aining order was

dissolved, an injunction was denied, and the com-

plaint dismissed .(R. 26). The District Court held

“that the state court had concurrent jurisdiction

under the Price Control Act t,/ fond that the Federal

court accordingly | lacked Jurisdiction to enjoin the

state goyrt proceeding (R. 20-26).

On the landlo l’s motion, the Fercible Detainer

action in the first case was subsequently dismissed

<-

_~

4

without wdiuitins (2 R. 22). On June 25, 1945 the

respondents, Hazel Lee and Lucas J. Lee, insti-.

tuted another action. in Foreible Detainer in the

Court of Justice: of the Peace Sue Lakenan, ask-

ing fer a writ of resfitution to remove R. C.

Beever and his family from his apartment on the

eround of non-payment of rent since October 18,

1944 (2 R. 14). In fact, the tenant had paid tbe.

rent each month.on the due date to his attorney,

who betained it im escgow pursuant to an agree-

ment with the attorney for the respondent (R.

77). On uly 2, 1945, the Justice of the Peace

entered a judgment in favor of Hazel Le ‘and

Lucas J. Lee directing the eviction of the tenant

Beever (2 R. 15). On July 9, 1945, the Adminis-

trator instituted the second action in the United.

States District Court (No. 10,079 below) in whie h?

. he sought to restrain the enforcement and execu-

tion of this judgment by the respondents Hazel

Lee and Dr. Lucas J. Lee and by any constable

working out of Sue Lakenan’s court (2 R. 6). Re--

- spondents’ motion to dismiss the complaint of the

Administrator was granted on the. ground that

the court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin the action

in the ‘State court (2 R. 28-30).

An appeal was duly taker in each action (R.

27; 2R. 32). Appligation was made to the Circuit

Gaue of Appeals for-an injunction pending ap-

peal-in the first case, but was denied (R. aR

On July 14, 1945 the tenant was served with a

writ of possession upon which the Justice of the

691033—46-——2

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Cli. Peace had written that he must vacate within ten

days.’ “The tenant, finding that he had no choice

in the matter, to keep his furniture from being:

put on the street, moved it toa friend’s basement.

He and his family went to live with his wife's par-

yents“at Covington, Kentucky for six, weeks, and,

then they moved to his parents’ home in Mic ‘higan

where lived in the basement for five’ months’

| ® =until he: found accommodations to house his fam-

Fad ily. He stat hat at no thaé was he willing to

move out of the premises but did so only because.

he knew that if lie did not he would ‘be put out.

At the argument of the appeals, an affidavit was

submitted by-the landlord setting forth that the -

premises had.been vacated (R. iLL) | and. thes Cir-

cuit Court of Appeals, on the respondents’ motion,

dismissed - both ‘actions on the ground that they °

were now moot because the tenant Was no » longer

“on the premises. . (41/7) .

,

~

: SPECIFICATION OF ERRORS TO BE URGED

1. The Cireuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth

Circuit ‘erred in dismissing the appeals from the

denials of the injunctions on the ground that the

cases had become moot because the tenant had va- \

‘~ ated the premises pursuant td the order of the °

J ustice of the Peace.

? The facts appearing in this paragraph are set forth in

the affidavit of R. C. Beever submitted. by the petitioner to

the Circuit Court of Appeals in opposition td y respondents’

motion to have the cause dismissed as moot (R/? =).

4

4

.

.

»* Q a .

‘ ~

.

2. The Cireuit Court of Appeals erred in deny-

ying a temporary injunction against the eviction

~ pending appeal. -° | ,

~ 3. The Cireuit Court of Appeals erred in not

holding that the District Court posgessed jurisdic-

tion to enjoin the eviction proc ceedings | in the state

courts. ; os

, The Circuit Court of Appeals erréd in not

Waid that the District Court should have en-

tered the injunction prayed for by. petitioner.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

1. The decision that the case is moot because

the tenant has been. evicted eontlicts with Mender-

SON. hal ety 16 F.2d 381(C.C. A.5). Inthat

case exactly the Same situation-existed as pré “vails .

here. The court there held (p. 381): oil

On the argument of the appeal, it was sug-

gested that the tenant had now vacated the

premises, and the cause is moot. The appel-

lant contends that he is nevertheless entitled

to an Injunction and to have the status re-

stored. We authorized affidavits to be filed

as to the facts. The tenant says she moved

out a few days after the injunction was de-

nied [in the district court] to escape bodily

eviction under the warrant from the Stite

court. Appellee makes affidavit that the

tenant moved voluntarily on. Jan. 6,, 1943,

owing, two months and six days rent which

has not been paid. We are of opinion that

if the tenant was forced out, and if an in-

10

junction be finally granted,_ it ‘would be

- within the power of the court granting it to

order the status as of the time of filing the:

complaint to be restored.’ Jones v. Steu-

vities and n ones ommission, 298 U. S\

1, 2. 56S. Cr. 65-4, 80 L. Ed. 1015 », aNd Cases

‘cited. The. eause - is therefore not

moe eee \ P ao

The decision below as to mootneéss’ was clearly

wrong. As is pointed out in the Flechinger, ease,

the mafter is not moot because the court can still

grant relief to the tenant by reinstating him- in

the apartment. See Jones v..S. E. C., 298 U. Syl,

15-18; Teras dN. O. R. C9. v. Northside Belt Ry.

. Co 0.» 276 U. S. 475, 479. Moreover, inasmuch ‘as

the complaints in ‘Gees eases prayed for injune-

tive relief ggainst the eviction of ‘‘Beever or any

other tenant”? and against the conumission or con-

.tinuance of violations of the Rent Regulations, it

is apparent that the departure of Beever did not

_render the cause moot any “more than an, iInjune-

tion suit against a store, based,on sales at unlawful

prices to one individual becomes: nioott when he.

ceases to patronize the ‘store or dies. Cf. Hecht

Co. ¥. Bowles, 321. ©. 8.3 321, 327; Federal Tirade

Coitinission v. Goody year Tire & Rubber Cy, 304

U. S. 257; Walling v. Helmerieh &: Pat, 323

U. 8. 37, 43. i

-2. The holding in this case that the case becomes

moot. when the tenant has been evicted, together’

with the refusal of the court below to grant in-

v

11

junctions pending appeal to maintain the status

quo in this type of case makes it impossible for

the Administrator to, protect the tenants -in the

Sixth Circuit. As is moré fully developedtcit’ the

petition in the Dicken case, tiled herewith, the

most erticial area for price control, at prese nt isin.

. the field’ of rent. The shcttage In Jieusing ix

steadily growing greater and any break in: the

system of control would result in grave hardship:

’ for tenants\ illegally evicted, and an extreme pres-

~ sure on the\ rent ceilings. Iflandlords ean de-

prive tenants of -all protection by evicting thém.. .

hs

before remedis al action can be taken in the federal

‘courts, which is the result of the holding éf ‘noot-

ness: here, they\ will be greatly erieouraged to’ at-

icopt inlaw hil evictions. This evil is exacerbated

“by the refusal of: the court below, to grant in--

junctions ace appeal, which inevitably means

that the evictions will take place. |

3. The Cireuit Court-of Appeals clearly abused

its discretion in refusing to stay the-evietion pend-

ing appeal. .We recognize that an interlocutory

ruling en an application for temporary injunction

Will not ‘be disturbed by this Court unless -plainly

arbitrary. But here there was no reason at all.

why. the restraining order should have heen

denied, and the policy of the court below in deny-

ing restraining orders in thege circumstances in

itself presents an important issue ‘because of its

effect in interfering with the enforeement of the

Giron. , aie

Was ¢

. is'aggravated bythe decision that fhe eviction,

12

‘Rent Regulations at the present time. ie, Clearly the —

harm. to the tenant— forced ‘to me move ve during the

~ pendeney v af the appeal Was very gre: at. oT he bene-

fit to the. Jandbord, who merely desired to rent to

someone else, presumably without children, was

negligible oy non-existent. From the broader

Viewpoint -of law enforcement poliey, it is yital

that in a suit to prevent a violation of law, the

law vielator not be permitted to achieve his illegal

end while the suit is still pending. And. if it Js

proper for a court, in passing upon an application

for. temporary — relief pending appeah, to. give.

weight to the liketihood that the jud&ment ay

pealed from will be reversed, ave shall show below

that the district court's decision that it’ lacked

jurisdiction is in ¢antlict with the decision of this

Court in Bowles vy. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503.

In addition, our summary of the evidence in the

Statement, supra, pp. 4-8, demonstrates that the

respondents were not evicting Beever for not hav-

ing paid his rent. In the absence of any possible

reason for denying the: Administrator temporary

relief, the action of the court below in this ‘respect

arly an abuse of discretion, which, as.we have

see

Pending | appeal retiders the case moot.

This Court on certiorari may review the inter-

locutory as well as the final orders of the. Circuit

Court of Appeals. Toledo Seale Co. v. Computing

Bs)

_

13

~ "Seal (Co.. 261 UL S. 399, 418: Mamilton-Brown

‘Shoe Co. v. Wolf Brothers & Co., 240 UL So251,:

258; Panama RoR. Cooly. Napicr Shipping Co.,

166 U.S. 280, 284. In view of the number of in-

stances in whieh the present problem may arise,

partic ularly in the light of the: existing “housing

shortage, it is iMiport: unit that this Court set the

Ciredit Court of Appe als straight with respect to

the necessity Of preventing’ evietions pe ‘nding

ane “als. |

The hecessity for an immediate determination

day the: district courts have power to enjoin

evic tions jn Viehation of OP. A. Regulations com-

pels Tis to request the Court, if it erants certiorari,

~ to reach the merits of the jur isdlie tional issue, and

hot merely tochold that the case is net moot or

that a temporary -injunetion should have been

granted. To remand the case to the Cireuit Court

of Appeals for the purpose of deciding the juris.

dietional question, With a possibility of further

review here, would impair the effectiveness of the

_ rent control program in’ the Sixth Cireuit for

many months An Which the housing situation will

be most critical.

/Vhe District Court in this case reasoned that

Section 205 (¢) gives the Federal and the State

Courts concurrent jurisdiction overall proceed-

ings other than criminal, ‘that, accordingly, the

local’ mayistrate’s court has equal jurisdiction

“With it to determine the lawfulness of the evietion,

“e

14

and that, accordingly, Section 205 (ce) itself de-’

prived the federal court of power to enjoin the -

he, instituted local proceeding. (R. 20- |

25). This decision completely: disregards the

many manifestations on the face of Section 205

that the concurrent jurisdiction granted was

limited to etvil enforcement suits- under that See-

tion, and that this Court expressly so declared

in Bowles vy. Willingham, 321 U.S. 508, 511-512.

Clearly the suit by the Lees in the. local court ©

to evict Beever was neither a suit ‘under See- -

* tion 205° as specifically required by the con-

current jurisdictional provision in| Section 205

‘(¢), nor an enforcement ‘action at all. In the

Willingham case this Court stated (p, 512);

eae a Under the present Act all. juris-

diction has not ‘been withheld -from. state

courts, since they have concurrent jurisdic-

tion over civil cuforcement suits ‘be ought

by thie Administrator. 6205 (6). * * *

' [Italiex Aupplied. ] ; :

The Court, also declared (p. 511n):

It is true that §205 (¢) gives to state

and territorial courts concurrent jurisdic-

_tion of all proceedings (except) criminal

proceedings) under § 205 of the Act. But

they embrace only enforcemint — sitits -

brought by the Administratoys, not suits

brought to restraiy or enjoin enforcement

of the Act or orders or regulations there-

under. [Italies supplied.].

15

7~_

The text of See tien 205 demonst rates that there

ean he no question that only \enforcere nt actions.

are included within the ‘proceedings under See-

tion 205" referred tocin Section 205 ¢¢). ‘This

appears clearly fromy the official title of the See-

tion ( Enforcement” ), from the fact that the

Section provides: only for various types of enforce-

_ ment proceedings and for limitations upon such

proceedings, and frony the fact that Section 205.

(¢) itself declares that with certain exceptions

“sueh other’ proceedings: may be brought im any

district in which any part of any act or trans-

‘action constituting the violation occurred,”’.[ Italics

supplied. ]

As” this Court note ed. in the Willingham ‘case

(p. 510): “By 9 205 (a) the Administrator is

given authority to sgek injunctive relief ino the

appropriate. court’ (including the federal district

courts) «against acts or practices in violation

ak ate *” The attempt at eviction here was

itself a violation of the Rent Regulations and there- °

fore of 64 of the Aet. In conferring concurrent

jurisdiction to enforce the Act upon state courts,

Congress was clearly not intending to grant the state

courts authority to proceed with unlawful evi¢tion

proceedings or to render such proceedings Immune

fromthe injunctive power of the federal court under

Section 203 (a). The contrary has been held in

numerous cases. It may be observed: that although

there have been a great many cases, including the

BY1UsS-—46 3

. S pF , : .

ela. eee : ;

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16 3 .

Willingham. case and the Fleckinger case, supra,

in which state court proe eedings have been. en-

joined in which the objection raised by the dis-

trict court here could -have been presented, this

“is, so far as we know, the first case in which any

such challenge to the federal: court’s power has >

been “made or accepted.’

CONCLUSION

.

— The court below decided a question’ of impor- .

‘tance to the enforcement and administration of

“the Emergency Price Control Act. This decision .

contlicts with a decision of another Circuit Court

of Appeals. It is clearly wrong. For these

reasons a‘writ of certiorari should be gr. anted.

Respectfully submitted. |

; J ‘How arp “MoGrata,

Sclicitor Ge neral,.

v

.

>

Georae MONCHARSH,

Deputy Administrator for Enforcement, Sox

Office of Price ne

i

‘Apri. 1946.

_ * Objections, -haye been raised under Section 265 of the

Judicial Code. a point which we discuss in our petition for

certiorari in Porter v. Dicken, to be filed herewith.

%

oO

APPENDIX | 4

A. The St al ute s

The ‘pertinent provisions of the Emergeney

Price Control Act of 1942, as amended (56 Stat.

93, 50 U.S. Apy.. Sees. 901, ef seg., are Sec-

tions 2 (1), 4 (a). #(b) and 205. |

Ser: & * %:* :* | ae 3

—-(d) Whenever it the judgment of the

Administrator such action. is necessary or

proper in order to effectuate the pyrposes

of this-Act, he may, by regulation o1 order,

regulate or prohibit speculative or manipu-

lative practices ( including practices Pebat in

to changes in form or quality) or. hoarding,

in connection with any commodity, aid

speculative _ or manipulative practices or

renting or leasing practices (ineluding

practices relating to recovery of the posses-

sion) mM connection with any defense-ared

housing accommodations, * whieh in. ais

judgment. are equivalent to or are likely to

result in price or rent Increases, as the case

_ may. be, inconsistent, with the purposes ety

this: Act.. * Be Sts tress 2

Sec. 4. (a): It shall be unlawful, regard-.

jess of any contract, agreement, lease, “oT”

other obligation. heretofore or hereafter ene

tered into, for any petson fo sell or deliver.

any conunodity, or in the course of trade

or business: te buy or receive any cout

modity, or to demand or receive any rent

for -any defense-area housing aceommoda-

tions, or otherwise to do or omit.toe do. any

act, in violation of any regulation or order.

. 7) ys

J

G

under section 2¢ or of aty price schedule

effective in accordance. with the provisions.

of section 206, or of any regulation, order,

or requirement under section 202 (b) or

section 205 (f), or to offer, solicit, attempt.

or agree to do any of the foregoing.

(b) It shall be unlawful for any person

to remove er attempt to. remove from any

» defense-area housing accommodations the

tenant or oecupant thereof or to refuse to

renew the lease or agreement for the use of

» sucli accommodations, because such tenant

or occupant has taken, or proposes to take,

action authorized or required by this Act or

any “regulation, order, or requirement

thereunder. - oe

Sec. 205. (a) Whenever in the judgment.

of the Administrater any person has en- —

gaged or is about to-engage in any acts oF

practices which constitute or will constitute

_a violation of anyProvision of seétion 4 of

this Act; he may make application to the

appropriate court for ‘an order enjoining

such acts or practices, or for an order en-

forcing compliance with -such provision,

and upon.a showing by the Administrator

that such person has engaged: or is about to

engage in any such acts or practices a per-

manent or temporary injunction, restrain- ©

ing order, or other order shail be granted |

without bond.

(b) Any person who’ willfully. violates -

any provision of. section 4 of this Act, and

any person who makes any ‘statement or -

entry false in any material respect in any _

document. or report required to be kept or:

filed under section 2 ‘or section 202, shall.

upon conviction thereof, be subject to a fine

of not more than $5,000; or to imprisonment

for not more than two years in the case of a

‘

_ ebleaee

violation of section 4 (@ and for not more

than one vear invall other cases, or to ‘both

such tine and imprisonment. Whenever the:

Administrator has-reason to believe that

any, person is liable to punishment under

this subsection, he may certify the facts.to -

the Attorney General, vaio may, in his dis-

-eretion, cause appropriate proceedings to

be brought.

(¢) The district courts shall Shave juris-

“ diction of*criminal proc eodings for’ viola-

' tions of section 4+ of this Act, and, coneur-

rently with State and Territorial courts, of.

all other proceedings wider ‘section 205 of

this Act. Sueh criminal proceedings may

be brought in any district in which any part

—of-any act’ or ‘transaction constituting the

Violation occurred, Except as provided: in-

section 205 (f) (2), such other proceedings

may be-bronght in any district in whieh any

© part of any act or transaction constituting

the violation occurred, aiid may alse be

a ebrontiet in the district in. which the defend-

ant resides or tratsacts business, and proc;

ess in such cases may be served in any dis-

triet wherein the defendant resides or tvans-

-acts business or wherever the defendant

may be feund: Provided, however, That all

suits under subsection (Ce) of this sechion

shall be brought in the district or county in

which the defendant resides or has a. place”

Of business, an office, or an agent. Any

“such court shall advance on the docket and

expedite the. disposition of any eriminal or

other proceedings brought before it under

‘this section. No costs shalk be assessed

agaist the Administrator or the United

T Added by sec. LO8(a) of Stabilization Extension Aer of

144. : ne

<j

: 20

, eee A ~

States Government in any proceeding under

this ‘Act. or a ee BS

(ad) No person shall be held liable for

damages or penalties in‘any Federal, State,

or Territorial court, on any grounds for or

in Kespect of anything done or omitted to be

done, in good faith pursuant to any pro- ..

} vision of this Act or any regulation, order,

———_

?

price schedule, ‘requirement, or agreément_

« thereunder, or. under any price schedule of

‘the Administrator of the Oftice of Price Ad-

Aninistration or of the Administrator of the _

Office of Price Administration and Civilian~ >

Supply, notwithstanding that subsequently:

suth provision, regulation, order, - price

schedule, requirement, or agreement may be

_ modified, rescinded, or determined to. be

invalid.: In any suit or action wherein, a

party relies for ground of relief or defense

‘upon this Act or any regulation, order, price

schedule, requirement, or agreement there-

under the.cgurt having jurisdiction of*such

stitgor action shall certify such fact to the

Administrator. The Administrator may In-

‘tervene in any such suit or action. |

{e) If any person selling a com@niodity

violates a regulation, order, or price sched-

ule freseribing a maximum price or maxi-

mum prices, the person. who buys such com-

Modity for use or consumption other than

in the course of trade or business may,

within. one-year from the date of the oceur-

rence of the violation, except as hereinafter

Provided, bring an action against the seller’,

‘on account of the overcharge. In such ac-

-. tion, the seller shall be liable for reasonable

attorney's fees and costs as dete ruined by

the court, plus whichever of the following ~~

‘sums ts the greater: (1) Such amount not

more than three times the wiouut of the

< . ‘

+ .

aa es _

¢ -

overcharge, or the overcharges, upon whiel

5 the action is based as the convi in tts. dis?

éretion may determin& oF (2) on®anount

not less than 825 nor more than S50, as the

court in its diserction may determines Pro-

ivded, however, That such amount shall be-

charges or 825, whichercr is greater, if the

~. \ defendant proves that the violation of the

, reyulation, order, or price schedule in ques-

tion was neither willful nor the result of

fatlare to take. practicable sprecautions

™ the amount-of the overcharge cor over-

f

ment or reveipt of rent fpr defense-area

housing accommodations sha'i be deemed

the buying or selling of a connnedity, as Me

- ¢Rse may be; and the word “overcharge”

shall mear the amount by which. the eou-

\ sideration erceeds.the applicable matimum

- \ price’ \Tf any person selling.a commodity

. violates\a regulation, order, or price sébed-

ule prescribing a maximum price Gor max-

infum prices, and the buyer either fails to

* institute an action under this subsection

within thirty days from-the date of the oe-

currence of ‘the violation or is not entitled

forany reason to bring the action, the Ad-

« behalf.of the United States within such onc-

year period, If such action ts instituted by

‘the Administrator, the buyer shall there-

after be barred from bringing an action, for

\

ee .

? As amended by see.\L0s (b) of Stabilization Extension:

Act of 1944. Formerly read. in place of italicized language: *

“es * bring an action either for Sy or for treble the

amount by which the conkideration exceeded he applenble >

maxing price, whichever is the greater’ his reasonible -

attorney's feews and costs asdetermined by the court.” '

"Added byser. 108 (b) of Stabilization Exten-ton Net of

: 144. ‘ , | m ' a ae

-

a

against the occurrence of the violation! -

For the purposes of this section the pay--

ministrator may: institute such action on:

\ . . 22

the same violation or violations. Any action

under this subsection by either the buyer or

the.Administrator, as the case may be, may

be Brought in any court of com petent juris-

diction. A judgment in an action for dam-

ages under this subsection shall be a bar to

the recovery under this subsection of, any

damages in any other action against the

same: seller on account of sales made to the

same purchaser prior to the institution of

the action in whieh such judgment was ren-

dered [The amendment made by ‘subsce-

tion (b), insofar as it relates‘to actions by

buyers or actions which my be brought. by

the Administrator only after the buyer has

failed to, institute .an action within thirty.

days from the occurrence of the violation,

. shall be applicable only with respect to vio-

“ —. dations occurring after the date of cnact-

. ment of this Act. In other cases, such

— amendment shail be upplicable with respect

+ to proceedings pending on the date of cnact-

ment of this Act and with respect to pro-

ceedings instituted thereafter. iy <

(f) (1) Whenever in the judgment of the

Administrator such action is necessary or

_ proper in order to effectuate the purposes

of this Act and to assure compliance with

and provide for the effective enforcement

*As amefdedl by sec. 108 (b) of Stahilization Extension

Act of #44. Formerly read, in place of italicized language :

*

“es * * is not entitled to bring suit or action under this

subsection, the Administrator may bring such action ‘tinder

thisesubsection’ on behalf of the United States. Any suitor

action under this subseetion maybe brought in any court of

conspetent: jurisdiction, ad shall be instituted’ Within one

yet? after d r

sions of this subsection shall not take effect orn teed the

expiration of six months from. the «late of-enactm of this

Act.” ; e a

“Sec. LOS (¢) of Stabilization Extension Act of 1944.

¢

’*

» .

"}

elivery is completed or ren wid. The provi. -

"93

of any regulation or order issued or whieh

may be issued under sectiol 2, or of any

price schedule ffeetive in accordance with

the provisions. of section 206, he may by

regulation or order isstie to or require of

any person or persons subject to any regu-

‘lation. or order issued under section 2.-or*

subject to any such price schedule, a license

‘as a condition selling any commodity or

commodities with respect to which such reg-

ation, order, or price schedule is appli-

cable, It+shall not he-necessary for the

Administrator to issue a separate license for

each commodity or for each regulation,

order, or price schedule: with respect to:

which a license is required. No such license

shall contain any provisiey Which could not

“be prescribed by regulation, order, or re-

quirement under séction 2 ar section 202;

Provided, That no such license may be re-

quired as a condition of selling or distribut-

ing (except as waste or scrap) newspapers,

periodicals, books.; or other printed or

written material; or motion pieturds, or as a

. & °,° . - e . °

condition of selfing radio time: Provided

further, That no license may be required

of any farmer as a condition of selling any

agricultural commodity produced by him,

and no liceuse may be required of any fish-

erman as a condition of selling any fishery.

commodity caught or taken bY him: Pro-

vided further, That in any ease in which

such a license is required of: any person,

the Administrator shall wot have power to

.deny to.such person a license to sell any

commodity or commodities, unless such per-

son already has such a license to sell sueh

commedity or commodities, or unless there

ix in effect mnder paragraph (2) of this sub-

section with respect te such person an order

1 / " ° , ‘

%

24

of suspension of a previous license to the

Se that such previous license authorized

sQch- person to sell such commodity or -

commodities. —- ‘

(2) Whenever, in, the judgment of the

Administrator a person has violated any of |

the provisions of a license issued under this

subsection, or has violated any of the pro-

visions of any regulation, order, or require-_

ment under section 2 or section 202 (b),

or any of the -provisions..of any price

schedule effective in accordance with the

provisions of section: 206, which is appli-

eable to such person, a warning notice shall

be sent by registered mail to such person.

If the Administrator has reason to “believe

that such person has again violated any. of

the provisions of such license, regulation,

order, price schedule, er requirement after

receipt of such warning notice, the Ad-

ministrater may petition ‘any State or Ter-

-—

ritorial court of competent jurisdiction, or a’

district court subject to the limitations here-

inafter provided, for ain order suspending

the license of such person for any period of.

not more than twelve months. If any such -

court finds that such person has violated any

of the provisions of ‘such license, regulation,

‘order, price schedule, or requirement .after

the receipt of the warning notice, such court

shall issue an order suspending the license

to the extent that it authorizes such person

to sell the commodity or commodities in-

connection with which the violation oc-

curred, or to the extent that it authorizes

such person to sell any commodity -or com-

modities with respect: to which a regula-.

tion or order issued. under section 2, or a

. price schedule effective in accordance with

the provisions of section 206, is-applicable;

25 *

but no such suspension shali be for a period

of more than twelve‘months. For the pur-

poses of this. subsection, any such proceed-

ings for the suspension of a license. may be

brought in a district court if the licensee is

doing business in more than-one State, or

if his gross sales ‘exceeded $100,000 per an-

num. Within’ thirty days after the entry

of the: judgment or order of any court

“either suspending a license, or dismissing or

denying in whole or in- part the Adminis-

trator’s ‘petition for suspension, an appeal

may be taken from such judgment or order

"an like manner as an appeal may be taken -

In other cases from a judgment or order of ,

a State, Territorial, or district court, as. the

case may be. Upon good cause shown, any

such order of suspension may be staved by

the appropriate court or any judge thereof

In accordance with the applicable practice;

and upon written stipulation of the parties

to the proceeding for suspension, approved

by the trial court, ary such order of suspen-

sion miaiv be modified, and the license which

has been suspended may be restored, upon

such* terms and conditions as such court

shall find reasonable. Any such order of

suspension’ shall be affirmed by the appro-

priate appellate court if, under the appli-

cable rules of law, the evidence in the record

supports a finding that there -has been a

violation of any provision of such license,

regulation, order, price sehedule, or require-

ment after receipt of such warning notice.

No proceedings for suspension of a license,

and no such suspension, shall confer any

immunity from any other provision of this

Act: Provided, That no regulation, order,

license, or requirement heretofer’ or Acre-

after issued or prescribed pursuant to sec-

26

tion 2 (a) (2) of the Act of June 28, 1940,

as amended by the Act of May 31,-1941, and

by title ITT of the Second War Powers Act,

*. 1942, may validly contain any requirement

as to the observance of any regulation,

order, license, or requirement.ixssued or pre-

scribed pursuant to this Act or the Stabili-

zation Act of October 2, 1942.

(9g) The district courts shall: have erclu-

sve jurisdyction to enjoin or'set aside, in

whole or je part, orders for suspension of

allocations, and orders denying a stay of

such suspension, issued by the Adminis-

trator pursucnt to, section 2 (a) (2) of the

Act of June 28, 1940, as amended by the

Act of May 31, 1941, and title III of the

Second War Powers Act, 1942, and under

authority conferred upon him pursuant to—

section 201 (b) of this Aet. Any action to

enjoin or set aside such order shall be

brought within five days after the service

thereof. No suspension order shall take

effect within five days after it is served, or,

if an application for a stay is made to the’

Administrator within such five-day period,

until the expiration of five days after serv-

tee of an order denying the stay. No inter-

‘locutory relief shall be granted against the

Administrator under this subsection unless

the applicant for such. relief shall consent,

without prejudice, to the entry of an order

enjoining him from violations of the reg-

uation or order involved in the SUSPENSION

proceedings.

* Added by sec. 109 (d) ‘Stabilization Extension Act of

1944. ;

* Added by sec. 108 (e) of Stabilization Extension Act of

1944.

27

B. The Re gulations

The pertinent. provisions, of the Rent Regula;

tions for Housing (10.F. R. 3436, veut are as

follows: |

— Sere. 6. Removal é foudat—<(a) Re iets.

tious on removal of tenant. \So long as the

tenant continues to pay the \rent to which

the landlord is entitled, no tenant shall be

removed from any housing accommoda-

tions, by action to evict oF to recover pos-

session, by exclusion ‘from | possession, or

otherwise, nor shall any person attempt

such removal or’exchusion from possession,

notwithstanding that such tenant has no

* lease or that his lease or other rental agree-

ment has expired, or otherwise terminated,

‘and regardless of any contract, lease, agree-

-ment or obligation heretofore: or hereafter

entered into: which provides for entry of

judgment upon the tenant's confession for

breach of. the covenants thereof or which

otherwise provides contrary hereto, unless:

(1) Tenant's refusal to re new lease, The

tenant, who had a written. lease or other

written rental agreement, has refused upon

adlemand of the landlord to execute a writ-

ten extension or renewal thereof * * *

© (2) Tenant’s refusal of access. to cland-,

lord. The tenant ‘has wniveasonably refused

the landlord access to the housing accom-

modations for the purpose of inspection or

of showing the accommodations to. a pres-

pective purchaser, mortgagee, or prospec-

tive mortgagee, or other person having a

legitimate interest therein: Provided, reat

ever, That such refusal shall niet be ground

for removal or eviction if such inspection

or showing of the aceommodations is con-

trary ‘to the provisions of the tenant's lease

-or other rental agreeMent; or) ,

28 o

(3) Violating obligation of tenancy or

committing nuisance. The tenant ‘(i) has -

violated a substantial obligation of his ten-

/ aney, other than an obligation to pay rent,

' and has continued, or failed to cure, such

violation after written notice by the land-

lord that the violation cease, or (if) is eom-

mitting or permitting a nuisance or is

using or permitting a use of ‘the housing

accommodations for an immoral or illegal

purpose; * * *

* * _ * : . *

(6) Occupancy by landlord. The land-

lord owned, or acquired an enforceable

right te buy or. the right to possession of,

the housing accommodations prior to the

effective date of regulation (or prior to

October 29, 1942 where the effective date of

regulation is prior to that date, or prior to

November 6, 1942 for ‘housing aceommoda-

tions within the Hastings Defense-Rental

Area), and has an immediate compelling

} necessity to _recover possession of such ac-

commodations for use and occupancy as a

dwelling for himself, or has served during >

the period of the war emergency in the

armed forces of the United States and in

good faith seeks possession: for Jhis own

occupancy. If a tenant has been removed

or eyicted under this paragraph (a) (6)

from housing accommodations, the Jand-

lord shall file a written repert on a form ,

provided therefor before renting the ac-

commodations or anx part thereof during

a period of six months after such removal

or eviction. — dinsretess

(b) Administrator’s certificate — (1)

Renrovals not inconsistent with act-or regu

29

No tenant shall be «removed = or

evicted}on grounds other than those stated

above unless, on. petition of the landlord,

the Administrator certifies that the land-

Jord may pursue his remedies in accordance

with the requirements of the local law. The

-Adininistrator stall so certify if the land-

- lord establishes that removals or evictions

of the character sproposed are not) incon-

sistent with the purposes of the act or this.

regulation and would not be likely to result

in the circumvention or evasion thereof,

The certificate shall authorize the pursuit

of local remedies at ‘the expiration ‘of six

months after the date of filing of the peti-

tion unless the Area Rent Director has de-

termined that a three months period is

adequate for the purposes-ef the act in the

particular area in issuing certifientes under

section 6 (b) (2), in whiely event the ap-

Hicable period shall’ be three months.

Vithin the diseretion of the Area’Rent Di-

rector the certificate may authorize the pur-

suit. of local remedies for the removal or -

eviction of the tenant at a time jess than six

or three months, as the casé may ‘be, after

the date of the filing of the petition if the

petitioner establishes that ered hardship

would. otherwise result, or that a lésser

period in the’ particular case is consistent

with the purposes of the regulation and the

act. fo

(2) Occupancy by purchaser, A cortifi-

cate shall be issued authorizing the jrursuit

of local remedies to remove or evict a tonant

of the vendor, for occupancy by a purchaser

who has acquired his rights in the housing

accommodations on or after the effective

date of regulation (or on or after October

»

\w

)

; 30

20, 4942 where the effective date of regula- \

tion is prior to that date, or on or after No-

vember 6, 1942 for housing accommodations

within the Hastings Defense-Rental Area),

only as provided in this paragraph (b) (2).

(1) Where the Administrator ‘finds that

the payment or payments‘of principal made

by the purchaser aggregate twenty percent

or more of the purchase price, he shall, on

petition of either the vendor or purchaser

issue a certificate authorizing the vendor or

purchaser to pursue his remedies for re-

moval or eviction of* the tenant in accord-

ance with the requirements of the local law.

Except as herein provided and unless the

Area Rent Director shall determine that av

three months’ period is adequate for the

purposes of the act in the particular de-

fense-rental area, the certifieate shall au-

thorize the pursuit of local remedies ‘at the

expiration of six months after the date of

filing of the petition.

* * * . # ;

(«l) Notices required—(1). Notices prior

to action to remove tenant. Every notice to

_ a tenent to vacate or surrender possession

‘of housing accommodations shall state the

ground under this section upon which the

landlord relies for removal or eviction of

‘the tenant. A written copy of such notice

shall be giversto fhe area rent office within.

24 hours after the notice is given.to'the

tenant. | pada ’

No tenant shall be removed or evicted

from housing accommodations by court pro-

cess or otherwise, unless at least ten days

(or, where the ground for removal or evic-

tion is non-payment of rent, the period re-

quired by the local law for notice prior to

the commencement of an action for removal

“2

a 31

‘ ‘ . |

or eviction in such cases; but in no event less

than three days) prior to the titne specified

for surrender of possession and to the eom-

‘mencement of any action for removal or,

eviction, the landlord has_,given written

notices of the proposed vemoval or eviction

to the tenant and to the area rent office,

stating the ground under this section upon

which such removal or eviction is sought

and specifying the time when the tenant is

required to surrender possession: * .* *

U. &. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1948